--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-009.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-009.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ 		<link rel="author" href="http://opera.com" title="Opera Software ASA"> 		<link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-conditional/#at-supports"> 		<link rel="match" href="at-supports-001-ref.html">-		<meta name="flags" content=""> 		<style> 			div { 				background-color:red;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-009.html [Lines] 6  
   [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">`  
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)  

Additional Details:  
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related  
- This seems to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix  
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change  
- The modification doesn't introduce or fix any security-sensitive functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/sandbox/linux/launch/SandboxLaunch.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/sandbox/linux/launch/SandboxLaunch.cpp@@ -265,6 +265,8 @@       // GetEffectiveSocketProcessSandboxLevel is main-thread-only due to prefs.       MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());       return GetEffectiveSocketProcessSandboxLevel();+    case GeckoProcessType_Utility:+      return PR_GetEnv("MOZ_DISABLE_UTILITY_SANDBOX") == nullptr ? 1 : 0;     default:       return 0;   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Insufficient Sandboxing for Utility Process [security/sandbox/linux/launch/SandboxLaunch.cpp] [Lines 265-268]  
[Old Code]  
```  
    default:  
      return 0;  
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```  
    case GeckoProcessType_Utility:  
      return PR_GetEnv("MOZ_DISABLE_UTILITY_SANDBOX") == nullptr ? 1 : 0;  
    default:  
      return 0;  
```  

Additional Details:  
1. The vulnerability appears to be a missing sandbox implementation for utility processes, which could lead to insufficient process isolation.  
2. The fix adds proper sandboxing for utility processes by checking the MOZ_DISABLE_UTILITY_SANDBOX environment variable.  
3. When the variable is not set (nullptr), it enables sandboxing (level 1), otherwise disables it (level 0).  
4. This appears to be a security hardening measure rather than fixing a known vulnerability, but the lack of sandboxing could be considered a security weakness.  

Note: While this isn't fixing a specific named vulnerability, it's addressing a security weakness by implementing proper sandboxing controls for a previously unprotected process type.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionMgr.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionMgr.h@@ -208,8 +208,15 @@   //-------------------------------------------------------------------------   ReentrantMonitor mReentrantMonitor{"nsHttpConnectionMgr.mReentrantMonitor"};+  // This is used as a flag that we're shut down, and no new events should be+  // dispatched.   nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> mSocketThreadTarget;+  Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> mIsShuttingDown{false};++  //-------------------------------------------------------------------------+  // NOTE: these members are only accessed on the socket transport thread+  //-------------------------------------------------------------------------   // connection limits   uint16_t mMaxUrgentExcessiveConns{0};   uint16_t mMaxConns{0};@@ -225,11 +232,6 @@   uint32_t mThrottleHoldTime{0};   TimeDuration mThrottleMaxTime;   bool mBeConservativeForProxy{true};-  Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> mIsShuttingDown{false};--  //--------------------------------------------------------------------------  // NOTE: these members are only accessed on the socket transport thread-  //-------------------------------------------------------------------------   [[nodiscard]] bool ProcessPendingQForEntry(ConnectionEntry*,                                              bool considerAll);

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Thread Safety/Shutdown Race Condition] [netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionMgr.h] [Lines 208-232]
    [Old Code: mIsShuttingDown was declared after other members without clear grouping]
    [Fixed Code: mIsShuttingDown moved up with added comment about its purpose as a shutdown flag]

The main change appears to be moving the `mIsShuttingDown` atomic boolean higher in the class declaration and adding documentation about its purpose. While this doesn't directly fix a known vulnerability, it improves code organization and makes the shutdown flag's purpose more clear, which could prevent potential race conditions during shutdown sequences.

The change suggests there might have been concerns about proper shutdown synchronization, but without seeing the actual bug report or more context, I can't be certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving code organization.

