--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ic-unit-011.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ic-unit-011.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-values-4/#font-relative-lengths">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ic-unit-009-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="In this test, the ic unit is the advance height measure of the 水 (CJK water ideograph, U+6C34) glyph.">   <style>

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ic-unit-011.html [Lines] 8  
   [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">`  
   [Fixed Code] (removed line)  

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with empty meta tags
- The change doesn't appear to address any security-related functionality

Note: The diff shows a minor HTML cleanup change in a test file, but doesn't indicate any security vulnerability fixes. The removal of an empty meta tag doesn't correspond to any known security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-003.html@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ <title>CSS Test: overflow:auto on table overflowing upwards</title> <link rel="author" title="Simon Pieters" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/Style/css2-updates/REC-CSS2-20110607-errata.html#s.11.1.1b">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that overflow:auto on table means visible."> <link rel="match" href="s-11-1-1b-001-ref.html"> <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found in this diff. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with the "flags" attribute, which appears to be a test configuration cleanup rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential HTML Meta Tag Information Leak [File] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/css21-errata/s-11-1-1b-003.html] [Lines 2-7]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed)

Additional Details:
While this doesn't appear to be a security vulnerability fix, the removal of empty meta tags could potentially reduce information leakage about test configurations. However, this is speculative as the "flags" attribute was empty and didn't contain sensitive information in this case.

Note: The diff shows a minor cleanup change in a test file, not a security-related fix. The removed meta tag was empty and didn't pose any security risk. This appears to be routine test file maintenance rather than a security patch.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-176.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-176.xml@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>   <p id="id" class="class test">This line should be green.</p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-176.xml] [Lines 15]
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
    Fixed Code: [line removed]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata
- There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here
- The modification seems to be cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change

The diff shows only a minor cleanup change in a test file with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-9.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-9.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0.3333333333turn, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-9.html] [Lines 17-18, 25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed - it's likely either a code style improvement or preparation for some future change. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security implications were found in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-175a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-175a.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-color.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>    <p class="13">This line should be green.</p>

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
2. There's no evidence of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change.
3. The "flags" meta tag wasn't being used (empty content) and its removal doesn't affect security.

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be purely cosmetic or related to test maintenance rather than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@         return SECSuccess;     }+    /* If buf is non-NULL, space must be non-zero;+     * if buf is NULL, space must be zero. */+    PORT_Assert((b->buf && b->space) || (!b->buf && !b->space));     newLen = PR_MAX(newLen, b->len + 1024);     if (newLen > b->space) {         unsigned char *newBuf;@@ -54,6 +57,22 @@         b->buf = newBuf;         b->space = newLen;     }+    return SECSuccess;+}++/* Appends len copies of c to b */+SECStatus+sslBuffer_Fill(sslBuffer *b, PRUint8 c, size_t len)+{+    PORT_Assert(b);+    SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_Grow(b, b->len + len);+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {+        return SECFailure;+    }+    if (len > 0) {+        memset(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(b), c, len);+    }+    b->len += len;     return SECSuccess; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Buffer Overflow Prevention [File] security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c [Lines 40-43]  
[Old Code]  
No explicit check for buffer-space consistency  
[Fixed Code]  
Added assertion: `PORT_Assert((b->buf && b->space) || (!b->buf && !b->space));`  
This prevents potential buffer overflow by enforcing consistent buffer state.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Uninitialized Memory Exposure [File] security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c [Lines 54-72]  
[Old Code]  
No function existed for controlled buffer filling  
[Fixed Code]  
Added new `sslBuffer_Fill` function with proper length checks and memset  
This prevents exposure of uninitialized memory when expanding buffers.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Integer Overflow [File] security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c [Lines 40-72]  
[Old Code]  
No explicit checks for arithmetic overflow in buffer growth calculations  
[Fixed Code]  
While improved, still lacks explicit overflow checks for `newLen = PR_MAX(newLen, b->len + 1024)`  
The impact depends on how `sslBuffer_Grow` handles large values.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/example-compositor/compositor/src/main.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/example-compositor/compositor/src/main.rs@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@         ReferenceFrameKind::Transform {             is_2d_scale_translation: false,             should_snap: false,+            paired_with_perspective: false,         },         SpatialTreeItemKey::new(0, 0),     );@@ -280,6 +281,8 @@         LayoutRect::from_size(layout_size),         LayoutRect::from_size(layout_size),         LayoutVector2D::zero(),+        APZScrollGeneration::default(),+        HasScrollLinkedEffect::No,         SpatialTreeItemKey::new(0, 1),     );

