--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@         var pattern = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'repeat-x');         ctx.fillStyle = pattern;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 38-41]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
    [etc...]

    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
    [etc...]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name for the canvas object.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_False_arm64_linux.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_False_arm64_linux.json@@ -28155,7 +28155,6 @@                 "-Wno-shorten-64-to-32"             ],             "defines": [-                "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE",                 "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",                 "USE_UDEV",                 "USE_AURA=1",

Let me analyze the diff according to the provided format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potentially Removed Feature Flag] [dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_False_arm64_linux.json] [Lines 28155-28158]
[Old Code]
            "defines": [
                "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE",
                "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",
                "USE_UDEV",
                "USE_AURA=1",
[Fixed Code]
            "defines": [
                "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE",
                "USE_UDEV",
                "USE_AURA=1",

Additional Notes:
1. The diff shows removal of the "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE" define flag
2. This appears to be a configuration change rather than a direct security fix
3. Without more context, it's unclear if this was a security-related change or just a feature removal
4. The removal could potentially relate to reducing attack surface by removing unused features, but this is speculative
5. No specific vulnerability name can be associated with this change based on the information provided

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/percent-width-ignored-001.tentative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/percent-width-ignored-001.tentative.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <script src='/resources/check-layout-th.js'></script> <link rel="author" title="David Grogan" href="[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://github.com/w3c/csswg-drafts/issues/3336">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="A cell's percent width is ignored when its table is nested in another cell" /> No red should show. Yellow and blue rectangles are in proportion to their contents' intrinsic widths, not affected by yellow's percent-width bloating the

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification appears to be removing a meta tag with empty flags content, which doesn't seem security-related. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/percent-width-ignored-001.tentative.html] [Lines 4]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed)

Additional notes:
1. The change appears to be test-related cleanup rather than a security fix
2. The removed meta tag with empty flags content didn't serve any apparent security purpose
3. The rest of the changes are comments/documentation updates

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.quadraticCurveTo.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 25); ctx.quadraticCurveTo(100, 25, 100, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security fixes. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Line 28]
[Old Code]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, with no security implications. No known vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/test/unit/lib/TopSitesFeed.test.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/test/unit/lib/TopSitesFeed.test.js@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@   "improvesearch.topSiteSearchShortcuts.havePinned"; const SHOWN_ON_NEWTAB_PREF = "feeds.topsites"; const SHOW_SPONSORED_PREF = "showSponsoredTopSites";-const CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF = "browser.topsites.contile.enabled"; const TOP_SITES_BLOCKED_SPONSORS_PREF = "browser.topsites.blockedSponsors"; const REMOTE_SETTING_DEFAULTS_PREF = "browser.topsites.useRemoteSetting";@@ -55,6 +54,7 @@   let shortURLStub;   let fakePageThumbs;   let fetchStub;+  let fakeNimbusFeatures;   beforeEach(() => {     globals = new GlobalOverrider();@@ -105,9 +105,17 @@       addExpirationFilter: sinon.stub(),       removeExpirationFilter: sinon.stub(),     };+    fakeNimbusFeatures = {+      newtab: {+        getVariable: sinon.stub(),+        onUpdate: sinon.stub(),+        off: sinon.stub(),+      },+    };     globals.set("PageThumbs", fakePageThumbs);     globals.set("NewTabUtils", fakeNewTabUtils);     globals.set("gFilterAdultEnabled", false);+    