--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/build/clang-plugin/tests/TestCanRunScript.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/build/clang-plugin/tests/TestCanRunScript.cpp@@ -623,32 +623,67 @@ struct AllowMozKnownLiveMember { public:   MOZ_KNOWN_LIVE RefCountedBase* mWhatever;-  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void foo(RefCountedBase* aWhatever) {}-  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void bar() {-    foo(mWhatever);+  MOZ_KNOWN_LIVE RefPtr<RefCountedBase> mRefCountedWhatever;+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void fooPtr(RefCountedBase* aWhatever) {}+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void fooRef(RefCountedBase& aWhatever) {}+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void bar() {+    fooPtr(mWhatever);+    fooRef(*mWhatever);+    fooPtr(mRefCountedWhatever);+    fooRef(*mRefCountedWhatever);   } }; struct AllowMozKnownLiveMemberParent : AllowMozKnownLiveMember {   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void baz() {-    foo(mWhatever);+    fooPtr(mWhatever);+    fooRef(*mWhatever);+    fooPtr(mRefCountedWhatever);+    fooRef(*mRefCountedWhatever);   } }; struct AllowMozKnownLiveParamMember { public:   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void foo(AllowMozKnownLiveMember& aAllow) {-    aAllow.foo(aAllow.mWhatever);+    aAllow.fooPtr(aAllow.mWhatever);+    aAllow.fooRef(*aAllow.mWhatever);+    aAllow.fooPtr(aAllow.mRefCountedWhatever);+    aAllow.fooRef(*aAllow.mRefCountedWhatever);   }   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void bar(AllowMozKnownLiveMemberParent& aAllowParent) {-    aAllowParent.foo(aAllowParent.mWhatever);-  }-};+    aAllowParent.fooPtr(aAllowParent.mWhatever);+    aAllowParent.fooRef(*aAllowParent.mWhatever);+    aAllowParent.fooPtr(aAllowParent.mRefCountedWhatever);+    aAllowParent.fooRef(*aAllowParent.mRefCountedWhatever);+  }+};++MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void AllowMozKnownLiveMemberInAutoStorage() {+  AllowMozKnownLiveMember inStack;+  AllowMozKnownLiveMember* inHeap = new AllowMozKnownLiveMember();+  inStack.fooPtr(inStack.mWhatever);+  inStack.fooRef(*inStack.mWhatever);+  inStack.fooPtr(inStack.mRefCountedWhatever);+  inStack.fooRef(*inStack.mRefCountedWhatever);+  inStack.fooPtr(inHeap->mWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  'inHeap->mWhatever' is neither.}}+  inStack.fooRef(*inHeap->mWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  '*inHeap->mWhatever' is neither.}}+  inStack.fooPtr(inHeap->mRefCountedWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  'inHeap->mRefCountedWhatever' is neither.}}+  inStack.fooRef(*inHeap->mRefCountedWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  '*inHeap->mRefCountedWhatever' is neither.}}+} struct DisallowMozKnownLiveMemberNotFromKnownLive {   AllowMozKnownLiveMember* mMember;-  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void foo(RefCountedBase* aWhatever) {}-  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void bar() {-    foo(mMember->mWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  'mMember->mWhatever' is neither.}}-  }-};+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void fooPtr(RefCountedBase* aWhatever) {}+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void fooRef(RefCountedBase& aWhatever) {}+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void bar() {+    fooPtr(mMember->mWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  'mMember->mWhatever' is neither.}}+    fooRef(*mMember->mWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  '*mMember->mWhatever' is neither.}}+    fooPtr(mMember->mRefCountedWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  'mMember->mRefCountedWhatever' is neither.}}+    fooRef(*mMember->mRefCountedWhatever); // expected-error {{arguments must all be strong refs or caller's parameters when calling a function marked as MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT (including the implicit object argument).  '*mMember->mRefCountedWhatever' is neither.}}+  }+};++void IncorrectlyUnmarkedEarlyDeclaration(); // expected-note {{The first declaration exists here}}++MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void IncorrectlyUnmarkedEarlyDeclaration() {}; // expected-error {{MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT must be put in front of the declaration, not the definition}}

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [Potential Use-After-Free Vulnerability] [build/clang-plugin/tests/TestCanRunScript.cpp] [Lines 623-690]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void foo(RefCountedBase* aWhatever) {}
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void bar() {
     foo(mWhatever);
   }
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void fooPtr(RefCountedBase* aWhatever) {}
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void fooRef(RefCountedBase& aWhatever) {}
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void bar() {
     fooPtr(mWhatever);
     fooRef(*mWhatever);
     fooPtr(mRefCountedWhatever);
     fooRef(*mRefCountedWhatever);
   }
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [Incorrect MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT Annotation] [build/clang-plugin/tests/TestCanRunScript.cpp] [Lines 690-691]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   (Not present in old version)
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   void IncorrectlyUnmarkedEarlyDeclaration(); // expected-note {{The first declaration exists here}}