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Initialization Vulnerability] [gfx/wr/example-compositor/compositor/src/main.rs] [Lines 240-244]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   ReferenceFrameKind::Transform {
       is_2d_scale_translation: false,
       should_snap: false,
   },
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   ReferenceFrameKind::Transform {
       is_2d_scale_translation: false,
       should_snap: false,
       paired_with_perspective: false,
   },
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Initialization Vulnerability] [gfx/wr/example-compositor/compositor/src/main.rs] [Lines 280-284]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   LayoutRect::from_size(layout_size),
   LayoutRect::from_size(layout_size),
   LayoutVector2D::zero(),
   SpatialTreeItemKey::new(0, 1),
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```rust
   LayoutRect::from_size(layout_size),
   LayoutRect::from_size(layout_size),
   LayoutVector2D::zero(),
   APZScrollGeneration::default(),
   HasScrollLinkedEffect::No,
   SpatialTreeItemKey::new(0, 1),
   ```

Note: While these changes appear to be adding missing fields to struct initializations, I cannot determine with certainty if these were actual security vulnerabilities or just general code improvements. The changes could potentially relate to security if the missing fields could lead to undefined behavior or security-relevant incorrect behavior, but without more context about the specific structs and their usage, this remains uncertain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/nimbus/test/unit/test_ExperimentManager_unenroll.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/nimbus/test/unit/test_ExperimentManager_unenroll.js@@ -71,6 +71,41 @@   Services.prefs.clearUserPref(STUDIES_OPT_OUT_PREF); });+add_task(async function test_unenroll_rollout_opt_out() {+  globalSandbox.reset();+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref(STUDIES_OPT_OUT_PREF, true);+  const manager = ExperimentFakes.manager();+  const rollout = ExperimentFakes.rollout("foo");++  await manager.onStartup();+  await manager.store.addEnrollment(rollout);++  Services.prefs.setBoolPref(STUDIES_OPT_OUT_PREF, false);++  Assert.equal(+    manager.store.get(rollout.slug).active,+    false,+    "should set .active to false"+  );+  Assert.ok(TelemetryEvents.sendEvent.calledOnce);+  Assert.deepEqual(+    TelemetryEvents.sendEvent.firstCall.args,+    [+      "unenroll",+      "nimbus_experiment",+      rollout.slug,+      {+        reason: "studies-opt-out",+        branch: rollout.branch.slug,+        enrollmentId: rollout.enrollmentId,+      },+    ],+    "should send an unenrollment ping with the slug, reason, branch slug, and enrollmentId"+  );+  // reset pref+  Services.prefs.clearUserPref(STUDIES_OPT_OUT_PREF);+});+ add_task(async function test_setExperimentInactive_called() {   globalSandbox.reset();   const manager = ExperimentFakes.manager();

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes appear to add a new test case (`test_unenroll_rollout_opt_out`) that verifies the behavior of unenrolling from experiments when the studies opt-out preference changes. The test checks that:
- The experiment is properly deactivated
- A telemetry event is sent with correct parameters
- The preference is properly reset

The changes are purely test-related and don't modify any production code. The test verifies existing security-related functionality (proper handling of opt-out preferences) but doesn't introduce or fix any vulnerabilities itself.

Additional observations:
- The test properly cleans up by resetting the preference
- It verifies secure handling of experiment unenrollment
- It checks proper telemetry reporting
- No actual security flaws are being fixed in this diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/performance-new/browser.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/performance-new/browser.js@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ /** @type {PerformancePref["UIBaseUrlPathPref"]} */ const UI_BASE_URL_PATH_PREF = "devtools.performance.recording.ui-base-url-path";+/** @type {PerformancePref["UIEnableActiveTabView"]} */+const UI_ENABLE_ACTIVE_TAB_PREF =+  "devtools.performance.recording.active-tab-view.enabled";+ const UI_BASE_URL_DEFAULT = "https://profiler.firefox.com"; const UI_BASE_URL_PATH_DEFAULT = "/from-browser";@@ -58,50 +62,66 @@  * @param {ProfilerViewMode | undefined} profilerViewMode - View mode for the Firefox Profiler  *   front-end timeline. While opening the url, we should append a query string  *   if a view other than "full" needs to be displayed.- * @returns {MockedExports.Browser} The browser for the opened tab.- */-function openProfilerTab(profilerViewMode) {+ * @returns {Promise<MockedExports.Browser>} The browser for the opened tab.+ */+async function openProfilerTab(profilerViewMode) {   const Services = lazy.Services();++  // Allow the user to point to something other than profiler.firefox.com.+  const baseUrl = Services.prefs.getStringPref(+    UI_BASE_URL_PREF,+    UI_BASE_URL_DEFAULT+  );+  // Allow tests to override the path.+  const baseUrlPath = Services.prefs.getStringPref(+    UI_BASE_URL_PATH_PREF,+    UI_BASE_URL_PATH_DEFAULT+  );+  // This controls whether we enable the active tab view when capturing in web+  // developer preset.+  const enableActiveTab = Services.prefs.getBoolPref(+    UI_ENABLE_ACTIVE_TAB_PREF,+    false+  );++  // We automatically open up the "full" mode if no query string is present.+  // `undefined` also means nothing is specified, and it should open the "full"+  // timeline view in that case.+  let viewModeQueryString = "";+  if (profilerViewMode === "active-tab") {+    // We're not enabling the active-tab view in all environments until we+    // iron out all its issues.+    if (enableActiveTab) {+      viewModeQueryString = "?view=active-tab&implementation=js";+    } else {+      viewModeQueryString = "?implementation=js";+    }+  } else if (profilerViewMode !== undefined && profilerViewMode !== "full") {+    viewModeQueryString = `?view=${profilerViewMode}`;+  }++  const urlToLoad = `${baseUrl}${baseUrlPath}${viewModeQueryString}`;+   // Find the most recently used window, as the DevTools client could be in a variety   // of hosts.   const win = Services.wm.getMostRecentWindow("navigator:browser");   if (!win) {     throw new Error("No browser window");   }-  const browser = win.gBrowser;   win.focus();-  // Allow the user to point to something other than profiler.firefox.com.-  const baseUrl = Services.prefs.getStringPref(-    UI_BASE_URL_PREF,-    UI_BASE_URL_DEFAULT-  );-  // Allow tests to override the path.-  const baseUrlPath = Services.prefs.getStringPref(-    UI_BASE_URL_PATH_PREF,-    UI_BASE_URL_PATH_DEFAULT-  );--  // We automatically open up the "full" mode if no query string is present.-  // `undefined` also means nothing is specified, and it should open the "full"-  // timeline view in that case.-  let viewModeQueryString = "";-  if (profilerViewMode === "active-tab") {-    viewModeQueryString = "?view=active-tab&implementation=js";-  } else if (profilerViewMode !== undefined && profilerViewMode !== "full") {-    viewModeQueryString = `?view=${profilerViewMode}`;-  }--  const tab = browser.addWebTab(-    `${baseUrl}${baseUrlPath}${viewModeQueryString}`,-    {-      triggeringPrincipal: Services.scriptSecurityManager.createNullPrincipal({-        userContextId: browser.contentPrincipal.userContextId,-      }),-    }-  );-  browser.selectedTab = tab;-  return tab.linkedBrowser;+  // The profiler frontend currently doesn't support being loaded in a private+  // window, because it does some storage writes in IndexedDB. That's why we+  // force the opening of the tab in a non-private window. This might open a new+  // non-private window if the only currently opened window is a private window.+  const contentBrowser = await new Promise(resolveOnContentBrowserCreated =>+    win.openWebLinkIn(urlToLoad, "tab", {+      forceNonPrivate: true,+      resolveOnContentBrowserCreated,+      userContextId: win.gBrowser.contentPrincipal.userContextId,+    })+  );+  return contentBrowser; } /**

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential URL Injection/Open Redirect] [devtools/client/performance-new/browser.js] [Lines 58-66]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   function openProfilerTab(profilerViewMode) {
     const Services = lazy.Services();
     // Find the most recently used window, as the DevTools client could be in a variety
     // of hosts.
     const win = Services.wm.getMostRecentWindow("navigator:browser");
     if (!win) {
       throw new Error("No browser window");
     }
     const browser = win.gBrowser;
     win.focus();
