Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/aboutwelcome/content/aboutwelcome.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/aboutwelcome/content/aboutwelcome.css@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ body { --grey-subtitle-1: #696977;- --welcome-header-text-color-1: #20133A; --newtab-button-secondary-color: #0060DF; font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", "Ubuntu", "Helvetica Neue", sans-serif; font-size: 16px;@@ -45,7 +44,6 @@ } body[lwt-newtab-brighttext] { --grey-subtitle-1: #FFF;- --welcome-header-text-color-1: #7542E5; --newtab-button-secondary-color: #FFF; }@@ -134,6 +132,9 @@ visibility: hidden; padding: unset; margin-top: 50px;+}+.onboardingContainer .hide-rtamo-icon {+ display: none; } .onboardingContainer .welcome-text { display: flex;@@ -600,6 +601,9 @@ line-height: 16px; padding: 11px 15px; transition: var(--transition);+}+.onboardingContainer .primary.rtamo {+ margin-top: 24px; } .onboardingContainer .noodle { display: block;@@ -1021,76 +1025,3 @@ translate: 0 calc(2 * var(--translate)); transition-delay: 0.4s; }-.onboardingContainer.rtamo {- background-color: var(--newtab-background-color-1);- background: none;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .screen {- flex-flow: column nowrap;- align-items: center;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .brand-logo {- background: url("chrome://branding/content/about-logo.svg") top center/112px no-repeat;- width: 112px;- padding: 112px 0 20px;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text {- display: flex;- flex-direction: column;- justify-content: center;- align-items: center;- margin-bottom: 20px;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h1,-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h2 {- width: 860px;-}-@media (max-width: 866px) {- .onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h1,-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h2 {- width: 530px;- }-}-@media (max-width: 610px) {- .onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h1,-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h2 {- width: 430px;- }-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h1 {- font-size: 48px;- line-height: 56px;- font-weight: bold;- margin: 0 6px;- color: var(--welcome-header-text-color-1);-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text h2 {- font-size: 18px;- font-weight: normal;- margin: 10px 6px 0;- color: var(--grey-subtitle-1);- line-height: 28px;- max-width: 750px;- letter-spacing: -0.01em;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text img {- margin-inline: 2px;- width: 20px;- height: 20px;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text .primary {- font-size: 16px;- padding: 12px 20px;- margin: 20px 0 0;- font-weight: inherit;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text .secondary {- background-color: initial;- padding: 0;- color: var(--newtab-button-secondary-color);- margin-top: 14px;- font-weight: inherit;-}-.onboardingContainer.rtamo .welcome-text .secondary:hover {- text-decoration: underline;-}
After analyzing the provided CSS diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily stylistic and structural modifications rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 37-45]
[Old Code]
body {
--grey-subtitle-1: #696977;
--welcome-header-text-color-1: #20133A;
--newtab-button-secondary-color: #0060DF;
font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", "Ubuntu", "Helvetica Neue", sans-serif;
font-size: 16px;
}
body[lwt-newtab-brighttext] {
--grey-subtitle-1: #FFF;
--welcome-header-text-color-1: #7542E5;
--newtab-button-secondary-color: #FFF;
}
[Fixed Code]
body {
--grey-subtitle-1: #696977;
--newtab-button-secondary-color: #0060DF;
font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", "Ubuntu", "Helvetica Neue", sans-serif;
font-size: 16px;
}
body[lwt-newtab-brighttext] {
--grey-subtitle-1: #FFF;
--newtab-button-secondary-color: #FFF;
}
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 1021-1025]
[Old Code]
.onboardingContainer.rtamo {
background-color: var(--newtab-background-color-1);
background: none;
}
[Removed Code]
(Entire .onboardingContainer.rtamo section was removed)
The changes consist of:
1. Removal of color variables and related styles
2. Addition of new CSS classes (.hide-rtamo-icon and .primary.rtamo)
3. Removal of the entire .onboardingContainer.rtamo section
4. Minor style adjustments
These appear to be design/theme changes rather than security fixes. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this CSS diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/aboutDialog.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/aboutDialog.js@@ -23,27 +23,25 @@ return; }- var distroId = Services.prefs.getCharPref("distribution.id", "");+ let defaults = Services.prefs.getDefaultBranch(null);+ let distroId = defaults.getCharPref("distribution.id", ""); if (distroId) {- var distroAbout = Services.prefs.getStringPref("distribution.about", "");+ let distroAbout = defaults.getStringPref("distribution.about", ""); // If there is about text, we always show it. if (distroAbout) {- var distroField = document.getElementById("distribution");+ let distroField = document.getElementById("distribution"); distroField.value = distroAbout; distroField.style.display = "block"; } // If it's not a mozilla distribution, show the rest, // unless about text exists, then we always show. if (!distroId.startsWith("mozilla-") || distroAbout) {- var distroVersion = Services.prefs.getCharPref(- "distribution.version",- ""- );+ let distroVersion = defaults.getCharPref("distribution.version", ""); if (distroVersion) { distroId += " - " + distroVersion; }- var distroIdField = document.getElementById("distributionId");+ let distroIdField = document.getElementById("distributionId"); distroIdField.value = distroId; distroIdField.style.display = "block"; }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leakage] [browser/base/content/aboutDialog.js] [Lines 23-27]
[Old Code]
```javascript
var distroId = Services.prefs.getCharPref("distribution.id", "");
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
let defaults = Services.prefs.getDefaultBranch(null);
let distroId = defaults.getCharPref("distribution.id", "");
```
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leakage] [browser/base/content/aboutDialog.js] [Lines 29-30]
[Old Code]
```javascript
var distroAbout = Services.prefs.getStringPref("distribution.about", "");
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
let distroAbout = defaults.getStringPref("distribution.about", "");
```
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leakage] [browser/base/content/aboutDialog.js] [Lines 36-39]
[Old Code]
```javascript
var distroVersion = Services.prefs.getCharPref(
"distribution.version",
""
);
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
let distroVersion = defaults.getCharPref("distribution.version", "");
```
The changes appear to be switching from using direct preference access to using the default branch of preferences. While this might indicate a security improvement (potentially preventing information leakage or unauthorized preference access), I can't be certain without more context about the threat model or what these preferences contain. The changes could also be related to code style or maintainability rather than security.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/dist/parser-worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/dist/parser-worker.js@@ -8524,8 +8524,6 @@ var t = _interopRequireWildcard(__webpack_require__(2));-var _isEmpty = _interopRequireDefault(__webpack_require__(686));- var _sources = __webpack_require__(687); function _getRequireWildcardCache(nodeInterop) { if (typeof WeakMap !== "function") return null; var cacheBabelInterop = new WeakMap(); var cacheNodeInterop = new WeakMap(); return (_getRequireWildcardCache = function (nodeInterop) { return nodeInterop ? cacheNodeInterop : cacheBabelInterop; })(nodeInterop); }@@ -8681,7 +8679,7 @@ function traverseAst(sourceId, visitor, state) { const ast = getAst(sourceId);- if ((0, _isEmpty.default)(ast)) {+ if (!ast || Object.keys(ast).length == 0) { return null; }@@ -8957,41 +8955,7 @@ } /***/ }),-/* 577 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var baseGetTag = __webpack_require__(569),- isObjectLike = __webpack_require__(565);--/** `Object#toString` result references. */-var symbolTag = '[object Symbol]';--/**- * Checks if `value` is classified as a `Symbol` primitive or object.- *- * @static- * @memberOf _- * @since 4.0.0- * @category Lang- * @param {*} value The value to check.- * @returns {boolean} Returns `true` if `value` is a symbol, else `false`.- * @example- *- * _.isSymbol(Symbol.iterator);- * // => true- *- * _.isSymbol('abc');- * // => false- */-function isSymbol(value) {- return typeof value == 'symbol' ||- (isObjectLike(value) && baseGetTag(value) == symbolTag);-}--module.exports = isSymbol;---/***/ }),+/* 577 */, /* 578 */ /***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {@@ -12315,109 +12279,9 @@ } /***/ }),-/* 604 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var toFinite = __webpack_require__(844);--/**- * Converts `value` to an integer.