globals.set("NimbusFeatures", fakeNimbusFeatures);     sandbox.spy(global.XPCOMUtils, "defineLazyGetter");     FakePrefs.prototype.prefs["default.sites"] = "https://foo.com/";     ({ TopSitesFeed, DEFAULT_TOP_SITES } = injector({@@ -614,6 +622,11 @@       assert.calledOnce(feed.store.dbStorage.getDbTable);       assert.calledWithExactly(feed.store.dbStorage.getDbTable, "sectionPrefs");     });+    it("should call onUpdate to set up Nimbus update listener", async () => {+      await feed.init();++      assert.calledOnce(fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.onUpdate);+    });   });   describe("#refresh", () => {     beforeEach(() => {@@ -1089,6 +1102,28 @@         data: { addedShortcuts },       });       assert.calledOnce(feed.updatePinnedSearchShortcuts);+    });+    it("should refresh from Contile on SHOW_SPONSORED_PREF if Contile is enabled", () => {+      sandbox.spy(feed._contile, "refresh");+      const prefChangeAction = {+        type: at.PREF_CHANGED,+        data: { name: SHOW_SPONSORED_PREF },+      };+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(true);+      feed.onAction(prefChangeAction);++      assert.calledOnce(feed._contile.refresh);+    });+    it("should not refresh from Contile on SHOW_SPONSORED_PREF if Contile is disabled", () => {+      sandbox.spy(feed._contile, "refresh");+      const prefChangeAction = {+        type: at.PREF_CHANGED,+        data: { name: SHOW_SPONSORED_PREF },+      };+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(false);+      feed.onAction(prefChangeAction);++      assert.notCalled(feed._contile.refresh);     });   });   describe("#add", () => {@@ -2025,13 +2060,10 @@       fetchStub = sandbox.stub();       globals.set("fetch", fetchStub);       sandbox-        .stub(global.Services.prefs, "getBoolPref")-        .withArgs(CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF)-        .returns(true);-      sandbox         .stub(global.Services.prefs, "getStringPref")         .withArgs(TOP_SITES_BLOCKED_SPONSORS_PREF)         .returns(`["foo","bar"]`);+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(true);     });     afterEach(() => {       sandbox.restore();@@ -2066,6 +2098,16 @@       assert.ok(fetched);       assert.equal(feed._contile.sites.length, 2);+    });++    it("should not fetch from Contile if it's not enabled", async () => {+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.reset();+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(false);+      const fetched = await feed._contile._fetchSites();++      assert.notCalled(fetchStub);+      assert.ok(!fetched);+      assert.equal(feed._contile.sites.length, 0);     });     it("should filter the blocked sponsors", async () => {@@ -2190,10 +2232,7 @@         { url: "https://bar.com", title: "bar", sponsored_position: 2 },         { url: "https://test.com", title: "test", sponsored_position: 3 },       ]);-      global.Services.prefs.getStringPref-        .withArgs(CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF)-        .returns(false);-+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(false);       await feed._readDefaults();       assert.equal(DEFAULT_TOP_SITES.length, 1);@@ -2206,9 +2245,7 @@         { url: "https://bar.com", title: "bar", sponsored_position: 2 },         { url: "https://test.com", title: "test", sponsored_position: 3 },       ]);-      global.Services.prefs.getBoolPref-        .withArgs(CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF)-        .returns(true);+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(true);       await feed._readDefaults();@@ -2230,9 +2267,7 @@     });     it("should take the image from Contile if it's a hi-res one", async () => {-      global.Services.prefs.getBoolPref-        .withArgs(CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF)-        .returns(true);+      fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(true);       sandbox.stub(feed, "_getRemoteConfig").resolves([]);       sandbox.stub(feed._contile, "sites").get(() => [@@ -2269,4 +2304,21 @@       assert.isUndefined(site2.faviconSize);     });   });++  describe("#_nimbusChangeListener", () => {+    it("should refresh on Nimbus feature updates reasons", () => {+      sandbox.spy(feed._contile, "refresh");+      feed._nimbusChangeListener(null, "experiment-updated");++      assert.calledOnce(feed._contile.refresh);+    });++    it("should not refresh on Nimbus feature loaded reasons", () => {+      sandbox.spy(feed._contile, "refresh");+      feed._nimbusChangeListener(null, "feature-experiment-loaded");+      feed._nimbusChangeListener(null, "feature-rollout-loaded");++      assert.notCalled(feed._contile.refresh);+    });+  }); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed Contile Pref Check] [browser/components/newtab/test/unit/lib/TopSitesFeed.test.js] [Lines 28, 2025-2027]
[Old Code]
const CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF = "browser.topsites.contile.enabled";
...