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   async function openProfilerTab(profilerViewMode) {
     const Services = lazy.Services();
     // Allow the user to point to something other than profiler.firefox.com.
     const baseUrl = Services.prefs.getStringPref(
       UI_BASE_URL_PREF,
       UI_BASE_URL_DEFAULT
     );
     // Allow tests to override the path.
     const baseUrlPath = Services.prefs.getStringPref(
       UI_BASE_URL_PATH_PREF,
       UI_BASE_URL_PATH_DEFAULT
     );
     // This controls whether we enable the active tab view when capturing in web
     // developer preset.
     const enableActiveTab = Services.prefs.getBoolPref(
       UI_ENABLE_ACTIVE_TAB_PREF,
       false
     );
   ```
   Additional Details: The change adds more control over URL construction and introduces a preference to enable/disable active tab view, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific security issue or just adding functionality.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Privilege Escalation/Context Isolation] [devtools/client/performance-new/browser.js] [Lines 58-66]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   const tab = browser.addWebTab(
     `${baseUrl}${baseUrlPath}${viewModeQueryString}`,
     {
       triggeringPrincipal: Services.scriptSecurityManager.createNullPrincipal({
         userContextId: browser.contentPrincipal.userContextId,
       }),
     }
   );
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   const contentBrowser = await new Promise(resolveOnContentBrowserCreated =>
     win.openWebLinkIn(urlToLoad, "tab", {
       forceNonPrivate: true,
       resolveOnContentBrowserCreated,
       userContextId: win.gBrowser.contentPrincipal.userContextId,
     })
   );
   ```
   Additional Details: The change modifies how the tab is opened, now using `openWebLinkIn` with explicit parameters including `forceNonPrivate` flag. This might be addressing potential privacy/security issues with private browsing mode, but it's not clear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

Note: While there are significant changes in how URLs are constructed and tabs are opened, the diff doesn't clearly indicate that these changes were made to address specific security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be more about functionality improvements and better control over the profiler's behavior.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-atop.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,128,128,191, "50,25", "0,128,128,191", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,128,128,191, "50,25", "0,128,128,191", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.destination-atop.html] [Lines 17-18, 26]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,128,128,191, "50,25", "0,128,128,191", 5);
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,128,128,191, "50,25", "0,128,128,191", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name is different. No security vulnerabilities were addressed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/fronts/targets/window-global.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/fronts/targets/window-global.js@@ -61,9 +61,7 @@    * Event listener for `frameUpdate` event.    */   _onFrameUpdate(packet) {-    // @backward-compat { version 96 } isTopLevel was added on the server in 96, so we-    // can simply send `packet` when 96 hits release.-    this.emit("frame-update", { ...packet, isTopLevel: !packet.parentID });+    this.emit("frame-update", packet);   }   /**@@ -73,7 +71,6 @@     const event = Object.create(null);     event.url = packet.url;     event.title = packet.title;-    event.nativeConsoleAPI = packet.nativeConsoleAPI;     event.isFrameSwitching = packet.isFrameSwitching;     // Keep the title unmodified when a developer toolbox switches frame@@ -110,20 +107,6 @@    */   setTitle(title) {     this._title = title;-  }--  // @backward-compat { version 96 } Fx 96 dropped the attach method on all but worker targets-  //                  This can be removed once we drop 95 support-  async attach() {-    if (this._attach) {-      return this._attach;-    }-    this._attach = (async () => {-      const response = await super.attach();--      this.targetForm.threadActor = response.threadActor;-    })();-    return this._attach;   }   async detach() {

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [devtools/client/fronts/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 61-63]
[Old Code]
    _onFrameUpdate(packet) {
        // @backward-compat { version 96 } isTopLevel was added on the server in 96, so we
        // can simply send `packet` when 96 hits release.
        this.emit("frame-update", { ...packet, isTopLevel: !packet.parentID });
[Fixed Code]
    _onFrameUpdate(packet) {
        this.emit("frame-update", packet);

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [devtools/client/fronts/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 73-76]
[Old Code]
    const event = Object.create(null);
    event.url = packet.url;
    event.title = packet.title;
    event.nativeConsoleAPI = packet.nativeConsoleAPI;
[Fixed Code]
    const event = Object.create(null);
    event.url = packet.url;
    event.title = packet.title;

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Backward Compatibility Issue] [devtools/client/fronts/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 110-121]
[Old Code]
    // @backward-compat { version 96 } Fx 96 dropped the attach method on all but worker targets
    //                  This can be removed once we drop 95 support
    async attach() {
        if (this._attach) {
            return this._attach;
        }
        this._attach = (async () => {
            const response = await super.attach();

            this.targetForm.threadActor = response.threadActor;
        })();
        return this._attach;
    }
[Fixed Code]
    [Entire method removed]

Note: While these changes appear to be primarily related to removing backward compatibility code and simplifying the implementation, I can't definitively determine if these were actual security fixes without more context about the threat model and potential attack vectors. The removal of certain properties from emitted events could potentially relate to information disclosure concerns, but this isn't certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.object.readonly.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.object.readonly.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 10, 10); var w = imgdata.width;

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or data handling
- This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/PrimaryPanes/SourcesTree.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/PrimaryPanes/SourcesTree.js@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import React, { Component } from "react"; import classnames from "classnames"; import { connect } from "../../utils/connect";-import { difference } from "lodash"; // Selectors import {@@ -18,9 +17,8 @@   getDisplayedSources,   getFocusedSourceItem,   getContext,+  getGeneratedSourceByURL, } from "../../selectors";--import { getGeneratedSourceByURL } from "../../reducers/sources"; // Actions import actions from "../../actions";@@ -190,7 +188,9 @@   getSourcesGroups = item => {     const sourcesAll = getAllSources(this.props);     const sourcesInside = getSourcesInsideGroup(item, this.props);-    const sourcesOuside = difference(sourcesAll, sourcesInside);+    const sourcesOuside = sourcesAll.filter(+      source => !sourcesInside.includes(source)+    );     return { sourcesInside, sourcesOuside };   };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Dependency Vulnerability] [devtools/client/debugger/src/components/PrimaryPanes/SourcesTree.js] [Lines: -6,7 +6,6]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   import { difference } from "lodash";
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   (removed import)
   ```  
   Additional Details: The removal of lodash's difference function might indicate a security concern with the dependency, though this could also be just a performance optimization.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Exposure] [devtools/client/debugger/src/components/PrimaryPanes/SourcesTree.js] [Lines: -190,7 +188,9]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   const sourcesOuside = difference(sourcesAll, sourcesInside);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   const sourcesOuside = sourcesAll.filter(
     source => !sourcesInside.includes(source)
   );
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change from lodash's difference to native array operations might be related to more predictable behavior in source filtering, but it's unclear if this was specifically a security fix.

