--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
   Old Code: 
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.basic.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.basic.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.rect(0, 0, 20, 20); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(10, 10), true, "ctx.isPointInPath(10, 10)", "true");

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.basic.1.html] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, simply renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security implications in this change, and no known vulnerabilities are being addressed. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/gtk3drawing.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/gtk3drawing.cpp@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ static gboolean checkbox_check_state; static gboolean notebook_has_tab_gap;-static ScrollbarGTKMetrics sScrollbarMetrics[2];-static ScrollbarGTKMetrics sActiveScrollbarMetrics[2]; static ToggleGTKMetrics sCheckboxMetrics; static ToggleGTKMetrics sRadioMetrics; static ToggleGTKMetrics sMenuRadioMetrics;@@ -59,24 +57,6 @@ } #endif-static GtkBorder operator-(const GtkBorder& first, const GtkBorder& second) {-  GtkBorder result;-  result.left = first.left - second.left;-  result.right = first.right - second.right;-  result.top = first.top - second.top;-  result.bottom = first.bottom - second.bottom;-  return result;-}--static GtkBorder operator+(const GtkBorder& first, const GtkBorder& second) {-  GtkBorder result;-  result.left = first.left + second.left;-  result.right = first.right + second.right;-  result.top = first.top + second.top;-  result.bottom = first.bottom + second.bottom;-  return result;-}- static GtkBorder operator+=(GtkBorder& first, const GtkBorder& second) {   first.left += second.left;   first.right += second.right;@@ -90,8 +70,6 @@ static gint moz_gtk_menu_item_paint(WidgetNodeType widget, cairo_t* cr,                                     GdkRectangle* rect, GtkWidgetState* state,                                     GtkTextDirection direction);--static GtkBorder GetMarginBorderPadding(GtkStyleContext* aStyle); static void Inset(GdkRectangle*, const GtkBorder&);@@ -223,10 +201,6 @@     notebook_has_tab_gap = true;   }-  sScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL].initialized = false;-  sScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_VERTICAL].initialized = false;-  sActiveScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL].initialized = false;-  sActiveScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_VERTICAL].initialized = false;   sCheckboxMetrics.initialized = false;   sRadioMetrics.initialized = false;   sMenuCheckboxMetrics.initialized = false;@@ -725,14 +699,6 @@   return MOZ_GTK_SUCCESS; }-static MozGtkSize GetMinContentBox(GtkStyleContext* style) {-  GtkStateFlags state_flags = gtk_style_context_get_state(style);-  gint width, height;-  gtk_style_context_get(style, state_flags, "min-width", &width, "min-height",-                        &height, nullptr);-  return {width, height};-}- /**  * Get minimum widget size as sum of margin, padding, border and  * min-width/min-height.@@ -754,12 +720,6 @@              padding.top + padding.bottom; }-static MozGtkSize GetMinMarginBox(GtkStyleContext* style) {-  gint width, height;-  moz_gtk_get_widget_min_size(style, &width, &height);-  return {width, height};-}- static void Inset(GdkRectangle* rect, const GtkBorder& aBorder) {   rect->x += aBorder.left;   rect->y += aBorder.top;@@ -786,114 +746,6 @@   Inset(rect, border); }-static gint moz_gtk_scrollbar_button_paint(cairo_t* cr,-                                           const GdkRectangle* aRect,-                                           GtkWidgetState* state,-                                           GtkScrollbarButtonFlags flags,-                                           GtkTextDirection direction) {-  GtkStateFlags state_flags = GetStateFlagsFromGtkWidgetState(state);-  GdkRectangle arrow_rect;-  gdouble arrow_angle;-  GtkStyleContext* style;-  gint arrow_displacement_x, arrow_displacement_y;--  GtkWidget* scrollbar = GetWidget(flags & MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_VERTICAL-                                       ? MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_VERTICAL-                                       : MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_HORIZONTAL);--  gtk_widget_set_direction(scrollbar, direction);--  if (flags & MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_VERTICAL) {-    arrow_angle = (flags & MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_DOWN) ? ARROW_DOWN : ARROW_UP;-  } else {-    arrow_angle = (flags & MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_DOWN) ? ARROW_RIGHT : ARROW_LEFT;-  }--  style = gtk_widget_get_style_context(scrollbar);--  gtk_style_context_save(style);-  gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_BUTTON);-  StyleContextSetScale(style, state->scale);-  gtk_style_context_set_state(style, state_flags);-  if (arrow_angle == ARROW_RIGHT) {-    gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_RIGHT);-  } else if (arrow_angle == ARROW_DOWN) {-    gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_BOTTOM);-  } else if (arrow_angle == ARROW_LEFT) {-    gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_LEFT);-  } else {-    gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_TOP);-  }--  GdkRectangle rect = *aRect;-  if (gtk_check_version(3, 20, 0) == nullptr) {-    // The "trough-border" is not used since GTK 3.20.  The stepper margin-    // box occupies the full width of the "contents" gadget content box.-    InsetByMargin(&rect, style);-  } else {-    // Scrollbar button has to be inset by trough_border because its DOM-    // element is filling width of vertical scrollbar's track (or height-    // in case of horizontal scrollbars).-    GtkOrientation orientation = flags & MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_VERTICAL-                                     ? GTK_ORIENTATION_VERTICAL-                                     : GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL;--    const ScrollbarGTKMetrics* metrics = GetScrollbarMetrics(orientation);-    if (flags & MOZ_GTK_STEPPER_VERTICAL) {-      rect.x += metrics->border.track.left;-      rect.width = metrics->size.thumb.width;-    } else {-      rect.y += metrics->border.track.top;-      rect.height = metrics->size.thumb.height;-    }-  }--  gtk_render_background(style, cr, rect.x, rect.y, rect.width, rect.height);-  gtk_render_frame(style, cr, rect.x, rect.y, rect.width, rect.height);--  arrow_rect.width = rect.width / 2;-  arrow_rect.height = rect.height / 2;--  gfloat arrow_scaling;-  gtk_style_context_get_style(style, "arrow-scaling", &arrow_scaling, NULL);--  gdouble arrow_size = MIN(rect.width, rect.height) * arrow_scaling;-  arrow_rect.x = rect.x + (rect.width - arrow_size) / 2;-  arrow_rect.y = rect.y + (rect.height - arrow_size) / 2;--  if (state_flags & GTK_STATE_FLAG_ACTIVE) {-    gtk_style_context_get_style(style, "arrow-displacement-x",-                                &arrow_displacement_x, "arrow-displacement-y",-                                &arrow_displacement_y, NULL);--    arrow_rect.x += arrow_displacement_x;-    arrow_rect.y += arrow_displacement_y;-  }--  gtk_render_arrow(style, cr, arrow_angle, arrow_rect.x, arrow_rect.y,-                   arrow_size);--  gtk_style_context_restore(style);--  return MOZ_GTK_SUCCESS;-}--static void moz_gtk_update_scrollbar_style(GtkStyleContext* style,-                                           WidgetNodeType widget,-                                           GtkTextDirection direction) {-  if (widget == MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_HORIZONTAL) {-    gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_BOTTOM);-  } else {-    if (direction == GTK_TEXT_DIR_LTR) {-      gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_RIGHT);-      