Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x86_win.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x86_win.json@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -222,7 +221,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -387,7 +385,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -552,7 +549,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -722,7 +718,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -888,7 +883,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -1050,7 +1044,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -1209,7 +1202,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -1377,7 +1369,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -1546,7 +1537,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -1714,7 +1704,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -1883,7 +1872,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -2051,7 +2039,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -2221,7 +2208,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -2378,7 +2364,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -2548,7 +2533,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -2720,7 +2704,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -2877,7 +2860,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -3042,7 +3024,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -3213,7 +3194,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -3378,7 +3358,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -3549,7 +3528,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -3720,7 +3698,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -3892,7 +3869,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -4049,7 +4025,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -4217,7 +4192,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -4389,7 +4363,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -4556,7 +4529,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -4738,7 +4710,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -4916,7 +4887,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -5094,7 +5064,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -5255,7 +5224,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -5416,7 +5384,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -5582,7 +5549,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -5748,7 +5714,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -5920,7 +5885,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -6089,7 +6053,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -6252,7 +6215,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -6419,7 +6381,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -6587,7 +6548,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -6751,7 +6711,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -6914,7 +6873,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -7077,7 +7035,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -7238,7 +7195,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -7402,7 +7358,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -7571,7 +7526,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -7742,7 +7696,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -7902,7 +7855,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -8068,7 +8020,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -8231,7 +8182,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -8395,7 +8345,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -8558,7 +8507,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -8722,7 +8670,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -8895,7 +8842,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -9060,7 +9006,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -9233,7 +9178,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -9400,7 +9344,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -9562,7 +9505,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -9727,7 +9669,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -9888,7 +9829,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -10051,7 +9991,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -10208,7 +10147,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -10383,7 +10321,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -10556,7 +10493,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -10729,7 +10665,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -10895,7 +10830,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -11068,7 +11002,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -11225,7 +11158,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -11397,7 +11329,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -11572,7 +11503,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -11743,7 +11673,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -11902,7 +11831,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -12070,7 +11998,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -12242,7 +12169,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -12427,7 +12353,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -12622,7 +12547,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -12791,7 +12715,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -12951,7 +12874,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -13114,7 +13036,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -13274,7 +13195,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -13431,7 +13351,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -13590,7 +13509,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -13751,7 +13669,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -13918,7 +13835,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -14077,7 +13993,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -14234,7 +14149,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -14406,7 +14320,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -14563,7 +14476,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -14720,7 +14632,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -14881,7 +14792,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -15047,7 +14957,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -15212,7 +15121,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -15381,7 +15289,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -15550,7 +15457,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -15707,7 +15613,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -15864,7 +15769,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -16029,7 +15933,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -16187,7 +16090,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -16361,7 +16263,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -16605,7 +16506,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -16806,7 +16706,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -16967,7 +16866,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -17143,7 +17041,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -17313,7 +17210,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -17530,7 +17426,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -17741,7 +17636,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -17917,7 +17811,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -18099,7 +17992,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -18275,7 +18167,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -18488,7 +18379,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -18662,7 +18552,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -18827,7 +18716,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -19015,7 +18903,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -19184,7 +19071,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -19342,7 +19228,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -19500,7 +19385,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -19706,7 +19590,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -19876,7 +19759,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -20098,7 +19980,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -20253,7 +20134,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -20419,7 +20299,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -20589,7 +20468,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -20746,7 +20624,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -20919,7 +20796,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro", "-Wno-builtin-macro-redefined", "-D__DATE__=",@@ -21087,7 +20963,6 @@ "-fmsc-version=1916", "/guard:cf,nochecks", "-m32",- "-fansi-escape-codes", "/Brepro",
After analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify one consistent change made throughout the file: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure ANSI Escape Code Injection Potential dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x86_win.json (multiple locations) Old Code: "-fansi-escape-codes" Fixed Code: (removed) The change removes the `-fansi-escape-codes` compiler flag from multiple locations in the configuration file. While I'm not certain this was a security fix, removing ANSI escape code support could potentially mitigate terminal escape sequence injection vulnerabilities if the compiled code were to output untrusted data to a terminal. However, without more context about how this flag was being used, I can't definitively say this was a security fix. The diff shows this change being made consistently throughout the file in multiple similar configuration blocks, but doesn't provide enough context to determine if this was specifically addressing a known vulnerability or just a general cleanup/optimization. No other security-relevant changes were apparent in the diff. The rest of the modifications appear to be either formatting changes or unrelated configuration adjustments.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-55.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-55.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found --> <link rel="match" href="reference/three-paragraph-lime-characters.xht"/>- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <div class="stub">
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 8]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(line removed)
Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with no content. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
- The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration and its removal doesn't indicate any security fix.
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
- The modification seems to be a cleanup rather than a security patch.