Note that this doesn't appear to be fixing any classic vulnerability (like buffer overflow, XSS, etc.), but rather improving thread safety during shutdown procedures.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/smallvec/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/smallvec/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"49cb9a97eb041da60c0db019be4b6c7cf335d16962ed222702d8d7a62d577115","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"0b28172679e0009b655da42797c03fd163a3379d5cfa67ba1f1655e974a2a1a9","README.md":"a01127c37308457e8d396b176fb790846be0978c173be3f13260b62efcef011b","benches/bench.rs":"7425b60d83d01a0bcedb5855ec8652fb1089194da5b5d8f7d7d9072c8ea9d133","scripts/run_miri.sh":"0d0b8c54c73fa9da1217d29ed0984f8328dd9fb61bb5a02db44458c360cdc3c4","src/lib.rs":"9ba7502191536089d511a0ba9d790d9dc26df6d1f36f89b8539787df1d8565b2","src/specialization.rs":"46433586203399251cba496d67b88d34e1be3c2b591986b77463513da1c66471","src/tests.rs":"5ff6c88e4742b0373a4c3859b91db42bf58601ed611472eee08dd995223249ce","tests/macro.rs":"22ad4f6f104a599fdcba19cad8834105b8656b212fb6c7573a427d447f5db14f"},"package":"1ecab6c735a6bb4139c0caafd0cc3635748bbb3acf4550e8138122099251f309"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"94a908a090a75ef2e262dd128e46129628873c13d7fdbf57d9718efd3ac59567","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"0b28172679e0009b655da42797c03fd163a3379d5cfa67ba1f1655e974a2a1a9","README.md":"a01127c37308457e8d396b176fb790846be0978c173be3f13260b62efcef011b","benches/bench.rs":"ede0ed2f95612e90261d473f42e26e7b4acb98e9675d051767821391497cd20b","scripts/run_miri.sh":"0d0b8c54c73fa9da1217d29ed0984f8328dd9fb61bb5a02db44458c360cdc3c4","src/arbitrary.rs":"22e55cfbf60374945b30e6d0855129eff67cd8b878cef6fa997e1f4be67b9e3d","src/lib.rs":"87e1ca95b06bde34f330f0253ddc8074785a6204be96fe0317747bfed611aed3","src/specialization.rs":"46433586203399251cba496d67b88d34e1be3c2b591986b77463513da1c66471","src/tests.rs":"2bcf69dc0597e4e8a59a92566a3dd5c82ec3a1ea563aa006ea0f4a2722cb2d17","tests/macro.rs":"22ad4f6f104a599fdcba19cad8834105b8656b212fb6c7573a427d447f5db14f"},"package":"f2dd574626839106c320a323308629dcb1acfc96e32a8cba364ddc61ac23ee83"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.selfintersect.html========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.selfintersect.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.selfintersect.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(45, 20, 10, 10); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be either updates to checksums or variable renaming in test files. Here's the analysis:

1. For the first file (smallvec/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is just a checksum update for the package, indicating some files were modified but there's no security vulnerability indicated in the diff.

2. For the second file (2d.path.rect.selfintersect.html):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    The changes are purely variable renaming (offscreenCanvas → canvas) in a test file, which doesn't indicate any security issue.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff. The changes appear to be routine updates and test modifications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/places/nsPlacesTables.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/places/nsPlacesTables.h@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@       "  last_interaction_at INTEGER NOT NULL, "                              \       "  document_type INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, "                          \       "  user_persisted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, "                         \+      "  title TEXT, "                                                        \       "  FOREIGN KEY (place_id) REFERENCES moz_places(id) ON DELETE CASCADE " \       ")")@@ -334,7 +335,9 @@   nsLiteralCString(                                                        \       "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS moz_places_metadata_snapshots_groups ( " \       "  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, "                                         \-      "  title TEXT NOT NULL "                                             \+      "  title TEXT NOT NULL, "                                            \+      "  builder TEXT NOT NULL, "                                          \+      "  builder_data TEXT "                                               \       ")") #define CREATE_MOZ_PLACES_METADATA_GROUPS_TO_SNAPSHOTS                        \

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potentially Missing Column] [toolkit/components/places/nsPlacesTables.h] [Lines 316-316]
[Old Code]
"  user_persisted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, "                         \
[Fixed Code]
"  user_persisted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, "                         \
"  title TEXT, "                                                        \

Additional Details: The change adds a 'title' column to the table. While this isn't clearly a security fix, it might be related to data integrity or completeness.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potentially Missing Columns] [toolkit/components/places/nsPlacesTables.h] [Lines 334-335]
[Old Code]
"  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, "                                         \
"  title TEXT NOT NULL "                                             \
[Fixed Code]
"  id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, "                                         \
"  title TEXT NOT NULL, "                                            \
"  builder TEXT NOT NULL, "                                          \
"  builder_data TEXT "                                               \

Additional Details: This change adds 'builder' and 'builder_data' columns to the snapshots groups table. Again, while not clearly a security fix, it might be related to better data organization or tracking.