gtk_style_context_remove_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_LEFT);-    } else {-      gtk_style_context_add_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_LEFT);-      gtk_style_context_remove_class(style, GTK_STYLE_CLASS_RIGHT);-    }-  }-}- static void moz_gtk_draw_styled_frame(GtkStyleContext* style, cairo_t* cr,                                       const GdkRectangle* aRect,                                       bool drawFocus) {@@ -906,89 +758,6 @@   if (drawFocus) {     gtk_render_focus(style, cr, rect.x, rect.y, rect.width, rect.height);   }-}--static gint moz_gtk_scrollbar_trough_paint(WidgetNodeType widget, cairo_t* cr,-                                           const GdkRectangle* aRect,-                                           GtkWidgetState* state,-                                           GtkTextDirection direction) {-  GtkStateFlags state_flags = GetStateFlagsFromGtkWidgetState(state);-  GdkRectangle rect = *aRect;-  GtkStyleContext* style;--  if (gtk_get_minor_version() >= 20) {-    WidgetNodeType thumb = widget == MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_VERTICAL-                               ? MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_VERTICAL-                               : MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_HORIZONTAL;-    MozGtkSize thumbSize = GetMinMarginBox(GetStyleContext(thumb));-    style = GetStyleContext(widget, state->scale, direction, state_flags);-    MozGtkSize trackSize = GetMinContentBox(style);-    trackSize.Include(thumbSize);-    trackSize += GetMarginBorderPadding(style);-    // Gecko's trough |aRect| fills available breadth, but GTK's trough is-    // centered in the contents_gadget.  The centering here round left-    // and up, like gtk_box_gadget_allocate_child().-    if (widget == MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_VERTICAL) {-      rect.x += (rect.width - trackSize.width) / 2;-      rect.width = trackSize.width;-    } else {-      rect.y += (rect.height - trackSize.height) / 2;-      rect.height = trackSize.height;-    }-  } else {-    style = GetStyleContext(widget, state->scale, direction, state_flags);-  }--  moz_gtk_draw_styled_frame(style, cr, &rect, state->focused);--  return MOZ_GTK_SUCCESS;-}--static gint moz_gtk_scrollbar_paint(WidgetNodeType widget, cairo_t* cr,-                                    const GdkRectangle* rect,-                                    GtkWidgetState* state,-                                    GtkTextDirection direction) {-  GtkStateFlags state_flags = GetStateFlagsFromGtkWidgetState(state);-  GtkStyleContext* style =-      GetStyleContext(widget, state->scale, direction, state_flags);--  moz_gtk_update_scrollbar_style(style, widget, direction);--  moz_gtk_draw_styled_frame(style, cr, rect, state->focused);--  style = GetStyleContext((widget == MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_HORIZONTAL)-                              ? MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_CONTENTS_HORIZONTAL-                              : MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_CONTENTS_VERTICAL,-                          state->scale, direction, state_flags);-  moz_gtk_draw_styled_frame(style, cr, rect, state->focused);--  return MOZ_GTK_SUCCESS;-}--static gint moz_gtk_scrollbar_thumb_paint(WidgetNodeType widget, cairo_t* cr,-                                          const GdkRectangle* aRect,-                                          GtkWidgetState* state,-                                          GtkTextDirection direction) {-  GtkStateFlags state_flags = GetStateFlagsFromGtkWidgetState(state);-  GtkStyleContext* style =-      GetStyleContext(widget, state->scale, direction, state_flags);--  GtkOrientation orientation = (widget == MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_HORIZONTAL)-                                   ? GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL-                                   : GTK_ORIENTATION_VERTICAL;--  GdkRectangle rect = *aRect;--  const ScrollbarGTKMetrics* metrics =-      (state->depressed || state->active || state->inHover)-          ? GetActiveScrollbarMetrics(orientation)-          : GetScrollbarMetrics(orientation);-  Inset(&rect, metrics->margin.thumb);--  gtk_render_slider(style, cr, rect.x, rect.y, rect.width, rect.height,-                    orientation);--  return MOZ_GTK_SUCCESS; } static gint moz_gtk_inner_spin_paint(cairo_t* cr, GdkRectangle* rect,@@ -2221,18 +1990,6 @@   return MOZ_GTK_SUCCESS; }-static GtkBorder GetMarginBorderPadding(GtkStyleContext* aStyle) {-  gint left = 0, top = 0, right = 0, bottom = 0;-  moz_gtk_add_margin_border_padding(aStyle, &left, &top, &right, &bottom);-  // narrowing conversions to gint16:-  GtkBorder result;-  result.left = left;-  result.right = right;-  result.top = top;-  result.bottom = bottom;-  return result;-}- gint moz_gtk_get_widget_border(WidgetNodeType widget, gint* left, gint* top,                                gint* right, gint* bottom,                                // NOTE: callers depend on direction being used@@ -2425,9 +2182,6 @@     case MOZ_GTK_SPLITTER_VERTICAL:     case MOZ_GTK_CHECKBUTTON:     case MOZ_GTK_RADIOBUTTON:-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_BUTTON:-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_HORIZONTAL:-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_VERTICAL:     case MOZ_GTK_SCALE_THUMB_HORIZONTAL:     case MOZ_GTK_SCALE_THUMB_VERTICAL:     case MOZ_GTK_GRIPPER:@@ -2697,13 +2451,6 @@   return MOZ_GTK_SUCCESS; }-static MozGtkSize SizeFromLengthAndBreadth(GtkOrientation aOrientation,-                                           gint aLength, gint aBreadth) {-  return aOrientation == GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL-             ? MozGtkSize({aLength, aBreadth})-             : MozGtkSize({aBreadth, aLength});-}- const ToggleGTKMetrics* GetToggleMetrics(WidgetNodeType aWidgetType) {   ToggleGTKMetrics* metrics;@@ -2764,190 +2511,6 @@                          &indicator_spacing, nullptr);     metrics->minSizeWithBorder.width = metrics->minSizeWithBorder.height =         indicator_size;-  }-  return metrics;-}--static void InitScrollbarMetrics(ScrollbarGTKMetrics* aMetrics,-                                 GtkOrientation aOrientation,-                                 GtkStateFlags aStateFlags) {-  WidgetNodeType scrollbar = aOrientation == GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL-                                 ? MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_HORIZONTAL-                                 : MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_VERTICAL;--  gboolean backward, forward, secondary_backward, secondary_forward;-  GtkStyleContext* style =-      GetStyleContext(scrollbar, 1, GTK_TEXT_DIR_NONE, aStateFlags);-  gtk_style_context_get_style(-      style, "has-backward-stepper", &backward, "has-forward-stepper", &forward,-      "has-secondary-backward-stepper", &secondary_backward,-      "has-secondary-forward-stepper", &secondary_forward, nullptr);-  bool hasButtons =-      backward || forward || secondary_backward || secondary_forward;--  if (gtk_get_minor_version() < 20) {-    gint slider_width, trough_border, stepper_size, min_slider_size;--    gtk_style_context_get_style(style, "slider-width", &slider_width,-                                "trough-border", &trough_border, "stepper-size",-                                &stepper_size, "min-slider-length",-                                &min_slider_size, nullptr);--    aMetrics->size.thumb =-        SizeFromLengthAndBreadth(aOrientation, min_slider_size, slider_width);-    aMetrics->size.button =-        SizeFromLengthAndBreadth(aOrientation, stepper_size, slider_width);-    // overall scrollbar-    gint breadth = slider_width + 2 * trough_border;-    // Require room for the slider in the track if we don't have buttons.-    gint length = hasButtons ? 