- *- * **Note:** This method is loosely based on- * [`ToInteger`](http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/7.0/#sec-tointeger).- *- * @static- * @memberOf _- * @since 4.0.0- * @category Lang- * @param {*} value The value to convert.- * @returns {number} Returns the converted integer.- * @example- *- * _.toInteger(3.2);- * // => 3- *- * _.toInteger(Number.MIN_VALUE);- * // => 0- *- * _.toInteger(Infinity);- * // => 1.7976931348623157e+308- *- * _.toInteger('3.2');- * // => 3- */-function toInteger(value) {- var result = toFinite(value),- remainder = result % 1;-- return result === result ? (remainder ? result - remainder : result) : 0;-}--module.exports = toInteger;---/***/ }),-/* 605 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var baseToString = __webpack_require__(639);--/**- * Converts `value` to a string. An empty string is returned for `null`- * and `undefined` values. The sign of `-0` is preserved.- *- * @static- * @memberOf _- * @since 4.0.0- * @category Lang- * @param {*} value The value to convert.- * @returns {string} Returns the converted string.- * @example- *- * _.toString(null);- * // => ''- *- * _.toString(-0);- * // => '-0'- *- * _.toString([1, 2, 3]);- * // => '1,2,3'- */-function toString(value) {- return value == null ? '' : baseToString(value);-}--module.exports = toString;---/***/ }),-/* 606 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var isSymbol = __webpack_require__(577);--/** Used as references for various `Number` constants. */-var INFINITY = 1 / 0;--/**- * Converts `value` to a string key if it's not a string or symbol.- *- * @private- * @param {*} value The value to inspect.- * @returns {string|symbol} Returns the key.- */-function toKey(value) {- if (typeof value == 'string' || isSymbol(value)) {- return value;- }- var result = (value + '');- return (result == '0' && (1 / value) == -INFINITY) ? '-0' : result;-}--module.exports = toKey;---/***/ }),+/* 604 */,+/* 605 */,+/* 606 */, /* 607 */, /* 608 */, /* 609 */,@@ -14913,111 +14777,9 @@ /***/ }),-/* 639 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var Symbol = __webpack_require__(570),- arrayMap = __webpack_require__(640),- isArray = __webpack_require__(563),- isSymbol = __webpack_require__(577);--/** Used as references for various `Number` constants. */-var INFINITY = 1 / 0;--/** Used to convert symbols to primitives and strings. */-var symbolProto = Symbol ? Symbol.prototype : undefined,- symbolToString = symbolProto ? symbolProto.toString : undefined;--/**- * The base implementation of `_.toString` which doesn't convert nullish- * values to empty strings.- *- * @private- * @param {*} value The value to process.- * @returns {string} Returns the string.- */-function baseToString(value) {- // Exit early for strings to avoid a performance hit in some environments.- if (typeof value == 'string') {- return value;- }- if (isArray(value)) {- // Recursively convert values (susceptible to call stack limits).- return arrayMap(value, baseToString) + '';- }- if (isSymbol(value)) {- return symbolToString ? symbolToString.call(value) : '';- }- var result = (value + '');- return (result == '0' && (1 / value) == -INFINITY) ? '-0' : result;-}--module.exports = baseToString;---/***/ }),-/* 640 */-/***/ (function(module, exports) {--/**- * A specialized version of `_.map` for arrays without support for iteratee- * shorthands.- *- * @private- * @param {Array} [array] The array to iterate over.- * @param {Function} iteratee The function invoked per iteration.- * @returns {Array} Returns the new mapped array.- */-function arrayMap(array, iteratee) {- var index = -1,- length = array == null ? 0 : array.length,- result = Array(length);-- while (++index < length) {- result[index] = iteratee(array[index], index, array);- }- return result;-}--module.exports = arrayMap;---/***/ }),-/* 641 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var isArray = __webpack_require__(563),- isSymbol = __webpack_require__(577);--/** Used to match property names within property paths. */-var reIsDeepProp = /\.|\[(?:[^[\]]*|(["'])(?:(?!\1)[^\\]|\\.)*?\1)\]/,- reIsPlainProp = /^\w*$/;--/**- * Checks if `value` is a property name and not a property path.- *- * @private- * @param {*} value The value to check.- * @param {Object} [object] The object to query keys on.- * @returns {boolean} Returns `true` if `value` is a property name, else `false`.- */-function isKey(value, object) {- if (isArray(value)) {- return false;- }- var type = typeof value;- if (type == 'number' || type == 'symbol' || type == 'boolean' ||- value == null || isSymbol(value)) {- return true;- }- return reIsPlainProp.test(value) || !reIsDeepProp.test(value) ||- (object != null && value in Object(object));-}--module.exports = isKey;---/***/ }),+/* 639 */,+/* 640 */,+/* 641 */, /* 642 */, /* 643 */, /* 644 */,@@ -31493,89 +31255,7 @@ /***/ }),-/* 686 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var baseKeys = __webpack_require__(656),- getTag = __webpack_require__(578),- isArguments = __webpack_require__(618),- isArray = __webpack_require__(563),- isArrayLike = __webpack_require__(599),- isBuffer = __webpack_require__(595),- isPrototype = __webpack_require__(598),- isTypedArray = __webpack_require__(621);--/** `Object#toString` result references. */-var mapTag = '[object Map]',- setTag = '[object Set]';--/** Used for built-in method references. */-var objectProto = Object.prototype;--/** Used to check objects for own properties. */-var hasOwnProperty = objectProto.hasOwnProperty;--/**- * Checks if `value` is an empty object, collection, map, or set.- *- * Objects are considered empty if they have no own enumerable string keyed- * properties.- *- * Array-like values such as `arguments` objects, arrays, buffers, strings, or- * jQuery-like collections are considered empty if they have a `length` of `0`.- * Similarly, maps and sets are considered empty if they have a `size` of `0`.- *- * @static- * @memberOf _- * @since 0.1.0- * @category Lang- * @param {*} value The value to check.- * @returns {boolean} Returns `true` if `value` is empty, else `false`.- * @example- *- * _.isEmpty(null);- * // => true- *- * _.isEmpty(true);- * // => true- *- * _.isEmpty(1);- * // => true- *- * _.isEmpty([1, 2, 3]);- * // => false- *- * _.isEmpty({ 'a': 1 });- * // => false- */-function isEmpty(value) {- if (value == null) {- return true;- }- if (isArrayLike(value) &&- (isArray(value) || typeof value == 'string' || typeof value.splice == 'function' ||- isBuffer(value) || isTypedArray(value) || isArguments(value))) {- return !value.length;- }- var tag = getTag(value);- if (tag == mapTag || tag == setTag) {- return !value.size;- }- if (isPrototype(value)) {- return !baseKeys(value).length;- }- for (var key in value) {- if (hasOwnProperty.call(value, key)) {- return false;- }- }- return true;-}--module.exports = isEmpty;---/***/ }),+/* 686 */, /* 687 */ /***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {@@ -32462,270 +32142,13 @@ } /***/ }),-/* 693 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var baseMatches = __webpack_require__(872),- baseMatchesProperty = __webpack_require__(880),- identity = __webpack_require__(888),- isArray = __webpack_require__(563),- property = __webpack_require__(889);--/**- * The base implementation of `_.iteratee`.- *- * @private- * @param {*} [value=_.identity] The value to convert to an iteratee.- * @returns {Function} Returns the iteratee.- */-function baseIteratee(value) {- // Don't store the `typeof` result in a variable to avoid a JIT bug in Safari 9.- // See https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=156034 for more details.- if (typeof value == 'function') {- return value;- }- if (value == null) {- return identity;- }- if (typeof value == 'object') {- return isArray(value)- ? baseMatchesProperty(value[0], value[1])- : baseMatches(value);- }- return property(value);-}--module.exports = baseIteratee;---/***/ }),-/* 694 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var baseIsEqualDeep = __webpack_require__(874),- isObjectLike = __webpack_require__(565);--/**- * The base implementation of `_.isEqual` which supports partial comparisons- * and tracks traversed objects.- *- * @private- * @param {*} value The value to compare.- * @param {*} other The other value to compare.- * @param {boolean} bitmask The bitmask flags.- * 1 - Unordered comparison- * 2 - Partial comparison- * @param {Function} [customizer] The function to customize comparisons.- * @param {Object} [stack] Tracks traversed `value` and `other` objects.- * @returns {boolean} Returns `true` if the values are equivalent, else `false`.