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void IncorrectlyUnmarkedEarlyDeclaration() {}; // expected-error {{MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT must be put in front of the declaration, not the definition}}
   ```

The changes appear to be strengthening the static analysis checks around MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT functions to prevent potential use-after-free scenarios by:
1. Adding more comprehensive checks for member variable access
2. Adding checks for RefPtr types
3. Adding checks for both pointer and reference parameters
4. Enforcing proper annotation placement

The diff doesn't show an actual security vulnerability being fixed, but rather improvements to the static analysis that would help prevent security vulnerabilities (particularly use-after-free) in code using these patterns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/apps/AppSignatureVerification.cpp@@ -1322,28 +1322,18 @@   if (aSignerCert) {     // The COSE certificate is authoritative.     if (aPolicy.COSERequired() || !coseCertDER.IsEmpty()) {-      if (coseCertDER.IsEmpty() ||-          coseCertDER.Length() > std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) {+      if (coseCertDER.IsEmpty()) {         return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;       }-      nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert(nsNSSCertificate::ConstructFromDER(-          reinterpret_cast<char*>(coseCertDER.Elements()),-          coseCertDER.Length()));-      if (!signerCert) {+      nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert(+          new nsNSSCertificate(std::move(coseCertDER)));+      signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);+    } else {+      if (pkcs7CertDER.IsEmpty()) {         return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;       }-      signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);-    } else {-      if (pkcs7CertDER.IsEmpty() ||-          pkcs7CertDER.Length() > std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) {-        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;-      }-      nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert(nsNSSCertificate::ConstructFromDER(-          reinterpret_cast<char*>(pkcs7CertDER.Elements()),-          pkcs7CertDER.Length()));-      if (!signerCert) {-        return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;-      }+      nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signerCert(+          new nsNSSCertificate(std::move(pkcs7CertDER)));       signerCert.forget(aSignerCert);     }   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Integer Overflow Vulnerability [File] [Lines 1322-1324, 1331-1333]
[Old Code]
if (coseCertDER.IsEmpty() ||
    coseCertDER.Length() > std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
...
if (pkcs7CertDER.IsEmpty() ||
    pkcs7CertDER.Length() > std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
[Fixed Code]
if (coseCertDER.IsEmpty()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
...
if (pkcs7CertDER.IsEmpty()) {
    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability was related to potential integer overflow checks that were removed in the fixed code.
- The old code checked for certificate length exceeding std::numeric_limits<int>::max(), suggesting there might have been concerns about integer overflows when converting size_t to int.
- The fixed version simplifies the checks and uses a safer approach by moving the certificate data directly into nsNSSCertificate constructor rather than using ConstructFromDER with explicit length parameters.
- The new implementation using std::move() is more modern and likely safer against potential integer-related vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.letterSpacing.measure.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.letterSpacing.measure.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.letterSpacing, '0px', "ctx.letterSpacing", "'0px'"); _assertSame(ctx.wordSpacing, '0px', "ctx.wordSpacing", "'0px'");

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
1. The change appears to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`, which doesn't affect security.
2. No security-relevant functionality is modified - the same OffscreenCanvas operations are being performed.
3. The change doesn't introduce or fix any security-related issues like XSS, injection, or memory safety concerns.
4. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-004.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-004.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ 		<link rel="author" href="http://opera.com" title="Opera Software ASA"> 		<link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-conditional/#at-supports"> 		<link rel="match" href="at-supports-001-ref.html">-		<meta name="flags" content=""> 		<style> 			div { 				background-color:red;

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-004.html [Lines] 6
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This seems to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't introduce or fix any security-sensitive functionality

Note: If this were a security-related meta tag (like CSP), it might be significant, but "flags" appears to be test-related metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-170.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-170.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-color.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>    <p><span>This line should be green.</span></p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 9]
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="" />
    [Fixed Code]
    (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability.
