ANALYSIS · d3cc9a1a · PATCHDIFF

new-apiv1.0.0-rc.17 → v1.0.0-rc.18✓ COMPLETED

Started2026-08-18 05:58:40Z Finished2026-08-18 06:00:24Z Elapsed1m 44s

Vulnerabilities 23

1 CVE article ready PatchLeaks generated full security writeups for the matched CVEs · one per CVE, with affected files linked

CVE-2026-71479

FILTERS 0

STATUS

JUDGE

CVE MATCH

EXTENSION · 1

CWE · 0

OPTIONS

Hide “No vulnerability” Hide unjudged

22/25

All 25 CVE 22 Vuln files 21

SORT

common/quota_math.go

No vulnerability

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479

#001

controller/task_video.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#003

dto/openai_image.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 FP

#004

pkg/billingexpr/round.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#006

relay/channel/ali/image.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#007

relay/channel/openai/audio.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#008

relay/channel/task/ali/adaptor.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#009

relay/channel/task/gemini/billing.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#010

relay/channel/task/kling/adaptor.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#011

relay/common/relay_utils.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#012

relay/common/relay_utils_test.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 FP

#013

relay/helper/max_tokens_bounds_test.go

No vulnerability

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479

#014

relay/helper/openai_image_request_test.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 FP

#015

relay/helper/price.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#016

relay/helper/valid_request.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#017

relay/relay_task.go

AI: 3 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 3 TP

#018

service/task_billing.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#020

service/text_quota.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#021

service/text_quota_test.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#022

service/token_counter.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-71479 1 TP

#023

1–20 of 22

1 2 › »

⌖

Select a file from the list to inspect its diff and AI analysis.

↑ ↓ to navigate

CVES 1

CVE-2026-71479

Security writeup for CVE-2026-71479

✓ 22 FILES

## The Exploit

A low-privileged user with an active subscription or positive account balance can craft a request that injects unbounded token counts, image generation parameters, or audio durations into the billing calculation pipeline. The attacker observes their account balance flip from negative charge to positive credit; upstream payment processors reflect fraudulent refunds.

```bash
# Attack path 1: Unbounded max_tokens in chat completion
curl -X POST https://gateway.newapi.local/v1/chat/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-user-token" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "model": "gpt-4",
    "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
    "max_tokens": 2147483647
  }'

# Attack path 2: Malicious image n parameter overflow
curl -X POST https://gateway.newapi.local/v1/images/generations \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-user-token" \
  -F "prompt=a cat" \
  -F "n=18446744073686646784"

# Attack path 3: Unbounded audio duration in billing metadata
curl -X POST https://gateway.newapi.local/v1/audio/transcriptions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-user-token" \
  -F "file=@audio.mp3" \
  -F "durationSeconds=999999999"
```

When the request reaches the quota calculation stage in `service/tool_billing.go` or `relay/helper/price.go`, the oversized parameter is cast directly to `int` without bounds checking. The floating-point multiplication (`maxTokens * quotaPerUnit * groupRatio`) overflows, wrapping to a negative integer. The billing system records a negative charge—interpreted as account credit—and the attacker's balance increases.

## What the Patch Did

**Before**

```go
// service/tool_billing.go, lines 52, 73
quota := int(math.Round(totalPrice * common.QuotaPerUnit * groupRatio))
quota := int(math.Round(price * common.QuotaPerUnit * groupRatio))

// relay/helper/valid_request.go
// No centralized validation for max_tokens across all request types
imageRequest.N = common.GetPointer(uint(common.String2Int(formData.Get("n"))))

// pkg/billingexpr/round.go
func QuotaRound(f float64) int {
    return int(math.Round(f))
}

// relay/helper/price.go, lines 115, 120
preConsumedQuota = int(float64(preConsumedTokens) * ratio)
preConsumedQuota = int(modelPrice * common.QuotaPerUnit * groupRatioInfo.GroupRatio)
```

**After**

```go
// service/tool_billing.go
quota := common.QuotaFromFloat(math.Round(totalPrice * common.QuotaPerUnit * groupRatio))
quota := common.QuotaFromFloat(math.Round(price * common.QuotaPerUnit * groupRatio))

// relay/helper/valid_request.go — new centralized validator
const maxTokensLimit = math.MaxInt32 / 2

func exceedsMaxTokensLimit(values ...*uint) bool {
    for _, v := range values {
        if lo.FromPtrOr(v, uint(0)) > maxTokensLimit {
            return true
        }
    }
    return false
}

// Applied across all request types:
if exceedsMaxTokensLimit(request.MaxOutputTokens) {
    return nil, errors.New("max_output_tokens is invalid")
}

// pkg/billingexpr/round.go
func QuotaRound(f float64) int {
    r := math.Round(f)
    if math.IsNaN(r) {
        return 0
    }
    if r >= math.MaxInt32 {
        return math.MaxInt32
    }
    if r <= math.MinInt32 {
        return math.MinInt32
    }
    return int(r)
}

// relay/helper/price.go
preConsumedQuota = common.QuotaFromFloat(float64(preConsumedTokens) * ratio)
preConsumedQuota = common.QuotaFromFloat(modelPrice * common.QuotaPerUnit * groupRatioInfo.GroupRatio)
```

