--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/apz/src/APZCTreeManager.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/apz/src/APZCTreeManager.h@@ -549,6 +549,15 @@   ScreenMargin GetCompositorFixedLayerMargins() const;+  APZScrollGeneration NewAPZScrollGeneration() {+    // In the production code this function gets only called from the sampler+    // thread but in tests using nsIDOMWindowUtils.setAsyncScrollOffset this+    // function gets called from the controller thread so we need to lock the+    // mutex for this counter.+    MutexAutoLock lock(mScrollGenerationLock);+    return mScrollGenerationCounter.NewAPZGeneration();+  }+  private:   using GuidComparator = ScrollableLayerGuid::Comparator;   using ScrollNode = WebRenderScrollDataWrapper;@@ -986,6 +995,12 @@   friend class IAPZHitTester;   UniquePtr<IAPZHitTester> mHitTester;+  // NOTE: This ScrollGenerationCounter needs to be per APZCTreeManager since+  // the generation is bumped up on the sampler theread which is per+  // APZCTreeManager.+  ScrollGenerationCounter mScrollGenerationCounter;+  mozilla::Mutex mScrollGenerationLock;+ #if defined(MOZ_WIDGET_ANDROID)  private:   // Last Frame metrics sent to java through UIController.

Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify one security-related change involving thread safety. Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition Vulnerability [gfx/layers/apz/src/APZCTreeManager.h] [Lines 549-557]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of NewAPZScrollGeneration() function)
[Fixed Code]
APZScrollGeneration NewAPZScrollGeneration() {
    // In the production code this function gets only called from the sampler
    // thread but in tests using nsIDOMWindowUtils.setAsyncScrollOffset this
    // function gets called from the controller thread so we need to lock the
    // mutex for this counter.
    MutexAutoLock lock(mScrollGenerationLock);
    return mScrollGenerationCounter.NewAPZGeneration();
}

Additional Details:
1. The vulnerability was a potential race condition in scroll generation counting, which could occur when accessed from different threads (sampler thread vs controller thread in tests).
2. The fix adds proper mutex protection (mScrollGenerationLock) around the scroll generation counter access.
3. The comment explicitly mentions the thread safety concern that motivated this change.
4. The fix also includes adding the necessary member variables (mScrollGenerationCounter and mScrollGenerationLock) to maintain thread-safe state.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-6.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-6.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120deg, 100.0%, 50.0%)';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, simply renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/statusfilter/nsBrowserStatusFilter.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/statusfilter/nsBrowserStatusFilter.cpp@@ -354,3 +354,9 @@   self->CallDelayedProgressListeners(); }++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsBrowserStatusFilter::GetDocumentRequest(nsIRequest** aRequest) {+  *aRequest = nullptr;+  return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;+}

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Implementation Vulnerability] [nsBrowserStatusFilter.cpp] [Lines 354-360]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation existed for GetDocumentRequest method)
[Fixed Code]
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsBrowserStatusFilter::GetDocumentRequest(nsIRequest** aRequest) {
  *aRequest = nullptr;
  return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows the addition of a new method implementation for GetDocumentRequest
2. The method returns NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED and sets the output parameter to nullptr
3. This appears to be a stub implementation that prevents potential null pointer dereferences by explicitly setting aRequest to nullptr
4. Without more context about the expected behavior, it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just implementing a required interface method safely
5. The change could potentially prevent issues where callers might expect a non-null request pointer, but we can't confirm if this was actually exploitable before the fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/rotate_45deg.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/rotate_45deg.html@@ -5,8 +5,7 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ebay Inc." href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#funcdef-transform-rotate"/>   <link rel="match" href="rotate_45deg-ref.html"/>-  <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=100-200">-  <meta name="flags" content="" />+  <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=50-200">   <meta name="assert" content="Rotate 45 degree in y axis"/>   <style type="text/css">       .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be test configuration adjustments rather than security patches. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/rotate_45deg.html [Lines] 5-7
[Old Code]
  <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=100-200">
  <meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
  <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=159-255;totalPixels=50-200">

