--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.end.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.end.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ ctx.roundRect(150, 150, 2000, 2000, [0]); ctx.lineTo(160, 160); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.end.2.worker.js
Lines: 13-14, 25-28
Old Code: 
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");

Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve renaming the variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' and updating all references to it. There are no security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-035.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-035.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-035-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the basic shape ellipse(40px 60px at left bottom) value.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 9]
Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple test file modification removing an empty meta tag
- The change doesn't show any security-related fixes
- The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration and its removal doesn't indicate a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification seems to be a cleanup rather than a security patch

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The change is minimal and doesn't show any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/project-text-search.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/actions/project-text-search.js@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ import { isThirdParty } from "../utils/source"; import { loadSourceText } from "./sources/loadSourceText"; import {-  statusType,   getTextSearchOperation,   getTextSearchStatus,-} from "../reducers/project-text-search";+} from "../selectors/project-text-search";+import { statusType } from "../reducers/project-text-search"; export function addSearchQuery(cx, query) {   return { type: "ADD_QUERY", cx, query };

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 18-22]
    [Old Code]
    import {
      statusType,
      getTextSearchOperation,
      getTextSearchStatus,
    } from "../reducers/project-text-search";
    [Fixed Code]
    import {
      getTextSearchOperation,
      getTextSearchStatus,
    } from "../selectors/project-text-search";
    import { statusType } from "../reducers/project-text-search";

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be a code reorganization/refactoring rather than a security fix
- The imports are being split between selectors and reducers, which is a common architectural pattern in Redux applications
- No security-related patterns (like input validation, sanitization, or security-sensitive operations) are being modified
- The change doesn't introduce or fix any obvious security vulnerabilities

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-padding-block-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-padding-block-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-padding-block-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { width: 500px }

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-padding-block-1.html] [Lines 5]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
2. This modification doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability
3. The change is likely related to test cleanup or maintenance rather than security fixes
4. No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are present in this change

The diff shows no evidence of security fixes, just removal of what appears to be unused test metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmIonCompile.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmIonCompile.cpp@@ -1607,7 +1607,14 @@                             bytecodeIfNotAsmJS());     // Generate better code (on x86)-    if (viewType == Scalar::Float64) {+    // If AVX2 is enabled, more broadcast operators are available.+    if (viewType == Scalar::Float64+#  if defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64) || defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86)+        || (js::jit::CPUInfo::IsAVX2Present() &&+            (viewType == Scalar::Uint8 || viewType == Scalar::Uint16 ||+             viewType == Scalar::Float32))+#  endif+    ) {       access.setSplatSimd128Load();       return load(addr.base, &access, ValType::V128);     }@@ -2474,6 +2481,24 @@     if (loopBody) {       fixupRedundantPhis(loopBody);     }++    // Pending jumps to an enclosing try-catch may reference the recycled phis.+    // We have to search above all enclosing try blocks, as a delegate may move+    // patches around.+#ifdef ENABLE_WASM_EXCEPTIONS+    for (uint32_t depth = 0; depth < iter().controlStackDepth(); depth++) {+      if (iter().controlKind(depth) != LabelKind::Try) {+        continue;+      }+      Control& control = iter().controlItem(depth);+      for (MControlInstruction* patch : control.tryPadPatches) {+        MBasicBlock* block = patch->block();+        if (block->loopDepth() >= loopEntry->loopDepth()) {+          fixupRedundantPhis(block);+        }+      }+    }+#endif     // Discard redundant phis and add to the free list.     for (MPhiIterator phi = loopEntry->phisBegin();

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential AVX2-related optimization issue] [js/src/wasm/WasmIonCompile.cpp] [Lines 1607-1615]
   [Old Code]
   if (viewType == Scalar::Float64) {
   [Fixed Code]
   if (viewType == Scalar::Float64
#  if defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64) || defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86)
        || (js::jit::CPUInfo::IsAVX2Present() &&
            (viewType == Scalar::Uint8 || viewType == Scalar::Uint16 ||
             viewType == Scalar::Float32))
#  endif
    ) {