Note: Neither change appears to directly address a known security vulnerability, but both involve database schema modifications that could potentially affect data integrity or storage. Without more context about the specific functionality being modified, it's difficult to determine if these changes were made for security reasons.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/test/browsertime-desktop.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/test/browsertime-desktop.yml@@ -65,17 +65,13 @@                 fission:                     by-test-platform:                         windows.*-32.*: []-                        .*shippable-qr/.*: [mozilla-central]+                        .*shippable-qr/.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]                         default: []                 default:                     by-app:                         firefox:                             by-test-platform:-                                (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*-qr).*: []-                                linux.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                macosx1014-64-shippable-qr.*: [trunk]-                                macosx1015.*shippable-qr.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]+                                (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [trunk, mozilla-beta]                                 default: []                         default: []         treeherder-symbol: Btime(tp6)@@ -151,10 +147,7 @@                 by-app:                     firefox:                         by-test-platform:-                            .*clang.*: []-                            linux.*shippable.*: [trunk]-                            macosx1015.*shippable.*: [trunk]-                            windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk]+                            (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [trunk]                             default: []                     default: []     tier:@@ -179,16 +172,20 @@             - wikipedia             - yahoo-mail     run-on-projects:-        by-app:-            firefox:-                by-test-platform:-                    linux.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                    macosx1014-64-shippable-qr.*: [trunk]-                    macosx1015.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                    windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]+        by-variant:+            fission:+                by-test-platform:+                    windows.*-32.*: []                     macosx1100.*shippable.*: [mozilla-central, mozilla-beta]-                    default: []-            default: []+                    .*shippable-qr/.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]+                    default: []+            default:+                by-app:+                    firefox:+                        by-test-platform:+                            (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [trunk]+                            default: []+                    default: []     tier:         by-test-platform:             linux1804-64-clang-trunk-qr/opt: 2@@ -205,6 +202,7 @@             - ares6             - [assorted-dom, dom]             - [jetstream2, js2]+            - [matrix-react-bench, mrb]             - [motionmark-animometer, mm-a]             - [motionmark-htmlsuite, mm-h]             - [speedometer, sp]@@ -215,8 +213,7 @@     treeherder-symbol: Btime()     tier:         by-variant:-            fission: 3-            default:+            fission:                 by-app:                     firefox:                         by-subtest:@@ -234,71 +231,38 @@                         by-subtest:                             unity-webgl: 3                             default: 2+            default: 3     variants: [fission]     run-on-projects:         by-variant:             fission:-                by-test-platform:-                    windows.*-32.*: []-                    .*shippable-qr/.*: [mozilla-central]-                    default: []-            default:                 by-subtest:-                    assorted-dom:-                        by-app:-                            firefox:-                                by-test-platform:-                                    (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*shippable).*: []-                                    (linux|windows|macosx1015)(?!.*-qr).*: [autoland]-                                    linux.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    macosx1014-64-shippable-qr.*: [trunk]-                                    macosx1015.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    default: []-                            default: []-                    motionmark-htmlsuite:-                        by-app:-                            firefox:-                                by-test-platform:-                                    (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*shippable).*: []-                                    (linux|windows|macosx1015)(?!.*-qr).*: [autoland]-                                    linux.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    macosx1014-64-shippable-qr.*: [trunk]-                                    macosx1015.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    default: []-                            default: []-                    speedometer:-                        by-app:-                            firefox:-                                by-test-platform:-                                    (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*shippable).*: []-                                    (linux|windows|macosx1015)(?!.*-qr).*: [autoland]-                                    linux.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    macosx1014-64-shippable-qr.*: [trunk]-                                    macosx1015.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    default: []-                            default: []+                    unity-webgl:+                        by-test-platform:+                            windows.*-32.*: []+                            .*shippable-qr/.*: [trunk]+                            default: []+                    default:+                        by-test-platform:+                            windows.*-32.*: []+                            .*shippable-qr/.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]+                            default: []+            default:+                by-subtest:                     unity-webgl:                         by-app:                             firefox:                                 by-test-platform:                                     windows.*-32.*: []-                                    (linux|windows10-64|macos)(?!.*shippable).*: []-                                    (linux|windows|macosx1015)(?!.*-qr).*: []-                                    default: [autoland]+                                    (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [trunk]+                                    default: []                             default: []                     default:                         by-app:                             firefox:                                 by-test-platform:-                                    (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*shippable).*: []-                                    (linux|windows|macosx1015)(?!.*-qr).*: []-                                    linux.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    macosx1014-64-shippable-qr.*: [trunk]-                                    macosx1015.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                                    windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]+                                    windows.*-32.*: []+                                    (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [trunk, mozilla-beta]                                     default: []                             default: []     max-run-time:@@ -308,6 +272,7 @@                     .*-qr/.*: 2100                     default: 1500             jetstream2: 8000+            matrix-react-bench: 1500             motionmark-htmlsuite: 1500             unity-webgl: 1500             default: 900@@ -315,6 +280,7 @@         fetch:             - assorted-dom             - jetstream2+            - matrix-react-bench             - unity-webgl browsertime-benchmark-wasm:@@ -341,19 +307,13 @@             fission:                 by-test-platform:                     windows.*-32.*: []-                    macosx1014.*: []                     .*shippable-qr/.*: [mozilla-central]                     default: []             default:                 by-app:                     firefox:                         by-test-platform:-                            macosx1014.*: []-                            (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*shippable).*: []-                            (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*-qr).*: []-                            linux.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                            macosx1015.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]-                            windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk, mozilla-beta]+                            (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [mozilla-central]                             default: []                     default: []     max-run-time:@@ -390,8 +350,7 @@                     default: []             default:                 by-test-platform:-                    windows.*-32.*/opt: []-                    (linux|windows.*64|macos)(.*shippable).*: [mozilla-central]+                    (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [mozilla-central]                     default: []     tier: 2     limit-platforms:@@ -473,7 +432,6 @@                     (linux|windows10-64|macos)(?!.*shippable).*: []                     (linux|windows|macosx1015)(?!.*-qr).*: []                     windows.*-32.*: []-                    macosx1014.*: []                     default: []     tier: 2     treeherder-symbol: Btime-live(tp6)@@ -495,7 +453,6 @@             fission: []             default:                 by-test-platform:-                    (linux|windows|macosx1015)(?!.*-qr).*: []                     (linux|windows|macosx1015).*shippable-qr.*: [mozilla-central]                     default: []     tier:@@ -524,7 +481,7 @@                     default: []             default:                 by-test-platform:-                    (linux|windows10-64|macosx).*shippable-qr.*: [mozilla-central]+                    (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [mozilla-central]                     default: []     tier: 2     treeherder-symbol: Btime(ps)@@ -545,14 +502,11 @@             fission:                 by-test-platform:                     windows.*-32.*: []-                    .*shippable-qr/.*: [mozilla-central]-                    default: []-            default:-                by-test-platform:-                    (linux|windows|macos)(?!.*-qr).*: []-                    linux.*shippable.*: [trunk]-                    macos.*shippable-qr.*: [trunk]-                    windows10-64.*shippable.*: [trunk]+                    .*shippable-qr/.*: [trunk]+                    default: []+            default:+                by-test-platform:+                    (!.*shippable-qr/.*): [trunk]                     default: []     tier: 2     treeherder-symbol: Btime(welcome)

