--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/connection_server.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/connection_server.rs@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ // except according to those terms. use crate::connection::{Http3Connection, Http3State};-use crate::hframe::HFrame;+use crate::frames::HFrame; use crate::recv_message::{RecvMessage, RecvMessageInfo}; use crate::send_message::SendMessage; use crate::server_connection_events::{Http3ServerConnEvent, Http3ServerConnEvents};@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@         }     }+    #[must_use]+    pub fn state(&self) -> Http3State {+        self.base_handler.state()+    }+     /// Supply a response for a request.     /// # Errors     /// `InvalidStreamId` if the stream does not exist,@@ -146,6 +151,24 @@         )     }+    /// Close `WebTransport` cleanly+    /// # Errors+    /// `InvalidStreamId` if the stream does not exist,+    /// `TransportStreamDoesNotExist` if the transport stream does not exist (this may happen if `process_output`+    /// has not been called when needed, and HTTP3 layer has not picked up the info that the stream has been closed.)+    /// `InvalidInput` if an empty buffer has been supplied.+    pub fn webtransport_close_session(+        &mut self,+        conn: &mut Connection,+        session_id: StreamId,+        error: u32,+        message: &str,+    ) -> Res<()> {+        self.needs_processing = true;+        self.base_handler+            .webtransport_close_session(conn, session_id, error, message)+    }+     pub fn webtransport_create_stream(         &mut self,         conn: &mut Connection,@@ -187,7 +210,7 @@             self.needs_processing = false;             return true;         }-        self.base_handler.has_data_to_send() | self.events.has_events()+        self.base_handler.has_data_to_send() || self.events.has_events()     }     // This function takes the provided result and check for an error.

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Integer Overflow/Underflow Vulnerability [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/connection_server.rs] [Lines 146-168]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of webtransport_close_session)
[Fixed Code]
pub fn webtransport_close_session(
    &mut self,
    conn: &mut Connection,
    session_id: StreamId,
    error: u32,
    message: &str,
) -> Res<()> {
    self.needs_processing = true;
    self.base_handler
        .webtransport_close_session(conn, session_id, error, message)
}

Additional Details: The addition of webtransport_close_session with an unsigned error code (u32) could potentially lead to integer overflow/underflow issues if not properly validated. The function should validate the error code range.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Logical Operator Vulnerability [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/connection_server.rs] [Lines 187-190]
[Old Code]
self.base_handler.has_data_to_send() | self.events.has_events()
[Fixed Code]
self.base_handler.has_data_to_send() || self.events.has_events()

Additional Details: The change from bitwise OR (|) to logical OR (||) fixes a potential logical error that could lead to incorrect boolean evaluations. While not a direct security vulnerability, incorrect logic could lead to security-relevant behavior.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Exposure [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/connection_server.rs] [Lines 40-43]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of state() method)
[Fixed Code]
#[must_use]
pub fn state(&self) -> Http3State {
    self.base_handler.state()
}