Note: The diff shows two main changes - removal of a lodash dependency and replacement of its difference function with native array operations. While these could be security-related (e.g., removing a potentially vulnerable dependency or making array operations more predictable), the diff doesn't provide enough context to confirm actual vulnerabilities. The changes could equally be performance optimizations or code simplifications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_nonascii_path.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_nonascii_path.js@@ -22,13 +22,6 @@   /[^\x20-\x7f]/.test(file.path),   "the profile path should contain a non-ASCII character" );-if (mozinfo.os == "win") {-  file.QueryInterface(Ci.nsILocalFileWin);-  Assert.ok(-    /[^\x20-\x7f]/.test(file.canonicalPath),-    "the profile short path should contain a non-ASCII character"-  );-} // Restore the original value. env.set("XPCSHELL_TEST_PROFILE_DIR", profd);

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Path Handling Issue] [security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_nonascii_path.js] [Lines 22-28]  
   Old Code:  
   ```javascript
   if (mozinfo.os == "win") {
     file.QueryInterface(Ci.nsILocalFileWin);
     Assert.ok(
       /[^\x20-\x7f]/.test(file.canonicalPath),
       "the profile short path should contain a non-ASCII character"
     );
   }
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```javascript
   // (removed entirely)
   ```  
   Additional Details: The removed code was checking for non-ASCII characters in Windows canonical paths. While not clearly a security vulnerability, removing path handling checks could potentially affect security if there were underlying path normalization or encoding issues. The exact security implications are unclear without more context.

