--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.miterLimit.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.miterLimit.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.miterLimit;

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.miterLimit.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed here - this is likely just a code style/consistency improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed. No security implications were found in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/page_rule.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/servo/components/style/stylesheets/page_rule.rs@@ -6,27 +6,91 @@ //! //! [page]: https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/page.html#page-box+use crate::parser::{Parse, ParserContext}; use crate::properties::PropertyDeclarationBlock; use crate::shared_lock::{DeepCloneParams, DeepCloneWithLock, Locked}; use crate::shared_lock::{SharedRwLock, SharedRwLockReadGuard, ToCssWithGuard}; use crate::str::CssStringWriter;-use cssparser::SourceLocation;+use crate::values::{AtomIdent, CustomIdent};+use style_traits::{CssWriter, ParseError, ToCss};+use cssparser::{Parser, SourceLocation}; #[cfg(feature = "gecko")] use malloc_size_of::{MallocSizeOf, MallocSizeOfOps, MallocUnconditionalShallowSizeOf}; use servo_arc::Arc; use std::fmt::{self, Write};++/// Type of a single [`@page`][page selector]+///+/// We do not support pseudo selectors yet.+/// [page-selectors]: https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/page.html#page-selectors+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, MallocSizeOf, PartialEq, SpecifiedValueInfo, ToCss, ToShmem)]+pub struct PageSelector(pub AtomIdent);++impl PageSelector {+    /// Checks if the ident matches a page-name's ident.+    ///+    /// This does not currently take pseudo selectors into account.+    #[inline]+    pub fn ident_matches(&self, other: &CustomIdent) -> bool {+        self.0.0 == other.0+    }+}++impl Parse for PageSelector {+    fn parse<'i, 't>(+        _context: &ParserContext,+        input: &mut Parser<'i, 't>,+    ) -> Result<Self, ParseError<'i>> {+        let s = input.expect_ident()?;+        Ok(PageSelector(AtomIdent::from(&**s)))+    }+}++/// A list of [`@page`][page selectors]+///+/// [page-selectors]: https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/page.html#page-selectors+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, MallocSizeOf, ToCss, ToShmem)]+#[css(comma)]+pub struct PageSelectors(#[css(iterable)] pub Box<[PageSelector]>);++impl PageSelectors {+    /// Creates a new PageSelectors from a Vec, as from parse_comma_separated+    #[inline]+    pub fn new(s: Vec<PageSelector>) -> Self {+        PageSelectors(s.into())+    }+    /// Returns true iff there are any page selectors+    #[inline]+    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {+        self.as_slice().is_empty()+    }+    /// Get the underlying PageSelector data as a slice+    #[inline]+    pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[PageSelector] {+        &*self.0+    }+}++impl Parse for PageSelectors {+    fn parse<'i, 't>(+        context: &ParserContext,+        input: &mut Parser<'i, 't>,+    ) -> Result<Self, ParseError<'i>> {+        Ok(PageSelectors::new(input.parse_comma_separated(|i| PageSelector::parse(context, i))?))+    }+} /// A [`@page`][page] rule. /// /// This implements only a limited subset of the CSS /// 2.2 syntax. ///-/// In this subset, [page selectors][page-selectors] are not implemented.-/// /// [page]: https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/page.html#page-box /// [page-selectors]: https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/page.html#page-selectors-#[derive(Debug, ToShmem)]+#[derive(Clone, Debug, ToShmem)] pub struct PageRule {+    /// Selectors of the page-rule+    pub selectors: PageSelectors,     /// The declaration block this page rule contains.     pub block: Arc<Locked<PropertyDeclarationBlock>>,     /// The source position this rule was found at.@@ -38,7 +102,7 @@     #[cfg(feature = "gecko")]     pub fn size_of(&self, guard: &SharedRwLockReadGuard, ops: &mut MallocSizeOfOps) -> usize {         // Measurement of other fields may be added later.-        self.block.unconditional_shallow_size_of(ops) + self.block.read_with(guard).size_of(ops)+        self.block.unconditional_shallow_size_of(ops) + self.block.read_with(guard).size_of(ops) + self.selectors.size_of(ops)     } }@@ -46,13 +110,18 @@     /// Serialization of PageRule is not specced, adapted from steps for     /// StyleRule.     fn to_css(&self, guard: &SharedRwLockReadGuard, dest: &mut CssStringWriter) -> fmt::Result {-        dest.write_str("@page { ")?;+        dest.write_str("@page ")?;+        if !self.selectors.is_empty() {+            self.selectors.to_css(&mut CssWriter::new(dest))?;+            dest.write_char(' ')?;+        }+        dest.write_str("{ ")?;         let declaration_block = self.block.read_with(guard);         declaration_block.to_css(dest)?;         if !declaration_block.declarations().is_empty() {-            dest.write_str(" ")?;+            dest.write_char(' ')?;         }-        dest.write_str("}")+        dest.write_char('}')     } }@@ -64,6 +133,7 @@         _params: &DeepCloneParams,     ) -> Self {         PageRule {+            selectors: self.selectors.clone(),             block: Arc::new(lock.wrap(self.block.read_with(&guard).clone())),             source_location: self.source_location.clone(),         }

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [servo/components/style/stylesheets/page_rule.rs] [Various]
[Old Code]
[Various lines of old implementation]
[Fixed Code]
[Various lines of new implementation]

Additional Details:
The diff shows significant changes to the page rule implementation, but these appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes. The main changes include:
1. Added PageSelector and PageSelectors types to support page selectors
2. Modified PageRule to include selectors
3. Updated serialization and cloning logic

There are no obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed here - the changes are primarily functional enhancements to support page selectors in CSS @page rules. The modifications follow standard Rust patterns and don't show any signs of patching security issues like memory safety problems, injection vulnerabilities, or similar concerns.