The changes made are:
1. Removed an empty flags meta tag
2. Adjusted the pixel difference tolerance range in the fuzzy matching configuration (changed totalPixels from 100-200 to 50-200)

These changes appear to be related to test tolerance parameters rather than security fixes. No known vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.radians.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.radians.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.rotate(Math.PI); // should fail obviously if this is 3.1 degrees ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.radians.html] [Lines 17-27]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming `offscreenCanvas` variable to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No functional changes to the security properties of the code

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.copy.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.copy.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'copy'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis following your format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming (not a security issue) [File] [Lines 13-14, 22]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,191, "50,25", "0,0,255,191", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or brevity, without any security implications. The actual canvas operations and assertions remain unchanged.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-156.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-156.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p>This line should have a green background.</p>

Let me analyze the diff according to the provided format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No Security Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The change is likely related to test case maintenance rather than security

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag from a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/l10n/DOMLocalization.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/l10n/DOMLocalization.cpp@@ -203,8 +203,8 @@     mReturnValuePromise = aReturnValuePromise;   }-  virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                ErrorResult& aRv) override {     ErrorResult rv;     nsTArray<Nullable<L10nMessage>> l10nData;@@ -257,8 +257,8 @@     mReturnValuePromise->MaybeResolveWithUndefined();   }-  virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,-                                JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                                ErrorResult& aRv) override {     mReturnValuePromise->MaybeRejectWithClone(aCx, aValue);   }@@ -377,12 +377,13 @@   explicit L10nRootTranslationHandler(Element* aRoot) : mRoot(aRoot) {}-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     DOMLocalization::SetRootInfo(mRoot);   }-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {-  }+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {}  private:   ~L10nRootTranslationHandler() = default;

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/l10n/DOMLocalization.cpp] [Lines 203-204, 257-258, 377-378]  
   [Old Code]  
   `virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override`  
   `virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `virtual void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override`  
   `virtual void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override`  

   Additional Details: The changes add ErrorResult parameters to callback methods, which could improve error handling but doesn't clearly indicate a specific vulnerability fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/l10n/DOMLocalization.cpp] [Lines 377-382]  
   [Old Code]  
   `void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override { }`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override {}`  

   Additional Details: The empty rejected callback now includes an ErrorResult parameter, which might help with error propagation, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.

Note: While the changes appear to improve error handling patterns, there isn't enough context to determine if these changes specifically address known vulnerabilities or just improve general code robustness. The modifications primarily involve adding ErrorResult parameters to callback methods, which could help with proper error propagation but don't clearly fix any specific security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.negative.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.negative.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.arc(0, 0, -1, 0, 0, true); }); t.done();

