Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/geckodriver/doc/Flags.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/geckodriver/doc/Flags.md@@ -1,5 +1,31 @@ Flags =====++#### <code>--allow-hosts <var>ALLOW_HOSTS</var>...</code>++Values of the `Host` header to allow for incoming requests.++By default the value of <var>HOST</var> is allowed. If `--allow-hosts`+is provided, exactly the given values will be permitted. For example+`--allow-host geckodriver.test webdriver.local` will allow requests+with `Host` set to `geckodriver.test` or `webdriver.local`.++Requests with `Host` set to an IP address are always allowed.++#### <code>--allow-origins <var>ALLOW_ORIGINS</var>...</code>++Values of the `Origin` header to allow for incoming requests.++`Origin` is set by web browsers for all `POST` requests, and most+other cross-origin requests. By default any request with an `Origin`+header is rejected to protect against malicious websites trying to+access geckodriver running on the local machine.++If `--allow-origins` is provided, web services running on the given+origin will be able to make requests to geckodriver. For example+`--allow-origins https://webdriver.test:8080` will allow a web-based+service on the origin with scheme `https`, hostname `webdriver.test`,+and port `8080` to access the geckodriver instance. #### <code>--android-storage <var>ANDROID_STORAGE</var></code>@@ -133,7 +159,6 @@ A helpful trick is that it is possible to bind to 0 to get the system to atomically assign a free port.- #### <code>--jsdebugger</code> Attach [browser toolbox] debugger when Firefox starts. This is@@ -174,3 +199,5 @@ Increases the logging verbosity by to debug level when passing a single `-v`, or to trace level if `-vv` is passed. This is analogous to passing `--log debug` and `--log trace`, respectively.++[Marionette]: /testing/marionette/index.rst
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the security-related changes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) / Host Header Injection [testing/geckodriver/doc/Flags.md] [Lines added at top] [Old Code] No host/origin restrictions mentioned [Fixed Code] Added `--allow-hosts` and `--allow-origins` flags to restrict which hosts/origins can access geckodriver 2. Vulnerability Existed: yes Insecure Default Configuration [testing/geckodriver/doc/Flags.md] [Lines added at top] [Old Code] No default security restrictions mentioned [Fixed Code] Added default security behavior: "By default any request with an `Origin` header is rejected" and "By default the value of <var>HOST</var> is allowed" The changes introduce new security features to protect against: - CSRF attacks by validating Origin headers - Host header injection attacks by validating Host headers - Default secure configuration that rejects cross-origin requests by default These appear to be proactive security measures rather than fixes for specific known vulnerabilities, but they address well-known web security concerns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/network/TCPServerSocket.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/network/TCPServerSocket.cpp@@ -60,12 +60,8 @@ } if (XRE_GetProcessType() == GeckoProcessType_Content) {- nsCOMPtr<nsISerialEventTarget> target;- if (nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = GetOwnerGlobal()) {- target = global->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);- }- mServerBridgeChild = new TCPServerSocketChild(this, mPort, mBacklog,- mUseArrayBuffers, target);+ mServerBridgeChild =+ new TCPServerSocketChild(this, mPort, mBacklog, mUseArrayBuffers); return NS_OK; }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [dom/network/TCPServerSocket.cpp] [Lines 60-68]
[Old Code]
```cpp
nsCOMPtr<nsISerialEventTarget> target;
if (nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = GetOwnerGlobal()) {
target = global->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);
}
mServerBridgeChild = new TCPServerSocketChild(this, mPort, mBacklog,
mUseArrayBuffers, target);
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
mServerBridgeChild =
new TCPServerSocketChild(this, mPort, mBacklog, mUseArrayBuffers);
```
The main change removes the target parameter from the TCPServerSocketChild constructor. While this could potentially relate to a security issue (like preventing null pointer dereference if target was null), the exact vulnerability isn't clear from the diff alone. The change simplifies the code by removing a potentially unnecessary parameter, which might have been part of a security hardening effort. Without more context about the TCPServerSocketChild implementation, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/rust/moz_task/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/rust/moz_task/src/lib.rs@@ -12,12 +12,8 @@ mod event_loop; mod executor; pub use executor::{- spawn, spawn_blocking, spawn_local, spawn_onto, spawn_onto_blocking, TaskBuilder,+ spawn, spawn_blocking, spawn_local, spawn_onto, spawn_onto_blocking, AsyncTask, TaskBuilder, };--// FIXME: Unfortunately directly re-exporting as `Task` conflicts with the task-// trait below. This type is useful for folks using the `spawn*` methods.-pub use async_task::Task as AsyncTask; // Expose functions intended to be used only in gtest via this module. // We don't use a feature gate here to stop the need to compile all crates that
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [xpcom/rust/moz_task/src/lib.rs] [Lines 12-15]
[Old Code]
pub use executor::{
spawn, spawn_blocking, spawn_local, spawn_onto, spawn_onto_blocking, TaskBuilder,
};
// FIXME: Unfortunately directly re-exporting as `Task` conflicts with the task
// trait below. This type is useful for folks using the `spawn*` methods.
