Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/fetch/Fetch.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/fetch/Fetch.cpp@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "Fetch.h" #include "js/Value.h"+#include "mozilla/CycleCollectedJSContext.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Document.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundSharedTypes.h" #include "nsIGlobalObject.h"@@ -43,14 +44,35 @@ #include "InternalResponse.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRef.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRunnable.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h"+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+# include "mozilla/dom/ReadableStreamDefaultReader.h"+#endif+ namespace mozilla::dom { namespace {++#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+void AbortStream(JSContext* aCx, ReadableStream* aReadableStream,+ ErrorResult& aRv) {+ if (aReadableStream->State() != ReadableStream::ReaderState::Readable) {+ return;+ }++ RefPtr<DOMException> e = DOMException::Create(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);+ JS::Rooted<JS::Value> value(aCx);+ if (!GetOrCreateDOMReflector(aCx, e, &value)) {+ return;+ }++ ReadableStreamError(aCx, aReadableStream, value, aRv);+}++#else void AbortStream(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aStream, ErrorResult& aRv) {@@ -76,6 +98,7 @@ aRv.StealExceptionFromJSContext(aCx); } }+#endif } // namespace@@ -116,47 +139,17 @@ class AbortSignalProxy;-class WorkerSignalFollower final : public AbortFollower {+// This runnable propagates changes from the AbortSignalImpl on workers to the+// AbortSignalImpl on main-thread.+class AbortSignalProxyRunnable final : public Runnable {+ RefPtr<AbortSignalProxy> mProxy;+ public:- // This runnable propagates changes from the AbortSignalImpl on workers to the- // AbortSignalImpl on main-thread.- class AbortSignalProxyRunnable final : public Runnable {- RefPtr<AbortSignalProxy> mProxy;-- public:- explicit AbortSignalProxyRunnable(AbortSignalProxy* aProxy)- : Runnable("dom::WorkerSignalFollower::AbortSignalProxyRunnable"),- mProxy(aProxy) {}-- NS_IMETHOD Run() override;- };-- public:- NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ISUPPORTS- NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(WorkerSignalFollower)-- void RunAbortAlgorithm() override {}-- private:- ~WorkerSignalFollower() = default;+ explicit AbortSignalProxyRunnable(AbortSignalProxy* aProxy)+ : Runnable("dom::AbortSignalProxyRunnable"), mProxy(aProxy) {}++ NS_IMETHOD Run() override; };--NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(WorkerSignalFollower)--NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ADDREF(WorkerSignalFollower)-NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_RELEASE(WorkerSignalFollower)--NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN(WorkerSignalFollower)- AbortFollower::Unlink(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp));-NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END--NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN(WorkerSignalFollower)- AbortFollower::Traverse(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp), cb);-NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END--NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(WorkerSignalFollower)- NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsISupports)-NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END // This class orchestrates the proxying of AbortSignal operations between the // main thread and a worker thread.@@ -217,7 +210,7 @@ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS0(AbortSignalProxy)-NS_IMETHODIMP WorkerSignalFollower::AbortSignalProxyRunnable::Run() {+NS_IMETHODIMP AbortSignalProxyRunnable::Run() { MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); AbortSignalImpl* signalImpl = mProxy->GetOrCreateSignalImplForMainThread(); signalImpl->SignalAbort(JS::UndefinedHandleValue);@@ -226,8 +219,6 @@ void AbortSignalProxy::RunAbortAlgorithm() { MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());- using AbortSignalProxyRunnable =- WorkerSignalFollower::AbortSignalProxyRunnable; RefPtr<AbortSignalProxyRunnable> runnable = new AbortSignalProxyRunnable(this); MainThreadEventTarget()->Dispatch(runnable.forget(), NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);@@ -817,10 +808,14 @@ } nsresult Cancel() override {+ // We need to check first if cancel is called twice+ nsresult rv = WorkerRunnable::Cancel();+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);+ // Execute Run anyway to make sure we cleanup our promise proxy to avoid // leaking the worker thread Run();- return WorkerRunnable::Cancel();+ return NS_OK; } };@@ -1096,16 +1091,15 @@ template <class Derived> FetchBody<Derived>::FetchBody(nsIGlobalObject* aOwner) : mOwner(aOwner),- mWorkerPrivate(nullptr), mReadableStreamBody(nullptr), mReadableStreamReader(nullptr), mBodyUsed(false) { MOZ_ASSERT(aOwner); if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {- mWorkerPrivate = GetCurrentThreadWorkerPrivate();- MOZ_ASSERT(mWorkerPrivate);- mMainThreadEventTarget = mWorkerPrivate->MainThreadEventTarget();+ WorkerPrivate* wp = GetCurrentThreadWorkerPrivate();+ MOZ_ASSERT(wp);+ mMainThreadEventTarget = wp->MainThreadEventTarget(); } else { mMainThreadEventTarget = aOwner->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other); }@@ -1134,6 +1128,9 @@ // If this stream is disturbed, return true. if (mReadableStreamBody) {+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ return mReadableStreamBody->Disturbed();+#else aRv.MightThrowJSException(); AutoJSAPI jsapi;@@ -1151,6 +1148,7 @@ } return disturbed;+#endif } return false;@@ -1186,11 +1184,11 @@ mBodyUsed = true;+#ifndef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS // If we already have a ReadableStreamBody and it has been created by DOM, we // have to lock it now because it can have been shared with other objects. if (mReadableStreamBody) { aRv.MightThrowJSException();- JSAutoRealm ar(aCx, mOwner->GetGlobalJSObject()); JS::Rooted<JSObject*> readableStreamObj(aCx, mReadableStreamBody);@@ -1219,6 +1217,29 @@ mReadableStreamReader = reader; } }+#else+ // If we already have a ReadableStreamBody and it has been created by DOM, we+ // have to lock it now because it can have been shared with other objects.+ if (mReadableStreamBody) {+ if (mReadableStreamBody->HasNativeUnderlyingSource()) {+ LockStream(aCx, mReadableStreamBody, aRv);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return;+ }+ } else {+ MOZ_ASSERT(mFetchStreamReader);+ // Let's activate the FetchStreamReader.+ RefPtr<ReadableStreamDefaultReader> reader;+ mFetchStreamReader->StartConsuming(aCx, mReadableStreamBody,+ getter_AddRefs(reader), aRv);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return;+ }++ mReadableStreamReader = reader.forget();+ }+ }+#endif } template void FetchBody<Request>::SetBodyUsed(JSContext* aCx, ErrorResult& aRv);@@ -1231,7 +1252,8 @@ JSContext* aCx, BodyConsumer::ConsumeType aType, ErrorResult& aRv) { aRv.MightThrowJSException();- RefPtr<AbortSignalImpl> signalImpl = DerivedClass()->GetSignalImpl();+ RefPtr<AbortSignalImpl> signalImpl =+ DerivedClass()->GetSignalImplToConsumeBody(); if (signalImpl && signalImpl->Aborted()) { aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR); return nullptr;@@ -1357,6 +1379,7 @@ template const nsAString& FetchBody<EmptyBody>::BodyLocalPath() const;+#ifndef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS template <class Derived> void FetchBody<Derived>::SetReadableStreamBody(JSContext* aCx, JSObject* aBody) {@@ -1387,6 +1410,37 @@ template void FetchBody<Response>::SetReadableStreamBody(JSContext* aCx, JSObject* aBody);+#else+template <class Derived>+void FetchBody<Derived>::SetReadableStreamBody(JSContext* aCx,+ ReadableStream* aBody) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(!mReadableStreamBody);+ MOZ_ASSERT(aBody);+ mReadableStreamBody = aBody;++ RefPtr<AbortSignalImpl> signalImpl = DerivedClass()->GetSignalImpl();+ if (!signalImpl) {+ return;+ }++ bool aborted = signalImpl->Aborted();+ if (aborted) {+ IgnoredErrorResult result;+ AbortStream(aCx, mReadableStreamBody, result);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(result.Failed())) {+ return;+ }+ } else if (!IsFollowing()) {+ Follow(signalImpl);+ }+}++template void FetchBody<Request>::SetReadableStreamBody(JSContext* aCx,+ ReadableStream* aBody);++template void FetchBody<Response>::SetReadableStreamBody(JSContext* aCx,+ ReadableStream* aBody);+#endif #ifndef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS template <class Derived>@@ -1449,21 +1503,102 @@ template void FetchBody<Response>::GetBody( JSContext* aCx, JS::MutableHandle<JSObject*> aMessage, ErrorResult& aRv);+#else+template <class Derived>+already_AddRefed<ReadableStream> FetchBody<Derived>::GetBody(JSContext* aCx,+ ErrorResult& aRv) {+ if (mReadableStreamBody) {+ RefPtr<ReadableStream> body(mReadableStreamBody);+ return body.forget();+ }++ nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> inputStream;+ DerivedClass()->GetBody(getter_AddRefs(inputStream));++ if (!inputStream) {+ return nullptr;+ }++ BodyStream::Create(aCx, this, DerivedClass()->GetParentObject(), inputStream,+ aRv);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return nullptr;+ }++ MOZ_ASSERT(mReadableStreamBody);++ RefPtr<ReadableStream> body(mReadableStreamBody);++ // If the body has been already consumed, we lock the stream.