Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/notification/Notification.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/notification/Notification.cpp@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerGlobalScopeBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerManager.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerUtils.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRunnable.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "Navigator.h"@@ -364,8 +363,12 @@ } nsresult Cancel() override {+ // We need to check first if cancel is called twice+ nsresult rv = NotificationWorkerRunnable::Cancel();+ NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);+ mNotification->ReleaseObject();- return NotificationWorkerRunnable::Cancel();+ return NS_OK; } };
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Double-Free or Improper Cleanup] [dom/notification/Notification.cpp] [Lines 364-368]
[Old Code]
nsresult Cancel() override {
mNotification->ReleaseObject();
return NotificationWorkerRunnable::Cancel();
}
[Fixed Code]
nsresult Cancel() override {
// We need to check first if cancel is called twice
nsresult rv = NotificationWorkerRunnable::Cancel();
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
mNotification->ReleaseObject();
return NS_OK;
}
Additional Details:
- The change appears to address potential issues with double cancellation or improper cleanup sequence
- The comment suggests concern about Cancel() being called twice
- The fix ensures the parent class's Cancel() is called first and checks its success before proceeding
- While this looks like a defensive programming improvement, it's not clear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just preventing potential issues
- The change could potentially prevent memory leaks or use-after-free scenarios if Cancel() was being called multiple times
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-82.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-82.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <div class="t1">
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability identified [File] [Lines 8] Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" /> Fixed Code: (line removed) Additional Details: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related - This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix - No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change - The modification is in a test file (css3-modsel-82.xml) which typically doesn't contain production security fixes No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test file metadata.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/android/ImageDecoderSupport.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/android/ImageDecoderSupport.cpp@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ #include "mozilla/gfx/Swizzle.h" #include "mozilla/java/ImageWrappers.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h"++using namespace mozilla::gfx; namespace mozilla { namespace widget {
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability [File] widget/android/ImageDecoderSupport.cpp [Lines] 14-16 [Old Code] #include "mozilla/gfx/Swizzle.h" #include "mozilla/java/ImageWrappers.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" [Fixed Code] #include "mozilla/gfx/Swizzle.h" #include "mozilla/java/ImageWrappers.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" +using namespace mozilla::gfx; The change simply adds a namespace usage directive (`using namespace mozilla::gfx`). This is a code organization/readability improvement rather than a security fix. There's no indication of any vulnerability being addressed in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.end.ltr.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.end.ltr.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.textAlign = 'end'; ctx.fillText('DD', 100, 37.5);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2); }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the assertions. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.end.ltr.html
Lines: 17-18, 32-37
Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect security. The test assertions remain functionally identical, just using the renamed variable. There are no security-related patterns like input validation, resource loading, or sensitive data handling being modified in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/tests/gtest/TestThreadMetrics.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/tests/gtest/TestThreadMetrics.cpp@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ uint32_t mDispatchCount; };+// Disabled on Windows x64 due to high failure rate in bug 1745116+#if !defined(_WIN64) TEST_F(ThreadMetrics, CollectMetrics) { nsresult rv; initScheduler();@@ -185,6 +187,7 @@ uint64_t duration = mCounter->GetExecutionDuration(); ASSERT_GE(duration, 50000u); }+#endif TEST_F(ThreadMetrics, CollectRecursiveMetrics) { nsresult rv;
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.
Vulnerability Existed: no
[Test Disabling] [xpcom/tests/gtest/TestThreadMetrics.cpp] [Lines 159-187]
[Old Code]
TEST_F(ThreadMetrics, CollectMetrics) {
nsresult rv;
initScheduler();
...
uint64_t duration = mCounter->GetExecutionDuration();
ASSERT_GE(duration, 50000u);
}
[Fixed Code]
// Disabled on Windows x64 due to high failure rate in bug 1745116
#if !defined(_WIN64)
TEST_F(ThreadMetrics, CollectMetrics) {
nsresult rv;
initScheduler();
...
uint64_t duration = mCounter->GetExecutionDuration();
ASSERT_GE(duration, 50000u);
}
#endif
Additional Details:
This change appears to be a test maintenance fix rather than a security vulnerability fix. The test is being disabled specifically for Windows x64 platforms due to high failure rates (as referenced in bug 1745116). There's no indication of security-related changes in this diff. The modification simply wraps the test in a platform-specific conditional compilation block.