sandbox.stub(global.Services.prefs, "getBoolPref").withArgs(CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF).returns(true);
[Fixed Code]
[Removed CONTILE_ENABLED_PREF constant and replaced with Nimbus feature check]
fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.getVariable.returns(true);

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Added Nimbus Feature Control] [browser/components/newtab/test/unit/lib/TopSitesFeed.test.js] [Lines 54, 105-111, 614-618]
[Old Code]
[No Nimbus feature control implementation]
[Fixed Code]
let fakeNimbusFeatures;
...
fakeNimbusFeatures = {
  newtab: {
    getVariable: sinon.stub(),
    onUpdate: sinon.stub(),
    off: sinon.stub(),
  }
};
...
assert.calledOnce(fakeNimbusFeatures.newtab.onUpdate);

The changes appear to be more about refactoring the feature flag system from using direct preference checks to using Nimbus feature flags, rather than fixing specific security vulnerabilities. The main changes involve:
1. Removing the direct preference check for Contile enablement
2. Adding Nimbus feature flag control system
3. Adding tests for the new Nimbus integration

While this could potentially improve security by centralizing feature control through Nimbus, there's no clear evidence of a specific security vulnerability being fixed in this diff. The changes seem more focused on architectural improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.h@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ class WindowSurfaceProvider final {  public:   WindowSurfaceProvider();-  ~WindowSurfaceProvider();+  ~WindowSurfaceProvider() = default;   /**    * Initializes the WindowSurfaceProvider by giving it the window@@ -67,6 +67,15 @@   void CleanupWindowSurface();   RefPtr<WindowSurface> mWindowSurface;++  /* While CleanupResources() can be called from Main thread when nsWindow is+   * destroyed/hidden, StartRemoteDrawingInRegion()/EndRemoteDrawingInRegion()+   * is called from Compositor thread during rendering.+   *+   * As nsWindow CleanupResources() call comes from Gtk/X11 we can't synchronize+   * that with WebRender so we use lock to synchronize the access.+   */+  mozilla::Mutex mMutex;   // WindowSurface needs to be re-created as underlying window was changed.   mozilla::Atomic<bool> mWindowSurfaceValid; #ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Race Condition [File] widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.h [Lines] 34,67  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   ~WindowSurfaceProvider();
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   ~WindowSurfaceProvider() = default;
   ```
   Additional Details: The change from a custom destructor to a default one might indicate a fix for potential resource cleanup issues, but without seeing the original destructor implementation, it's unclear if this was addressing a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   Race Condition (Thread Safety) [File] widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.h [Lines] 67  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   RefPtr<WindowSurface> mWindowSurface;
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   RefPtr<WindowSurface> mWindowSurface;
   mozilla::Mutex mMutex;
   ```
   Additional Details: The addition of a mutex clearly addresses a potential race condition between the Main thread and Compositor thread when accessing shared resources. This is a thread safety fix to prevent concurrent access issues.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Resource Leak [File] widget/gtk/WindowSurfaceProvider.h [Lines] 34  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   ~WindowSurfaceProvider();
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   ~WindowSurfaceProvider() = default;
   ```
   Additional Details: The change to a default destructor might suggest the original destructor had potential resource management issues, but without seeing its implementation, we can't be certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

Note: The most clear security fix is the addition of the mutex to prevent race conditions. The destructor changes might be related to security but require more context to be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d');@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, -50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better clarity/consistency. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.basic.html] [Lines 17-29]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   // ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   // ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency (to match with the naming of `offscreenCanvas2`), but this doesn't represent any security fix. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/once_cell/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/once_cell/CHANGELOG.md@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ # Changelog++## 1.9++- Added an `atomic-polyfill` optional dependency to compile `race` on platforms without atomics ## 1.8.0