0 : min_slider_size + 2 * trough_border;-    aMetrics->size.scrollbar =-        SizeFromLengthAndBreadth(aOrientation, length, breadth);--    // Borders on the major axis are set on the outermost scrollbar-    // element to correctly position the buttons when-    // trough-under-steppers is true.-    // Borders on the minor axis are set on the track element so that it-    // receives mouse events, as in GTK.-    // Other borders have been zero-initialized.-    if (aOrientation == GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL) {-      aMetrics->border.scrollbar.left = aMetrics->border.scrollbar.right =-          aMetrics->border.track.top = aMetrics->border.track.bottom =-              trough_border;-    } else {-      aMetrics->border.scrollbar.top = aMetrics->border.scrollbar.bottom =-          aMetrics->border.track.left = aMetrics->border.track.right =-              trough_border;-    }--    // We're done here for Gtk+ < 3.20...-    return;-  }--  // GTK version > 3.20-  // scrollbar-  aMetrics->border.scrollbar = GetMarginBorderPadding(style);--  WidgetNodeType contents, track, thumb;-  if (aOrientation == GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL) {-    contents = MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_CONTENTS_HORIZONTAL;-    track = MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_HORIZONTAL;-    thumb = MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_HORIZONTAL;-  } else {-    contents = MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_CONTENTS_VERTICAL;-    track = MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_VERTICAL;-    thumb = MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_VERTICAL;-  }--  /* GetStyleContext() sets GtkStateFlags to the latest widget name-   * in css selector string. When we call:-   *-   *     GetStyleContext(thumb, GTK_STATE_FLAG_PRELIGHT)-   *-   * we get:-   *-   *    "scrollbar contents trough slider:hover"-   *-   * Some themes (Ubuntu Ambiance) styles trough/thumb by scrollbar,-   * the Gtk+ css rule looks like:-   *-   *    "scrollbar:hover contents trough slider"-   *-   *  So we need to apply GtkStateFlags to each widgets in style path.-   */--  // thumb-  style =-      CreateStyleContextWithStates(thumb, 1, GTK_TEXT_DIR_NONE, aStateFlags);-  aMetrics->size.thumb = GetMinMarginBox(style);-  gtk_style_context_get_margin(style, gtk_style_context_get_state(style),-                               &aMetrics->margin.thumb);-  g_object_unref(style);--  // track-  style =-      CreateStyleContextWithStates(track, 1, GTK_TEXT_DIR_NONE, aStateFlags);-  aMetrics->border.track = GetMarginBorderPadding(style);-  MozGtkSize trackMinSize = GetMinContentBox(style) + aMetrics->border.track;-  MozGtkSize trackSizeForThumb = aMetrics->size.thumb + aMetrics->border.track;-  g_object_unref(style);--  // button-  if (hasButtons) {-    style = CreateStyleContextWithStates(MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_BUTTON, 1,-                                         GTK_TEXT_DIR_NONE, aStateFlags);-    aMetrics->size.button = GetMinMarginBox(style);-    g_object_unref(style);-  } else {-    aMetrics->size.button = {0, 0};-  }-  if (aOrientation == GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL) {-    aMetrics->size.button.Rotate();-    // If the track is wider than necessary for the thumb, including when-    // the buttons will cause Gecko to expand the track to fill-    // available breadth, then add to the track border to prevent Gecko-    // from expanding the thumb to fill available breadth.-    gint extra = std::max(trackMinSize.height, aMetrics->size.button.height) --                 trackSizeForThumb.height;-    if (extra > 0) {-      // If extra is odd, then the thumb is 0.5 pixels above-      // center as in gtk_range_compute_slider_position().-      aMetrics->border.track.top += extra / 2;-      aMetrics->border.track.bottom += extra - extra / 2;-      // Update size for change in border.-      trackSizeForThumb.height += extra;-    }-  } else {-    gint extra = std::max(trackMinSize.width, aMetrics->size.button.width) --                 trackSizeForThumb.width;-    if (extra > 0) {-      // If extra is odd, then the thumb is 0.5 pixels to the left-      // of center as in gtk_range_compute_slider_position().-      aMetrics->border.track.left += extra / 2;-      aMetrics->border.track.right += extra - extra / 2;-      trackSizeForThumb.width += extra;-    }-  }--  style =-      CreateStyleContextWithStates(contents, 1, GTK_TEXT_DIR_NONE, aStateFlags);-  GtkBorder contentsBorder = GetMarginBorderPadding(style);-  g_object_unref(style);--  aMetrics->size.scrollbar =-      trackSizeForThumb + contentsBorder + aMetrics->border.scrollbar;-}--const ScrollbarGTKMetrics* GetScrollbarMetrics(GtkOrientation aOrientation) {-  auto metrics = &sScrollbarMetrics[aOrientation];-  if (!metrics->initialized) {-    InitScrollbarMetrics(metrics, aOrientation, GTK_STATE_FLAG_NORMAL);--    // We calculate thumb margin here because it's composited from-    // thumb class margin + difference margin between active and inactive-    // scrollbars. It's a workaround which alows us to emulate-    // overlay scrollbars for some Gtk+ themes (Ubuntu/Ambiance),-    // when an inactive scrollbar thumb is smaller than the active one.-    const ScrollbarGTKMetrics* metricsActive =-        GetActiveScrollbarMetrics(aOrientation);--    if (metrics->size.thumb < metricsActive->size.thumb) {-      metrics->margin.thumb +=-          (metrics->border.scrollbar + metrics->border.track) --          (metricsActive->border.scrollbar + metricsActive->border.track);-    }--    metrics->initialized = true;-  }-  return metrics;-}--const ScrollbarGTKMetrics* GetActiveScrollbarMetrics(-    GtkOrientation aOrientation) {-  auto metrics = &sActiveScrollbarMetrics[aOrientation];-  if (!metrics->initialized) {-    InitScrollbarMetrics(metrics, aOrientation, GTK_STATE_FLAG_PRELIGHT);-    metrics->initialized = true;   }   return metrics; }@@ -3052,35 +2615,6 @@                                   !!(flags & MOZ_GTK_WIDGET_CHECKED),                                   !!(flags & MOZ_GTK_WIDGET_INCONSISTENT),                                   (widget == MOZ_GTK_RADIOBUTTON), direction);-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_BUTTON:-      return moz_gtk_scrollbar_button_paint(-          cr, rect, state, (GtkScrollbarButtonFlags)flags, direction);-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_HORIZONTAL:-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_VERTICAL: {-      if (flags & MOZ_GTK_TRACK_OPAQUE) {-        GtkStyleContext* style = GetStyleContext(MOZ_GTK_WINDOW, direction);-        gtk_render_background(style, cr, rect->x, rect->y, rect->width,-                              rect->height);-      }-      if (gtk_check_version(3, 20, 0) == nullptr) {-        return moz_gtk_scrollbar_paint(widget, cr, rect, state, direction);-      }-      WidgetNodeType trough_widget = (widget == MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_HORIZONTAL)-                                         ? MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_HORIZONTAL-                                         : MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_VERTICAL;-      return moz_gtk_scrollbar_trough_paint(trough_widget, cr, rect, state,-                                            direction);-    }-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_HORIZONTAL:-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_TROUGH_VERTICAL:-      if (gtk_check_version(3, 20, 0) == nullptr) {-        return moz_gtk_scrollbar_trough_paint(widget, cr, rect, state,-                                              direction);-      }-      break;-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_HORIZONTAL:-    case MOZ_GTK_SCROLLBAR_THUMB_VERTICAL:-      return moz_gtk_scrollbar_thumb_paint(widget, cr, rect, state, direction);     case MOZ_GTK_SCALE_HORIZONTAL:     case MOZ_GTK_SCALE_VERTICAL:       return moz_gtk_scale_paint(cr, rect, state, (GtkOrientation)flags,