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Wasm exception handling issue] [js/src/wasm/WasmIonCompile.cpp] [Lines 2481-2496]
   [Old Code]
   if (loopBody) {
     fixupRedundantPhis(loopBody);
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   if (loopBody) {
     fixupRedundantPhis(loopBody);
   }

   // Pending jumps to an enclosing try-catch may reference the recycled phis.
   // We have to search above all enclosing try blocks, as a delegate may move
   // patches around.
#ifdef ENABLE_WASM_EXCEPTIONS
   for (uint32_t depth = 0; depth < iter().controlStackDepth(); depth++) {
     if (iter().controlKind(depth) != LabelKind::Try) {
       continue;
     }
     Control& control = iter().controlItem(depth);
     for (MControlInstruction* patch : control.tryPadPatches) {
       MBasicBlock* block = patch->block();
       if (block->loopDepth() >= loopEntry->loopDepth()) {
         fixupRedundantPhis(block);
       }
     }
   }
#endif

Notes:
1. The first change appears to be an optimization improvement for AVX2-enabled processors, allowing more broadcast operations. While not clearly a security fix, it could potentially relate to preventing incorrect code generation on certain processors.
2. The second change adds handling for pending jumps in try-catch blocks in WebAssembly exception handling. This could potentially fix a security issue related to incorrect control flow or memory references in exception handling scenarios, though it's not explicitly stated as a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsla-clamp-4.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsla-clamp-4.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(120, 100%, -200%, 1)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,255, "50,25", "0,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,255, "50,25", "0,0,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 19]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,255, "50,25", "0,0,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,255, "50,25", "0,0,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no changes to the actual security-sensitive operations or data handling in the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/handshake.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/handshake.rs@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@     let mut cfg = Vec::from(config);     // Ensure that the version and config_id is correct.     assert_eq!(cfg[2], 0xfe);-    assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0a);+    assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0d);     assert_eq!(cfg[6], ECH_CONFIG_ID);     // Change the config_id so that the server doesn't recognize it.     cfg[6] ^= 0x94;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Configuration Mismatch Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/handshake.rs] [Lines 901-904]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   assert_eq!(cfg[2], 0xfe);
   assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0a);
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   assert_eq!(cfg[2], 0xfe);
   assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0d);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change modifies an expected configuration value from 0x0a to 0x0d. While this appears to be a version or configuration update, without more context about the protocol being tested, it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just updating test expectations.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential ECH Configuration ID Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/handshake.rs] [Lines 901-907]  
   Old Code:  
   ```rust
   assert_eq!(cfg[6], ECH_CONFIG_ID);
   // Change the config_id so that the server doesn't recognize it.
   cfg[6] ^= 0x94;
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```rust
   assert_eq!(cfg[6], ECH_CONFIG_ID);
   // Change the config_id so that the server doesn't recognize it.
   cfg[6] ^= 0x94;
   ```  
   Additional Details: While this part of the code wasn't modified, the surrounding changes suggest possible security implications related to ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) configuration. The test appears to be verifying and then deliberately corrupting a configuration ID, which could be related to testing security behavior. However, since this wasn't modified, it's unclear if there was a vulnerability being addressed.

Note: The changes appear to be related to test assertions and configuration values, possibly for QUIC or TLS handshake testing. Without more context about the protocol version numbers and ECH implementation details, it's difficult to determine if these were security fixes or just test updates.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.pattern.transparent.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.pattern.transparent.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@         ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0';         ctx.fillStyle = pattern;         ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 40-42]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-textarea-011.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-textarea-011.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-selectors">   <link rel="match" href="reference/selection-textarea-011-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <style>   textarea

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-textarea-011.html [Lines] 8  
[Old Code]  
`<meta content="" name="flags">`  
[Fixed Code]  
(Line removed)  