- */-function baseIsEqual(value, other, bitmask, customizer, stack) {- if (value === other) {- return true;- }- if (value == null || other == null || (!isObjectLike(value) && !isObjectLike(other))) {- return value !== value && other !== other;- }- return baseIsEqualDeep(value, other, bitmask, customizer, baseIsEqual, stack);-}--module.exports = baseIsEqual;---/***/ }),-/* 695 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var SetCache = __webpack_require__(673),- arraySome = __webpack_require__(875),- cacheHas = __webpack_require__(674);--/** Used to compose bitmasks for value comparisons. */-var COMPARE_PARTIAL_FLAG = 1,- COMPARE_UNORDERED_FLAG = 2;--/**- * A specialized version of `baseIsEqualDeep` for arrays with support for- * partial deep comparisons.- *- * @private- * @param {Array} array The array to compare.- * @param {Array} other The other array to compare.- * @param {number} bitmask The bitmask flags. See `baseIsEqual` for more details.- * @param {Function} customizer The function to customize comparisons.- * @param {Function} equalFunc The function to determine equivalents of values.- * @param {Object} stack Tracks traversed `array` and `other` objects.- * @returns {boolean} Returns `true` if the arrays are equivalent, else `false`.- */-function equalArrays(array, other, bitmask, customizer, equalFunc, stack) {- var isPartial = bitmask & COMPARE_PARTIAL_FLAG,- arrLength = array.length,- othLength = other.length;-- if (arrLength != othLength && !(isPartial && othLength > arrLength)) {- return false;- }- // Assume cyclic values are equal.- var stacked = stack.get(array);- if (stacked && stack.get(other)) {- return stacked == other;- }- var index = -1,- result = true,- seen = (bitmask & COMPARE_UNORDERED_FLAG) ? new SetCache : undefined;-- stack.set(array, other);- stack.set(other, array);-- // Ignore non-index properties.- while (++index < arrLength) {- var arrValue = array[index],- othValue = other[index];-- if (customizer) {- var compared = isPartial- ? customizer(othValue, arrValue, index, other, array, stack)- : customizer(arrValue, othValue, index, array, other, stack);- }- if (compared !== undefined) {- if (compared) {- continue;- }- result = false;- break;- }- // Recursively compare arrays (susceptible to call stack limits).- if (seen) {- if (!arraySome(other, function(othValue, othIndex) {- if (!cacheHas(seen, othIndex) &&- (arrValue === othValue || equalFunc(arrValue, othValue, bitmask, customizer, stack))) {- return seen.push(othIndex);- }- })) {- result = false;- break;- }- } else if (!(- arrValue === othValue ||- equalFunc(arrValue, othValue, bitmask, customizer, stack)- )) {- result = false;- break;- }- }- stack['delete'](array);- stack['delete'](other);- return result;-}--module.exports = equalArrays;---/***/ }),-/* 696 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var isObject = __webpack_require__(573);--/**- * Checks if `value` is suitable for strict equality comparisons, i.e. `===`.- *- * @private- * @param {*} value The value to check.- * @returns {boolean} Returns `true` if `value` if suitable for strict- * equality comparisons, else `false`.- */-function isStrictComparable(value) {- return value === value && !isObject(value);-}--module.exports = isStrictComparable;---/***/ }),-/* 697 */-/***/ (function(module, exports) {--/**- * A specialized version of `matchesProperty` for source values suitable- * for strict equality comparisons, i.e. `===`.- *- * @private- * @param {string} key The key of the property to get.- * @param {*} srcValue The value to match.- * @returns {Function} Returns the new spec function.- */-function matchesStrictComparable(key, srcValue) {- return function(object) {- if (object == null) {- return false;- }- return object[key] === srcValue &&- (srcValue !== undefined || (key in Object(object)));- };-}--module.exports = matchesStrictComparable;---/***/ }),-/* 698 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var castPath = __webpack_require__(699),- toKey = __webpack_require__(606);--/**- * The base implementation of `_.get` without support for default values.- *- * @private- * @param {Object} object The object to query.- * @param {Array|string} path The path of the property to get.- * @returns {*} Returns the resolved value.- */-function baseGet(object, path) {- path = castPath(path, object);-- var index = 0,- length = path.length;-- while (object != null && index < length) {- object = object[toKey(path[index++])];- }- return (index && index == length) ? object : undefined;-}--module.exports = baseGet;---/***/ }),-/* 699 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var isArray = __webpack_require__(563),- isKey = __webpack_require__(641),- stringToPath = __webpack_require__(882),- toString = __webpack_require__(605);--/**- * Casts `value` to a path array if it's not one.- *- * @private- * @param {*} value The value to inspect.- * @param {Object} [object] The object to query keys on.- * @returns {Array} Returns the cast property path array.- */-function castPath(value, object) {- if (isArray(value)) {- return value;- }- return isKey(value, object) ? [value] : stringToPath(toString(value));-}--module.exports = castPath;---/***/ }),+/* 693 */,+/* 694 */,+/* 695 */,+/* 696 */,+/* 697 */,+/* 698 */,+/* 699 */, /* 700 */ /***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {@@ -40607,126 +40030,8 @@ /***/ }), /* 843 */,-/* 844 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var toNumber = __webpack_require__(845);--/** Used as references for various `Number` constants. */-var INFINITY = 1 / 0,- MAX_INTEGER = 1.7976931348623157e+308;--/**- * Converts `value` to a finite number.- *- * @static- * @memberOf _- * @since 4.12.0- * @category Lang- * @param {*} value The value to convert.- * @returns {number} Returns the converted number.- * @example- *- * _.toFinite(3.2);- * // => 3.2- *- * _.toFinite(Number.MIN_VALUE);- * // => 5e-324- *- * _.toFinite(Infinity);- * // => 1.7976931348623157e+308- *- * _.toFinite('3.2');- * // => 3.2- */-function toFinite(value) {- if (!value) {- return value === 0 ? value : 0;- }- value = toNumber(value);- if (value === INFINITY || value === -INFINITY) {- var sign = (value < 0 ? -1 : 1);- return sign * MAX_INTEGER;- }- return value === value ? value : 0;-}--module.exports = toFinite;---/***/ }),-/* 845 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var isObject = __webpack_require__(573),- isSymbol = __webpack_require__(577);--/** Used as references for various `Number` constants. */-var NAN = 0 / 0;--/** Used to match leading and trailing whitespace. */-var reTrim = /^\s+|\s+$/g;--/** Used to detect bad signed hexadecimal string values. */-var reIsBadHex = /^[-+]0x[0-9a-f]+$/i;--/** Used to detect binary string values. */-var reIsBinary = /^0b[01]+$/i;--/** Used to detect octal string values. */-var reIsOctal = /^0o[0-7]+$/i;--/** Built-in method references without a dependency on `root`. */-var freeParseInt = parseInt;--/**- * Converts `value` to a number.- *- * @static- * @memberOf _- * @since 4.0.0- * @category Lang- * @param {*} value The value to process.- * @returns {number} Returns the number.- * @example- *- * _.toNumber(3.2);- * // => 3.2- *- * _.toNumber(Number.MIN_VALUE);- * // => 5e-324- *- * _.toNumber(Infinity);- * // => Infinity- *- * _.toNumber('3.2');- * // => 3.2- */-function toNumber(value) {- if (typeof value == 'number') {- return value;- }- if (isSymbol(value)) {- return NAN;- }- if (isObject(value)) {- var other = typeof value.valueOf == 'function' ? value.valueOf() : value;- value = isObject(other) ? (other + '') : other;- }- if (typeof value != 'string') {- return value === 0 ? value : +value;- }- value = value.replace(reTrim, '');- var isBinary = reIsBinary.test(value);- return (isBinary || reIsOctal.test(value))- ? freeParseInt(value.slice(2), isBinary ? 2 : 8)- : (reIsBadHex.test(value) ? NAN : +value);-}--module.exports = toNumber;---/***/ }),+/* 844 */,+/* 845 */, /* 846 */, /* 847 */, /* 848 */,@@ -47222,19 +46527,17 @@ exports.parseSourceScopes = parseSourceScopes; exports.buildScopeList = buildScopeList;-var _isEmpty = _interopRequireDefault(__webpack_require__(686));- var t = _interopRequireWildcard(__webpack_require__(2)); var _getFunctionName = _interopRequireDefault(__webpack_require__(691)); var _ast = __webpack_require__(572);+function _interopRequireDefault(obj) { return obj && obj.__esModule ? obj : { default: obj }; }+ function _getRequireWildcardCache(nodeInterop) { if (typeof WeakMap !== "function") return null; var cacheBabelInterop = new WeakMap(); var cacheNodeInterop = new WeakMap(); return (_getRequireWildcardCache = function (nodeInterop) { return nodeInterop ? cacheNodeInterop : cacheBabelInterop; })(nodeInterop); } function _interopRequireWildcard(obj, nodeInterop) { if (!nodeInterop && obj && obj.__esModule) { return obj; } if (obj === null || typeof obj !== "object" && typeof obj !== "function") { return { default: obj }; } var cache = _getRequireWildcardCache(nodeInterop); if (cache && cache.has(obj)) { return cache.get(obj); } var newObj = {}; var hasPropertyDescriptor = Object.defineProperty && Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor; for (var key in obj) { if (key !