Note: The diff shows the removal of a Windows-specific path check for non-ASCII characters in canonical paths. While this doesn't directly indicate a security vulnerability, it might be related to changes in path handling security. Without more context about why this check was removed, we can't be certain about security implications. The main test for non-ASCII characters in the regular path remains.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp@@ -196,12 +196,6 @@ //------------------------------------------------------------------------------bool nsThread::ShutdownContextsComp::Equals(-    const ShutdownContexts::elem_type& a,-    const ShutdownContexts::elem_type::Pointer b) const {-  return a.get() == b;-}- // This event is responsible for notifying nsThread::Shutdown that it is time // to call PR_JoinThread. It implements nsICancelableRunnable so that it can // run on a DOM Worker thread (where all events must implement@@ -220,7 +214,7 @@  private:   virtual ~nsThreadShutdownAckEvent() = default;-  NotNull<nsThreadShutdownContext*> mShutdownContext;+  NotNull<RefPtr<nsThreadShutdownContext>> mShutdownContext; }; // This event is responsible for setting mShutdownContext@@ -232,6 +226,8 @@         mThread(aThr),         mShutdownContext(aCtx) {}   NS_IMETHOD Run() override {+    // Creates a cycle between `mThread` and the shutdown context which will be+    // broken when the thread exits.     mThread->mShutdownContext = mShutdownContext;     if (mThread->mEventTarget) {       mThread->mEventTarget->NotifyShutdown();@@ -242,7 +238,7 @@  private:   NotNull<RefPtr<nsThread>> mThread;-  NotNull<nsThreadShutdownContext*> mShutdownContext;+  NotNull<RefPtr<nsThreadShutdownContext>> mShutdownContext; }; //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------@@ -422,36 +418,34 @@     PROFILER_UNREGISTER_THREAD();   }-  // Dispatch shutdown ACK-  NotNull<nsThreadShutdownContext*> context =+  NotNull<RefPtr<nsThreadShutdownContext>> context =       WrapNotNull(self->mShutdownContext);+  self->mShutdownContext = nullptr;   MOZ_ASSERT(context->mTerminatingThread == self);-  nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> event =-      do_QueryObject(new nsThreadShutdownAckEvent(context));-  if (context->mIsMainThreadJoining) {-    DebugOnly<nsresult> dispatch_ack_rv =-        SchedulerGroup::Dispatch(TaskCategory::Other, event.forget());-#ifdef DEBUG-    // On the main thread, dispatch may fail if this thread is part of a-    // `nsIThreadPool` which was shut down using `ShutdownWithTimeout`, and-    // that shutdown attempt timed out. In that case, the main thread may have-    // already completed thread shutdown before this dispatch attempt,-    // allowing it to fail. At that point, it is impossible for us to join-    // this thread anymore, so give up and warn instead.-    if (NS_FAILED(dispatch_ack_rv)) {-      NS_WARNING(-          "Thread shudown ack dispatch failed, the main thread may no longer "-          "be waiting.");-    }-#endif-  } else {++  // Take the joining thread from our shutdown context. This may have been+  // cleared by the joining thread if it decided to cancel waiting on us, in+  // which case we won't notify our caller, and leak.+  RefPtr<nsThread> joiningThread;+  {+    auto lock = context->mJoiningThread.Lock();+    joiningThread = lock->forget();+  }+  if (joiningThread) {+    // Dispatch shutdown ACK+    nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> event = new nsThreadShutdownAckEvent(context);     nsresult dispatch_ack_rv =-        context->mJoiningThread->Dispatch(event, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);+        joiningThread->Dispatch(event, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);+     // We do not expect this to ever happen, but If we cannot dispatch     // the ack event, someone probably blocks waiting on us and will     // crash with a hang later anyways. The best we can do is to tell     // the world what happened right here.     MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(dispatch_ack_rv));+  } else {+    NS_WARNING(+        "nsThread exiting after StopWaitingAndLeakThread was called, thread "+        "resources will be leaked!");   }   // Release any observer of the thread here.@@ -548,6 +542,7 @@     : mEvents(aQueue.get()),       mEventTarget(           new ThreadEventTarget(mEvents.get(), aMainThread == MAIN_THREAD)),+      mOutstandingShutdownContexts(0),       mShutdownContext(nullptr),       mScriptObserver(nullptr),       mThreadName("<uninitialized>"),@@ -572,6 +567,7 @@ nsThread::nsThread()     : mEvents(nullptr),       mEventTarget(nullptr),+      mOutstandingShutdownContexts(0),       mShutdownContext(nullptr),       mScriptObserver(nullptr),       mThreadName("<uninitialized>"),@@ -590,22 +586,10 @@ } nsThread::~nsThread() {-  NS_ASSERTION(mRequestedShutdownContexts.IsEmpty(),+  NS_ASSERTION(mOutstandingShutdownContexts == 0,                "shouldn't be waiting on other threads to shutdown");   MaybeRemoveFromThreadList();--#ifdef DEBUG-  // We deliberately leak these so they can be tracked by the leak checker.-  // If you're having nsThreadShutdownContext leaks, you can set:-  //   XPCOM_MEM_LOG_CLASSES=nsThreadShutdownContext-  // during a test run and that will at least tell you what thread is-  // requesting shutdown on another, which can be helpful for diagnosing-  // the leak.-  for (size_t i = 0; i < mRequestedShutdownContexts.Length(); ++i) {-    Unused << mRequestedShutdownContexts[i].release();-  }-#endif } nsresult nsThread::Init(const nsACString& aName) {@@ -778,36 +762,44 @@ nsThread::AsyncShutdown() {   LOG(("THRD(%p) async shutdown\n", this));-  ShutdownInternal(/* aSync = */ false);-  return NS_OK;-}--nsThreadShutdownContext* nsThread::ShutdownInternal(bool aSync) {+  nsCOMPtr<nsIThreadShutdown> shutdown;+  BeginShutdown(getter_AddRefs(shutdown));+  return NS_OK;+}++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsThread::BeginShutdown(nsIThreadShutdown** aShutdown) {+  LOG(("THRD(%p) begin shutdown\n", this));+   MOZ_ASSERT(mEvents);   MOZ_ASSERT(mEventTarget);   MOZ_ASSERT(mThread != PR_GetCurrentThread());   if (NS_WARN_IF(mThread == PR_GetCurrentThread())) {-    return nullptr;+    return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;   }   // Prevent multiple calls to this method.   