The changes do improve the code by:
- Adding proper selector support
- Implementing Parse traits for new types
- Maintaining consistency with CSS specifications
- Improving serialization
But these don't appear to be security-related fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/serde_derive/src/pretend.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/serde_derive/src/pretend.rs@@ -65,11 +65,13 @@ fn pretend_fields_used(cont: &Container, is_packed: bool) -> TokenStream {     match &cont.data {         Data::Enum(variants) => pretend_fields_used_enum(cont, variants),-        Data::Struct(Style::Struct, fields) => if is_packed {-            pretend_fields_used_struct_packed(cont, fields)-        } else {-            pretend_fields_used_struct(cont, fields)-        },+        Data::Struct(Style::Struct, fields) => {+            if is_packed {+                pretend_fields_used_struct_packed(cont, fields)+            } else {+                pretend_fields_used_struct(cont, fields)+            }+        }         Data::Struct(_, _) => quote!(),     } }

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Style Improvement [third_party/rust/serde_derive/src/pretend.rs] [Lines 65-73]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   Data::Struct(Style::Struct, fields) => if is_packed {
       pretend_fields_used_struct_packed(cont, fields)
   } else {
       pretend_fields_used_struct(cont, fields)
   },
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   Data::Struct(Style::Struct, fields) => {
       if is_packed {
           pretend_fields_used_struct_packed(cont, fields)
       } else {
           pretend_fields_used_struct(cont, fields)
       }
   }
   ```

The change appears to be purely stylistic, adding braces around the if-else block for better readability and consistency. There doesn't appear to be any security vulnerability being fixed here - just a code style improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with different formatting.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/windows/nsWindow.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/windows/nsWindow.cpp@@ -2294,13 +2294,44 @@   return pl.showCmd; }+void nsWindow::SetSizeModeInternal(nsSizeMode aMode) {+  // save the requested state+  mLastSizeMode = mSizeMode;+  nsBaseWidget::SetSizeMode(aMode);+  if (mIsVisible) {+    switch (aMode) {+      case nsSizeMode_Fullscreen:+        ::ShowWindow(mWnd, SW_SHOW);+        break;++      case nsSizeMode_Maximized:+        ::ShowWindow(mWnd, SW_MAXIMIZE);+        break;++      case nsSizeMode_Minimized:+        ::ShowWindow(mWnd, SW_MINIMIZE);+        break;++      default:+        // Don't call ::ShowWindow if we're trying to "restore" a window that is+        // already in a normal state.  Prevents a bug where snapping to one side+        // of the screen and then minimizing would cause Windows to forget our+        // window's correct restored position/size.+        if (GetCurrentShowCmd(mWnd) != SW_SHOWNORMAL) {+          ::ShowWindow(mWnd, SW_RESTORE);+        }+    }+  }++  // we activate here to ensure that the right child window is focused+  if (mIsVisible &&+      (aMode == nsSizeMode_Maximized || aMode == nsSizeMode_Fullscreen)) {+    DispatchFocusToTopLevelWindow(true);+  }+}+ // Maximize, minimize or restore the window. void nsWindow::SetSizeMode(nsSizeMode aMode) {-  // Let's not try and do anything if we're already in that state.-  // (This is needed to prevent problems when calling window.minimize(), which-  // calls us directly, and then the OS triggers another call to us.)-  if (aMode == mSizeMode) return;-   // If we are still displaying a maximized pre-XUL skeleton UI, ignore the   // noise of sizemode changes. Once we have "shown" the window for the first   // time (called nsWindow::Show(true), even though the window is already@@ -2309,39 +2340,22 @@     return;   }-  // save the requested state-  mLastSizeMode = mSizeMode;-  nsBaseWidget::SetSizeMode(aMode);-  if (mIsVisible) {-    int mode;--    switch (aMode) {-      case nsSizeMode_Fullscreen:-        mode = SW_SHOW;-        break;--      case nsSizeMode_Maximized:-        mode = SW_MAXIMIZE;-        break;--      case nsSizeMode_Minimized:-        mode = SW_MINIMIZE;-        break;--      default:-        mode = SW_RESTORE;-    }--    // Don't call ::ShowWindow if we're trying to "restore" a window that is-    // already in a normal state.  Prevents a bug where snapping to one side-    // of the screen and then minimizing would cause Windows to forget our-    // window's correct restored position/size.-    if (!