Additional Details: The new state() method exposes internal state information which could potentially be used by an attacker to gain information about the connection state. However, without more context about how this is used, I'm not certain if this constitutes a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/streams/UnderlyingSourceCallbackHelpers.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/streams/UnderlyingSourceCallbackHelpers.cpp@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */+#include "mozilla/dom/BodyStream.h" #include "mozilla/dom/UnderlyingSourceCallbackHelpers.h" #include "mozilla/dom/UnderlyingSourceBinding.h"@@ -68,6 +69,19 @@                           UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(IDLUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper)+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END_INHERITING(UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper)++// BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper,+                         mUnderlyingSource)++NS_IMPL_ADDREF_INHERITED(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper,+                         UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper)+NS_IMPL_RELEASE_INHERITED(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper,+                          UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper)++NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(+    BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END_INHERITING(UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper) // UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper@@ -111,6 +125,27 @@ NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(IDLUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END_INHERITING(UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper)+// UnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION(UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ADDREF(UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_RELEASE(UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)+  NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsISupports)+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END++// BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper,+                         mUnderlyingSource)++NS_IMPL_ADDREF_INHERITED(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper,+                         UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper)+NS_IMPL_RELEASE_INHERITED(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper,+                          UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper)++NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(+    BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper)+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END_INHERITING(UnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper)+ void UnderlyingSourceStartCallbackHelper::StartCallback(     JSContext* aCx, ReadableStreamController& aController,     JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> aRetVal, ErrorResult& aRv) {@@ -150,6 +185,18 @@   return promise.forget(); }+BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper::+    BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper(+        BodyStreamHolder* underlyingSource)+    : mUnderlyingSource(underlyingSource) {}++already_AddRefed<Promise>+BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper::PullCallback(+    JSContext* aCx, ReadableStreamController& aController, ErrorResult& aRv) {+  RefPtr<BodyStream> bodyStream = mUnderlyingSource->GetBodyStream();+  return bodyStream->PullCallback(aCx, aController, aRv);+}+ already_AddRefed<Promise> IDLUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper::CancelCallback(     JSContext* aCx, const Optional<JS::Handle<JS::Value>>& aReason,@@ -165,4 +212,40 @@   return promise.forget(); }+BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper::+    BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper(+        BodyStreamHolder* aUnderlyingSource)+    : mUnderlyingSource(aUnderlyingSource) {}++already_AddRefed<Promise>+BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper::CancelCallback(+    JSContext* aCx, const Optional<JS::Handle<JS::Value>>& aReason,+    ErrorResult& aRv) {+  RefPtr<BodyStream> bodyStream = mUnderlyingSource->GetBodyStream();+  return bodyStream->CancelCallback(aCx, aReason, aRv);+}++// BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper,+                         mUnderlyingSource)++NS_IMPL_ADDREF_INHERITED(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper,+                         UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)+NS_IMPL_RELEASE_INHERITED(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper,+                          UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)++NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(+    BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END_INHERITING(UnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper)++BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper::+    BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper(+        BodyStreamHolder* aUnderlyingSource)+    : mUnderlyingSource(aUnderlyingSource) {}++void BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper::Call() {+  RefPtr<BodyStream> bodyStream = mUnderlyingSource->GetBodyStream();+  bodyStream->ErrorCallback();+}+ }  // namespace mozilla::dom

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily adding new functionality related to BodyStream handling rather than fixing security issues. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found - File: dom/streams/UnderlyingSourceCallbackHelpers.cpp
   The changes mainly add new classes and methods for BodyStream handling:
   - Added BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper
   - Added BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceCancelCallbackHelper
   - Added BodyStreamUnderlyingSourceErrorCallbackHelper
   These appear to be new features rather than security fixes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential memory management consideration - File: dom/streams/UnderlyingSourceCallbackHelpers.cpp
   The code adds cycle collection for new classes which helps prevent memory leaks, but this appears to be standard practice rather than fixing a specific vulnerability:
   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION(BodyStreamUnderlyingSourcePullCallbackHelper,
                         mUnderlyingSource)
   While this improves memory safety, it's not clear if it's fixing a specific vulnerability.

The changes seem focused on extending functionality for BodyStream support with proper memory management patterns, rather than addressing specific security vulnerabilities. The cycle collection additions are good practices for preventing memory leaks, but don't appear to be fixing any known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/src/address.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/src/address.rs@@ -195,74 +195,5 @@ } #[cfg(test)]-mod tests {-    use self::url::ParseError;-    use super::*;-    use std::error::Error;-    use std::net::{AddrParseError, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};--    #[derive(Debug)]-    enum ParseTestError {-        Host(ParseError),-        Ip(AddrParseError),-    }-    impl fmt::Display for ParseTestError {-        fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {-            match self {-                ParseTestError::Host(inner) => inner.fmt(f),-                ParseTestError::Ip(inner) => inner.fmt(f),-            }-        }-    }-    impl From<ParseError> for ParseTestError {-        fn from(err: ParseError) -> Self {-            ParseTestError::Host(err)-        }-    }-    impl From<AddrParseError> for ParseTestError {-        fn from(err: AddrParseError) -> Self {-            ParseTestError::Ip(err)-        }-    }-    impl Error for ParseTestError {-        fn source(&self) -> Option<&(dyn Error + 'static)> {-            // Generic error, underlying cause isn't tracked.-            match self {-                ParseTestError::Host(a) => Some(a),-                ParseTestError::Ip(a) => Some(a),-            }-        }-    }-    #[test]-    fn test_domain_name_parsing() -> Result<(), ParseTestError> {-        let address = Host::parse("this.is.a.fqdn")?;-        if let Host::Domain(domain) = address {-            assert_eq!(domain, "this.is.a.fqdn");-        } else {-            panic!();-        }-        Ok(())-    }--    #[test]-    fn test_ipv4_address_parsing() -> Result<(), ParseTestError> {-        let address = Host::parse("1.0.0.1")?;-        if let Host::Ipv4(ip) = address {-            assert_eq!(ip, "1.0.0.1".parse::<Ipv4Addr>()?);-        } else {-            panic!();-        }-        Ok(())-    }--    #[test]-    fn test_ipv6_address_parsing() -> Result<(), ParseTestError> {-        let address = Host::parse("[::1]")?;-        if let Host::Ipv6(ip) = address {-            assert_eq!(ip, "::1".parse::<Ipv6Addr>()?);-        } else {-            panic!();-        }-        Ok(())-    }-}+#[path = "./address_tests.rs"]+mod address_tests;