if (!mShutdownRequired.compareExchange(true, false)) {-    return nullptr;+    return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;   }   MOZ_ASSERT(mThread);   MaybeRemoveFromThreadList();-  NotNull<nsThread*> currentThread =-      WrapNotNull(nsThreadManager::get().GetCurrentThread());+  RefPtr<nsThread> currentThread = nsThreadManager::get().GetCurrentThread();   MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(currentThread->EventQueue(),                         "Shutdown() may only be called from an XPCOM thread");-  // Allocate a shutdown context and store a strong ref.-  auto context =-      new nsThreadShutdownContext(WrapNotNull(this), currentThread, aSync);-  Unused << *currentThread->mRequestedShutdownContexts.EmplaceBack(context);+  // Allocate a shutdown context, and record that we're waiting for it.+  RefPtr<nsThreadShutdownContext> context =+      new nsThreadShutdownContext(WrapNotNull(this), currentThread);++  ++currentThread->mOutstandingShutdownContexts;+  nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> clearOutstanding = NS_NewRunnableFunction(+      "nsThread::ClearOutstandingShutdownContext",+      [currentThread] { --currentThread->mOutstandingShutdownContexts; });+  context->OnCompletion(clearOutstanding);   // Set mShutdownContext and wake up the thread in case it is waiting for   // events to process.@@ -816,7 +808,7 @@   if (!mEvents->PutEvent(event.forget(), EventQueuePriority::Normal)) {     // We do not expect this to happen. Let's collect some diagnostics.     nsAutoCString threadName;-    currentThread->GetThreadName(threadName);+    GetThreadName(threadName);     MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("Attempt to shutdown an already dead thread: %s",                             threadName.get());   }@@ -824,7 +816,8 @@   // We could still end up with other events being added after the shutdown   // task, but that's okay because we process pending events in ThreadFunc   // after setting mShutdownContext just before exiting.-  return context;+  context.forget(aShutdown);+  return NS_OK; } void nsThread::ShutdownComplete(NotNull<nsThreadShutdownContext*> aContext) {@@ -834,13 +827,6 @@   MaybeRemoveFromThreadList();-  if (aContext->mAwaitingShutdownAck) {-    // We're in a synchronous shutdown, so tell whatever is up the stack that-    // we're done and unwind the stack so it can call us again.-    aContext->mAwaitingShutdownAck = false;-    return;-  }-   // Now, it should be safe to join without fear of dead-locking.   PR_JoinThread(aContext->mTerminatingPRThread);   MOZ_ASSERT(!mThread);@@ -850,11 +836,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(!obs, "Should have been cleared at shutdown!"); #endif-  // Delete aContext.-  // aContext might not be in mRequestedShutdownContexts if it belongs to a-  // thread that was leaked by calling nsIThreadPool::ShutdownWithTimeout.-  aContext->mJoiningThread->mRequestedShutdownContexts.RemoveElement(-      aContext, ShutdownContextsComp{});+  aContext->MarkCompleted(); } void nsThread::WaitForAllAsynchronousShutdowns() {@@ -862,19 +844,18 @@   // has the template parameter we are providing here.   SpinEventLoopUntil<ProcessFailureBehavior::IgnoreAndContinue>(       "nsThread::WaitForAllAsynchronousShutdowns"_ns,-      [&]() { return mRequestedShutdownContexts.IsEmpty(); }, this);+      [&]() { return mOutstandingShutdownContexts == 0; }, this); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsThread::Shutdown() {   LOG(("THRD(%p) sync shutdown\n", this));-  nsThreadShutdownContext* maybeContext = ShutdownInternal(/* aSync = */ true);-  if (!maybeContext) {+  nsCOMPtr<nsIThreadShutdown> context;+  nsresult rv = BeginShutdown(getter_AddRefs(context));+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {     return NS_OK;  // The thread has already shut down.   }--  NotNull<nsThreadShutdownContext*> context = WrapNotNull(maybeContext);   // If we are going to hang here we want to see the thread's name   nsAutoCString threadName;@@ -882,12 +863,8 @@   // Process events on the current thread until we receive a shutdown ACK.   // Allows waiting; ensure no locks are held that would deadlock us!-  SpinEventLoopUntil(-      "nsThread::Shutdown: "_ns + threadName,-      [&, context]() { return !context->mAwaitingShutdownAck; },-      context->mJoiningThread);--  ShutdownComplete(context);+  SpinEventLoopUntil("nsThread::Shutdown: "_ns + threadName,+                     [&]() { return context->GetCompleted(); });   return NS_OK; }@@ -1025,7 +1002,6 @@   if (mShutdownContext) {     n += aMallocSizeOf(mShutdownContext);   }-  n += mRequestedShutdownContexts.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);   return aMallocSizeOf(this) + aMallocSizeOf(mThread) + n; }@@ -1448,6 +1424,52 @@   mEventQueueStack.PopEventQueue(mLocalEventTarget); }+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsThreadShutdownContext, nsIThreadShutdown)++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsThreadShutdownContext::OnCompletion(nsIRunnable* aEvent) {+  if (mCompleted) {+    aEvent->Run();+  } else {+    mCompletionCallbacks.AppendElement(aEvent);+  }+  return NS_OK;+}++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsThreadShutdownContext::GetCompleted(bool* aCompleted) {+  *aCompleted = mCompleted;+  return NS_OK;+}++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsThreadShutdownContext::StopWaitingAndLeakThread() {+  // Take the joining thread from `mJoiningThread` so that the terminating+  // thread won't try to dispatch nsThreadShutdownAckEvent to us anymore.+  RefPtr<nsThread> joiningThread;+  {+    auto lock = mJoiningThread.Lock();+    joiningThread = lock->forget();+  }+  if (!joiningThread) {+    // Shutdown is already being resolved, so there's nothing for us to do.+    return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;+  }++  MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(joiningThread->IsOnCurrentThread());+  MarkCompleted();+  return NS_OK;+}++void nsThreadShutdownContext::MarkCompleted() {+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mCompleted);+  mCompleted = true;+  nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable>> callbacks(std::move(mCompletionCallbacks));+  for (auto& callback : callbacks) {+    callback->Run();+  }+}+ namespace mozilla { PerformanceCounterState::Snapshot PerformanceCounterState::RunnableWillRun(     PerformanceCounter* aCounter, TimeStamp aNow, bool aIsIdleRunnable) {

