Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/src/data.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/src/data.h@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ void dav1d_data_ref(Dav1dData *dst, const Dav1dData *src); /**- * Copy the source properties to the destitionatin and increase the+ * Copy the source properties to the destination and increase the * user_data's reference count (if it's not NULL). */ void dav1d_data_props_copy(Dav1dDataProps *dst, const Dav1dDataProps *src);
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no Typo Fix [File] third_party/dav1d/src/data.h [Lines] 33-37 Old Code: "Copy the source properties to the destitionatin and increase the" Fixed Code: "Copy the source properties to the destination and increase the" Additional Details: - This change only fixes a typo in a comment (changing "destitionatin" to "destination") - No security vulnerability was addressed in this change - The modification doesn't affect any executable code, only documentation - The function's behavior and security implications remain unchanged No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely a documentation improvement.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/tests/chrome/test_styles-applied.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/tests/chrome/test_styles-applied.html@@ -38,96 +38,100 @@ runNextTest(); });-addTest(function inheritedUserStyles() {- promiseDone(gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node").then(node => {- return gStyles.getApplied(node, { inherited: true, filter: "user" });- }).then(applied => {- ok(!applied[0].inherited, "Entry 0 should be uninherited");- is(applied[0].rule.type, 100, "Entry 0 should be an element style");- ok(!!applied[0].rule.href, "Element styles should have a URL");- is(applied[0].rule.cssText, "", "Entry 0 should be an empty style");+addTest(async function inheritedUserStyles() {+ const node = await gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node")+ const applied = await gStyles.getApplied(node, { inherited: true, filter: "user" });- is(applied[1].inherited.id, "uninheritable-rule-inheritable-style",- "Entry 1 should be inherited from the parent");- is(applied[1].rule.type, 100, "Entry 1 should be an element style");- is(applied[1].rule.cssText, "color: red;",- "Entry 1 should have the expected cssText");+ ok(!applied[0].inherited, "Entry 0 should be uninherited");+ is(applied[0].rule.type, 100, "Entry 0 should be an element style");+ ok(!!applied[0].rule.href, "Element styles should have a URL");+ is(applied[0].rule.cssText, "", "Entry 0 should be an empty style");- is(applied[2].inherited.id, "inheritable-rule-inheritable-style",- "Entry 2 should be inherited from the parent's parent");- is(applied[2].rule.type, 100, "Entry 2 should be an element style");- is(applied[2].rule.cssText, "color: blue;",- "Entry 2 should have the expected cssText");+ is(applied[1].inherited.id, "uninheritable-rule-inheritable-style",+ "Entry 1 should be inherited from the parent");+ is(applied[1].rule.type, 100, "Entry 1 should be an element style");+ is(applied[1].rule.cssText, "color: red;",+ "Entry 1 should have the expected cssText");- is(applied[3].inherited.id, "inheritable-rule-inheritable-style",- "Entry 3 should be inherited from the parent's parent");- is(applied[3].rule.type, 1, "Entry 3 should be a rule style");- is(applied[3].rule.cssText, "font-size: 15px;",- "Entry 3 should have the expected cssText");- ok(!applied[3].matchedSelectors,- "Shouldn't get matchedSelectors with this request.");+ is(applied[2].inherited.id, "inheritable-rule-inheritable-style",+ "Entry 2 should be inherited from the parent's parent");+ is(applied[2].rule.type, 100, "Entry 2 should be an element style");+ is(applied[2].rule.cssText, "color: blue;",+ "Entry 2 should have the expected cssText");- is(applied[4].inherited.id, "inheritable-rule-uninheritable-style",- "Entry 4 should be inherited from the parent's parent");- is(applied[4].rule.type, 1, "Entry 4 should be an rule style");- is(applied[4].rule.cssText, "font-size: 15px;",- "Entry 4 should have the expected cssText");- ok(!applied[4].matchedSelectors, "Shouldn't get matchedSelectors with this request.");+ is(applied[3].inherited.id, "inheritable-rule-inheritable-style",+ "Entry 3 should be inherited from the parent's parent");+ is(applied[3].rule.type, 1, "Entry 3 should be a rule style");+ is(applied[3].rule.cssText, "font-size: 15px;",+ "Entry 3 should have the expected cssText");+ ok(!applied[3].matchedSelectors,+ "Shouldn't get matchedSelectors with this request.");- is(applied.length, 5, "Should have 5 rules.");- }).then(runNextTest));+ is(applied[4].inherited.id, "inheritable-rule-uninheritable-style",+ "Entry 4 should be inherited from the parent's parent");+ is(applied[4].rule.type, 1, "Entry 4 should be an rule style");+ is(applied[4].rule.cssText, "font-size: 15px;",+ "Entry 4 should have the expected cssText");+ ok(!applied[4].matchedSelectors, "Shouldn't get matchedSelectors with this request.");++ is(applied.length, 5, "Should have 5 rules.");++ runNextTest(); });-addTest(function inheritedSystemStyles() {- promiseDone(gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node").then(node => {- return gStyles.getApplied(node, { inherited: true, filter: "ua" });- }).then(applied => {- // If our system stylesheets are prone to churn, this might be a fragile- // test. If you're here because of that I apologize, file a bug- // and we can find a different way to test.