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be purely structural, moving test code to a separate file rather than addressing any security issues.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found - test code reorganization [File] [Lines]
    [Old Code: Entire test module was inline]
    [Fixed Code: Test module moved to external file address_tests.rs]

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows a refactoring where test code was moved from being inline in the address.rs file to a separate address_tests.rs file
- This appears to be a code organization/maintainability change rather than a security fix
- No changes were made to the actual test logic or functionality
- No security-related code was modified in this diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/lint/hooks_js_format.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/lint/hooks_js_format.py@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ topsrcdir = os.path.join(here, os.pardir, os.pardir) EXTRA_PATHS = (+    "python/mach",+    "python/mozbuild",     "python/mozversioncontrol",-    "python/mozbuild",     "testing/mozbase/mozfile",     "third_party/python/jsmin", )@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@     path_list = []     for filename in sorted(changedFiles):         # Ignore files unsupported in eslint and prettier-        if filename.decode().endswith(extensions):+        if filename.endswith(extensions):             path_list.append(filename)     if not path_list:@@ -67,7 +68,8 @@     try:         changedFiles = check_output(-            ["git", "diff", "--staged", "--diff-filter=d", "--name-only", "HEAD"]+            ["git", "diff", "--staged", "--diff-filter=d", "--name-only", "HEAD"],+            text=True,         ).split()         # TODO we should detect if we are in a "add -p" mode and show a warning         return run_js_format(hooktype, changedFiles)

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Encoding Issue [tools/lint/hooks_js_format.py] [Lines 36-37]
    [Old Code]
    if filename.decode().endswith(extensions):
    [Fixed Code]
    if filename.endswith(extensions):
    Additional Details: The removal of .decode() suggests the input is now properly handled as text, but it's unclear if this was specifically fixing a security issue or just a code improvement.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Command Injection [tools/lint/hooks_js_format.py] [Lines 67-69]
    [Old Code]
    changedFiles = check_output(
        ["git", "diff", "--staged", "--diff-filter=d", "--name-only", "HEAD"]
    ).split()
    [Fixed Code]
    changedFiles = check_output(
        ["git", "diff", "--staged", "--diff-filter=d", "--name-only", "HEAD"],
        text=True,
    ).split()
    Additional Details: The addition of text=True parameter suggests better handling of command output, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability or just improving reliability.

Note: While these changes appear to be improvements in code quality and reliability, I cannot definitively state they were fixing specific security vulnerabilities without more context about the threat model or previous issues. The changes seem more related to proper string handling than direct security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/atk/nsMaiInterfaceComponent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/atk/nsMaiInterfaceComponent.cpp@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@       node = browser->GetOwnerElement();     }     MOZ_ASSERT(node);-    nsIntPoint winCoords = nsCoreUtils::GetScreenCoordsForWindow(node);+    mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint winCoords =+        nsCoreUtils::GetScreenCoordsForWindow(node);     aX += winCoords.x;     aY += winCoords.y;   }@@ -138,11 +139,11 @@       return;     }-    nsIntRect screenRect = accWrap->Bounds();+    mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntRect screenRect = accWrap->Bounds();     if (screenRect.IsEmpty()) return;     if (aCoordType == ATK_XY_WINDOW) {-      nsIntPoint winCoords =+      mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint winCoords =           nsCoreUtils::GetScreenCoordsForWindow(accWrap->GetNode());       screenRect.x -= winCoords.x;       screenRect.y -= winCoords.y;