No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely related to test reliability and maintenance.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/source-test/mozlint-android.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/source-test/mozlint-android.yml@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ --linter android-checkstyle --linter android-lint --linter android-test+ * tooltool-downloads: internal # For internal toolchains. fetches: toolchain:
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Command Injection] [taskcluster/ci/source-test/mozlint-android.yml] [Lines 75-80]
[Old Code]
--linter android-checkstyle
--linter android-lint
--linter android-test
tooltool-downloads: internal # For internal toolchains.
[Fixed Code]
--linter android-checkstyle
--linter android-lint
--linter android-test
+ *
tooltool-downloads: internal # For internal toolchains.
Additional Details:
- The change adds a wildcard (*) to the command arguments. While this doesn't directly indicate a security vulnerability, it could potentially be related to fixing a command injection vulnerability if the previous version was too restrictive in file selection. However, without more context about how these arguments are processed, we can't be certain.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_cert_dbKey.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_cert_dbKey.js@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ let certFromDbKey = certDB.findCertByDBKey(expectedDbKey); ok(- certFromDbKey.equals(cert),+ areCertsEqual(certFromDbKey, cert), "nsIX509CertDB.findCertByDBKey should find the right certificate" );@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ ); certFromDbKey = certDB.findCertByDBKey(expectedDbKeyWithCRLF); ok(- certFromDbKey.equals(cert),+ areCertsEqual(certFromDbKey, cert), "nsIX509CertDB.findCertByDBKey should work with dbKey with CRLF" );@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ ); certFromDbKey = certDB.findCertByDBKey(expectedDbKeyWithSpaces); ok(- certFromDbKey.equals(cert),+ areCertsEqual(certFromDbKey, cert), "nsIX509CertDB.findCertByDBKey should work with dbKey with spaces" );
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Certificate Comparison Vulnerability] [security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_cert_dbKey.js] [Lines 125, 140, 151] [Old Code] `certFromDbKey.equals(cert)` [Fixed Code] `areCertsEqual(certFromDbKey, cert)` Additional Details: The change replaces direct certificate equality comparison (`equals()`) with a function call (`areCertsEqual()`). While this might indicate a security improvement in certificate comparison logic, without seeing the implementation of `areCertsEqual()`, we can't be certain if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just a test improvement. The change could potentially address issues with certificate comparison (like timing attacks or improper equality checks), but this is speculative. Note: There are no obvious, well-known vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be test improvements rather than direct security fixes. The modification could be related to making certificate comparisons more robust, but without additional context about the `areCertsEqual()` function's implementation, we can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability being addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-029.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-029.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-ui-4/#text-overflow"> <link rel="match" href="reference/text-overflow-029-ref.html"> <meta name="assert" content="When there's content of mixed directionality, text-overflow ellides the characters at the physical end of the line.">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div { font: 20px monospace;
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 7] [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">` [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional Details: - The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag for "flags", which appears to be a test configuration cleanup rather than a security fix. - No actual security vulnerabilities or sensitive data exposures were identified in this change. - The modification is likely part of test suite maintenance rather than addressing any security issue. Note: If there were other changes in the full diff not shown here, they might contain security fixes, but based on the provided diff content, no vulnerabilities were addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_noise.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_noise.h@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ void RandomImage3(size_t seed, const Rect& rect, Image3F* JXL_RESTRICT noise);+void Random3Planes(size_t seed, const std::pair<ImageF*, Rect>& plane0,+ const std::pair<ImageF*, Rect>& plane1,+ const std::pair<ImageF*, Rect>& plane2);+ // Must only call if FrameHeader.flags.kNoise. Status DecodeNoise(BitReader* br, NoiseParams* noise_params);
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Function Exposure/Incomplete API] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_noise.h] [Lines 28+]
[Old Code]
```cpp
void RandomImage3(size_t seed, const Rect& rect, Image3F* JXL_RESTRICT noise);
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
void RandomImage3(size_t seed, const Rect& rect, Image3F* JXL_RESTRICT noise);
void Random3Planes(size_t seed, const std::pair<ImageF*, Rect>& plane0,
const std::pair<ImageF*, Rect>& plane1,
const std::pair<ImageF*, Rect>& plane2);
```
Additional Details: The diff adds a new function `Random3Planes` but doesn't show its implementation. While this isn't necessarily a vulnerability, exposing new functions without proper security review could potentially introduce risks if the implementation has security issues. Without seeing the implementation, we can't be certain.