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily configuration updates and simplifications to the test platform rules and project run conditions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: taskcluster/ci/test/browsertime-desktop.yml
   The changes are configuration updates and simplifications to test platform rules

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: taskcluster/ci/test/browsertime-desktop.yml
   The changes involve updates to project run conditions and test platform filters

The main changes observed in the diff include:
1. Simplification of platform-specific rules using more generic patterns
2. Updates to which branches/projects tests should run on
3. Addition of new benchmarks (matrix-react-bench)
4. Adjustments to timeout values
5. Reorganization of conditional logic structure

These changes appear to be maintenance and configuration updates rather than security fixes. No specific vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.reflect.setidl.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.reflect.setidl.html@@ -17,13 +17,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 120;-offscreenCanvas.height = 60;-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 120, "offscreenCanvas.width", "120");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 60, "offscreenCanvas.height", "60");+canvas.width = 120;+canvas.height = 60;+_assertSame(canvas.width, 120, "canvas.width", "120");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 60, "canvas.height", "60"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and test case updates without any security implications.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

offscreenCanvas.width = 120;
offscreenCanvas.height = 60;
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 120, "offscreenCanvas.width", "120");
_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 60, "offscreenCanvas.height", "60");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

canvas.width = 120;
canvas.height = 60;
_assertSame(canvas.width, 120, "canvas.width", "120");
_assertSame(canvas.height, 60, "canvas.height", "60");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the corresponding assertion messages, which doesn't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/builtin/Object.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/builtin/Object.cpp@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ #include "vm/PlainObject.h"  // js::PlainObject #include "vm/RegExpObject.h" #include "vm/StringObject.h"-#include "vm/ToSource.h"       // js::ValueToSource+#include "vm/ToSource.h"  // js::ValueToSource+#include "vm/Watchtower.h" #include "vm/WellKnownAtom.h"  // js_*_str #ifdef ENABLE_RECORD_TUPLE@@ -299,6 +300,17 @@   if (!GetPropertyKeys(cx, obj, JSITER_OWNONLY | JSITER_SYMBOLS, &idv)) {     return nullptr;   }++#ifdef ENABLE_RECORD_TUPLE+  if (IsExtendedPrimitiveWrapper(*obj)) {+    if (obj->is<TupleObject>()) {+      Rooted<TupleType*> tup(cx, &obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());+      return TupleToSource(cx, tup);+    }+    MOZ_ASSERT(obj->is<RecordObject>());+    return RecordToSource(cx, obj->as<RecordObject>().unbox());+  }+#endif   bool comma = false;@@ -488,7 +500,7 @@     val.set(desc->value());-    JSFunction* fun;+    JSFunction* fun = nullptr;     if (IsFunctionObject(val, &fun) && fun->isMethod()) {       if (!AddProperty(id, val, PropertyKind::Method)) {         return nullptr;@@ -814,9 +826,7 @@ // Returns true if properties not named "__proto__" can be added to |obj| // with a fast path that doesn't check any properties on the prototype chain. static bool CanAddNewPropertyExcludingProtoFast(PlainObject* obj) {-  // The object must be an extensible, non-prototype object. Prototypes require-  // extra shadowing checks for shape teleporting.-  if (!obj->isExtensible() || obj->isUsedAsPrototype()) {+  if (!obj->isExtensible()) {     return false;   }@@ -912,6 +922,8 @@   // enumerable/writable/configurable data properties, try to use its shape.   if (toWasEmpty && !hasPropsWithNonDefaultAttrs &&       toPlain->canReuseShapeForNewProperties(fromPlain->shape())) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(!Watchtower::watchesPropertyAdd(toPlain),+               "watched objects require Watchtower calls");     Shape* newShape = fromPlain->shape();     if (!toPlain->setShapeAndUpdateSlots(cx, newShape)) {       return false;@@ -1437,7 +1449,7 @@ #ifdef ENABLE_RECORD_TUPLE   if (obj->is<TupleObject>()) {-    Rooted<TupleType*> tup(cx, obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());+    Rooted<TupleType*> tup(cx, &obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());     return TryEnumerableOwnPropertiesNative<kind>(cx, tup, rval, optimized);   } else if (obj->is<RecordObject>()) {     Rooted<RecordType*> tup(cx, obj->as<RecordObject>().unbox());

