--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.h@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #ifndef jit_CacheIRCompiler_h #define jit_CacheIRCompiler_h+#include "mozilla/Casting.h" #include "mozilla/Maybe.h" #include "jit/CacheIR.h"@@ -866,6 +867,8 @@   void emitLoadStubFieldConstant(StubFieldOffset val, Register dest);   void emitLoadValueStubField(StubFieldOffset val, ValueOperand dest);+  void emitLoadDoubleValueStubField(StubFieldOffset val, ValueOperand dest,+                                    FloatRegister scratch);   uintptr_t readStubWord(uint32_t offset, StubField::Type type) {     MOZ_ASSERT(stubFieldPolicy_ == StubFieldPolicy::Constant);@@ -901,6 +904,11 @@     MOZ_ASSERT(stubFieldPolicy_ == StubFieldPolicy::Constant);     uint64_t raw = readStubInt64(offset, StubField::Type::Value);     return Value::fromRawBits(raw);+  }+  double doubleStubField(uint32_t offset) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(stubFieldPolicy_ == StubFieldPolicy::Constant);+    uint64_t raw = readStubInt64(offset, StubField::Type::Double);+    return mozilla::BitwiseCast<double>(raw);   }   JSString* stringStubField(uint32_t offset) {     MOZ_ASSERT(stubFieldPolicy_ == StubFieldPolicy::Constant);

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Type Confusion/Precision Loss] [js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.h] [Lines 904-911]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous implementation of doubleStubField)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   double doubleStubField(uint32_t offset) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(stubFieldPolicy_ == StubFieldPolicy::Constant);
     uint64_t raw = readStubInt64(offset, StubField::Type::Double);
     return mozilla::BitwiseCast<double>(raw);
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The addition of proper double value handling using BitwiseCast suggests potential previous issues with type conversion or precision loss when dealing with double values.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.h] [Lines 7]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   #include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   #include "mozilla/Casting.h"
   #include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
   ```  
   Additional Details: The addition of Casting.h header suggests potential previous issues with unsafe type casting operations.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Value Handling Issue] [js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.h] [Lines 867]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   void emitLoadValueStubField(StubFieldOffset val, ValueOperand dest);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   void emitLoadValueStubField(StubFieldOffset val, ValueOperand dest);
   void emitLoadDoubleValueStubField(StubFieldOffset val, ValueOperand dest,
                                   FloatRegister scratch);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The addition of a specialized double value loading function suggests potential previous issues with how double values were handled in the stub fields.

Note: While these changes appear to improve type safety and precision handling, without more context about previous behavior or reported vulnerabilities, we can't definitively state these were security fixes. The changes do suggest potential areas where vulnerabilities could have existed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.ideographic.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.ideographic.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.textBaseline = 'ideographic';     ctx.fillText('CC', 0, 31.25);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the references accordingly. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 27-32]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.miter.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.miter.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -40,16 +40,16 @@ ctx.stroke(); ctx.fillRect(60, 10, 30, 20); ctx.fillRect(70, 10, 20, 30);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 38,12, 0,255,0,255, "38,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 39,11, 0,255,0,255, "39,11", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 40,10, 0,255,0,255, "40,10", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,9, 0,255,0,255, "41,9", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 42,8, 0,255,0,255, "42,8", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 88,12, 0,255,0,255, "88,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 89,11, 0,255,0,255, "89,11", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,10, 0,255,0,255, "90,10", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 91,9, 0,255,0,255, "91,9", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 92,8, 0,255,0,255, "92,8", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 38,12, 0,255,0,255, "38,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 39,11, 0,255,0,255, "39,11", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 40,10, 0,255,0,255, "40,10", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,9, 0,255,0,255, "41,9", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 42,8, 0,255,0,255, "42,8", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 88,12, 0,255,0,255, "88,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 89,11, 0,255,0,255, "89,11", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,10, 0,255,0,255, "90,10", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 91,9, 0,255,0,255, "91,9", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 92,8, 0,255,0,255, "92,8", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions to use the new variable name.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are purely variable renaming and test assertion updates.