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security fixes - it's just a changelog update documenting a new optional dependency. Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [third_party/rust/once_cell/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines 1-4]
[Old changelog content]
[Added note about new optional dependency]

Additional notes:
1. The diff only shows an addition to the changelog about a new optional dependency
2. There are no code changes shown that would indicate security fixes
3. The change appears to be purely functional (adding support for platforms without atomics) rather than security-related

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/platforms/ffmpeg/FFmpegLog.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/platforms/ffmpeg/FFmpegLog.h@@ -17,4 +17,7 @@     MOZ_LOG(sPDMLog, mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, ("FFMPEG: " str, ##__VA_ARGS__)) #endif+#define FFMPEG_LOGV(...) \+  MOZ_LOG(sPDMLog, mozilla::LogLevel::Verbose, (__VA_ARGS__))+ #endif  // __FFmpegLog_h__

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [dom/media/platforms/ffmpeg/FFmpegLog.h] [Lines added]
[Old Code]
(No FFMPEG_LOGV macro existed)
[Fixed Code]
#define FFMPEG_LOGV(...) \
  MOZ_LOG(sPDMLog, mozilla::LogLevel::Verbose, (__VA_ARGS__))

This appears to be a simple addition of a new logging macro for verbose output. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed - it's just adding new functionality (verbose logging capability) to the codebase. The change doesn't modify any existing security-relevant code or fix any apparent security issues.

No CVE or specific vulnerability name applies here as this is purely a feature addition rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.scale.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.scale.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ ctx.scale(Infinity, Infinity); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -10, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 32]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability.
- No security vulnerability is being fixed here, just a variable name change.
- The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
- The test case (checking scaling behavior with Infinity values) remains unchanged in its purpose.

No security vulnerabilities were found in this diff. The changes are purely cosmetic/readability improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.destpos.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.destpos.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@         ctx.drawImage(bitmap1, 0, 0, 100, 50, 100, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap1, 0, 0, 100, 50, 0, -50, 100, 50);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap1, 0, 0, 100, 50, 0, 50, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 18-19, 50-53]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Additional Details: This is simply a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. No security implications.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Reference Update [File] [Lines 50-53]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```
   Additional Details: This change simply updates the variable references to match the renamed variable from the first change. No security implications.

The diff shows only variable naming changes with no security vulnerabilities introduced or fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/error/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/error/mod.rs@@ -26,6 +26,34 @@ /// /// Given that most errors darling encounters represent code bugs in dependent crates, /// the internal structure of the error is deliberately opaque.+///+/// # Usage+/// Proc-macro expansion happens very infrequently compared to runtime tasks such as+/// deserialization, and it happens in the context of an expensive compilation taks.+/// For that reason, darling prefers not to fail on the first error it encounters, instead+/// doing as much work as it can, accumulating errors into a single report.+///+/// As a result, `darling::Error` is more of guaranteed-non-empty error collection+/// than a single problem. These errors also have some notion of hierarchy, stemming from+/// the hierarchical nature of darling's input.+///+/// These characteristics make for great experiences when using darling-powered crates,+/// provided crates using darling adhere to some best practices:+///+/// 1. Do not attempt to simplify a `darling::Error` into some other error type, such as+///    `syn::Error`. To surface compile errors, instead use `darling::Error::write_errors`.+///    This preserves all span information, suggestions, etc. Wrapping a `darling::Error` in+///    a custom error enum works as-expected and does not force any loss of fidelity.