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Null Pointer Dereference [File] js/src/builtin/Object.cpp [Lines 488]
[Old Code]
    JSFunction* fun;
[Fixed Code]
    JSFunction* fun = nullptr;

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Prototype Pollution [File] js/src/builtin/Object.cpp [Lines 814-826]
[Old Code]
  if (!obj->isExtensible() || obj->isUsedAsPrototype()) {
[Fixed Code]
  if (!obj->isExtensible()) {

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Watchtower Monitoring Issue [File] js/src/builtin/Object.cpp [Lines 912-922]
[Old Code]
  if (toWasEmpty && !hasPropsWithNonDefaultAttrs &&
      toPlain->canReuseShapeForNewProperties(fromPlain->shape())) {
[Fixed Code]
  if (toWasEmpty && !hasPropsWithNonDefaultAttrs &&
      toPlain->canReuseShapeForNewProperties(fromPlain->shape())) {
    MOZ_ASSERT(!Watchtower::watchesPropertyAdd(toPlain),
               "watched objects require Watchtower calls");

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Reference Handling [File] js/src/builtin/Object.cpp [Lines 1437-1449]
[Old Code]
    Rooted<TupleType*> tup(cx, obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());
[Fixed Code]
    Rooted<TupleType*> tup(cx, &obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());

The most significant security fixes appear to be:
1. The null pointer initialization prevents potential null pointer dereferences
2. The prototype check removal suggests a fix for prototype pollution vulnerabilities
3. The Watchtower assertion addition indicates improved monitoring of property additions
4. The reference handling change suggests more careful memory management

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/search/content/searchbar.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/search/content/searchbar.js@@ -807,11 +807,19 @@         this.handleSearchCommand(event, engine);       };+      this.textbox.onbeforeinput = event => {+        if (event.data && this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp) {+          // Ignore char key input while processing enter key.+          event.preventDefault();+        }+      };+       this.textbox.onkeyup = event => {-        if (-          event.keyCode === KeyEvent.DOM_VK_RETURN &&-          this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp-        ) {+        // Pressing Enter key while pressing Meta key, and next, even when+        // releasing Enter key before releasing Meta key, the keyup event is not+        // fired. Therefore, if Enter keydown is detecting, continue the post+        // processing for Enter key when any keyup event is detected.+        if (this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp) {           this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp = false;           gBrowser.selectedBrowser.focus();         }

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition in Key Event Handling [browser/components/search/content/searchbar.js] [Lines 807-819]
[Old Code]
this.textbox.onkeyup = event => {
  if (
    event.keyCode === KeyEvent.DOM_VK_RETURN &&
    this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp
  ) {
    this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp = false;
    gBrowser.selectedBrowser.focus();
  }

[Fixed Code]
this.textbox.onbeforeinput = event => {
  if (event.data && this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp) {
    // Ignore char key input while processing enter key.
    event.preventDefault();
  }
};

this.textbox.onkeyup = event => {
  // Pressing Enter key while pressing Meta key, and next, even when
  // releasing Enter key before releasing Meta key, the keyup event is not
  // fired. Therefore, if Enter keydown is detecting, continue the post
  // processing for Enter key when any keyup event is detected.
  if (this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp) {
    this._needBrowserFocusAtEnterKeyUp = false;
    gBrowser.selectedBrowser.focus();
  }

The vulnerability appears to be a race condition in key event handling where:
1. The original code only checked for RETURN keyup events, which could be missed in certain key combination scenarios (like Meta+Enter)
2. This could lead to inconsistent behavior where the browser focus might not be properly set
3. The fix adds an onbeforeinput handler to prevent character input during enter key processing and modifies the keyup handler to be more robust

The vulnerability doesn't have a specific CVE name, but it's a race condition in event handling that could potentially be exploited to cause inconsistent UI behavior or focus issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch3.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the `_assertPixel` calls. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-23, 23-33]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.negative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.negative.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.createRadialGradient(0, 0, -0.1, 0, 0, 1); }); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.createRadialGradient(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, -0.1); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.negative.html] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security vulnerability is being fixed here, just a code style/consistency change
- The functionality remains exactly the same
- The test assertions (which check for proper error throwing with negative radii) are unchanged

No actual security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/CanvasDrawEventRecorder.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/CanvasDrawEventRecorder.h@@ -253,6 +253,9 @@     aEvent.RecordToStream(mOutputStream);   }+  void StoreSourceSurfaceRecording(gfx::SourceSurface* aSurface,+                                   const char* aReason) final;+   void RecordSourceSurfaceDestruction(void* aSurface) final;   void Flush() final {}