Additional Details:  
The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. No specific vulnerability is being addressed here. The meta tag wasn't serving any apparent purpose since its content was empty.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/nsINode.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/nsINode.h@@ -1585,6 +1585,17 @@   nsIContent* GetNextSibling() const { return mNextSibling; }   nsIContent* GetPreviousSibling() const;++  /**+   * Return true if the node is being removed from the parent, it means that+   * the node still knows the container which it's disconnected from, but the+   * node has already been removed from the child node chain of the container.+   * I.e., Return true between a call of DisconnectChild of the parent and+   * a call of UnbindFromTree of the node.+   */+  bool IsBeingRemoved() const {+    return mParent && !mNextSibling && !mPreviousOrLastSibling;+  }   /**    * Get the next node in the pre-order tree traversal of the DOM.  If@@ -2102,6 +2113,7 @@                                  ErrorResult& aRv);   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ReplaceChildren(       const Sequence<OwningNodeOrString>& aNodes, ErrorResult& aRv);+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ReplaceChildren(nsINode* aNode, ErrorResult& aRv);   void GetBoxQuads(const BoxQuadOptions& aOptions,                    nsTArray<RefPtr<DOMQuad>>& aResult, CallerType aCallerType,

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [dom/base/nsINode.h] [Lines 1585-1597]
   [Old Code]
   (No equivalent function existed before)
   [Fixed Code]
   bool IsBeingRemoved() const {
     return mParent && !mNextSibling && !mPreviousOrLastSibling;
   }

   Additional Details: The addition of IsBeingRemoved() method suggests it might be related to fixing potential memory safety issues during node removal operations, but without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed, we can't be certain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential DOM Manipulation Issue] [dom/base/nsINode.h] [Lines 2102-2114]
   [Old Code]
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ReplaceChildren(
       const Sequence<OwningNodeOrString>& aNodes, ErrorResult& aRv);
   [Fixed Code]
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ReplaceChildren(
       const Sequence<OwningNodeOrString>& aNodes, ErrorResult& aRv);
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ReplaceChildren(nsINode* aNode, ErrorResult& aRv);

   Additional Details: The addition of a new ReplaceChildren overload might be related to fixing potential DOM manipulation issues, but without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed, we can't be certain. The MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT annotation suggests it might be related to script safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/cdp/PuppeteerVendor.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/cdp/PuppeteerVendor.md@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@    up for review, run the Puppeteer test job on try again with `--rebuild 10` 	 to check for stability.-[Testing]: ../Testing.html+[Testing]: ../Testing.md [Puppeteer test suite]: https://github.com/GoogleChrome/puppeteer/tree/master/test [re-install the project]: https://github.com/puppeteer/puppeteer/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#getting-code [run tests against both Chromium and Firefox]: https://github.com/puppeteer/puppeteer/blob/main/test/README.md#running-tests

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 74]
   [Old Code]: [Testing]: ../Testing.html
   [Fixed Code]: [Testing]: ../Testing.md

Additional Details:
- The change is simply a file extension modification from .html to .md (Markdown)
- This appears to be a documentation update rather than a security fix
- No security-related patterns or vulnerabilities are evident in this change
- The modification is likely for consistency in documentation file formats

No other vulnerabilities detected in the provided diff. The change is purely cosmetic/documentation related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/urlbar/tests/unit/head.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/urlbar/tests/unit/head.js@@ -929,6 +929,11 @@       expected.heuristic,       `result.heuristic at result index ${i}`     );+    Assert.equal(+      actual.isBestMatch,+      expected.isBestMatch,+      `result.isBestMatch at result index ${i}`+    );     if (expected.providerName) {       Assert.equal(         actual.providerName,

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be adding a test assertion for a new property (`isBestMatch`) in test cases.

Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [browser/components/urlbar/tests/unit/head.js] [Lines 929+]
[Old Code: Missing assertion for isBestMatch property]
[Fixed Code: Added assertion for isBestMatch property]

Additional notes:
1. This appears to be a test enhancement rather than a security fix
2. The change adds test coverage for a new result property
3. No actual security-related code changes are visible in this diff
4. The modification is purely in test assertions, not in production code

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.path.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.path.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.clearRect(0, 0, 16, 16); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`). Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes don't affect security in any way - they're just renaming a variable for better clarity or consistency. No security-related vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-image-gradient-1-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-image-gradient-1-ref.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <head>   <title>CSS Reference: Test for calc() on background-image gradients</title>   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> p {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 3-6]
   [Old Code]
   <meta name="flags" content="">
   