No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test file metadata.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/idna/tests/punycode.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/idna/tests/punycode.rs@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ // option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed // except according to those terms.+use crate::test::TestFn; use idna::punycode::{decode, encode_str};+use serde_json::map::Map; use serde_json::Value;-use serde_json::map::Map; use std::str::FromStr;-use test::TestFn; fn one_test(decoded: &str, encoded: &str) { match decode(encoded) {
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [third_party/rust/idna/tests/punycode.rs] [Lines 6-11]
Old Code:
use idna::punycode::{decode, encode_str};
use serde_json::Value;
use serde_json::map::Map;
use std::str::FromStr;
use test::TestFn;
Fixed Code:
use crate::test::TestFn;
use idna::punycode::{decode, encode_str};
use serde_json::map::Map;
use serde_json::Value;
use std::str::FromStr;
The changes appear to be primarily import statement reorganizations and changing `test::TestFn` to `crate::test::TestFn`. These modifications don't indicate any security vulnerability fixes but rather code organization improvements. No security-related patterns or known vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-4.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-4.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0, 100%, 0)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
Old Code:
```
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
```
Fixed Code:
```
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
```
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Line 20]
Old Code:
```
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
Fixed Code:
```
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains the same, and there's no evidence of any security vulnerability being addressed in this diff. The changes are likely for code consistency or readability purposes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/config/mozunit/mozunit/mozunit.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/config/mozunit/mozunit/mozunit.py@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ args.extend( [ "--rootdir",- topsrcdir,+ str(topsrcdir), "-c", os.path.join(here, "pytest.ini"), "-vv",
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Type Confusion Vulnerability [config/mozunit/mozunit/mozunit.py] [Lines 313-320]
[Old Code]
"--rootdir",
topsrcdir,
[Fixed Code]
"--rootdir",
str(topsrcdir),
Additional Details:
The change converts the `topsrcdir` variable to a string explicitly using `str()`. While this doesn't appear to be fixing a known vulnerability, it could potentially prevent:
1. Type confusion issues if `topsrcdir` could be a non-string type
2. String representation inconsistencies
3. Potential command injection if the variable's string representation mattered for security
However, without more context about what `topsrcdir` contains or how it's used, I can't definitively say this was fixing a security vulnerability. It's more likely a robustness improvement.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.initial.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.initial.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 17-18]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
The diff shows only a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix. No security vulnerabilities are evident in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been modified for consistency or clarity.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/t/hazards/test.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/devtools/rootAnalysis/t/hazards/test.py@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ # gcFunctions should be the inverse, but we get to rely on unmangled names here. gcFunctions = test.load_gcFunctions()-print(gcFunctions) assert "void GC()" in gcFunctions assert "void suppressedFunction()" not in gcFunctions assert "void halfSuppressedFunction()" in gcFunctions@@ -26,10 +25,11 @@ assert "<returnvalue>" in hazmap assert "this" in hazmap-# All hazards should be in f(), loopy(), safevals(), and method()+# All hazards should be in f(), loopy(), safevals(), method(), and refptr_test{1,3,4}() assert hazmap["cell2"].function == "Cell* f()"-print(len(set(haz.function for haz in hazards)))-assert len(set(haz.function for haz in hazards)) == 4+haz_functions = set(haz.function for haz in hazards)+print(haz_functions)+assert len(haz_functions) == 7 # Check that the correct GC call is reported for each hazard. (cell3 has a # hazard from two different GC calls; it doesn't really matter which is@@ -39,8 +39,16 @@ "void halfSuppressedFunction()", "void unsuppressedFunction()", )-assert hazmap["<returnvalue>"].GCFunction.startswith(- "void GCInDestructor::~GCInDestructor()"+returnval_hazards = set(+ haz.function for haz in hazards if haz.variable == "<returnvalue>"+)+assert returnval_hazards == set(+ [+ "Cell* f()",+ "Cell* refptr_test1()",+ "Cell* refptr_test3()",+ "Cell* refptr_test4()",+ ] ) assert "container1" in hazmap
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Information Exposure Through Debug Logging [File] [Lines 7-8]
[Old Code]
gcFunctions = test.load_gcFunctions()
print(gcFunctions)
[Fixed Code]
gcFunctions = test.load_gcFunctions()
Additional Details: The removal of the print statement suggests potential concern about exposing sensitive information through debug logging, though it's not clear if this was actually a security vulnerability or just cleanup.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Assertion Scope Expansion [File] [Lines 26-29]
[Old Code]
assert len(set(haz.function for haz in hazards)) == 4
[Fixed Code]
haz_functions = set(haz.function for haz in hazards)
print(haz_functions)
assert len(haz_functions) == 7
Additional Details: The change expands the expected number of hazard functions from 4 to 7 and adds more detailed checking. While this improves the test's thoroughness, it's not clear if this fixes a security vulnerability or just updates test expectations.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Return Value Hazard Validation [File] [Lines 39-48]
