Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/pkgconf.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/pkgconf.yml@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ arguments: ['x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu'] fetches: toolchain:- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-toolchain - sysroot-x86_64-linux-gnu macosx64-pkgconf:@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ arguments: ['x86_64-apple-darwin'] fetches: toolchain:- - linux64-clang-13- - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-toolchain+ - linux64-cctools-port - macosx64-sdk-11.0 macosx64-aarch64-pkgconf:@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ arguments: ['aarch64-apple-darwin'] fetches: toolchain:- - linux64-clang-13- - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-toolchain+ - linux64-cctools-port - macosx64-sdk-11.0 win64-pkgconf:
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be updates to toolchain references rather than security patches. Here's the analysis following your requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [taskcluster/ci/toolchain/pkgconf.yml] [Lines 24,34-35,45-46] [Old Code] - - linux64-clang-13 + - linux64-clang-toolchain [Fixed Code] - - linux64-clang-13 - - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13 + - linux64-clang-toolchain + - linux64-cctools-port Additional Details: The changes appear to be: 1. Updating from a specific version (clang-13) to a more generic toolchain reference 2. Simplifying the cctools-port reference by removing the clang version specification 3. No security-related changes are evident in the diff These changes seem to be part of maintenance or toolchain standardization rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/mips32/Trampoline-mips32.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/mips32/Trampoline-mips32.cpp@@ -908,12 +908,7 @@ break; case Type_Double:- if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {- masm.as_ldc1(ReturnDoubleReg, StackPointer, 0);- } else {- masm.assumeUnreachable(- "Unable to load into float reg, with no FP support.");- }+ masm.as_ldc1(ReturnDoubleReg, StackPointer, 0); masm.freeStack(sizeof(double)); break;@@ -955,13 +950,8 @@ masm.pop(temp1); LiveRegisterSet save;- if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {- save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),- FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask));- } else {- save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),- FloatRegisterSet());- }+ save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),+ FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask)); save.add(ra); masm.PushRegsInMask(save);
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. First Change: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Removal of Floating Point Check] [js/src/jit/mips32/Trampoline-mips32.cpp] [Lines 908-912] [Old Code] if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) { masm.as_ldc1(ReturnDoubleReg, StackPointer, 0); } else { masm.assumeUnreachable( "Unable to load into float reg, with no FP support."); } [Fixed Code] masm.as_ldc1(ReturnDoubleReg, StackPointer, 0); 2. Second Change: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Removal of Floating Point Check] [js/src/jit/mips32/Trampoline-mips32.cpp] [Lines 955-960] [Old Code] if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) { save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask), FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask)); } else { save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask), FloatRegisterSet()); } [Fixed Code] save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask), FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask)); Notes: - Both changes remove conditional checks for floating point support (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) - While this might indicate a security fix (removing potentially unsafe fallback paths), it could also simply reflect an architectural change where floating point support is now always assumed - Without more context about the JitOptions configuration or the broader system requirements, it's difficult to determine if these changes address actual vulnerabilities or just simplify the code - The changes could potentially be related to preventing undefined behavior when floating point operations are attempted without proper support
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/places/tests/browser/browser_default_bookmark_location.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/places/tests/browser/browser_default_bookmark_location.js@@ -105,40 +105,49 @@ * bookmark location. */ add_task(async function test_context_menu_link() {- await withBookmarksDialog(- true,- async function openDialog() {- const contextMenu = win.document.getElementById("contentAreaContextMenu");- is(contextMenu.state, "closed", "checking if popup is closed");- let promisePopupShown = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(- contextMenu,- "popupshown"- );- BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(- "a[href*=config]", // Bookmark about:config- { type: "contextmenu", button: 2 },- win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser- );- await promisePopupShown;- contextMenu.activateItem(- win.document.getElementById("context-bookmarklink")- );- },- async function test(dialogWin) {- let expectedFolder = "BookmarksToolbarFolderTitle";- let expectedFolderName = PlacesUtils.getString(expectedFolder);-- let folderPicker = dialogWin.document.getElementById(- "editBMPanel_folderMenuList"- );-- // Check the initial state of the folder picker.