+addTest(async function inheritedSystemStyles() {+ const node = await gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node");+ const applied = await gStyles.getApplied(node, { inherited: true, filter: "ua" });+ // If our system stylesheets are prone to churn, this might be a fragile+ // test. If you're here because of that I apologize, file a bug+ // and we can find a different way to test.- ok(!applied[1].inherited, "Entry 1 should not be inherited");- ok(applied[1].rule.parentStyleSheet.system, "Entry 1 should be a system style");- is(applied[1].rule.type, 1, "Entry 1 should be a rule style");+ ok(!applied[1].inherited, "Entry 1 should not be inherited");+ ok(applied[1].rule.parentStyleSheet.system, "Entry 1 should be a system style");+ is(applied[1].rule.type, 1, "Entry 1 should be a rule style");+ is(applied.length, 9, "Should have the expected number of rules.");- is(applied.length, 9, "Should have the expected number of rules.");- }).then(runNextTest));+ runNextTest(); });-addTest(function noInheritedStyles() {- promiseDone(gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node").then(node => {- return gStyles.getApplied(node, { inherited: false, filter: "user" });- }).then(applied => {- ok(!applied[0].inherited, "Entry 0 should be uninherited");- is(applied[0].rule.type, 100, "Entry 0 should be an element style");- is(applied[0].rule.cssText, "", "Entry 0 should be an empty style");- is(applied.length, 1, "Should have 1 rule.");- }).then(runNextTest));+addTest(async function noInheritedStyles() {+ const node = await gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node")+ const applied = await gStyles.getApplied(node, { inherited: false, filter: "user" });+ ok(!applied[0].inherited, "Entry 0 should be uninherited");+ is(applied[0].rule.type, 100, "Entry 0 should be an element style");+ is(applied[0].rule.cssText, "", "Entry 0 should be an empty style");+ is(applied.length, 1, "Should have 1 rule.");++ runNextTest(); });-addTest(function matchedSelectors() {- promiseDone(gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node").then(node => {- return gStyles.getApplied(node, {- inherited: true, filter: "user", matchedSelectors: true,- });- }).then(applied => {- is(applied[3].matchedSelectors[0], ".inheritable-rule",- "Entry 3 should have a matched selector");- is(applied[4].matchedSelectors[0], ".inheritable-rule",- "Entry 4 should have a matched selector");- }).then(runNextTest));+addTest(async function matchedSelectors() {+ const node = await gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#test-node");+ const applied = await gStyles.getApplied(node, {+ inherited: true, filter: "user", matchedSelectors: true,+ });+ is(applied[3].matchedSelectors[0], ".inheritable-rule",+ "Entry 3 should have a matched selector");+ is(applied[4].matchedSelectors[0], ".inheritable-rule",+ "Entry 4 should have a matched selector");++ runNextTest(); });-addTest(function testMediaQuery() {- promiseDone(gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#mediaqueried").then(node => {- return gStyles.getApplied(node, {- inherited: false, filter: "user", matchedSelectors: true,- });- }).then(applied => {- is(applied[1].rule.type, 1, "Entry 1 is a rule style");- is(applied[1].rule.parentRule.type, 4, "Entry 1's parent rule is a media rule");- is(applied[1].rule.media[0], "screen", "Entry 1's rule has the expected medium");- }).then(runNextTest));+addTest(async function testMediaQuery() {+ const node = await gWalker.querySelector(gWalker.rootNode, "#mediaqueried")+ const applied = await gStyles.getApplied(node, {+ inherited: false,+ filter: "user",+ matchedSelectors: true,+ });++ const ruleWithMedia = applied[1].rule;+ is(ruleWithMedia.type, 1, "Entry 1 is a rule style");+ is(ruleWithMedia.ancestorData[0].type, "media", "Entry 1's rule ancestor data holds the media rule data...");+ is(ruleWithMedia.ancestorData[0].value, "screen", "...with the expected value");++ runNextTest(); }); addTest(function cleanup() {
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily refactoring from promise chains to async/await syntax and some test logic adjustments. Here's the analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/server/tests/chrome/test_styles-applied.html [Lines 38-140] [Old Code] Promise chain implementation [Fixed Code] Async/await implementation 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/server/tests/chrome/test_styles-applied.html [Lines 38-140] [Old Code] Test assertions with direct rule checks [Fixed Code] Modified test assertions for media query handling The changes are primarily: 1. Converting promise chains to async/await syntax for better readability 2. Modifying how media query tests are performed (changing from checking parentRule to ancestorData) 3. General code style improvements None of these changes appear to address security vulnerabilities but rather improve code quality and test reliability. The test functionality remains essentially the same, just implemented with more modern JavaScript syntax.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/README.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/README.md@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ * Static Files and Directories * Websockets * Access logging+* Gzip, Deflate, and Brotli compression Since it builds on top of [hyper](https://hyper.rs), you automatically get:
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found in README.md update File: third_party/rust/warp/README.md Lines: 20 Old Code: (no mention of compression features) Fixed Code: Added "* Gzip, Deflate, and Brotli compression" to feature list Additional Details: - This appears to be a documentation update adding mention of compression support features - No actual code changes were made, just documentation - The addition of compression feature documentation doesn't indicate any security fixes - Without seeing actual code changes, we can't assess security implications of the compression features themselves The diff only shows an update to the feature list in the README.md file, which doesn't contain any security fixes or vulnerabilities. It's simply adding documentation about existing compression capabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-anchor-center-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-anchor-center-001.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <title>CSS Test: Anchor of the element</title> <link rel="author" title="Jihye Hong" href="mailto:[email protected]" /> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/motion-1/#polar-anchor-property">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the representative point of the element specified with 'polar-anchor'."> <style type="text/css"> .container {
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-anchor-center-001.html] [Lines 4-7] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] [Removed line] Additional Details: The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be a testing-related metadata field. This doesn't appear to be security-related but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's just removing an unused or redundant HTML element. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either the old or new code, and the change doesn't appear to be security-motivated. The modification is likely for code cleanliness or test suite maintenance purposes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libdav1d/version.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libdav1d/version.h@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ #ifndef DAV1D_VERSION_H #define DAV1D_VERSION_H-#define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MAJOR 5-#define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MINOR 1+#define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MAJOR 9+#define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MINOR 2 #define DAV1D_API_VERSION_PATCH 0 #endif /* DAV1D_VERSION_H */
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Version Update] [media/libdav1d/version.h] [Lines 27-28] [Old Code] #define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MAJOR 5 #define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MINOR 1 [Fixed Code] #define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MAJOR 9 #define DAV1D_API_VERSION_MINOR 2 Additional Details: - This appears to be a version number update for the libdav1d library (from 5.1.0 to 9.2.0) - While version updates often include security fixes, the diff alone doesn't provide enough context to determine specific vulnerabilities addressed - No direct security vulnerability is evident from just the version number change - The change suggests an upgrade to a newer version of libdav1d which likely includes various improvements and potentially security fixes
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/microphone-reporting.https.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/microphone-reporting.https.html@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ var check_report_format = (reports, observer) => { let report = reports[0];- assert_equals(report.type, "feature-policy-violation");+ assert_equals(report.type, "permissions-policy-violation"); assert_equals(report.url, document.location.href); assert_equals(report.body.featureId, "microphone"); assert_equals(report.body.sourceFile, document.location.href);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ }; new ReportingObserver(t.step_func_done(check_report_format),- {types: ['feature-policy-violation']}).observe();+ {types: ['permissions-policy-violation']}).observe(); setMediaPermission().then(() => navigator.mediaDevices.getUserMedia({audio: true})) .then(
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
Feature Policy to Permissions Policy Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/microphone-reporting.https.html] [Lines 13,23]
[Old Code]
assert_equals(report.type, "feature-policy-violation");
...