[Old Code]
assert hazmap["<returnvalue>"].GCFunction.startswith(
"void GCInDestructor::~GCInDestructor()"
)
[Fixed Code]
returnval_hazards = set(
haz.function for haz in hazards if haz.variable == "<returnvalue>"
)
assert returnval_hazards == set(
[
"Cell* f()",
"Cell* refptr_test1()",
"Cell* refptr_test3()",
"Cell* refptr_test4()",
]
)
Additional Details: The change replaces a simple assertion about GC function with a more comprehensive check of return value hazards. This appears to be improving test coverage rather than fixing a specific vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsla-clamp-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsla-clamp-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(120, 200%, 50%, 1)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Here's the analysis following the required format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsla-clamp-1.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(120, 200%, 50%, 1)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(120, 200%, 50%, 1)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating its references. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsla-clamp-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsla-clamp-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(120, -200%, 49.9%, 1)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255"); t.done(); });
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and don't involve any security vulnerabilities. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255");
The changes are:
1. Renaming variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No security implications in these changes
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/wr/WebRenderCommandBuilder.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/wr/WebRenderCommandBuilder.cpp@@ -1660,6 +1660,67 @@ } }+// A helper struct to store information needed when creating a new+// WebRenderLayerScrollData in CreateWebRenderCommandsFromDisplayList().+// This information is gathered before the recursion, and then used to+// emit the new layer after the recursion.+struct NewLayerData {+ size_t mLayerCountBeforeRecursing = 0;+ const ActiveScrolledRoot* mStopAtAsr = nullptr;++ // Information pertaining to the deferred transform.+ nsDisplayTransform* mDeferredItem = nullptr;+ ScrollableLayerGuid::ViewID mDeferredId = ScrollableLayerGuid::NULL_SCROLL_ID;+ bool mTransformShouldGetOwnLayer = false;++ void ComputeDeferredTransformInfo(const StackingContextHelper& aSc,+ nsDisplayItem* aItem) {+ // See the comments on StackingContextHelper::mDeferredTransformItem+ // for an overview of what deferred transforms are.+ // In the case where we deferred a transform, but have a child display+ // item with a different ASR than the deferred transform item, we cannot+ // put the transform on the WebRenderLayerScrollData item for the child.+ // We cannot do this because it will not conform to APZ's expectations+ // with respect to how the APZ tree ends up structured. In particular,+ // the GetTransformToThis() for the child APZ (which is created for the+ // child item's ASR) will not include the transform when we actually do+ // want it to.+ // When we run into this scenario, we solve it by creating two+ // WebRenderLayerScrollData items; one that just holds the transform,+ // that we deferred, and a child WebRenderLayerScrollData item that+ // holds the scroll metadata for the child's ASR.+ mDeferredItem = aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem();+ if (mDeferredItem) {+ // It's possible the transform's ASR is not only an ancestor of+ // the item's ASR, but an ancestor of stopAtAsr. In such cases,+ // don't use the transform at all at this level (it would be+ // scrolled by stopAtAsr which is incorrect). The transform will+ // instead be emitted as part of the ancestor WebRenderLayerScrollData+ // node (the one with stopAtAsr as its item ASR), or one of its+ // ancetors in turn.+ if (ActiveScrolledRoot::IsProperAncestor(+ mDeferredItem->GetActiveScrolledRoot(), mStopAtAsr)) {+ mDeferredItem = nullptr;+ }+ }+ if (mDeferredItem) {+ if (const auto* asr = mDeferredItem->GetActiveScrolledRoot()) {+ mDeferredId = asr->GetViewId();+ }+ if (mDeferredItem->GetActiveScrolledRoot() !=+ aItem->GetActiveScrolledRoot()) {+ mTransformShouldGetOwnLayer = true;+ } else if (aItem->GetType() == DisplayItemType::TYPE_SCROLL_INFO_LAYER) {+ // A scroll info layer has its own scroll id that's not reflected+ // in item->GetActiveScrolledRoot(), but will be added to the+ // WebRenderLayerScrollData node, so it needs to be treated as+ // having a distinct ASR from the deferred transform item.+ mTransformShouldGetOwnLayer = true;+ }+ }+ }+};+ void WebRenderCommandBuilder::CreateWebRenderCommandsFromDisplayList( nsDisplayList* aDisplayList, nsDisplayItem* aWrappingItem, nsDisplayListBuilder* aDisplayListBuilder, const StackingContextHelper& aSc,@@ -1750,13 +1811,14 @@ } }- bool forceNewLayerData = false;- size_t layerCountBeforeRecursing = mLayerScrollData.size();+ Maybe<NewLayerData> newLayerData; if (apzEnabled) { // For some types of display items we want to force a new // WebRenderLayerScrollData object, to ensure we preserve the APZ-relevant // data that is in the display item.- forceNewLayerData = item->UpdateScrollData(nullptr, nullptr);+ if (item->UpdateScrollData(nullptr, nullptr)) {+ newLayerData = Some(NewLayerData());+ } // Anytime the ASR changes we also want to force a new layer data because // the stack of scroll metadata is going to be different for this@@ -1765,7 +1827,7 @@ const ActiveScrolledRoot* asr = item->GetActiveScrolledRoot(); if (asr != mLastAsr) { mLastAsr = asr;- forceNewLayerData = true;+ newLayerData = Some(NewLayerData()); } // Refer to the comment on StackingContextHelper::mDeferredTransformItem@@ -1775,17 +1837,34 @@ // merge the deferred transforms, but need to force a new // WebRenderLayerScrollData item to flush the old deferred transform, so // that we can then start deferring the new one.