   [Fixed Code]
   (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This seems to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification appears to be part of routine maintenance or test case refinement

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/core/ProfileBufferEntry.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/core/ProfileBufferEntry.cpp@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <type_traits> using namespace mozilla;+using namespace mozilla::literals::ProportionValue_literals; //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// // BEGIN ProfileBufferEntry@@ -263,10 +264,17 @@                                     std::move(jitFrameToFrameJSONMap)}; }-JITFrameInfo::JITFrameInfo(const JITFrameInfo& aOther)-    : mUniqueStrings(MakeUnique<UniqueJSONStrings>(*aOther.mUniqueStrings)) {-  for (const JITFrameInfoForBufferRange& range : aOther.mRanges) {-    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(mRanges.append(range.Clone()));+JITFrameInfo::JITFrameInfo(const JITFrameInfo& aOther,+                           mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger)+    : mUniqueStrings(MakeUnique<UniqueJSONStrings>(+          *aOther.mUniqueStrings,+          aProgressLogger.CreateSubLoggerFromTo(+              0_pc, "Creating JIT frame info unique strings...", 49_pc,+              "Created JIT frame info unique strings"))) {+  MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(mRanges.reserve(aOther.mRanges.length()));+  for (auto&& [i, progressLogger] : aProgressLogger.CreateLoopSubLoggersFromTo(+           50_pc, 100_pc, aOther.mRanges.length(), "Copying JIT frame info")) {+    mRanges.infallibleAppend(aOther.mRanges[i].Clone());   } }@@ -636,13 +644,21 @@ class EntryGetter {  public:   explicit EntryGetter(-      ProfileChunkedBuffer::Reader& aReader, uint64_t aInitialReadPos = 0,+      ProfileChunkedBuffer::Reader& aReader,+      mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger = {},+      uint64_t aInitialReadPos = 0,       ProcessStreamingContext* aStreamingContextForMarkers = nullptr)       : mStreamingContextForMarkers(aStreamingContextForMarkers),         mBlockIt(             aReader.At(ProfileBufferBlockIndex::CreateFromProfileBufferIndex(                 aInitialReadPos))),-        mBlockItEnd(aReader.end()) {+        mBlockItEnd(aReader.end()),+        mRangeStart(mBlockIt.BufferRangeStart().ConvertToProfileBufferIndex()),+        mRangeSize(+            double(mBlockIt.BufferRangeEnd().ConvertToProfileBufferIndex() -+                   mRangeStart)),+        mProgressLogger(std::move(aProgressLogger)) {+    SetLocalProgress(ProgressLogger::NO_LOCATION_UPDATE);     if (!ReadLegacyOrEnd()) {       // Find and read the next non-legacy entry.       Next();@@ -682,6 +698,14 @@   uint64_t CurPos() const {     return CurBlockIndex().ConvertToProfileBufferIndex();+  }++  void SetLocalProgress(const char* aLocation) {+    mProgressLogger.SetLocalProgress(+        ProportionValue{double(CurBlockIndex().ConvertToProfileBufferIndex() -+                               mRangeStart) /+                        mRangeSize},+        aLocation);   }  private:@@ -706,6 +730,7 @@       if (type == ProfileBufferEntry::Kind::Marker &&           mStreamingContextForMarkers) {         StreamMarkerAfterKind(er, *mStreamingContextForMarkers);+        SetLocalProgress("Processed marker");       }       er.SetRemainingBytes(0);       return false;@@ -727,6 +752,7 @@       // Otherwise loop around until we hit a legacy entry or the end.       ++mBlockIt;     }+    SetLocalProgress(ProgressLogger::NO_LOCATION_UPDATE);   }   ProcessStreamingContext* const mStreamingContextForMarkers;@@ -734,6 +760,12 @@   ProfileBufferEntry mEntry;   ProfileChunkedBuffer::BlockIterator mBlockIt;   const ProfileChunkedBuffer::BlockIterator mBlockItEnd;++  // Progress logger, and the data needed to compute the current relative+  // position in the buffer.+  const mozilla::ProfileBufferIndex mRangeStart;+  const double mRangeSize;+  mozilla::ProgressLogger mProgressLogger; }; // The following grammar shows legal sequences of profile buffer entries.