The changes are:
1. Variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` (lines 13-14)
2. Updated assertions to use the new variable name (lines 40-49)

No security implications were identified in these changes. The modifications appear to be code style/consistency improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.ideographic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.ideographic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.textBaseline = 'ideographic';     ctx.fillText('CC', 0, 31.25);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls using this variable. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.ideographic.html
   Lines: 17-18, 31-36
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgb-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0, 255.0, 0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where variable names were updated for consistency. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   Old Code:
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the test file, which doesn't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/assorted/float-retry-push-image.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/assorted/float-retry-push-image.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/"> <link rel="match" href="reference/float-retry-push-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test that a too-wide inline block is pushed in the block direction along a shape-outside image until it fits."> <style>   body {

Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 5-6]
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code]
    (removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with the "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security-related change but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup.
- No actual security vulnerabilities are addressed in this change. The modification is likely related to test configuration or documentation rather than security fixes.
- The removed tag didn't contain any sensitive information or configuration that could lead to security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/x64/CodeGenerator-x64.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/x64/CodeGenerator-x64.cpp@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@   Scalar::Type storageType = mir->storageType();+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_load in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   auto sync = Synchronization::Load();   masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);@@ -351,6 +353,8 @@   masm.loadBigInt64(value, temp1);+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_store in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   auto sync = Synchronization::Store();   masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Barrier Issue] [js/src/jit/x64/CodeGenerator-x64.cpp] [Lines 325-351]
[Old Code]
  Scalar::Type storageType = mir->storageType();

  auto sync = Synchronization::Load();

  masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);
[Fixed Code]
  Scalar::Type storageType = mir->storageType();

  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_load in
  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py
  auto sync = Synchronization::Load();

  masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Atomic Operations Synchronization Issue] [js/src/jit/x64/CodeGenerator-x64.cpp] [Lines 351-353]
[Old Code]
  masm.loadBigInt64(value, temp1);

  auto sync = Synchronization::Store();

  masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);
[Fixed Code]
  masm.loadBigInt64(value, temp1);

  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_store in
  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py
  auto sync = Synchronization::Store();

  masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);

Notes:
1. The changes appear to be adding comments about synchronization requirements between generated code and assembly code in GenerateAtomicOperations.py
2. While these look like important synchronization notes, I can't determine if they're fixing an actual vulnerability or just adding documentation
3. The changes relate to atomic operations which are security-sensitive, but without more context about previous behavior, I can't confirm if there was an actual vulnerability
4. The comments suggest there might have been potential for mismatched synchronization behavior between different code generation paths

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/extensions/webcompat/manifest.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/extensions/webcompat/manifest.json@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@   "manifest_version": 2,   "name": "Web Compatibility Interventions",   "description": "Urgent post-release fixes for web compatibility.",-  "version": "29.7.0",+  "version": "30.0.0",   "applications": {     "gecko": {       "id": "[email protected]",@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@     "shims/apstag.js",     "shims/bmauth.js",     "shims/chartbeat.js",+    "shims/crave-ca.js",     "shims/criteo.js",     "shims/cxense.js",     "shims/eluminate.js",

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Version Update:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Version Update [File] [Lines 2-7]
    [Old Code]
    "version": "29.7.0",
    [Fixed Code]
    "version": "30.0.0",