- The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration and its removal doesn't impact security.
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
- The modification appears to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic/structural, removing an unused meta tag from the test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.measure.rtl.text.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.measure.rtl.text.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); metrics = ctx.measureText('اَلْعَرَبِيَّةُ'); _assert(metrics.actualBoundingBoxLeft < metrics.actualBoundingBoxRight, "metrics.actualBoundingBoxLeft < metrics.actualBoundingBoxRight");

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.measure.rtl.text.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations
- The test's functionality remains the same, only the variable name was changed for consistency or clarity

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.end.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.end.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.textAlign = 'right';     ctx.fillText('EE ', 100, 37.5);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the references accordingly. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.end.html
   Lines: 17-18, 31-32
   Old Code: 
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.end.html
   Lines: 31-32
   Old Code:
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   Fixed Code:
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect security. The functionality remains the same, just with a renamed variable for better clarity or consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/core/ProfileBuffer.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/core/ProfileBuffer.h@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@   // that are currently in the buffer at or after aRangeStart, in samples   // for the given thread.   void AddJITInfoForRange(uint64_t aRangeStart, ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,-                          JSContext* aContext,-                          JITFrameInfo& aJITFrameInfo) const;+                          JSContext* aContext, JITFrameInfo& aJITFrameInfo,+                          mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;   // Stream JSON for samples in the buffer to aWriter, using the supplied   // UniqueStacks object.@@ -67,30 +67,34 @@   // words, you need to have called AddJITInfoForRange for every range that   // might contain JIT frame information before calling this method.   // Return the thread ID of the streamed sample(s), or 0.-  ProfilerThreadId StreamSamplesToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,-                                       ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,-                                       double aSinceTime,-                                       UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks) const;+  ProfilerThreadId StreamSamplesToJSON(+      SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter, ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,+      double aSinceTime, UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks,+      mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;   void StreamMarkersToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,                            ProfilerThreadId aThreadId,                            const mozilla::TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime,-                           double aSinceTime,-                           UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks) const;+                           double aSinceTime, UniqueStacks& aUniqueStacks,+                           mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;   // Stream samples and markers from all threads that `aProcessStreamingContext`   // accepts.   void StreamSamplesAndMarkersToJSON(-      ProcessStreamingContext& aProcessStreamingContext) const;+      ProcessStreamingContext& aProcessStreamingContext,+      mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;   void StreamPausedRangesToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,-                                double aSinceTime) const;-  void StreamProfilerOverheadToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,-                                    const mozilla::TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime,-                                    double aSinceTime) const;+                                double aSinceTime,+                                mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;+  void StreamProfilerOverheadToJSON(+      SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,+      const mozilla::TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime, double aSinceTime,+      mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;   void StreamCountersToJSON(SpliceableJSONWriter& aWriter,                             const mozilla::TimeStamp& aProcessStartTime,-                            double aSinceTime) const;+                            double aSinceTime,+                            mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;   // Find (via |aLastSample|) the most recent sample for the thread denoted by   // |aThreadId| and clone it, patching in the current time as appropriate.@@ -197,8 +201,8 @@   ProfilerThreadId DoStreamSamplesAndMarkersToJSON(       GetStreamingParametersForThreadCallback&&           aGetStreamingParametersForThreadCallback,-      double aSinceTime,-      ProcessStreamingContext* aStreamingContextForMarkers) const;+      double aSinceTime, ProcessStreamingContext* aStreamingContextForMarkers,+      mozilla::ProgressLogger aProgressLogger) const;   double mFirstSamplingTimeUs = 0.0;   double mLastSamplingTimeUs = 0.0;

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes primarily involve adding a `mozilla::ProgressLogger` parameter to various methods, which appears to be a feature addition or enhancement rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] tools/profiler/core/ProfileBuffer.h [Lines] Various
   The changes are adding progress logging functionality rather than fixing security issues

The changes are consistent throughout the file, adding a new parameter to track progress, but there's no evidence of:
- Memory safety issues being fixed
- Input validation being added
- Access control being modified
- Any other common security vulnerability patterns

The modifications appear to be purely functional additions to support progress tracking in the profiler system.

Would you like me to examine any other aspects of these changes that might relate to security?