- await TestUtils.waitForCondition(- () => folderPicker.selectedItem.label == expectedFolderName,- "The folder is the expected one."- );+ for (let t = 0; t < 2; t++) {+ if (t == 1) {+ // For the second iteration, ensure that the default folder is invalid first.+ await createAndRemoveDefaultFolder(); }- );++ await withBookmarksDialog(+ true,+ async function openDialog() {+ const contextMenu = win.document.getElementById(+ "contentAreaContextMenu"+ );+ is(contextMenu.state, "closed", "checking if popup is closed");+ let promisePopupShown = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(+ contextMenu,+ "popupshown"+ );+ BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(+ "a[href*=config]", // Bookmark about:config+ { type: "contextmenu", button: 2 },+ win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser+ );+ await promisePopupShown;+ contextMenu.activateItem(+ win.document.getElementById("context-bookmarklink")+ );+ },+ async function test(dialogWin) {+ let expectedFolder = "BookmarksToolbarFolderTitle";+ let expectedFolderName = PlacesUtils.getString(expectedFolder);++ let folderPicker = dialogWin.document.getElementById(+ "editBMPanel_folderMenuList"+ );++ // Check the initial state of the folder picker.+ await TestUtils.waitForCondition(+ () => folderPicker.selectedItem.label == expectedFolderName,+ "The folder is the expected one."+ );+ }+ );+ } }); /**
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test functionality improvements rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] browser/components/places/tests/browser/browser_default_bookmark_location.js [Lines 105-149] [Old Code] Single iteration test for bookmark dialog [Fixed Code] Added second iteration test case with folder validation The changes primarily: 1. Added a loop to run the test twice 2. Added special handling for the second iteration to test with an invalid default folder 3. Improved test robustness by validating folder states These changes appear to be test quality improvements rather than security fixes. The modifications don't show any patterns of common vulnerabilities like XSS, injection, or privilege escalation. The test continues to use safe APIs like BrowserTestUtils and TestUtils. If I were to speculate about the purpose, it might be related to improving test coverage for edge cases in bookmark handling, but this doesn't constitute a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/payments/PaymentRequestUpdateEvent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/payments/PaymentRequestUpdateEvent.cpp@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ } void PaymentRequestUpdateEvent::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,- JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+ JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) { MOZ_ASSERT(aCx); MOZ_ASSERT(mRequest); if (!mRequest->InFullyActiveDocument()) {@@ -93,7 +94,8 @@ } void PaymentRequestUpdateEvent::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,- JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+ JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) { MOZ_ASSERT(mRequest); if (!mRequest->InFullyActiveDocument()) { return;
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis following the required format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/payments/PaymentRequestUpdateEvent.cpp] [Lines 50-51, 93-94] [Old Code] void PaymentRequestUpdateEvent::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) void PaymentRequestUpdateEvent::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) [Fixed Code] void PaymentRequestUpdateEvent::ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) void PaymentRequestUpdateEvent::RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) Additional Details: - The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& parameter to both callback functions - This suggests improved error handling, but it's not clear if this fixes a specific vulnerability - The change could be related to preventing unhandled exceptions or improving error reporting - Without more context, we can't identify a specific vulnerability being fixed No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be focused on improving error handling infrastructure rather than fixing a specific security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-003.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ -ms-column-fill: auto; -webkit-column-fill: auto; column-fill: auto;- border: 2px dashed;+ border: 2px solid salmon; margin-bottom: 5px; }
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-003.html [Lines] 23 [Old Code] border: 2px dashed; [Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon; Additional Details: - This appears to be purely a visual/style change in a test file, changing the border style from dashed to solid and adding a color (salmon) - The change doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations, input handling, or potential attack vectors - The file is a CSS grid fragmentation test case, not production code that would handle user input or sensitive operations No security vulnerabilities were identified in this change. The modification is purely cosmetic and related to test visualization.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_patch_dictionary.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_patch_dictionary.h@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ void FindBestPatchDictionary(const Image3F& opsin, PassesEncoderState* JXL_RESTRICT state,- ThreadPool* pool, AuxOut* aux_out,- bool is_xyb = true);+ const JxlCmsInterface& cms, ThreadPool* pool,+ AuxOut* aux_out, bool is_xyb = true); void RoundtripPatchFrame(Image3F* reference_frame, PassesEncoderState* JXL_RESTRICT state, int idx,- CompressParams& cparams, ThreadPool* pool,- bool subtract);+ CompressParams& cparams, const JxlCmsInterface& cms,+ ThreadPool* pool, bool subtract); } // namespace jxl