+ bool bodyUsed = GetBodyUsed(aRv);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return nullptr;+ }+ if (bodyUsed) {+ LockStream(aCx, body, aRv);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return nullptr;+ }+ }++ RefPtr<AbortSignalImpl> signalImpl = DerivedClass()->GetSignalImpl();+ if (signalImpl) {+ if (signalImpl->Aborted()) {+ AbortStream(aCx, body, aRv);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return nullptr;+ }+ } else if (!IsFollowing()) {+ Follow(signalImpl);+ }+ }++ return body.forget();+}++template already_AddRefed<ReadableStream> FetchBody<Request>::GetBody(+ JSContext* aCx, ErrorResult& aRv);++template already_AddRefed<ReadableStream> FetchBody<Response>::GetBody(+ JSContext* aCx, ErrorResult& aRv);+ #endif+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+template <class Derived>+void FetchBody<Derived>::LockStream(JSContext* aCx, ReadableStream* aStream,+ ErrorResult& aRv) {+ // This is native stream, creating a reader will not execute any JS code.+ RefPtr<ReadableStreamDefaultReader> reader =+ AcquireReadableStreamDefaultReader(aCx, aStream, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ return;+ }++ mReadableStreamReader = reader;+}++template void FetchBody<Request>::LockStream(JSContext* aCx,+ ReadableStream* aStream,+ ErrorResult& aRv);++template void FetchBody<Response>::LockStream(JSContext* aCx,+ ReadableStream* aStream,+ ErrorResult& aRv);+#else template <class Derived> void FetchBody<Derived>::LockStream(JSContext* aCx, JS::HandleObject aStream, ErrorResult& aRv) { aRv.MightThrowJSException();-#if DEBUG+# if DEBUG JS::ReadableStreamMode streamMode; if (!JS::ReadableStreamGetMode(aCx, aStream, &streamMode)) { aRv.StealExceptionFromJSContext(aCx); return; } MOZ_ASSERT(streamMode == JS::ReadableStreamMode::ExternalSource);-#endif // DEBUG+# endif // DEBUG // This is native stream, creating a reader will not execute any JS code. JS::Rooted<JSObject*> reader(@@ -1484,7 +1619,9 @@ template void FetchBody<Response>::LockStream(JSContext* aCx, JS::HandleObject aStream, ErrorResult& aRv);-+#endif++#ifndef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS template <class Derived> void FetchBody<Derived>::MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody( JSContext* aCx, JS::MutableHandle<JSObject*> aBodyOut,@@ -1548,6 +1685,59 @@ FetchStreamReader** aStreamReader, nsIInputStream** aInputStream, ErrorResult& aRv);+#else++template <class Derived>+void FetchBody<Derived>::MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody(+ JSContext* aCx, ReadableStream** aBodyOut,+ FetchStreamReader** aStreamReader, nsIInputStream** aInputStream,+ ErrorResult& aRv) {+ MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(aStreamReader);+ MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(aInputStream);+ MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(!CheckBodyUsed());++ *aBodyOut = nullptr;+ *aStreamReader = nullptr;+ *aInputStream = nullptr;++ if (!mReadableStreamBody) {+ return;+ }++ // If this is a ReadableStream with an native source, this has been+ // generated by a Fetch. In this case, Fetch will be able to recreate it+ // again when GetBody() is called.+ if (mReadableStreamBody->HasNativeUnderlyingSource()) {+ *aBodyOut = nullptr;+ return;+ }++ nsTArray<RefPtr<ReadableStream> > branches;+ MOZ_KnownLive(mReadableStreamBody)->Tee(aCx, branches, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ return;+ }++ mReadableStreamBody = branches[0];+ branches[1].forget(aBodyOut);++ aRv = FetchStreamReader::Create(aCx, mOwner, aStreamReader, aInputStream);+ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return;+ }+}++template void FetchBody<Request>::MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody(+ JSContext* aCx, ReadableStream** aBodyOut,+ FetchStreamReader** aStreamReader, nsIInputStream** aInputStream,+ ErrorResult& aRv);++template void FetchBody<Response>::MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody(+ JSContext* aCx, ReadableStream** aBodyOut,+ FetchStreamReader** aStreamReader, nsIInputStream** aInputStream,+ ErrorResult& aRv);+#endif+ template <class Derived> void FetchBody<Derived>::RunAbortAlgorithm() { if (!mReadableStreamBody) {@@ -1561,7 +1751,11 @@ JSContext* cx = jsapi.cx();+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ RefPtr<ReadableStream> body(mReadableStreamBody);+#else JS::Rooted<JSObject*> body(cx, mReadableStreamBody);+#endif IgnoredErrorResult result; AbortStream(cx, body, result); }@@ -1576,18 +1770,24 @@ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(EmptyBody) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(EmptyBody, FetchBody<EmptyBody>)- AbortFollower::Unlink(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp)); NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mOwner) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mAbortSignalImpl) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mFetchStreamReader)+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamBody)+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamReader)+#endif NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN_INHERITED(EmptyBody, FetchBody<EmptyBody>)- AbortFollower::Traverse(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp), cb); NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mOwner) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mAbortSignalImpl) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mFetchStreamReader)+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mReadableStreamBody)+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mReadableStreamReader)+#endif NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_BEGIN_INHERITED(EmptyBody, FetchBody<EmptyBody>)
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Double Cancel Vulnerability [dom/fetch/Fetch.cpp] [Lines 807-817]
[Old Code]
nsresult Cancel() override {
// Execute Run anyway to make sure we cleanup our promise proxy to avoid
// leaking the worker thread
Run();
return WorkerRunnable::Cancel();
}
[Fixed Code]
nsresult Cancel() override {
// We need to check first if cancel is called twice
nsresult rv = WorkerRunnable::Cancel();
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Execute Run anyway to make sure we cleanup our promise proxy to avoid
// leaking the worker thread
Run();
return NS_OK;
}
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Memory Leak [dom/fetch/Fetch.cpp] [Lines 1096-1108]
[Old Code]
FetchBody(nsIGlobalObject* aOwner)
: mOwner(aOwner),
mWorkerPrivate(nullptr),
mReadableStreamBody(nullptr),
mReadableStreamReader(nullptr),
mBodyUsed(false) {
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
mWorkerPrivate = GetCurrentThreadWorkerPrivate();
MOZ_ASSERT(mWorkerPrivate);
mMainThreadEventTarget = mWorkerPrivate->MainThreadEventTarget();
}
[Fixed Code]
FetchBody(nsIGlobalObject* aOwner)
: mOwner(aOwner),
mReadableStreamBody(nullptr),
mReadableStreamReader(nullptr),
mBodyUsed(false) {
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
WorkerPrivate* wp = GetCurrentThreadWorkerPrivate();
MOZ_ASSERT(wp);
mMainThreadEventTarget = wp->MainThreadEventTarget();
}
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Abort Signal Handling Improvement [dom/fetch/Fetch.cpp] [Lines 1250-1255]
[Old Code]
RefPtr<AbortSignalImpl> signalImpl = DerivedClass()->GetSignalImpl();
[Fixed Code]
RefPtr<AbortSignalImpl> signalImpl =
DerivedClass()->GetSignalImplToConsumeBody();
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Cycle Collection Improvement [dom/fetch/Fetch.cpp] [Lines 1769-1791]
[Old Code]
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(EmptyBody, FetchBody<EmptyBody>)
AbortFollower::Unlink(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp));
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mOwner)
[Fixed Code]
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(EmptyBody, FetchBody<EmptyBody>)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mOwner)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mAbortSignalImpl)
Note: The most clear security fix is the first one which prevents potential issues with double cancellation. The other changes appear to be improvements in memory management and code organization, but their security impact is less clear. The diff shows significant refactoring around stream handling and abort signal management, which could have security implications but aren't clearly tied to specific vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-variant-ligatures.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-variant-ligatures.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="John Daggett" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-fonts-3/#font-variant-ligatures-prop"/> <link rel="match" href="font-variant-ligatures-ref.html"/>-<meta name="flags" content=""/> <meta name="assert" content="Values of font-variant-ligatures should enable specific features without enabling others"/> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <script type="text/javascript" src="support/fonts/gsubtest-features.js"></script>
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5]
<meta name="flags" content=""/>
[Line removed]
Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of a meta tag with empty "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here
- The change is likely related to test configuration rather than security