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/WarpOracle.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/WarpOracle.cpp@@ -1046,6 +1046,8 @@       case StubField::Type::RawInt32:       case StubField::Type::RawPointer:       case StubField::Type::RawInt64:+      case StubField::Type::Double:+        break;       case StubField::Type::Shape:         static_assert(std::is_convertible_v<Shape*, gc::TenuredCell*>,                       "Code assumes shapes are tenured");

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Case Handling] [js/src/jit/WarpOracle.cpp] [Lines 1046+]
[Old Code]
      case StubField::Type::RawInt32:
      case StubField::Type::RawPointer:
      case StubField::Type::RawInt64:
      case StubField::Type::Shape:
[Fixed Code]
      case StubField::Type::RawInt32:
      case StubField::Type::RawPointer:
      case StubField::Type::RawInt64:
      case StubField::Type::Double:
        break;
      case StubField::Type::Shape:

Additional Details:
- The diff adds handling for StubField::Type::Double with an explicit break statement
- This appears to fix a potential control flow issue where Double type wasn't properly handled
- While this could prevent undefined behavior, it's not clear if this was an exploitable security vulnerability
- The change improves code robustness but may not directly address a known security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-clamp-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-clamp-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-clamp-2.worker.js [Lines] 13-21  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 2)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 2)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding reference in the `_assertPixel` call. There doesn't appear to be any security-related fix in this diff. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/tps/tps/phase.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/tps/tps/phase.py@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@ # This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public # License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.--from __future__ import absolute_import import re import os.path

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/tps/tps/phase.py] [Lines 1-8]
[Old Code]
from __future__ import absolute_import

[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes a Python future import statement (`absolute_import`) which was likely no longer needed as the codebase modernized.
2. This change doesn't appear to be security-related - it's more of a code cleanup/modernization change.
3. There are no clear security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.
4. The removal of future imports is a common practice when updating code to work with newer Python versions where these features are standard.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/params.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/params.rs@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ // except according to those terms. use crate::connection::{ConnectionIdManager, Role, LOCAL_ACTIVE_CID_LIMIT};+pub use crate::recovery::FAST_PTO_SCALE; use crate::recv_stream::RECV_BUFFER_SIZE; use crate::rtt::GRANULARITY; use crate::stream_id::StreamType;@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@     datagram_size: u64,     outgoing_datagram_queue: usize,     incoming_datagram_queue: usize,+    fast_pto: u8, } impl Default for ConnectionParameters {@@ -89,6 +91,7 @@             datagram_size: 0,             outgoing_datagram_queue: MAX_QUEUED_DATAGRAMS_DEFAULT,             incoming_datagram_queue: MAX_QUEUED_DATAGRAMS_DEFAULT,+            fast_pto: FAST_PTO_SCALE,         }     } }@@ -243,6 +246,30 @@     pub fn incoming_datagram_queue(mut self, v: usize) -> Self {         // The max queue length must be at least 1.         self.incoming_datagram_queue = max(v, 1);+        self+    }++    pub fn get_fast_pto(&self) -> u8 {+        self.fast_pto+    }++    /// Scale the PTO timer.  A value of `FAST_PTO_SCALE` follows the spec, a smaller+    /// value does not, but produces more probes with the intent of ensuring lower+    /// latency in the event of tail loss. A value of `FAST_PTO_SCALE/4` is quite+    /// aggressive. Smaller values (other than zero) are not rejected, but could be+    /// very wasteful. Values greater than `FAST_PTO_SCALE` delay probes and could+    /// reduce performance. It should not be possible to increase the PTO timer by+    /// too much based on the range of valid values, but a maximum value of 255 will+    /// result in very poor performance.+    /// Scaling PTO this way does not affect when persistent congestion is declared,+    /// but may change how many retransmissions are sent before declaring persistent+    /// congestion.+    ///+    /// # Panics+    /// A value of 0 is invalid and will cause a panic.+    pub fn fast_pto(mut self, scale: u8) -> Self {+        assert_ne!(scale, 0);+        self.fast_pto = scale;         self     }

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Integer Overflow/Underflow] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/params.rs] [Lines 246-270]
[Old Code]
(None - new functionality added)
[Fixed Code]
    pub fn fast_pto(mut self, scale: u8) -> Self {
        assert_ne!(scale, 0);
        self.fast_pto = scale;
        self
    }

Additional Details:
- The new fast_pto function adds input validation with assert_ne to prevent zero values
- However, the function accepts a u8 parameter which could potentially lead to integer-related issues if not properly handled
- The comment suggests values greater than FAST_PTO_SCALE could reduce performance, but doesn't explicitly prevent them

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/params.rs] [Lines 5-6]