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Missing Input Validation [File] third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_patch_dictionary.h [Lines] 96-103 [Old Code] ```cpp void FindBestPatchDictionary(const Image3F& opsin, PassesEncoderState* JXL_RESTRICT state, ThreadPool* pool, AuxOut* aux_out, bool is_xyb = true); ``` [Fixed Code] ```cpp void FindBestPatchDictionary(const Image3F& opsin, PassesEncoderState* JXL_RESTRICT state, const JxlCmsInterface& cms, ThreadPool* pool, AuxOut* aux_out, bool is_xyb = true); ``` Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Missing Input Validation [File] third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_patch_dictionary.h [Lines] 96-103 [Old Code] ```cpp void RoundtripPatchFrame(Image3F* reference_frame, PassesEncoderState* JXL_RESTRICT state, int idx, CompressParams& cparams, ThreadPool* pool, bool subtract); ``` [Fixed Code] ```cpp void RoundtripPatchFrame(Image3F* reference_frame, PassesEncoderState* JXL_RESTRICT state, int idx, CompressParams& cparams, const JxlCmsInterface& cms, ThreadPool* pool, bool subtract); ``` The main change in both functions is the addition of a `const JxlCmsInterface& cms` parameter. While this could potentially be related to security (such as adding proper color management system handling to prevent potential issues with color processing), there isn't enough context to definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed. The changes appear to be more about functionality enhancement than direct security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/events/GlobalKeyListener.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/events/GlobalKeyListener.cpp@@ -584,8 +584,13 @@ return false; }- aElement->GetAttr(nsGkAtoms::oncommand, value);- return !value.IsEmpty();+ // Internal keys are defined as <key> elements so that the menu label+ // and disabled state can be updated properly, but the command is executed+ // by some other means. This will typically be because the key is defined+ // as a shortcut defined in ShortcutKeyDefinitions.cpp instead, or on Mac,+ // some special system defined keys.+ return !aElement->AttrValueIs(kNameSpaceID_None, nsGkAtoms::internal,+ nsGkAtoms::_true, eCaseMatters); } already_AddRefed<dom::EventTarget> XULKeySetGlobalKeyListener::GetHandlerTarget(
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Command Injection Prevention] [dom/events/GlobalKeyListener.cpp] [Lines 584-586] [Old Code] aElement->GetAttr(nsGkAtoms::oncommand, value); return !value.IsEmpty(); [Fixed Code] return !aElement->AttrValueIs(kNameSpaceID_None, nsGkAtoms::internal, nsGkAtoms::_true, eCaseMatters); Additional Details: The change appears to modify how key commands are handled, replacing a direct check for an "oncommand" attribute with a check for an "internal" attribute. While this doesn't directly indicate a known vulnerability, it could potentially prevent command injection by: 1. Removing direct evaluation of arbitrary command strings 2. Enforcing a more controlled execution path for internal commands 3. Explicitly marking which keys are internally handled vs. user-defined However, without more context about how these commands were processed, I can't definitively say this was fixing a security vulnerability. The change seems more architectural than security-focused, but could have security implications.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/anyhow/src/backtrace.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/anyhow/src/backtrace.rs@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ impl Backtrace { fn enabled() -> bool { static ENABLED: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);- match ENABLED.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {+ match ENABLED.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { 0 => {} 1 => return false, _ => return true,@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ None => false, }, };- ENABLED.store(enabled as usize + 1, Ordering::SeqCst);+ ENABLED.store(enabled as usize + 1, Ordering::Relaxed); enabled }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Atomic Ordering Issue] [third_party/rust/anyhow/src/backtrace.rs] [Lines 182, 194] [Old Code] ```rust match ENABLED.load(Ordering::SeqCst) ENABLED.store(enabled as usize + 1, Ordering::SeqCst) ``` [Fixed Code] ```rust match ENABLED.load(Ordering::Relaxed) ENABLED.store(enabled as usize + 1, Ordering::Relaxed) ``` Additional Details: - The change involves switching from `Ordering::SeqCst` (Sequentially Consistent) to `Ordering::Relaxed` for atomic operations - While this isn't a classic security vulnerability, it could potentially affect thread safety if the atomic ordering semantics were important for correctness - The relaxed ordering may be appropriate here since it's just tracking whether backtraces are enabled, but without more context about the usage, we can't be certain - No CVE or specific vulnerability name applies to this change, but it's related to thread safety considerations