2. New Shim Addition:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    New Shim Addition [File] [Lines 98-99]
    [Old Code]
    (no entry for crave-ca.js)
    [Fixed Code]
    "shims/crave-ca.js",

Note: The diff shows two main changes:
1. A version number update (minor version bump) which doesn't appear to be security-related
2. Addition of a new shim file ('crave-ca.js') which could potentially be a security fix for web compatibility issues, but without seeing the contents of the shim file, we can't be certain if it addresses a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/control_stream_local.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/control_stream_local.rs@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ // option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed // except according to those terms.-use crate::hframe::HFrame;+use crate::frames::HFrame; use crate::{BufferedStream, Http3StreamType, RecvStream, Res}; use neqo_common::{qtrace, Encoder}; use neqo_transport::{Connection, StreamId, StreamType};@@ -74,14 +74,14 @@                 update_stream.stream_type(),                 Http3StreamType::Http | Http3StreamType::Push             ));-            let priority_handler = update_stream.http_stream().unwrap().priority_handler_mut();+            let stream = update_stream.http_stream().unwrap();             // in case multiple priority_updates were issued, ignore now irrelevant-            if let Some(hframe) = priority_handler.maybe_encode_frame(update_id) {+            if let Some(hframe) = stream.priority_update_frame() {                 let mut enc = Encoder::new();                 hframe.encode(&mut enc);                 if self.stream.send_atomic(conn, &enc)? {-                    priority_handler.priority_update_sent();+                    stream.priority_update_sent();                 } else {                     self.outstanding_priority_update.push_front(update_id);                     break;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Logic Flaw] [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/control_stream_local.rs] [Lines 74-84]
[Old Code]
            let priority_handler = update_stream.http_stream().unwrap().priority_handler_mut();
            if let Some(hframe) = priority_handler.maybe_encode_frame(update_id) {
                let mut enc = Encoder::new();
                hframe.encode(&mut enc);
                if self.stream.send_atomic(conn, &enc)? {
                    priority_handler.priority_update_sent();
[Fixed Code]
            let stream = update_stream.http_stream().unwrap();
            if let Some(hframe) = stream.priority_update_frame() {
                let mut enc = Encoder::new();
                hframe.encode(&mut enc);
                if self.stream.send_atomic(conn, &enc)? {
                    stream.priority_update_sent();

Analysis:
1. The changes appear to be related to priority handling in HTTP/3 streams, but without more context about the overall functionality, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a security vulnerability.
2. The main change is moving from using a separate `priority_handler` to handling priorities directly on the stream object.
3. The functionality remains similar but is now more directly tied to the stream object.
4. This could potentially be fixing a race condition or synchronization issue, but there's no clear evidence of a specific vulnerability being addressed.

Note: The diff shows improvements in the code structure and potentially better encapsulation, but doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability fix. The changes might be related to reliability or correctness improvements rather than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/talos/talos.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/talos/talos.json@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@             "tests": ["tart_flex", "ts_paint_flex"]         },         "other": {-            "_comment": "Bug 1220362 - Disabled startup_about_home_paint_cached for high frequency intermittents",-            "tests": ["a11yr", "ts_paint", "twinopen", "sessionrestore", "sessionrestore_no_auto_restore", "tabpaint", "cpstartup", "startup_about_home_paint", "pdfpaint", "cross_origin_pageload"]+            "tests": ["a11yr", "ts_paint", "twinopen", "sessionrestore", "sessionrestore_no_auto_restore", "tabpaint", "cpstartup", "startup_about_home_paint", "pdfpaint", "cross_origin_pageload", "startup_about_home_paint_cached"]         },         "sessionrestore-many-windows": {             "tests": ["sessionrestore_many_windows"]

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potentially Re-enabled Test with Known Issues] [testing/talos/talos.json] [Lines 13-16]
   [Old Code]
   "_comment": "Bug 1220362 - Disabled startup_about_home_paint_cached for high frequency intermittents",
   "tests": ["a11yr", "ts_paint", "twinopen", "sessionrestore", "sessionrestore_no_auto_restore", "tabpaint", "cpstartup", "startup_about_home_paint", "pdfpaint", "cross_origin_pageload"]
   [Fixed Code]
   "tests": ["a11yr", "ts_paint", "twinopen", "sessionrestore", "sessionrestore_no_auto_restore", "tabpaint", "cpstartup", "startup_about_home_paint", "pdfpaint", "cross_origin_pageload", "startup_about_home_paint_cached"]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows that a previously disabled test ("startup_about_home_paint_cached") was re-enabled by removing the comment and adding it back to the test list.