{types: ['feature-policy-violation']}).observe();
[Fixed Code]
assert_equals(report.type, "permissions-policy-violation");
...
{types: ['permissions-policy-violation']}).observe();
Additional Details:
This appears to be a standard update reflecting the renaming from "Feature Policy" to "Permissions Policy" in the web platform specification. The change is consistent with the W3C specification update (https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/blob/main/CHANGES.md). There's no security vulnerability being fixed here, just a terminology update to match the current specification.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/content-src/lib/aboutwelcome-utils.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/content-src/lib/aboutwelcome-utils.js@@ -53,27 +53,50 @@ export const DEFAULT_RTAMO_CONTENT = { template: "return_to_amo",+ utm_term: "rtamo",+ totalNumberOfScreens: 1,+ order: 0, content: {- header: { string_id: "onboarding-welcome-header" },- subtitle: { string_id: "return-to-amo-subtitle" },- text: {+ hero_text: { string_id: "mr1-welcome-screen-hero-text" },+ title: { string_id: "return-to-amo-subtitle" },+ subtitle: { string_id: "return-to-amo-addon-title", },+ help_text: {+ text: { string_id: "mr1-onboarding-welcome-image-caption" },+ },+ hideLogo: true,+ background_url:+ "chrome://activity-stream/content/data/content/assets/proton-bkg.avif", primary_button: { label: { string_id: "return-to-amo-add-extension-label" },+ source_id: "ADD_EXTENSION_BUTTON", action: { type: "INSTALL_ADDON_FROM_URL", data: { url: null, telemetrySource: "rtamo" }, }, },- startButton: {+ secondary_button: { label: { string_id: "onboarding-not-now-button-label", },- message_id: "RTAMO_START_BROWSING_BUTTON",+ source_id: "RTAMO_START_BROWSING_BUTTON", action: { type: "OPEN_AWESOME_BAR", }, },+ secondary_button_top: {+ label: {+ string_id: "mr1-onboarding-sign-in-button-label",+ },+ source_id: "RTAMO_FXA_SIGNIN_BUTTON",+ action: {+ data: {+ entrypoint: "activity-stream-firstrun",+ },+ type: "SHOW_FIREFOX_ACCOUNTS",+ addFlowParams: true,+ },+ }, }, };
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific security vulnerability was identified in this diff. The changes appear to be feature enhancements and UI improvements rather than security fixes. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Exposure] [browser/components/newtab/content-src/lib/aboutwelcome-utils.js] [Lines 53-50] [Old Code] (No background_url was specified) [Fixed Code] background_url: "chrome://activity-stream/content/data/content/assets/proton-bkg.avif" Additional Details: While not clearly a vulnerability, adding a background_url could potentially expose internal paths, though in this case it's using a chrome:// URI which is standard for Firefox extensions. 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Clickjacking Risk] [browser/components/newtab/content-src/lib/aboutwelcome-utils.js] [Lines 53-50] [Old Code] (Simpler button structure) [Fixed Code] (More complex button structure with additional actions) Additional Details: The addition of more interactive elements (buttons with various actions) could potentially increase the attack surface, though no specific vulnerability is evident in the changes. Note: The changes primarily appear to be UI/UX improvements with additional buttons and styling options rather than security fixes. The added functionality (like SHOW_FIREFOX_ACCOUNTS action) follows existing patterns in the codebase.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex3.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '#g00'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
try { ctx.fillStyle = '#g00'; } catch (e) { }
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
try { ctx.fillStyle = '#g00'; } catch (e) { }
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding references. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The test continues to perform the same validation of canvas fillStyle parsing behavior.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.lineJoin.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.lineJoin.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.lineJoin;
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.lineJoin.html] [Lines 17-18]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
- This change appears to be purely a variable naming convention change (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`), not a security fix.
- No security vulnerability is being addressed here, just a code style/readability improvement.
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.
No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-offsets-absolute-left-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-offsets-absolute-left-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation"> <link rel="match" href="calc-offsets-relative-left-1-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { margin: 0 100px; width: 200px } body > div { height: 3px; position: relative }
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't have any security implications.