- if (!forceNewLayerData && item->CreatesStackingContextHelper() &&+ if (!newLayerData && item->CreatesStackingContextHelper() && aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem() && aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem()->GetActiveScrolledRoot() != asr) {- forceNewLayerData = true;+ newLayerData = Some(NewLayerData()); } // If we're going to create a new layer data for this item, stash the // ASR so that if we recurse into a sublist they will know where to stop // walking up their ASR chain when building scroll metadata.- if (forceNewLayerData) {- mAsrStack.push_back(asr);+ if (newLayerData) {+ newLayerData->mLayerCountBeforeRecursing = mLayerScrollData.size();+ newLayerData->mStopAtAsr =+ mAsrStack.empty() ? nullptr : mAsrStack.back();+ newLayerData->ComputeDeferredTransformInfo(aSc, item);++ const ActiveScrolledRoot* stopAtAsrForDescendants = asr;+ // While unusual and probably indicative of a poorly behaved display+ // list, it's possible to have a deferred transform item which we+ // will emit as its own layer on the way out of the recursion, whose+ // ASR (let's call it T) is a *descendant* of the current item's ASR.+ // In such cases, make sure our descendants have stopAtAsr=T, otherwise+ // ASRs in the range [T, asr) may be emitted in duplicate, leading to+ // cylic scroll metadata annotations.+ if (newLayerData->mTransformShouldGetOwnLayer) {+ stopAtAsrForDescendants = ActiveScrolledRoot::PickDescendant(+ asr, newLayerData->mDeferredItem->GetActiveScrolledRoot());+ }+ mAsrStack.push_back(stopAtAsrForDescendants); } }@@ -1822,64 +1901,20 @@ } if (apzEnabled) {- if (forceNewLayerData) {+ if (newLayerData) { // Pop the thing we pushed before the recursion, so the topmost item on // the stack is enclosing display item's ASR (or the stack is empty) mAsrStack.pop_back();- const ActiveScrolledRoot* stopAtAsr =- mAsrStack.empty() ? nullptr : mAsrStack.back();++ const ActiveScrolledRoot* stopAtAsr = newLayerData->mStopAtAsr; int32_t descendants =- mLayerScrollData.size() - layerCountBeforeRecursing;-- // See the comments on StackingContextHelper::mDeferredTransformItem- // for an overview of what deferred transforms are.- // In the case where we deferred a transform, but have a child display- // item with a different ASR than the deferred transform item, we cannot- // put the transform on the WebRenderLayerScrollData item for the child.- // We cannot do this because it will not conform to APZ's expectations- // with respect to how the APZ tree ends up structured. In particular,- // the GetTransformToThis() for the child APZ (which is created for the- // child item's ASR) will not include the transform when we actually do- // want it to.- // When we run into this scenario, we solve it by creating two- // WebRenderLayerScrollData items; one that just holds the transform,- // that we deferred, and a child WebRenderLayerScrollData item that- // holds the scroll metadata for the child's ASR.- nsDisplayTransform* deferred = aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem();- ScrollableLayerGuid::ViewID deferredId =- ScrollableLayerGuid::NULL_SCROLL_ID;- bool transformShouldGetOwnLayer = false;- if (deferred) {- // It's possible the transform's ASR is not only an ancestor of- // the item's ASR, but an ancestor of stopAtAsr. In such cases,- // don't use the transform at all at this level (it would be- // scrolled by stopAtAsr which is incorrect). The transform will- // instead be emitted as part of the ancestor WebRenderLayerScrollData- // node (the one with stopAtAsr as its item ASR), or one of its- // ancetors in turn.- if (ActiveScrolledRoot::IsProperAncestor(- deferred->GetActiveScrolledRoot(), stopAtAsr)) {- deferred = nullptr;- }- }- if (deferred) {- if (const auto* asr = deferred->GetActiveScrolledRoot()) {- deferredId = asr->GetViewId();- }- if (deferred->GetActiveScrolledRoot() !=- item->GetActiveScrolledRoot()) {- transformShouldGetOwnLayer = true;- } else if (item->GetType() ==- DisplayItemType::TYPE_SCROLL_INFO_LAYER) {- // A scroll info layer has its own scroll id that's not reflected- // in item->GetActiveScrolledRoot(), but will be added to the- // WebRenderLayerScrollData node, so it needs to be treated as- // having a distinct ASR from the deferred transform item.- transformShouldGetOwnLayer = true;- }- }- if (transformShouldGetOwnLayer) {+ mLayerScrollData.size() - newLayerData->mLayerCountBeforeRecursing;++ nsDisplayTransform* deferred = newLayerData->mDeferredItem;+ ScrollableLayerGuid::ViewID deferredId = newLayerData->mDeferredId;++ if (newLayerData->mTransformShouldGetOwnLayer) { // This creates the child WebRenderLayerScrollData for |item|, but // omits the transform (hence the Nothing() as the last argument to // Initialize(...)). We also need to make sure that the ASR from
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Potential Scroll Metadata Duplication Vulnerability [gfx/layers/wr/WebRenderCommandBuilder.cpp] [Lines 1750-1822]
Old Code:
```
bool forceNewLayerData = false;
size_t layerCountBeforeRecursing = mLayerScrollData.size();
```
Fixed Code:
```
Maybe<NewLayerData> newLayerData;
if (apzEnabled) {
if (item->UpdateScrollData(nullptr, nullptr)) {
newLayerData = Some(NewLayerData());
}
// ... additional logic for handling ASR changes and deferred transforms
}
```
Additional Details: The fix introduces a new structure to properly handle deferred transforms and ASR changes, preventing potential duplicate scroll metadata annotations that could lead to cyclic dependencies.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Improper ASR Handling Vulnerability [gfx/layers/wr/WebRenderCommandBuilder.cpp] [Lines 1775-1847]
Old Code:
```
if (!forceNewLayerData && item->CreatesStackingContextHelper() &&
aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem() &&
aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem()->GetActiveScrolledRoot() != asr) {
forceNewLayerData = true;
}
```
Fixed Code:
```
if (!newLayerData && item->CreatesStackingContextHelper() &&
aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem() &&
aSc.GetDeferredTransformItem()->GetActiveScrolledRoot() != asr) {
newLayerData = Some(NewLayerData());
}
```
Additional Details: The fix properly handles cases where deferred transforms have different ASRs than the current item, preventing potential incorrect scroll behavior.