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Integer Overflow/Type Safety Issue] [accessible/atk/nsMaiInterfaceComponent.cpp] [Lines 105-106, 138-139, 144-145]
[Old Code]
nsIntPoint winCoords = nsCoreUtils::GetScreenCoordsForWindow(node);
nsIntRect screenRect = accWrap->Bounds();
nsIntPoint winCoords = nsCoreUtils::GetScreenCoordsForWindow(accWrap->GetNode());
[Fixed Code]
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint winCoords = nsCoreUtils::GetScreenCoordsForWindow(node);
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntRect screenRect = accWrap->Bounds();
mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint winCoords = nsCoreUtils::GetScreenCoordsForWindow(accWrap->GetNode());

Additional Details:
The changes involve replacing `nsIntPoint` and `nsIntRect` with `mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntPoint` and `mozilla::LayoutDeviceIntRect`. While this doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability, it might be addressing potential type safety issues or integer overflow concerns by using more specific types. The change could be part of a broader effort to improve type safety and prevent potential arithmetic overflow issues when dealing with screen coordinates. However, without more context, I can't definitively say this was fixing a security vulnerability.

Note: There are no clearly identified vulnerabilities like buffer overflow, XSS, etc. in this diff. The changes appear to be more about type safety and code modernization than fixing specific security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-3.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(360120, 100%, 50%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(360120, 100%, 50%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(360120, 100%, 50%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`), with no security implications. The test logic remains identical, just using a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities are introduced or fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/CanvasDrawEventRecorder.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/CanvasDrawEventRecorder.cpp@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <string.h>+#include "mozilla/layers/SharedSurfacesChild.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h" namespace mozilla {@@ -501,6 +502,18 @@   mWrite->returnCount = readCount; }+void CanvasDrawEventRecorder::StoreSourceSurfaceRecording(+    gfx::SourceSurface* aSurface, const char* aReason) {+  wr::ExternalImageId extId{};+  nsresult rv = layers::SharedSurfacesChild::Share(aSurface, extId);+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {+    DrawEventRecorderPrivate::StoreSourceSurfaceRecording(aSurface, aReason);+    return;+  }++  StoreExternalSurfaceRecording(aSurface, wr::AsUint64(extId));+}+ void CanvasDrawEventRecorder::RecordSourceSurfaceDestruction(void* aSurface) {   // We must only record things on the main thread and surfaces that have been   // recorded can sometimes be destroyed off the main thread.

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [gfx/layers/CanvasDrawEventRecorder.cpp] [Lines 501-518]
   [Old Code: No explicit handling of surface sharing]
   [Fixed Code: Added StoreSourceSurfaceRecording method with proper surface sharing and fallback]

Additional Notes:
- The diff adds a new method `StoreSourceSurfaceRecording` that properly handles surface sharing through `SharedSurfacesChild::Share`
- The change appears to improve security by:
  1. Adding proper surface sharing mechanism
  2. Including a fallback to the base class implementation if sharing fails
  3. Explicitly handling external surface recording
- While not clearly fixing a specific known vulnerability, this change improves memory safety by ensuring surfaces are properly managed when recorded
- The change might be related to preventing potential use-after-free or memory management issues with canvas surfaces

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/benches/crossbeam.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/benches/crossbeam.rs@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@     #[bench]     fn create(b: &mut Bencher) {-        b.iter(|| unbounded::<i32>());+        b.iter(unbounded::<i32>);     }     #[bench]

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability [File] third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/benches/crossbeam.rs [Lines] 13  
   [Old Code]  
   `b.iter(|| unbounded::<i32>());`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `b.iter(unbounded::<i32>);`  

Additional Details:  
- The change appears to be a performance optimization rather than a security fix  
- The modification simplifies the closure syntax by removing unnecessary closure wrapping  
- Benchmarks typically don't contain security vulnerabilities as they're test code  
- No known vulnerability patterns (e.g., memory safety, injection) are present in this change  

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely syntactical/performance-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.winding.subtract.3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.winding.subtract.3.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(100, 50); ctx.lineTo(100, 0); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better clarity/consistency. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 34]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't appear to address any security issues but rather improves code consistency or readability. No security-related vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1503406.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1503406.js@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") let g = newGlobal(); let reader = g.eval(`     let stream = new ReadableStream({

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Feature Check] [js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1503406.js] [Lines 1]  
   [Old Code]  
   `let g = newGlobal();`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream")`  
   `let g = newGlobal();`  

   Additional Details:  
   The fix adds a conditional skip for the test case if the environment doesn't have the ReadableStream property. While this isn't a direct security vulnerability fix, it prevents potential runtime errors in environments lacking this feature. The original code might have caused issues when running in environments without ReadableStream support.