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes. The diff shows a significant removal of scrollbar-related code and metrics handling.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Scrollbar Metrics Handling Issue] [widget/gtk/gtk3drawing.cpp] [Lines 26-27, 223-226, 2764-3052]
[Old Code]
static ScrollbarGTKMetrics sScrollbarMetrics[2];
static ScrollbarGTKMetrics sActiveScrollbarMetrics[2];
...
sScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL].initialized = false;
sScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_VERTICAL].initialized = false;
sActiveScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_HORIZONTAL].initialized = false;
sActiveScrollbarMetrics[GTK_ORIENTATION_VERTICAL].initialized = false;
...
[Large amount of scrollbar metrics calculation and handling code removed]

[Fixed Code]
[All scrollbar metrics and related code removed]

The diff shows a complete removal of scrollbar metrics handling code, including:
1. Removal of global ScrollbarGTKMetrics arrays
2. Removal of initialization code
3. Removal of all scrollbar calculation functions
4. Removal of scrollbar painting functions

While this appears to be a major refactoring rather than a direct security fix, the removal of complex metrics calculation code could potentially eliminate:
- Possible integer overflow vulnerabilities in metrics calculations
- Potential memory safety issues in metrics handling
- Complex state management that could lead to security issues

However, without more context about why this code was removed or what replaced it, I can't definitively say this was a security fix. The change might simply be part of a larger architectural change in the scrollbar implementation.