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/fronts/style-rule.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/fronts/style-rule.js@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ this.actorID = form.actor; this._form = form; this.traits = form.traits || {};+ // @backward-compat { version 98 }+ // This property isn't used anymore except when debugging older servers.+ // This can be removed when 98 is in release if (this._mediaText) { this._mediaText = null; }@@ -39,7 +42,6 @@ * Ensure _form is updated when location-changed is emitted. */ _locationChangedPre(line, column) {- this._clearOriginalLocation(); this._form.line = line; this._form.column = column; }@@ -90,9 +92,15 @@ get selectors() { return this._form.selectors; }+ // @backward-compat { version 98 }+ // This getter isn't used anymore except when debugging older servers. This can be+ // removed when 98 is in release. get media() { return this._form.media; }+ // @backward-compat { version 98 }+ // This getter isn't used anymore except when debugging older servers. This can be+ // removed when 98 is in release. get mediaText() { if (!this._form.media) { return null;@@ -102,10 +110,6 @@ } this._mediaText = this.media.join(", "); return this._mediaText;- }-- get parentRule() {- return this.conn.getFrontByID(this._form.parentRule); } get parentStyleSheet() {@@ -154,38 +158,16 @@ }; }- _clearOriginalLocation() {- this._originalLocation = null;- }-- getOriginalLocation() {- if (this._originalLocation) {- return Promise.resolve(this._originalLocation);- }- const parentSheet = this.parentStyleSheet;- if (!parentSheet) {- // This rule doesn't belong to a stylesheet so it is an inline style.- // Inline styles do not have any mediaText so we can return early.- return Promise.resolve(this.location);- }- return parentSheet- .getOriginalLocation(this.line, this.column)- .then(({ fromSourceMap, source, line, column }) => {- const location = {- href: source,- line: line,- column: column,- mediaText: this.mediaText,- };- if (fromSourceMap === false) {- location.source = this.parentStyleSheet;- }- if (!source) {- location.href = this.href;- }- this._originalLocation = location;- return location;- });+ get ancestorData() {+ // @backward-compat { version 98 }+ // ancestorData was added to the actor form in 98, so for older servers, we need to+ // return a similar structure, with `mediaText` info in it. (@layer information was+ // also added in 98, so older server won't have this data)+ if (typeof this._form.ancestorData === "undefined") {+ return this.mediaText ? [{ type: "media", value: this.mediaText }] : [];+ }++ return this._form.ancestorData; } async modifySelector(node, value) {
I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security analysis following the specified format. However, based on the changes shown, this appears to be more of a refactoring/cleanup change rather than a security fix. 1. Vulnerability Existed: no Code Cleanup/Refactoring [devtools/client/fronts/style-rule.js] [Lines 30-33, 39, 90-110, 154-158, added 158-170] Old Code: ``` this.traits = form.traits || {}; if (this._mediaText) { this._mediaText = null; } ``` Fixed Code: ``` this.traits = form.traits || {}; // @backward-compat { version 98 } // This property isn't used anymore except when debugging older servers. // This can be removed when 98 is in release if (this._mediaText) { this._mediaText = null; } ``` 2. Vulnerability Existed: no Code Cleanup/Refactoring [devtools/client/fronts/style-rule.js] [Lines 39] Old Code: ``` _locationChangedPre(line, column) { this._clearOriginalLocation(); this._form.line = line; this._form.column = column; } ``` Fixed Code: ``` _locationChangedPre(line, column) { this._form.line = line; this._form.column = column; } ``` 3. Vulnerability Existed: no Code Cleanup/Refactoring [devtools/client/fronts/style-rule.js] [Lines 90-110] Old Code: ``` get media() { return this._form.media; } get mediaText() { if (!this._form.media) { return null; } if (this._mediaText) { return this._mediaText; } this._mediaText = this.media.join(", "); return this._mediaText; } ``` Fixed Code: ``` get media() { return this._form.media; } // @backward-compat { version 98 } // This getter isn't used anymore except when debugging older servers. This can be // removed when 98 is in release. get mediaText() { if (!this._form.media) { return null; } if (this._mediaText) { return this._mediaText; } this._mediaText = this.media.join(", "); return this._mediaText; } ``` 4. Vulnerability Existed: no Code Cleanup/Refactoring [devtools/client/fronts/style-rule.js] [Lines 154-170] Old Code: ``` _clearOriginalLocation() { this._originalLocation = null; } ``` Fixed Code: ``` get ancestorData() { // @backward-compat { version 98 } // ancestorData was added to the actor form in 98, so for older servers, we need to // return a similar structure, with `mediaText` info in it. (@layer information was // also added in 98, so older server won't have this data) if (typeof this._form.ancestorData === "undefined") { return this.mediaText ? [{ type: "media", value: this.mediaText }] : []; } return this._form.ancestorData; } ``` The changes appear to be: 1. Adding backward compatibility comments 2. Removing unused methods (_clearOriginalLocation) 3. Adding new functionality (ancestorData) 4. General code cleanup No security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The modifications seem focused on maintaining backward compatibility while cleaning up unused code and adding new features.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mozglue/misc/TimeStamp.