- The original comment indicates this test was disabled due to "high frequency intermittents" (likely referring to intermittent test failures).
- While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, re-enabling a previously problematic test could potentially mask underlying issues.
- Without more context about Bug 1220362, we can't be certain if there were security implications to the original intermittent failures.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-007.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-007.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Jieqiong Cui" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="8. The 'transform-origin' Property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#transform-origin-property"> <link rel="match" href="transform-origin-007-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'transform-origin' property set 'bottom' computes to 100% for the vertical position."> <style>   .div1 {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be minor HTML cleanup or test file modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-origin-007.html] [Lines 5-7]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: [removed line]]

Additional Notes:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose
2. This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
3. No actual security-related code changes were made in this diff
4. The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-ifc-022.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-layout-ifc-022.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-layout-ifc-022-ref.html">   <meta content="This test checks that an element with 'contain: layout' will make such element create its own formatting context. In this test, the element with 'contain: layout' acts as if it has its own formatting context independent from div#floated-left element. In other words, the div#with-contain-layout is no longer required to flow its content around the div#floated-left element and current line boxes next to the float are no longer shortened to make room for the margin box of the float." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
    [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This change seems to be a cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification is in a test file (html) and doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; ctx.shadowColor = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.off.2.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and don't introduce or fix any security-related issues. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/builtin/Array.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/builtin/Array.cpp@@ -3839,6 +3839,10 @@     JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("forEach", "ArrayForEach", 1, 0),     JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("map", "ArrayMap", 1, 0),     JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("filter", "ArrayFilter", 1, 0),+#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("groupBy", "ArrayGroupBy", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("groupByToMap", "ArrayGroupByToMap", 1, 0),+#endif     JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("reduce", "ArrayReduce", 1, 0),     JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("reduceRight", "ArrayReduceRight", 1, 0),     JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("some", "ArraySome", 1, 0),@@ -4123,6 +4127,15 @@       !DefineDataProperty(cx, unscopables, cx->names().values, value)) {     return false;   }++#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+  if (cx->realm()->creationOptions().getArrayGroupingEnabled()) {+    if (!DefineDataProperty(cx, unscopables, cx->names().groupBy, value) ||+        !DefineDataProperty(cx, unscopables, cx->names().groupByToMap, value)) {+      return false;+    }+  }+#endif #ifdef ENABLE_CHANGE_ARRAY_BY_COPY   if (cx->options().changeArrayByCopy()) {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   New Feature Addition [File] js/src/builtin/Array.cpp [Lines 3839-3843, 4127-4135]
   [Old Code]
   No code existed for groupBy and groupByToMap methods
   [Fixed Code]
   Added new array methods groupBy and groupByToMap behind NIGHTLY_BUILD flag

Additional details:
- The diff shows the addition of two new array methods (groupBy and groupByToMap) that are only available in nightly builds
- These are feature additions rather than security fixes
- The methods are properly guarded behind both compile-time (NIGHTLY_BUILD) and runtime (getArrayGroupingEnabled()) checks
- No security vulnerabilities are being fixed here, just new functionality being added
- The changes follow standard Mozilla practices for introducing experimental features

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes represent feature additions with appropriate safeguards rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/cascade-highlight-004.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/cascade-highlight-004.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-cascade">   <link rel="match" href="cascade-highlight-004-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta name="assert" content="In this test, 'color' and 'background-color' have not been given a value for the span element. Since its parent element has an highlight pseudo-element, then these values should be inherited. Therefore the span element should be green on a yellow background and should not use the OS default selection highlight color values.">   <!--

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/cascade-highlight-004.html [Lines] 8  
Old Code: `<meta content="" name="flags">`  
Fixed Code: (line removed)  

Additional Details:  
- This appears to be a simple test file cleanup rather than a security fix  
- The removed line was an empty meta tag that served no apparent purpose  
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change  
- The modification seems related to test case maintenance rather than security  

No other vulnerabilities or changes were detected in the provided diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/transport/dtlsidentity.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/transport/dtlsidentity.cpp@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #include "mozilla/Sprintf.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CryptoBuffer.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CryptoKey.h"-#include "mozilla/psm/PSMIPCCommon.h" #include "ipc/IPCMessageUtils.h" namespace mozilla {

I'll analyze the code diff according to the provided format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Build System Vulnerability] [dom/media/webrtc/transport/dtlsidentity.cpp] [Lines 20]
[Old Code]
#include "mozilla/psm/PSMIPCCommon.h"
[Fixed Code]
(removed)

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows removal of a header file inclusion (`mozilla/psm/PSMIPCCommon.h`).