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Leak Vulnerability [xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp] [Lines: 422-459]
[Old Code]
// Dispatch shutdown ACK
NotNull<nsThreadShutdownContext*> context =
    WrapNotNull(self->mShutdownContext);
MOZ_ASSERT(context->mTerminatingThread == self);
nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> event =
    do_QueryObject(new nsThreadShutdownAckEvent(context));
if (context->mIsMainThreadJoining) {
  DebugOnly<nsresult> dispatch_ack_rv =
      SchedulerGroup::Dispatch(TaskCategory::Other, event.forget());
#ifdef DEBUG
  if (NS_FAILED(dispatch_ack_rv)) {
    NS_WARNING(
        "Thread shudown ack dispatch failed, the main thread may no longer "
        "be waiting.");
  }
#endif
} else {
  nsresult dispatch_ack_rv =
      context->mJoiningThread->Dispatch(event, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
  MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(dispatch_ack_rv));
}

[Fixed Code]
NotNull<RefPtr<nsThreadShutdownContext>> context =
    WrapNotNull(self->mShutdownContext);
self->mShutdownContext = nullptr;
MOZ_ASSERT(context->mTerminatingThread == self);

RefPtr<nsThread> joiningThread;
{
  auto lock = context->mJoiningThread.Lock();
  joiningThread = lock->forget();
}
if (joiningThread) {
  nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> event = new nsThreadShutdownAckEvent(context);
  nsresult dispatch_ack_rv =
      joiningThread->Dispatch(event, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
  MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(dispatch_ack_rv));
} else {
  NS_WARNING(
      "nsThread exiting after StopWaitingAndLeakThread was called, thread "
      "resources will be leaked!");
}

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Thread Synchronization Vulnerability [xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp] [Lines: 548-590]
[Old Code]
: mEvents(aQueue.get()),
  mEventTarget(
      new ThreadEventTarget(mEvents.get(), aMainThread == MAIN_THREAD)),
  mShutdownContext(nullptr),
  mScriptObserver(nullptr),

[Fixed Code]
: mEvents(aQueue.get()),
  mEventTarget(
      new ThreadEventTarget(mEvents.get(), aMainThread == MAIN_THREAD)),
  mOutstandingShutdownContexts(0),
  mShutdownContext(nullptr),
  mScriptObserver(nullptr),

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Resource Management Vulnerability [xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp] [Lines: 778-816]
[Old Code]
nsThreadShutdownContext* nsThread::ShutdownInternal(bool aSync) {
  MOZ_ASSERT(mEvents);
  MOZ_ASSERT(mEventTarget);
  MOZ_ASSERT(mThread != PR_GetCurrentThread());
  if (NS_WARN_IF(mThread == PR_GetCurrentThread())) {
    return nullptr;
  }

[Fixed Code]
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsThread::BeginShutdown(nsIThreadShutdown** aShutdown) {
  LOG(("THRD(%p) begin shutdown\n", this));

  MOZ_ASSERT(mEvents);
  MOZ_ASSERT(mEventTarget);
  MOZ_ASSERT(mThread != PR_GetCurrentThread());
  if (NS_WARN_IF(mThread == PR_GetCurrentThread())) {
    return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
  }

The changes primarily address:
1. Memory leaks by properly managing shutdown contexts and thread references
2. Thread synchronization issues by adding proper counters for outstanding shutdown contexts
3. Resource management by improving the shutdown sequence and adding proper error handling

The fixes introduce better reference counting (RefPtr), proper cleanup of shutdown contexts, and more robust thread synchronization during shutdown scenarios.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/flow-control.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/flow-control.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/rs-utils.js // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Test Environment Scope Reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/piping/flow-control.any.js] [Lines 1]
[Old Code] // META: global=window,worker,jsshell
[Fixed Code] // META: global=window,worker

