--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/src/atomic.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/src/atomic.rs@@ -562,6 +562,65 @@             })     }+    /// Fetches the pointer, and then applies a function to it that returns a new value.+    /// Returns a `Result` of `Ok(previous_value)` if the function returned `Some`, else `Err(_)`.+    ///+    /// Note that the given function may be called multiple times if the value has been changed by+    /// other threads in the meantime, as long as the function returns `Some(_)`, but the function+    /// will have been applied only once to the stored value.+    ///+    /// `fetch_update` takes two [`Ordering`] arguments to describe the memory+    /// ordering of this operation. The first describes the required ordering for+    /// when the operation finally succeeds while the second describes the+    /// required ordering for loads. These correspond to the success and failure+    /// orderings of [`Atomic::compare_exchange`] respectively.+    ///+    /// Using [`Acquire`] as success ordering makes the store part of this+    /// operation [`Relaxed`], and using [`Release`] makes the final successful+    /// load [`Relaxed`]. The (failed) load ordering can only be [`SeqCst`],+    /// [`Acquire`] or [`Relaxed`] and must be equivalent to or weaker than the+    /// success ordering.+    ///+    /// [`Relaxed`]: Ordering::Relaxed+    /// [`Acquire`]: Ordering::Acquire+    /// [`Release`]: Ordering::Release+    /// [`SeqCst`]: Ordering::SeqCst+    ///+    /// # Examples+    ///+    /// ```+    /// use crossbeam_epoch::{self as epoch, Atomic};+    /// use std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst;+    ///+    /// let a = Atomic::new(1234);+    /// let guard = &epoch::pin();+    ///+    /// let res1 = a.fetch_update(SeqCst, SeqCst, guard, |x| Some(x.with_tag(1)));+    /// assert!(res1.is_ok());+    ///+    /// let res2 = a.fetch_update(SeqCst, SeqCst, guard, |x| None);+    /// assert!(res2.is_err());+    /// ```+    pub fn fetch_update<'g, F>(+        &self,+        set_order: Ordering,+        fail_order: Ordering,+        guard: &'g Guard,+        mut func: F,+    ) -> Result<Shared<'g, T>, Shared<'g, T>>+    where+        F: FnMut(Shared<'g, T>) -> Option<Shared<'g, T>>,+    {+        let mut prev = self.load(fail_order, guard);+        while let Some(next) = func(prev) {+            match self.compare_exchange_weak(prev, next, set_order, fail_order, guard) {+                Ok(shared) => return Ok(shared),+                Err(next_prev) => prev = next_prev.current,+            }+        }+        Err(prev)+    }+     /// Stores the pointer `new` (either `Shared` or `Owned`) into the atomic pointer if the current     /// value is the same as `current`. The tag is also taken into account, so two pointers to the     /// same object, but with different tags, will not be considered equal.

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The diff shows an addition of a new method `fetch_update` to the `Atomic` implementation, but no security-related changes or fixes.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found in the diff. The change is an addition of new functionality rather than a security fix.

Additional Notes:
1. The added `fetch_update` method appears to be a safe implementation of a common atomic operation pattern.
2. The method follows Rust's memory safety guarantees and proper atomic operation patterns.
3. No existing code was modified or fixed - only new functionality was added.
4. The implementation properly handles concurrent access through atomic operations and guard references.

If you'd like me to analyze a different diff that might contain security fixes, please provide it.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/decimal.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/decimal.rs@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ /// `UnpackedDecimal` contains unpacked representation of `Decimal` where each component /// of decimal-format stored in it's own field-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct UnpackedDecimal {     pub negative: bool,     pub scale: u32,@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@     /// is away from zero. e.g. 6.4 -> 6, 6.5 -> 7, -6.5 -> -7     MidpointAwayFromZero,     /// When a number is halfway between two others, it is rounded toward the nearest number that-    /// is toward zero. e.g. 6.4 -> 6, 6.5 -> 7, -6.5 -> -6+    /// is toward zero. e.g. 6.4 -> 6, 6.5 -> 6, -6.5 -> -6     MidpointTowardZero,     /// The number is always rounded toward zero. e.g. -6.8 -> -6, 6.8 -> 6     ToZero,@@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@     /// Returns `Some(Decimal)` number rounded to the specified number of significant digits. If     /// the resulting number is unable to be represented by the `Decimal` number then `None` will-    /// be returned.  +    /// be returned.     /// When the number of significant figures of the `Decimal` being rounded is greater than the requested     /// number of significant digits then rounding will be performed using `MidpointNearestEven` strategy.     ///@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@     /// Returns `Some(Decimal)` number rounded to the specified number of significant digits. If     /// the resulting number is unable to be represented by the `Decimal` number then `None` will-    /// be returned.  +    /// be returned.     /// When the number of significant figures of the `Decimal` being rounded is greater than the requested     /// number of significant digits then rounding will be performed using the provided [RoundingStrategy].     ///