No other changes were detected in the provided diff that would indicate security fixes. The modification seems to be minor test file maintenance rather than addressing any security concerns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/location.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/location.js@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at <http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/>. */-import { sortBy } from "lodash"; import { getSelectedLocation } from "./selected-location"; export function comparePosition(a, b) {@@ -25,12 +24,33 @@ } export function sortSelectedLocations(locations, selectedSource) {- return sortBy(locations, [- // Priority: line number, undefined column, column number- location => getSelectedLocation(location, selectedSource).line,- location => {- const selectedLocation = getSelectedLocation(location, selectedSource);- return selectedLocation.column === undefined || selectedLocation.column;- },- ]);+ return Array.from(locations).sort((locationA, locationB) => {+ const aSelected = getSelectedLocation(locationA, selectedSource);+ const bSelected = getSelectedLocation(locationB, selectedSource);++ // Order the locations by line number…+ if (aSelected.line < bSelected.line) {+ return -1;+ }++ if (aSelected.line > bSelected.line) {+ return 1;+ }++ // … and if we have the same line, we want to return location with undefined columns+ // first, and then order them by column+ if (aSelected.column == bSelected.column) {+ return 0;+ }++ if (aSelected.column === undefined) {+ return -1;+ }++ if (bSelected.column === undefined) {+ return 1;+ }++ return aSelected.column < bSelected.column ? -1 : 1;+ }); }
I'll analyze the code diff according to the provided format. The changes involve replacing lodash's `sortBy` with a native JavaScript array sort implementation.
Vulnerability Existed: no
Dependency Removal / Code Improvement [File] [Lines 2, 24-33]
[Old Code]
import { sortBy } from "lodash";
...
return sortBy(locations, [
// Priority: line number, undefined column, column number
location => getSelectedLocation(location, selectedSource).line,
location => {
const selectedLocation = getSelectedLocation(location, selectedSource);
return selectedLocation.column === undefined || selectedLocation.column;
},
]);
[Fixed Code]
return Array.from(locations).sort((locationA, locationB) => {
const aSelected = getSelectedLocation(locationA, selectedSource);
const bSelected = getSelectedLocation(locationB, selectedSource);
// Order the locations by line number…
if (aSelected.line < bSelected.line) {
return -1;
}
if (aSelected.line > bSelected.line) {
return 1;
}
// … and if we have the same line, we want to return location with undefined columns
// first, and then order them by column
if (aSelected.column == bSelected.column) {
return 0;
}
if (aSelected.column === undefined) {
return -1;
}
if (bSelected.column === undefined) {
return 1;
}
return aSelected.column < bSelected.column ? -1 : 1;
});
Additional Details:
- This change removes a dependency on lodash's `sortBy` function and implements the sorting logic natively
- The functionality remains the same but is now more explicit and potentially more performant
- No security vulnerability was fixed - this appears to be a code improvement/optimization
- The change makes the sorting logic more transparent and potentially easier to maintain
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.open.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.open.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00';@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(1000, 50); ctx.lineTo(100, 50); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. Here's the structured response:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.open.html] [Lines 17-32]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]
This appears to be a simple refactoring change with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/resources/chromium/webxr-test.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/resources/chromium/webxr-test.js@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ 'light-estimation': vrMojom.XRSessionFeature.LIGHT_ESTIMATION, 'anchors': vrMojom.XRSessionFeature.ANCHORS, 'depth-sensing': vrMojom.XRSessionFeature.DEPTH,+ 'secondary-views': vrMojom.XRSessionFeature.SECONDARY_VIEWS, }; static _sessionModeToMojoMap = {@@ -436,25 +437,34 @@ // This appropriately handles if the coordinates are null this.setBoundsGeometry(fakeDeviceInit.boundsCoordinates);- this.setViews(fakeDeviceInit.views);+ this.setViews(fakeDeviceInit.views, fakeDeviceInit.secondaryViews); // Need to support webVR which doesn't have a notion of features this._setFeatures(fakeDeviceInit.supportedFeatures || []); } // WebXR Test API- setViews(views) {- if (views) {- this.displayInfo_.views = [];- this.viewOffsets_ = [];- for (let i = 0; i < views.length; i++) {- this.displayInfo_.views[i] = this._getView(views[i]);- this.viewOffsets_[i] = composeGFXTransform(views[i].viewOffset);- }-- if (this.sessionClient_) {- this.sessionClient_.onChanged(this.displayInfo_);- }+ setViews(primaryViews, secondaryViews) {+ this.primaryViews_ = [];+ this.secondaryViews_ = [];+ let xOffset = 0;+ if (primaryViews) {+ this.primaryViews_ = [];+ xOffset = this._setViews(primaryViews, xOffset, this.primaryViews_);+ }++ if (secondaryViews) {+ this.secondaryViews_ = [];+ this._setViews(secondaryViews, xOffset, this.secondaryViews_);+ }++ // Do not include secondary views here because they are only exposed to+ // WebXR if requested by the session. getFrameData() will send back the+ // secondary views when enabled.+ this.displayInfo_.views = this.primaryViews_;++ if (this.sessionClient_) {+ this.sessionClient_.onChanged(this.displayInfo_); } }@@ -701,6 +711,15 @@ } }+ _setViews(deviceViews, xOffset, views) {+ for (let i = 0; i < deviceViews.length; i++) {+ views[i] = this._getView(deviceViews[i], xOffset);+ xOffset += deviceViews[i].resolution.width;+ }++ return xOffset;+ }+ _onStageParametersUpdated() { // Indicate for the frame loop that the stage parameters have been updated. this.stageParametersId_++;@@ -739,7 +758,7 @@ position: [-0.032, 0, 0], orientation: [0, 0, 0, 1] })),- viewport: { width: viewport_size, height: viewport_size }+ viewport: { x: 0, y: 0, width: viewport_size, height: viewport_size } }, { eye: vrMojom.XREye.kRight,@@ -753,14 +772,14 @@ position: [0.032, 0, 0], orientation: [0, 0, 0, 1] })),- viewport: { width: viewport_size, height: viewport_size }+ viewport: { x: viewport_size, y: 0, width: viewport_size, height: viewport_size } }] }; } // This function converts between the matrix provided by the WebXR test API // and the internal data representation.- _getView(fakeXRViewInit) {+ _getView(fakeXRViewInit, xOffset) { let fov = null; if (fakeXRViewInit.fieldOfView) {@@ -811,9 +830,13 @@ fieldOfView: fov, mojoFromView: this._getMojoFromViewerWithOffset(composeGFXTransform(fakeXRViewInit.viewOffset)), viewport: {+ x: xOffset,+ y: 0, width: fakeXRViewInit.resolution.width, height: fakeXRViewInit.resolution.height- }+ },+ isFirstPersonObserver: fakeXRViewInit.isFirstPersonObserver ? true : false,+ viewOffset: composeGFXTransform(fakeXRViewInit.viewOffset) }; }@@ -882,14 +905,23 @@ } }- let views = this.displayInfo_.views;- for (let i = 0; i < views.length; i++) {- views[i].mojoFromView = this._getMojoFromViewerWithOffset(this.viewOffsets_[i]);+ let frame_views = this.primaryViews_;+ for (let i = 0; i < this.primaryViews_.length; i++) {+ this.primaryViews_[i].mojoFromView =+ this._getMojoFromViewerWithOffset(this.primaryViews_[i].viewOffset);+ }+ if (this.enabledFeatures_.includes(vrMojom.XRSessionFeature.SECONDARY_VIEWS)) {+ for (let i = 0; i < this.secondaryViews_.length; i++) {+ this.secondaryViews_[i].mojoFromView =+ this._getMojoFromViewerWithOffset(this.secondaryViews_[i].viewOffset);+ }++ frame_views = frame_views.concat(this.secondaryViews_); } const frameData = { mojoFromViewer: this.pose_,- views: views,+ views: frame_views, mojoSpaceReset: mojo_space_reset, inputState: input_state, timeDelta: {
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [testing/web-platform/tests/resources/chromium/webxr-test.js] [Lines 436-437, 447-460]
[Old Code]
setViews(views) {
if (views) {
this.displayInfo_.views = [];
this.viewOffsets_ = [];
for (let i = 0; i < views.length; i++) {
this.displayInfo_.views[i] = this._getView(views[i]);
this.viewOffsets_[i] = composeGFXTransform(views[i].viewOffset);
}
[Fixed Code]
setViews(primaryViews, secondaryViews) {
this.primaryViews_ = [];
this.secondaryViews_ = [];
let xOffset = 0;
if (primaryViews) {
this.primaryViews_ = [];
xOffset = this._setViews(primaryViews, xOffset, this.primaryViews_);
}
if (secondaryViews) {
this.secondaryViews_ = [];
this._setViews(secondaryViews, xOffset, this.secondaryViews_);
}
this.displayInfo_.views = this.primaryViews_;
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Viewport Security Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/resources/chromium/webxr-test.js] [Lines 739, 753, 830-834]
[Old Code]
viewport: { width: viewport_size, height: viewport_size }
[Fixed Code]
viewport: { x: 0, y: 0, width: viewport_size, height: viewport_size }
and
viewport: { x: viewport_size, y: 0, width: viewport_size, height: viewport_size }
and
viewport: {
x: xOffset,
y: 0,
width: fakeXRViewInit.resolution.width,
height: fakeXRViewInit.resolution.height
}
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Feature Control Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/resources/chromium/webxr-test.js] [Lines 326-328, 905-913]
[Old Code]
No secondary-views feature defined
[Fixed Code]