Here's the structured response:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-offsets-absolute-left-1.html] [Lines 5]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Removed line]
The change is purely cosmetic/structural, removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag. There's no indication this was related to any security fix. The "flags" meta tag appears to have been used for test configuration purposes, and its removal doesn't impact security.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/typenum/src/int.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/typenum/src/int.rs@@ -38,12 +38,14 @@ /// Type-level signed integers with positive sign. #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]+#[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))] pub struct PInt<U: Unsigned + NonZero> { pub(crate) n: U, } /// Type-level signed integers with negative sign. #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]+#[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))] pub struct NInt<U: Unsigned + NonZero> { pub(crate) n: U, }@@ -66,6 +68,7 @@ /// The type-level signed integer 0. #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]+#[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))] pub struct Z0; impl Z0 {
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] third_party/rust/typenum/src/int.rs [Lines 38-68] [Old Code] Various struct definitions without `#[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))]` [Fixed Code] Same struct definitions with added `#[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))]` The changes simply add conditional derivation of `scale_info::TypeInfo` for the structs when the "scale_info" feature is enabled. This appears to be a feature enhancement rather than a security fix. There are no changes to the actual logic or data handling that would indicate a security vulnerability being addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.shape.curve2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.shape.curve2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var tol = 1.5; // tolerance to avoid antialiasing artifacts ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ ctx.moveTo(10, 25); ctx.arcTo(75, 25, 75, 60, 20); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 55,19, 0,255,0,255, "55,19", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 55,20, 0,255,0,255, "55,20", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 55,21, 0,255,0,255, "55,21", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 64,22, 0,255,0,255, "64,22", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 65,21, 0,255,0,255, "65,21", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 72,28, 0,255,0,255, "72,28", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 73,27, 0,255,0,255, "73,27", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 78,36, 0,255,0,255, "78,36", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,35, 0,255,0,255, "79,35", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 80,44, 0,255,0,255, "80,44", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 80,45, 0,255,0,255, "80,45", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 80,46, 0,255,0,255, "80,46", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 55,19, 0,255,0,255, "55,19", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 55,20, 0,255,0,255, "55,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 55,21, 0,255,0,255, "55,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 64,22, 0,255,0,255, "64,22", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 65,21, 0,255,0,255, "65,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 72,28, 0,255,0,255, "72,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 73,27, 0,255,0,255, "73,27", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 78,36, 0,255,0,255, "78,36", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,35, 0,255,0,255, "79,35", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 80,44, 0,255,0,255, "80,44", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 80,45, 0,255,0,255, "80,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 80,46, 0,255,0,255, "80,46", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 32-46]
Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
```
```javascript
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
```
```javascript
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
The changes in this diff are purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this change - it's simply a variable naming improvement for consistency or readability. The functionality remains exactly the same.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/sync/browser_contextmenu_sendtab.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/sync/browser_contextmenu_sendtab.js@@ -15,16 +15,19 @@ id: 1, name: "Foo", availableCommands: { "https://identity.mozilla.com/cmd/open-uri": "baz" },+ lastAccessTime: Date.now(), }, { id: 2, name: "Bar", availableCommands: { "https://identity.mozilla.com/cmd/open-uri": "boo" },+ lastAccessTime: Date.now() + 60000, // add 30min }, { id: 3, name: "Baz", clientRecord: "bar",+ lastAccessTime: Date.now() + 120000, // add 60min }, // Legacy send tab target (no availableCommands). { id: 4, name: "Homer" }, // Incompatible target. ];
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [browser_contextmenu_sendtab.js] [Lines 15-28]
Old Code: Devices array without lastAccessTime
Fixed Code: Devices array with lastAccessTime added
Additional details:
- The changes appear to be adding timestamp information (lastAccessTime) to device objects in a test file
- This seems to be test data enhancement rather than a security fix
- No obvious security vulnerability patterns are present in the diff (no XSS, injection, auth issues, etc.)
- The changes are related to adding metadata for testing purposes
The modification adds timing information to test devices, likely to support more comprehensive testing scenarios, but doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability. The availableCommands field was already properly formatted with full URLs in both versions.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-09.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-09.js@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ "Should increase float numbers correctly" );+ widget.destroy(); triggerKey = null; });
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Leak] [devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-09.js] [Lines 127]
[Old Code]
(No explicit widget destruction)
[Fixed Code]
widget.destroy();
Additional Details:
- The diff shows the addition of `widget.destroy()` call before setting `triggerKey` to null.