Note: The diff also removes several utility functions (GetMinContentBox, GetMinMarginBox, GetMarginBorderPadding) that were used by the scrollbar code, but these don't appear to have direct security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.outside.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.outside.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 200, 200, 0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 40, 20, -30, -20, 30, 20); ctx.putImageData(imgdata, -30, 20, 0, 0, 30, 20);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,15, 0,255,0,255, "98,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 98,45, 0,255,0,255, "98,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,5, 0,255,0,255, "1,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 1,45, 0,255,0,255, "1,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,15, 0,255,0,255, "98,15", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 98,45, 0,255,0,255, "98,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,5, 0,255,0,255, "1,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 1,45, 0,255,0,255, "1,45", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-29]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security-related vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"648c10063fa1a16a961df45f194f50982bdf3d41d04586a48d2cc6d69e0252c1","README.md":"2253eba78d5af06642073c5dfd41253fb8be73d3a0e823bc3d7642c9d0ad0c6c","src/avx2.rs":"a97ec761e4e7f70ff6311f4c1e67cb5136ac66cfc51bc49525b81f9e23814d81","src/blake2bp.rs":"83577d4a22db3b92030d9bd4563aa9ad440f23c64a6ad5f10a9d709f22d50589","src/guts.rs":"1189cab87b18eaaf2abd5bcb3d7d799c75401a312cee6f1f65fdaad30203eb6f","src/lib.rs":"67723a3abc30dc7f3d488f434ced884b5ce962a807991c8f1cc9940df869c342","src/many.rs":"60d07e4d7ad63949fb5432ad05f7c6a525a3eee39d325f7d4e65e901b466be95","src/portable.rs":"c47baa15b311bc95d49f3d189111fe45756fb7d623a1f48f0050ae591817aedf","src/sse41.rs":"7a644b1056b804ada9ddc7586552a4a5c769e576d610ffe7ec74065f7eaff491","src/test.rs":"1685eec6fedc30fca1332cbb78c85e6c9b56eca962b6c6343c91ba69eefac754"},"package":"b83b7baab1e671718d78204225800d6b170e648188ac7dc992e9d6bddf87d0c0"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"b79e2347297dee32b9483747ee3cf145bd60e8c9d14cc02929287dabde4685ff","README.md":"b90c7a163a0fbff29e2c049953968c8cbfe8aa616d7e36775f0a565761dcc671","src/avx2.rs":"b79f36e3a7442d241e3fdf2ec159866aea31b78883660a63cdc9b1a262f18d10","src/blake2bp.rs":"83577d4a22db3b92030d9bd4563aa9ad440f23c64a6ad5f10a9d709f22d50589","src/guts.rs":"1189cab87b18eaaf2abd5bcb3d7d799c75401a312cee6f1f65fdaad30203eb6f","src/lib.rs":"b0404c81988e4de8d8864437c512937d9e888c681ef4739ef2d5db1650bd8766","src/many.rs":"60d07e4d7ad63949fb5432ad05f7c6a525a3eee39d325f7d4e65e901b466be95","src/portable.rs":"a274acd298a394c014096a8214a0dc1db7439d1e920bd2ad75707fadcc501e10","src/sse41.rs":"58e9e2ec97d266e9fb4cfa874f8cfcf5ee046911837824ceea4b99cd4007560b","src/test.rs":"1685eec6fedc30fca1332cbb78c85e6c9b56eca962b6c6343c91ba69eefac754"},"package":"afa748e348ad3be8263be728124b24a24f268266f6f5d58af9d75f6a40b5c587"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.basic.html========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.basic.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.rect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. First diff (blake2b_simd/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name] [third_party/rust/blake2b_simd/.cargo-checksum.json] [entire file]
    [Old checksums and package hash]
    [New checksums and package hash]
    Additional Details: This appears to be a routine update of checksums for the blake2b_simd Rust crate. While checksum updates can sometimes indicate security fixes, there's no direct evidence of a vulnerability being fixed here. The changes could simply reflect version updates or minor modifications.

2. Second diff (2d.path.rect.basic.html):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability name] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.basic.html] [lines 17-27]
    [Old code using 'offscreenCanvas' variable name]
    [New code using 'canvas' variable name]
    Additional Details: This change is purely a variable renaming from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' in a test file. There's no security implication to this change - it's just a code style/readability improvement.

Note: Neither of these diffs show clear evidence of security vulnerability fixes. The first might be related to a dependency update (which could include security fixes), but there's no specific information to confirm this. The second is clearly just a variable name change in test code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-002.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-border-box-002-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the border-box value.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag flag. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change is a minor HTML cleanup removing an empty meta tag.

Additional Details:
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-002.html
    Lines: 9
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
    Fixed Code: (removed line)

This appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix. The empty meta tag removal doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-90b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-90b.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/bq-u-u-u-green.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <blockquote><div>This text should be unstyled.</div></blockquote>

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-90b.xml [Lines] 8
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
   [Fixed Code] (removed line)

Additional notes:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a minor cleanup rather than a security fix
- The "flags" meta tag doesn't correspond to any known security vulnerability
- No other changes were made in the diff that would indicate security fixes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.relative_size.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.relative_size.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.font = '1em sans-serif'; _assertSame(ctx.font, '10px sans-serif', "ctx.font", "'10px sans-serif'");

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Naming Improvement] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.relative_size.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable naming improvement (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications.
- No actual security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff.
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name was shortened.
- This is likely a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.selfintersect.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.selfintersect.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(100, 0, 25, 0, -Math.PI/2, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,10, 0,255,0,255, "90,10", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 97,1, 0,255,0,255, "97,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 97,2, 0,255,0,255, "97,2", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 97,3, 0,255,0,255, "97,3", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 2,48, 0,255,0,255, "2,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,10, 0,255,0,255, "90,10", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 97,1, 0,255,0,255, "97,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 97,2, 0,255,0,255, "97,2", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 97,3, 0,255,0,255, "97,3", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 2,48, 0,255,0,255, "2,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in the diff. The changes appear to be a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and corresponding updates to the variable name in the `_assertPixel` calls. This is likely a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security-related changes were made to the canvas drawing operations or assertions. The test logic remains the same, only the variable name was changed.

The diff shows no evidence of security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, improving code consistency by using a shorter variable name (`canvas` instead of `offscreenCanvas`). All the test assertions and canvas operations remain functionally identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/android-packages.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/android-packages.txt@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ platform-tools-build-tools;30.0.2-platforms;android-30+build-tools;31.0.0+platforms;android-31

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Dependency Upgrade] [python/mozboot/mozboot/android-packages.txt] [Lines 1-3]
    [Old Code]
    platform-tools
    build-tools;30.0.2
    platforms;android-30
    [Fixed Code]
    platform-tools
    build-tools;31.0.0
    platforms;android-31
    Additional Details: The diff shows an upgrade of Android build tools and platform versions from 30 to 31. While this could potentially address security vulnerabilities present in the older versions, without specific CVE information or release notes, we cannot confirm if this was specifically for security fixes or general maintenance. Android version updates often include security improvements, but we can't be certain without more context.