Note: The diff shows only a test file modification, and test files typically don't contain production vulnerabilities. The change appears to be a test reliability improvement rather than a security fix. No clear security vulnerability is being addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/MediaTransportHandlerIPC.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/MediaTransportHandlerIPC.cpp@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@               __func__);         }         MediaTransportChild* child = new MediaTransportChild(this);-        actor->SetEventTargetForActor(child, mCallbackThread);         // PBackgroungChild owns mChild! When it is done with it,         // mChild will let us know it it going away.         mChild = actor->SendPMediaTransportConstructor(child);

I'll analyze the code diff according to the provided format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition or Improper Actor Initialization] [dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/MediaTransportHandlerIPC.cpp] [Lines 40-43]
[Old Code]
        MediaTransportChild* child = new MediaTransportChild(this);
        actor->SetEventTargetForActor(child, mCallbackThread);
        // PBackgroungChild owns mChild! When it is done with it,
        // mChild will let us know it it going away.
        mChild = actor->SendPMediaTransportConstructor(child);
[Fixed Code]
        MediaTransportChild* child = new MediaTransportChild(this);
        // PBackgroungChild owns mChild! When it is done with it,
        // mChild will let us know it it going away.
        mChild = actor->SendPMediaTransportConstructor(child);

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows removal of `actor->SetEventTargetForActor(child, mCallbackThread)`
2. This could potentially be related to thread synchronization or actor initialization timing
3. Without more context, it's unclear if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a code cleanup
4. The change might be related to ensuring proper actor initialization sequence or preventing race conditions in message handling

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-036.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-036.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-circle-036-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the basic shape circle() value.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff only shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The change doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

Since this is just removing an unused meta tag from an HTML test file, there doesn't appear to be any security implication in this change. The modification seems to be purely for code cleanup purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/transport/mdns_service/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/transport/mdns_service/src/lib.rs@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@     hosts: &mut HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>,     pending_queries: &mut HashMap<String, Query>, ) -> bool {-     // Record a simple marker to see how often this is called.     gecko_profiler::add_untyped_marker(         "handle_mdns_socket",

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [dom/media/webrtc/transport/mdns_service/src/lib.rs] [Lines 204-207]
[Old Code]
    hosts: &mut HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>,
    pending_queries: &mut HashMap<String, Query>,
) -> bool {

    // Record a simple marker to see how often this is called.
[Fixed Code]
    hosts: &mut HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>,
    pending_queries: &mut HashMap<String, Query>,
) -> bool {
    // Record a simple marker to see how often this is called.

The change simply removes an extra blank line before a comment. This appears to be purely a code style/formatting change with no security implications. There's no indication of any vulnerability being fixed in this change.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff snippet. The change doesn't affect any security-critical functionality, memory handling, input validation, or other common security-sensitive areas.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/CacheIR.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/CacheIR.h@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@     RawInt64,     First64BitType = RawInt64,     Value,+    Double,     Limit   };

Let me analyze the code diff according to the provided format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Type Confusion] [js/src/jit/CacheIR.h] [Lines 243-248]
[Old Code]
    RawInt64,
    First64BitType = RawInt64,
    Value,

[Fixed Code]
    RawInt64,
    First64BitType = RawInt64,
    Value,
    Double,

Additional Details:
1. The diff adds a new `Double` type to an enum that appears to be used for type representation in Firefox's JavaScript JIT compiler (CacheIR).
2. While this could potentially relate to type confusion vulnerabilities (a common issue in JIT compilers), there's not enough context to confirm if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just adding new functionality.
3. The addition of proper Double type handling might prevent potential type confusion issues that could occur when dealing with floating-point numbers.
4. Without more context about how this enum is used, we can't be certain if this was fixing an existing vulnerability or just extending functionality.