== "default" && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key)) { var desc = hasPropertyDescriptor ? Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(obj, key) : null; if (desc && (desc.get || desc.set)) { Object.defineProperty(newObj, key, desc); } else { newObj[key] = obj[key]; } } } newObj.default = obj; if (cache) { cache.set(obj, newObj); } return newObj; }--function _interopRequireDefault(obj) { return obj && obj.__esModule ? obj : { default: obj }; } /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this@@ -47269,7 +46572,7 @@ function parseSourceScopes(sourceId) { const ast = (0, _ast.getAst)(sourceId);- if ((0, _isEmpty.default)(ast)) {+ if (!ast || Object.keys(ast).length == 0) { return null; }@@ -48003,15 +47306,9 @@ }); exports.default = void 0;-var _findIndex = _interopRequireDefault(__webpack_require__(871));--var _findLastIndex = _interopRequireDefault(__webpack_require__(892));- var _contains = __webpack_require__(700); var _getSymbols = __webpack_require__(648);--function _interopRequireDefault(obj) { return obj && obj.__esModule ? obj : { default: obj }; } /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this@@ -48050,33 +47347,48 @@ } /** * Find the nearest location containing the input position and- * return new locations without inner locations under that nearest location+ * return inner locations under that nearest location *- * @param locations Notice! The locations MUST be sorted by `sortByStart`+ * @param {Array<Object>} locations Notice! The locations MUST be sorted by `sortByStart` * so that we can do linear time complexity operation.+ * @returns {Array<Object>} */-function removeInnerLocations(locations, position) {+function getInnerLocations(locations, position) { // First, let's find the nearest position-enclosing function location, // which is to find the last location enclosing the position.- const newLocs = locations.slice();- const parentIndex = (0, _findLastIndex.default)(newLocs, loc => (0, _contains.containsPosition)(loc, position));-- if (parentIndex < 0) {- return newLocs;- } // Second, from the nearest location, loop locations again, stop looping- // once seeing the 1st location not enclosed by the nearest location- // to find the last inner locations inside the nearest location.--- const innerStartIndex = parentIndex + 1;- const parentLoc = newLocs[parentIndex];- const outerBoundaryIndex = (0, _findIndex.default)(newLocs, loc => !(0, _contains.containsLocation)(parentLoc, loc), innerStartIndex);- const innerBoundaryIndex = outerBoundaryIndex < 0 ? newLocs.length - 1 : outerBoundaryIndex - 1; // Third, remove those inner functions-- newLocs.splice(innerStartIndex, innerBoundaryIndex - parentIndex);- return newLocs;+ let parentIndex;++ for (let i = locations.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {+ const loc = locations[i];++ if ((0, _contains.containsPosition)(loc, position)) {+ parentIndex = i;+ break;+ }+ }++ if (parentIndex == undefined) {+ return [];+ }++ const parentLoc = locations[parentIndex]; // Then, from the nearest location, loop locations again and put locations into+ // the innerLocations array until we get to a location not enclosed by the nearest location.++ const innerLocations = [];++ for (let i = parentIndex + 1; i < locations.length; i++) {+ const loc = locations[i];++ if (!(0, _contains.containsLocation)(parentLoc, loc)) {+ break;+ }++ innerLocations.push(loc);+ }++ return innerLocations; } /** * Return an new locations array which excludes@@ -48131,1057 +47443,44 @@ comments } = findSymbols(sourceId); const commentLocations = comments.map(c => c.location);- let locations = functions.map(getLocation).concat(commentLocations).sort(sortByStart); // Must remove inner locations then filter, otherwise,- // we will mis-judge in-scope inner locations as out of scope.-- locations = removeInnerLocations(locations, position).filter(loc => !(0, _contains.containsPosition)(loc, position));- return removeOverlaps(locations);+ const locations = functions.map(getLocation).concat(commentLocations).sort(sortByStart);+ const innerLocations = getInnerLocations(locations, position);+ const outerLocations = locations.filter(loc => {+ if (innerLocations.includes(loc)) {+ return false;+ }++ return !(0, _contains.containsPosition)(loc, position);+ });+ return removeOverlaps(outerLocations); } var _default = findOutOfScopeLocations; exports.default = _default; /***/ }),-/* 871 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var baseFindIndex = __webpack_require__(630),- baseIteratee = __webpack_require__(693),- toInteger = __webpack_require__(604);--/* Built-in method references for those with the same name as other `lodash` methods. */-var nativeMax = Math.max;--/**- * This method is like `_.find` except that it returns the index of the first- * element `predicate` returns truthy for instead of the element itself.- *- * @static- * @memberOf _- * @since 1.1.0- * @category Array- * @param {Array} array The array to inspect.- * @param {Function} [predicate=_.identity] The function invoked per iteration.- * @param {number} [fromIndex=0] The index to search from.- * @returns {number} Returns the index of the found element, else `-1`.- * @example- *- * var users = [- * { 'user': 'barney', 'active': false },- * { 'user': 'fred', 'active': false },- * { 'user': 'pebbles', 'active': true }- * ];- *- * _.findIndex(users, function(o) { return o.user == 'barney'; });- * // => 0- *- * // The `_.matches` iteratee shorthand.- * _.findIndex(users, { 'user': 'fred', 'active': false });- * // => 1- *- * // The `_.matchesProperty` iteratee shorthand.- * _.findIndex(users, ['active', false]);- * // => 0- *- * // The `_.property` iteratee shorthand.- * _.findIndex(users, 'active');- * // => 2- */-function findIndex(array, predicate, fromIndex) {- var length = array == null ? 0 : array.length;- if (!length) {- return -1;- }- var index = fromIndex == null ? 0 : toInteger(fromIndex);- if (index < 0) {- index = nativeMax(length + index, 0);- }- return baseFindIndex(array, baseIteratee(predicate, 3), index);-}--module.exports = findIndex;---/***/ }),-/* 872 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var baseIsMatch = __webpack_require__(873),- getMatchData = __webpack_require__(879),- matchesStrictComparable = __webpack_require__(697);--/**- * The base implementation of `_.matches` which doesn't clone `source`.- *- * @private- * @param {Object} source The object of property values to match.- * @returns {Function} Returns the new spec function.- */-function baseMatches(source) {- var matchData = getMatchData(source);- if (matchData.length == 1 && matchData[0][2]) {- return matchesStrictComparable(matchData[0][0], matchData[0][1]);- }- return function(object) {- return object === source || baseIsMatch(object, source, matchData);- };-}--module.exports = baseMatches;---/***/ }),-/* 873 */-/***/ (function(module, exports, __webpack_require__) {--var Stack = __webpack_require__(613),- baseIsEqual = __webpack_require__(694);--/** Used to compose bitmasks for value comparisons. */-var COMPARE_PARTIAL_FLAG = 1,- COMPARE_UNORDERED_FLAG = 2;--/**- * The base implementation of `_.isMatch` without support for iteratee shorthands.
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the specified format:
1. First vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Dependency Usage [devtools/client/debugger/dist/parser-worker.js] [Lines 8524, 8681]
[Old Code]
var _isEmpty = _interopRequireDefault(__webpack_require__(686));
if ((0, _isEmpty.default)(ast)) {
[Fixed Code]
if (!ast || Object.keys(ast).length == 0) {
Additional Details: The code removed dependency on lodash's isEmpty function and replaced it with a direct check. This could be related to removing potentially vulnerable dependencies or improving performance.
2. Second vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Code Simplification/Security Improvement [devtools/client/debugger/dist/parser-worker.js] [Lines 47269, 47272]
[Old Code]
var _isEmpty = _interopRequireDefault(__webpack_require__(686));
if ((0, _isEmpty.default)(ast)) {
[Fixed Code]
if (!ast || Object.keys(ast).length == 0) {
Additional Details: Similar to the first finding, this shows the removal of lodash dependency in favor of native checks, which could be more secure and performant.
3. Third vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Logic Change [devtools/client/debugger/dist/parser-worker.js] [Lines 48050-48131]
[Old Code]
function removeInnerLocations(locations, position) {
// Implementation using lodash findIndex/findLastIndex
}
[Fixed Code]
function getInnerLocations(locations, position) {
// New implementation using direct iteration
}
Additional Details: The logic for handling locations was significantly changed, but it's unclear if this was for security reasons or just code improvement. The new implementation appears more straightforward.