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No vulnerability found] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_noise.h] [Lines 28+]
Additional Details: The change appears to be a functional addition rather than a security fix. The added function declaration doesn't show any obvious security issues in its interface.
Note: The diff shows only header file changes (function declarations) without implementation details, making it difficult to assess potential vulnerabilities definitively. The changes appear to be API additions rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/servo/components/style/values/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/servo/components/style/values/mod.rs@@ -290,6 +290,16 @@ W: Write, { serialize_atom_identifier(&self.0, dest)+ }+}++#[cfg(feature = "gecko")]+impl style_traits::ToCss for AtomIdent {+ fn to_css<W>(&self, dest: &mut CssWriter<W>) -> fmt::Result+ where+ W: Write,+ {+ cssparser::ToCss::to_css(self, dest) } }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Serialization Vulnerability] [servo/components/style/values/mod.rs] [Lines 290-300]
[Old Code]
```rust
impl style_traits::ToCss for AtomIdent {
fn to_css<W>(&self, dest: &mut CssWriter<W>) -> fmt::Result
where
W: Write,
{
serialize_atom_identifier(&self.0, dest)
}
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
#[cfg(feature = "gecko")]
impl style_traits::ToCss for AtomIdent {
fn to_css<W>(&self, dest: &mut CssWriter<W>) -> fmt::Result
where
W: Write,
{
cssparser::ToCss::to_css(self, dest)
}
}
```
Additional Details:
1. The change involves switching from a custom `serialize_atom_identifier` to using the standard `cssparser::ToCss` trait implementation for serialization.
2. While this could potentially address serialization-related security issues (like improper escaping or injection vulnerabilities), there's no clear evidence of a specific vulnerability being fixed.
3. The addition of `#[cfg(feature = "gecko")]` suggests this might be part of a larger security hardening effort for Gecko-specific code paths.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/indexedDB/IDBFactory.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/indexedDB/IDBFactory.cpp@@ -659,10 +659,6 @@ { BackgroundFactoryChild* actor = new BackgroundFactoryChild(*this);- // Set EventTarget for the top-level actor.- // All child actors created later inherit the same event target.- backgroundActor->SetEventTargetForActor(actor, EventTarget());- MOZ_ASSERT(actor->GetActorEventTarget()); mBackgroundActor = static_cast<BackgroundFactoryChild*>( backgroundActor->SendPBackgroundIDBFactoryConstructor( actor, idbThreadLocal->GetLoggingInfo()));@@ -757,9 +753,6 @@ return NS_ERROR_DOM_INDEXEDDB_UNKNOWN_ERR; }- MOZ_ASSERT(actor->GetActorEventTarget(),- "The event target shall be inherited from its manager actor.");- return NS_OK; }
Here's the analysis following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Event Target Inheritance Issue] [dom/indexedDB/IDBFactory.cpp] [Lines 659-663, 757]
[Old Code]
```cpp
// Set EventTarget for the top-level actor.
// All child actors created later inherit the same event target.
backgroundActor->SetEventTargetForActor(actor, EventTarget());
MOZ_ASSERT(actor->GetActorEventTarget());
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
// (removed code)
```
Additional Details:
The removed code suggests there was concern about event target inheritance between actors. While the removal might indicate a security fix, without more context about the IPC architecture, it's unclear if this was actually a vulnerability or just a defensive programming measure being removed. The removal of the assertion check later in the file (line 757) supports this was a deliberate architectural change rather than a direct security fix.