[Old Code]
use crate::connection::{ConnectionIdManager, Role, LOCAL_ACTIVE_CID_LIMIT};
[Fixed Code]
use crate::connection::{ConnectionIdManager, Role, LOCAL_ACTIVE_CID_LIMIT};
pub use crate::recovery::FAST_PTO_SCALE;

Additional Details:
- This is just an addition of a new import, no security implications

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/params.rs] [Lines 70-71]
[Old Code]
    incoming_datagram_queue: usize,
[Fixed Code]
    incoming_datagram_queue: usize,
    fast_pto: u8,

Additional Details:
- This is just adding a new field to the struct, no security implications

The main change appears to be adding PTO (Probe Timeout) scaling functionality with some basic input validation, but no clear security vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed. The assert_ne prevents zero values which could cause issues, but this is more of a correctness check than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-overlapping-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-overlapping-002.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/box-shadow-overlapping-001-ref.html">   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta content="Box shadows do not affect layout. Box shadows take up no space. Box shadows do not affect or influence normal flow of boxes. Therefore, box shadows can 'collide' with other boxes and can overlap other boxes (inline box or line box) or be overlapped by other boxes. In this test, the text ('PNG') follows a right outer box shadow and therefore overlaps such shadow." name="assert">   <style>

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability identified  
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/box-shadow-overlapping-002.html  
   Lines: 9  
   Old Code: `<meta content="" name="flags">`  
   Fixed Code: (line removed)  

Additional Details:  
- This appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose  
- No security vulnerability is evident in this change  
- The change seems to be more about code cleanup than security fixes  
- The meta tag being removed had no content and was likely just leftover from template code  

No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic/cleanup in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.xor.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.xor.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'xor'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18,26]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,64,191,128, "50,25", "0,64,191,128", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. This doesn't appear to address any security issue but rather improves code consistency or readability. No security-related functionality is modified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_peerConnection_twoAudioVideoStreamsCombined.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_peerConnection_twoAudioVideoStreamsCombined.html@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ <html> <head>   <script type="application/javascript" src="pc.js"></script>+  <script type="application/javascript" src="stats.js"></script> </head> <body> <pre id="test">@@ -18,6 +19,44 @@                                 {audio: true, video: true}],                              [{audio: true, video: true},                                 {audio: true, video: true}]);++    // Test stats, including coalescing of codec stats.+    test.chain.insertAfter("PC_LOCAL_WAIT_FOR_MEDIA_FLOW",+      [PC_LOCAL_TEST_LOCAL_STATS]);++    test.chain.insertAfter("PC_REMOTE_WAIT_FOR_MEDIA_FLOW",+      [PC_REMOTE_TEST_REMOTE_STATS]);++    const testCoalescedCodecStats = stats => {+      is([...stats.values()].filter(({type}) => type.endsWith("rtp")).length,+        16,+        "Expected: 4 outbound, 4 remote-inbound, 4 inbound, 4 remote-inbound");+      const codecs = [...stats.values()]+          .filter(({type}) => type == "codec")+          .sort((a, b) => a.mimeType > b.mimeType);+      is(codecs.length, 2, "Should have registered two codecs (coalesced)");+      is(new Set(codecs.map(({transportId}) => transportId)).size, 1,+        "Should have registered only one transport with BUNDLE");+      const codecTypes = new Set(codecs.map(({codecType}) => codecType));+      is(codecTypes.size, 1,+        "Should have identical encode and decode configurations (and stats)");+      is(codecTypes[0], undefined,+        "Should have identical encode and decode configurations (and stats)");+      is(codecs[0].mimeType.slice(0, 5), "audio",+        "Should have registered an audio codec");+      is(codecs[1].mimeType.slice(0, 5), "video",+        "Should have registered a video codec");+    };++    test.chain.append([+      async function PC_LOCAL_TEST_COALESCED_CODEC_STATS() {+        testCoalescedCodecStats(await test.pcLocal._pc.getStats());+      },+      async function PC_REMOTE_TEST_COALESCED_CODEC_STATS() {+        testCoalescedCodecStats(await test.pcRemote._pc.getStats());+      },+    ]);+     return test.run();   }); </script>

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding test functionality for WebRTC statistics and codec coalescing. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_peerConnection_twoAudioVideoStreamsCombined.html] [Lines 2-3, 19-44]
[Old Code]
<script type="application/javascript" src="pc.js"></script>
[Fixed Code]
<script type="application/javascript" src="pc.js"></script>
<script type="application/javascript" src="stats.js"></script>

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/test_peerConnection_twoAudioVideoStreamsCombined.html] [Lines 18-44]
[Old Code]
                                {audio: true, video: true}]);
    return test.run();
[Fixed Code]
                                {audio: true, video: true}]);

    // Test stats, including coalescing of codec stats.