(GetCurrentShowCmd(mWnd) == SW_SHOWNORMAL && mode == SW_RESTORE)) {-      ::ShowWindow(mWnd, mode);-    }-    // we activate here to ensure that the right child window is focused-    if (mode == SW_MAXIMIZE || mode == SW_SHOW)-      DispatchFocusToTopLevelWindow(true);+  // Let's not try and do anything if we're already in that state.+  // (This is needed to prevent problems when calling window.minimize(), which+  // calls us directly, and then the OS triggers another call to us.)+  if (aMode == mSizeMode) return;++  if (aMode == nsSizeMode_Fullscreen) {+    MakeFullScreen(true);+  } else if ((mSizeMode == nsSizeMode_Fullscreen) &&+             (aMode == nsSizeMode_Normal)) {+    // If we are in fullscreen mode, minimize should work like normal and+    // return us to fullscreen mode when unminimized. Maximize isn't really+    // available and won't do anything. "Restore" should do the same thing as+    // requesting to end fullscreen.+    MakeFullScreen(false);+  } else {+    SetSizeModeInternal(aMode);   } }@@ -3666,26 +3680,33 @@   mTransitionWnd = nullptr; }-nsresult nsWindow::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen* aTargetScreen) {+nsresult nsWindow::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) {+  if (mFullscreenMode == aFullScreen) {+    return NS_OK;+  }++  if (mWidgetListener) {+    mWidgetListener->FullscreenWillChange(aFullScreen);+  }++  mFullscreenMode = aFullScreen;+  if (aFullScreen) {+    mOldSizeMode = mSizeMode;+    SetSizeModeInternal(nsSizeMode_Fullscreen);+  } else {+    if (mSizeMode != mOldSizeMode) {+      SetSizeModeInternal(mOldSizeMode);+    }++    MOZ_ASSERT(mSizeMode == mOldSizeMode);+  }+   // taskbarInfo will be nullptr pre Windows 7 until Bug 680227 is resolved.   nsCOMPtr<nsIWinTaskbar> taskbarInfo = do_GetService(NS_TASKBAR_CONTRACTID);-  if (mWidgetListener) {-    mWidgetListener->FullscreenWillChange(aFullScreen);-  }--  mFullscreenMode = aFullScreen;-  if (aFullScreen) {-    if (mSizeMode == nsSizeMode_Fullscreen) return NS_OK;-    mOldSizeMode = mSizeMode;-    SetSizeMode(nsSizeMode_Fullscreen);--    // Notify the taskbar that we will be entering full screen mode.-    if (taskbarInfo) {-      taskbarInfo->PrepareFullScreenHWND(mWnd, TRUE);-    }-  } else {-    SetSizeMode(mOldSizeMode);+  // Notify the taskbar that we will be entering full screen mode.+  if (aFullScreen && taskbarInfo) {+    taskbarInfo->PrepareFullScreenHWND(mWnd, TRUE);   }   // If we are going fullscreen, the window size continues to change@@ -3695,9 +3716,11 @@   // Will call hide chrome, reposition window. Note this will   // also cache dimensions for restoration, so it should only   // be called once per fullscreen request.-  nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen, aTargetScreen);--  if (mIsVisible && !aFullScreen && mOldSizeMode == nsSizeMode_Normal) {+  nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen);++  if (mIsVisible && !aFullScreen && mSizeMode == nsSizeMode_Normal) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(mSizeMode == mOldSizeMode);+     // Ensure the window exiting fullscreen get activated. Window     // activation might be bypassed in SetSizeMode.     DispatchFocusToTopLevelWindow(true);@@ -3867,6 +3890,18 @@              ::GetLastError()));   } #endif+}++void nsWindow::SetBigIconNoData() {+  HICON bigIcon =+      ::LoadIconW(::GetModuleHandleW(nullptr), gStockApplicationIcon);+  SetBigIcon(bigIcon);+}++void nsWindow::SetSmallIconNoData() {+  HICON smallIcon =+      ::LoadIconW(::GetModuleHandleW(nullptr), gStockApplicationIcon);+  SetSmallIcon(smallIcon); } /**************************************************************

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential State Management Issue] [widget/windows/nsWindow.cpp] [Lines 2294-2340]
   [Old Code]
   void nsWindow::SetSizeMode(nsSizeMode aMode) {
     if (aMode == mSizeMode) return;
     [...]
     if (mIsVisible) {
       int mode;
       switch (aMode) {
         [...]
       }
       ::ShowWindow(mWnd, mode);
     }
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   void nsWindow::SetSizeMode(nsSizeMode aMode) {
     [...]
     if (aMode == nsSizeMode_Fullscreen) {
       MakeFullScreen(true);
     } else if ((mSizeMode == nsSizeMode_Fullscreen) &&
                (aMode == nsSizeMode_Normal)) {
       MakeFullScreen(false);
     } else {
       SetSizeModeInternal(aMode);
     }
   }
   Additional Details: The refactoring separates fullscreen handling from other size modes and introduces more robust state management, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Fullscreen State Handling Issue] [widget/windows/nsWindow.cpp] [Lines 3666-3696]
   [Old Code]
   nsresult nsWindow::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen* aTargetScreen) {
     if (mSizeMode == nsSizeMode_Fullscreen) return NS_OK;
     [...]