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Missing Virtual Function Implementation] [gfx/layers/CanvasDrawEventRecorder.h] [Lines 253-256]
    [Old Code]
    void RecordSourceSurfaceDestruction(void* aSurface) final;
    
    void Flush() final {}
    [Fixed Code]
    void StoreSourceSurfaceRecording(gfx::SourceSurface* aSurface,
                                   const char* aReason) final;
    
    void RecordSourceSurfaceDestruction(void* aSurface) final;
    
    void Flush() final {}

Additional Details:
- The diff shows the addition of a new pure virtual function `StoreSourceSurfaceRecording` that was not present in the old code
- While this could indicate a fix for a potential incomplete interface issue, there's no clear evidence of a security vulnerability being fixed
- The change might be related to improving the recording functionality rather than fixing a security issue
- Without more context about how this interface is used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a security vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/html/HTMLSelectAccessible.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/html/HTMLSelectAccessible.h@@ -205,7 +205,6 @@   virtual ~HTMLComboboxListAccessible() {}   // LocalAccessible-  virtual nsIFrame* GetFrame() const override;   virtual a11y::role NativeRole() const override;   virtual uint64_t NativeState() const override;   virtual nsRect RelativeBounds(nsIFrame** aBoundingFrame) const override;

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak or Improper Access Control] [accessible/html/HTMLSelectAccessible.h] [Lines 205-208]
[Old Code]
virtual nsIFrame* GetFrame() const override;
virtual a11y::role NativeRole() const override;
virtual uint64_t NativeState() const override;
virtual nsRect RelativeBounds(nsIFrame** aBoundingFrame) const override;
[Fixed Code]
virtual a11y::role NativeRole() const override;
virtual uint64_t NativeState() const override;
virtual nsRect RelativeBounds(nsIFrame** aBoundingFrame) const override;

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of the `GetFrame()` method override from the `HTMLComboboxListAccessible` class
- While this could potentially relate to security (as frame access might expose sensitive information), without more context about why this was removed, we can't be certain if this was a security fix
- The change might simply be a refactoring or optimization rather than a security fix
- No specific vulnerability name can be identified from this change alone

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/unset-val-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/unset-val-001.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-cascade-3/#inherit-initial">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-cascade-4/#inherit-initial">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="color:unset is the same as color:inherit since color is an inherited property. background-color:unset is the same as background-color:initial since background-color is a non-inherited property.">   <style> .square {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/unset-val-001.html] [Lines 8]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: [removed line]]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with name="flags" which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The change seems to be a minor cleanup of test file metadata rather than addressing any security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/shared/test/xpcshell/test_Navigate.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/shared/test/xpcshell/test_Navigate.js@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,  * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */++const { Services } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm"); const { waitForInitialNavigationCompleted } = ChromeUtils.import(   "chrome://remote/content/shared/Navigate.jsm"@@ -67,6 +69,7 @@ class MockTopContext {   constructor(webProgress = null) {+    this.currentURI = Services.io.newURI("http://foo.bar");     this.currentWindowGlobal = { isInitialDocument: true };     this.id = 7;     this.top = this;@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ add_test(   async function test_waitForInitialNavigation_initialDocumentFinishedLoading() {     const browsingContext = new MockTopContext();-    await waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext);+    await waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext.webProgress);     ok(       !browsingContext.webProgress.isLoadingDocument,@@ -97,7 +100,9 @@     const browsingContext = new MockTopContext();     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStartState({ isInitial: true });-    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext);+    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(+      browsingContext.webProgress+    );     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStopState();     await completed;@@ -119,7 +124,9 @@     const browsingContext = new MockTopContext();     delete browsingContext.currentWindowGlobal;-    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext);+    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(+      browsingContext.webProgress+    );     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStartState({ isInitial: true });     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStopState();     await completed;@@ -143,7 +150,7 @@     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStartState({ isInitial: false });     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStopState();-    await waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext);+    await waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext.webProgress);     ok(       !browsingContext.webProgress.isLoadingDocument,@@ -163,7 +170,9 @@     const browsingContext = new MockTopContext();     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStartState({ isInitial: false });-    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext);+    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(+      browsingContext.webProgress+    );     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStopState();     await completed;@@ -180,6 +189,30 @@   } );+add_test(async function test_waitForInitialNavigation_resolveWhenStarted() {+  const browsingContext = new MockTopContext();+  browsingContext.webProgress.sendStartState();++  const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(+    browsingContext.webProgress,+    {+      resolveWhenStarted: true,+    }+  );+  await completed;++  ok(+    browsingContext.webProgress.isLoadingDocument,+    "Document is still loading"+  );+  ok(+    !browsingContext.currentWindowGlobal.isInitialDocument,+    "Is not initial document"+  );++  run_next_test();+});+ add_test(   async function test_waitForInitialNavigation_crossOriginAlreadyLoading() {     const browsingContext = new MockTopContext();@@ -187,7 +220,9 @@     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStartState({ coop: true });-    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext);+    const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(+      browsingContext.webProgress+    );     browsingContext.webProgress.sendStopState();     await completed;