'secondary-views': vrMojom.XRSessionFeature.SECONDARY_VIEWS,
and
if (this.enabledFeatures_.includes(vrMojom.XRSessionFeature.SECONDARY_VIEWS)) {
for (let i = 0; i < this.secondaryViews_.length; i++) {
this.secondaryViews_[i].mojoFromView =
this._getMojoFromViewerWithOffset(this.secondaryViews_[i].viewOffset);
}
frame_views = frame_views.concat(this.secondaryViews_);
}
The changes appear to be primarily about adding support for secondary views in WebXR, with improved viewport handling and feature control. While I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed, there are several changes that could potentially relate to security:
1. The separation of primary and secondary views could prevent information leaks between different view contexts
2. The explicit viewport positioning (x,y) could prevent rendering artifacts or potential visual spoofing
3. The explicit feature control for secondary views ensures they're only accessible when properly requested
However, without more context about the WebXR security model, I can't definitively say these were security fixes. The changes seem more like feature enhancements with security-conscious implementation.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/frontend/react.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/frontend/react.md@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ If you are using something like Redux to manage state this is handled automatically for you with the library you use to bind Redux with-React. See more in [Redux](redux.html).+React. See more in [Redux](redux.md). ## DOM Diffing@@ -154,4 +154,4 @@ ## Next Read the [React Guidelines](react-guidelines.md) next to learn how to-write React code specifically for the devtools.+write React code specifically for the devtools.
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be documentation updates (file extension changes from .html to .md and a minor text correction). Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [devtools/docs/contributor/frontend/react.md] [Lines 132, 154] [Old Code: See more in [Redux](redux.html)] [Fixed Code: See more in [Redux](redux.md)] Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [devtools/docs/contributor/frontend/react.md] [Lines 154] [Old Code: write React code specifically for the devtools.] [Fixed Code: write React code specifically for the devtools.] The changes are purely documentation-related with no security implications. The first change updates a link extension from .html to .md, and the second change appears to be a trivial text correction (adding a space before the line). Neither modification affects security.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/tests/mochitest/treeupdate/test_optgroup.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/tests/mochitest/treeupdate/test_optgroup.html@@ -45,12 +45,8 @@ { COMBOBOX: [ { COMBOBOX_LIST: [ { GROUPING: [- { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [- { TEXT_LEAF: [] },- ] },- { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [- { TEXT_LEAF: [] },- ] },+ { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [ ] },+ { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [ ] }, ]}, { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [] }, ] },
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [accessible/tests/mochitest/treeupdate/test_optgroup.html] [Lines 45-53]
[Old Code]
{ COMBOBOX_OPTION: [
{ TEXT_LEAF: [] },
] },
{ COMBOBOX_OPTION: [
{ TEXT_LEAF: [] },
] },
[Fixed Code]
{ COMBOBOX_OPTION: [ ] },
{ COMBOBOX_OPTION: [ ] },
Additional Details:
1. This appears to be a test file modification, not production code
2. The changes involve simplifying test assertions by removing nested TEXT_LEAF elements
3. No security-related patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are visible in the changes
4. The modification seems focused on test structure rather than security fixes
The changes don't appear to address any security vulnerability but rather simplify test assertions. The removal of TEXT_LEAF elements suggests the tests were made less specific about the exact structure of accessible objects.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/arm/MacroAssembler-arm.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/arm/MacroAssembler-arm.cpp@@ -4935,6 +4935,8 @@ ScratchRegisterScope scratch(masm);+ // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_cmpxchg in+ // GenerateAtomicOperations.py masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync); masm.bind(&again);@@ -5038,6 +5040,8 @@ ScratchRegisterScope scratch(masm);+ // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_exchange in+ // GenerateAtomicOperations.py masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync); masm.bind(&again);@@ -5139,6 +5143,8 @@ SecondScratchRegisterScope scratch2(masm); Register ptr = ComputePointerForAtomic(masm, mem, scratch2);+ // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_fetchop in+ // GenerateAtomicOperations.py masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync); ScratchRegisterScope scratch(masm);@@ -5394,6 +5400,8 @@ SecondScratchRegisterScope scratch2(masm); Register ptr = ComputePointerForAtomic(masm, mem, scratch2);+ // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_cmpxchg in+ // GenerateAtomicOperations.py masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync); masm.bind(&again);@@ -6152,6 +6160,8 @@ type == Scalar::Int32 || type == Scalar::Int64; unsigned byteSize = access.byteSize();+ // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_load in+ // GenerateAtomicOperations.py asMasm().memoryBarrierBefore(access.sync()); BufferOffset load;@@ -6267,7 +6277,9 @@ } }- asMasm().memoryBarrierAfter(access.sync());+ // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_store in+ // GenerateAtomicOperations.py+ asMasm().memoryBarrierBefore(access.sync()); BufferOffset store; if (type == Scalar::Int64) {
Analyzing the provided code diff, I notice several changes related to memory barriers in atomic operations. Here's the analysis following the requested format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Memory Barrier Issue [js/src/jit/arm/MacroAssembler-arm.cpp] [Lines 6267] [Old Code] asMasm().memoryBarrierAfter(access.sync()); [Fixed Code] asMasm().memoryBarrierBefore(access.sync()); Additional Details: The change moves the memory barrier from after to before the operation. This could be related to fixing potential race conditions in atomic operations, but without more context it's hard to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Atomic Operation Consistency Issue [js/src/jit/arm/MacroAssembler-arm.cpp] [Multiple locations] [Old Code] (Various locations without matching comments) [Fixed Code] (Added comments about matching generated code with assembly in GenerateAtomicOperations.py) Additional Details: Multiple locations added comments emphasizing the need for generated code to match assembly code in GenerateAtomicOperations.py. This suggests potential fixes for consistency issues in atomic operations, but it's unclear if these were actual vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be related to improving the correctness and consistency of atomic operations, particularly around memory barriers and code generation. While these could potentially address security issues related to race conditions or incorrect atomic operations, the diff doesn't provide enough context to confirm actual vulnerabilities were fixed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/workers/WorkerNavigator.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/workers/WorkerNavigator.cpp@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ #include "ErrorList.h" #include "MainThreadUtils.h" #include "RuntimeService.h"-#include "WorkerPrivate.h" #include "WorkerRunnable.h" #include "WorkerScope.h" #include "mozilla/dom/LockManager.h"
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Header Inclusion Change] [dom/workers/WorkerNavigator.cpp] [Lines 11-14] [Old Code] ```cpp #include "ErrorList.h" #include "MainThreadUtils.h" #include "RuntimeService.h" #include "WorkerPrivate.h" #include "WorkerRunnable.h" ``` [Fixed Code] ```cpp #include "ErrorList.h" #include "MainThreadUtils.h" #include "RuntimeService.h" #include "WorkerRunnable.h" ``` Additional Details: - The change involves removing an unused header (`WorkerPrivate.h`). While this could potentially reduce attack surface by removing unnecessary code, there's no clear evidence this was fixing a specific vulnerability. - Header cleanup changes are often done for code hygiene rather than security fixes. - Without more context about what `WorkerPrivate.h` contained or how it was used, we can't definitively say this was a security fix. No other vulnerabilities are apparent from this diff. The change appears to be a minor code cleanup rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/privatebrowsing/content/aboutPrivateBrowsing.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/privatebrowsing/content/aboutPrivateBrowsing.html@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ </div> </div>- <div class="promo">+ <div class="promo" hidden> <div class="promo-image-large"> <img src="" alt="" /> </div>@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ </div> </div> </div>+ <button data-l10n-id="about-private-browsing-dismiss-button" id="dismiss-btn" class="promo-dismiss"></button> </div> </body> </html>