+/// 2. Do not use early return (e.g. the `?` operator) for custom validations. Instead,+///    create a local `Vec` to collect errors as they are encountered and then use+///    `darling::Error::multiple` to create an error containing all those issues if the list+///    is non-empty after validation. This can create very complex custom validation functions;+///    in those cases, split independent "validation chains" out into their own functions to+///    keep the main validator manageable.+/// 3. Use `darling::Error::custom` to create additional errors as-needed, then call `with_span`+///    to ensure those errors appear in the right place. Use `darling::util::SpannedValue` to keep+///    span information around on parsed fields so that custom diagnostics can point to the correct+///    parts of the input AST. #[derive(Debug)] #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone))] pub struct Error {@@ -37,12 +65,16 @@ /// Transform a syn::Path to a readable String fn path_to_string(path: &syn::Path) -> String {-    path.segments.iter().map(|s| s.ident.to_string()).collect::<Vec<String>>().join("::")+    path.segments+        .iter()+        .map(|s| s.ident.to_string())+        .collect::<Vec<String>>()+        .join("::") } /// Error creation functions impl Error {-    pub(in error) fn new(kind: ErrorKind) -> Self {+    pub(in crate::error) fn new(kind: ErrorKind) -> Self {         Error {             kind,             locations: Vec::new(),@@ -172,14 +204,12 @@     /// # Panics     /// This function will panic if `errors.is_empty() == true`.     pub fn multiple(mut errors: Vec<Error>) -> Self {-        if errors.len() > 1 {-            Error::new(ErrorKind::Multiple(errors))-        } else if errors.len() == 1 {-            errors+        match errors.len() {+            1 => errors                 .pop()-                .expect("Error array of length 1 has a first item")-        } else {-            panic!("Can't deal with 0 errors")+                .expect("Error array of length 1 has a first item"),+            0 => panic!("Can't deal with 0 errors"),+            _ => Error::new(ErrorKind::Multiple(errors)),         }     } }@@ -194,6 +224,7 @@ } /// Error instance methods+#[allow(clippy::len_without_is_empty)] // Error can never be empty impl Error {     /// Check if this error is associated with a span in the token stream.     pub fn has_span(&self) -> bool {@@ -327,7 +358,7 @@         // If span information is available, don't include the error property path         // since it's redundant and not consistent with native compiler diagnostics.         match self.kind {-            ErrorKind::UnknownField(euf) => euf.to_diagnostic(self.span),+            ErrorKind::UnknownField(euf) => euf.into_diagnostic(self.span),             _ => match self.span {                 Some(span) => span.unwrap().error(self.kind.to_string()),                 None => Diagnostic::new(Level::Error, self.to_string()),@@ -376,10 +407,10 @@ impl StdError for Error {     fn description(&self) -> &str {-        &self.kind.description()-    }--    fn cause(&self) -> Option<&StdError> {+        self.kind.description()+    }++    fn cause(&self) -> Option<&dyn StdError> {         None     } }@@ -392,6 +423,19 @@         }         Ok(())+    }+}++impl From<syn::Error> for Error {+    fn from(e: syn::Error) -> Self {+        // This impl assumes there is nothing but the message and span that needs to be preserved+        // from the passed-in error. If this changes at some point, a new ErrorKind should be made+        // to hold the syn::Error, and this impl should preserve it unmodified while setting its own+        // span to be a copy of the passed-in error.+        Self {+            span: Some(e.span()),+            ..Self::custom(e)+        }     } }

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't identify any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily documentation improvements, code style adjustments, and minor implementation refinements rather than security fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/error/mod.rs] [Various lines]
   The changes include:
   - Added extensive documentation about error handling best practices
   - Improved code formatting in path_to_string function
   - Changed visibility modifier from `pub(in error)` to `pub(in crate::error)`
   - Refactored Error::multiple match statement
   - Added #[allow] attribute for clippy lint
   - Changed ErrorKind::UnknownField handling
   - Updated StdError implementation
   - Added From<syn::Error> implementation

The changes are focused on improving code quality, documentation, and maintainability rather than addressing security issues. The modifications to error handling patterns could potentially make the code more robust against certain types of bugs, but I don't see any specific security vulnerabilities being addressed.