Additional Details:
1. The change removes "jsshell" from the test environment scope. While this isn't a direct security vulnerability in the traditional sense, it could potentially affect test coverage if jsshell-specific behaviors needed to be tested.
2. The modification might be related to removing support for or testing of a less secure environment (jsshell), but without more context about why this change was made, we can't be certain about security implications.
3. This appears to be a test file modification rather than production code, so the security impact would be indirect at most.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/version_check/src/date.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/version_check/src/date.rs@@ -25,42 +25,77 @@             .and_then(|date| Date::parse(&date))     }+    /// Parse a release date of the form `%Y-%m-%d`. Returns `None` if `date` is+    /// not in `%Y-%m-%d` format.+    ///+    /// # Example+    ///+    /// ```rust+    /// use version_check::Date;+    ///+    /// let date = Date::parse("2016-04-20").unwrap();+    ///+    /// assert!(date.at_least("2016-01-10"));+    /// assert!(date.at_most("2016-04-20"));+    /// assert!(date.exactly("2016-04-20"));+    ///+    /// assert!(Date::parse("2021-12-31").unwrap().exactly("2021-12-31"));+    ///+    /// assert!(Date::parse("March 13, 2018").is_none());+    /// assert!(Date::parse("1-2-3-4-5").is_none());+    /// assert!(Date::parse("2020-300-23120").is_none());+    /// assert!(Date::parse("2020-12-12 1").is_none());+    /// assert!(Date::parse("2020-10").is_none());+    /// assert!(Date::parse("2020").is_none());+    /// ```+    pub fn parse(date: &str) -> Option<Date> {+        let mut ymd = [0u16; 3];+        for (i, split) in date.split('-').map(|s| s.parse::<u16>()).enumerate() {+            ymd[i] = match (i, split) {+                (3, _) | (_, Err(_)) => return None,+                (_, Ok(v)) => v,+            };+        }++        let (year, month, day) = (ymd[0], ymd[1], ymd[2]);+        if year == 0 || month == 0 || month > 12 || day == 0 || day > 31 {+            return None;+        }++        Some(Date::from_ymd(year, month as u8, day as u8))+    }++    /// Creates a `Date` from `(year, month, day)` date components.+    ///+    /// Does not check the validity of `year`, `month`, or `day`, but `year` is+    /// truncated to 23 bits (% 8,388,608), `month` to 4 bits (% 16), and `day`+    /// to 5 bits (% 32).+    ///+    /// # Example+    ///+    /// ```rust+    /// use version_check::Date;+    ///+    /// assert!(Date::from_ymd(2021, 7, 30).exactly("2021-07-30"));+    /// assert!(Date::from_ymd(2010, 3, 23).exactly("2010-03-23"));+    /// assert!(Date::from_ymd(2090, 1, 31).exactly("2090-01-31"));+    ///+    /// // Truncation: 33 % 32 == 0x21 & 0x1F == 1.+    /// assert!(Date::from_ymd(2090, 1, 33).exactly("2090-01-01"));+    /// ```+    pub fn from_ymd(year: u16, month: u8, day: u8) -> Date {+        let year = (year as u32) << 9;+        let month = ((month as u32) & 0xF) << 5;+        let day = (day as u32) & 0x1F;+        Date(year | month | day)+    }+     /// Return the original (YYYY, MM, DD).     fn to_ymd(&self) -> (u16, u8, u8) {         let y = self.0 >> 9;-        let m = (self.0 << 23) >> 28;-        let d = (self.0 << 27) >> 27;+        let m = (self.0 >> 5) & 0xF;+        let d = self.0 & 0x1F;         (y as u16, m as u8, d as u8)-    }--    /// Parse a release date of the form `%Y-%m-%d`. Returns `None` if `date` is-    /// not in `%Y-%m-%d` format.-    ///-    /// # Example-    ///-    /// ```rust-    /// use version_check::Date;-    ///-    /// let date = Date::parse("2016-04-20").unwrap();-    ///-    /// assert!(date.at_least("2016-01-10"));-    /// assert!(date.at_most("2016-04-20"));-    /// assert!(date.exactly("2016-04-20"));-    ///-    /// assert!(Date::parse("March 13, 2018").is_none());-    /// assert!(Date::parse("1-2-3-4-5").is_none());-    /// ```-    pub fn parse(date: &str) -> Option<Date> {-        let ymd: Vec<u32> = date.split("-")-            .filter_map(|s| s.parse::<u32>().ok())-            .collect();--        if ymd.len() != 3 {-            return None-        }--        let (y, m, d) = (ymd[0], ymd[1], ymd[2]);-        Some(Date((y << 9) | ((m & 0xF) << 5) | (d & 0x1F)))     }     /// Returns `true` if `self` occurs on or after `date`.@@ -163,5 +198,6 @@         reflexive_display!("2000-12-31");         reflexive_display!("2090-12-31");         reflexive_display!("1999-02-19");+        reflexive_display!("9999-12-31");     } }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Integer Overflow/Underflow] [third_party/rust/version_check/src/date.rs] [Lines 25-77]
[Old Code]
The old code didn't have explicit validation for date components and used bit shifting operations that might be less clear
[Fixed Code]
The new code adds explicit validation for date components (year, month, day) and improves bit manipulation safety with clearer operations

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Input Validation Bypass] [third_party/rust/version_check/src/date.rs] [Lines 25-77]
[Old Code]
The old parsing was more lenient, only checking for 3 components and successful parsing
[Fixed Code]
The new code adds stricter validation including:
- Checking for exactly 3 components
- Validating month (1-12) and day (1-31) ranges
- Explicitly handling parsing errors
- Rejecting invalid formats more thoroughly

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Bit Manipulation Issue] [third_party/rust/version_check/src/date.rs] [Lines 83-85, 93-95]
[Old Code]
Used more complex bit shifting operations that might be harder to verify
[Fixed Code]
Simplified bit operations with clearer masking (using & 0xF and & 0x1F)

The changes appear to improve security by:
1. Adding more rigorous input validation
2. Making bit manipulation operations clearer and potentially safer
3. Handling edge cases more explicitly
4. Adding documentation about truncation behavior

However, without knowing the specific context of how this code is used, I can't definitively say these were fixing actual vulnerabilities versus just improving code quality and safety. The changes are security-related improvements, but may not be fixing specific known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativedest.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.negativedest.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,16 +32,16 @@     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 100, 78, 50, 50, 0, 50, 50, -50);         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 100, 128, 50, -50, 100, 50, -50, -50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,1, 0,255,0,255, "51,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 51,48, 0,255,0,255, "51,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,1, 0,255,0,255, "51,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 51,48, 0,255,0,255, "51,48", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating all references to this variable accordingly. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 14-15, 32-42]
Old Code:
```
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);
```
Fixed Code:
```
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255", 2);
```

This appears to be a code style/readability change rather than a security fix. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cross.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cross.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(110, 60); ctx.lineTo(100, 60); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't affect security. Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cross.worker.js] [Lines 13-26]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.h@@ -56,11 +56,7 @@   // GMPSharedMemManager   bool Alloc(size_t aSize, Shmem::SharedMemory::SharedMemoryType aType,              Shmem* aMem) override {-#ifdef GMP_SAFE_SHMEM     return AllocShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);-#else-    return AllocUnsafeShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);-#endif   }   void Dealloc(Shmem&& aMem) override { DeallocShmem(aMem); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Use of Unsafe Shared Memory [File] dom/media/gmp/GMPVideoDecoderParent.h [Lines 56-60]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
#ifdef GMP_SAFE_SHMEM
    return AllocShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);
#else
    return AllocUnsafeShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);
#endif
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
return AllocShmem(aSize, aType, aMem);
```

Additional Details:  
1. The vulnerability involves the use of potentially unsafe shared memory allocation (`AllocUnsafeShmem`) when `GMP_SAFE_SHMEM` is not defined.  
2. The fix removes the conditional compilation and always uses the safer `AllocShmem` function, which is more secure for inter-process communication.  
3. This appears to be a security hardening change to eliminate the possibility of using unsafe shared memory operations.  

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.