The patch introduces three layered defences: (1) input validation via `exceedsMaxTokensLimit()` that rejects token/duration/count values exceeding `math.MaxInt32 / 2` *before* they enter calculations; (2) a hardened conversion function `common.QuotaFromFloat()` that clamps float-to-int casts to the safe range `[math.MinInt32, math.MaxInt32]` and handles NaN; (3) specialized validators for edge-case parameters (audio duration in `relay/channel/openai/audio.go`, image generation count `n` in `relay/helper/valid_request.go`).

## Root Cause

**CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound.** User-controlled parameters (`max_tokens`, `max_completion_tokens`, `maxOutputTokens`, `n`, `durationSeconds`) flow from the HTTP request body or form data into arithmetic expressions in `relay/helper/price.go`, `service/tool_billing.go`, and `relay/channel/openai/audio.go`. These parameters are parsed as integers or floats, multiplied by fixed constants (`common.QuotaPerUnit`, `common.GroupRatio`), and cast directly to `int` via `int(math.Round(...))`. When the multiplication result exceeds `math.MaxInt32` (2,147,483,647), the cast causes wraparound, producing a negative integer—which the billing ledger misinterprets as a credit.

The trust boundary violation occurs at the HTTP request parsing stage: the developer assumed downstream cast operations would handle bounds implicitly, rather than validating inputs upfront or using safe conversion primitives.

## Why It Works

The load-bearing line is the call to `common.QuotaFromFloat()` (or the inline clamping in `pkg/billingexpr/round.go`). Without it, a 64-bit float multiplication can produce a value like `9.22e+18`, which silently wraps to a large negative `int32` when cast. With the clamp, the function returns `math.MaxInt32`, capping the charge to a safe upper bound.

The other lines matter for defence-in-depth: the input validation in `exceedsMaxTokensLimit()` prevents oversized tokens from *entering* the calculation pipeline at all, reducing the surface area of downstream converters. The NaN checks in `QuotaRound()` and the `!(ratio > 0) || math.IsInf(ratio, 1)` guard in `types/price_data.go` catch floating-point special values that can poison calculations. Were any single layer removed, an attacker could still craft inputs that trigger wraparound—either through a corner-case ratio injection or a direct parameter oversupply.

## Hardening Checklist

- **Implement input validation guards before arithmetic:** Use a bounded constant (e.g., `MaxInt32 / 2`) and reject any user-supplied token count, duration, or multiplier that exceeds it. Check this *immediately after parsing*, not after the calculation.
- **Use saturating cast functions for all float-to-int conversions in financial code:** Never use bare `int(float64)` on user-influenced values; wrap conversions in a function that checks `math.IsNaN()`, `math.IsInf()`, and clamps to `[math.MinInt32, math.MaxInt32]`.
- **Audit all billing-path multiplications for user parameters:** Grep for `*` in `price`, `quota`, `charge` calculation functions and verify each multiplicand is either a constant or validated input.
- **Add test cases for integer overflow scenarios:** Include tests with `math.MaxInt32`, `math.MaxInt32 + 1`, and very large parsed values (e.g., `"18446744073686646784"`) to ensure they are rejected or safely saturated.
- **Validate special floating-point values explicitly:** Before using a float in financial calculations, check `math.IsNaN()` and `math.IsInf()` and treat them as error conditions, not zeros.

## References

- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71479

CVE CVE-2026-71479

PRODUCT new-api

AFFECTED ≤ v1.0.0-rc.17

FIXED IN v1.0.0-rc.18

STATUS Generated

Security writeup · CVE-2026-71479

Source files · 22

common/quota_math.go Linked

controller/task_video.go Linked

dto/openai_image.go Linked

pkg/billingexpr/round.go Linked

relay/channel/ali/image.go Linked

relay/channel/openai/audio.go Linked

relay/channel/task/ali/adaptor.go Linked

relay/channel/task/gemini/billing.go Linked

relay/channel/task/kling/adaptor.go Linked

relay/common/relay_utils.go Linked

relay/common/relay_utils_test.go Linked

relay/helper/max_tokens_bounds_test.go Linked

relay/helper/openai_image_request_test.go Linked

relay/helper/price.go Linked

relay/helper/valid_request.go Linked

relay/relay_task.go Linked

service/task_billing.go Linked

service/text_quota.go Linked

service/text_quota_test.go Linked

service/token_counter.go Linked

service/tool_billing.go Linked

types/price_data.go Linked

↗ NVD