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Disclosure] [browser/components/privatebrowsing/content/aboutPrivateBrowsing.html] [Lines 60-74] [Old Code] ```html <div class="promo"> ``` [Fixed Code] ```html <div class="promo" hidden> ``` Additional Details: The change adds a `hidden` attribute to a promotional div, which could prevent unintended information disclosure, though this is more of a privacy improvement than a clear security vulnerability. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Clickjacking or UI Redress] [browser/components/privatebrowsing/content/aboutPrivateBrowsing.html] [Lines 74] [Old Code] ```html </div> ``` [Fixed Code] ```html <button data-l10n-id="about-private-browsing-dismiss-button" id="dismiss-btn" class="promo-dismiss"></button> </div> ``` Additional Details: The addition of a dismiss button with proper attributes could help prevent UI manipulation attacks, though this appears to be more of a usability improvement than a direct security fix. Note: Neither change clearly addresses a known vulnerability, but both could be considered security-related improvements in terms of privacy and UI integrity. The changes appear to be more about enhancing user experience in private browsing mode rather than fixing specific security vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/syn/tests/repo/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/syn/tests/repo/mod.rs@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use tar::Archive; use walkdir::DirEntry;-const REVISION: &str = "ac2d9fc509e36d1b32513744adf58c34bcc4f43c";+const REVISION: &str = "e100ec5bc7cd768ec17d75448b29c9ab4a39272b"; #[rustfmt::skip] static EXCLUDE: &[&str] = &[@@ -46,16 +46,31 @@ "src/tools/rustfmt/tests/target/configs/spaces_around_ranges/true.rs", "src/tools/rustfmt/tests/target/type.rs",+ // Clippy lint lists represented as expressions+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.deprecated.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_all.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_cargo.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_complexity.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_correctness.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_internal.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_lints.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_nursery.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_pedantic.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_perf.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_restriction.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_style.rs",+ "src/tools/clippy/clippy_lints/src/lib.register_suspicious.rs",+ // Not actually test cases "src/test/rustdoc-ui/test-compile-fail2.rs", "src/test/rustdoc-ui/test-compile-fail3.rs",- "src/test/ui/include-single-expr-helper.rs",- "src/test/ui/include-single-expr-helper-1.rs", "src/test/ui/json-bom-plus-crlf-multifile-aux.rs", "src/test/ui/lint/expansion-time-include.rs", "src/test/ui/macros/auxiliary/macro-comma-support.rs", "src/test/ui/macros/auxiliary/macro-include-items-expr.rs",- "src/test/ui/parser/auxiliary/issue-21146-inc.rs",+ "src/test/ui/macros/include-single-expr-helper.rs",+ "src/test/ui/macros/include-single-expr-helper-1.rs",+ "src/test/ui/parser/issues/auxiliary/issue-21146-inc.rs", ]; pub fn base_dir_filter(entry: &DirEntry) -> bool {
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be: 1. Updating a git revision hash 2. Adding new exclusion patterns for Clippy lint files 3. Reorganizing some test file paths Here's the analysis following your requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability [third_party/rust/syn/tests/repo/mod.rs] [Lines 10,46-69] [Old code with previous revision and exclusions] [New code with updated revision and additional exclusions] The changes seem to be related to test configuration and maintenance rather than security fixes. The git revision update could be related to getting newer, potentially more secure code, but there's no specific vulnerability being referenced in the diff. The path changes and additional exclusions appear to be organizational/structural changes in the test files rather than security-related modifications.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/UbiNodeShortestPaths.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/UbiNodeShortestPaths.cpp@@ -46,16 +46,15 @@ JS_PUBLIC_API void dumpPaths(JSContext* cx, Node node, uint32_t maxNumPaths /* = 10 */) {- mozilla::Maybe<AutoCheckCannotGC> nogc;-- JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, nogc, true);- MOZ_ASSERT(rootList.init());+ JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, true);+ auto [ok, nogc] = rootList.init();+ MOZ_ASSERT(ok); NodeSet targets;- bool ok = targets.putNew(node);+ ok = targets.putNew(node); MOZ_ASSERT(ok);- auto paths = ShortestPaths::Create(cx, nogc.ref(), maxNumPaths, &rootList,+ auto paths = ShortestPaths::Create(cx, nogc, maxNumPaths, &rootList, std::move(targets)); MOZ_ASSERT(paths.isSome());
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [js/src/vm/UbiNodeShortestPaths.cpp] [Lines 46-56] [Old Code] ```cpp mozilla::Maybe<AutoCheckCannotGC> nogc; JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, nogc, true); MOZ_ASSERT(rootList.init()); ``` [Fixed Code] ```cpp JS::ubi::RootList rootList(cx, true); auto [ok, nogc] = rootList.init(); MOZ_ASSERT(ok); ``` Additional Details: The change modifies how garbage collection (GC) safety is handled. The old version created a Maybe<AutoCheckCannotGC> before initializing rootList, while the new version gets it from rootList.init(). This could potentially address a memory safety issue related to GC, but without more context, we can't be certain. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Resource Initialization Issue] [js/src/vm/UbiNodeShortestPaths.cpp] [Lines 46-56] [Old Code] ```cpp bool ok = targets.putNew(node); ``` [Fixed Code] ```cpp ok = targets.putNew(node); ``` Additional Details: The change reuses the 'ok' variable from the previous initialization check. This might indicate a fix for potential resource initialization or error handling issue, but the impact isn't clear from the diff alone. Note: While these changes appear to improve code robustness, without more context about the specific vulnerabilities they address, we can't definitively identify them as security fixes. The changes do show improved error handling and resource management patterns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/test/raptor.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/test/raptor.py@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from gecko_taskgraph.util.treeherder import split_symbol, join_symbol transforms = TransformSequence()+task_transforms = TransformSequence() raptor_description_schema = Schema( {@@ -297,3 +298,13 @@ extra_options.append("--project={}".format(config.params.get("project"))) yield test+++@task_transforms.add+def add_scopes_and_proxy(config, tasks):+ for task in tasks:+ task.setdefault("worker", {})["taskcluster-proxy"] = True+ task.setdefault("scopes", []).append(+ "secrets:get:project/perftest/gecko/level-{level}/perftest-login"+ )+ yield task
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insufficient Scope Restriction [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/test/raptor.py] [Lines 298-306]
[Old Code]
(None - new code being added)
[Fixed Code]
@task_transforms.add
def add_scopes_and_proxy(config, tasks):
for task in tasks:
task.setdefault("worker", {})["taskcluster-proxy"] = True
task.setdefault("scopes", []).append(
"secrets:get:project/perftest/gecko/level-{level}/perftest-login"
)
yield task
Additional Details:
- The vulnerability involves adding secret access scopes to tasks without sufficient validation or restriction
- The fix adds a new transform that explicitly controls access to perftest secrets
- The scope is now properly defined with level-based access control
- The taskcluster-proxy is explicitly enabled for these tasks that need secret access
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Secret Exposure [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/test/raptor.py] [Lines 298-306]
[Old Code]
(None - new code being added)
[Fixed Code]
@task_transforms.add
def add_scopes_and_proxy(config, tasks):
for task in tasks:
task.setdefault("worker", {})["taskcluster-proxy"] = True
task.setdefault("scopes", []).append(
"secrets:get:project/perftest/gecko/level-{level}/perftest-login"
)
yield task
Additional Details:
- While the code properly scopes secret access, it's unclear if additional protections are needed for the perftest-login secret
- The change might be related to fixing potential secret exposure in previous versions, but we can't confirm without seeing the previous implementation
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-023.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-023.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ -ms-column-fill: auto; -webkit-column-fill: auto; column-fill: auto;- border: 2px dashed;+ border: 2px solid salmon; margin-bottom: 5px; }
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-023.html [Lines] 23
Old Code: border: 2px dashed;
Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;
Additional Details:
- This appears to be purely a visual/style change in a test file, changing the border style from dashed to solid and adding a color (salmon)
- The change doesn't involve any security-sensitive functionality (no input handling, no DOM manipulation, no script execution, etc.)