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities following the required format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/decimal.rs [Lines] 83
   Old Code: `#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]`
   Fixed Code: `#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]`
   Additional Details: This is simply adding PartialEq derivation for better functionality, not a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation clarification [File] third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/decimal.rs [Lines] 125-127
   Old Code: `/// is toward zero. e.g. 6.4 -> 6, 6.5 -> 7, -6.5 -> -6`
   Fixed Code: `/// is toward zero. e.g. 6.4 -> 6, 6.5 -> 6, -6.5 -> -6`
   Additional Details: This is just correcting documentation examples, not a security issue.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Whitespace cleanup [File] third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/decimal.rs [Lines] 1183-1185
   Old Code: `/// be returned.  `
   Fixed Code: `/// be returned.`
   Additional Details: This is just removing trailing whitespace in documentation.

4. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Whitespace cleanup [File] third_party/rust/rust_decimal/src/decimal.rs [Lines] 1224-1226
   Old Code: `/// be returned.  `
   Fixed Code: `/// be returned.`
   Additional Details: This is just removing trailing whitespace in documentation.

The changes appear to be primarily documentation improvements and minor code enhancements rather than security fixes. No security vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/ttwf-transform-skewy-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/ttwf-transform-skewy-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@     <link rel="author" title="Mihai Corlan" href="mailto:[email protected]">     <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#transform-property">     <link rel="match" href="reference/ttwf-reftest-transform-skewy-001.html">-    <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-66;totalPixels=200-200">+    <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-68;totalPixels=100-200">     <meta name="assert" content="Test that the green shape is skew on Y axis by 45 degrees">     <style type="text/css">         .greenSquare {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be adjustments to test parameters rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/ttwf-transform-skewy-001.html [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
<meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-66;totalPixels=200-200">
[Fixed Code]
<meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-68;totalPixels=100-200">

The change only modifies the fuzzy matching parameters for the test case, adjusting the allowed difference ranges. This is a test configuration change rather than a security fix. No known vulnerability patterns are present in this modification.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/wayland_surface.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/wayland_surface.rs@@ -1,29 +1,23 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk; use crate::RawPtr;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct WaylandSurface {     handle: vk::Instance,-    wayland_surface_fn: vk::KhrWaylandSurfaceFn,+    fp: vk::KhrWaylandSurfaceFn, } impl WaylandSurface {-    pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {-        let surface_fn = vk::KhrWaylandSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+    pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+        let handle = instance.handle();+        let fp = vk::KhrWaylandSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: instance.handle(),-            wayland_surface_fn: surface_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::KhrWaylandSurfaceFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCreateWaylandSurfaceKHR.html>"]@@ -33,7 +27,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::SurfaceKHR> {         let mut surface = mem::zeroed();-        self.wayland_surface_fn+        self.fp             .create_wayland_surface_khr(                 self.handle,                 create_info,@@ -51,7 +45,7 @@         wl_display: &mut vk::wl_display,     ) -> bool {         let b = self-            .wayland_surface_fn+            .fp             .get_physical_device_wayland_presentation_support_khr(                 physical_device,                 queue_family_index,@@ -61,8 +55,12 @@         b > 0     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::KhrWaylandSurfaceFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrWaylandSurfaceFn {-        &self.wayland_surface_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/wayland_surface.rs] [Lines 1-61]
   The changes appear to be primarily code refactoring (renaming `wayland_surface_fn` to `fp`, changing `EntryCustom<L>` to `Entry`, and reorganizing method order) rather than security fixes. No security-related vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Type Safety Issue [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/wayland_surface.rs] [Lines 14-16]
   Old Code:
   ```
   mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))
   ```
   The change from `instance.handle()` to `handle` might relate to type safety, but without more context about the underlying types and their safety guarantees, this is uncertain. The use of `mem::transmute` is generally risky but was present in both versions.