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential URI Validation Issue] [File: remote/shared/test/xpcshell/test_Navigate.js] [Lines: ~72]  
   [Old Code]  
   `constructor(webProgress = null) {`  
   `  this.currentWindowGlobal = { isInitialDocument: true };`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `constructor(webProgress = null) {`  
   `  this.currentURI = Services.io.newURI("http://foo.bar");`  
   `  this.currentWindowGlobal = { isInitialDocument: true };`  
   Additional Details: The addition of `currentURI` could be related to security validation, but without more context about how this URI is used, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Web Progress Handling Issue] [File: remote/shared/test/xpcshell/test_Navigate.js] [Lines: multiple changes]  
   [Old Code]  
   Various calls to `waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext)`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Changed to `waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(browsingContext.webProgress)`  
   Additional Details: The change to explicitly pass webProgress instead of the entire browsing context might be related to security by limiting the scope of what's accessible, but this could also just be a refactoring.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Race Condition in Navigation Handling] [File: remote/shared/test/xpcshell/test_Navigate.js] [Lines: ~191-207]  
   [Old Code]  
   (New test case added)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `const completed = waitForInitialNavigationCompleted(`  
   `  browsingContext.webProgress,`  
   `  { resolveWhenStarted: true }`  
   `);`  
   Additional Details: The addition of `resolveWhenStarted` option might be addressing a race condition in navigation handling, but without more context it's unclear if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily focused on test improvements and more precise handling of navigation states rather than fixing clear security vulnerabilities. The modifications could be related to security hardening, but without additional context about the threat model or specific vulnerabilities being addressed, it's difficult to identify concrete security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/serde_yaml/tests/test_de.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/serde_yaml/tests/test_de.rs@@ -339,7 +339,17 @@         let value = serde_yaml::from_str::<Value>(yaml).unwrap();         match value {             Value::Number(number) => assert_eq!(number.to_string(), expected),-            _ => panic!("expected number"),+            _ => panic!("expected number. input={:?}, result={:?}", yaml, value),+        }+    }++    // NOT numbers.+    let cases = ["0127", "+0127", "-0127"];+    for yaml in &cases {+        let value = serde_yaml::from_str::<Value>(yaml).unwrap();+        match value {+            Value::String(string) => assert_eq!(string, *yaml),+            _ => panic!("expected string. input={:?}, result={:?}", yaml, value),         }     } }

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Integer Parsing Issue] [third_party/rust/serde_yaml/tests/test_de.rs] [Lines 339-351]
   [Old Code]
        let value = serde_yaml::from_str::<Value>(yaml).unwrap();
        match value {
            Value::Number(number) => assert_eq!(number.to_string(), expected),
            _ => panic!("expected number"),
        }
   [Fixed Code]
        let value = serde_yaml::from_str::<Value>(yaml).unwrap();
        match value {
            Value::Number(number) => assert_eq!(number.to_string(), expected),
            _ => panic!("expected number. input={:?}, result={:?}", yaml, value),
        }

    // NOT numbers.
    let cases = ["0127", "+0127", "-0127"];
    for yaml in &cases {
        let value = serde_yaml::from_str::<Value>(yaml).unwrap();
        match value {
            Value::String(string) => assert_eq!(string, *yaml),
            _ => panic!("expected string. input={:?}, result={:?}", yaml, value),
        }
    }

Additional Details:
- The change adds better error reporting in test cases and includes new test cases for string inputs that look like numbers (with leading zeros or signs).
- While this appears to be test code improvement, it might be related to fixing potential parsing issues where strings with leading zeros were incorrectly interpreted as numbers.
- The change suggests there might have been a parsing vulnerability where certain string inputs could be misinterpreted as numbers, but this is not confirmed from the test code alone.
- The added test cases ensure that strings like "0127" are properly handled as strings rather than being parsed as octal numbers or other numeric formats.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/selectors/requests.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/selectors/requests.js@@ -175,7 +175,14 @@   return state.requests.recording; }+const getClickedRequest = createSelector(+  state => state.requests,+  ({ requests, clickedRequestId }) =>+    requests.find(request => request.id == clickedRequestId)+);+ module.exports = {+  getClickedRequest,   getDisplayedRequestById,   getDisplayedRequests,   getDisplayedRequestsSummary,

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Object Property Access Vulnerability] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/selectors/requests.js] [Lines 175-178]
   [Old Code: None (function was added)]
   [Fixed Code: 
   const getClickedRequest = createSelector(
     state => state.requests,
     ({ requests, clickedRequestId }) =>
       requests.find(request => request.id == clickedRequestId)
   );
   ]