- The file is a reftest (reference test) for CSS Grid functionality, which typically doesn't contain security-related code
No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change seems to be purely cosmetic for testing purposes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/storage.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/storage.rs@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ pub const INVALID: Index<T> = Index(u32::MAX, PhantomData); pub const UNUSED: Index<T> = Index(u32::MAX-1, PhantomData);+}++#[derive(Debug)]+pub struct OpenRange<T> {+ start: Index<T>, } #[derive(Debug)]@@ -91,15 +96,32 @@ Index(index as u32, PhantomData) }+ pub fn reserve(&mut self, count: usize) {+ self.data.reserve(count);+ }+ pub fn recycle(&mut self, recycler: &mut Recycler) { recycler.recycle_vec(&mut self.data); } pub fn extend<II: IntoIterator<Item=T>>(&mut self, iter: II) -> Range<T> {- let start = Index::new(self.data.len());+ let range = self.open_range(); self.data.extend(iter);- let end = Index::new(self.data.len());- Range { start, end }++ self.close_range(range)+ }++ pub fn open_range(&self) -> OpenRange<T> {+ OpenRange {+ start: Index::new(self.data.len())+ }+ }++ pub fn close_range(&self, range: OpenRange<T>) -> Range<T> {+ Range {+ start: range.start,+ end: Index::new(self.data.len()),+ } } }
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Integer Overflow] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/storage.rs] [Lines 91-96]
[Old Code]
pub fn extend<II: IntoIterator<Item=T>>(&mut self, iter: II) -> Range<T> {
let start = Index::new(self.data.len());
self.data.extend(iter);
let end = Index::new(self.data.len());
Range { start, end }
}
[Fixed Code]
pub fn extend<II: IntoIterator<Item=T>>(&mut self, iter: II) -> Range<T> {
let range = self.open_range();
self.data.extend(iter);
self.close_range(range)
}
Additional Details: The change introduces more careful handling of range tracking, which might help prevent potential integer overflow issues when dealing with large data sets, though it's not explicitly a security fix.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Exhaustion] [gfx/wr/webrender/src/prim_store/storage.rs] [Lines 96-98]
[Old Code]
(None - new function added)
[Fixed Code]
pub fn reserve(&mut self, count: usize) {
self.data.reserve(count);
}
Additional Details: The addition of reserve() method allows for better memory management, which could help prevent potential resource exhaustion attacks by allowing explicit control over memory allocation.
Note: While these changes appear to improve the robustness of the code, I couldn't identify any specific, named vulnerabilities that were clearly fixed. The modifications seem more focused on improving code structure and safety rather than addressing specific security vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/from_meta.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/from_meta.rs@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@+use std::borrow::Cow; use std::cell::RefCell;-use std::collections::hash_map::{Entry, HashMap};+use std::collections::hash_map::HashMap;+use std::collections::HashSet; use std::hash::BuildHasher; use std::rc::Rc; use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool; use std::sync::Arc;-use ident_case;-use syn::{self, Lit, Meta, NestedMeta};--use {Error, Result};+use syn::{Expr, Lit, Meta, NestedMeta};++use crate::{Error, Result}; /// Create an instance from an item in an attribute declaration. ///@@ -22,6 +23,10 @@ /// * Word with no value specified - becomes `true`. /// * As a boolean literal, e.g. `foo = true`. /// * As a string literal, e.g. `foo = "true"`.+///+/// ## char+/// * As a char literal, e.g. `foo = '#'`.+/// * As a string literal consisting of a single character, e.g. `foo = "#"`. /// /// ## String /// * As a string literal, e.g. `foo = "hello"`.@@ -96,6 +101,7 @@ (match *value { Lit::Bool(ref b) => Self::from_bool(b.value), Lit::Str(ref s) => Self::from_string(&s.value()),+ Lit::Char(ref ch) => Self::from_char(ch.value()), _ => Err(Error::unexpected_lit_type(value)), }) .map_err(|e| e.with_span(value))@@ -133,6 +139,7 @@ Ok(true) }+ #[allow(clippy::wrong_self_convention)] // false positive fn from_bool(value: bool) -> Result<Self> { Ok(value) }@@ -147,6 +154,25 @@ FromMeta::from_meta(mi) .map(AtomicBool::new) .map_err(|e| e.with_span(mi))+ }+}++impl FromMeta for char {+ #[allow(clippy::wrong_self_convention)] // false positive+ fn from_char(value: char) -> Result<Self> {+ Ok(value)+ }++ fn from_string(s: &str) -> Result<Self> {+ let mut chars = s.chars();+ let char1 = chars.next();+ let char2 = chars.next();++ if let (Some(char), None) = (char1, char2) {+ Ok(char)+ } else {+ Err(Error::unexpected_type("string"))+ } } }@@ -231,6 +257,63 @@ } }+/// Parsing support for punctuated. This attempts to preserve span information+/// when available, but also supports parsing strings with the call site as the+/// emitted span.+impl<T: syn::parse::Parse, P: syn::parse::Parse> FromMeta for syn::punctuated::Punctuated<T, P> {+ fn from_value(value: &Lit) -> Result<Self> {+ if let Lit::Str(ref ident) = *value {+ ident+ .parse_with(syn::punctuated::Punctuated::parse_terminated)+ .map_err(|_| Error::unknown_lit_str_value(ident))+ } else {+ Err(Error::unexpected_lit_type(value))+ }+ }+}++/// Parsing support for an array, i.e. `example = "[1 + 2, 2 - 2, 3 * 4]"`.+impl FromMeta for syn::ExprArray {+ fn from_value(value: &Lit) -> Result<Self> {+ if let Lit::Str(ref ident) = *value {+ ident+ .parse::<syn::ExprArray>()+ .map_err(|_| Error::unknown_lit_str_value(ident))+ } else {+ Err(Error::unexpected_lit_type(value))+ }+ }+}++macro_rules! from_numeric_array {+ ($ty:ident) => {+ /// Parsing an unsigned integer array, i.e. `example = "[1, 2, 3, 4]"`.+ impl FromMeta for Vec<$ty> {+ fn from_value(value: &Lit) -> Result<Self> {+ let expr_array = syn::ExprArray::from_value(value)?;+ // To meet rust <1.36 borrow checker rules on expr_array.elems+ let v =+ expr_array+ .elems+ .iter()+ .map(|expr| match expr {+ Expr::Lit(lit) => $ty::from_value(&lit.lit),+ _ => Err(Error::custom("Expected array of unsigned integers")+ .with_span(expr)),+ })+ .collect::<Result<Vec<$ty>>>();+ v+ }+ }+ };+}++from_numeric_array!(u8);+from_numeric_array!(u16);+from_numeric_array!(u32);+from_numeric_array!(u64);+from_numeric_array!(usize);+ /// Parsing support for paths. This attempts to preserve span information when available, /// but also supports parsing strings with the call site as the emitted span. impl FromMeta for syn::Path {@@ -349,40 +432,161 @@ } }-impl<V: FromMeta, S: BuildHasher + Default> FromMeta for HashMap<String, V, S> {- fn from_list(nested: &[syn::NestedMeta]) -> Result<Self> {- let mut map = HashMap::with_capacity_and_hasher(nested.len(), Default::default());- for item in nested {- if let syn::NestedMeta::Meta(ref inner) = *item {- let path = inner.path();- let name = path.segments.iter().map(|s| s.ident.to_string()).collect::<Vec<String>>().join("::");- match map.entry(name) {- Entry::Occupied(_) => {- return Err(- Error::duplicate_field_path(&path).with_span(inner)- );- }- Entry::Vacant(entry) => {- // In the error case, extend the error's path, but assume the inner `from_meta`- // set the span, and that subsequently we don't have to.- entry.insert(FromMeta::from_meta(inner).map_err(|e| e.at_path(&path))?);+fn path_to_string(path: &syn::Path) -> String {+ path.segments+ .iter()+ .map(|s| s.ident.to_string())+ .collect::<Vec<String>>()+ .join("::")+}++/// Trait to convert from a path into an owned key for a map.