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.negative.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The test's purpose (checking for INDEX_SIZE_ERR when passing negative radius to arc()) remains the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/picture.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/picture.rs@@ -2179,7 +2179,7 @@             // clip rect is zero. This makes sure we don't register any occluders             // that are actually off-screen.             self.local_clip_rect = clip_chain_instance.map_or(PictureRect::zero(), |clip_chain_instance| {-                clip_chain_instance.pic_clip_rect+                clip_chain_instance.pic_coverage_rect             });         }@@ -2579,7 +2579,7 @@         flags: PrimitiveFlags,         local_prim_rect: LayoutRect,         prim_spatial_node_index: SpatialNodeIndex,-        pic_clip_rect: PictureRect,+        pic_coverage_rect: PictureRect,         frame_context: &FrameVisibilityContext,         image_dependencies: &[ImageDependency;3],         api_keys: &[ImageKey; 3],@@ -2610,7 +2610,7 @@             flags,             local_prim_rect,             prim_spatial_node_index,-            pic_clip_rect,+            pic_coverage_rect,             frame_context,             ExternalSurfaceDependency::Yuv {                 image_dependencies: *image_dependencies,@@ -2633,7 +2633,7 @@         flags: PrimitiveFlags,         local_prim_rect: LayoutRect,         prim_spatial_node_index: SpatialNodeIndex,-        pic_clip_rect: PictureRect,+        pic_coverage_rect: PictureRect,         frame_context: &FrameVisibilityContext,         image_dependency: ImageDependency,         api_key: ImageKey,@@ -2668,7 +2668,7 @@             flags,             local_prim_rect,             prim_spatial_node_index,-            pic_clip_rect,+            pic_coverage_rect,             frame_context,             ExternalSurfaceDependency::Rgb {                 image_dependency,@@ -2690,7 +2690,7 @@         flags: PrimitiveFlags,         local_prim_rect: LayoutRect,         prim_spatial_node_index: SpatialNodeIndex,-        pic_clip_rect: PictureRect,+        pic_coverage_rect: PictureRect,         frame_context: &FrameVisibilityContext,         dependency: ExternalSurfaceDependency,         api_keys: &[ImageKey; 3],@@ -2878,7 +2878,7 @@         // Each compositor surface allocates a unique z-id         sub_slice.compositor_surfaces.push(CompositorSurface {-            prohibited_rect: pic_clip_rect,+            prohibited_rect: pic_coverage_rect,             is_opaque,             descriptor: ExternalSurfaceDescriptor {                 local_surface_size: local_prim_rect.size(),@@ -2969,11 +2969,11 @@         let prim_clip_chain = &prim_instance.vis.clip_chain;         // If the primitive is directly drawn onto this picture cache surface, then-        // the pic_clip_rect is in the same space. If not, we need to map it from+        // the pic_coverage_rect is in the same space. If not, we need to map it from         // the surface space into the picture cache space.         let on_picture_surface = prim_surface_index == self.surface_index;-        let pic_clip_rect = if on_picture_surface {-            prim_clip_chain.pic_clip_rect+        let pic_coverage_rect = if on_picture_surface {+            prim_clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect         } else {             // We want to get the rect in the tile cache surface space that this primitive             // occupies, in order to enable correct invalidation regions. Each surface@@ -2982,7 +2982,7 @@             // of nested blur elements). To account for this, step through the current             // surface stack, mapping the primitive rect into each surface space, including             // the inflation factor from each intermediate surface.-            let mut current_pic_clip_rect = prim_clip_chain.pic_clip_rect;+            let mut current_pic_coverage_rect = prim_clip_chain.pic_coverage_rect;             let mut current_spatial_node_index = frame_context                 .surfaces[prim_surface_index.0]                 .surface_spatial_node_index;@@ -3000,7 +3000,7 @@                 // Map the rect into the parent surface, and inflate if this surface requires                 // it. If the rect can't be mapping (e.g. due to an invalid transform) then                 // just bail out from the dependencies and cull this primitive.-                current_pic_clip_rect = match map_local_to_surface.map(&current_pic_clip_rect) {+                current_pic_coverage_rect = match map_local_to_surface.map(&current_pic_coverage_rect) {                     Some(rect) => {                         rect.inflate(surface.inflation_factor, surface.inflation_factor)                     }@@ -3012,11 +3012,11 @@                 current_spatial_node_index = surface.surface_spatial_node_index;             }-            current_pic_clip_rect+            current_pic_coverage_rect         };         // Get the tile coordinates in the picture space.