@@ -899,8 +931,8 @@ ProfilerThreadId ProfileBuffer::DoStreamSamplesAndMarkersToJSON(     GetStreamingParametersForThreadCallback&&         aGetStreamingParametersForThreadCallback,-    double aSinceTime,-    ProcessStreamingContext* aStreamingContextForMarkers) const {+    double aSinceTime, ProcessStreamingContext* aStreamingContextForMarkers,+    mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   UniquePtr<char[]> dynStrBuf = MakeUnique<char[]>(kMaxFrameKeyLength);   return mEntries.Read([&](ProfileChunkedBuffer::Reader* aReader) {@@ -910,7 +942,7 @@     ProfilerThreadId processedThreadId;-    EntryGetter e(*aReader, /* aInitialReadPos */ 0,+    EntryGetter e(*aReader, std::move(aProgressLogger), /* aInitialReadPos */ 0,                   aStreamingContextForMarkers);     for (;;) {@@ -1149,6 +1181,8 @@         // would need these frames to be present.         ReadStack(e, time, 0, Nothing{}, RunningTimes{});++        e.SetLocalProgress("Processed sample");       } else if (e.Has() && e.Get().IsTimeBeforeCompactStack()) {         double time = e.Get().GetDouble();         // Note: Even if this sample is too old (before aSinceTime), we still@@ -1212,6 +1246,8 @@         }         e.RestartAfter(it);++        e.SetLocalProgress("Processed compact sample");       } else if (e.Has() && e.Get().IsTimeBeforeSameSample()) {         if (previousStackState == ThreadStreamingContext::eNoStackYet) {           // We don't have any full sample yet, we cannot duplicate a "previous"@@ -1278,6 +1314,8 @@         }         e.RestartAfter(it);++        e.SetLocalProgress("Processed repeated sample");       } else {         ERROR_AND_CONTINUE("expected a Time entry");       }@@ -1289,7 +1327,8 @@ ProfilerThreadId ProfileBuffer::StreamSamplesToJSON(     SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter, ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,-    double aSinceTime, UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks) const {+    double aSinceTime, UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks,+    mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   ThreadStreamingContext::PreviousStackState previousStackState =       ThreadStreamingContext::eNoStackYet;   uint32_t stack = 0u;@@ -1312,11 +1351,13 @@         }         return streamingParameters;       },-      aSinceTime, /* aStreamingContextForMarkers */ nullptr);+      aSinceTime, /* aStreamingContextForMarkers */ nullptr,+      std::move(aProgressLogger)); } void ProfileBuffer::StreamSamplesAndMarkersToJSON(-    ProcessStreamingContext& aProcessStreamingContext) const {+    ProcessStreamingContext& aProcessStreamingContext,+    mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   (void)DoStreamSamplesAndMarkersToJSON(       [&](ProfilerThreadId aReadThreadId) {         Maybe<StreamingParametersForThread> streamingParameters;@@ -1329,13 +1370,14 @@         }         return streamingParameters;       },-      aProcessStreamingContext.GetSinceTime(), &aProcessStreamingContext);-}--void ProfileBuffer::AddJITInfoForRange(uint64_t aRangeStart,-                                       ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,-                                       JSContext* aContext,-                                       JITFrameInfo& aJITFrameInfo) const {+      aProcessStreamingContext.GetSinceTime(), &aProcessStreamingContext,+      std::move(aProgressLogger));+}++void ProfileBuffer::AddJITInfoForRange(+    uint64_t aRangeStart, ProfilerThreadId aThreadId, JSContext* aContext,+    JITFrameInfo& aJITFrameInfo,+    mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   // We can only process JitReturnAddr entries if we have a JSContext.   MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aContext);@@ -1351,7 +1393,7 @@                      "ProfileChunkedBuffer cannot be out-of-session when "                      "sampler is running");-          EntryGetter e(*aReader, aRangeStart);+          EntryGetter e(*aReader, std::move(aProgressLogger), aRangeStart);           while (true) {             // Advance to the next ThreadId entry.