Note: Many modules were removed (marked with commas in the diff), but without seeing their actual content, I can't determine if those removals were security-related. The most evident changes were the removal of lodash dependency usage in favor of native JavaScript operations, which generally improves security by reducing third-party dependencies.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgb-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgb-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(255 0 0, 1)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis following your format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgb-2.html] [17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references accordingly. There are no security implications to these changes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/stability.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/stability.py@@ -288,7 +288,11 @@ # warning+ level logs only logger.add_handler(StreamHandler(log, JSONFormatter()))- wptrunner.run_tests(**kwargs)+ # Use the number of iterations of the test suite that were run to process the results.+ # if the runs were stopped to avoid hitting the maximum run time.+ _, test_status = wptrunner.run_tests(**kwargs)+ iterations = test_status.repeated_runs+ all_skipped = test_status.all_skipped logger._state.handlers = initial_handlers logger._state.running_tests = set()@@ -296,7 +300,7 @@ log.seek(0) results, inconsistent, slow = process_results(log, iterations)- return results, inconsistent, slow, iterations+ return results, inconsistent, slow, iterations, all_skipped def get_steps(logger, repeat_loop, repeat_restart, kwargs_extras):@@ -311,12 +315,24 @@ if repeat_loop: desc = "Running tests in a loop %d times%s" % (repeat_loop, flags_string)- steps.append((desc, functools.partial(run_step, logger, repeat_loop, False, kwargs_extra)))+ steps.append((desc,+ functools.partial(run_step,+ logger,+ repeat_loop,+ False,+ kwargs_extra),+ repeat_loop)) if repeat_restart: desc = "Running tests in a loop with restarts %s times%s" % (repeat_restart, flags_string)- steps.append((desc, functools.partial(run_step, logger, repeat_restart, True, kwargs_extra)))+ steps.append((desc,+ functools.partial(run_step,+ logger,+ repeat_restart,+ True,+ kwargs_extra),+ repeat_restart)) return steps@@ -335,6 +351,7 @@ logger.info(':::')+ def check_stability(logger, repeat_loop=10, repeat_restart=5, chaos_mode=True, max_time=None, output_results=True, **kwargs): kwargs_extras = [{}]@@ -348,7 +365,7 @@ github_checks_outputter = get_gh_checks_outputter(kwargs["github_checks_text_file"])- for desc, step_func in steps:+ for desc, step_func, expected_iterations in steps: if max_time and datetime.now() - start_time > max_time: logger.info("::: Test verification is taking too long: Giving up!") logger.info("::: So far, all checks passed, but not all checks were run.")@@ -358,7 +375,15 @@ logger.info(':::') logger.info('::: Running test verification step "%s"...' % desc) logger.info(':::')- results, inconsistent, slow, iterations = step_func(**kwargs)+ results, inconsistent, slow, iterations, all_skipped = step_func(**kwargs)++ if iterations <= 1 and expected_iterations > 1 and not all_skipped:+ step_results.append((desc, "FAIL"))+ logger.info("::: Reached iteration timeout before finishing 2 or more repeat runs.")+ logger.info("::: At least 2 successful repeat runs are required to validate stability.")+ write_summary(logger, step_results, "TIMEOUT")+ return 1+ if output_results: write_results(logger.info, results, iterations)@@ -378,6 +403,12 @@ write_summary(logger, step_results, "FAIL") return 1- step_results.append((desc, "PASS"))+ # If the tests passed but the number of iterations didn't match the number expected to run,+ # it is likely that the runs were stopped early to avoid a timeout.+ if iterations != expected_iterations:+ result = f"PASS * {iterations}/{expected_iterations} repeats completed"+ step_results.append((desc, result))+ else:+ step_results.append((desc, "PASS")) write_summary(logger, step_results, "PASS")
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific security vulnerability was identified in this diff. The changes appear to be functional improvements rather than security fixes. The modifications include: - Better handling of test iterations and skipped tests - Added tracking of expected iterations - Improved timeout handling - Enhanced result reporting 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Timeout Handling Improvement [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/stability.py] [Lines 358-381] Old Code: Basic timeout checking without detailed iteration validation Fixed Code: Added specific checks for iteration counts and timeout conditions 3. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes primarily focus on: - Adding return value processing from wptrunner.run_tests() - Tracking skipped tests (all_skipped flag) - Enhanced iteration counting and validation - Improved result reporting format - Better timeout handling logic The diff shows quality improvements in test stability checking rather than security fixes. The changes make the test runner more robust but don't appear to address any specific security vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/web.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/web.rs@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ } impl AdapterContext {+ pub fn is_owned(&self) -> bool {+ false+ }+ /// Obtain a lock to the EGL context and get handle to the [`glow::Context`] that can be used to /// do rendering. #[track_caller]
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Missing Ownership Check [File] [Lines 11-13]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of is_owned)
[Fixed Code]
pub fn is_owned(&self) -> bool {
false
}
Additional Details:
The diff adds a new method `is_owned()` that always returns false. While this doesn't appear to fix an existing vulnerability, it might be related to preventing potential security issues by explicitly stating the ownership status of the AdapterContext. Without more context about how this method is used, I can't determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just adding defensive programming. The method could be used to prevent unsafe operations on unowned contexts, but we'd need to see the calling code to be certain.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/project.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/project.rs@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream}; use quote::ToTokens; use syn::{+ parse_quote, visit_mut::{self, VisitMut},- *,+ Expr, ExprLet, ExprMatch, Ident, ImplItem, Item, ItemFn, ItemImpl, ItemUse, Lifetime, Local,+ Pat, PatBox, PatIdent, PatOr, PatPath, PatReference, PatStruct, PatTupleStruct, PatType, Path,+ PathArguments, PathSegment, Result, Stmt, Type, TypePath, UseTree, }; use crate::utils::{
Based on the provided diff content, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to code organization and imports rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [third_party/rust/pin-project-internal/src/project.rs] [Lines 1-8]
[Old Code]
use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream};
use quote::ToTokens;
use syn::{
visit_mut::{self, VisitMut},
*,
};
[Fixed Code]
use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream};
use quote::ToTokens;
use syn::{
parse_quote,
visit_mut::{self, VisitMut},
Expr, ExprLet, ExprMatch, Ident, ImplItem, Item, ItemFn, ItemImpl, ItemUse, Lifetime, Local,
Pat, PatBox, PatIdent, PatOr, PatPath, PatReference, PatStruct, PatTupleStruct, PatType, Path,
PathArguments, PathSegment, Result, Stmt, Type, TypePath, UseTree,
};
Additional Details:
The change appears to be replacing a wildcard import (`*`) with explicit imports from the `syn` crate. This is generally considered better practice for code maintainability and clarity, but doesn't represent a security fix. The addition of `parse_quote` is also just an additional import being made explicit.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.invalid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.invalid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.lineJoin = 'bevel' _assertSame(ctx.lineJoin, 'bevel', "ctx.lineJoin", "'bevel'");
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
The changes in the diff appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There is no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The modification doesn't affect the functionality or security of the code, it simply improves code readability or consistency with naming conventions.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.5.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.5.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 0); ctx.rect(100, 25, 0, 0); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.5.worker.js [Lines] 13-23
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect the behavior or security properties of the code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/WebExtensionController.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/WebExtensionController.java@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package org.mozilla.geckoview;+import android.annotation.SuppressLint; import android.os.Build; import android.util.Log; import android.util.SparseArray;@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@ @Retention(RetentionPolicy.SOURCE) @IntDef({EnableSource.USER, EnableSource.APP})- @interface EnableSources {}+ public @interface EnableSources {} /** * Contains the possible values for the <code>source</code> parameter in {@link #enable} and@@ -870,6 +871,7 @@ })); }+ @SuppressLint("WrongThread") // for .toGeckoBundle private void getSettings(final Message message, final WebExtension extension) { final WebExtension.BrowsingDataDelegate delegate = mListener.getBrowsingDataDelegate(extension); if (delegate == null) {
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Thread Safety Issue] [WebExtensionController.java] [Lines 870+]
[Old Code: No thread safety annotation]
[Fixed Code: Added @SuppressLint("WrongThread") annotation]
The addition of @SuppressLint("WrongThread") suggests there might have been a potential thread safety issue where the code was accessing UI elements from a non-UI thread. However, the annotation is suppressing this warning, so it's unclear if this was actually fixed or just acknowledged.
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[Visibility Change] [WebExtensionController.java] [Lines 545-546]
[Old Code: @interface EnableSources {}]
[Fixed Code: public @interface EnableSources {}]
This change simply increases the visibility of the annotation interface from package-private to public. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a design/API change.