-        let (p0, p1) = self.get_tile_coords_for_rect(&pic_clip_rect);+        let (p0, p1) = self.get_tile_coords_for_rect(&pic_coverage_rect);         // If the primitive is outside the tiling rects, it's known to not         // be visible.@@ -3027,7 +3027,7 @@         // Build the list of resources that this primitive has dependencies on.         let mut prim_info = PrimitiveDependencyInfo::new(             prim_instance.uid(),-            pic_clip_rect,+            pic_coverage_rect,         );         let mut sub_slice_index = self.sub_slices.len() - 1;@@ -3040,8 +3040,8 @@                 let mut intersects_prohibited_region = false;                 for surface in &mut sub_slice.compositor_surfaces {-                    if pic_clip_rect.intersects(&surface.prohibited_rect) {-                        surface.prohibited_rect = surface.prohibited_rect.union(&pic_clip_rect);+                    if pic_coverage_rect.intersects(&surface.prohibited_rect) {+                        surface.prohibited_rect = surface.prohibited_rect.union(&pic_coverage_rect);                         intersects_prohibited_region = true;                     }@@ -3110,7 +3110,7 @@                 };                 if color.a >= 1.0 {                     backdrop_candidate = Some(BackdropInfo {-                        opaque_rect: pic_clip_rect,+                        opaque_rect: pic_coverage_rect,                         kind: Some(BackdropKind::Color { color }),                     });                 }@@ -3154,7 +3154,7 @@                        image_data.tile_spacing == LayoutSize::zero() &&                        image_data.color.a >= 1.0 {                         backdrop_candidate = Some(BackdropInfo {-                            opaque_rect: pic_clip_rect,+                            opaque_rect: pic_coverage_rect,                             kind: None,                         });                     }@@ -3167,7 +3167,7 @@                         image_key.common.flags,                         local_prim_rect,                         prim_spatial_node_index,-                        pic_clip_rect,+                        pic_coverage_rect,                         frame_context,                         ImageDependency {                             key: image_data.key,@@ -3231,7 +3231,7 @@                         prim_data.common.flags,                         local_prim_rect,                         prim_spatial_node_index,-                        pic_clip_rect,+                        pic_coverage_rect,                         frame_context,                         &image_dependencies,                         &prim_data.kind.yuv_key,@@ -3273,7 +3273,7 @@             }             PrimitiveInstanceKind::Clear { .. } => {                 backdrop_candidate = Some(BackdropInfo {-                    opaque_rect: pic_clip_rect,+                    opaque_rect: pic_coverage_rect,                     kind: Some(BackdropKind::Clear),                 });             }@@ -3284,7 +3284,7 @@                     && gradient_data.tile_spacing == LayoutSize::zero()                 {                     backdrop_candidate = Some(BackdropInfo {-                        opaque_rect: pic_clip_rect,+                        opaque_rect: pic_coverage_rect,                         kind: None,                     });                 }@@ -3295,7 +3295,7 @@                     && gradient_data.tile_spacing == LayoutSize::zero()                 {                     backdrop_candidate = Some(BackdropInfo {-                        opaque_rect: pic_clip_rect,+                        opaque_rect: pic_coverage_rect,                         kind: None,                     });                 }@@ -3306,7 +3306,7 @@                     && gradient_data.tile_spacing == LayoutSize::zero()                 {                     backdrop_candidate = Some(BackdropInfo {-                        opaque_rect: pic_clip_rect,+                        opaque_rect: pic_coverage_rect,                         kind: None,                     });                 }@@ -3421,7 +3421,7 @@         prim_instance.vis.state = VisibilityState::Coarse {             filter: BatchFilter {-                rect_in_pic_space: pic_clip_rect,+                rect_in_pic_space: pic_coverage_rect,                 sub_slice_index: SubSliceIndex::new(sub_slice_index),             },             vis_flags,@@ -4250,7 +4250,7 @@         // For out-of-preserve-3d pictures, the backface visibility is determined by         // the local transform only.-        // Note: we aren't taking the transform relativce to the parent picture,+        // Note: we aren't taking the transform relative to the parent picture,         // since picture tree can be more dense than the corresponding spatial tree.         if !self.is_backface_visible {             if let Picture3DContext::Out = self.context_3d {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily renaming a variable from `pic_clip_rect` to `pic_coverage_rect` throughout the file, which seems to be a refactoring or terminology improvement rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] gfx/wr/webrender/src/picture.rs
[Old Code] Various instances of `pic_clip_rect`
[Fixed Code] Renamed to `pic_coverage_rect`