+trait KeyFromPath: Sized {+ fn from_path(path: &syn::Path) -> Result<Self>;+ fn to_display(&self) -> Cow<'_, str>;+}++impl KeyFromPath for String {+ fn from_path(path: &syn::Path) -> Result<Self> {+ Ok(path_to_string(path))+ }++ fn to_display(&self) -> Cow<'_, str> {+ Cow::Borrowed(self)+ }+}++impl KeyFromPath for syn::Path {+ fn from_path(path: &syn::Path) -> Result<Self> {+ Ok(path.clone())+ }++ fn to_display(&self) -> Cow<'_, str> {+ Cow::Owned(path_to_string(self))+ }+}++impl KeyFromPath for syn::Ident {+ fn from_path(path: &syn::Path) -> Result<Self> {+ if path.segments.len() == 1+ && path.leading_colon.is_none()+ && path.segments[0].arguments.is_empty()+ {+ Ok(path.segments[0].ident.clone())+ } else {+ Err(Error::custom("Key must be an identifier").with_span(path))+ }+ }++ fn to_display(&self) -> Cow<'_, str> {+ Cow::Owned(self.to_string())+ }+}++macro_rules! hash_map {+ ($key:ty) => {+ impl<V: FromMeta, S: BuildHasher + Default> FromMeta for HashMap<$key, V, S> {+ fn from_list(nested: &[syn::NestedMeta]) -> Result<Self> {+ // Convert the nested meta items into a sequence of (path, value result) result tuples.+ // An outer Err means no (key, value) structured could be found, while an Err in the+ // second position of the tuple means that value was rejected by FromMeta.+ //+ // We defer key conversion into $key so that we don't lose span information in the case+ // of String keys; we'll need it for good duplicate key errors later.+ let pairs = nested+ .iter()+ .map(|item| -> Result<(&syn::Path, Result<V>)> {+ match *item {+ syn::NestedMeta::Meta(ref inner) => {+ let path = inner.path();+ Ok((+ path,+ FromMeta::from_meta(inner).map_err(|e| e.at_path(&path)),+ ))+ }+ syn::NestedMeta::Lit(_) => Err(Error::unsupported_format("literal")),+ }+ });++ let mut errors = vec![];+ // We need to track seen keys separately from the final map, since a seen key with an+ // Err value won't go into the final map but should trigger a duplicate field error.+ //+ // This is a set of $key rather than Path to avoid the possibility that a key type+ // parses two paths of different values to the same key value.+ let mut seen_keys = HashSet::with_capacity(nested.len());++ // The map to return in the Ok case. Its size will always be exactly nested.len(),+ // since otherwise ≥1 field had a problem and the entire map is dropped immediately+ // when the function returns `Err`.+ let mut map = HashMap::with_capacity_and_hasher(nested.len(), Default::default());++ for item in pairs {+ match item {+ Ok((path, value)) => {+ let key: $key = match KeyFromPath::from_path(path) {+ Ok(k) => k,+ Err(e) => {+ errors.push(e);++ // Surface value errors even under invalid keys+ if let Err(val_err) = value {+ errors.push(val_err);+ }++ continue;+ }+ };++ let already_seen = seen_keys.contains(&key);++ if already_seen {+ errors.push(+ Error::duplicate_field(&key.to_display()).with_span(path),+ );+ }++ match value {+ Ok(_) if already_seen => {}+ Ok(val) => {+ map.insert(key.clone(), val);+ }+ Err(e) => {+ errors.push(e);+ }+ }++ seen_keys.insert(key);+ }+ Err(e) => {+ errors.push(e);+ } } }++ if !errors.is_empty() {+ return Err(Error::multiple(errors));+ }++ Ok(map) } }-- Ok(map)- }-}+ };+}++// This is done as a macro rather than a blanket impl to avoid breaking backwards compatibility+// with 0.12.x, while still sharing the same impl.+hash_map!(String);+hash_map!(syn::Ident);+hash_map!(syn::Path); /// Tests for `FromMeta` implementations. Wherever the word `ignore` appears in test input, /// it should not be considered by the parsing. #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use proc_macro2::TokenStream;- use syn;-- use {Error, FromMeta, Result};++ use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result}; /// parse a string as a syn::Meta instance. fn pm(tokens: TokenStream) -> ::std::result::Result<syn::Meta, String> {@@ -397,10 +601,11 @@ #[test] fn unit_succeeds() {- assert_eq!(fm::<()>(quote!(ignore)), ());- }-- #[test]+ let () = fm::<()>(quote!(ignore));+ }++ #[test]+ #[allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)] fn bool_succeeds() { // word format assert_eq!(fm::<bool>(quote!(ignore)), true);@@ -415,6 +620,15 @@ } #[test]+ fn char_succeeds() {+ // char literal+ assert_eq!(fm::<char>(quote!(ignore = '😬')), '😬');++ // string literal+ assert_eq!(fm::<char>(quote!(ignore = "😬")), '😬');+ }++ #[test] fn string_succeeds() { // cooked form assert_eq!(&fm::<String>(quote!(ignore = "world")), "world");@@ -424,6 +638,7 @@ } #[test]+ #[allow(clippy::float_cmp)] // we want exact equality fn number_succeeds() { assert_eq!(fm::<u8>(quote!(ignore = "2")), 2u8); assert_eq!(fm::<i16>(quote!(ignore = "-25")), -25i16);@@ -441,6 +656,7 @@ } #[test]+ #[allow(clippy::float_cmp)] // we want exact equality fn float_without_quotes() { assert_eq!(fm::<f32>(quote!(ignore = 2.)), 2.0f32); assert_eq!(fm::<f32>(quote!(ignore = 2.0)), 2.0f32);@@ -490,6 +706,68 @@ assert_eq!(err.to_string(), Error::duplicate_field("hello").to_string()); }+ #[test]+ fn hash_map_multiple_errors() {+ use std::collections::HashMap;++ let err = HashMap::<String, bool>::from_meta(+ &pm(quote!(ignore(hello, hello = 3, hello = false))).unwrap(),+ )+ .expect_err("Duplicates and bad values should error");++ assert_eq!(err.len(), 3);+ let errors = err.into_iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();+ assert!(errors[0].has_span());+ assert!(errors[1].has_span());+ assert!(errors[2].has_span());+ }++ #[test]+ fn hash_map_ident_succeeds() {+ use std::collections::HashMap;+ use syn::parse_quote;++ let comparison = {+ let mut c = HashMap::<syn::Ident, bool>::new();+ c.insert(parse_quote!(first), true);+ c.insert(parse_quote!(second), false);+ c+ };++ assert_eq!(+ fm::<HashMap<syn::Ident, bool>>(quote!(ignore(first, second = false))),+ comparison+ );+ }++ #[test]+ fn hash_map_ident_rejects_non_idents() {+ use std::collections::HashMap;++ let err: Result<HashMap<syn::Ident, bool>> =+ FromMeta::from_meta(&pm(quote!(ignore(first, the::second))).unwrap());++ err.unwrap_err();+ }++ #[test]+ fn hash_map_path_succeeds() {+ use std::collections::HashMap;+ use syn::parse_quote;++ let comparison = {+ let mut c = HashMap::<syn::Path, bool>::new();+ c.insert(parse_quote!(first), true);+ c.insert(parse_quote!(the::second), false);+ c+ };++ assert_eq!(+ fm::<HashMap<syn::Path, bool>>(quote!(ignore(first, the::second = false))),+ comparison+ );+ }+ /// Tests that fallible parsing will always produce an outer `Ok` (from `fm`), /// and will accurately preserve the inner contents. #[test]@@ -497,4 +775,43 @@ fm::<Result<()>>(quote!(ignore)).unwrap(); fm::<Result<()>>(quote!(ignore(world))).unwrap_err(); }-}++ /// Test punctuated+ #[test]+ fn test_punctuated() {+ fm::<syn::punctuated::Punctuated<syn::FnArg, syn::token::Comma>>(quote!(+ ignore = "a: u8, b: Type"+ ));+ fm::<syn::punctuated::Punctuated<syn::Expr, syn::token::Comma>>(quote!(ignore = "a, b, c"));+ }++ #[test]+ fn test_expr_array() {+ fm::<syn::ExprArray>(quote!(ignore = "[0x1, 0x2]"));+ fm::<syn::ExprArray>(quote!(ignore = "[\"Hello World\", \"Test Array\"]"));+ }++ #[test]+ fn test_number_array() {+ assert_eq!(+ fm::<Vec<u8>>(quote!(ignore = "[16, 0xff]")),+ vec![0x10, 0xff]+ );+ assert_eq!(+ fm::<Vec<u16>>(quote!(ignore = "[32, 0xffff]")),+ vec![0x20, 0xffff]+ );+ assert_eq!(+ fm::<Vec<u32>>(quote!(ignore = "[48, 0xffffffff]")),+ vec![0x30, 0xffffffff]+ );+ assert_eq!(+ fm::<Vec<u64>>(quote!(ignore = "[64, 0xffffffffffffffff]")),+ vec![0x40, 0xffffffffffffffff]+ );+ assert_eq!(+ fm::<Vec<usize>>(quote!(ignore = "[80, 0xffffffff]")),+ vec![0x50, 0xffffffff]+ );+ }+}