Note: This could potentially be related to security hardening, but the diff alone doesn't provide enough evidence of a specific vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/video-encoder.https.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/video-encoder.https.any.js@@ -1,33 +1,13 @@ // META: global=window,dedicatedworker // META: script=/common/media.js // META: script=/webcodecs/utils.js+// META: script=/webcodecs/video-encoder-utils.js const defaultConfig = {   codec: 'vp8',   width: 640,   height: 480 };--let bitmap_blob = null;--async function generateBitmap(width, height) {-  if (!bitmap_blob) {-    let response = await fetch("pattern.png");-    bitmap_blob = await response.blob();-  }--  var size = {-    resizeWidth: width,-    resizeHeight: height-  };--  return createImageBitmap(bitmap_blob, size);-}--async function createVideoFrame(width, height, timestamp) {-  let bitmap = await generateBitmap(width, height);-  return new VideoFrame(bitmap, { timestamp: timestamp });-} promise_test(t => {   // VideoEncoderInit lacks required fields.@@ -81,8 +61,8 @@   let encoder = new VideoEncoder(codecInit);   encoder.configure(encoderConfig);-  let frame1 = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 0);-  let frame2 = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 33333);+  let frame1 = createFrame(640, 480, 0);+  let frame2 = createFrame(640, 480, 33333);   encoder.encode(frame1);   encoder.encode(frame2);@@ -129,17 +109,15 @@   const frames_count = 100;   let frames = [];   for (let i = 0; i < frames_count; i++) {-    let frame = await createVideoFrame(320, 200, i * 16000);+    let frame = createFrame(320, 200, i * 16000);     frames.push(frame);   }   for (let frame of frames)     encoder.encode(frame);-  // Some encodes should have already started being processed, but not all-  // 100 of them.   assert_greater_than(encoder.encodeQueueSize, 0);-  assert_less_than(encoder.encodeQueueSize, frames_count);+  assert_less_than_equal(encoder.encodeQueueSize, frames_count);   await encoder.flush();   // We can guarantee that all encodes are processed after a flush.@@ -163,7 +141,7 @@   const timestamp_step = 40000;   const expected_callbacks_before_reset = 3;   let codecInit = getDefaultCodecInit(t);-  let bitmap = await generateBitmap(320, 200);+  let original = createFrame(320, 200, 0);   let encoder = null;   let reset_completed = false;   codecInit.output = (chunk, metadata) => {@@ -188,7 +166,7 @@   // and make sure no more chunks are emitted afterwards.   let encodes_before_reset = expected_callbacks_before_reset * 10;   for (let i = 0; i < encodes_before_reset; i++) {-    let frame = new VideoFrame(bitmap, { timestamp: timestamp });+    let frame = new VideoFrame(original, { timestamp: timestamp });     timestamp += timestamp_step;     encoder.encode(frame);     frame.close();@@ -208,7 +186,7 @@   const frames_after_reset = 5;   for (let i = 0; i < frames_after_reset; i++) {-    let frame = await createVideoFrame(800, 600, timestamp + 1);+    let frame = createFrame(800, 600, timestamp + 1);     timestamp += timestamp_step;     encoder.encode(frame);     frame.close();@@ -236,8 +214,8 @@   encoder.configure(config);-  let frame1 = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 0);-  let frame2 = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 33333);+  let frame1 = createFrame(640, 480, 0);+  let frame2 = createFrame(640, 480, 33333);   encoder.encode(frame1);   encoder.configure(config);@@ -247,16 +225,16 @@   await encoder.flush();   // We can guarantee that all encodes are processed after a flush.-  assert_equals(encoder.encodeQueueSize, 0);--  assert_true(output_chunks.length == 2);+  assert_equals(encoder.encodeQueueSize, 0, "queue size after encode");++  assert_equals(output_chunks.length, 2, "number of chunks");   assert_equals(output_chunks[0].timestamp, frame1.timestamp);   assert_equals(output_chunks[1].timestamp, frame2.timestamp);   output_chunks = [];-  let frame3 = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 66666);-  let frame4 = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 100000);+  let frame3 = createFrame(640, 480, 66666);+  let frame4 = createFrame(640, 480, 100000);   encoder.encode(frame3);@@ -276,7 +254,7 @@ promise_test(async t => {   let encoder = new VideoEncoder(getDefaultCodecInit(t));-  let frame = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 0);+  let frame = createFrame(640, 480, 0);   return testClosedCodec(t, encoder, defaultConfig, frame); }, 'Verify closed VideoEncoder operations');@@ -284,7 +262,7 @@ promise_test(async t => {   let encoder = new VideoEncoder(getDefaultCodecInit(t));-  let frame = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 0);+  let frame = createFrame(640, 480, 0);   return testUnconfiguredCodec(t, encoder, frame); }, 'Verify unconfigured VideoEncoder operations');@@ -292,7 +270,7 @@ promise_test(async t => {   let encoder = new VideoEncoder(getDefaultCodecInit(t));-  let frame = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, 0);+  let frame = createFrame(640, 480, 0);   frame.close();   encoder.configure(defaultConfig);@@ -311,7 +289,7 @@   let config = defaultConfig;   encoder.configure(config);-  let frame = await createVideoFrame(640, 480, -10000);+  let frame = createFrame(640, 480, -10000);   encoder.encode(frame);   frame.close();   await encoder.flush();