The main changes appear to be structural/refactoring rather than security fixes. The most notable change is the removal of the generic parameter `L` from `EntryCustom<L>` to just `Entry`, which might simplify the code but doesn't appear to be security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-2.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.2)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.2)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name. There are no apparent security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/test/marionette.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/test/marionette.yml@@ -21,23 +21,39 @@     test-manifest-loader: null  # don't load tests in the taskgraph     tier:         by-variant:-            fission: 2-            default: default+            fission: default+            headless: 2+            default: 2     variants:         - fission         - webrender-sw+        - webrender-sw+fission+        - headless+        - headless+fission     run-on-projects:         by-variant:-            fission:+            fission: built-projects+            headless:                 by-test-platform:-                    (linux.*64|windows10-64)(-shippable)?(-qr)?/.*: ['trunk']-                    linux.*64-asan-qr/opt: ['trunk']+                    linux.*(tsan|ccov).*: []+                    linux.*64(-shippable)?-qr/opt: ['trunk']+                    default: []+            headless+fission:+                by-test-platform:+                    (linux.*64)(-shippable)?-qr/opt: built-projects                     default: []             webrender-sw:                 by-test-platform:+                    linux.*/debug: ['trunk']+                    default: []+            webrender-sw+fission:+                by-test-platform:                     .*/debug: built-projects                     default: []-            default: built-projects+            default:+                by-test-platform:+                    linux.*: ['trunk']+                    default: []     virtualization:         by-test-platform:             windows10-64.*: hardware@@ -49,13 +65,3 @@     max-run-time: 5400     instance-size: default     chunks: 1--marionette-headless:-    description: "Marionette headless unittest run"-    treeherder-symbol: MnH-    max-run-time: 5400-    instance-size: default-    tier: 2-    mozharness:-        extra-options:-            - --headless

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found
   File: taskcluster/ci/test/marionette.yml
   Lines: Various
   Old Code: Various configuration settings for test variants and platforms
   Fixed Code: Updated configuration settings with additional variants and platform specifications

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found
   File: taskcluster/ci/test/marionette.yml
   Lines: 49-65
   Old Code: Separate marionette-headless configuration block
   Fixed Code: Headless configuration integrated into main configuration (removed separate block)

Notes:
- The changes appear to be configuration updates rather than security fixes
- The modifications include:
  * Added new test variants (headless, webrender-sw+fission, headless+fission)
  * Updated run-on-projects rules with more specific platform targeting
  * Integrated headless configuration into main configuration
  * Removed separate marionette-headless block
- No obvious security vulnerabilities were addressed in these changes
- The changes seem focused on test configuration management and organization

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-animations/CSSAnimation-effect.tentative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-animations/CSSAnimation-effect.tentative.html@@ -133,6 +133,14 @@ test(t => {   const div = addDiv(t);+  div.style.animation = 'anim 100s';+  div.style.animationComposition = 'add';+  const animation = div.getAnimations()[0];+  assert_equals(animation.effect.composite, 'add');+}, 'Setting animation-composition sets the composite property on the effect');++test(t => {+  const div = addDiv(t);   // Create custom keyframes so we can tweak them   const stylesheet = document.styleSheets[0];@@ -161,6 +169,7 @@   div.style.animationDelay = '8s';   div.style.animationFillMode = 'both';   div.style.animationPlayState = 'paused';+  div.style.animationComposition = 'add';   // Update the keyframes   keyframesRule.deleteRule(0);@@ -197,6 +206,11 @@     '200px',     'keyframes should be the value set by the API'   );+  assert_equals(+    animation.effect.composite,+    'replace',+    'composite should be the value set by the API'+  );   // Unlike the other properties animation-play-state maps to the Animation   // not the KeyframeEffect so it should be overridden.

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test case additions and modifications related to CSS animation properties, specifically focusing on the `animationComposition` property and its effect on composite operations.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are test case additions for CSS animation composition functionality.