    test.chain.insertAfter("PC_LOCAL_WAIT_FOR_MEDIA_FLOW",
      [PC_LOCAL_TEST_LOCAL_STATS]);

    test.chain.insertAfter("PC_REMOTE_WAIT_FOR_MEDIA_FLOW",
      [PC_REMOTE_TEST_REMOTE_STATS]);

    const testCoalescedCodecStats = stats => {
      is([...stats.values()].filter(({type}) => type.endsWith("rtp")).length,
        16,
        "Expected: 4 outbound, 4 remote-inbound, 4 inbound, 4 remote-inbound");
      const codecs = [...stats.values()]
          .filter(({type}) => type == "codec")
          .sort((a, b) => a.mimeType > b.mimeType);
      is(codecs.length, 2, "Should have registered two codecs (coalesced)");
      is(new Set(codecs.map(({transportId}) => transportId)).size, 1,
        "Should have registered only one transport with BUNDLE");
      const codecTypes = new Set(codecs.map(({codecType}) => codecType));
      is(codecTypes.size, 1,
        "Should have identical encode and decode configurations (and stats)");
      is(codecTypes[0], undefined,
        "Should have identical encode and decode configurations (and stats)");
      is(codecs[0].mimeType.slice(0, 5), "audio",
        "Should have registered an audio codec");
      is(codecs[1].mimeType.slice(0, 5), "video",
        "Should have registered a video codec");
    };

    test.chain.append([
      async function PC_LOCAL_TEST_COALESCED_CODEC_STATS() {
        testCoalescedCodecStats(await test.pcLocal._pc.getStats());
      },
      async function PC_REMOTE_TEST_COALESCED_CODEC_STATS() {
        testCoalescedCodecStats(await test.pcRemote._pc.getStats());
      },
    ]);

    return test.run();

The changes are purely test-related additions, including:
1. Adding a new script reference to stats.js
2. Adding new test cases for WebRTC statistics collection and codec coalescing verification
3. No security-related fixes or vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.obtuse.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.obtuse.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(800, 300); ctx.lineTo(10000, -8900); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, but this doesn't affect security.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.obtuse.html] [Lines 17-38]
[Old Code: used variable name 'offscreenCanvas']
[Fixed Code: changed variable name to 'canvas']

The changes are:
1. Variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` in the initialization
2. Corresponding updates to the variable name in the `_assertPixel` calls

These changes don't introduce or fix any security issues - they're purely about code style/readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.large.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.large.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var n = 2147483647; // 2^31 - 1, which should be supported by any sensible definition of "long"-offscreenCanvas.width = n;-offscreenCanvas.height = n;-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, n, "offscreenCanvas.width", "n");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, n, "offscreenCanvas.height", "n");+canvas.width = n;+canvas.height = n;+_assertSame(canvas.width, n, "canvas.width", "n");+_assertSame(canvas.height, n, "canvas.height", "n"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.large.html [Lines] 17-24
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   offscreenCanvas.width = n;
   offscreenCanvas.height = n;
   _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, n, "offscreenCanvas.width", "n");
   _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, n, "offscreenCanvas.height", "n");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   canvas.width = n;
   canvas.height = n;
   _assertSame(canvas.width, n, "canvas.width", "n");
   _assertSame(canvas.height, n, "canvas.height", "n");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The test continues to verify that large canvas dimensions (2^31 - 1) are properly supported, but this is a test case rather than a security fix. No actual vulnerability is being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/general/browser_ctrlTab.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/general/browser_ctrlTab.js@@ -141,6 +141,43 @@       document.commandDispatcher.focusedWindow,       "Ctrl+Tab doesn't change focus if one tab is open"     );+  }++  // eslint-disable-next-line no-lone-blocks+  {+    // Bug 1731050: test hidden tabs+    info("Starting hidden tabs test");+    checkTabs(1);+    await BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser);+    await BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser);+    await BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser);+    await BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser);++    selectTabs([1, 2, 3, 4, 3]);+    gBrowser.hideTab(gBrowser.tabs[4]);+    selectTabs([2]);+    gBrowser.hideTab(gBrowser.tabs[3]);++    is(gBrowser.tabs[4].hidden, true, "Tab at index 4 is hidden");+    is(gBrowser.tabs[3].hidden, true, "Tab at index 3 is hidden");+    