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[Code Cleanup/Refactoring] [dom/indexedDB/IDBFactory.cpp] [Lines 757]
[Old Code]
```cpp
MOZ_ASSERT(actor->GetActorEventTarget(),
"The event target shall be inherited from its manager actor.");
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
// (assertion removed)
```
Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple cleanup/refactoring change where an assertion was removed, likely because the event target inheritance behavior was changed or became unnecessary. There's no clear security implication to this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-toolkit.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-toolkit.js@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ var { ExtensionCommon } = ChromeUtils.import( "resource://gre/modules/ExtensionCommon.jsm" );++var { ExtensionError } = ExtensionUtils; global.EventEmitter = ExtensionCommon.EventEmitter; global.EventManager = ExtensionCommon.EventManager;@@ -103,3 +105,27 @@ isContainerCookieStoreId(storeId) ); };++global.getOriginAttributesPatternForCookieStoreId = function(cookieStoreId) {+ if (isDefaultCookieStoreId(cookieStoreId)) {+ return {+ userContextId: Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager.DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID,+ privateBrowsingId:+ Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager.DEFAULT_PRIVATE_BROWSING_ID,+ };+ }+ if (isPrivateCookieStoreId(cookieStoreId)) {+ return {+ userContextId: Ci.nsIScriptSecurityManager.DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID,+ privateBrowsingId: 1,+ };+ }+ if (isContainerCookieStoreId(cookieStoreId)) {+ let userContextId = getContainerForCookieStoreId(cookieStoreId);+ if (userContextId !== null) {+ return { userContextId };+ }+ }++ throw new ExtensionError("Invalid cookieStoreId");+};
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Input Validation] [toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-toolkit.js] [Lines 106-127] [Old Code: (function not present)] [Fixed Code: Added getOriginAttributesPatternForCookieStoreId function with input validation] The main change is the addition of a new function `getOriginAttributesPatternForCookieStoreId` that includes validation for cookieStoreId. While this appears to be a security improvement (adding proper validation where none existed before), I can't definitively say there was a vulnerability in the previous version since the function didn't exist. The new code: - Properly validates different types of cookie store IDs (default, private, container) - Throws an ExtensionError for invalid inputs - Handles different security contexts appropriately This appears to be a defensive programming improvement that could prevent potential security issues related to improper cookie store handling, but without seeing how this function might have been used (or misused) before its addition, I can't confirm an actual vulnerability existed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-padding-box-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-padding-box-001.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values"> <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-padding-box-001-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the padding-box value."> <style> .container {
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata. Here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9] Old Code: <meta name="flags" content=""> Fixed Code: (line removed) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which was likely unnecessary test metadata - No security implications were found in this change - This appears to be routine test maintenance rather than a security fix
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-051.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-051.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes"> <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-circle-051-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by circle(50% at right 40px bottom 40px) value under vertical-lr writing-mode."> <style> .container {
Analysis of the code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional details: - The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag, which doesn't appear to be security-related - This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix - No security vulnerabilities are evident in this change - The modification is related to test metadata rather than functional code that could have security implications