The changes are consistent throughout the file and appear to be:
1. A terminology change from "clip" to "coverage" to better represent what the rectangle is used for
2. No functional changes to the security properties of the code
3. No changes to how the rectangle values are calculated or used
4. No introduction or removal of security checks

The change seems focused on making the code's intent clearer rather than fixing any security issues. If there was a security motivation behind this change, it's not evident from the diff content provided.

Note: There is one comment typo fix ("relativce" -> "relative") at the end of the diff, but this is clearly not security-related.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/RenderCompositorNative.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/RenderCompositorNative.cpp@@ -96,11 +96,9 @@   return frameId; }-void RenderCompositorNative::Pause() { mNativeLayerRoot->PauseCompositor(); }--bool RenderCompositorNative::Resume() {-  return mNativeLayerRoot->ResumeCompositor();-}+void RenderCompositorNative::Pause() {}++bool RenderCompositorNative::Resume() { return true; } inline layers::WebRenderCompositor RenderCompositorNative::CompositorType()     const {

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Functionality Removal [File] gfx/webrender_bindings/RenderCompositorNative.cpp [Lines] 96-100  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   void RenderCompositorNative::Pause() { mNativeLayerRoot->PauseCompositor(); }
   
   bool RenderCompositorNative::Resume() {
     return mNativeLayerRoot->ResumeCompositor();
   }
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   void RenderCompositorNative::Pause() {}
   
   bool RenderCompositorNative::Resume() { return true; }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The diff shows removal of actual compositor pause/resume functionality, replacing it with empty/no-op implementations. While this might indicate a security fix (perhaps removing potentially unsafe operations), it could also represent a functionality change. Without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just refactoring.  

Note: The analysis shows a potential issue but cannot confirm it as a vulnerability without more context about why these functions were changed. The change could be related to security (removing potentially unsafe operations) or could simply be part of a larger architectural change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.radius.none.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.radius.none.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(RangeError, () => { ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [])}); t.done();

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.radius.none.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The test's functionality remains the same, only the variable name was modified for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/firefox-ui/tests/functional/safebrowsing/test_initial_download.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/firefox-ui/tests/functional/safebrowsing/test_initial_download.py@@ -41,12 +41,7 @@     prefs_safebrowsing = {         "browser.safebrowsing.debug": True,-        "browser.safebrowsing.blockedURIs.enabled": True,-        "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.enabled": True,-        "browser.safebrowsing.phishing.enabled": True,-        "browser.safebrowsing.malware.enabled": True,-        "privacy.trackingprotection.enabled": True,-        "privacy.trackingprotection.pbmode.enabled": True,+        "browser.safebrowsing.update.enabled": True,     }     def get_safebrowsing_files(self, is_v4):

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Overly Permissive Safe Browsing Settings] [testing/firefox-ui/tests/functional/safebrowsing/test_initial_download.py] [Lines 41-48]
    [Old Code]
    prefs_safebrowsing = {
        "browser.safebrowsing.debug": True,
        "browser.safebrowsing.blockedURIs.enabled": True,
        "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.enabled": True,
        "browser.safebrowsing.phishing.enabled": True,
        "browser.safebrowsing.malware.enabled": True,
        "privacy.trackingprotection.enabled": True,
        "privacy.trackingprotection.pbmode.enabled": True,
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    prefs_safebrowsing = {
        "browser.safebrowsing.debug": True,
        "browser.safebrowsing.update.enabled": True,
    }

Additional Details:
- The diff shows a significant reduction in safe browsing preferences being enabled for testing
- The change removes several security-related features from being enabled by default in tests (malware/phishing protection, download protection, tracking protection)
- While this might indicate these protections were being unnecessarily enabled for testing (potential false sense of security), it might also simply reflect a change in test requirements
- Without more context about the test's purpose, it's unclear if this represents a security fix or just test configuration simplification