@@ -1430,11 +1472,11 @@       }); }-void ProfileBuffer::StreamMarkersToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,-                                        ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,-                                        const TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime,-                                        double aSinceTime,-                                        UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks) const {+void ProfileBuffer::StreamMarkersToJSON(+    SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter, ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,+    const TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime, double aSinceTime,+    UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks,+    mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   mEntries.ReadEach([&](ProfileBufferEntryReader& aER) {     auto type = static_cast<ProfileBufferEntry::Kind>(         aER.ReadObject<ProfileBufferEntry::KindUnderlyingType>());@@ -1482,13 +1524,13 @@ void ProfileBuffer::StreamProfilerOverheadToJSON(     SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter, const TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime,-    double aSinceTime) const {+    double aSinceTime, mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   mEntries.Read([&](ProfileChunkedBuffer::Reader* aReader) {     MOZ_ASSERT(aReader,                "ProfileChunkedBuffer cannot be out-of-session when sampler is "                "running");-    EntryGetter e(*aReader);+    EntryGetter e(*aReader, std::move(aProgressLogger));     enum Schema : uint32_t {       TIME = 0,@@ -1629,9 +1671,9 @@   return addPtr->value(); }-void ProfileBuffer::StreamCountersToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,-                                         const TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime,-                                         double aSinceTime) const {+void ProfileBuffer::StreamCountersToJSON(+    SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter, const TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime,+    double aSinceTime, mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   // Because this is a format entirely internal to the Profiler, any parsing   // error indicates a bug in the ProfileBuffer writing or the parser itself,   // or possibly flaky hardware.@@ -1641,7 +1683,7 @@                "ProfileChunkedBuffer cannot be out-of-session when sampler is "                "running");-    EntryGetter e(*aReader);+    EntryGetter e(*aReader, std::move(aProgressLogger));     enum Schema : uint32_t { TIME = 0, NUMBER = 1, COUNT = 2 };@@ -1842,14 +1884,17 @@   aWriter.End(); }-void ProfileBuffer::StreamPausedRangesToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,-                                             double aSinceTime) const {+void ProfileBuffer::StreamPausedRangesToJSON(+    SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter, double aSinceTime,+    mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const {   mEntries.Read([&](ProfileChunkedBuffer::Reader* aReader) {     MOZ_ASSERT(aReader,                "ProfileChunkedBuffer cannot be out-of-session when sampler is "                "running");-    EntryGetter e(*aReader);+    EntryGetter e(*aReader,+                  aProgressLogger.CreateSubLoggerFromTo(+                      1_pc, "Streaming pauses...", 99_pc, "Streamed pauses"));     Maybe<double> currentPauseStartTime;     Maybe<double> currentCollectionStartTime;@@ -1949,7 +1994,9 @@                "ProfileChunkedBuffer cannot be out-of-session when sampler is "                "running");-    EntryGetter e(*aReader, *aLastSample);+    // DuplicateLsatSample is only called during profiling, so we don't need a+    // progress logger (only useful when capturing the final profile).+    EntryGetter e(*aReader, ProgressLogger{}, *aLastSample);     if (e.CurPos() != *aLastSample) {       // The last sample is no longer within the buffer range, so we cannot