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/rule_parser.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/rule_parser.rs@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ use crate::stylesheets::supports_rule::SupportsCondition; use crate::stylesheets::{ viewport_rule, AllowImportRules, CorsMode, CssRule, CssRuleType, CssRules, DocumentRule,- FontFeatureValuesRule, KeyframesRule, MediaRule, NamespaceRule, PageRule, RulesMutateError,- ScrollTimelineRule, StyleRule, StylesheetLoader, SupportsRule, ViewportRule,+ FontFeatureValuesRule, KeyframesRule, MediaRule, NamespaceRule, PageRule, PageSelectors,+ RulesMutateError, ScrollTimelineRule, StyleRule, StylesheetLoader, SupportsRule, ViewportRule, }; use crate::values::computed::font::FamilyName; use crate::values::{CssUrl, CustomIdent, KeyframesName, TimelineName};@@ -168,8 +168,8 @@ Viewport, /// A @keyframes rule, with its animation name and vendor prefix if exists. Keyframes(KeyframesName, Option<VendorPrefix>),- /// A @page rule prelude.- Page,+ /// A @page rule prelude, with its page name if it exists.+ Page(PageSelectors), /// A @document rule, with its conditional. Document(DocumentCondition), /// A @import rule prelude.@@ -464,7 +464,11 @@ AtRulePrelude::Keyframes(name, prefix) }, "page" if cfg!(feature = "gecko") => {- AtRulePrelude::Page+ AtRulePrelude::Page(if static_prefs::pref!("layout.css.named-pages.enabled") {+ input.try_parse(|i| PageSelectors::parse(self.context, i)).unwrap_or_default()+ } else {+ PageSelectors::default()+ }) }, "-moz-document" if cfg!(feature = "gecko") => { let cond = DocumentCondition::parse(self.context, input)?;@@ -577,7 +581,7 @@ }, )))) },- AtRulePrelude::Page => {+ AtRulePrelude::Page(selectors) => { let context = ParserContext::new_with_rule_type( self.context, CssRuleType::Page,@@ -586,6 +590,7 @@ let declarations = parse_property_declaration_list(&context, input, None); Ok(CssRule::Page(Arc::new(self.shared_lock.wrap(PageRule {+ selectors, block: Arc::new(self.shared_lock.wrap(declarations)), source_location: start.source_location(), }))))
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found in this diff. The changes appear to be feature enhancements and code improvements rather than security fixes. The main changes involve:
- Adding support for named pages in @page rules
- Modifying the PageRule structure to include selectors
- Updating the parser to handle page selectors
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Exposure [File] [Lines 464-468]
Old Code:
```rust
"page" if cfg!(feature = "gecko") => {
AtRulePrelude::Page
}
```
Fixed Code:
```rust
"page" if cfg!(feature = "gecko") => {
AtRulePrelude::Page(if static_prefs::pref!("layout.css.named-pages.enabled") {
input.try_parse(|i| PageSelectors::parse(self.context, i)).unwrap_or_default()
} else {
PageSelectors::default()
})
}
```
Note: While not clearly a security fix, the change adds a preference check before parsing page selectors, which could potentially prevent information exposure if named pages were disabled. However, this is speculative and more likely just a feature toggle.
3. Vulnerability Existed: no
The remaining changes appear to be structural modifications to support the new PageSelectors functionality in the PageRule implementation, with no obvious security implications. The changes maintain the same security context and wrapping patterns as before.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/dot/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/dot/mod.rs@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ E::ImageSample { image, sampler,+ gather, coordinate, array_index, offset: _,@@ -260,7 +261,11 @@ if let Some(expr) = depth_ref { edges.insert("depth_ref", expr); }- ("ImageSample".into(), 5)+ let string = match gather {+ Some(component) => Cow::Owned(format!("ImageGather{:?}", component)),+ _ => Cow::Borrowed("ImageSample"),+ };+ (string, 5) } E::ImageLoad { image,
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Possible Information Leak or Incorrect Image Processing] [third_party/rust/naga/src/back/dot/mod.rs] [Lines 231-261]
Old Code:
```rust
E::ImageSample {
image,
sampler,
coordinate,
array_index,
offset: _,
...
```
Fixed Code:
```rust
E::ImageSample {
image,
sampler,
gather,
coordinate,
array_index,
offset: _,
...
let string = match gather {
Some(component) => Cow::Owned(format!("ImageGather{:?}", component)),
_ => Cow::Borrowed("ImageSample"),
};
(string, 5)
```
Additional Details: The diff adds handling for a `gather` parameter in image sampling operations. While this appears to be a functional improvement rather than a direct security fix, improper handling of image gather operations could potentially lead to information leaks or incorrect image processing. However, without more context, this is uncertain.