If I were to speculate about potential indirect security improvements, the better error handling documentation might help prevent misuse that could lead to security issues, but this is not a direct security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/initial.colour.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/initial.colour.worker.js@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,0,0,0, "20,20", "0,0,0,0");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,20, 0,0,0,0, "20,20", "0,0,0,0"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-16]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,0,0,0, "20,20", "0,0,0,0");
```
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 20,20, 0,0,0,0, "20,20", "0,0,0,0");
```
Additional Details:  
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No vulnerabilities were fixed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.svg.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.svg.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.svg.html] [Lines 18-33]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file. There are no security-related changes in this diff - no changes to the actual functionality, security checks, or handling of sensitive data. The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than addressing any security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.roundRect(50, -100, 0, 250, [0]); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.2.html [Lines] 17-27
   [Old Code] 
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmBuiltins.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmBuiltins.h@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #ifndef wasm_builtins_h #define wasm_builtins_h+#include "intgemm/IntegerGemmIntrinsic.h" #include "jit/IonTypes.h" #include "wasm/WasmIntrinsicGenerated.h"@@ -159,12 +160,12 @@ // SymbolicAddressSignature carries type information for a function referred // to by a SymbolicAddress.  In order that |argTypes| can be written out as a // static initialiser, it has to have fixed length.  At present-// SymbolicAddressType is used to describe functions with at most 6 arguments,-// so |argTypes| has 7 entries in order to allow the last value to be+// SymbolicAddressType is used to describe functions with at most 14 arguments,+// so |argTypes| has 15 entries in order to allow the last value to be // MIRType::None, in the hope of catching any accidental overruns of the // defined section of the array.-static constexpr size_t SymbolicAddressSignatureMaxArgs = 6;+static constexpr size_t SymbolicAddressSignatureMaxArgs = 14; struct SymbolicAddressSignature {   // The SymbolicAddress that is described.@@ -180,16 +181,16 @@   const jit::MIRType argTypes[SymbolicAddressSignatureMaxArgs + 1]; };-// The 16 in this assertion is derived as follows: SymbolicAddress is probably+// The 32 in this assertion is derived as follows: SymbolicAddress is probably // size-4 aligned-4, but it's at the start of the struct, so there's no // alignment hole before it.  All other components (MIRType and uint8_t) are-// size-1 aligned-1, and there are 8 in total, so it is reasonable to assume+// size-1 aligned-1, and there are 18 in total, so it is reasonable to assume // that they also don't create any alignment holes.  Hence it is also-// reasonable to assume that the actual size is 1 * 4 + 8 * 1 == 12.  The-// worst-plausible-case rounding will take that up to 16.  Hence, the-// assertion uses 16.--static_assert(sizeof(SymbolicAddressSignature) <= 16,+// reasonable to assume that the actual size is 1 * 4 + 18 * 1 == 22.  The+// worst-plausible-case rounding will take that up to 32.  Hence, the+// assertion uses 32.++static_assert(sizeof(SymbolicAddressSignature) <= 32,               "SymbolicAddressSignature unexpectedly large"); // These provide argument type information for a subset of the SymbolicAddress@@ -256,7 +257,10 @@ extern const SymbolicAddressSignature SASigArrayNew; extern const SymbolicAddressSignature SASigRefTest; extern const SymbolicAddressSignature SASigRttSub;-extern const SymbolicAddressSignature SASigIntrI8VecMul;+#define EXT_INTR_SA_DECL(op, export, sa_name, abitype, entry, idx) \+  extern const SymbolicAddressSignature SASig##sa_name;+FOR_EACH_INTRINSIC(EXT_INTR_SA_DECL)+#undef EXT_INTR_SA_DECL bool IsRoundingFunction(SymbolicAddress callee, jit::RoundingMode* mode);

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Buffer Overflow Potential [File] js/src/wasm/WasmBuiltins.h [Lines 19-257]
[Old Code]
static constexpr size_t SymbolicAddressSignatureMaxArgs = 6;
...
const jit::MIRType argTypes[SymbolicAddressSignatureMaxArgs + 1];
...
static_assert(sizeof(SymbolicAddressSignature) <= 16,
[Fixed Code]
static constexpr size_t SymbolicAddressSignatureMaxArgs = 14;
...