pub use async_task::Task as AsyncTask;
[Fixed Code]
pub use executor::{
spawn, spawn_blocking, spawn_local, spawn_onto, spawn_onto_blocking, AsyncTask, TaskBuilder,
};
Additional Details:
This appears to be a code organization/cleanup change rather than a security fix. The main changes are:
1. Moving `AsyncTask` into the executor's pub use statement
2. Removing the separate re-export and its associated FIXME comment
3. No actual functionality changes or security-related modifications were made
The change improves code organization by consolidating exports and removing a potential naming conflict, but doesn't address any security vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.onlyspace.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.onlyspace.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = ' ';-offscreenCanvas.height = ' ';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 0, "offscreenCanvas.width", "0");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "0");+canvas.width = ' ';+canvas.height = ' ';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 0, "canvas.width", "0");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 0, "canvas.height", "0"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and test assertion message updates. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.onlyspace.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "0");]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertSame(canvas.height, 0, "canvas.height", "0");]
The changes are:
1. Renaming variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the assertion messages to match the new variable name
3. The actual test logic (setting width/height to spaces and asserting they become 0) remains the same
No security-related changes were made in this diff. The modification appears to be for code consistency or readability purposes only.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/image/imgLoader.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/image/imgLoader.h@@ -108,6 +108,12 @@ bool ForcePrincipalCheck() const { return mForcePrincipalCheck; }+ bool HasNotified() const { return mHasNotified; }+ void SetHasNotified() {+ MOZ_ASSERT(!mHasNotified);+ mHasNotified = true;+ }+ imgLoader* Loader() const { return mLoader; } private: // methods@@ -136,6 +142,7 @@ bool mEvicted : 1; bool mHasNoProxies : 1; bool mForcePrincipalCheck : 1;+ bool mHasNotified : 1; }; #include <vector>
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Notification State Tracking] [image/imgLoader.h] [Lines 108-142] [Old Code] (No previous notification state tracking) [Fixed Code] Added mHasNotified flag and related accessor methods Additional Details: The diff shows the addition of a notification state tracking mechanism (mHasNotified flag) with associated methods. While this appears to be a feature addition rather than a direct security fix, it could potentially be related to fixing: - A race condition in notification handling - A double-notification vulnerability - A state tracking issue in image loading However, without more context about why this was added or what security issue it addresses, we can't be certain. The MOZ_ASSERT(!mHasNotified) suggests it's preventing duplicate notifications, which could have security implications if notifications trigger privileged operations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-content-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-content-002.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-paint-ifc-011-ref.html"> <meta content="This test checks that a block element with 'contain: content' establishes a new block formatting context which is independent and separate from others. This causes margin collapsing to be ineffective among vertically-adjacent boxes. In this test, the top margin of parent boxes and top margin of their respective first in-flow child do not collapse. Also, in this test, the bottom margin of the last in-flow child of boxes and bottom margin of their respective parent boxes do not collapse." name="assert">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability was identified in this diff. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with the "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. The diff shows: - Removal of: `<meta name="flags" content="">` This appears to be a cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix. The "flags" meta tag in web-platform-tests is typically used to specify test requirements or characteristics (like "interactive" or "slow"), and its removal doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being addressed. No vulnerability name can be associated with this change as it doesn't appear to be security-related. The modification seems to be either test cleanup or removal of unnecessary metadata.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h@@ -222,7 +222,6 @@ BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode, NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy, CertificateTransparencyMode ctMode, CRLiteMode crliteMode,- uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds, const Vector<EnterpriseCert>& thirdPartyCerts); ~CertVerifier();@@ -238,7 +237,6 @@ const NetscapeStepUpPolicy mNetscapeStepUpPolicy; const CertificateTransparencyMode mCTMode; const CRLiteMode mCRLiteMode;- const uint64_t mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds; private: OCSPCache mOCSPCache;
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potentially Unused Parameter] [security/certverifier/CertVerifier.h] [Lines 222-238]
[Old Code]
uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds,
const uint64_t mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds;
[Fixed Code]
[Parameter and member variable removed]
Additional Details:
1. The diff shows removal of a parameter `crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds` and its corresponding member variable `mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds`.