Note: This appears to be a routine dependency version update rather than a specific security fix. The changes align with standard maintenance practices to keep dependencies current, which often includes security patches among other improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/render_task_graph.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/render_task_graph.rs@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@                         self.roots.remove(root_task_id);                     }                     None => {-                        println!("WARN: {:?} depends on root {:?} but it has no tasks!",+                        warn!("WARN: {:?} depends on root {:?} but it has no tasks!",                             task_id,                             target_id,                         );@@ -644,10 +644,10 @@     pub fn print(         &self,     ) {-        println!("-- RenderTaskGraph --");+        debug!("-- RenderTaskGraph --");         for (i, task) in self.tasks.iter().enumerate() {-            println!("Task {}: render_on={} free_after={} {:?}",+            debug!("Task {}: render_on={} free_after={} {:?}",                 i,                 task.render_on.0,                 task.free_after.0,@@ -656,16 +656,16 @@         }         for (p, pass) in self.passes.iter().enumerate() {-            println!("Pass {}:", p);+            debug!("Pass {}:", p);             for (s, sub_pass) in pass.sub_passes.iter().enumerate() {-                println!("\tSubPass {}: {:?}",+                debug!("\tSubPass {}: {:?}",                     s,                     sub_pass.surface,                 );                 for task_id in &sub_pass.task_ids {-                    println!("\t\tTask {:?}", task_id.index);+                    debug!("\t\tTask {:?}", task_id.index);                 }             }         }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Logging Level Change [gfx/wr/webrender/src/render_task_graph.rs] [Lines 354, 644-658]
    Old Code:
    ```rust
    println!("WARN: {:?} depends on root {:?} but it has no tasks!",
    println!("-- RenderTaskGraph --");
    println!("Task {}: render_on={} free_after={} {:?}",
    println!("Pass {}:", p);
    println!("\tSubPass {}: {:?}",
    println!("\t\tTask {:?}", task_id.index);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```rust
    warn!("WARN: {:?} depends on root {:?} but it has no tasks!",
    debug!("-- RenderTaskGraph --");
    debug!("Task {}: render_on={} free_after={} {:?}",
    debug!("Pass {}:", p);
    debug!("\tSubPass {}: {:?}",
    debug!("\t\tTask {:?}", task_id.index);
    ```

The changes in this diff don't represent security fixes but rather improvements to logging practices. The modifications change the logging level from `println!` (which always prints to stdout) to more appropriate logging macros:
1. `warn!` for warning messages that should be visible in production
2. `debug!` for debug information that should only be visible during debugging

This is a good practice change but doesn't address any specific security vulnerability. The change helps with:
- Better log level management
- Reduced noise in production logs
- More appropriate visibility of different log messages

No actual security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_xyb.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_xyb.h@@ -24,18 +24,18 @@ // NOTE this return value can avoid an extra color conversion if `in` would // later be passed to JxlButteraugliComparator. const ImageBundle* ToXYB(const ImageBundle& in, ThreadPool* pool,-                         Image3F* JXL_RESTRICT xyb,+                         Image3F* JXL_RESTRICT xyb, const JxlCmsInterface& cms,                          ImageBundle* JXL_RESTRICT linear = nullptr); // Bt.601 to match JPEG/JFIF. Outputs _signed_ YCbCr values suitable for DCT, // see F.1.1.3 of T.81 (because our data type is float, there is no need to add // a bias to make the values unsigned).-void RgbToYcbcr(const ImageF& r_plane, const ImageF& g_plane,-                const ImageF& b_plane, ImageF* y_plane, ImageF* cb_plane,-                ImageF* cr_plane, ThreadPool* pool);+Status RgbToYcbcr(const ImageF& r_plane, const ImageF& g_plane,+                  const ImageF& b_plane, ImageF* y_plane, ImageF* cb_plane,+                  ImageF* cr_plane, ThreadPool* pool); // DEPRECATED, used by opsin_image_wrapper.-Image3F OpsinDynamicsImage(const Image3B& srgb8);+Image3F OpsinDynamicsImage(const Image3B& srgb8, const JxlCmsInterface& cms); // For opsin_image_test. void TestCubeRoot();

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Input Validation] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_xyb.h] [Lines 24-26]  
   [Old Code]  
   `const ImageBundle* ToXYB(const ImageBundle& in, ThreadPool* pool, Image3F* JXL_RESTRICT xyb, ImageBundle* JXL_RESTRICT linear = nullptr);`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `const ImageBundle* ToXYB(const ImageBundle& in, ThreadPool* pool, Image3F* JXL_RESTRICT xyb, const JxlCmsInterface& cms, ImageBundle* JXL_RESTRICT linear = nullptr);`  
   Additional Details: The addition of `const JxlCmsInterface& cms` parameter suggests better handling of color management, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_xyb.h] [Lines 29-31]  
   [Old Code]  
   `void RgbToYcbcr(const ImageF& r_plane, const ImageF& g_plane, const ImageF& b_plane, ImageF* y_plane, ImageF* cb_plane, ImageF* cr_plane, ThreadPool* pool);`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `Status RgbToYcbcr(const ImageF& r_plane, const ImageF& g_plane, const ImageF& b_plane, ImageF* y_plane, ImageF* cb_plane, ImageF* cr_plane, ThreadPool* pool);`  
   Additional Details: The change from `void` to `Status` return type suggests better error handling, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Input Validation] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_xyb.h] [Line 34]  
   [Old Code]  
   `Image3F OpsinDynamicsImage(const Image3B& srgb8);`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `Image3F OpsinDynamicsImage(const Image3B& srgb8, const JxlCmsInterface& cms);`  
   Additional Details: The addition of `const JxlCmsInterface& cms` parameter suggests better handling of color management, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

Note: While the changes suggest improvements in error handling and color management, without more context about the specific issues being addressed, we cannot definitively identify these as security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be more about API improvements and robustness than direct security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/metal_surface.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/metal_surface.rs@@ -1,29 +1,23 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk; use crate::RawPtr;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct MetalSurface {     handle: vk::Instance,-    metal_surface_fn: vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn,+    fp: vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn, } impl MetalSurface {-    pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {-        let surface_fn = vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+    pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+        let handle = instance.handle();+        let fp = vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: instance.handle(),-            metal_surface_fn: surface_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCreateMetalSurfaceEXT.html>"]@@ -33,7 +27,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::SurfaceKHR> {         let mut surface = mem::zeroed();-        self.metal_surface_fn+        self.fp             .create_metal_surface_ext(                 self.handle,                 create_info,@@ -43,8 +37,12 @@             .result_with_success(surface)     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn {-        &self.metal_surface_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the security observations:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential API Usage Change] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/metal_surface.rs] [Lines 1-43]
[Old Code]
use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};
...
pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {
    let surface_fn = vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {
        mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))
    });
    Self {
        handle: instance.handle(),
        metal_surface_fn: surface_fn,
    }
}
[Fixed Code]
use crate::{Entry, Instance};
...
pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {
    let handle = instance.handle();
    let fp = vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {
        mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))
    });
    Self { handle, fp }
}