Additional Details:
The diff shows:
1. Addition of a new test case for `animationComposition` property
2. Addition of `animationComposition` to an existing test case
3. Addition of an assertion for the composite property in an existing test

These changes appear to be functional tests rather than security fixes. The modifications are focused on verifying correct behavior of CSS animation properties, particularly the interaction between `animationComposition` style and the effect's composite property.

No old code was removed or modified in a way that would suggest a security fix - only additions were made to test new functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/signup/overlay.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/signup/overlay.js@@ -5,7 +5,10 @@ It does not contain any logic for saving or communication with the extension or server. */+import React from "react";+import ReactDOM from "react-dom"; import pktPanelMessaging from "../messages.js";+import Signup from "../components/Signup/Signup"; var SignupOverlay = function(options) {   this.inited = false;@@ -36,42 +39,58 @@     let elBody = document.querySelector(`body`);     // Extract local variables passed into template via URL query params-    let queryParams = new URL(window.location.href).searchParams;-    let pockethost = queryParams.get(`pockethost`) || `getpocket.com`;-    let utmCampaign =-      queryParams.get(`utmCampaign`) || `firefox_door_hanger_menu`;-    let utmSource = queryParams.get(`utmSource`) || `control`;-    let language = queryParams-      .get(`locale`)-      ?.split(`-`)[0]-      .toLowerCase();+    const { searchParams } = new URL(window.location.href);+    const isEmailSignupEnabled = searchParams.get(`emailButton`) === `true`;+    const pockethost = searchParams.get(`pockethost`) || `getpocket.com`;+    const locale = searchParams.get(`locale`) || ``;+    const language = locale.split(`-`)[0].toLowerCase();+    const utmCampaign =+      searchParams.get(`utmCampaign`) || `firefox_door_hanger_menu`;+    const utmSource = searchParams.get(`utmSource`) || `control`;+    const layoutRefresh = searchParams.get(`layoutRefresh`) === `true`;     if (this.active) {       return;     }     this.active = true;-    const templateData = {-      pockethost,-      utmCampaign,-      utmSource,-    };+    if (layoutRefresh) {+      // Create actual content+      document+        .querySelector(`.pkt_ext_containersignup`)+        ?.classList.remove(`pkt_ext_containersignup`);+      ReactDOM.render(+        <Signup pockethost={pockethost} locale={locale} />,+        document.querySelector(`body`)+      );+    } else {+      const templateData = {+        pockethost,+        utmCampaign,+        utmSource,+      };-    // extra modifier class for language-    if (language) {-      elBody.classList.add(`pkt_ext_signup_${language}`);+      // extra modifier class for language+      if (language) {+        elBody.classList.add(`pkt_ext_signup_${language}`);+      }++      // Create actual content+      elBody.append(+        parser.parseFromString(+          Handlebars.templates.signup_shell(templateData),+          `text/html`+        ).documentElement+      );++      // Remove email button based on `extensions.pocket.refresh.emailButton.enabled` pref+      if (!isEmailSignupEnabled) {+        document.querySelector(`.btn-container-email`).remove();+      }++      // click events+      this.setupClickEvents();     }--    // Create actual content-    elBody.append(-      parser.parseFromString(-        Handlebars.templates.signup_shell(templateData),-        `text/html`-      ).documentElement-    );--    // click events-    this.setupClickEvents();     // tell back end we're ready     pktPanelMessaging.sendMessage("PKT_show_signup");