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mozglue/misc/TimeStamp.h@@ -7,14 +7,14 @@ #ifndef mozilla_TimeStamp_h #define mozilla_TimeStamp_h-#include <stdint.h>-#include <algorithm> // for std::min, std::max-#include <ostream>-#include <type_traits> #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" #include "mozilla/Attributes.h" #include "mozilla/FloatingPoint.h" #include "mozilla/Types.h"+#include <algorithm> // for std::min, std::max+#include <ostream>+#include <stdint.h>+#include <type_traits> namespace IPC { template <typename T>@@ -422,16 +422,11 @@ /** * Return a timestamp representing the time when the current process was * created which will be comparable with other timestamps taken with this- * class. If the actual process creation time is detected to be inconsistent- * the @a aIsInconsistent parameter will be set to true, the returned- * timestamp however will still be valid though inaccurate.+ * class. *- * @param aIsInconsistent If non-null, set to true if an inconsistency was- * detected in the process creation time- * @returns A timestamp representing the time when the process was created,- * this timestamp is always valid even when errors are reported- */- static MFBT_API TimeStamp ProcessCreation(bool* aIsInconsistent = nullptr);+ * @returns A timestamp representing the time when the process was created+ */+ static MFBT_API TimeStamp ProcessCreation(); /** * Records a process restart. After this call ProcessCreation() will return@@ -531,8 +526,10 @@ private: friend struct IPC::ParamTraits<mozilla::TimeStamp>;-- MOZ_IMPLICIT TimeStamp(TimeStampValue aValue) : mValue(aValue) {}+ friend struct TimeStampInitialization;++ MOZ_IMPLICIT+ TimeStamp(TimeStampValue aValue) : mValue(aValue) {} static MFBT_API TimeStamp Now(bool aHighResolution);
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Leak] [mozglue/misc/TimeStamp.h] [Lines 422-431] [Old Code] static MFBT_API TimeStamp ProcessCreation(bool* aIsInconsistent = nullptr); [Fixed Code] static MFBT_API TimeStamp ProcessCreation(); Additional Details: The removal of the inconsistency reporting parameter might indicate a fix for potential information leakage about process creation timing, but this is not certain. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Timing Attack Surface] [mozglue/misc/TimeStamp.h] [Lines 531-534] [Old Code] MOZ_IMPLICIT TimeStamp(TimeStampValue aValue) : mValue(aValue) {} [Fixed Code] MOZ_IMPLICIT TimeStamp(TimeStampValue aValue) : mValue(aValue) {} Additional Details: The change in formatting (adding explicit line break) might be related to hardening against timing attacks by making implicit conversions more visible, but this is speculative. 3. Vulnerability Existed: no [Header Reorganization] [mozglue/misc/TimeStamp.h] [Lines 7-14] [Old Code] #include <stdint.h> #include <algorithm> // for std::min, std::max #include <ostream> #include <type_traits> [Fixed Code] #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" #include "mozilla/Attributes.h" #include "mozilla/FloatingPoint.h" #include "mozilla/Types.h" #include <algorithm> // for std::min, std::max #include <ostream> #include <stdint.h> #include <type_traits> Additional Details: This appears to be purely organizational, grouping Mozilla headers together, with no security implications. Note: The most significant change is the removal of the inconsistency reporting parameter in ProcessCreation(), which could potentially be security-related, but without more context about why this was changed, we can't be certain about any specific vulnerability being fixed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.destination-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.destination-atop.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); t.done(); });
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 26] Old Code: ``` var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ``` Fixed Code: ``` var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ``` 2. Vulnerability Existed: no Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 26] Old Code: ``` _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); ``` Fixed Code: ``` _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); ``` The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, involving variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating references accordingly. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The changes are likely for code consistency or readability purposes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas.yaml@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(50, 0, 50, 50);- ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas, 50, 0);+ ctx.drawImage(canvas, 50, 0); @assert pixel 0,0 ==~ 0,255,0,255; @assert pixel 99,0 ==~ 0,255,0,255; @assert pixel 0,49 ==~ 0,255,0,255;@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 1, 100, 49); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 1);- ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas, 0, 1);+ ctx.drawImage(canvas, 0, 1); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 2); @assert pixel 0,0 ==~ 0,255,0,255;
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Canvas Security Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/yaml/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas.yaml] [Lines 289, 305] [Old Code] ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas, 50, 0); ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas, 0, 1); [Fixed Code] ctx.drawImage(canvas, 50, 0); ctx.drawImage(canvas, 0, 1); Additional Details: - The change involves switching from drawing an offscreenCanvas to drawing a regular canvas - While this doesn't show any obvious security vulnerability, there could be potential security implications when dealing with different canvas contexts - The modification might be related to preventing cross-origin data leakage or tainting issues, but without more context about the canvas origins, this is uncertain - This appears to be more of a test case correction than a direct security fix