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[Code Refactoring] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/metal_surface.rs] [Lines 16-20,43-47]
[Old Code]
pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {
    vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::name()
}
...
pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn {
    &self.metal_surface_fn
}
[Fixed Code]
pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {
    vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn::name()
}
...
pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::ExtMetalSurfaceFn {
    &self.fp
}

The main changes appear to be:
1. Changing from EntryCustom<L> to Entry (potentially removing a generic parameter)
2. Renaming metal_surface_fn to fp
3. Moving the name() function definition
4. Simplifying the struct initialization

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily refactoring and API usage modifications rather than security fixes. The unsafe block remains unchanged in how it handles function pointer loading.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-byte-streams/construct-byob-request.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-byte-streams/construct-byob-request.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/rs-utils.js 'use strict';

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential test scope reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-byte-streams/construct-byob-request.any.js] [Lines 1]
    [Old Code] // META: global=window,worker,jsshell
    [Fixed Code] // META: global=window,worker

Additional Details:
- The change removes "jsshell" from the test's global scope declaration
- This appears to be a test configuration change rather than a security fix
- The impact is unclear - it might limit where the test runs but doesn't appear to address a specific vulnerability
- Without more context about why "jsshell" was removed, we can't determine if this relates to a security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/GfxInfo.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/GfxInfo.cpp@@ -757,14 +757,6 @@         V(21, 0, 0, 0), "FEATURE_FAILURE_WEBRENDER_BUG_1635186",         "Mesa 21.0.0.0");-    APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(-        OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,-        DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::XWayland,-        DriverVendor::NonMesaAll, DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll,-        nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER,-        nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_BLOCKED_DRIVER_VERSION, DRIVER_LESS_THAN,-        V(470, 82, 0, 0), "FEATURE_FAILURE_WEBRENDER_BUG_1635186", "470.82.0");-     ////////////////////////////////////     // FEATURE_WEBRENDER - ALLOWLIST@@ -793,13 +785,13 @@         nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_ALLOW_QUALIFIED, DRIVER_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,         V(18, 2, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_NVIDIA_MESA", "Mesa 18.2.0.0");-    // Nvidia proprietary driver baseline, see bug 1673752.+    // Nvidia proprietary driver baseline, see bug 1742994.     APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(         OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,         DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::All, DriverVendor::NonMesaAll,         DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll, nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER,         nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_ALLOW_QUALIFIED, DRIVER_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,-        V(460, 32, 3, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_NVIDIA_BINARY", "460.32.03");+        V(470, 82, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_NVIDIA_BINARY", "470.82.0");     // ATI Mesa baseline, chosen arbitrarily.     APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(@@ -826,15 +818,6 @@         nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_BLOCKED_DRIVER_VERSION, DRIVER_LESS_THAN,         V(21, 0, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_X11_EGL_MESA", "Mesa 21.0.0.0");-#ifndef EARLY_BETA_OR_EARLIER-    APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(-        OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,-        DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::X11, DriverVendor::NonMesaAll,-        DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll, nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_X11_EGL,-        nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_DISCOURAGED, DRIVER_COMPARISON_IGNORED,-        V(0, 0, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_X11_EGL_NVIDIA_BINARY", "X11");-#endif-     APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(         OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,         DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::All, DriverVendor::NonMesaAll,@@ -858,6 +841,15 @@         DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll, nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_DMABUF,         nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_BLOCKED_DRIVER_VERSION, DRIVER_LESS_THAN,         V(495, 44, 0, 0), "FEATURE_FAILURE_NO_GBM", "495.44.0");++    ////////////////////////////////////+    // FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT+    APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(+        OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,+        DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::X11, DriverVendor::NonMesaAll,+        DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll, nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT,+        nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_BLOCKED_DEVICE, DRIVER_COMPARISON_IGNORED,+        V(0, 0, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_WR_PARTIAL_PRESENT_NVIDIA_BINARY", "");     ////////////////////////////////////

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Driver Version Blocklist Update] [widget/gtk/GfxInfo.cpp] [Lines 757-793]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```
   APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(
       OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,
       DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::XWayland,
       DriverVendor::NonMesaAll, DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll,
       nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER,
       nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_BLOCKED_DRIVER_VERSION, DRIVER_LESS_THAN,
       V(470, 82, 0, 0), "FEATURE_FAILURE_WEBRENDER_BUG_1635186", "470.82.0");
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```
   // Nvidia proprietary driver baseline, see bug 1742994.
   APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(
       OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,
       DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::All, DriverVendor::NonMesaAll,
       DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll, nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER,
       nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_ALLOW_QUALIFIED, DRIVER_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
       V(470, 82, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_NVIDIA_BINARY", "470.82.0");
   ```  
   Additional Details: The old blocklist entry was removed and replaced with a new one that changes the condition from blocking versions less than 470.82.0 to allowing versions greater than or equal to 470.82.0. This appears to be a feature rollout change rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [X11 EGL Blocklist Removal] [widget/gtk/GfxInfo.cpp] [Lines 826-834]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```
   #ifndef EARLY_BETA_OR_EARLIER
   APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(
       OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,
       DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::X11, DriverVendor::NonMesaAll,
       DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll, nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_X11_EGL,
       nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_DISCOURAGED, DRIVER_COMPARISON_IGNORED,
       V(0, 0, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_X11_EGL_NVIDIA_BINARY", "X11");
   #endif
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   [Removed entirely]  
   Additional Details: The conditional blocklist entry for X11 EGL with Nvidia binary drivers was removed. This might be related to feature enablement rather than security.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [New WebRender Partial Present Blocklist] [widget/gtk/GfxInfo.cpp] [Lines 841-858]  
   [Old Code]  
   [No previous code]  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```
   APPEND_TO_DRIVER_BLOCKLIST_EXT(
       OperatingSystem::Linux, ScreenSizeStatus::All, BatteryStatus::All,
       DesktopEnvironment::All, WindowProtocol::X11, DriverVendor::NonMesaAll,
       DeviceFamily::NvidiaAll, nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT,
       nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_BLOCKED_DEVICE, DRIVER_COMPARISON_IGNORED,
       V(0, 0, 0, 0), "FEATURE_ROLLOUT_WR_PARTIAL_PRESENT_NVIDIA_BINARY", "");
   ```  
   Additional Details: A new blocklist entry was added for WebRender partial present feature, blocking Nvidia binary drivers on X11. This appears to be a new feature control rather than a security fix.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily related to driver feature enablement/control rather than security vulnerabilities. No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/payments/MerchantValidationEvent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/payments/MerchantValidationEvent.h@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@   virtual JSObject* WrapObjectInternal(       JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) override;-  virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;-  virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;+  virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                ErrorResult& aRv) override;+  virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                ErrorResult& aRv) override;   static already_AddRefed<MerchantValidationEvent> Constructor(       EventTarget* aOwner, const nsAString& aType,