2. While this might indicate a security improvement (removing unnecessary dependencies), I can't determine a specific vulnerability from this change alone.
3. The change could be related to build system improvements or IPC security hardening, but without more context about why this header was removed, I can't identify a specific vulnerability.

Note: This appears to be a minor cleanup change rather than a direct security fix. The removal of unused headers can improve security by reducing the attack surface, but this doesn't directly correspond to any known vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/indexedDB/IDBTransaction.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/indexedDB/IDBTransaction.cpp@@ -225,8 +225,9 @@           }         });     if (NS_WARN_IF(!workerRef)) {-      // Silence the destructor assertion if we never made this object live. #ifdef DEBUG+      // Silence the destructor assertions if we never made this object live.+      transaction->mReadyState = ReadyState::Finished;       transaction->mSentCommitOrAbort.Flip(); #endif       return nullptr;@@ -288,9 +289,6 @@     transactionChild.SendPBackgroundIDBRequestConstructor(actor, aParams);   });-  MOZ_ASSERT(actor->GetActorEventTarget(),-             "The event target shall be inherited from its manager actor.");-   // Balanced in BackgroundRequestChild::Recv__delete__().   OnNewRequest();@@ -305,9 +303,6 @@   DoWithTransactionChild([&aBackgroundActor, &aParams](auto& actor) {     actor.SendPBackgroundIDBCursorConstructor(&aBackgroundActor, aParams);   });--  MOZ_ASSERT(aBackgroundActor.GetActorEventTarget(),-             "The event target shall be inherited from its manager actor.");   // Balanced in BackgroundCursorChild::RecvResponse().   OnNewRequest();@@ -350,11 +345,11 @@       return;     }-    if (mReadyState == ReadyState::Inactive) {-      mReadyState = ReadyState::Committing;-    }-     if (aRequestCompletedSuccessfully) {+      if (mReadyState == ReadyState::Inactive) {+        mReadyState = ReadyState::Committing;+      }+       if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mAbortCode)) {         SendCommit(true);       } else {@@ -362,7 +357,8 @@       }     } else {       // Don't try to send any more messages to the parent if the request actor-      // was killed.+      // was killed. Set our state accordingly to Finished.+      mReadyState = ReadyState::Finished;       mSentCommitOrAbort.Flip();       IDB_LOG_MARK_CHILD_TRANSACTION(           "Request actor was killed, transaction will be aborted",@@ -457,18 +453,6 @@   } }-IDBTransaction::AutoRestoreState<IDBTransaction::ReadyState::Inactive,-                                 IDBTransaction::ReadyState::Active>-IDBTransaction::TemporarilyTransitionToActive() {-  return AutoRestoreState<ReadyState::Inactive, ReadyState::Active>{*this};-}--IDBTransaction::AutoRestoreState<IDBTransaction::ReadyState::Active,-                                 IDBTransaction::ReadyState::Inactive>-IDBTransaction::TemporarilyTransitionToInactive() {-  return AutoRestoreState<ReadyState::Active, ReadyState::Inactive>{*this};-}- void IDBTransaction::GetCallerLocation(nsAString& aFilename,                                        uint32_t* const aLineNo,                                        uint32_t* const aColumn) const {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I've identified several potential security-related changes:

1. First vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Race Condition/State Management Issue [dom/indexedDB/IDBTransaction.cpp] [Lines 225-229]
    [Old Code]
    if (NS_WARN_IF(!workerRef)) {
      // Silence the destructor assertion if we never made this object live.