2. While this could indicate a security fix (such as removing a potentially dangerous timing parameter), there isn't enough context to confirm this was specifically a security vulnerability.
3. The change might simply be a code cleanup if the parameter was unused or deemed unnecessary.
4. Without more context about how this parameter was used, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowBlur.valid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowBlur.valid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.shadowBlur = 1; _assertSame(ctx.shadowBlur, 1, "ctx.shadowBlur", "1");
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be a simple variable name refactoring from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.cpp@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ bool CPUInfo::bmi1Present = false; bool CPUInfo::bmi2Present = false; bool CPUInfo::lzcntPresent = false;+bool CPUInfo::avx2Present = false; namespace js { namespace jit {@@ -267,7 +268,9 @@ #endif }-void CPUInfo::SetSSEVersion() {+void CPUInfo::ComputeFlags() {+ MOZ_ASSERT(!FlagsHaveBeenComputed());+ int flagsEax = 1; int flagsEbx = 0; int flagsEcx = 0;@@ -334,6 +337,10 @@ static constexpr int BMI1Bit = 1 << 3; static constexpr int BMI2Bit = 1 << 8;+ static constexpr int AVX2Bit = 1 << 5; bmi1Present = (flagsEbx & BMI1Bit); bmi2Present = bmi1Present && (flagsEbx & BMI2Bit);-}+ avx2Present = avxPresent && (flagsEbx & AVX2Bit);++ MOZ_ASSERT(FlagsHaveBeenComputed());+}
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential CPU Feature Detection Improvement] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.cpp] [Lines 208, 267-268, 334, 337]
[Old Code]
bool CPUInfo::lzcntPresent = false;
...
void CPUInfo::SetSSEVersion() {
...
bmi1Present = (flagsEbx & BMI1Bit);
bmi2Present = bmi1Present && (flagsEbx & BMI2Bit);
[Fixed Code]
bool CPUInfo::lzcntPresent = false;
bool CPUInfo::avx2Present = false;
...
void CPUInfo::ComputeFlags() {
MOZ_ASSERT(!FlagsHaveBeenComputed());
...
static constexpr int AVX2Bit = 1 << 5;
...
avx2Present = avxPresent && (flagsEbx & AVX2Bit);
MOZ_ASSERT(FlagsHaveBeenComputed());
Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be adding AVX2 detection capability and renaming/refactoring the CPU feature detection function
- While this improves CPU feature detection, it's not clear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability
- The changes include better initialization checks (MOZ_ASSERTs) which could help prevent potential issues
- The modification from SetSSEVersion() to ComputeFlags() suggests a more comprehensive approach to CPU feature detection
No clear security vulnerability is being fixed here, but the changes improve the robustness of CPU feature detection which could have security implications in edge cases.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/fetch/Response.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/fetch/Response.cpp@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ #include "FetchStreamReader.h" #include "InternalResponse.h"+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+# include "mozilla/dom/ReadableStreamDefaultReader.h"+#endif+ namespace mozilla::dom { NS_IMPL_ADDREF_INHERITED(Response, FetchBody<Response>)@@ -36,29 +40,36 @@ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(Response) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(Response, FetchBody<Response>)- AbortFollower::Unlink(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp)); NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mOwner) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mHeaders) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mSignalImpl) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mFetchStreamReader)-+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamBody)+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamReader)+#else tmp->mReadableStreamBody = nullptr; tmp->mReadableStreamReader = nullptr;-+#endif NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_PRESERVED_WRAPPER NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN_INHERITED(Response, FetchBody<Response>)- AbortFollower::Traverse(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp), cb); NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mOwner) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mHeaders) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mSignalImpl) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mFetchStreamReader)+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mReadableStreamBody)+ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mReadableStreamReader)+#endif NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_BEGIN_INHERITED(Response, FetchBody<Response>)+#ifndef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_JS_MEMBER_CALLBACK(mReadableStreamBody) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_JS_MEMBER_CALLBACK(mReadableStreamReader)+#endif NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_PRESERVED_WRAPPER NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_END@@ -281,12 +292,35 @@ const fetch::ResponseBodyInit& body = aBody.Value(); if (body.IsReadableStream()) {-#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS- MOZ_CRASH("MOZ_DOM_STREAMS:NYI");+ JSContext* cx = aGlobal.Context();+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ aRv.MightThrowJSException();++ ReadableStream& readableStream = body.GetAsReadableStream();++ if (readableStream.Locked() || readableStream.Disturbed()) {+ aRv.ThrowTypeError<MSG_FETCH_BODY_CONSUMED_ERROR>();+ return nullptr;+ }++ r->SetReadableStreamBody(cx, &readableStream);++ // If this is a DOM generated ReadableStream, we can extract the+ // inputStream directly.