- This appears to be a cleanup/fix for potential resource management, but it's not clear if this was causing an actual security vulnerability or just a best practice improvement.
- Without more context about what `widget` represents or how it's used, we can't definitively say this was a security fix, though it does appear to be a memory/resource management improvement.
- The change is in a test file, which typically wouldn't contain production vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/test/perf/perftest_http3_google_search.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/test/perf/perftest_http3_google_search.js@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ /* eslint-env node */ /*-Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enabled:true` is+Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enable:true` is set for this test. */
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [netwerk/test/perf/perftest_http3_google_search.js] [Lines 4] [Old Code] `Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enabled:true` is` [Fixed Code] `Ensure the `--firefox.preference=network.http.http3.enable:true` is` Additional Details: This appears to be a simple correction of a preference name from "network.http.http3.enabled" to "network.http.http3.enable". There's no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed - it's likely just a configuration update or correction of a typo in the preference name. The change is in a test file's comment, not in actual executable code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-04.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-04.js@@ -100,4 +100,5 @@ ); widget._mouseUp();+ widget.destroy(); });
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Leak] [devtools/client/shared/test/browser_filter-editor-04.js] [Lines 100-103]
[Old Code]
widget._mouseUp();
});
[Fixed Code]
widget._mouseUp();
widget.destroy();
});
Analysis: The diff shows the addition of `widget.destroy()` call. This appears to be fixing a potential resource leak by properly cleaning up the widget object after use. While not a direct security vulnerability, resource leaks can potentially lead to memory exhaustion or other stability issues that could be exploited. However, since this is in test code, the security impact would be minimal.
Note: There isn't enough context to determine if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code quality. The change is good practice but may not necessarily indicate a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozpack/packager/l10n.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozpack/packager/l10n.py@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ self._dictionaries = {} def add(self, path, file):+ base, relpath = self._get_base(path) if path.endswith(".dic"):- base, relpath = self._get_base(path) if relpath.startswith("dictionaries/"): root, ext = mozpath.splitext(mozpath.basename(path)) self._dictionaries[root] = path@@ -112,6 +112,14 @@ # The GeneratedFile content is only really generated after # all calls to formatter.add. file = GeneratedFile(lambda: json.dumps(data))+ elif relpath.startswith("META-INF/"):+ # Ignore signatures inside omnijars. We drop these items: if we+ # don't treat them as omnijar resources, they will be included in+ # the top-level package, and that's not how omnijars are signed (Bug+ # 1750676). If we treat them as omnijar resources, they will stay+ # in the omnijar, as expected -- but the signatures won't be valid+ # after repacking. Therefore, drop them.+ return super(L10NRepackFormatterMixin, self).add(path, file)
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Potential Security Bypass via Improper Signature Handling] [python/mozbuild/mozpack/packager/l10n.py] [Lines 101-112]
[Old Code]
```python
def add(self, path, file):
if path.endswith(".dic"):
base, relpath = self._get_base(path)
if relpath.startswith("dictionaries/"):
root, ext = mozpath.splitext(mozpath.basename(path))
self._dictionaries[root] = path
```
[Fixed Code]
```python
def add(self, path, file):
base, relpath = self._get_base(path)
if path.endswith(".dic"):
if relpath.startswith("dictionaries/"):
root, ext = mozpath.splitext(mozpath.basename(path))
self._dictionaries[root] = path
```
Additional Details: The fix moves the `_get_base` call outside the conditional, ensuring path processing occurs for all files, not just `.dic` files. This prevents potential security issues where other file types might bypass proper validation.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Invalid Signature Handling in Omnijar] [python/mozbuild/mozpack/packager/l10n.py] [Lines 112+]
[Old Code]
```python
# No explicit handling of META-INF/ files
```
[Fixed Code]
```python
elif relpath.startswith("META-INF/"):
# Ignore signatures inside omnijars. We drop these items...
return
```
Additional Details: The fix explicitly drops signature files in META-INF directories to prevent invalid signatures after repacking (Bug 1750676). Without this, repacked omnijars could contain invalid signatures that might be misinterpreted as valid.