3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Scroll Metadata Annotation Vulnerability [gfx/layers/wr/WebRenderCommandBuilder.cpp] [Lines 1822-1901]
Old Code:
```
if (forceNewLayerData) {
mAsrStack.pop_back();
const ActiveScrolledRoot* stopAtAsr =
mAsrStack.empty() ? nullptr : mAsrStack.back();
// ... complex logic for handling deferred transforms
}
```
Fixed Code:
```
if (newLayerData) {
mAsrStack.pop_back();
const ActiveScrolledRoot* stopAtAsr = newLayerData->mStopAtAsr;
// ... simplified logic using pre-computed newLayerData
}
```
Additional Details: The fix prevents potential cyclic scroll metadata annotations by properly tracking and handling the ASR hierarchy.
The changes primarily focus on improving the handling of scroll metadata and ASR (Active Scrolled Root) relationships, which are security-sensitive as they affect how scrolling behavior is processed in the browser. The introduction of the NewLayerData structure helps prevent several edge cases that could lead to incorrect scroll behavior or potential security issues in the scrolling subsystem.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/image-decoder.https.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/image-decoder.https.any.js@@ -372,8 +372,9 @@ }) .then(_ => { // Ensure feeding the source after closing doesn't crash.- source.addFrame();- return promise_rejects_dom(t, 'InvalidStateError', decoder.decode());+ assert_throws_js(TypeError, () => {+ source.addFrame();+ }); }); }, 'Test ReadableStream of gif');
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/image-decoder.https.any.js] [Lines 372-376]
[Old Code]
source.addFrame();
return promise_rejects_dom(t, 'InvalidStateError', decoder.decode());
[Fixed Code]
assert_throws_js(TypeError, () => {
source.addFrame();
});
Additional Details:
1. The change modifies how errors are handled when trying to add a frame after closing
2. The old code used promise_rejects_dom with 'InvalidStateError' while the new code uses assert_throws_js with TypeError
3. This appears to be more of a test correction than a security fix, but could potentially relate to error handling robustness
4. No clear CVE or specific vulnerability is being addressed here
Vulnerability Existed: no
[Test Case Improvement] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/image-decoder.https.any.js] [Lines 372-376]
[Old Code]
source.addFrame();
return promise_rejects_dom(t, 'InvalidStateError', decoder.decode());
[Fixed Code]
assert_throws_js(TypeError, () => {
source.addFrame();
});
Additional Details:
1. The change appears to be a test improvement rather than a security fix
2. The modification better isolates the test case to specifically check the addFrame() behavior
3. The error type expectation was changed from InvalidStateError to TypeError
4. This seems to reflect a more accurate expectation of the API behavior
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.componentTransfer.gamma.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.componentTransfer.gamma.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // From https://www.w3.org/TR/SVG11/filters.html#feComponentTransferElement function getColor(inputColor, amplitude, exponent, offset) {@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ let outputColor = getColor(color, amplitudes, exponents, offsets); ctx.fillStyle = `rgb(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]})`; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2); } t.done();
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to variable references. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.componentTransfer.gamma.worker.js [Lines] 13-14, 46
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/telemetry/histogram-allowlists.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/telemetry/histogram-allowlists.json@@ -807,7 +807,6 @@ "SSL_OCSP_STAPLING", "SSL_PERMANENT_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES", "SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING",- "SSL_SERVER_AUTH_EKU", "SSL_SUCCESFUL_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX", "SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_FULL", "SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_RESUMED",
Let me analyze the diff for security fixes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potentially removed insecure SSL/TLS related histogram] [toolkit/components/telemetry/histogram-allowlists.json] [Lines 807]
[Old Code]
"SSL_SERVER_AUTH_EKU",
[Fixed Code]
[removed line]
Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of "SSL_SERVER_AUTH_EKU" from the telemetry allowlist
- This appears to be related to SSL server authentication Extended Key Usage (EKU)
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a cleanup
- The removal might indicate this metric was no longer needed or could potentially expose sensitive information
- No CVE or specific vulnerability name is immediately apparent from this change alone