No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The thread annotation addition might indicate a potential threading issue, but without more context about the implementation of toGeckoBundle, I can't be certain if this was an actual vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/mozharness/scripts/telemetry/telemetry_client.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/mozharness/scripts/telemetry/telemetry_client.py@@ -192,6 +192,10 @@ "-vv", ]+ # Symbols for crash reports+ if self.symbols_path:+ cmd.extend(["--symbols-path", self.symbols_path])+ cmd.extend(["--setpref={}".format(p) for p in self.config["extra_prefs"]]) if not self.config["e10s"]:
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Crash Report Symbols] [testing/mozharness/scripts/telemetry/telemetry_client.py] [Lines 192-198]
[Old Code]
"-vv",
]
cmd.extend(["--setpref={}".format(p) for p in self.config["extra_prefs"]])
if not self.config["e10s"]:
[Fixed Code]
"-vv",
]
# Symbols for crash reports
if self.symbols_path:
cmd.extend(["--symbols-path", self.symbols_path])
cmd.extend(["--setpref={}".format(p) for p in self.config["extra_prefs"]])
if not self.config["e10s"]:
Additional Details:
The change adds support for specifying a symbols path for crash reports. While this isn't a direct security vulnerability fix, it could be related to improving crash reporting and debugging capabilities, which indirectly contributes to security by enabling better analysis of potential security-related crashes. Without more context about the symbols_path usage and how it's set, I can't be certain if this addresses a specific vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/api/src/ipc.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/api/src/ipc.rs@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ FOG_RegisterContentChildShutdown(); }; }+ nsIXULRuntime::PROCESS_TYPE_GMPLUGIN => {+ // GMP process shutdown is handled in GMPChild::ActorDestroy.+ } nsIXULRuntime::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU => { // GPU process shutdown is handled in GPUParent::ActorDestroy. }@@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ } nsIXULRuntime::PROCESS_TYPE_SOCKET => { // Socket process shutdown is handled in SocketProcessChild::ActorDestroy.+ }+ nsIXULRuntime::PROCESS_TYPE_UTILITY => {+ // Utility process shutdown is handled in UtilityProcessChild::ActorDestroy. } _ => { // We don't yet support other process types.
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 116-127]
[Old Code]
Missing handling for PROCESS_TYPE_GMPLUGIN and PROCESS_TYPE_UTILITY process types
[Fixed Code]
Added handling for PROCESS_TYPE_GMPLUGIN and PROCESS_TYPE_UTILITY process types with appropriate comments
Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be adding support for additional process types (GMP plugin and Utility processes) in the shutdown handling code.
- This is more of a feature completion/improvement rather than a security fix.
- No actual vulnerability is being addressed here, just making the code more complete by handling additional process types.
- The changes follow the existing pattern of deferring shutdown handling to the appropriate process-specific destructors.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.4.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.4.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.rect(100, 25, 0, 0); ctx.lineTo(0, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-sensitive operations or patterns.
Here's the structured response:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.4.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 23]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");]
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect the security posture of the code. The functionality remains identical, just with a renamed variable for consistency or clarity.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/serde_derive/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/serde_derive/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"900a8fd1ed5ed528dee953b986d99caef871be0e180d75a867e4d6d552c15ef2","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"5cf9d2158d70048a2916360ad59d9079f6233c6f68781a7a792e70f8b772d8ce","build.rs":"d0fc2047a792e90b95df7be8d1e75732b231b3a60cb481feebfca46b7edb1209","crates-io.md":"25ed421fe25d0f6f74c4b78674144bef2843a5f78bf552d0a8ec633be69d282b","src/bound.rs":"afb3550b77f271f38d8b5c38141a6a45687a8264dc3c6349ccf14ef0dd911dfe","src/de.rs":"c35ef3bccfc23d07fb6f87e7c52c7cac8a63ce15e35b9000bed406cb2f98685b","src/dummy.rs":"ad78556876053e74be976e91032200666ffbeeb6f7e92f3a7a8463fea1f60ac5","src/fragment.rs":"5548ba65a53d90a296f60c1328a7a7fb040db467f59c2f5210b2fb320457145d","src/internals/ast.rs":"b019865eef92c1ddbb9029423ac22179f132dc655a51c09fb2a42f4aaef172fd","src/internals/attr.rs":"d3ae0ad0e7d40fbf3c8a5f86c8a8c5b5f289c3318dd79afc6c5c2ce9b3523931","src/internals/case.rs":"9492f0c5142d7b7e8cd39c86d13a855e5ce4489425adb2b96aed89e1b7851ac0","src/internals/check.rs":"11ea94257d2a2ee2276938a6beb4ae11b74c39225c1e342e6df1e7d2b2924496","src/internals/ctxt.rs":"6fa544ae52914498a62a395818ebdc1b36ac2fb5903c60afb741a864ad559f1c","src/internals/mod.rs":"f32138ff19d57eb00f88ba11f6b015efab2102657804f71ebbf386a3698dad91","src/internals/receiver.rs":"ad30c3e4583ef07f74c7905f22a6580af25ebd431fdf1e04878b9a770ca4ede6","src/internals/respan.rs":"899753859c58ce5f532a3ec4584796a52f13ed5a0533191e48c953ba5c1b52ff","src/internals/symbol.rs":"3c9ce461773b7df3bb64d82aa5a0d93052c3bb0e60209db6c0b5c10ee9cfc9cf","src/lib.rs":"3f75e3a849cbe74bac87e7ef2f9d97caabc1e5a5a159bb3ba2da855e55e2ddb0","src/pretend.rs":"113ff3ba6dbf42d4999663b1abe57fdeb72ba7376cfd90dc81829439be7dfbb0","src/ser.rs":"0d99c841f6c7bc9751ab225fe42d1f8b7fe56e36903efcb4ff10bf6e35c390ba","src/try.rs":"b171b0088c23ebf4bfa07ba457881b41ac5e547d55dd16f737ea988d34badf61"},"package":"d7bc1a1ab1961464eae040d96713baa5a724a8152c1222492465b54322ec508b"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"b5633393dd45d256ac07041528902fb2a68208df77fb4204c44a9086d0a4039b","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"5cf9d2158d70048a2916360ad59d9079f6233c6f68781a7a792e70f8b772d8ce","build.rs":"d0fc2047a792e90b95df7be8d1e75732b231b3a60cb481feebfca46b7edb1209","crates-io.md":"25ed421fe25d0f6f74c4b78674144bef2843a5f78bf552d0a8ec633be69d282b","src/bound.rs":"f3a1a7b76426921ee435e9963c02c2fc7663c15aecfdf6dc1198aacf3f4c2e70","src/de.rs":"c5a41016ce15f8176a2d7a8445ba06d2eb8de0863c1fea0dab51c395dd7dccff","src/dummy.rs":"ad78556876053e74be976e91032200666ffbeeb6f7e92f3a7a8463fea1f60ac5","src/fragment.rs":"5548ba65a53d90a296f60c1328a7a7fb040db467f59c2f5210b2fb320457145d","src/internals/ast.rs":"b019865eef92c1ddbb9029423ac22179f132dc655a51c09fb2a42f4aaef172fd","src/internals/attr.rs":"d3ae0ad0e7d40fbf3c8a5f86c8a8c5b5f289c3318dd79afc6c5c2ce9b3523931","src/internals/case.rs":"9492f0c5142d7b7e8cd39c86d13a855e5ce4489425adb2b96aed89e1b7851ac0","src/internals/check.rs":"11ea94257d2a2ee2276938a6beb4ae11b74c39225c1e342e6df1e7d2b2924496","src/internals/ctxt.rs":"6fa544ae52914498a62a395818ebdc1b36ac2fb5903c60afb741a864ad559f1c","src/internals/mod.rs":"f32138ff19d57eb00f88ba11f6b015efab2102657804f71ebbf386a3698dad91","src/internals/receiver.rs":"ad30c3e4583ef07f74c7905f22a6580af25ebd431fdf1e04878b9a770ca4ede6","src/internals/respan.rs":"899753859c58ce5f532a3ec4584796a52f13ed5a0533191e48c953ba5c1b52ff","src/internals/symbol.rs":"3c9ce461773b7df3bb64d82aa5a0d93052c3bb0e60209db6c0b5c10ee9cfc9cf","src/lib.rs":"29038346522acd412b6a54e60ccea8c3e89498decdf5e8deb172fdc0bc10f7be","src/pretend.rs":"73fe121ced5804e77d37512bd2c7548be249dcab3eeb0bad59f82e64188f9ace","src/ser.rs":"0d99c841f6c7bc9751ab225fe42d1f8b7fe56e36903efcb4ff10bf6e35c390ba","src/try.rs":"b171b0088c23ebf4bfa07ba457881b41ac5e547d55dd16f737ea988d34badf61"},"package":"ed201699328568d8d08208fdd080e3ff594e6c422e438b6705905da01005d537"}=========third_party/rust/bumpalo/README.md========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/bumpalo/README.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/bumpalo/README.md@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ # `bumpalo`- **A fast bump allocation arena for Rust.**@@ -8,7 +7,7 @@ [](https://crates.io/crates/bumpalo) [](https://github.com/fitzgen/bumpalo/actions?query=workflow%3ARust)-+ ### Bump Allocation@@ -33,11 +32,12 @@ deallocation *extremely* fast, but allocated objects' `Drop` implementations are not invoked.-> **However:** [`bumpalo::boxed::Box<T>`][crate::boxed::Box] can be used to wrap+> **However:** [`bumpalo::boxed::Box<T>`][box] can be used to wrap > `T` values allocated in the `Bump` arena, and calls `T`'s `Drop` > implementation when the `Box<T>` wrapper goes out of scope. This is similar to > how [`std::boxed::Box`] works, except without deallocating its backing memory.+[box]: https://docs.rs/bumpalo/latest/bumpalo/boxed/struct.Box.html [`std::boxed::Box`]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/boxed/struct.Box.html ### What happens when the memory chunk is full?@@ -80,19 +80,22 @@ arenas. ```rust-use bumpalo::{Bump, collections::Vec};--// Create a new bump arena.