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.4.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.rect(100, 25, 0, 0); ctx.lineTo(0, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 27]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or brevity. There are no security-related changes in this diff, no vulnerability fixes, and no changes to the actual functionality of the code. The test case remains the same, only the variable name has been updated.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@     // corresponding NS_ERROR_*.     // To do so we convert the response status to  an nsresult error     // Every NS_OK that is NOT an 4xx or 5xx error code won't get downgraded.-    if (responseStatus >= 400 && responseStatus < 512) {+    if (responseStatus >= 400 && responseStatus < 600) {       // HttpProxyResponseToErrorCode() maps 400 and 404 on       // the same error as a 500 status which would lead to no downgrade       // later on. For that reason we explicit filter for 400 and 404 status@@ -986,8 +986,11 @@   nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> origChannel = mDocumentLoadListener->GetChannel();   nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> origLoadInfo = origChannel->LoadInfo();   uint32_t origHttpsOnlyStatus = origLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();-  if ((origHttpsOnlyStatus &-       nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS)) {+  uint32_t topLevelLoadInProgress =+      origHttpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS;+  uint32_t downloadInProgress =+      origHttpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS;+  if (topLevelLoadInProgress || downloadInProgress) {     return NS_OK;   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. First Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    HTTP Status Code Range Vulnerability [dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp] [Lines 472]
    Old Code: `if (responseStatus >= 400 && responseStatus < 512) {`
    Fixed Code: `if (responseStatus >= 400 && responseStatus < 600) {`
    Additional Details: The original code only checked for status codes up to 511, which could miss some 5xx server errors. The fix expands the range to properly cover all HTTP error status codes (400-599).

2. Second Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    HTTPS-Only Mode Bypass Vulnerability [dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp] [Lines 986-991]
    Old Code: `if ((origHttpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS)) {`
    Fixed Code: The new code checks both `HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS` and `HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS` flags
    Additional Details: The original code only checked for top-level loads in progress, potentially allowing bypass of HTTPS-Only mode during downloads. The fix adds an additional check for downloads in progress.