I'll analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[XSS Potential] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/signup/overlay.js] [Lines 36-39]
Old Code:
    let queryParams = new URL(window.location.href).searchParams;
    let pockethost = queryParams.get(`pockethost`) || `getpocket.com`;
    let utmCampaign = queryParams.get(`utmCampaign`) || `firefox_door_hanger_menu`;
    let utmSource = queryParams.get(`utmSource`) || `control`;
Fixed Code:
    const { searchParams } = new URL(window.location.href);
    const isEmailSignupEnabled = searchParams.get(`emailButton`) === `true`;
    const pockethost = searchParams.get(`pockethost`) || `getpocket.com`;
    const locale = searchParams.get(`locale`) || ``;
Additional Details:
    The code handles URL parameters which could potentially be used for XSS if not properly sanitized. While the change makes the code more robust (using const instead of let), it's unclear if there was an actual XSS vulnerability here. The parameters are used in template rendering and class names, which could be problematic if user input isn't properly escaped.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[DOM-based XSS Potential] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/signup/overlay.js] [Lines 60-63]
Old Code:
    elBody.append(
      parser.parseFromString(
        Handlebars.templates.signup_shell(templateData),
        `text/html`
      ).documentElement
    );
Fixed Code:
    ReactDOM.render(
        <Signup pockethost={pockethost} locale={locale} />,
        document.querySelector(`body`)
      );
Additional Details:
    The change moves from direct HTML string manipulation using Handlebars to React components, which generally provides better XSS protection through automatic escaping. However, it's unclear if the previous implementation was actually vulnerable since we don't see the Handlebars template content.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[DOM Manipulation Vulnerability] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/js/signup/overlay.js] [Lines 82-84]
Old Code:
    (none - new code added)
Fixed Code:
    if (!isEmailSignupEnabled) {
        document.querySelector(`.btn-container-email`).remove();
    }
Additional Details:
    The new code removes DOM elements based on a URL parameter. If an attacker could control this parameter, they might be able to manipulate the page in unintended ways. However, this would likely require other vulnerabilities to be exploitable.

Note: While there are several changes in the code that could potentially relate to security, none clearly indicate fixed vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be more about code modernization (switching to React) and adding new features (layoutRefresh option).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.selfintersect.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.selfintersect.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(45, 20, 10, 10); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.selfintersect.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes don't address any security issues but rather improve code consistency by using a shorter variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/l10n/L10nMutations.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/l10n/L10nMutations.cpp@@ -165,10 +165,11 @@   explicit L10nMutationFinalizationHandler(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal)       : mGlobal(aGlobal) {}-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {-  }--  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {}++  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     nsTArray<nsCString> errors{         "[dom/l10n] Errors during l10n mutation frame."_ns,     };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Error Handling Improvement [dom/l10n/L10nMutations.cpp] [Lines 165-172]
[Old Code]
  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
  }

  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
[Fixed Code]
  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {}

  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {

Additional Details:
- The change adds ErrorResult parameters to both callback methods
- This appears to be improving error handling capabilities
- While not clearly fixing a specific vulnerability, it could potentially prevent unhandled errors
- The change might be related to better error propagation in promise handling

Note: Without more context about the actual implementation or any security issues this was specifically addressing, I can't definitively identify a security vulnerability. The change appears to be more about improving robustness than fixing a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-size-adjust-zero-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-size-adjust-zero-2.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-fonts/#font-size-adjust-prop"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/CSS21/box.html#collapsing-margins"> <link rel="match" href="font-size-zero-2-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <style> /* spec ambiguous whether font-size-adjust influences line-height: normal */ body { line-height: 1.2 }

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-size-adjust-zero-2.html] [Lines 5]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata rather than security-related code.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a minor test file cleanup.
3. The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration and its removal doesn't impact security.
4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.multiply.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.multiply.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.transform(-2,1, 3/2,-1/2, 1,-2); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 26]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wast/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wast/src/lib.rs@@ -45,10 +45,11 @@ //! [`Parse`]: parser::Parse //! [`LexError`]: lexer::LexError-#![deny(missing_docs, broken_intra_doc_links)]+#![deny(missing_docs, rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)] use std::fmt; use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};+use unicode_width::UnicodeWidthStr; #[cfg(feature = "wasm-module")] mod binary;@@ -229,7 +230,26 @@ impl Text {     fn new(content: &str, span: Span) -> Text {         let (line, col) = span.linecol_in(content);-        let snippet = content.lines().nth(line).unwrap_or("").to_string();+        let contents = content.lines().nth(line).unwrap_or("");+        let mut snippet = String::new();+        for ch in contents.chars() {+            match ch {+                // Replace tabs with spaces to render consistently+                '\t' => {+                    snippet.push_str("    ");+                }+                // these codepoints change how text is rendered so for clarity+                // in error messages they're dropped.+                '\u{202a}' | '\u{202b}' | '\u{202d}' | '\u{202e}' | '\u{2066}' | '\u{2067}'+                | '\u{2068}' | '\u{206c}' | '\u{2069}' => {}++                c => snippet.push(c),+            }+        }+        // Use the `unicode-width` crate to figure out how wide the snippet, up+        // to our "column", actually is. That'll tell us how many spaces to+        // place before the `^` character that points at the problem+        let col = snippet.get(..col).map(|s| s.width()).unwrap_or(col);         Text { line, col, snippet }     } }