-let bump = Bump::new();--// Create a vector of integers whose storage is backed by the bump arena. The-// vector cannot outlive its backing arena, and this property is enforced with-// Rust's lifetime rules.-let mut v = Vec::new_in(&bump);--// Push a bunch of integers onto `v`!-for i in 0..100 {- v.push(i);+#[cfg(feature = "collections")]+{+ use bumpalo::{Bump, collections::Vec};++ // Create a new bump arena.+ let bump = Bump::new();++ // Create a vector of integers whose storage is backed by the bump arena. The+ // vector cannot outlive its backing arena, and this property is enforced with+ // Rust's lifetime rules.+ let mut v = Vec::new_in(&bump);++ // Push a bunch of integers onto `v`!+ for i in 0..100 {+ v.push(i);+ } } ```@@ -114,33 +117,36 @@ in its space itself. ```rust-use bumpalo::{Bump, boxed::Box};-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};--static NUM_DROPPED: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);--struct CountDrops;--impl Drop for CountDrops {- fn drop(&mut self) {- NUM_DROPPED.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);+#[cfg(feature = "boxed")]+{+ use bumpalo::{Bump, boxed::Box};+ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};++ static NUM_DROPPED: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);++ struct CountDrops;++ impl Drop for CountDrops {+ fn drop(&mut self) {+ NUM_DROPPED.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);+ } }++ // Create a new bump arena.+ let bump = Bump::new();++ // Create a `CountDrops` inside the bump arena.+ let mut c = Box::new_in(CountDrops, &bump);++ // No `CountDrops` have been dropped yet.+ assert_eq!(NUM_DROPPED.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);++ // Drop our `Box<CountDrops>`.+ drop(c);++ // Its `Drop` implementation was run, and so `NUM_DROPS` has been incremented.+ assert_eq!(NUM_DROPPED.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); }--// Create a new bump arena.-let bump = Bump::new();--// Create a `CountDrops` inside the bump arena.-let mut c = Box::new_in(CountDrops, &bump);--// No `CountDrops` have been dropped yet.-assert_eq!(NUM_DROPPED.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);--// Drop our `Box<CountDrops>`.-drop(c);--// Its `Drop` implementation was run, and so `NUM_DROPS` has been incremented.-assert_eq!(NUM_DROPPED.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1); ``` ### `#![no_std]` Support@@ -174,14 +180,14 @@ Next, enable the `allocator_api` nightly Rust feature in your `src/lib.rs` or `src/main.rs`:-```rust+```rust,ignore #![feature(allocator_api)] ``` Finally, use `std` collections with `Bump`, so that their internal heap allocations are made within the given bump arena:-```rust+```rust,ignore #![feature(allocator_api)] use bumpalo::Bump;@@ -197,9 +203,8 @@ #### Minimum Supported Rust Version (MSRV)-This crate is guaranteed to compile on stable Rust 1.44 and up. It might compile-with older versions but that may change in any new patch release.+This crate is guaranteed to compile on stable Rust **1.54** and up. It might+compile with older versions but that may change in any new patch release. We reserve the right to increment the MSRV on minor releases, however we will strive to only do it deliberately and for good reasons.-
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily documentation updates and minor code adjustments rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:
1. For the serde_derive/.cargo-checksum.json file:
Vulnerability Existed: no
This is just a checksum update for the package files, which is a normal maintenance activity and doesn't indicate any security fixes.
2. For the bumpalo/README.md file:
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes are documentation updates including:
- Changing image reference from 'master' to 'main' branch
- Adding link reference for box documentation
- Wrapping code examples in feature-gated blocks
- Updating minimum supported Rust version
- Minor formatting changes
None of these changes appear to be security-related. They're typical documentation improvements and maintenance updates.
The diff doesn't show any changes to actual source code that would indicate security fixes (like patching unsafe operations, fixing memory safety issues, or addressing potential vulnerabilities). The changes to checksums and documentation don't suggest any security vulnerabilities were addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/config.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/config.yml@@ -35,21 +35,35 @@ 'Fetch': 'Fetch and store content' 'Fxfn-l': 'Firefox functional tests (local)' 'Fxfn-r': 'Firefox functional tests (remote)'+ 'Fxfn-l-fis': 'Firefox functional tests (local) with fission enabled'+ 'Fxfn-r-fis': 'Firefox functional tests (remote) with fission enabled' 'iris': 'Iris testing suite' 'l10n-bump': 'L10n Bumper' 'M': 'Mochitests'+ 'M-headless': 'Headless Mochitests'+ 'M-headless-fis': 'Headless Mochitests with fission.'+ 'M-headless-spi-nw': 'Headless Mochitests with fission and socketprocess networking.'+ 'M-headless-spi-nw-fis': 'Headless Mochitests with fission and socketprocess networking and fission enabled.' 'M-aab': 'Mochitests with AAB test_runner.' 'M-1proc': 'Mochitests without e10s' 'M-a11y-checks': 'Mochitests with accessibility checks enabled'+ 'M-a11y-checks-fis': 'Mochitests with accessibility checks enabled and fission enabled'+ 'M-dfpi': 'Mochitests with dFPI enabled'+ 'M-dfpi-fis': 'Mochitests with dFPI and Fission enabled'+ 'M-dfpi-fis-xorig': 'Mochitests with dFPI, cross-origin and fission enabled' 'M-fis': 'Mochitests with fission enabled' 'M-fis-xorig': 'Mochitests with cross-origin and fission enabled' 'M-fis-gli': 'Mochitests with fission and WebGL IPC enabled' 'M-gli': 'Mochitests with WebGL over IPC'+ 'M-gli-fis': 'Mochitests with WebGL over IPC with fission enabled' 'M-spi': 'Mochitests with socket process'+ 'M-spi-fis': 'Mochitests with socket process with fission enabled' 'M-spi-nw': 'Mochitests with networking on socket process'+ 'M-spi-nw-fis': 'Mochitests with networking on socket process with fission enabled' 'M-spi-nw-1proc': 'Mochitests with networking on socket process without e10s' 'M-swr': 'Mochitests with software webrender enabled' 'M-swr-a11y-checks': 'Mochitests with software webrender and accessibility checks enabled'+ 'M-swr-a11y-checks-fis': 'Mochitests with software webrender and accessibility checks enabled and fission' 'M-swr-1proc': 'Mochitests with software webrender enabled without e10s' 'M-swr-fis': 'Mochitests with software webrender and fission enabled' 'M-swr-wayland': 'Mochitests with software webrender and Wayland backend enabled'@@ -75,6 +89,7 @@ 'R': 'Reftests' 'R-fis': 'Reftests with fission enabled' 'R-swr': 'Reftests with software webrender enabled'+ 'R-swr-fis': 'Reftests with software webrender and fission enabled' 'R-wayland': 'Reftests with Wayland backend enabled' 'Rap': 'Raptor performance tests on Firefox' 'Rap-live': 'Raptor performance tests on Firefox with live sites'@@ -87,19 +102,25 @@ 'remote': 'Remote debugging protocol tests' 'T': 'Talos performance tests' 'T-fis': 'Talos performance tests with fission enabled'- 'T-fis-swr': 'Talos performance tests with fission enabled and software webrender' 'T-gli': 'Talos performance tests with WebGL over IPC'+ 'T-gli-fis': 'Talos performance tests with WebGL over IPC with fission enabled' 'T-Prof': 'Talos performance tests on Firefox with Gecko Profiling' 'T-Prof-fis': 'Talos performance tests on Firefox with fission and Gecko Profiling' 'T-Prof-gli': 'Talos performance tests with WebGL over IPC and Gecko Profiling'+ 'T-Prof-gli-fis': 'Talos performance tests with WebGL over IPC and Gecko Profiling and fission enabled' 'T-swr': 'Talos performance tests with software webrender enabled'+ 'T-swr-fis': 'Talos performance tests with software webrender enabled' 'tt': 'Telemetry tests' 'tt-fis': 'Telemetry tests with fission enabled' 'SY': 'Are we slim yet tests by TaskCluster' 'SY-fis': 'Are we slim yet tests by TaskCluster, fission enabled' 'W': 'Web platform tests'+ 'W-dfpi-fis': 'Web platform tests with dFPI and Fission enabled' 'W-fis': 'Web platform tests with fission enabled'+ 'W-headless': 'Headless web platform tests'+ 'W-headless-fis': 'Headless web platform tests with fission enabled' 'W-swr': 'Web platform tests with software webrender enabled'+ 'W-swr-fis': 'Web platform tests with software webrender enabled' 'W-b': 'Web platform tests (backlog)' 'W-b-fis': 'Web platform tests (backlog) with fission enabled' 'X': 'Xpcshell tests'@@ -423,7 +444,8 @@ 'mozilla-inbound': 'low' 'default': 'very-low'-taskgraph: {}+taskgraph:+ register: gecko_taskgraph:register workers: aliases:@@ -620,3 +642,7 @@ production: security/mac/hardenedruntime/production.entitlements.xml default: security/mac/hardenedruntime/developer.entitlements.xml default: ''+ mac-requirements:+ by-platform:+ macosx64.*: build/package/mac_osx/requirements.plist+ default: ''
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily additions of new test configurations and minor configuration updates. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - File: taskcluster/ci/config.yml - Lines: Various
The changes are primarily additions of new test configurations with various combinations of features (like fission, headless mode, etc.) and some configuration updates.