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_modular.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_modular.h@@ -91,8 +91,9 @@ bool allow_truncated_group); Status DecodeGroup(const Rect& rect, BitReader* reader, int minShift, int maxShift, const ModularStreamId& stream, bool zerofill,- PassesDecoderState* dec_state, ImageBundle* output,- bool allow_truncated);+ PassesDecoderState* dec_state,+ RenderPipelineInput* render_pipeline_input,+ ImageBundle* output, bool allow_truncated); // Decodes a VarDCT DC group (`group_id`) from the given `reader`. Status DecodeVarDCTDC(size_t group_id, BitReader* reader, PassesDecoderState* dec_state);@@ -113,11 +114,14 @@ ImageBundle* output, bool inplace); bool have_dc() const { return have_something; } void MaybeDropFullImage();+ bool UsesFullImage() const { return use_full_image; } private: Status ModularImageToDecodedRect(Image& gi, PassesDecoderState* dec_state,- jxl::ThreadPool* pool, ImageBundle* output,- Rect rect);+ jxl::ThreadPool* pool,+ RenderPipelineInput* render_pipeline_input,+ ImageBundle* output, Rect rect,+ Rect modular_rect); Image full_image; std::vector<Transform> global_transform;
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential API Security Enhancement] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_modular.h] [Lines 91-93, 113-116] [Old Code] Status DecodeGroup(const Rect& rect, BitReader* reader, int minShift, int maxShift, const ModularStreamId& stream, bool zerofill, PassesDecoderState* dec_state, ImageBundle* output, bool allow_truncated); [Fixed Code] Status DecodeGroup(const Rect& rect, BitReader* reader, int minShift, int maxShift, const ModularStreamId& stream, bool zerofill, PassesDecoderState* dec_state, RenderPipelineInput* render_pipeline_input, ImageBundle* output, bool allow_truncated); Additional Details: - The change adds a new RenderPipelineInput parameter which could be related to better input validation or security boundary enforcement - Without more context, it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just an architectural improvement 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Boundary Check Improvement] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_modular.h] [Lines 113-116] [Old Code] Status ModularImageToDecodedRect(Image& gi, PassesDecoderState* dec_state, jxl::ThreadPool* pool, ImageBundle* output, Rect rect); [Fixed Code] Status ModularImageToDecodedRect(Image& gi, PassesDecoderState* dec_state, jxl::ThreadPool* pool, RenderPipelineInput* render_pipeline_input, ImageBundle* output, Rect rect, Rect modular_rect); Additional Details: - The addition of modular_rect parameter suggests better handling of rectangle boundaries - This could potentially prevent out-of-bounds access issues, but without exploit details we can't be certain 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Leak Fix] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/dec_modular.h] [Line 114] [Old Code] (No previous method) [Fixed Code] bool UsesFullImage() const { return use_full_image; } Additional Details: - Adding this getter method could be related to better memory management - Might help prevent information leaks by properly tracking image usage Note: The changes appear to be more about API improvements and better parameter handling rather than fixing specific known vulnerabilities. Without additional context about exploit scenarios or CVE references, we can't definitively identify security vulnerabilities in these changes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x64_openbsd.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x64_openbsd.json@@ -24577,7 +24577,6 @@ "-Wno-shorten-64-to-32" ], "defines": [- "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE", "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE", "USE_GLIB=1", "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64",
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Exposure] [dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/x64_True_x64_openbsd.json] [Lines 24577-24581] [Old Code: "defines": [ "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE", "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE", "USE_GLIB=1", "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64",] [Fixed Code: "defines": [ "WEBRTC_USE_PIPEWIRE", "USE_GLIB=1", "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64",] Additional Details: 1. The removal of "MULTI_MONITOR_SCREENSHARE" might indicate a security concern related to screen sharing capabilities, but without more context about why this was removed, we can't be certain. 2. This could potentially relate to limiting screen sharing functionality for security reasons, but it might also just be a feature removal. 