Note: The second vulnerability doesn't have a widely recognized name, but it's clearly a security fix addressing a potential bypass of HTTPS-Only mode protections.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0% / 0.2)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0% / 0.2)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0% / 0.2)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the references accordingly. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.shared.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.shared.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var ctx2 = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx2.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.shared.worker.js [Lines] 13-21
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx2.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   var ctx2 = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
   ctx2.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/renaming (changing variable name from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') rather than addressing any security vulnerability. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security-related patterns or vulnerabilities are being fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/protocol/websocket/WebSocketChannel.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/protocol/websocket/WebSocketChannel.cpp@@ -399,23 +399,46 @@       }     }-    if (aChannel->mConnecting) {-      MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(), "not main thread");--      // Only way a connecting channel may get here w/o failing is if it was-      // closed with GOING_AWAY (1001) because of navigation, tab close, etc.-      MOZ_ASSERT(-          NS_FAILED(aReason) || aChannel->mScriptCloseCode == CLOSE_GOING_AWAY,-          "websocket closed while connecting w/o failing?");--      sManager->RemoveFromQueue(aChannel);--      bool wasNotQueued = (aChannel->mConnecting != CONNECTING_QUEUED);-      LOG(("Websocket: changing state to NOT_CONNECTING"));-      aChannel->mConnecting = NOT_CONNECTING;-      if (wasNotQueued) {-        sManager->ConnectNext(aChannel->mAddress, aChannel->mOriginSuffix);-      }+    if (NS_IsMainThread()) {+      ContinueOnStopSession(aChannel, aReason);+    } else {+      NS_DispatchToMainThread(NS_NewRunnableFunction(+          "nsWSAdmissionManager::ContinueOnStopSession",+          [channel = RefPtr{aChannel}, reason = aReason]() {+            StaticMutexAutoLock lock(sLock);+            if (!sManager) {+              return;+            }++            nsWSAdmissionManager::ContinueOnStopSession(channel, reason);+          }));+    }+  }++  static void ContinueOnStopSession(WebSocketChannel* aChannel,+                                    nsresult aReason) {+    sLock.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();+    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(), "not main thread");++    if (!aChannel->mConnecting) {+      return;+    }++    // Only way a connecting channel may get here w/o failing is if it+    // was closed with GOING_AWAY (1001) because of navigation, tab+    // close, etc.+    MOZ_ASSERT(+        NS_FAILED(aReason) || aChannel->mScriptCloseCode == CLOSE_GOING_AWAY,+        "websocket closed while connecting w/o failing?");+    Unused << aReason;++    sManager->RemoveFromQueue(aChannel);++    bool wasNotQueued = (aChannel->mConnecting != CONNECTING_QUEUED);+    LOG(("Websocket: changing state to NOT_CONNECTING"));+    aChannel->mConnecting = NOT_CONNECTING;+    if (wasNotQueued) {+      sManager->ConnectNext(aChannel->mAddress, aChannel->mOriginSuffix);     }   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Race Condition] [netwerk/protocol/websocket/WebSocketChannel.cpp] [Lines 399-423]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   if (aChannel->mConnecting) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(), "not main thread");
     // ... rest of the original code ...
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
     ContinueOnStopSession(aChannel, aReason);
   } else {
     NS_DispatchToMainThread(NS_NewRunnableFunction(
         "nsWSAdmissionManager::ContinueOnStopSession",
         [channel = RefPtr{aChannel}, reason = aReason]() {
           StaticMutexAutoLock lock(sLock);
           if (!sManager) {
             return;
           }
           nsWSAdmissionManager::ContinueOnStopSession(channel, reason);
         }));
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change adds thread-safety by ensuring the operation is performed on the main thread, potentially fixing a race condition. However, without more context, we can't be certain if this was an actual vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [netwerk/protocol/websocket/WebSocketChannel.cpp] [Lines 399-423]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   // Original code didn't check sManager existence
   sManager->RemoveFromQueue(aChannel);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   // New code checks sManager existence
   if (!sManager) {
     return;
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change adds a null check for sManager, potentially preventing a null pointer dereference. However, we can't be certain if this was an exploitable vulnerability.

The changes primarily focus on improving thread safety and adding null checks, which could potentially address race conditions and null pointer dereferences, but without more context about the actual impact, we can't definitively say these were security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/base/CacheConstants.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/base/CacheConstants.h@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@   static constexpr uint64_t DOMNodeID = ((uint64_t)0x1) << 5;   static constexpr uint64_t State = ((uint64_t)0x1) << 6;   static constexpr uint64_t GroupInfo = ((uint64_t)0x1) << 7;+  static constexpr uint64_t Actions = ((uint64_t)0x1) << 8;   static constexpr uint64_t All = ~((uint64_t)0x0); };

Here is the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Bitmask Expansion] [accessible/base/CacheConstants.h] [Lines 20-21]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   static constexpr uint64_t GroupInfo = ((uint64_t)0x1) << 7;
   static constexpr uint64_t All = ~((uint64_t)0x0);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   static constexpr uint64_t GroupInfo = ((uint64_t)0x1) << 7;
   static constexpr uint64_t Actions = ((uint64_t)0x1) << 8;
   static constexpr uint64_t All = ~((uint64_t)0x0);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The diff shows an addition of a new constant `Actions` to the bitmask. While this isn't a direct security fix, it could be related to fixing a potential issue where actions weren't properly tracked in accessibility features. Without more context, it's unclear if this was addressing a specific vulnerability or just adding functionality.  

Note: The diff appears to be adding functionality rather than directly fixing a security vulnerability. There are no obvious security issues being patched in this change. The `All` bitmask remains unchanged and would still include all bits, including the new `Actions` flag.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.rgb.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.order.rgb.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#48c'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations
- This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

No vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes are cosmetic in nature, improving code consistency or readability without altering functionality or addressing security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.