     SetSizeMode(nsSizeMode_Fullscreen);
     [...]
     nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen, aTargetScreen);
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   nsresult nsWindow::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) {
     if (mFullscreenMode == aFullScreen) return NS_OK;
     [...]
     SetSizeModeInternal(nsSizeMode_Fullscreen);
     [...]
     nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen);
   }
   Additional Details: The changes introduce better state tracking with mFullscreenMode and remove the screen parameter, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Icon Loading Issue] [widget/windows/nsWindow.cpp] [Lines 3890-3902]
   [Old Code]
   [No equivalent code in old version]
   [Fixed Code]
   void nsWindow::SetBigIconNoData() {
     HICON bigIcon = ::LoadIconW(::GetModuleHandleW(nullptr), gStockApplicationIcon);
     SetBigIcon(bigIcon);
   }
   Additional Details: The new functions for icon handling appear to be safer by using stock icons, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

Note: While the changes improve code structure and potentially fix some edge cases, I couldn't identify any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The modifications appear to be primarily refactoring and robustness improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/shared/downloads/contentAreaDownloadsView.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/shared/downloads/contentAreaDownloadsView.css@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@   padding: 18px; }-#downloadsRichListBox:empty {+#downloadsListBox:empty {   border-color: transparent;   background-color: transparent; }

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
[No specific vulnerability] [browser/themes/shared/downloads/contentAreaDownloadsView.css] [Lines 8-11]  
[Old Code]  
`#downloadsRichListBox:empty {`  
[Fixed Code]  
`#downloadsListBox:empty {`  

Additional Details:  
This appears to be a simple CSS selector change from `downloadsRichListBox` to `downloadsListBox`. The modification seems to be related to UI/UX improvements or refactoring rather than addressing any security vulnerability. The change affects styling when the downloads list is empty, making the border and background transparent in both cases. There's no indication of security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-5.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Intel" href="http://www.intel.com"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-color/#hsl-color" /> <link rel="match" href="t424-hsl-values-b-5-ref.html" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="Implementation of algorithm for converting hsl() colors to rgb() colors." /> <style>   table { border-spacing: 0; padding: 0; border: none; }

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File: testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-5.html] [Lines: 6]
    Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="" />`
    Fixed Code: (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with name="flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

Since this is just removing an unused meta tag from a test file, there doesn't appear to be any security vulnerability being addressed here. The change is likely just part of general code cleanup or test suite maintenance.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.negative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.negative.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(40, 20, 20, 20) ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 40, 20, 20, 20, -20, -20);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,15, 0,255,0,255, "50,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,15, 0,255,0,255, "50,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security aspects. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.negative.html] [Lines: 17-18, 30-34]
    Old Code:
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    
    Fixed Code:
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes only involve renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. There are no security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/thebes/gfxPlatformFontList.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/thebes/gfxPlatformFontList.cpp@@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@     return eFontPrefLang_Others;   }   for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(gPrefLangNames); ++i) {-    if (!PL_strcasecmp(gPrefLangNames[i], aLang)) {+    if (!nsCRT::strcasecmp(gPrefLangNames[i], aLang)) {       return eFontPrefLang(i);     }   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Insecure String Comparison] [gfx/thebes/gfxPlatformFontList.cpp] [Lines 1993]  
[Old Code]  
`if (!PL_strcasecmp(gPrefLangNames[i], aLang))`  
[Fixed Code]  
`if (!nsCRT::strcasecmp(gPrefLangNames[i], aLang))`  

Additional Details:
The change replaces `PL_strcasecmp` with `nsCRT::strcasecmp` for case-insensitive string comparison. While this might not represent a direct security vulnerability, it could be related to:
1. Potential platform-specific behavior differences in string comparison
2. Mozilla's preference for using their internal string utilities (nsCRT) over PL (NSPR) functions
3. Possible memory safety or edge-case handling improvements in nsCRT implementation

Without more context about the specific behaviors of these functions, I can't definitively say this fixes a security vulnerability, but it appears to be a hardening change toward more consistent string handling.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.scale.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.scale.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ ctx.arcTo(50, 50, 50, 0, 50); ctx.lineTo(-1000, 0); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the `_assertPixel` calls. Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.scale.worker.js] [Lines 13-26]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect security. The functionality remains identical, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/ambient-light/META.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/ambient-light/META.yml@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ spec: https://w3c.github.io/ambient-light/ suggested_reviewers:-  - zqzhang   - riju   - rakuco   - Honry