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security assessment following the required format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Unicode Bidirectional Text Handling Issue [third_party/rust/wast/src/lib.rs] [Lines 229-230, modified]
[Old Code]
let snippet = content.lines().nth(line).unwrap_or("").to_string();
[Fixed Code]
let contents = content.lines().nth(line).unwrap_or("");
let mut snippet = String::new();
for ch in contents.chars() {
    match ch {
        // Replace tabs with spaces to render consistently
        '\t' => {
            snippet.push_str("    ");
        }
        // these codepoints change how text is rendered so for clarity
        // in error messages they're dropped.
        '\u{202a}' | '\u{202b}' | '\u{202d}' | '\u{202e}' | '\u{2066}' | '\u{2067}'
        | '\u{2068}' | '\u{206c}' | '\u{2069}' => {}

        c => snippet.push(c),
    }
}

Additional Details:
The changes involve handling of Unicode bidirectional control characters (like U+202A-E) and other formatting control characters. While this isn't a classic vulnerability, it could be related to potential Unicode-based spoofing or rendering issues. The addition of unicode-width calculation also suggests improved handling of text display.

Vulnerability Existed: no
Documentation Link Handling [third_party/rust/wast/src/lib.rs] [Lines 45]
[Old Code]
#![deny(missing_docs, broken_intra_doc_links)]
[Fixed Code]
#![deny(missing_docs, rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)]

Additional Details:
This is just a syntax update for Rust documentation linting and doesn't represent a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-43.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-43.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <div class="t1">

Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 8]
   [Old Code]
   <meta name="flags" content="" />
   [Fixed Code]
   (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change.
- The modification appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security-related fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.h@@ -21,10 +21,7 @@                                 unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookieLen,                                 ssl3CipherSuite *previousCipherSuite,                                 const sslNamedGroupDef **previousGroup,-                                PRBool *previousEchOffered,-                                HpkeKdfId *previousEchKdfId,-                                HpkeAeadId *previousEchAeadId,-                                PRUint8 *previousEchConfigId,-                                HpkeContext **previousEchHpkeCtx,+                                PRBool *previousOfferedEch,+                                sslEchCookieData *echData,                                 PRBool recoverState); #endif

Let me analyze the diff for potential security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) Parameter Consolidation] [security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.h] [Lines 21-28]
    [Old Code]
    PRBool *previousEchOffered,
    HpkeKdfId *previousEchKdfId,
    HpkeAeadId *previousEchAeadId,
    PRUint8 *previousEchConfigId,
    HpkeContext **previousEchHpkeCtx,
    [Fixed Code]
    PRBool *previousOfferedEch,
    sslEchCookieData *echData,

Additional Details:
- The diff shows a significant change in how ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) parameters are handled, consolidating multiple individual parameters into a single `sslEchCookieData` structure.
- While this appears to be a security-related change (ECH is a privacy/security feature), I can't determine if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just an architectural improvement.
- The change suggests better encapsulation of ECH-related data, which could prevent potential security issues related to improper parameter handling.
- The parameter name also changed from `previousEchOffered` to `previousOfferedEch`, suggesting some standardization in naming conventions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/canvas/CanvasRenderingContextHelper.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/canvas/CanvasRenderingContextHelper.cpp@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "ImageEncoder.h" #include "mozilla/dom/BlobImpl.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CanvasRenderingContext2D.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/OffscreenCanvasRenderingContext2D.h" #include "mozilla/GfxMessageUtils.h" #include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"@@ -137,6 +138,11 @@       ret = new CanvasRenderingContext2D(aCompositorBackend);       break;+    case CanvasContextType::OffscreenCanvas2D:+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CANVAS_2D_USED, 1);+      ret = new OffscreenCanvasRenderingContext2D(aCompositorBackend);+      break;+     case CanvasContextType::WebGL1:       Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CANVAS_WEBGL_USED, 1);@@ -166,6 +172,7 @@   }   MOZ_ASSERT(ret);+  ret->Initialize();   return ret.forget(); }@@ -261,8 +268,9 @@ nsresult CanvasRenderingContextHelper::ParseParams(     JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aType, const JS::Value& aEncoderOptions,     nsAString& outParams, bool* const outUsingCustomParseOptions) {-  // Quality parameter is only valid for the image/jpeg MIME type-  if (aType.EqualsLiteral("image/jpeg")) {+  // Quality parameter is only valid for the image/jpeg and image/webp MIME+  // types.+  if (aType.EqualsLiteral("image/jpeg") || aType.EqualsLiteral("image/webp")) {     if (aEncoderOptions.isNumber()) {       double quality = aEncoderOptions.toNumber();       // Quality must be between 0.0 and 1.0, inclusive