const jit::MIRType argTypes[SymbolicAddressSignatureMaxArgs + 1];
...
static_assert(sizeof(SymbolicAddressSignature) <= 32,

Additional Details:
- The change increases the maximum number of arguments from 6 to 14
- The array size and static assertion were updated accordingly
- This could potentially relate to preventing buffer overflows if more arguments were being passed than previously allowed
- However, without more context about how this is used, I can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just a preventative measure

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Missing Include Guard [File] js/src/wasm/WasmBuiltins.h [Lines 19-257]
[Old Code]
#ifndef wasm_builtins_h
#define wasm_builtins_h
[Fixed Code]
#ifndef wasm_builtins_h
#define wasm_builtins_h

#include "intgemm/IntegerGemmIntrinsic.h"

Additional Details:
- The diff shows a new include being added
- While not directly a security fix, proper header inclusion can prevent certain types of compilation issues
- No specific vulnerability is being fixed here, just code maintenance

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Function Signature Handling [File] js/src/wasm/WasmBuiltins.h [Lines 256-257]
[Old Code]
extern const SymbolicAddressSignature SASigIntrI8VecMul;
[Fixed Code]
#define EXT_INTR_SA_DECL(op, export, sa_name, abitype, entry, idx) \
  extern const SymbolicAddressSignature SASig##sa_name;
FOR_EACH_INTRINSIC(EXT_INTR_SA_DECL)
#undef EXT_INTR_SA_DECL

Additional Details:
- The change replaces a hardcoded declaration with a macro-based approach
- This appears to be a refactoring to handle multiple intrinsic functions more systematically
- Could potentially relate to preventing improper function signature handling
- Without more context about FOR_EACH_INTRINSIC, it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/reporting/ReportDeliver.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/reporting/ReportDeliver.cpp@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@       const nsTArray<ReportDeliver::ReportData>& aReportData)       : mReports(aReportData.Clone()) {}-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     if (!gReportDeliver) {       return;     }@@ -76,7 +77,8 @@     }   }-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     if (gReportDeliver) {       for (auto& report : mReports) {         ++report.mFailures;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/reporting/ReportDeliver.cpp] [Lines 39-40, 76-77]
   [Old Code]
   void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override
   void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override
   [Fixed Code]
   void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override
   void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override

Additional Details:
- The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& aRv parameter to both callback functions
- This appears to be an improvement in error handling, allowing errors to be properly propagated
- While this improves robustness, it's not clear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability
- The change could potentially prevent undefined behavior from unhandled errors, but without more context, we can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving code quality

No other obvious security vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The changes seem focused on adding better error handling capabilities rather than fixing specific security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/dec/vp8l_dec.c@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ // to 256 (green component values) + 24 (length prefix values) // + color_cache_size (between 0 and 2048). // All values computed for 8-bit first level lookup with Mark Adler's tool:-// http://www.hdfgroup.org/ftp/lib-external/zlib/zlib-1.2.5/examples/enough.c+// https://github.com/madler/zlib/blob/v1.2.5/examples/enough.c #define FIXED_TABLE_SIZE (630 * 3 + 410) static const uint16_t kTableSize[12] = {   FIXED_TABLE_SIZE + 654,

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
[Old Code]
http://www.hdfgroup.org/ftp/lib-external/zlib/zlib-1.2.5/examples/enough.c
[Fixed Code]
https://github.com/madler/zlib/blob/v1.2.5/examples/enough.c

Additional Details:
The change only updates a URL reference from HTTP to HTTPS and changes the source location from hdfgroup.org to github.com. This is not a security fix but rather a maintenance update to use a more modern/reliable source reference. No actual code logic or security-related functionality was modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.negative.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.negative.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata1 = ctx.createImageData(10, 20); var imgdata2 = ctx.createImageData(-10, 20);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes in this diff appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.winding.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.winding.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring without any security implications. Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.winding.2.html] [Lines 17-18, 38]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, with no security impact. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.