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be primarily feature additions and code improvements rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes are: - Added support for char literals - Improved HashMap implementation with better error handling - Added support for numeric arrays - Added support for punctuated expressions - Various code quality improvements 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes include: - Better error handling for duplicate fields - More robust parsing of different data types - Added test cases for new functionality The diff shows significant improvements in functionality and robustness, but no clear security vulnerabilities that were addressed. The changes are more about expanding capabilities and improving code quality rather than fixing security issues. If there were any security concerns in the previous version, they would likely have been related to potential parsing edge cases, but the diff doesn't explicitly mention fixing any such vulnerabilities. The improved error handling might prevent some edge cases that could have caused problems, but these don't appear to be security fixes per se.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/CHANGELOG.md@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@+### v0.2.3 (May 19, 2020)++- **Features**:+ - Add `warp::compression` filters, which will compress response bodies.+ - Add `warp::header::value()` filter to get a request `HeaderValue`.+ - Add `request_headers` method to `warp::log::Info`.+ - Add `max_frame_size` to `warp::ws::Ws` builder.+ - Add `remote_addr` to `warp::test::RequestBuilder`.+ - Add `try_bind_with_graceful_shutdown` to `warp::Server` builder.+ - Add `serve_incoming_with_graceful_shutdown` to `warp::Server` builder.+- **Fixes**:+ - Fix `warp::addr::remote` when used with `Server::tls`.+ - Fix panic in `warp::path::{peek, tail, full}` filters when the request URI is in authority-form or asterisk-form.+ ### v0.2.2 (March 3, 2020) - **Features**:
Based on the provided diff content from the CHANGELOG.md file, I'll analyze the changes for potential security fixes. However, since this is a changelog file rather than actual code changes, we can only infer potential vulnerabilities from the described fixes.
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential panic vulnerability] [third_party/rust/warp/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines 11-12]
[Old Code]: Not explicitly shown in diff (previous version may have had panicking behavior)
[Fixed Code]: "Fix panic in `warp::path::{peek, tail, full}` filters when the request URI is in authority-form or asterisk-form"
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential TLS/remote address vulnerability] [third_party/rust/warp/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines 10-11]
[Old Code]: Not explicitly shown in diff (previous version may have had incorrect remote address handling)
[Fixed Code]: "Fix `warp::addr::remote` when used with `Server::tls`"
Note: While these changelog entries describe fixes that could potentially relate to security vulnerabilities (especially the panic fix which could be a DoS vector), we cannot definitively confirm they were security fixes without more context or access to the actual code changes. The changelog doesn't explicitly label them as security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/MutexIDs.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/MutexIDs.h@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ \ _(GlobalHelperThreadState, 400) \ \- _(SharedImmutableStringsCache, 500) \ _(FutexThread, 500) \ _(GeckoProfilerStrings, 500) \ _(ProtectedRegionTree, 500) \@@ -57,7 +56,10 @@ _(WasmSignalInstallState, 500) \ _(WasmHugeMemoryEnabled, 500) \ _(MemoryTracker, 500) \+ _(StencilCache, 500) \+ _(SourceCompression, 500) \ \+ _(SharedImmutableStringsCache, 600) \ _(IrregexpLazyStatic, 600) \ _(ThreadId, 600) \ _(WasmCodeSegmentMap, 600) \
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Mutex ID Collision] [js/src/vm/MutexIDs.h] [Lines 31-57] [Old Code] _(SharedImmutableStringsCache, 500) \ _(FutexThread, 500) \ _(GeckoProfilerStrings, 500) \ ... [Fixed Code] _(FutexThread, 500) \ _(GeckoProfilerStrings, 500) \ ... _(SharedImmutableStringsCache, 600) \ Additional Details: The change moves SharedImmutableStringsCache from 500 to 600 mutex ID, potentially avoiding a collision with other mutexes at 500. However, without more context about how these IDs are used, we can't be certain if this was an actual security issue. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Race Condition Prevention] [js/src/vm/MutexIDs.h] [Lines 31-57] [Old Code] _(MemoryTracker, 500) \ [Fixed Code] _(MemoryTracker, 500) \ _(StencilCache, 500) \ _(SourceCompression, 500) \ Additional Details: The addition of two new mutexes (StencilCache and SourceCompression) at 500 might indicate these resources needed proper synchronization where previously they might have been unprotected. However, without seeing the actual usage, this is speculative. Note: The diff shows reorganization of mutex IDs, but without seeing the actual usage of these mutexes in the codebase, we can't definitively state these were security fixes. The changes could be for various reasons including code organization, performance optimization, or actual security fixes. The movement of SharedImmutableStringsCache to a higher ID might suggest it was sharing an ID with other mutexes which could potentially cause issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/html/input/NumericInputTypes.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/html/input/NumericInputTypes.h@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ nsresult GetValueMissingMessage(nsAString& aMessage) override; nsresult GetBadInputMessage(nsAString& aMessage) override;+ bool ConvertStringToNumber(nsAString& aValue,+ Decimal& aResultValue) const override; bool ConvertNumberToString(Decimal aValue, nsAString& aResultString) const override;
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Numeric Input Validation Issue] [dom/html/input/NumericInputTypes.h] [Lines 46-48] [Old Code] (none - function was not present) [Fixed Code] `bool ConvertStringToNumber(nsAString& aValue, Decimal& aResultValue) const override;` Additional Details: 1. The diff shows the addition of a new virtual function `ConvertStringToNumber()` that handles string-to-number conversion for numeric input types. 2. While not explicitly showing a security vulnerability, the addition of this function suggests there might have been concerns about proper numeric input validation in the previous version. 3. The function appears to be part of a security hardening effort to ensure proper numeric conversion, which could prevent issues like: - Integer overflows - Invalid numeric input handling - Type conversion vulnerabilities 4. Without seeing the implementation or more context about why this was added, we can't be certain about specific vulnerabilities that might have existed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.stroke.unaffected.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.stroke.unaffected.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the assertions. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 35-36]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.