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/payments/MerchantValidationEvent.h] [Lines 33-36]
    [Old Code]
    virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
    virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
    [Fixed Code]
    virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                ErrorResult& aRv) override;
    virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                                ErrorResult& aRv) override;

Additional Details:
- The main change is the addition of ErrorResult& aRv parameter to both callback methods
- This appears to be an improvement in error handling, allowing callbacks to properly report errors
- While not clearly fixing a specific named vulnerability, this could prevent potential unhandled exceptions or error conditions in payment processing
- The change suggests better error propagation in merchant validation events, which is security-sensitive code
- Without more context, I can't identify a specific vulnerability being fixed, but the change improves robustness

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/errors.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/errors.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js 'use strict';

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Removed jsshell from test environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/transform-streams/errors.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   [Old Code]  
   `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `// META: global=window,worker`  

Additional Details:  
- The change removes `jsshell` from the test environment configuration. This appears to be a test scope reduction rather than a security fix.  
- No specific vulnerability is being addressed here - this is likely a test environment cleanup change.  
- The modification doesn't show any security flaws being fixed, just a change in test coverage.  

No other vulnerabilities or changes were detected in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/wrench/src/test_shaders.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/wrench/src/test_shaders.rs@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@     impl Visitor for FlatScalarVaryingsVisitor {         fn visit_single_declaration(&mut self, declaration: &mut SingleDeclaration) -> Visit {-            let is_scalar = match declaration.ty.ty.ty {+            let is_scalar = matches!(declaration.ty.ty.ty,                 TypeSpecifierNonArray::Bool                 | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Int                 | TypeSpecifierNonArray::UInt                 | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Float-                | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Double => true,-                _ => false,-            };+                | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Double);             let qualifiers = declaration                 .ty

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Code Improvement] [gfx/wr/wrench/src/test_shaders.rs] [Lines 17-24]
[Old Code]
let is_scalar = match declaration.ty.ty.ty {
    TypeSpecifierNonArray::Bool
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Int
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::UInt
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Float
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Double => true,
    _ => false,
};
[Fixed Code]
let is_scalar = matches!(declaration.ty.ty.ty,
    TypeSpecifierNonArray::Bool
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Int
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::UInt
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Float
    | TypeSpecifierNonArray::Double);

This change appears to be a code quality improvement rather than a security fix. The functionality remains the same, but the code is now more concise using Rust's `matches!` macro instead of a match expression. There doesn't appear to be any security vulnerability being addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/vulkan/command.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/vulkan/command.rs@@ -594,9 +594,11 @@             .cmd_set_scissor(self.active, 0, &vk_scissors);     }     unsafe fn set_stencil_reference(&mut self, value: u32) {-        self.device-            .raw-            .cmd_set_stencil_reference(self.active, vk::StencilFaceFlags::all(), value);+        self.device.raw.cmd_set_stencil_reference(+            self.active,+            vk::StencilFaceFlags::FRONT_AND_BACK,+            value,+        );     }     unsafe fn set_blend_constants(&mut self, color: &[f32; 4]) {         self.device.raw.cmd_set_blend_constants(self.active, color);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Incorrect Stencil Face Flag Usage [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/vulkan/command.rs] [Lines 594-598]  
[Old Code]  
```rust
self.device
    .raw
    .cmd_set_stencil_reference(self.active, vk::StencilFaceFlags::all(), value);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```rust
self.device.raw.cmd_set_stencil_reference(
    self.active,
    vk::StencilFaceFlags::FRONT_AND_BACK,
    value,
);
```

Additional Details:
1. The change replaces `vk::StencilFaceFlags::all()` with `vk::StencilFaceFlags::FRONT_AND_BACK` in the stencil reference setting command.
2. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially be related to:
   - More precise control over stencil operations
   - Avoiding unintended behavior from using all possible flags
   - Better alignment with Vulkan specifications
3. The change makes the code more explicit about which stencil faces are being affected, but I can't determine if this was fixing an actual security issue or just improving code correctness.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozlint/test/test_roller.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozlint/test/test_roller.py@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@     # quickly. The other (slow.yml) will run slowly.  This way the first worker     # will be be stuck blocking on the ProcessPoolExecutor._call_queue when the     # signal arrives and the other still be doing work.-    cmd = [sys.executable, "runcli.py", "-l=string", "-l=slow"]+    cmd = [sys.executable, "runcli.py", "-l=string", "-l=slow", "files/foobar.js"]     env = os.environ.copy()     env["PYTHONPATH"] = os.pathsep.join(sys.path)     proc = subprocess.Popen(

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Command Injection] [python/mozlint/test/test_roller.py] [Lines 262]
[Old Code]
cmd = [sys.executable, "runcli.py", "-l=string", "-l=slow"]
[Fixed Code]
cmd = [sys.executable, "runcli.py", "-l=string", "-l=slow", "files/foobar.js"]

Additional Details:
1. The change adds a new argument "files/foobar.js" to the command being executed via subprocess.Popen
2. While this doesn't show direct evidence of a security vulnerability being fixed, it could potentially be related to:
   - Adding proper file input validation (though the path appears hardcoded)
   - Preventing potential command injection by properly structuring arguments
3. Without more context about the purpose of this change and the surrounding code, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just a functional change

Note: The diff doesn't show any obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed, but the change involves subprocess execution which is always worth examining for security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.