The changes appear to address two security-related issues: 1) ensuring consistent path processing for all file types, and 2) properly handling digital signatures during repackaging operations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_tabs_executeScript.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_tabs_executeScript.html@@ -133,8 +133,11 @@ }).then(result => { browser.test.fail("Expected error when specifying invalid frame ID"); }, error => {- browser.test.assertEq(`Frame not found, or missing host permission`,- error.message, "Got expected error");+ browser.test.assertEq(+ `Invalid frame IDs: [${Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER}].`,+ error.message,+ "Got expected error"+ ); }), browser.tabs.create({url: "http://example.net/", active: false}).then(async tab => {
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Incorrect Error Handling for Frame ID Validation [mobile/android/components/extensions/test/mochitest/test_ext_tabs_executeScript.html] [Lines 133-138]
Old Code:
browser.test.assertEq(`Frame not found, or missing host permission`,
error.message, "Got expected error");
Fixed Code:
browser.test.assertEq(
`Invalid frame IDs: [${Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER}].`,
error.message,
"Got expected error"
);
Additional Details:
The change shows a modification in error handling for frame ID validation. The old code had a generic error message about "Frame not found or missing host permission", while the new code specifically validates frame IDs and provides a more accurate error message when an invalid frame ID (Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) is provided. This suggests there might have been a potential security issue where invalid frame IDs weren't being properly validated before.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless_neon.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless_neon.c@@ -188,17 +188,21 @@ return avg; }-static uint32_t Predictor5_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {- return Average3_NEON(left, top[0], top[1]);-}-static uint32_t Predictor6_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {- return Average2_NEON(left, top[-1]);-}-static uint32_t Predictor7_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {- return Average2_NEON(left, top[0]);-}-static uint32_t Predictor13_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {- return ClampedAddSubtractHalf_NEON(left, top[0], top[-1]);+static uint32_t Predictor5_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,+ const uint32_t* const top) {+ return Average3_NEON(*left, top[0], top[1]);+}+static uint32_t Predictor6_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,+ const uint32_t* const top) {+ return Average2_NEON(*left, top[-1]);+}+static uint32_t Predictor7_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,+ const uint32_t* const top) {+ return Average2_NEON(*left, top[0]);+}+static uint32_t Predictor13_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,+ const uint32_t* const top) {+ return ClampedAddSubtractHalf_NEON(*left, top[0], top[-1]); } // Batch versions of those functions.
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Buffer Overflow/Incorrect Pointer Usage [File] media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless_neon.c [Lines 188-201]
[Old Code]
static uint32_t Predictor5_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {
return Average3_NEON(left, top[0], top[1]);
}
[Fixed Code]
static uint32_t Predictor5_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,
const uint32_t* const top) {
return Average3_NEON(*left, top[0], top[1]);
}
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Buffer Overflow/Incorrect Pointer Usage [File] media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless_neon.c [Lines 188-201]
[Old Code]
static uint32_t Predictor6_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {
return Average2_NEON(left, top[-1]);
}
[Fixed Code]
static uint32_t Predictor6_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,
const uint32_t* const top) {
return Average2_NEON(*left, top[-1]);
}
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Buffer Overflow/Incorrect Pointer Usage [File] media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless_neon.c [Lines 188-201]
[Old Code]
static uint32_t Predictor7_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {
return Average2_NEON(left, top[0]);
}
[Fixed Code]
static uint32_t Predictor7_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,
const uint32_t* const top) {
return Average2_NEON(*left, top[0]);
}
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Buffer Overflow/Incorrect Pointer Usage [File] media/libwebp/src/dsp/lossless_neon.c [Lines 188-201]
[Old Code]
static uint32_t Predictor13_NEON(uint32_t left, const uint32_t* const top) {
return ClampedAddSubtractHalf_NEON(left, top[0], top[-1]);
}
[Fixed Code]
static uint32_t Predictor13_NEON(const uint32_t* const left,
const uint32_t* const top) {
return ClampedAddSubtractHalf_NEON(*left, top[0], top[-1]);
}
The changes involve modifying the function signatures to take pointers to uint32_t instead of direct uint32_t values. While this could potentially relate to security fixes (such as preventing buffer overflows by ensuring proper pointer usage), without more context about how these functions are called and what values are passed, I can't be certain if there was an actual vulnerability being fixed. The changes appear to be more about consistency in pointer usage rather than fixing a specific known vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.zero.3.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.roundRect(50, 25, 0, 0, [0]); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:
1. Variable Renaming Changes:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 17-18, 27]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, but this doesn't represent any security fix. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security-related patterns (like input validation, sanitization, or security-sensitive operations) were modified in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.