+ if (readableStream.HasNativeUnderlyingSource()) {+ BodyStreamHolder* underlyingSource =+ readableStream.GetNativeUnderlyingSource();+ MOZ_ASSERT(underlyingSource);++ aRv = BodyStream::RetrieveInputStream(underlyingSource,+ getter_AddRefs(bodyStream));++ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) {+ return nullptr;+ } #else aRv.MightThrowJSException();- JSContext* cx = aGlobal.Context(); const ReadableStream& readableStream = body.GetAsReadableStream(); JS::Rooted<JSObject*> readableStreamObj(cx, readableStream.Obj());@@ -335,6 +369,7 @@ if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) { return nullptr; }+#endif } else { // If this is a JS-created ReadableStream, let's create a // FetchStreamReader.@@ -345,7 +380,6 @@ return nullptr; } }-#endif } else { uint64_t size = 0; aRv = ExtractByteStreamFromBody(body, getter_AddRefs(bodyStream),@@ -383,6 +417,9 @@ } if (!bodyUsed && mReadableStreamBody) {+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ bool locked = mReadableStreamBody->Locked();+#else aRv.MightThrowJSException(); AutoJSAPI jsapi;@@ -400,7 +437,7 @@ aRv.StealExceptionFromJSContext(cx); return nullptr; }-+#endif bodyUsed = locked; }@@ -412,9 +449,16 @@ RefPtr<FetchStreamReader> streamReader; nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> inputStream;+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ RefPtr<ReadableStream> body;+ MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody(aCx, getter_AddRefs(body),+ getter_AddRefs(streamReader),+ getter_AddRefs(inputStream), aRv);+#else JS::Rooted<JSObject*> body(aCx); MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody(aCx, &body, getter_AddRefs(streamReader), getter_AddRefs(inputStream), aRv);+#endif if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) { return nullptr; }@@ -452,9 +496,16 @@ RefPtr<FetchStreamReader> streamReader; nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> inputStream;+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ RefPtr<ReadableStream> body;+ MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody(aCx, getter_AddRefs(body),+ getter_AddRefs(streamReader),+ getter_AddRefs(inputStream), aRv);+#else JS::Rooted<JSObject*> body(aCx); MaybeTeeReadableStreamBody(aCx, &body, getter_AddRefs(streamReader), getter_AddRefs(inputStream), aRv);+#endif if (NS_WARN_IF(aRv.Failed())) { return nullptr; }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Leak] [dom/fetch/Response.cpp] [Lines 36-50]
[Old Code]
```
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(Response, FetchBody<Response>)
AbortFollower::Unlink(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp));
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mOwner)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mHeaders)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mSignalImpl)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mFetchStreamReader)
tmp->mReadableStreamBody = nullptr;
tmp->mReadableStreamReader = nullptr;
```
[Fixed Code]
```
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(Response, FetchBody<Response>)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mOwner)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mHeaders)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mSignalImpl)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mFetchStreamReader)
#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamBody)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamReader)
#else
tmp->mReadableStreamBody = nullptr;
tmp->mReadableStreamReader = nullptr;
#endif
```
Additional Details: The change improves memory management by properly unlinking cycle-collected objects, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving robustness.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Management Issue] [dom/fetch/Response.cpp] [Lines 281-335]
[Old Code]
```
if (body.IsReadableStream()) {
#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS
MOZ_CRASH("MOZ_DOM_STREAMS:NYI");
#else
aRv.MightThrowJSException();
```
[Fixed Code]
```
if (body.IsReadableStream()) {
JSContext* cx = aGlobal.Context();
#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS
aRv.MightThrowJSException();
ReadableStream& readableStream = body.GetAsReadableStream();
if (readableStream.Locked() || readableStream.Disturbed()) {
aRv.ThrowTypeError<MSG_FETCH_BODY_CONSUMED_ERROR>();
return nullptr;
}
```
Additional Details: The change adds proper stream state checking and error handling, which could prevent resource access issues, but it's unclear if this was fixing a known vulnerability.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition] [dom/fetch/Response.cpp] [Lines 383-437]
[Old Code]
```
if (!bodyUsed && mReadableStreamBody) {
aRv.MightThrowJSException();
AutoJSAPI jsapi;
[...]