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily refactoring and test improvements rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The changes mainly involve:
   - Removing the local `generateBitmap` and `createVideoFrame` functions in favor of a shared utility (`video-encoder-utils.js`)
   - Updating test assertions to be more precise
   - Adding more descriptive assertion messages
   - No security-related changes were made

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The diff shows test improvements including:
   - Changing assert_less_than to assert_less_than_equal for encodeQueueSize check
   - Adding more descriptive error messages to assertions
   - No security implications in these changes

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The removal of the bitmap_blob variable and related functions:
   - This was test code cleanup
   - No security implications as it was just moving functionality to a shared utility file

The changes appear to be focused on:
1. Code organization (moving common functions to a shared utility)
2. Test reliability improvements
3. Better assertion messages
4. No actual security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff

The most significant change is the removal of local test helper functions in favor of shared utilities, which improves maintainability but doesn't impact security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-5.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-5.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ p[title] { background-color : lime }]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p title="title">This paragraph should have a green background because its TITLE

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-5.xml] [Lines 6]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: [removed]]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any apparent purpose
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The modification appears to be a cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with empty meta tags in this context

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-image-gradient-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-image-gradient-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-background-image-gradient-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> p {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-image-gradient-1.html] [Lines 5]
   [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
   [Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata rather than security-related code.
- There's no indication this was related to any security vulnerability.
- The change is more likely related to test cleanup or maintenance rather than security fixes.
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/content/widgets/videocontrols.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/content/widgets/videocontrols.js@@ -1802,6 +1802,7 @@         var attrName = aPaused ? "playlabel" : "pauselabel";         var value = this.playButton.getAttribute(attrName);         this.playButton.setAttribute("aria-label", value);+        this.clickToPlay.setAttribute("aria-label", value);       },       get isEffectivelyMuted() {

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential ARIA Accessibility Issue] [toolkit/content/widgets/videocontrols.js] [Lines 1802-1806]
[Old Code]
        var attrName = aPaused ? "playlabel" : "pauselabel";
        var value = this.playButton.getAttribute(attrName);
        this.playButton.setAttribute("aria-label", value);
[Fixed Code]
        var attrName = aPaused ? "playlabel" : "pauselabel";
        var value = this.playButton.getAttribute(attrName);
        this.playButton.setAttribute("aria-label", value);
        this.clickToPlay.setAttribute("aria-label", value);

Additional Details:
The change adds an aria-label attribute to the clickToPlay element, matching what was already being done for the playButton. While this improves accessibility, I'm not certain if the lack of this attribute previously constituted a security vulnerability or just an accessibility issue. The change ensures better screen reader support by providing proper labels for both interactive elements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/tools/mach_test_package_initialize.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/tools/mach_test_package_initialize.py@@ -46,17 +46,6 @@     "xpcshell", ]-# Individual files providing mach commands.-MACH_MODULES = [-    "gtest/mach_test_package_commands.py",-    "marionette/mach_test_package_commands.py",-    "mochitest/mach_test_package_commands.py",-    "reftest/mach_test_package_commands.py",-    "tools/mach/mach/commands/commandinfo.py",-    "web-platform/mach_test_package_commands.py",-    "xpcshell/mach_test_package_commands.py",-]- CATEGORIES = {     "testing": {@@ -179,6 +168,35 @@     sys.path[0:0] = [os.path.join(test_package_root, path) for path in SEARCH_PATHS]     import mach.main+    from mach.main import MachCommandReference++    # Centralized registry of available mach commands+    MACH_COMMANDS = {+        "gtest": MachCommandReference("gtest/mach_test_package_commands.py"),+        "marionette-test": MachCommandReference(+            "marionette/mach_test_package_commands.py"+        ),+        "mochitest": MachCommandReference("mochitest/mach_test_package_commands.py"),+        "geckoview-junit": MachCommandReference(+            "mochitest/mach_test_package_commands.py"+        ),+        "reftest": MachCommandReference("reftest/mach_test_package_commands.py"),+        "mach-commands": MachCommandReference(+            "python/mach/mach/commands/commandinfo.py"+        ),+        "mach-debug-commands": MachCommandReference(+            "python/mach/mach/commands/commandinfo.py"+        ),+        "mach-completion": MachCommandReference(+            "python/mach/mach/commands/commandinfo.py"+        ),+        "web-platform-tests": MachCommandReference(+            "web-platform/mach_test_package_commands.py"+        ),+        "wpt": MachCommandReference("web-platform/mach_test_package_commands.py"),+        "xpcshell-test": MachCommandReference("xpcshell/mach_test_package_commands.py"),+    }+     def populate_context(context, key=None):         # These values will be set lazily, and cached after first being invoked.         if key == "package_root":@@ -227,12 +245,8 @@     for category, meta in CATEGORIES.items():         mach.define_category(category, meta["short"], meta["long"], meta["priority"])-    for path in MACH_MODULES:-        cmdfile = os.path.join(test_package_root, path)--        # Depending on which test zips were extracted,-        # the command module might not exist-        if os.path.isfile(cmdfile):-            mach.load_commands_from_file(cmdfile)+    # Depending on which test zips were extracted,+    # the command module might not exist+    mach.load_commands_from_spec(MACH_COMMANDS, test_package_root, missing_ok=True)     return mach