Additional Details:
- The added code introduces a new selector function that finds a request by ID
- Potential concern is the use of loose equality (`==`) instead of strict equality (`===`) which could lead to type coercion issues
- However, this might not be a security vulnerability per se, but rather a code quality issue
- No clear evidence of a security vulnerability in the traditional sense (XSS, injection, etc.)
- The code appears to be adding functionality rather than fixing a security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmJS.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmJS.cpp@@ -382,15 +382,15 @@ } bool wasm::HasPlatformSupport(JSContext* cx) {-#if !MOZ_LITTLE_ENDIAN() || defined(JS_CODEGEN_NONE) || defined(__wasi__)+#if !MOZ_LITTLE_ENDIAN()   return false; #else+  if (!HasJitBackend()) {+    return false;+  }+   if (gc::SystemPageSize() > wasm::PageSize) {-    return false;-  }--  if (!JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {     return false;   }@@ -5321,8 +5321,15 @@   CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);   RootedWasmModuleObject module(cx);-  if (!wasm::CompileIntrinsicModule(cx, mozilla::Span<IntrinsicOp>(),-                                    Shareable::True, &module)) {+  wasm::IntrinsicOp ops[] = {+      wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareB,+      wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareBFromTransposed,+      wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareBFromQuantizedTransposed,+      wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareA,+      wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareBias,+      wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8MultiplyAndAddBias,+      wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8SelectColumnsOfB};+  if (!wasm::CompileIntrinsicModule(cx, ops, Shareable::False, &module)) {     ReportOutOfMemory(cx);     return false;   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Platform Support Check Vulnerability] [js/src/wasm/WasmJS.cpp] [Lines 382-392]
   [Old Code]
   ```cpp
   #if !MOZ_LITTLE_ENDIAN() || defined(JS_CODEGEN_NONE) || defined(__wasi__)
     return false;
   #else

     if (gc::SystemPageSize() > wasm::PageSize) {
       return false;
     }

     if (!JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {
       return false;
     }
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```cpp
   #if !MOZ_LITTLE_ENDIAN()
     return false;
   #else

     if (!HasJitBackend()) {
       return false;
     }

     if (gc::SystemPageSize() > wasm::PageSize) {
       return false;
     }
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Intrinsic Module Compilation Vulnerability] [js/src/wasm/WasmJS.cpp] [Lines 5321-5323]
   [Old Code]
   ```cpp
   RootedWasmModuleObject module(cx);
   if (!wasm::CompileIntrinsicModule(cx, mozilla::Span<IntrinsicOp>(),
                                     Shareable::True, &module)) {
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```cpp
   RootedWasmModuleObject module(cx);
   wasm::IntrinsicOp ops[] = {
       wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareB,
       wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareBFromTransposed,
       wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareBFromQuantizedTransposed,
       wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareA,
       wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8PrepareBias,
       wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8MultiplyAndAddBias,
       wasm::IntrinsicOp::I8SelectColumnsOfB};
   if (!wasm::CompileIntrinsicModule(cx, ops, Shareable::False, &module)) {
   ```

Notes:
1. The first change modifies the platform support checks, removing some conditions and adding a check for JIT backend. This could be related to security hardening but I'm not certain.
2. The second change adds specific intrinsic operations and changes the Shareable flag from True to False. This might be addressing a potential security issue with shared modules, but without more context I can't be certain.
3. Neither change clearly identifies a specific CVE or well-known vulnerability pattern.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/after.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/after.rs@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ //! Tests for the after channel flavor.++#![cfg(not(miri))] // TODO: many assertions failed due to Miri is slow use std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize; use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;@@ -56,20 +58,20 @@     let r = after(ms(50));     assert_eq!(r.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full());     thread::sleep(ms(100));     assert_eq!(r.len(), 1);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), true);+    assert!(!r.is_empty());+    assert!(r.is_full());     r.try_recv().unwrap();     assert_eq!(r.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full()); } #[test]@@ -211,7 +213,7 @@                             break;                         }                         i => {-                            oper.recv(&v[i]).unwrap();+                            oper.recv(v[i]).unwrap();                             hits.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);                         }                     }

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Assertion Improvement [File] [Lines 56-72]
   [Old Code]
   assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);
   assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);
   [Fixed Code]
   assert!(r.is_empty());
   assert!(!r.is_full());

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Assertion Improvement [File] [Lines 211-213]
   [Old Code]
   oper.recv(&v[i]).unwrap();
   [Fixed Code]
   oper.recv(v[i]).unwrap();

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be test code improvements rather than security fixes
- The modifications involve:
  1. Replacing assert_eq! with more direct assert! macros for boolean checks
  2. Removing an unnecessary reference (&) in a test operation
- No actual security vulnerabilities are being addressed in these changes
- The addition of `#![cfg(not(miri))]` is a test configuration change for Miri (Rust's interpreter for checking unsafe code) and not a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/corb/script-resource-with-json-parser-breaker.tentative.sub.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/corb/script-resource-with-json-parser-breaker.tentative.sub.html@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@   prevent cross-site script inclusion (XSSI) and similar attacks.  For example,   it may be included in JSON files to prevent them from leaking data via a   <script> tag, making the response only useful to a fetch or XmlHttpRequest.-  See also https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/services/network/cross_origin_read_blocking_explainer.md#Protecting-JSON+  See also https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/services/network/cross_origin_read_blocking_explainer.md#Protecting-JSON   The assumption is that all images, other media, scripts, fonts and other   resources that may be embedded cross-origin will never begin with a JSON

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Documentation Update] [testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/corb/script-resource-with-json-parser-breaker.tentative.sub.html] [Lines 7]
[Old Code]
  See also https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/services/network/cross_origin_read_blocking_explainer.md#Protecting-JSON
[Fixed Code]
  See also https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/services/network/cross_origin_read_blocking_explainer.md#Protecting-JSON

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a documentation update where the URL reference was changed from "master" branch to "main" branch, reflecting GitHub's change in default branch naming conventions.
- No actual security vulnerability was fixed here, just a URL update.
- The change is related to CORB (Cross-Origin Read Blocking) documentation reference, but doesn't represent a security fix in the code itself.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.