Note: Telemetry allowlist changes often relate to privacy rather than direct security vulnerabilities, but can sometimes have security implications if sensitive data was being collected.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/version_check/README.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/version_check/README.md@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # version\_check-[](https://travis-ci.com/SergioBenitez/version_check)+[](https://github.com/SergioBenitez/version_check/actions) [](https://crates.io/crates/version_check) [](https://docs.rs/version_check)@@ -63,10 +63,14 @@ ## Alternatives-This crate is dead simple with no dependencies. If you need something more-and don't care about panicking if the version cannot be obtained, or if you-don't mind adding dependencies, see-[rustc_version](https://crates.io/crates/rustc_version).+This crate is dead simple with no dependencies. If you need something more and+don't care about panicking if the version cannot be obtained, or if you don't+mind adding dependencies, see [rustc_version]. If you'd instead prefer a feature+detection library that works by dynamically invoking `rustc` with a+representative code sample, see [autocfg].++[rustc_version]: https://crates.io/crates/rustc_version+[autocfg]: https://crates.io/crates/autocfg ## License
Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a documentation update rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [third_party/rust/version_check/README.md] [Lines 1-6, 63-71] [Old Code] [](https://travis-ci.com/SergioBenitez/version_check) ... This crate is dead simple with no dependencies. If you need something more and don't care about panicking if the version cannot be obtained, or if you don't mind adding dependencies, see [rustc_version](https://crates.io/crates/rustc_version). [Fixed Code] [](https://github.com/SergioBenitez/version_check/actions) ... This crate is dead simple with no dependencies. If you need something more and don't care about panicking if the version cannot be obtained, or if you don't mind adding dependencies, see [rustc_version]. If you'd instead prefer a feature detection library that works by dynamically invoking `rustc` with a representative code sample, see [autocfg]. [rustc_version]: https://crates.io/crates/rustc_version [autocfg]: https://crates.io/crates/autocfg Additional Details: The changes include: 1. Updating the build status badge from Travis CI to GitHub Actions 2. Adding information about an alternative crate (autocfg) 3. Improving link formatting using reference-style links None of these changes appear to address any security vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/services/settings/test/unit/test_remote_settings_poll.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/services/settings/test/unit/test_remote_settings_poll.js@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ const latest = entries[0]?.last_modified ?? 42; if (entries.length) { response.setHeader("ETag", `"${latest}"`);- response.setHeader("Last-Modified", new Date(latest).toGMTString()); } response.write(JSON.stringify({ timestamp: latest, changes: entries })); };
Let me analyze the code diff according to the provided format:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [services/settings/test/unit/test_remote_settings_poll.js] [Lines 64-67]
[Old Code]
const latest = entries[0]?.last_modified ?? 42;
if (entries.length) {
response.setHeader("ETag", `"${latest}"`);
response.setHeader("Last-Modified", new Date(latest).toGMTString());
}
[Fixed Code]
const latest = entries[0]?.last_modified ?? 42;
if (entries.length) {
response.setHeader("ETag", `"${latest}"`);
}
Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of the "Last-Modified" header setting in the response. While this could potentially reduce information disclosure (as the exact modification timestamp is no longer exposed), it's not clear if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a code cleanup. The ETag header remains, which still exposes some timestamp information. Without more context about how this header is used, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix or just a behavioral change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.cpp@@ -183,6 +183,11 @@ MediaRawData* aSample) override { AssertOnThread();+ if (NeedsNewDecoder()) {+ return DecodePromise::CreateAndReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_NEED_NEW_DECODER,+ __func__);+ }+ const VideoInfo* config = aSample->mTrackInfo ? aSample->mTrackInfo->GetAsVideoInfo() : &mConfig; MOZ_ASSERT(config);@@ -265,6 +270,17 @@ UniquePtr<layers::SurfaceTextureImage::SetCurrentCallback> releaseSample( new CompositeListener(mJavaDecoder, aSample));+ // If our output surface has been released (due to the GPU process crashing)+ // then request a new decoder, which will in turn allocate a new+ // Surface. This is usually be handled by the Error() callback, but on some+ // devices (or at least on the emulator) the java decoder does not raise an+ // error when the Surface is released. So we raise this error here as well.+ if (NeedsNewDecoder()) {+ Error(MediaResult(NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_NEED_NEW_DECODER,+ RESULT_DETAIL("VideoCallBack::HandleOutput")));+ return;+ }+ java::sdk::BufferInfo::LocalRef info = aSample->Info(); MOZ_ASSERT(info);@@ -314,6 +330,10 @@ if (isEOS) { DrainComplete(); }+ }++ bool NeedsNewDecoder() const override {+ return !mSurface || mSurface->IsReleased(); } const VideoInfo mConfig;@@ -863,8 +883,17 @@ if (GetState() == State::SHUTDOWN) { return; }- mDecodePromise.RejectIfExists(aError, __func__);- mDrainPromise.RejectIfExists(aError, __func__);++ // If we know we need a new decoder (eg because RemoteVideoDecoder's mSurface+ // has been released due to a GPU process crash) then override the error to+ // request a new decoder.+ const MediaResult& error =+ NeedsNewDecoder()+ ? MediaResult(NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_NEED_NEW_DECODER, __func__)+ : aError;++ mDecodePromise.RejectIfExists(error, __func__);+ mDrainPromise.RejectIfExists(error, __func__); } } // namespace mozilla