    #ifdef DEBUG
      transaction->mSentCommitOrAbort.Flip();
    #endif
      return nullptr;
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    if (NS_WARN_IF(!workerRef)) {
    #ifdef DEBUG
      // Silence the destructor assertions if we never made this object live.
      transaction->mReadyState = ReadyState::Finished;
      transaction->mSentCommitOrAbort.Flip();
    #endif
      return nullptr;
    }

2. Second vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Missing State Transition [dom/indexedDB/IDBTransaction.cpp] [Lines 350-364]
    [Old Code]
    if (mReadyState == ReadyState::Inactive) {
      mReadyState = ReadyState::Committing;
    }

    if (aRequestCompletedSuccessfully) {
    [Fixed Code]
    if (aRequestCompletedSuccessfully) {
      if (mReadyState == ReadyState::Inactive) {
        mReadyState = ReadyState::Committing;
      }

3. Third vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Missing State Transition [dom/indexedDB/IDBTransaction.cpp] [Lines 362-364]
    [Old Code]
      // Don't try to send any more messages to the parent if the request actor
      // was killed.
      mSentCommitOrAbort.Flip();
    [Fixed Code]
      // Don't try to send any more messages to the parent if the request actor
      // was killed. Set our state accordingly to Finished.
      mReadyState = ReadyState::Finished;
      mSentCommitOrAbort.Flip();

4. Fourth change (not clearly a vulnerability fix):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Assertion Removal [dom/indexedDB/IDBTransaction.cpp] [Lines 288-290, 305-307]
    [Old Code]
    MOZ_ASSERT(actor->GetActorEventTarget(),
               "The event target shall be inherited from its manager actor.");
    [Fixed Code]
    (removed)

The changes primarily focus on better state management in error cases, ensuring proper state transitions when transactions fail or when worker references are invalid. These could prevent race conditions or inconsistent state issues that might lead to security vulnerabilities. The removal of assertions appears to be more of a code cleanup rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.createImageData(Infinity, 10); }); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.createImageData(-Infinity, 10); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.nonfinite.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. No security implications in this change
3. The test continues to check for proper handling of non-finite values in createImageData calls

No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/style-rule.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/style-rule.js@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@   true );+loader.lazyRequireGetter(this, "ChromeUtils");+ const XHTML_NS = "http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"; const SUPPORTED_RULE_TYPES = [@@ -308,6 +310,7 @@       type: this.type,       line: this.line || undefined,       column: this.column,+      ancestorData: [],       traits: {         // Indicates whether StyleRuleActor implements and can use the setRuleText method.         // It cannot use it if the stylesheet was programmatically mutated via the CSSOM.@@ -315,22 +318,27 @@       },     };-    if (this.rawRule.parentRule) {-      form.parentRule = this.pageStyle._styleRef(-        this.rawRule.parentRule-      ).actorID;--      // CSS rules that we call media rules are STYLE_RULES that are children-      // of MEDIA_RULEs. We need to check the parentRule to check if a rule is-      // a media rule so we do this here instead of in the switch statement-      // below.-      if (this.rawRule.parentRule.type === CSSRule.MEDIA_RULE) {-        form.media = [];-        for (let i = 0, n = this.rawRule.parentRule.media.length; i < n; i++) {-          form.media.push(this.rawRule.parentRule.media.item(i));-        }-      }-    }+    // Go through all ancestor so we can build an array of all the media queries and+    // layers this rule is in.+    for (const ancestorRule of this.ancestorRules) {+      if (+        ancestorRule.type === CSSRule.MEDIA_RULE &&+        ancestorRule.rawRule.media?.length+      ) {+        form.ancestorData.push({+          type: "media",+          value: Array.from(ancestorRule.rawRule.media).join(", "),+        });+      } else if (+        ChromeUtils.getClassName(ancestorRule.rawRule) === "CSSLayerBlockRule"+      ) {+        form.ancestorData.push({+          type: "layer",+          value: ancestorRule.rawRule.name,+        });+      }+    }+     if (this._parentSheet) {       if (this.pageStyle.hasStyleSheetWatcherSupport) {         form.parentStyleSheet = this.pageStyle.styleSheetsManager.getStyleSheetResourceId(@@ -340,6 +348,18 @@         form.parentStyleSheet = this.pageStyle._sheetRef(           this._parentSheet         ).actorID;+      }++      // If the rule is in a imported stylesheet with a specified layer, put it at the top+      // of the ancestor data array.+      if (+        this._parentSheet.ownerRule &&+        this._parentSheet.ownerRule.layerName !== null+      ) {+        form.ancestorData.unshift({+          type: "layer",+          value: this._parentSheet.ownerRule.layerName,+        });       }     }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