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerabilities were found in the provided diff. The changes appear to be focused on adding progress logging functionality and improving error handling, rather than fixing security issues.

The main changes include:
1. Added progress logging to various operations
2. Modified constructors to accept progress loggers
3. Added progress tracking in EntryGetter class
4. Updated various streaming functions to support progress tracking

These changes are primarily functional improvements rather than security fixes. The modifications maintain the same security properties as the original code while adding more instrumentation for monitoring progress.

No specific vulnerabilities were identified in the changes, and no security-related patterns (like buffer overflows, injection vulnerabilities, etc.) were introduced or fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/attributes.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/attributes.py@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@     "l10n_chunk",     "locale",     "mar-channel-id",+    "maven_packages",     "nightly",     "required_signoffs",     "shippable",

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File] taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/attributes.py [Lines] 61
[Old Code]
    "l10n_chunk",
    "locale",
    "mar-channel-id",
    "nightly",
    "required_signoffs",
    "shippable",
[Fixed Code]
    "l10n_chunk",
    "locale",
    "mar-channel-id",
    "maven_packages",
    "nightly",
    "required_signoffs",
    "shippable",

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple addition of a new attribute "maven_packages" to the list of valid attributes
- No security vulnerability is evident from this change
- The change seems to be adding support for new functionality rather than fixing a security issue
- No code execution, input validation, or security-sensitive operations are modified

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-3.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0, 255, 0, 20%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Line 20]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/style/res/forms.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/style/res/forms.css@@ -161,6 +161,11 @@   visibility: hidden; }+::-moz-text-control-preview {+  overflow: hidden;+  font-family: system-ui;+}+ :not(:-moz-autofill-preview)::-moz-text-control-editing-root, :placeholder-shown:not(:autofill)::placeholder, :autofill::-moz-text-control-preview {@@ -961,7 +966,7 @@ } input::-moz-search-clear-button,-input::-moz-text-control-show-password-button {+input::-moz-reveal {   display: block;   cursor: default;   width: 1em;@@ -975,17 +980,17 @@   background-size: contain; }-input::-moz-text-control-show-password-button {+input::-moz-reveal {   background-image: url("resource://gre-resources/password.svg");   -moz-context-properties: fill;   fill: currentColor; }-input:-moz-revealed::-moz-text-control-show-password-button {+input:-moz-revealed::-moz-reveal {   background-image: url("resource://gre-resources/password-hide.svg"); }-input:-moz-value-empty::-moz-text-control-show-password-button,+input:-moz-value-empty::-moz-reveal, input:-moz-value-empty::-moz-search-clear-button {   visibility: hidden; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   CSS Selector Change [File] layout/style/res/forms.css [Lines] 961, 975, 980  
   [Old Code]  
   `input::-moz-text-control-show-password-button`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `input::-moz-reveal`  

   Additional Details: This appears to be a change in CSS selector naming convention for password reveal buttons, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just a code refactoring.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   CSS Property Addition [File] layout/style/res/forms.css [Lines] 161-164  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous code for this selector)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `::-moz-text-control-preview {  
     overflow: hidden;  
     font-family: system-ui;  
   }`  

   Additional Details: This adds new CSS rules for text control preview, but it's unclear if this was addressing any specific security concern or just adding styling.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily related to CSS styling and selector naming conventions rather than obvious security fixes. Without more context about specific vulnerabilities being addressed, it's difficult to determine if these changes were security-related. The most notable change is the renaming of the password reveal button selector, which could potentially be related to security hardening, but this is speculative.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/queuing-strategies.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/queuing-strategies.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker 'use strict'; const highWaterMarkConversions = new Map([

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Test Scope Reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/queuing-strategies.any.js] [Lines 1]
   [Old Code] // META: global=window,worker,jsshell
   [Fixed Code] // META: global=window,worker

Additional Details:
- The change removes 'jsshell' from the test's global scope definition, which reduces the environments where this test will run
- This could be either a security fix (removing potentially insecure test environment) or just a test scope adjustment
- Without more context about why 'jsshell' was removed, it's unclear if this was fixing a vulnerability or just a test configuration change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/extra-height-given-to-all-row-groups-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/extra-height-given-to-all-row-groups-002.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-tables-3/#height-distribution-algorithm"> <link rel="match" href="../../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht"> <link rel="bookmark" href="https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=708345" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="height of rows in tbody are increased to match table height" /> <title> all row groups receive extra height distribution

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than a security-related fix.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change removes an empty meta tag which doesn't affect security.

Additional Details:
- The diff removes an empty `<meta name="flags" content="">` tag
- This appears to be test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No actual code changes that could affect security were made
- The rest of the changes are just formatting/whitespace adjustments

No vulnerability names are applicable since this isn't a security-related change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.