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Command Injection] [testing/tools/mach_test_package_initialize.py] [Lines 46-54 removed, 168-196 added]
   [Old Code]
   MACH_MODULES = [
       "gtest/mach_test_package_commands.py",
       "marionette/mach_test_package_commands.py",
       "mochitest/mach_test_package_commands.py",
       "reftest/mach_test_package_commands.py",
       "tools/mach/mach/commands/commandinfo.py",
       "web-platform/mach_test_package_commands.py",
       "xpcshell/mach_test_package_commands.py",
   ]
   
   [Fixed Code]
   MACH_COMMANDS = {
       "gtest": MachCommandReference("gtest/mach_test_package_commands.py"),
       "marionette-test": MachCommandReference("marionette/mach_test_package_commands.py"),
       ...
   }

   Additional Details: The change moves from a direct file path list to using MachCommandReference objects, which might provide better path handling and validation, though it's not clear if this was specifically for security reasons.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential File Existence Check Bypass] [testing/tools/mach_test_package_initialize.py] [Lines 227-231 removed, 245 added]
   [Old Code]
   for path in MACH_MODULES:
       cmdfile = os.path.join(test_package_root, path)
       if os.path.isfile(cmdfile):
           mach.load_commands_from_file(cmdfile)
   
   [Fixed Code]
   mach.load_commands_from_spec(MACH_COMMANDS, test_package_root, missing_ok=True)
   
   Additional Details: The new version uses a more robust command loading mechanism with explicit handling of missing files, which could prevent potential issues with file path handling.

Note: While these changes appear to improve the robustness of the code, I couldn't identify any specific, named vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes seem more like architectural improvements than direct security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.skewed.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.skewed.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Create green with a red square ring inside it ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ for (var i = 0; i < pts.length; ++i)     ctx.lineTo(pts[i][0], pts[i][1]); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,11, 0,255,0,255, "21,11", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,11, 0,255,0,255, "79,11", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 21,39, 0,255,0,255, "21,39", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,39, 0,255,0,255, "79,39", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 39,19, 0,255,0,255, "39,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 61,19, 0,255,0,255, "61,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 39,31, 0,255,0,255, "39,31", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 61,31, 0,255,0,255, "61,31", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,11, 0,255,0,255, "21,11", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,11, 0,255,0,255, "79,11", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 21,39, 0,255,0,255, "21,39", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,39, 0,255,0,255, "79,39", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 39,19, 0,255,0,255, "39,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 61,19, 0,255,0,255, "61,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 39,31, 0,255,0,255, "39,31", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 61,31, 0,255,0,255, "61,31", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are purely variable renaming (offscreenCanvas to canvas) and corresponding updates to assertions. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

Additional Details:
- The changes consist of:
  1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` in line 17-18
  2. Updating all `_assertPixel` calls to use the new variable name (lines 40-47)
- No security-related patterns were modified (no input validation changes, no security-sensitive operations modified)
- The test functionality remains identical, only the variable name was changed for consistency or readability

The diff shows no evidence of any security vulnerabilities being addressed. This appears to be a routine maintenance change rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.