[No specific vulnerability found] [File: devtools/server/actors/style-rule.js] [Lines: 61, 308-348]  
[Old Code]  
The original code handled parent rules directly and only processed media rules from immediate parent.  
[Fixed Code]  
The new code introduces a more comprehensive approach to handling ancestor rules, including media rules and layer rules, and adds support for imported stylesheet layers.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Information Exposure] [File: devtools/server/actors/style-rule.js] [Lines: 318-348]  
[Old Code]  
Limited rule information was exposed through the form object.  
[Fixed Code]  
The new code exposes more detailed information about rule ancestors including media queries and layer names. While this appears to be a feature enhancement, there's a theoretical possibility this could expose more information than intended.

The main changes appear to be feature enhancements rather than security fixes:
1. Added support for ChromeUtils
2. Added ancestorData array to track rule hierarchy
3. Improved handling of media rules and added support for layer rules
4. Added special handling for imported stylesheet layers

No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes primarily improve functionality and completeness of CSS rule information handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/favicons/browser_favicon_credentials.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/favicons/browser_favicon_credentials.js@@ -21,8 +21,18 @@   Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault"); });+// Bug 1746646: Make mochitests work with TCP enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)+// All instances of addPermission and removePermission set up 3rd-party storage+// access in a way that allows the test to proceed with TCP enabled.+ function run_test(url, shouldHaveCookies, description) {   add_task(async () => {+    await SpecialPowers.addPermission(+      "3rdPartyStorage^http://example.com",+      true,+      url+    );+     await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(       { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },       async browser => {@@ -57,6 +67,10 @@         }       }     );+    await SpecialPowers.removePermission(+      "3rdPartyStorage^http://example.com",+      url+    );   }); }

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Cross-Site Tracking Vulnerability] [browser/base/content/test/favicons/browser_favicon_credentials.js] [Lines 21-67]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
function run_test(url, shouldHaveCookies, description) {
  add_task(async () => {
    await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
      { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },
      async browser => {
        // ... existing test code ...
      }
    );
  });
}
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
function run_test(url, shouldHaveCookies, description) {
  add_task(async () => {
    await SpecialPowers.addPermission(
      "3rdPartyStorage^http://example.com",
      true,
      url
    );

    await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
      { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },
      async browser => {
        // ... existing test code ...
      }
    );
    await SpecialPowers.removePermission(
      "3rdPartyStorage^http://example.com",
      url
    );
  });
}
```

Additional Details:
1. The change adds and removes 3rd-party storage permissions for testing purposes (as noted in the comment about Bug 1746646)
2. While this isn't fixing a direct security vulnerability in production code, it's related to testing with stricter cookie behaviors (TCP - Total Cookie Protection)
3. The modification ensures tests work correctly when third-party cookie blocking is enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)
4. Without seeing the complete test context, it's unclear if this was addressing a specific security issue or just test infrastructure improvements

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.