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - File: taskcluster/ci/config.yml - Lines: 423-424
Old Code: `taskgraph: {}`
Fixed Code:
```
taskgraph:
register: gecko_taskgraph:register
```
This appears to be a configuration update rather than a security fix.
3. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - File: taskcluster/ci/config.yml - Lines: 642-645
Old Code: (no mac-requirements section)
Fixed Code:
```
mac-requirements:
by-platform:
macosx64.*: build/package/mac_osx/requirements.plist
default: ''
```
This is an addition of configuration for macOS requirements, not a security fix.
The diff shows configuration updates and additions of new test variants, but no clear security-related fixes. The changes appear to be feature additions and maintenance updates rather than vulnerability patches.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/services/sync/modules/engines/tabs.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/services/sync/modules/engines/tabs.js@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ const { XPCOMUtils } = ChromeUtils.import( "resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm"+);+const { TabStateFlusher } = ChromeUtils.import(+ "resource:///modules/sessionstore/TabStateFlusher.jsm" ); const { Services } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm"); const { Log } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Log.jsm");@@ -156,7 +159,16 @@ // Make sure there are history entries to look at. if (!tabState || !tabState.entries.length) {- continue;+ // If we detected a tab but no entries we should+ // flush the window so SessionState properly updates+ await TabStateFlusher.flushWindow(win);+ tabState = this.getTabState(tab);++ // We failed to get entries even after a flush+ // safe to skip this tab+ if (!tabState || !tabState.entries.length) {+ continue;+ } } let acceptable = !filter
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition or State Inconsistency] [services/sync/modules/engines/tabs.js] [Lines 156-164]
[Old Code]
```javascript
if (!tabState || !tabState.entries.length) {
continue;
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
if (!tabState || !tabState.entries.length) {
// If we detected a tab but no entries we should
// flush the window so SessionState properly updates
await TabStateFlusher.flushWindow(win);
tabState = this.getTabState(tab);
// We failed to get entries even after a flush
// safe to skip this tab
if (!tabState || !tabState.entries.length) {
continue;
}
}
```
Additional Details: The fix adds a flush operation when no tab entries are found, which could potentially address a race condition or state inconsistency issue where tab state wasn't properly synchronized. However, without more context about the specific security implications, we can't be certain this was a security fix versus a general reliability improvement.
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[Dependency Addition] [services/sync/modules/engines/tabs.js] [Lines 9-12]
[Old Code]
```javascript
const { XPCOMUtils } = ChromeUtils.import(
"resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm"
);
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
const { XPCOMUtils } = ChromeUtils.import(
"resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm"
);
const { TabStateFlusher } = ChromeUtils.import(
"resource:///modules/sessionstore/TabStateFlusher.jsm"
);
```
Additional Details: This change simply adds a new module import to support the tab state flushing functionality and doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/JitContext.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/JitContext.h@@ -146,12 +146,9 @@ #endif };-// Process-wide initialization of JIT data structures.+// Process-wide initialization and shutdown of JIT data structures. [[nodiscard]] bool InitializeJit();--// Call this after changing hardware parameters via command line flags (on-// platforms that support that).-void ComputeJitSupportFlags();+void ShutdownJit(); // Get and set the current JIT context. JitContext* GetJitContext();
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Resource Leak] [js/src/jit/JitContext.h] [Lines 146-149] [Old Code] // Process-wide initialization of JIT data structures. [[nodiscard]] bool InitializeJit(); // Call this after changing hardware parameters via command line flags (on // platforms that support that). void ComputeJitSupportFlags(); [Fixed Code] // Process-wide initialization and shutdown of JIT data structures. [[nodiscard]] bool InitializeJit(); void ShutdownJit(); Additional Details: The main change is the addition of a `ShutdownJit()` function and removal of `ComputeJitSupportFlags()`. While this suggests better resource management, we can't definitively say there was a vulnerability without seeing the implementation details. The change appears to be more about proper resource cleanup than fixing a specific security issue. The comment now emphasizes both initialization and shutdown, suggesting improved lifecycle management of JIT resources. Note: Without seeing the actual implementations of these functions or more context about how they're used, we can't be certain about any specific vulnerabilities that might have existed. The change could be preventive rather than corrective.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-016.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-016.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ -ms-column-fill: auto; -webkit-column-fill: auto; column-fill: auto;- border: 2px dashed;+ border: 2px solid salmon; margin-bottom: 5px; }
Based on the provided code diff, this appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-016.html] [Lines 23] [Old Code: border: 2px dashed;] [Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;] Additional Notes: 1. The change is purely cosmetic/visual (changing border style from dashed to solid and adding a color) 2. This appears to be part of test case maintenance rather than a security fix 3. No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change 4. The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/src/program_cache.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/src/program_cache.rs@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ ErrorKind::InvalidData, "Failed to deserialize ProgramBinary", ))- }+ }, }; Ok(Arc::new(binary))@@ -204,10 +204,10 @@ match deserialize_program_binary(&path) { Ok(program) => { program_cache.load_program_binary(program);- }+ }, Err(err) => { error!("shader-cache: Failed to deserialize program binary: {}", err);- }+ }, }; } else { info!("shader-cache: Program binary not found in disk cache");@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ Err(err) => { info!("shader-cache: Could not read startup whitelist: {}", err); Vec::new()- }+ }, }; info!("Loaded startup shader whitelist in {:?}", start.elapsed());
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] gfx/webrender_bindings/src/program_cache.rs [Lines] 55-229
The changes appear to be primarily formatting/whitespace changes (adding trailing commas in match arms) rather than security fixes. No functional changes were made to the error handling or program binary deserialization logic.
Additional Notes:
- The diff shows only stylistic changes (adding trailing commas in match arms)
- No changes to the actual security-sensitive operations (deserialization, file handling)
- Error handling patterns remain the same
- The changes align with Rust's idiomatic formatting style but don't address any security vulnerabilities
Since these are purely formatting changes, no security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The error handling for deserialization and file operations remains unchanged.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/repeat.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/repeat.rs@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ use futures_core::ready; use futures_core::task::{Context, Poll};-#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]-use futures_io::Initializer; use futures_io::{AsyncRead, IoSliceMut}; use std::fmt; use std::io;@@ -59,12 +57,6 @@ } Poll::Ready(Ok(nwritten)) }-- #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]- #[inline]- unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {- Initializer::nop()- } } impl fmt::Debug for Repeat {
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed unsafe initialization feature] [third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/repeat.rs] [Lines 2-3, 59-63]
[Old Code]
```rust
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
use futures_io::Initializer;
...
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
#[inline]
unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {
Initializer::nop()
}
```
[Fixed Code]
(Removed entirely)
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential memory safety improvement] [third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/repeat.rs] [Lines 1-5]
[Old Code]
```rust
use futures_core::ready;
use futures_core::task::{Context, Poll};
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
use futures_io::Initializer;
use futures_io::{AsyncRead, IoSliceMut};
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
use futures_core::ready;
use futures_core::task::{Context, Poll};
use futures_io::{AsyncRead, IoSliceMut};
```
The main change appears to be the removal of an unsafe initialization feature and its associated code. While this could potentially address memory safety concerns, the diff doesn't provide enough context to confirm if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just removing unused/unsafe code as a precaution. The removal of unsafe code is generally a security improvement, but without more context about the specific vulnerabilities this might have addressed, we can't be certain.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.