No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff, but the change improves handling of image sampling operations which could have security implications in graphics processing contexts. The modification appears to be more of a feature enhancement than a direct security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/marionette/Building.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/marionette/Building.md@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ ac_add_options --disable-webdriver [mozilla-unified]: https://mozilla-version-control-tools.readthedocs.io/en/latest/hgmozilla/unifiedrepo.html-[artifact builds]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Build_Instructions/Artifact_builds-[mozconfig]: ../build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.html+[artifact builds]: /contributing/build/artifact_builds.rst+[mozconfig]: /build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.rst [ccache]: https://ccache.samba.org/ [sccache]: https://github.com/mozilla/sccache-[Remote Agent]: ../remote/index.html+[Remote Agent]: /remote/index.rst
Based on the provided diff, this appears to be documentation changes with URL updates rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no Documentation URL Updates [File] [Lines 50-54] [Old Code] [artifact builds]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Build_Instructions/Artifact_builds [mozconfig]: ../build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.html [Remote Agent]: ../remote/index.html [Fixed Code] [artifact builds]: /contributing/build/artifact_builds.rst [mozconfig]: /build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.rst [Remote Agent]: /remote/index.rst Additional Details: - The changes involve updating documentation links from external MDN URLs to internal .rst files - The changes also modify relative paths to absolute paths - No actual code changes or security fixes were made - The modifications appear to be part of documentation maintenance rather than vulnerability fixes
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-74b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-74b.xml@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <ul>
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-74b.xml [Lines] 12 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (removed line) Additional Details: The change simply removes an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability. This seems to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change rather than a security fix. No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowColor.invalid.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowColor.invalid.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.shadowColor = '#00ff00'; ctx.shadowColor = 'bogus';
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
The changes in this diff appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') and don't relate to any security fixes. The functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name. There are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/functions.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/functions.rs@@ -195,14 +195,39 @@ (value, expr_meta), meta, )?,- TypeInner::Struct { .. } | TypeInner::Array { .. } => ctx.add_expression(- Expression::Compose {- ty,- components: vec![value],- },- meta,- body,- ),+ TypeInner::Struct { ref members, .. } => {+ let scalar_components = members+ .get(0)+ .and_then(|member| scalar_components(&self.module.types[member.ty].inner));+ if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {+ ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut value, expr_meta, kind, width)?;+ }++ ctx.add_expression(+ Expression::Compose {+ ty,+ components: vec![value],+ },+ meta,+ body,+ )+ }++ TypeInner::Array { base, .. } => {+ let scalar_components = scalar_components(&self.module.types[base].inner);+ if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {+ ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut value, expr_meta, kind, width)?;+ }++ ctx.add_expression(+ Expression::Compose {+ ty,+ components: vec![value],+ },+ meta,+ body,+ )+ } _ => { self.errors.push(Error { kind: ErrorKind::SemanticError("Bad type constructor".into()),@@ -535,6 +560,26 @@ TypeInner::Vector { size, kind, width } => { return self.vector_constructor(ctx, body, ty, size, kind, width, &args, meta) }+ TypeInner::Array { base, .. } => {+ for (mut arg, meta) in args.iter().copied() {+ let scalar_components = scalar_components(&self.module.types[base].inner);+ if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {+ ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut arg, meta, kind, width)?;+ }++ components.push(arg)+ }+ }+ TypeInner::Struct { ref members, .. } => {+ for ((mut arg, meta), member) in args.iter().copied().zip(members.iter()) {+ let scalar_components = scalar_components(&self.module.types[member.ty].inner);+ if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {+ ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut arg, meta, kind, width)?;+ }++ components.push(arg)+ }+ } _ => { return Err(Error { kind: ErrorKind::SemanticError("Constructor: Too many arguments".into()),@@ -756,8 +801,6 @@ // If the argument is to be passed as a pointer but the type of the // expression returns a vector it must mean that it was for example // swizzled and it must be spilled into a local before calling- // TODO: this part doesn't work because of #1385 once that's sorted out- // revisit this part. TypeInner::Vector { size, kind, width } => ( self.module.types.insert( Type {@@ -829,7 +872,40 @@ arguments.push(temp_expr); // Register the temporary local to be written back to it's original // place after the function call- proxy_writes.push((handle, temp_expr));+ if let Expression::Swizzle {+ size,+ mut vector,+ pattern,+ } = ctx.expressions[value]+ {+ if let Expression::Load { pointer } = ctx.expressions[vector] {+ vector = pointer;+ }++ for (i, component) in pattern.iter().take(size as usize).enumerate() {+ let original = ctx.add_expression(+ Expression::AccessIndex {+ base: vector,+ index: *component as u32,+ },+ Span::default(),+ body,+ );++ let temp = ctx.add_expression(+ Expression::AccessIndex {+ base: temp_expr,+ index: i as u32,+ },+ Span::default(),+ body,+ );++ proxy_writes.push((original, temp));+ }+ } else {+ proxy_writes.push((handle, temp_expr));+ } continue; }@@ -1056,6 +1132,82 @@ defined: false, void, });+ }++ /// Helper function for building the input/output interface of the entry point+ ///+ /// Calls `f` with the data of the entry point argument, flattening composite types+ /// recursively+ ///+ /// The passed arguments to the callback are:+ /// - The name+ /// - The pointer expression to the global storage+ /// - The handle to the type of the entry point argument+ /// - The binding of the entry point argument+ /// - The expression arena+ fn arg_type_walker(+ &self,+ name: Option<String>,+ binding: crate::Binding,+ pointer: Handle<Expression>,+ ty: Handle<Type>,+ expressions: &mut Arena<Expression>,+ f: &mut impl FnMut(+ Option<String>,+ Handle<Expression>,+ Handle<Type>,+ crate::Binding,+ &mut Arena<Expression>,+ ),+ ) {+ match self.module.types[ty].inner {+ TypeInner::Struct { ref members, .. } => {+ let mut location = match binding {+ crate::Binding::Location { location, .. } => location,+ _ => return,+ };++ for (i, member) in members.iter().enumerate() {+ let member_pointer = expressions.append(+ Expression::AccessIndex {+ base: pointer,+ index: i as u32,+ },+ crate::Span::default(),+ );++ let binding = match member.binding.clone() {+ Some(binding) => binding,+ None => {+ let interpolation = self.module.types[member.ty]+ .inner+ .scalar_kind()+ .map(|kind| match kind {+ ScalarKind::Float => crate::Interpolation::Perspective,+ _ => crate::Interpolation::Flat,+ });+ let binding = crate::Binding::Location {+ location,+ interpolation,+ sampling: None,+ };+ location += 1;+ binding+ }+ };++ self.arg_type_walker(+ member.name.clone(),+ binding,+ member_pointer,+ member.ty,+ expressions,+ f,+ )+ }+ }+ _ => f(name, pointer, ty, binding, expressions),+ } } pub(crate) fn add_entry_point(@@ -1079,20 +1231,29 @@ continue; }- let ty = self.module.global_variables[arg.handle].ty;- let idx = arguments.len() as u32;-- arguments.push(FunctionArgument {- name: arg.name.clone(),- ty,- binding: Some(arg.binding.clone()),- });- let pointer = expressions.append(Expression::GlobalVariable(arg.handle), Default::default());- let value = expressions.append(Expression::FunctionArgument(idx), Default::default());-- body.push(Statement::Store { pointer, value }, Default::default());++ self.arg_type_walker(+ arg.name.clone(),+ arg.binding.clone(),+ pointer,+ self.module.global_variables[arg.handle].ty,+ &mut expressions,+ &mut |name, pointer, ty, binding, expressions| {+ let idx = arguments.len() as u32;++ arguments.push(FunctionArgument {+ name,+ ty,+ binding: Some(binding),+ });++ let value =+ expressions.append(Expression::FunctionArgument(idx), Default::default());+ body.push(Statement::Store { pointer, value }, Default::default());+ },+ ) } body.extend_block(global_init_body);@@ -1115,26 +1276,34 @@ continue; }- let ty = self.module.global_variables[arg.handle].ty;-- members.push(StructMember {- name: arg.name.clone(),- ty,- binding: Some(arg.binding.clone()),- offset: span,- });-- span += self.module.types[ty].inner.span(&self.module.constants);- let pointer = expressions.append(Expression::GlobalVariable(arg.handle), Default::default());- let len = expressions.len();- let load = expressions.append(Expression::Load { pointer }, Default::default());- body.push(- Statement::Emit(expressions.range_from(len)),- Default::default(),- );- components.push(load)++ self.arg_type_walker(+ arg.name.clone(),+ arg.binding.clone(),+ pointer,+ self.module.global_variables[arg.handle].ty,+ &mut expressions,+ &mut |name, pointer, ty, binding, expressions| {+ members.push(StructMember {+ name,+ ty,+ binding: Some(binding),+ offset: span,+ });++ span += self.module.types[ty].inner.span(&self.module.constants);++ let len = expressions.len();+ let load = expressions.append(Expression::Load { pointer }, Default::default());+ body.push(+ Statement::Emit(expressions.range_from(len)),+ Default::default(),+ );+ components.push(load)+ },+ ) } let (ty, value) = if !components.is_empty() {
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Type Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/functions.rs] [195-219]
[Old Code]
TypeInner::Struct { .. } | TypeInner::Array { .. } => ctx.add_expression(
Expression::Compose {
ty,
components: vec![value],
},
meta,
body,
),
[Fixed Code]
TypeInner::Struct { ref members, .. } => {
let scalar_components = members
.get(0)
.and_then(|member| scalar_components(&self.module.types[member.ty].inner));
if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {
ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut value, expr_meta, kind, width)?;
}
ctx.add_expression(
Expression::Compose {
ty,
components: vec![value],
},
meta,
body,
)
}
TypeInner::Array { base, .. } => {
let scalar_components = scalar_components(&self.module.types[base].inner);
if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {
ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut value, expr_meta, kind, width)?;
}
ctx.add_expression(
Expression::Compose {
ty,
components: vec![value],
},
meta,
body,
)
}
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Argument Validation Issue] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/functions.rs] [535-550]
[Old Code]
(No specific handling for Array/Struct types in constructor)
[Fixed Code]
TypeInner::Array { base, .. } => {
for (mut arg, meta) in args.iter().copied() {
let scalar_components = scalar_components(&self.module.types[base].inner);
if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {
ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut arg, meta, kind, width)?;
}
components.push(arg)
}
}
TypeInner::Struct { ref members, .. } => {
for ((mut arg, meta), member) in args.iter().copied().zip(members.iter()) {
let scalar_components = scalar_components(&self.module.types[member.ty].inner);
if let Some((kind, width)) = scalar_components {
ctx.implicit_conversion(self, &mut arg, meta, kind, width)?;
}
components.push(arg)
}
}
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Pointer Handling Issue] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/functions.rs] [829-872]
[Old Code]
proxy_writes.push((handle, temp_expr));
[Fixed Code]
if let Expression::Swizzle {
size,
mut vector,
pattern,
} = ctx.expressions[value]
{
if let Expression::Load { pointer } = ctx.expressions[vector] {
vector = pointer;
}
for (i, component) in pattern.iter().take(size as usize).enumerate() {
let original = ctx.add_expression(
Expression::AccessIndex {
base: vector,
index: *component as u32,
},
Span::default(),
body,
);
let temp = ctx.add_expression(
Expression::AccessIndex {
base: temp_expr,
index: i as u32,
},
Span::default(),
body,
);
proxy_writes.push((original, temp));
}
} else {
proxy_writes.push((handle, temp_expr));
}
The changes appear to improve type safety and validation, but without more context about the specific security implications of the original code, it's difficult to definitively identify vulnerabilities. The modifications add more rigorous type checking and handling of composite types, which could potentially prevent type confusion or memory safety issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.