bool locked;
if (!JS::ReadableStreamIsLocked(cx, readableStreamObj, &locked)) {
aRv.StealExceptionFromJSContext(cx);
return nullptr;
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```
if (!bodyUsed && mReadableStreamBody) {
#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS
bool locked = mReadableStreamBody->Locked();
#else
[...]
#endif
```
Additional Details: The change simplifies the stream locking check for DOM streams, potentially preventing race conditions, but it's not clear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.
Note: The changes appear to be primarily about improving stream handling and memory management, but without more context about specific vulnerabilities being addressed, it's difficult to confirm if these were security fixes or general improvements. The changes do make the code more robust in handling edge cases.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/docker/updatebot/updatebot-version.sh+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/docker/updatebot/updatebot-version.sh@@ -1 +1 @@-export UPDATEBOT_REVISION=c9133c4f2c15b30438fe6721ef7f490472851de4+export UPDATEBOT_REVISION=d000053c55f90487038de1df8986d1fb5f6a79ad
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Hardcoded Credential/Secret] [taskcluster/docker/updatebot/updatebot-version.sh] [Lines 1] [Old Code] `export UPDATEBOT_REVISION=c9133c4f2c15b30438fe6721ef7f490472851de4` [Fixed Code] `export UPDATEBOT_REVISION=d000053c55f90487038de1df8986d1fb5f6a79ad` Additional Details: - The change appears to be updating a hardcoded revision hash for UpdateBot - While not clearly a security vulnerability, hardcoding sensitive values (like API keys or tokens) is generally discouraged - Without knowing what UPDATEBOT_REVISION is used for, we can't be certain if this poses a security risk - The change might be simply updating to a newer, more secure version of UpdateBot
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-popup-position-with-zoom.tentative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-popup-position-with-zoom.tentative.html@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ const selectMenu0Button = document.getElementById("selectMenu0-button"); await clickOn(selectMenu0);- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu0.getBoundingClientRect().bottom), Math.round(selectMenu0Popup.getBoundingClientRect().top));- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu0.getBoundingClientRect().left), Math.round(selectMenu0Popup.getBoundingClientRect().left));+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu0.getBoundingClientRect().bottom - selectMenu0Popup.getBoundingClientRect().top)), 0);+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu0.getBoundingClientRect().left - selectMenu0Popup.getBoundingClientRect().left)), 0); }, "The popup should be bottom left positioned"); promise_test(async () => {@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ const selectMenu1Button = document.getElementById("selectMenu1-button"); selectMenu1Button.click();- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu1.getBoundingClientRect().top), Math.round(selectMenu1Popup.getBoundingClientRect().bottom * 2));- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu1.getBoundingClientRect().left), Math.round(selectMenu1Popup.getBoundingClientRect().left * 2));+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu1.getBoundingClientRect().top - selectMenu1Popup.getBoundingClientRect().bottom * 2)), 0);+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu1.getBoundingClientRect().left - selectMenu1Popup.getBoundingClientRect().left * 2)), 0); }, "The popup should be top left positioned"); promise_test(async () => {@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ const selectMenu2Button = document.getElementById("selectMenu2-button"); selectMenu2Button.click();- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu2.getBoundingClientRect().bottom), Math.round(selectMenu2Popup.getBoundingClientRect().top));- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu2.getBoundingClientRect().right), Math.round(selectMenu2Popup.getBoundingClientRect().right));+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu2.getBoundingClientRect().bottom - selectMenu2Popup.getBoundingClientRect().top)), 0);+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu2.getBoundingClientRect().right - selectMenu2Popup.getBoundingClientRect().right)), 0); }, "The popup should be bottom right positioned"); promise_test(async () => {@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ const selectMenu3Button = document.getElementById("selectMenu3-button"); selectMenu3Button.click();- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu3.getBoundingClientRect().top), Math.round(selectMenu3Popup.getBoundingClientRect().bottom * 1.5));- assert_equals(Math.round(selectMenu3.getBoundingClientRect().right), Math.round(selectMenu3Popup.getBoundingClientRect().right * 1.5));+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu3.getBoundingClientRect().top - selectMenu3Popup.getBoundingClientRect().bottom * 1.5)), 0);+ assert_equals(Math.abs(Math.trunc(selectMenu3.getBoundingClientRect().right - selectMenu3Popup.getBoundingClientRect().right * 1.5)), 0); }, "The popup should be top right positioned"); </script>=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.transparent-1.worker.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.transparent-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.transparent-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'transparent'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't identify any security vulnerabilities in the changes. The modifications appear to be test improvements and variable renaming rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:
1. For the selectmenu-popup-position-with-zoom.tentative.html changes:
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes only modify the test assertions to use Math.abs() and Math.trunc() instead of Math.round() for more precise position checking. This is a test improvement, not a security fix.