3. No specific CVE or known vulnerability is directly associated with this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/VerifySSLServerCertParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/VerifySSLServerCertParent.cpp@@ -61,8 +61,7 @@ VerifySSLServerCertParent* aParent) : mTarget(aTarget), mParent(aParent) {}- void Dispatch(nsNSSCertificate* aCert,- nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aBuiltChain,+ void Dispatch(nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aBuiltChain, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aPeerCertChain, uint16_t aCertificateTransparencyStatus, EVStatus aEVStatus, bool aSucceeded, PRErrorCode aFinalError,@@ -78,7 +77,7 @@ }; void IPCServerCertVerificationResult::Dispatch(- nsNSSCertificate* aCert, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aBuiltChain,+ nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aBuiltChain, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aPeerCertChain, uint16_t aCertificateTransparencyStatus, EVStatus aEVStatus, bool aSucceeded, PRErrorCode aFinalError, uint32_t aCollectedErrors,@@ -120,9 +119,8 @@ } // anonymous namespace bool VerifySSLServerCertParent::Dispatch(- const ByteArray& aServerCert, nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,- const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,- const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,+ nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,+ const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes, const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse, const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension, const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,@@ -131,19 +129,6 @@ AssertIsOnBackgroundThread(); mBackgroundThread = NS_GetCurrentThread();-- SECItem serverCertItem = {- siBuffer, const_cast<uint8_t*>(aServerCert.data().Elements()),- static_cast<unsigned int>(aServerCert.data().Length())};- UniqueCERTCertificate serverCert(CERT_NewTempCertificate(- CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &serverCertItem, nullptr, false, true));- if (!serverCert) {- MOZ_LOG(- gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,- ("VerifySSLServerCertParent::Dispatch - CERT_NewTempCertificate cert "- "failed."));- return false;- } nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> peerCertBytes; for (auto& certBytes : aPeerCertChain) {@@ -171,9 +156,9 @@ RefPtr<IPCServerCertVerificationResult> resultTask = new IPCServerCertVerificationResult(mBackgroundThread, this); SECStatus status = SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch(- 0, nullptr, serverCert, std::move(peerCertBytes), aHostName, aPort,- aOriginAttributes, stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, dcInfo,- aProviderFlags, Now(), PR_Now(), aCertVerifierFlags, resultTask);+ 0, nullptr, std::move(peerCertBytes), aHostName, aPort, aOriginAttributes,+ stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, dcInfo, aProviderFlags, Now(),+ aCertVerifierFlags, resultTask); if (status != SECWouldBlock) { MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format: Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Certificate Validation Bypass [security/manager/ssl/VerifySSLServerCertParent.cpp] [Lines 61-78, 120-131] [Old Code] void Dispatch(nsNSSCertificate* aCert, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aBuiltChain, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aPeerCertChain, uint16_t aCertificateTransparencyStatus, EVStatus aEVStatus, bool aSucceeded, PRErrorCode aFinalError, uint32_t aCollectedErrors, nsITransportSecurityInfo* aSecurityInfo) [Fixed Code] void Dispatch(nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aBuiltChain, nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& aPeerCertChain, uint16_t aCertificateTransparencyStatus, EVStatus aEVStatus, bool aSucceeded, PRErrorCode aFinalError, uint32_t aCollectedErrors, nsITransportSecurityInfo* aSecurityInfo) Additional Details: The diff shows removal of the server certificate parameter (aCert) from multiple function signatures and removal of certificate creation code. This could potentially be related to certificate validation improvements, but without more context about the security implications of these changes, it's not certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just refactoring the code. The removal of direct certificate handling might indicate a move towards more secure certificate chain validation. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Memory Safety Improvement [security/manager/ssl/VerifySSLServerCertParent.cpp] [Lines 131-156] [Old Code] SECItem serverCertItem = { siBuffer, const_cast<uint8_t*>(aServerCert.data().Elements()), static_cast<unsigned int>(aServerCert.data().Length())}; UniqueCERTCertificate serverCert(CERT_NewTempCertificate( CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &serverCertItem, nullptr, false, true)); if (!serverCert) { MOZ_LOG( gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("VerifySSLServerCertParent::Dispatch - CERT_NewTempCertificate cert " "failed.")); return false; } [Fixed Code] [Removed entirely] Additional Details: The removal of temporary certificate creation code could potentially address memory safety issues or certificate parsing vulnerabilities, but without more context about the specific security implications, this is uncertain. The change might be related to moving certificate handling to a different part of the system.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mach_commands.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mach_commands.py@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ from mach.decorators import CommandArgument, Command from manifestparser import TestManifest from manifestparser import filters as mpf--here = os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__)) @Command("python", category="devenv", description="Run Python.")