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Missing Initialization Vulnerability] [dom/canvas/CanvasRenderingContextHelper.cpp] [Lines 166-172]
[Old Code]
  MOZ_ASSERT(ret);
  return ret.forget();
[Fixed Code]
  MOZ_ASSERT(ret);
  ret->Initialize();
  return ret.forget();
Additional Details: The fix adds initialization for the newly created context objects. While not explicitly a security vulnerability, missing initialization could potentially lead to undefined behavior or information leaks.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Input Validation Vulnerability] [dom/canvas/CanvasRenderingContextHelper.cpp] [Lines 261-268]
[Old Code]
  // Quality parameter is only valid for the image/jpeg MIME type
  if (aType.EqualsLiteral("image/jpeg")) {
[Fixed Code]
  // Quality parameter is only valid for the image/jpeg and image/webp MIME
  // types.
  if (aType.EqualsLiteral("image/jpeg") || aType.EqualsLiteral("image/webp")) {
Additional Details: The fix expands input validation to include WebP format. While not clearly a security fix, proper input validation helps prevent potential issues with malformed inputs.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
[New Feature Implementation] [dom/canvas/CanvasRenderingContextHelper.cpp] [Lines 137-142]
[Old Code]
      ret = new CanvasRenderingContext2D(aCompositorBackend);
      break;
[Fixed Code]
      ret = new CanvasRenderingContext2D(aCompositorBackend);
      break;

    case CanvasContextType::OffscreenCanvas2D:
      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CANVAS_2D_USED, 1);
      ret = new OffscreenCanvasRenderingContext2D(aCompositorBackend);
      break;
Additional Details: This appears to be a new feature implementation (adding OffscreenCanvas support) rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-clamp-4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-clamp-4.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(-1000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 1000000000000000000000000000000000000000, -1000000000000000000000000000000000000000)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(-1000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 1000000000000000000000000000000000000000, -1000000000000000000000000000000000000000)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(-1000000000000000000000000000000000000000, 1000000000000000000000000000000000000000, -1000000000000000000000000000000000000000)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The test continues to check the same functionality (color clamping behavior for extreme RGB values) with the same assertions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-047.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-047.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-047-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the basic shape ellipse(closest-side farthest-side at top 40px right 60px) border-box">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-047.html] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags"
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerabilities are addressed in this change
- The modification doesn't introduce any security risks or fix any known vulnerabilities

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/quick-open.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/quick-open.js@@ -39,15 +39,3 @@       return state;   } }--export function getQuickOpenEnabled(state) {-  return state.quickOpen.enabled;-}--export function getQuickOpenQuery(state) {-  return state.quickOpen.query;-}--export function getQuickOpenType(state) {-  return state.quickOpen.searchType;-}

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Exposure] [devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/quick-open.js] [Lines 39-51]
   [Old Code]
   export function getQuickOpenEnabled(state) {
     return state.quickOpen.enabled;
   }
   
   export function getQuickOpenQuery(state) {
     return state.quickOpen.query;
   }
   
   export function getQuickOpenType(state) {
     return state.quickOpen.searchType;
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   [These functions were completely removed]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of three getter functions that exposed internal state properties
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, removing direct state access functions could be a security hardening measure to prevent potential information exposure
- Without more context about how these functions were used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just refactoring
- The change might be related to reducing attack surface by not exposing internal state unnecessarily

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-num-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-num-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(  0  ,  255  ,  0  ,  .499  )'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-num-1.html
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call accordingly

These changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.