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification is simply removing a suggested reviewer from a test file's metadata. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/ambient-light/META.yml] [Lines 1-6]
[Old Code with zqzhang as reviewer]
[Fixed Code without zqzhang as reviewer]

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be purely administrative (updating reviewer list)
- No code logic or security-related functionality was modified
- The file in question is just a test metadata file (META.yml) which doesn't affect runtime behavior

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/generate-profile/kind.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/generate-profile/kind.yml@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@             command: ./taskcluster/scripts/misc/run-profileserver.sh         fetches:             toolchain:-                - win64-clang-2stage+                - win64-clang-toolchain                 - win32-minidump-stackwalk     win64-shippable/opt:@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@             command: ./taskcluster/scripts/misc/run-profileserver.sh         fetches:             toolchain:-                - win64-clang-2stage+                - win64-clang-toolchain                 - win32-minidump-stackwalk     macosx64-shippable/opt:

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Toolchain Configuration Issue] [taskcluster/ci/generate-profile/kind.yml] [Lines 192,221]
    [Old Code]
                - win64-clang-2stage
    [Fixed Code]
                - win64-clang-toolchain

Additional Details:
- The change involves switching from 'win64-clang-2stage' to 'win64-clang-toolchain' in the toolchain fetches configuration
- While this appears to be a toolchain reference update, it's unclear if the previous reference posed a security risk
- The change might be related to build system improvements or security hardening, but without more context about the toolchains, we can't be certain

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    [Build Configuration Update] [taskcluster/ci/generate-profile/kind.yml] [Lines 192,221]
    [Old Code]
                - win64-clang-2stage
    [Fixed Code]
                - win64-clang-toolchain

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a routine update of toolchain references in the build configuration
- No direct security implications are evident from this change
- The modification is consistent across both Windows configurations (lines 192 and 221)

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.destination-atop.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.destination-atop.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 22]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 22]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
    ```

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, involving variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating references accordingly. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff - it's simply a code style/consistency improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/JSObject.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/JSObject.cpp@@ -2162,6 +2162,15 @@     return true;   }+#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD+  if (key == JSProto_Array &&+      !cx->realm()->creationOptions().getArrayGroupingEnabled() &&+      (id == NameToId(cx->names().groupBy) ||+       id == NameToId(cx->names().groupByToMap))) {+    return true;+  }+#endif+ #ifdef ENABLE_CHANGE_ARRAY_BY_COPY   if (key == JSProto_Array && !cx->options().changeArrayByCopy() &&       (id == NameToId(cx->names().withAt) ||@@ -3492,7 +3501,7 @@   } else if (obj->is<RecordObject>()) {     vp.setExtendedPrimitive(*obj->as<RecordObject>().unbox());   } else if (obj->is<TupleObject>()) {-    vp.setExtendedPrimitive(*obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());+    vp.setExtendedPrimitive(obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox()); #endif   } else {     vp.setUndefined();

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. First vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Access Control Issue] [js/src/vm/JSObject.cpp] [Lines 2162-2170]
    [Old Code]
    (No equivalent code existed before)
    [Fixed Code]
    #ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD
    if (key == JSProto_Array &&
        !cx->realm()->creationOptions().getArrayGroupingEnabled() &&
        (id == NameToId(cx->names().groupBy) ||
        id == NameToId(cx->names().groupByToMap))) {
        return true;
    }
    #endif

    Note: This appears to be adding a new access control check for array grouping methods in nightly builds, but without more context it's unclear if this fixes an actual vulnerability or just adds a feature flag check.

2. Second vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [js/src/vm/JSObject.cpp] [Lines 3492-3495]
    [Old Code]
    vp.setExtendedPrimitive(*obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());
    [Fixed Code]
    vp.setExtendedPrimitive(obj->as<TupleObject>().unbox());

    Note: The removal of the dereference operator (*) suggests there might have been a potential memory safety issue where an unnecessary dereference could lead to undefined behavior if unbox() returned a null or invalid pointer. This appears to be fixing how TupleObject values are handled.