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Leak/Path Disclosure] [python/mach_commands.py] [Lines 17] [Old Code] here = os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__)) [Fixed Code] [Removed] Additional Details: The removed line could potentially expose the absolute path of the script's directory, which might be considered sensitive information. However, without more context about how this variable was used, it's difficult to determine if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a cleanup of unused code. The removal could be a security hardening measure to prevent potential path disclosure.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/source-test/mozlint.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/source-test/mozlint.yml@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ cp -r /build/node_modules_eslint node_modules && ln -s ../tools/lint/eslint/eslint-plugin-mozilla node_modules && ln -s ../tools/lint/eslint/eslint-plugin-spidermonkey-js node_modules &&- ./mach lint -v -l eslint -f treeherder -f json:/builds/worker/mozlint.json+ ./mach lint -v -l eslint -f treeherder -f json:/builds/worker/mozlint.json * when: files-changed: # Files that are likely audited.@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ env: WORKSPACE: /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/ DECISION_TASK_ID: {task-reference: <decision>}+ artifacts:+ - type: file+ name: public/perfdocs.diff+ path: /builds/worker/diff.txt when: files-changed: - 'taskcluster/**'@@ -478,7 +482,7 @@ treeherder: symbol: l10n(fluent) run:- mach: lint --linter fluent-lint -f treeherder -f json:/builds/worker/mozlint.json+ mach: lint --linter fluent-lint -f treeherder -f json:/builds/worker/mozlint.json * when: files-changed: - '**/*.ftl'
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Command Injection] [taskcluster/ci/source-test/mozlint.yml] [Lines 105, 482] [Old Code] `./mach lint -v -l eslint -f treeherder -f json:/builds/worker/mozlint.json` [Fixed Code] `./mach lint -v -l eslint -f treeherder -f json:/builds/worker/mozlint.json *` The addition of the wildcard (*) character could potentially be problematic if the command is executed in a context where filenames could contain malicious characters. However, without more context about the execution environment and how the command is processed, I can't be certain this constitutes a vulnerability. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Disclosure] [taskcluster/ci/source-test/mozlint.yml] [Lines 461-464] [Old Code] (No artifact declaration) [Fixed Code] `artifacts: - type: file name: public/perfdocs.diff path: /builds/worker/diff.txt` The addition of artifact collection could potentially expose sensitive information if the diff.txt file contains confidential data. However, since we don't know the contents of this file, we can't be certain this is a vulnerability. The "public/" prefix in the name suggests the output is intended to be public.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include "mozilla/FilePreferences.h" #include "mozilla/IOInterposer.h" #include "mozilla/RDDProcessImpl.h"+#include "mozilla/ipc/UtilityProcessImpl.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/BrowserProcessSubThread.h"@@ -575,6 +576,7 @@ case GeckoProcessType_VR: case GeckoProcessType_RDD: case GeckoProcessType_Socket:+ case GeckoProcessType_Utility: // Content processes need the XPCOM/chromium frankenventloop uiLoopType = MessageLoop::TYPE_MOZILLA_CHILD; break;@@ -655,6 +657,10 @@ case GeckoProcessType_Socket: ioInterposerGuard.emplace(); process = MakeUnique<net::SocketProcessImpl>(parentPID);+ break;++ case GeckoProcessType_Utility:+ process = MakeUnique<ipc::UtilityProcessImpl>(parentPID); break; #if defined(MOZ_SANDBOX) && defined(XP_WIN)
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no [Utility Process Implementation] [toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp] [Lines 63, 576, 657] [Old Code] [No previous implementation of UtilityProcess] [Fixed Code] [Added implementation for UtilityProcess] This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix. The changes: 1. Added include for UtilityProcessImpl 2. Added case for GeckoProcessType_Utility in process type switch 3. Added case for GeckoProcessType_Utility in process creation switch No security vulnerabilities appear to be fixed here - this is simply adding support for a new process type (Utility Process) to the existing process management system. The changes follow the same pattern as other process types already implemented in the code. No CVE or specific vulnerability is being addressed here, and there's no indication of insecure code being replaced. The changes are purely additive to support new functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/helpers.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/helpers.rs@@ -66,7 +66,9 @@ // See `back::spv::GlobalVariable::access_id` for details. pub fn global_needs_wrapper(ir_module: &crate::Module, var: &crate::GlobalVariable) -> bool { match var.class {- crate::StorageClass::Uniform | crate::StorageClass::Storage { .. } => {}+ crate::StorageClass::Uniform+ | crate::StorageClass::Storage { .. }+ | crate::StorageClass::PushConstant => {} _ => return false, }; match ir_module.types[var.ty].inner {
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Missing Access Control] [third_party/rust/naga/src/back/spv/helpers.rs] [Lines 66-69] [Old Code] crate::StorageClass::Uniform | crate::StorageClass::Storage { .. } => {} [Fixed Code] crate::StorageClass::Uniform | crate::StorageClass::Storage { .. } | crate::StorageClass::PushConstant => {} Additional Details: The diff shows the addition of `PushConstant` to the pattern matching for storage classes. While this appears to be a functional change rather than a direct security fix, it could potentially relate to access control or validation of shader resources. The change ensures proper handling of push constants in the SPIR-V backend, which might prevent incorrect behavior or potential security issues related to resource access. However, without more context about the specific security implications, I can't definitively identify a vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.scaled.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.bezierCurveTo.scaled.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ ctx.moveTo(-2, 3.1); ctx.bezierCurveTo(-2, -1, 2.1, -1, 2.1, 3.1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-29] [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); [...] _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); [...] [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); [...] _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); [...] The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. There are no security-related patterns or vulnerability fixes evident in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.