is(gBrowser.tabs[2].hidden, false, "Tab at index 2 is still shown");+    is(gBrowser.tabs[1].hidden, false, "Tab at index 1 is still shown");+    is(gBrowser.tabs[0].hidden, false, "Tab at index 0 is still shown");++    await ctrlTabTest([], 1, 1);+    await ctrlTabTest([], 2, 0);+    gBrowser.showTab(gBrowser.tabs[4]);+    await ctrlTabTest([2], 3, 4);+    await ctrlTabTest([], 5, 4);+    gBrowser.showTab(gBrowser.tabs[3]);+    await ctrlTabTest([], 4, 3);+    await ctrlTabTest([], 6, 4);++    await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(gBrowser.tabs[4]);+    await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(gBrowser.tabs[3]);+    await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(gBrowser.tabs[2]);+    await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(gBrowser.tabs[1]);+    info("End hidden tabs test");   }   /* private utility functions */

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding test cases for hidden tabs functionality rather than addressing security issues.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerabilities found in this diff. The changes are test case additions for hidden tabs functionality.

Additional Notes:
- The diff adds test cases for hidden tabs behavior (Bug 1731050)
- The changes are focused on testing tab selection and visibility states
- No security-related fixes or vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff
- The code appears to be test code rather than production code that might contain vulnerabilities

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/clients/manager/ClientSource.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/clients/manager/ClientSource.cpp@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/MessageEvent.h" #include "mozilla/dom/MessageEventBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Navigator.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRef.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorker.h"@@ -676,4 +675,20 @@   return mRegisteringScopeList.Contains(aScope); }+nsIPrincipal* ClientSource::GetPrincipal() {+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());++  // We only create the principal if necessary because creating a principal is+  // expensive.+  if (!mPrincipal) {+    auto principalOrErr = Info().GetPrincipal();+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =+        principalOrErr.isOk() ? principalOrErr.unwrap() : nullptr;++    mPrincipal.emplace(prin);+  }++  return mPrincipal.ref();+}+ }  // namespace mozilla::dom

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak or Principal Handling Issue] [dom/clients/manager/ClientSource.cpp] [Lines 676-690]
   [Old Code]
   - No equivalent function existed in old code
   [Fixed Code]
   + nsIPrincipal* ClientSource::GetPrincipal() {
   +   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
   +
   +   // We only create the principal if necessary because creating a principal is
   +   // expensive.
   +   if (!mPrincipal) {
   +     auto principalOrErr = Info().GetPrincipal();
   +     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =
   +         principalOrErr.isOk() ? principalOrErr.unwrap() : nullptr;
   +
   +     mPrincipal.emplace(prin);
   +   }
   +
   +   return mPrincipal.ref();
   + }

Note: The diff shows the addition of a GetPrincipal() method which appears to be a security-related change, but without more context about the threat model and surrounding code, it's difficult to determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just a general security improvement. The change ensures proper principal handling and lazy initialization, which could prevent potential security issues related to improper principal management.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Worker-Related Security Issue] [dom/clients/manager/ClientSource.cpp] [Lines 20]
   [Old Code]
   - #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
   [Fixed Code]
   + (line removed)

Note: The removal of the WorkerPrivate.h include might indicate some security-related refactoring of worker handling, but without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just a code cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-020-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-020-ref.html@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; } .no-border { border-style:none; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-020-ref.html] [Lines 21]
[Old Code: border: 2px dashed;]
[Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;]

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely cosmetic/visual, changing the border style from dashed to solid and adding a color (salmon)
- This is part of a reftest (reference test) for CSS grid fragmentation
- No security implications are apparent in this change
- The modification doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations like input handling, data processing, or access control

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.