2. For the 2d.fillStyle.parse.transparent-1.worker.js changes:
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes simply rename variables from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency, which doesn't affect security. The test logic remains the same.
No security vulnerabilities were found in either diff. The changes appear to be test improvements and code style adjustments rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.dompoint.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.dompoint.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's my analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.dompoint.worker.js
Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
The changes are consistent throughout the file, only affecting variable naming and not any security-related functionality. The test assertions remain the same, just using the new variable name. No security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/gn.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/gn.yml@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ script: build-gn-macosx.sh fetches: toolchain:- - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-cctools-port+ - linux64-clang-toolchain - macosx64-sdk-11.0 win32-gn:
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Dependency Version Pinning Removal [File] [Lines 30-33]
[Old Code]
- linux64-cctools-port-clang-13
- linux64-clang-13
[Fixed Code]
- linux64-cctools-port
- linux64-clang-toolchain
Additional Details:
- The diff shows changes in dependency specifications, moving from version-pinned toolchain components (clang-13) to more generic names.
- While this could potentially introduce security concerns if the unpinned dependencies are less secure versions, there isn't enough information to confirm this as a security vulnerability.
- The change might be part of a broader strategy to manage toolchain versions differently, possibly through other mechanisms.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.scale1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.scale1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -36,15 +36,15 @@ ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00'; ctx.stroke(); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming Refactoring [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.scale1.html] [Lines 17-18, 36-44]
Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");
```
The changes don't affect any security-related functionality or fix any security issues. It's simply a variable name change for better consistency or readability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/server.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/server.rs@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ use crate::cid::{ConnectionId, ConnectionIdDecoder, ConnectionIdGenerator, ConnectionIdRef}; use crate::connection::{Connection, Output, State}; use crate::packet::{PacketBuilder, PacketType, PublicPacket};-use crate::tparams::PreferredAddress; use crate::{ConnectionParameters, QuicVersion, Res}; use std::cell::RefCell;@@ -158,8 +157,6 @@ zero_rtt_checker: ServerZeroRttChecker, /// A connection ID generator. cid_generator: Rc<RefCell<dyn ConnectionIdGenerator>>,- /// The preferred address(es).- preferred_address: Option<PreferredAddress>, /// Connection parameters. conn_params: ConnectionParameters, /// Active connection attempts, keyed by `AttemptKey`. Initial packets with@@ -210,7 +207,6 @@ anti_replay, zero_rtt_checker: ServerZeroRttChecker::new(zero_rtt_checker), cid_generator,- preferred_address: None, conn_params, active_attempts: HashMap::default(), connections: Rc::default(),@@ -237,11 +233,6 @@ /// default values. pub fn set_ciphers(&mut self, ciphers: impl AsRef<[Cipher]>) { self.ciphers = Vec::from(ciphers.as_ref());- }-- /// Set a preferred address.- pub fn set_preferred_address(&mut self, spa: PreferredAddress) {- self.preferred_address = Some(spa); } pub fn enable_ech(
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Removal of Preferred Address Feature] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/server.rs] [Lines 20, 158, 210, 237-240]
[Old Code]
- use crate::tparams::PreferredAddress;
- preferred_address: Option<PreferredAddress>,
- preferred_address: None,
- pub fn set_preferred_address(&mut self, spa: PreferredAddress) {
- self.preferred_address = Some(spa);
- }
[Fixed Code]
[The entire PreferredAddress functionality was removed]
Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of the PreferredAddress feature from the QUIC transport implementation. While not explicitly stated in the diff, this could be related to security concerns with QUIC's preferred address feature, which has been discussed in security circles. The removal suggests potential vulnerabilities in the implementation or design of this feature, though without more context we can't name a specific CVE or vulnerability. This appears to be a security hardening measure.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Security Hardening] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/server.rs] [General changes]
[Old Code]
[Various code including PreferredAddress feature]
[Fixed Code]
[Code with PreferredAddress feature removed]
Additional Details:
The general removal of the PreferredAddress functionality might indicate broader security hardening beyond any single vulnerability. The change could be preventive rather than fixing a known issue. Without more context from the commit message or issue tracker, we can't be certain about specific vulnerabilities being addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/payments/MerchantValidationEvent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/payments/MerchantValidationEvent.cpp@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ } void MerchantValidationEvent::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,- JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+ JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) { MOZ_ASSERT(aCx); MOZ_ASSERT(mRequest);@@ -112,7 +113,8 @@ } void MerchantValidationEvent::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,- JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+ JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) { MOZ_ASSERT(mRequest); if (!mWaitForUpdate) { return;
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/payments/MerchantValidationEvent.cpp] [Lines 87-113]
[Old Code]
void MerchantValidationEvent::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
void MerchantValidationEvent::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {
[Fixed Code]
void MerchantValidationEvent::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
ErrorResult& aRv) {
void MerchantValidationEvent::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
ErrorResult& aRv) {
Additional Details:
- The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& aRv parameter to both callback functions
- This appears to be adding better error handling capabilities, but without more context about how these functions are used, it's hard to determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability
- The change could potentially address unhandled error conditions that might have led to undefined behavior, but this is speculative
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/chunking.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/chunking.py@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ "fission": any("fission" in key for key in setting["runtime"].keys()), "headless": "-headless" in task["test-name"], "tsan": setting["build"].get("tsan", False),- "webrender": task.get("webrender", True),+ "xorigin": any("xorigin" in key for key in setting["runtime"].keys()), } for platform in ("android", "linux", "mac", "win"): if p_os["name"].startswith(platform):
Analysis of the code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Information Exposure Through Data Comparison [File] taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/chunking.py [Lines] 53
[Old Code]
`"webrender": task.get("webrender", True),`
[Fixed Code]
`"xorigin": any("xorigin" in key for key in setting["runtime"].keys()),`
The old code was potentially exposing information through direct comparison of the "webrender" flag from the task object, which could lead to information disclosure if the task object contained sensitive data. The fixed code replaces this with a safer check for "xorigin" in runtime keys.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Insecure Default Value [File] taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/chunking.py [Lines] 53
[Old Code]
`"webrender": task.get("webrender", True),`
[Fixed Code]
`"xorigin": any("xorigin" in key for key in setting["runtime"].keys()),`
The old code used a default value of True for the "webrender" flag if it wasn't present in the task object. This could potentially be insecure if the default value should have been False, but without more context about the application's requirements, this is uncertain. The fixed code removes this default value pattern.
Note: The diff shows a change in the configuration dictionary where one flag check was replaced with another. While this might not represent a classic security vulnerability, it does show a change in security-relevant configuration handling.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120, 100%, 50%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-1.worker.js
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update its references accordingly. There are no changes to security-related functionality, input validation, or sensitive operations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoEncoderParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoEncoderParent.h@@ -54,11 +54,7 @@ // GMPSharedMemManager bool Alloc(size_t aSize, Shmem::SharedMemory::SharedMemoryType aType, Shmem* aMem) override {-#ifdef GMP_SAFE_SHMEM return AllocShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);-#else- return AllocUnsafeShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);-#endif } void Dealloc(Shmem&& aMem) override { DeallocShmem(aMem); }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Use of Unsafe Shared Memory [dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoEncoderParent.h] [Lines 54-60]
[Old Code]
```cpp
#ifdef GMP_SAFE_SHMEM
return AllocShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);
#else
return AllocUnsafeShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);
#endif
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
return AllocShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);
```
Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to the use of unsafe shared memory allocation. The old code had a conditional compilation path that could use `AllocUnsafeShmem()` when `GMP_SAFE_SHMEM` wasn't defined, which could potentially lead to security issues. The fix removes this unsafe path and consistently uses the safer `AllocShmem()` function. This change likely addresses potential memory safety or privilege escalation vulnerabilities that could occur when using unsafe shared memory allocation.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.