I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format. Vulnerability Existed: yes Null Pointer Dereference/Invalid Surface Handling [dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.cpp] [Lines 183-186, 265-273, 314-333] [Old Code] No checks for mSurface validity before usage [Fixed Code] Added NeedsNewDecoder() checks to handle cases where mSurface is null or released, preventing potential crashes Vulnerability Existed: yes Error Handling Improvement [dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.cpp] [Lines 863-874] [Old Code] Directly rejecting promises with original error without considering surface state [Fixed Code] Added logic to override error with NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_NEED_NEW_DECODER when surface is invalid Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Resource Leak [dom/media/platforms/android/RemoteDataDecoder.cpp] [Lines 265-273] [Old Code] No explicit handling of surface release cases [Fixed Code] Added explicit handling for released surfaces which might prevent resource leaks The main security fixes address: 1. Potential null pointer dereferences when dealing with invalid surfaces 2. Improved error handling to properly recover from GPU process crashes 3. More robust handling of surface state changes The changes appear to prevent crashes and improve stability when the underlying surface becomes invalid, particularly in cases where the GPU process crashes. The fixes ensure proper error propagation and decoder recreation in such scenarios.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/StringType-inl.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/StringType-inl.h@@ -42,6 +42,28 @@ } JSFatInlineString* str = JSFatInlineString::new_<allowGC>(cx, heap);+ if (!str) {+ return nullptr;+ }+ *chars = str->init<CharT>(len);+ return str;+}++template <typename CharT>+static MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSInlineString* AllocateInlineStringForAtom(+ JSContext* cx, size_t len, CharT** chars) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(JSInlineString::lengthFits<CharT>(len));++ if (JSThinInlineString::lengthFits<CharT>(len)) {+ JSThinInlineString* str = JSThinInlineString::newForAtom(cx);+ if (!str) {+ return nullptr;+ }+ *chars = str->init<CharT>(len);+ return str;+ }++ JSFatInlineString* str = JSFatInlineString::newForAtom(cx); if (!str) { return nullptr; }@@ -70,6 +92,19 @@ return str; }+template <typename CharT>+static MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSInlineString* NewInlineStringForAtom(+ JSContext* cx, const CharT* chars, size_t length) {+ CharT* storage;+ JSInlineString* str = AllocateInlineStringForAtom(cx, length, &storage);+ if (!str) {+ return nullptr;+ }++ mozilla::PodCopy(storage, chars, length);+ return str;+}+ // Create a thin inline string if possible, and a fat inline string if not. template <typename CharT> static MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSInlineString* NewInlineString(@@ -119,7 +154,7 @@ size_t length) { if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(length > JSString::MAX_LENGTH)) { if constexpr (allowGC) {- js::ReportAllocationOverflow(maybecx);+ js::ReportOversizedAllocation(maybecx, JSMSG_ALLOC_OVERFLOW); } return false; }@@ -266,12 +301,15 @@ return nullptr; }- JSLinearString* str;- if (cx->zone()->isAtomsZone()) {- str = js::Allocate<js::NormalAtom, allowGC>(cx);- } else {- str = js::AllocateString<JSLinearString, allowGC>(cx, heap);- }+ return newValidLength<allowGC>(cx, std::move(chars), length, heap);+}++template <js::AllowGC allowGC, typename CharT>+MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSLinearString* JSLinearString::newValidLength(+ JSContext* cx, js::UniquePtr<CharT[], JS::FreePolicy> chars, size_t length,+ js::gc::InitialHeap heap) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(!cx->zone()->isAtomsZone());+ JSLinearString* str = js::AllocateString<JSLinearString, allowGC>(cx, heap); if (!str) { return nullptr; }@@ -298,6 +336,25 @@ return str; }+template <typename CharT>+MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSLinearString* JSLinearString::newForAtomValidLength(+ JSContext* cx, js::UniquePtr<CharT[], JS::FreePolicy> chars,+ size_t length) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(validateLength(cx, length));+ MOZ_ASSERT(cx->zone()->isAtomsZone());+ JSLinearString* str = js::Allocate<js::NormalAtom, js::NoGC>(cx);+ if (!str) {+ return nullptr;+ }++ MOZ_ASSERT(str->isTenured());+ cx->zone()->addCellMemory(str, length * sizeof(CharT),+ js::MemoryUse::StringContents);++ str->init(chars.release(), length);+ return str;+}+ inline js::PropertyName* JSLinearString::toPropertyName(JSContext* cx) { #ifdef DEBUG uint32_t dummy;@@ -316,21 +373,27 @@ template <js::AllowGC allowGC> MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSThinInlineString* JSThinInlineString::new_( JSContext* cx, js::gc::InitialHeap heap) {- if (cx->zone()->isAtomsZone()) {- return (JSThinInlineString*)(js::Allocate<js::NormalAtom, allowGC>(cx));- }-+ MOZ_ASSERT(!cx->zone()->isAtomsZone()); return js::AllocateString<JSThinInlineString, allowGC>(cx, heap);+}++MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSThinInlineString* JSThinInlineString::newForAtom(+ JSContext* cx) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(cx->zone()->isAtomsZone());+ return (JSThinInlineString*)(js::Allocate<js::NormalAtom, js::NoGC>(cx)); } template <js::AllowGC allowGC> MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSFatInlineString* JSFatInlineString::new_( JSContext* cx, js::gc::InitialHeap heap) {- if (cx->zone()->isAtomsZone()) {- return (JSFatInlineString*)(js::Allocate<js::FatInlineAtom, allowGC>(cx));- }-+ MOZ_ASSERT(!cx->zone()->isAtomsZone()); return js::AllocateString<JSFatInlineString, allowGC>(cx, heap);+}++MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE JSFatInlineString* JSFatInlineString::newForAtom(+ JSContext* cx) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(cx->zone()->isAtomsZone());+ return (JSFatInlineString*)(js::Allocate<js::FatInlineAtom, js::NoGC>(cx)); } template <>
Analyzing the provided code diff, I've identified several potential security-related changes. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Null Pointer Dereference [File] js/src/vm/StringType-inl.h [Lines] 42-48
[Old Code]
JSFatInlineString* str = JSFatInlineString::new_<allowGC>(cx, heap);
*chars = str->init<CharT>(len);
return str;
[Fixed Code]
JSFatInlineString* str = JSFatInlineString::new_<allowGC>(cx, heap);
if (!str) {
return nullptr;
}
*chars = str->init<CharT>(len);
return str;
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Allocation Error Handling [File] js/src/vm/StringType-inl.h [Lines] 70-76
[Old Code]
JSThinInlineString* str = JSThinInlineString::new_<allowGC>(cx, heap);
*chars = str->init<CharT>(len);
return str;
[Fixed Code]
JSThinInlineString* str = JSThinInlineString::new_<allowGC>(cx, heap);
if (!str) {
return nullptr;
}
*chars = str->init<CharT>(len);
return str;
3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Error Reporting Improvement [File] js/src/vm/StringType-inl.h [Lines] 119-123
[Old Code]
if constexpr (allowGC) {
js::ReportAllocationOverflow(maybecx);
}
[Fixed Code]
if constexpr (allowGC) {
js::ReportOversizedAllocation(maybecx, JSMSG_ALLOC_OVERFLOW);
}
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Memory Management Separation [File] js/src/vm/StringType-inl.h [Lines] 266-270
[Old Code]
if (cx->zone()->isAtomsZone()) {
str = js::Allocate<js::NormalAtom, allowGC>(cx);
} else {
str = js::AllocateString<JSLinearString, allowGC>(cx, heap);
}
[Fixed Code]
MOZ_ASSERT(!cx->zone()->isAtomsZone());
JSLinearString* str = js::AllocateString<JSLinearString, allowGC>(cx, heap);
5. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Atom Allocation Separation [File] js/src/vm/StringType-inl.h [Lines] 373-380
[Old Code]
if (cx->zone()->isAtomsZone()) {
return (JSThinInlineString*)(js::Allocate<js::NormalAtom, allowGC>(cx));
}
[Fixed Code]
MOZ_ASSERT(!cx->zone()->isAtomsZone());
return js::AllocateString<JSThinInlineString, allowGC>(cx, heap);
The first three vulnerabilities are clear improvements in error handling and reporting. The last two changes appear to be architectural changes separating atom and non-atom string handling, but I'm not certain if these were fixing specific security vulnerabilities or just improving code organization.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.zero.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.zero.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.getImageData(1, 1, 10, 0); }); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.getImageData(1, 1, 0, 10); });
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.zero.html] [Lines 17-18]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
- The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity.
- The actual test logic and assertions remain unchanged.
- No security vulnerabilities are addressed or introduced by this change.
- The test continues to verify proper error handling for invalid image data dimensions in OffscreenCanvas operations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.2.dompointinit.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.2.dompointinit.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's the analysis following your format: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.2.dompointinit.html] [Lines 17-48] [Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas'] [Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas'] The changes are: 1. Variable rename from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` (lines 17-18) 2. Updated all `_assertPixel` calls to use the new variable name (lines 27-48) No security implications are apparent in this change - it's purely a code style/readability improvement.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120, -200%, 49.9%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security fixes.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-2.html] [17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 127,127,127,255, "50,25", "127,127,127,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references accordingly. There are no security implications to these changes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.