The second change is more clearly a security fix, while the first one might be related to feature gating rather than a direct security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-002.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="https://florian.rivoal.net"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/visudet.html#line-height"> <link rel="match" href="reference/content-height-002-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The height of the content area of an inline-level box does not depend on the value of the line-height property,                              even when fallback fonts are used"> <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/content-height-002.html [Lines] 4
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag, which appears to be a test configuration change rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security-related change
- The change doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality or introduce/remove any security mechanisms

The modification is simply removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag from a test file, which doesn't have any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/linux/gnu/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/linux/gnu/mod.rs@@ -597,6 +597,7 @@ pub const RTLD_DI_TLS_DATA: ::c_int = 10; pub const SOCK_NONBLOCK: ::c_int = O_NONBLOCK;+pub const PIDFD_NONBLOCK: ::c_uint = O_NONBLOCK as ::c_uint; pub const SOL_RXRPC: ::c_int = 272; pub const SOL_PPPOL2TP: ::c_int = 273;

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Added Constant Definition] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/linux/gnu/mod.rs] [Lines 597-598]
[Old Code]
pub const SOCK_NONBLOCK: ::c_int = O_NONBLOCK;

[Fixed Code]
pub const SOCK_NONBLOCK: ::c_int = O_NONBLOCK;
pub const PIDFD_NONBLOCK: ::c_uint = O_NONBLOCK as ::c_uint;

The change simply adds a new constant definition for PIDFD_NONBLOCK, which appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix. The change involves adding support for non-blocking operations on PID file descriptors, but doesn't appear to address any specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/client-hints/accept-ch-stickiness/resources/do-not-expect-received.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/client-hints/accept-ch-stickiness/resources/do-not-expect-received.py@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@     """     Check that headers sent to navigate here *do not* contain the device-memory client     hint, and report success/failure in a way compatible with-    verify_subresource_state() in accept-ch-test.js+    verify_{subresource|iframe}_state() in accept-ch-test.js     """     if b"device-memory" in request.headers or b"sec-ch-device-memory" in request.headers:@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@     content = u''' <script>-  window.opener.postMessage("%s" , "*");+  let messagee = window.opener || window.parent;+  messagee.postMessage("%s" , "*"); </script> ''' % (result)     headers = [(b"Content-Type", b"text/html"), (b"Access-Control-Allow-Origin", b"*")]

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Potential [File] [Lines 12-15]
[Old Code]
  window.opener.postMessage("%s" , "*");
[Fixed Code]
  let messagee = window.opener || window.parent;
  messagee.postMessage("%s" , "*");

The change adds support for both window.opener and window.parent, but maintains the wildcard ("*") target origin which could potentially be a security concern. However, since this is test code and the message content appears to be controlled, it might not be an actual vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability name] [File] [Lines 2-4]
[Old Code]
    verify_subresource_state() in accept-ch-test.js
[Fixed Code]
    verify_{subresource|iframe}_state() in accept-ch-test.js

This appears to be just a documentation update to reflect additional test cases and doesn't indicate any security vulnerability.

The main change in the message posting code doesn't appear to fix a specific vulnerability but rather improves the test's functionality to handle more cases. The wildcard origin in postMessage() could theoretically be a security concern, but in this test context it's likely intentional.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.txt@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #-# This file is autogenerated by pip-compile with python 3.7+# This file is autogenerated by pip-compile # To update, run: # #    pip-compile --generate-hashes --output-file=tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.txt tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.in@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ colorama==0.4.4 \     --hash=sha256:5941b2b48a20143d2267e95b1c2a7603ce057ee39fd88e7329b0c292aa16869b \     --hash=sha256:9f47eda37229f68eee03b24b9748937c7dc3868f906e8ba69fbcbdd3bc5dc3e2-    # via-    #   -r pylint_requirements.in-    #   pylint+    # via -r tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.in isort==5.10.1 \     --hash=sha256:6f62d78e2f89b4500b080fe3a81690850cd254227f27f75c3a0c491a1f351ba7 \     --hash=sha256:e8443a5e7a020e9d7f97f1d7d9cd17c88bcb3bc7e218bf9cf5095fe550be2951@@ -58,46 +56,43 @@     --hash=sha256:806143ae5bfb6a3c6e736a764057db0e6a0e05e338b5630894a5f779cabb4f9b \     --hash=sha256:b3bda1d108d5dd99f4a20d24d9c348e91c4db7ab1b749200bded2f839ccbe68f     # via pylint-typed-ast==1.4.2 \-    --hash=sha256:07d49388d5bf7e863f7fa2f124b1b1d89d8aa0e2f7812faff0a5658c01c59aa1 \-    --hash=sha256:14bf1522cdee369e8f5581238edac09150c765ec1cb33615855889cf33dcb92d \-    --hash=sha256:240296b27397e4e37874abb1df2a608a92df85cf3e2a04d0d4d61055c8305ba6 \-    --hash=sha256:36d829b31ab67d6fcb30e185ec996e1f72b892255a745d3a82138c97d21ed1cd \-    --hash=sha256:37f48d46d733d57cc70fd5f30572d11ab8ed92da6e6b28e024e4a3edfb456e37 \-    --hash=sha256:4c790331247081ea7c632a76d5b2a265e6d325ecd3179d06e9cf8d46d90dd151 \-    --hash=sha256:5dcfc2e264bd8a1db8b11a892bd1647154ce03eeba94b461effe68790d8b8e07 \-    --hash=sha256:7147e2a76c75f0f64c4319886e7639e490fee87c9d25cb1d4faef1d8cf83a440 \-    --hash=sha256:7703620125e4fb79b64aa52427ec192822e9f45d37d4b6625ab37ef403e1df70 \-    --hash=sha256:8368f83e93c7156ccd40e49a783a6a6850ca25b556c0fa0240ed0f659d2fe496 \-    --hash=sha256:84aa6223d71012c68d577c83f4e7db50d11d6b1399a9c779046d75e24bed74ea \-    --hash=sha256:85f95aa97a35bdb2f2f7d10ec5bbdac0aeb9dafdaf88e17492da0504de2e6400 \-    --hash=sha256:8db0e856712f79c45956da0c9a40ca4246abc3485ae0d7ecc86a20f5e4c09abc \-    --hash=sha256:9044ef2df88d7f33692ae3f18d3be63dec69c4fb1b5a4a9ac950f9b4ba571606 \-    --hash=sha256:963c80b583b0661918718b095e02303d8078950b26cc00b5e5ea9ababe0de1fc \-    --hash=sha256:987f15737aba2ab5f3928c617ccf1ce412e2e321c77ab16ca5a293e7bbffd581 \-    --hash=sha256:9ec45db0c766f196ae629e509f059ff05fc3148f9ffd28f3cfe75d4afb485412 \-    --hash=sha256:9fc0b3cb5d1720e7141d103cf4819aea239f7d136acf9ee4a69b047b7986175a \-    --hash=sha256:a2c927c49f2029291fbabd673d51a2180038f8cd5a5b2f290f78c4516be48be2 \-    --hash=sha256:a38878a223bdd37c9709d07cd357bb79f4c760b29210e14ad0fb395294583787 \-    --hash=sha256:b4fcdcfa302538f70929eb7b392f536a237cbe2ed9cba88e3bf5027b39f5f77f \-    --hash=sha256:c0c74e5579af4b977c8b932f40a5464764b2f86681327410aa028a22d2f54937 \-    --hash=sha256:c1c876fd795b36126f773db9cbb393f19808edd2637e00fd6caba0e25f2c7b64 \-    --hash=sha256:c9aadc4924d4b5799112837b226160428524a9a45f830e0d0f184b19e4090487 \-    --hash=sha256:cc7b98bf58167b7f2db91a4327da24fb93368838eb84a44c472283778fc2446b \-    --hash=sha256:cf54cfa843f297991b7388c281cb3855d911137223c6b6d2dd82a47ae5125a41 \-    --hash=sha256:d003156bb6a59cda9050e983441b7fa2487f7800d76bdc065566b7d728b4581a \-    --hash=sha256:d175297e9533d8d37437abc14e8a83cbc68af93cc9c1c59c2c292ec59a0697a3 \-    --hash=sha256:d746a437cdbca200622385305aedd9aef68e8a645e385cc483bdc5e488f07166 \-    --hash=sha256:e683e409e5c45d5c9082dc1daf13f6374300806240719f95dc783d1fc942af10+typed-ast==1.4.3 \+    --hash=sha256:01ae5f73431d21eead5015997ab41afa53aa1fbe252f9da060be5dad2c730ace \+    --hash=sha256:067a74454df670dcaa4e59349a2e5c81e567d8d65458d480a5b3dfecec08c5ff \+    --hash=sha256:0fb71b8c643187d7492c1f8352f2c15b4c4af3f6338f21681d3681b3dc31a266 \+    --hash=sha256:1b3ead4a96c9101bef08f9f7d1217c096f31667617b58de957f690c92378b528 \+    --hash=sha256:2068531575a125b87a41802130fa7e29f26c09a2833fea68d9a40cf33902eba6 \+    --hash=sha256:209596a4ec71d990d71d5e0d312ac935d86930e6eecff6ccc7007fe54d703808 \+    --hash=sha256:2c726c276d09fc5c414693a2de063f521052d9ea7c240ce553316f70656c84d4 \+    --hash=sha256:398e44cd480f4d2b7ee8d98385ca104e35c81525dd98c519acff1b79bdaac363 \+    --hash=sha256:52b1eb8c83f178ab787f3a4283f68258525f8d70f778a2f6dd54d3b5e5fb4341 \+    --hash=sha256:5feca99c17af94057417d744607b82dd0a664fd5e4ca98061480fd8b14b18d04 \+    --hash=sha256:7538e495704e2ccda9b234b82423a4038f324f3a10c43bc088a1636180f11a41 \+    --hash=sha256:760ad187b1041a154f0e4d0f6aae3e40fdb51d6de16e5c99aedadd9246450e9e \+    --hash=sha256:777a26c84bea6cd934422ac2e3b78863a37017618b6e5c08f92ef69853e765d3 \+    --hash=sha256:95431a26309a21874005845c21118c83991c63ea800dd44843e42a916aec5899 \+    --hash=sha256:9ad2c92ec681e02baf81fdfa056fe0d818645efa9af1f1cd5fd6f1bd2bdfd805 \+    --hash=sha256:9c6d1a54552b5330bc657b7ef0eae25d00ba7ffe85d9ea8ae6540d2197a3788c \+    --hash=sha256:aee0c1256be6c07bd3e1263ff920c325b59849dc95392a05f258bb9b259cf39c \+    --hash=sha256:af3d4a73793725138d6b334d9d247ce7e5f084d96284ed23f22ee626a7b88e39 \+    --hash=sha256:b36b4f3920103a25e1d5d024d155c504080959582b928e91cb608a65c3a49e1a \+    --hash=sha256:b9574c6f03f685070d859e75c7f9eeca02d6933273b5e69572e5ff9d5e3931c3 \+    --hash=sha256:bff6ad71c81b3bba8fa35f0f1921fb24ff4476235a6e94a26ada2e54370e6da7 \+    --hash=sha256:c190f0899e9f9f8b6b7863debfb739abcb21a5c054f911ca3596d12b8a4c4c7f \+    --hash=sha256:c907f561b1e83e93fad565bac5ba9c22d96a54e7ea0267c708bffe863cbe4075 \+    --hash=sha256:cae53c389825d3b46fb37538441f75d6aecc4174f615d048321b716df2757fb0 \+    --hash=sha256:dd4a21253f42b8d2b48410cb31fe501d32f8b9fbeb1f55063ad102fe9c425e40 \+    --hash=sha256:dde816ca9dac1d9c01dd504ea5967821606f02e510438120091b84e852367428 \+    --hash=sha256:f2362f3cb0f3172c42938946dbc5b7843c2a28aec307c49100c8b38764eb6927 \+    --hash=sha256:f328adcfebed9f11301eaedfa48e15bdece9b519fb27e6a8c01aa52a17ec31b3 \+    --hash=sha256:f8afcf15cc511ada719a88e013cec87c11aff7b91f019295eb4530f96fe5ef2f \+    --hash=sha256:fb1bbeac803adea29cedd70781399c99138358c26d05fcbd23c13016b7f5ec65     # via -r tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.in typing-extensions==3.10.0.2 \     --hash=sha256:49f75d16ff11f1cd258e1b988ccff82a3ca5570217d7ad8c5f48205dd99a677e \     --hash=sha256:d8226d10bc02a29bcc81df19a26e56a9647f8b0a6d4a83924139f4a8b01f17b7 \     --hash=sha256:f1d25edafde516b146ecd0613dabcc61409817af4766fbbcfb8d1ad4ec441a34-    # via-    #   -r tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.in-    #   astroid-    #   pylint+    # via -r tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.in wrapt==1.13.3 \     --hash=sha256:086218a72ec7d986a3eddb7707c8c4526d677c7b35e355875a0fe2918b059179 \     --hash=sha256:0877fe981fd76b183711d767500e6b3111378ed2043c145e21816ee589d91096 \

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Dependency Version Update [File] tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.txt [Lines] 58-108
[Old Code]
typed-ast==1.4.2 \
    --hash=sha256:07d49388d5bf7e863f7fa2f124b1b1d89d8aa0e2f7812faff0a5658c01c59aa1 \
    --hash=sha256:14bf1522cdee369e8f5581238edac09150c765ec1cb33615855889cf33dcb92d \
    --hash=sha256:240296b27397e4e37874abb1df2a608a92df85cf3e2a04d0d4d61055c8305ba6 \
    ... (multiple hashes)
[Fixed Code]
typed-ast==1.4.3 \
    --hash=sha256:01ae5f73431d21eead5015997ab41afa53aa1fbe252f9da060be5dad2c730ace \
    --hash=sha256:067a74454df670dcaa4e59349a2e5c81e567d8d65458d480a5b3dfecec08c5ff \
    --hash=sha256:0fb71b8c643187d7492c1f8352f2c15b4c4af3f6338f21681d3681b3dc31a266 \
    ... (multiple hashes)

Additional Details:
The diff shows an update from typed-ast 1.4.2 to 1.4.3. While the specific vulnerabilities fixed aren't mentioned in the diff, version updates in dependency files often include security fixes. The extensive list of hash changes indicates this was a significant update.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Comment Format Change [File] tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.txt [Lines] 11-13
[Old Code]
    # via
    #   -r pylint_requirements.in
    #   pylint
[Fixed Code]
    # via -r tools/lint/python/pylint_requirements.in

Additional Details:
This change appears to be a formatting/comment update rather than a security fix, but it's unclear if there was any security implication to the previous format. The change makes the dependency chain clearer but doesn't appear to address any specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(0, 0, 50%, 1)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(0, 0, 50%, 1)'; } catch (e) { }
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(0, 0, 50%, 1)'; } catch (e) { }
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes were made
- The test functionality remains identical
- No actual security vulnerability was fixed in this diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.moveTo(0, 0); ctx.lineTo(100, 0);@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions to use the new variable name. There are no changes to security-related functionality or patterns.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.nonfinite.html] [Lines 17-49]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/schemas/user_scripts.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/schemas/user_scripts.json@@ -84,6 +84,20 @@             "default": "document_idle",             "optional": true,             "description": "The soonest that the JavaScript will be injected into the tab. Defaults to \"document_idle\"."+          },+          "cookieStoreId": {+            "choices": [ +              {+                "type": "array",+                "minItems": 1,+                "items": { "type": "string" }+              },+              {+                "type": "string"+              }          +            ],+            "optional": true,+            "description": "limit the set of matched tabs to those that belong to the given cookie store id"           }         }       },

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Cookie Store ID Restriction] [toolkit/components/extensions/schemas/user_scripts.json] [Lines 84-98]
[Old Code: No cookieStoreId parameter existed]
[Fixed Code: Added cookieStoreId parameter with validation]

Additional Details:
1. The diff adds a new "cookieStoreId" parameter to the schema with validation rules
2. This appears to be a security-related change as it controls access to tabs based on cookie store IDs
3. While not a direct vulnerability fix, this could prevent potential tab/cookie isolation issues
4. The change enforces validation of cookieStoreId values (either string or array of strings)

Note: This doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability, but rather adds security controls to prevent potential future issues related to cookie store isolation. The change ensures proper validation of cookie store IDs when matching tabs for script injection.

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.