Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/mochitest/runtests.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/mochitest/runtests.py@@ -1177,7 +1177,9 @@ testURL = "about:blank" return testURL- def getTestsByScheme(self, options, testsToFilter=None, disabled=True):+ def getTestsByScheme(+ self, options, testsToFilter=None, disabled=True, manifestToFilter=None+ ): """Build the url path to the specific test harness and test file or directory Build a manifest of tests to run and write out a json file for the harness to read testsToFilter option is used to filter/keep the tests provided in the list@@ -1190,6 +1192,18 @@ paths = [] for test in tests: if testsToFilter and (test["path"] not in testsToFilter):+ continue+ # If we are running a specific manifest, the previously computed set of active+ # tests should be filtered out based on the manifest that contains that entry.+ #+ # This is especially important when a test file is listed in multiple+ # manifests (e.g. because the same test runs under a different configuration,+ # and so it is being included in multiple manifests), without filtering the+ # active tests based on the current manifest (configuration) that we are+ # running for each of the N manifests we would be executing the active tests+ # exactly N times (and so NxN runs instead of the expected N runs, one for each+ # manifest).+ if manifestToFilter and (test["manifest"] not in manifestToFilter): continue paths.append(test)@@ -2647,7 +2661,7 @@ norm_paths.append(p) return norm_paths- def runMochitests(self, options, testsToRun):+ def runMochitests(self, options, testsToRun, manifestToFilter=None): "This is a base method for calling other methods in this class for --bisect-chunk." # Making an instance of bisect class for --bisect-chunk option. bisect = bisection.Bisect(self)@@ -2667,7 +2681,7 @@ ) bisection_log = 1- result = self.doTests(options, testsToRun)+ result = self.doTests(options, testsToRun, manifestToFilter) if options.bisectChunk: status = bisect.post_test(options, self.expectedError, self.result) else:@@ -2954,7 +2968,7 @@ # by the user, since we need to create a new directory for each run. We would face # problems if we use the directory provided by the user. tests_in_manifest = [t["path"] for t in tests if t["manifest"] == m]- res = self.runMochitests(options, tests_in_manifest)+ res = self.runMochitests(options, tests_in_manifest, manifestToFilter=m) result = result or res # Dump the logging buffer@@ -3033,7 +3047,7 @@ if self.profiler_tempdir: shutil.rmtree(self.profiler_tempdir)- def doTests(self, options, testsToFilter=None):+ def doTests(self, options, testsToFilter=None, manifestToFilter=None): # A call to initializeLooping method is required in case of --run-by-dir or --bisect-chunk # since we need to initialize variables for each loop. if options.bisectChunk or options.runByManifest:@@ -3163,7 +3177,9 @@ # testsToFilter parameter is used to filter out the test list that # is sent to getTestsByScheme- for (scheme, tests) in self.getTestsByScheme(options, testsToFilter):+ for (scheme, tests) in self.getTestsByScheme(+ options, testsToFilter, True, manifestToFilter+ ): # read the number of tests here, if we are not going to run any, # terminate early if not tests:
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found in the diff. The changes appear to be functional improvements related to test filtering by manifest rather than security fixes. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Test Execution Control Vulnerability [testing/mochitest/runtests.py] [Lines 1192-1194, 2661, 2968, 3047, 3177] The changes introduce additional filtering logic (`manifestToFilter`) that could potentially affect test execution control. However, this appears to be an intentional feature enhancement rather than a security fix. The main changes in the diff are: 1. Added `manifestToFilter` parameter to multiple methods to enable filtering tests by manifest 2. Modified `getTestsByScheme` to filter tests based on manifest when specified 3. Updated method calls to pass the new parameter through the call chain These changes appear to be functional improvements to prevent duplicate test executions when a test appears in multiple manifests, rather than addressing specific security vulnerabilities. The changes improve the test execution logic but don't appear to fix any security issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-paint-order-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-paint-order-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Julien Chaffraix" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="reviewer" title="Arron Eicholz" href="mailto:[email protected]" /> <!-- 2012-10-27 --> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-background/#the-background-clip">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The background is painted behind the border."> <link rel="match" href="reference/background-paint-order-001-ref.html"> <style>
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-paint-order-001.html] [Lines 5-5]
Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
Fixed Code: (line removed)
Additional Details:
- The diff shows the removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
- There are no clear security vulnerabilities being addressed in this change.
- The modification is likely related to test infrastructure or metadata cleanup rather than security concerns.
- No CVE or known vulnerability patterns match this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/favicons/browser_favicon_nostore.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/favicons/browser_favicon_nostore.js@@ -116,9 +116,17 @@ }); server.registerFile( "/favicon.ico",- FileUtils.getFile(- "CurWorkD",- `/browser/browser/base/content/test/favicons/no-store.png`.split("/")+ new FileUtils.File(+ PathUtils.join(+ Services.dirsvc.get("CurWorkD", Ci.nsIFile).path,+ "browser",+ "browser",+ "base",+ "content",+ "test",+ "favicons",+ "no-store.png"+ ) ) ); server.registerPathHandler("/page", (request, response) => {
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Path Traversal or File Access Vulnerability] [browser/base/content/test/favicons/browser_favicon_nostore.js] [Lines 116-129]
[Old Code]
FileUtils.getFile(
"CurWorkD",
`/browser/browser/base/content/test/favicons/no-store.png`.split("/")
)
[Fixed Code]
new FileUtils.File(
PathUtils.join(
Services.dirsvc.get("CurWorkD", Ci.nsIFile).path,
"browser",
"browser",
"base",
"content",
"test",
"favicons",
"no-store.png"
)
)
Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a more robust way of constructing file paths, using PathUtils.join() instead of string splitting
- The old method could potentially be vulnerable to path manipulation if the input wasn't properly sanitized
- The new version explicitly joins path components, which is generally safer
- However, since this is test code and the path components are hardcoded, it's unclear if this was actually fixing a security vulnerability or just improving code quality
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/tps/setup.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/tps/setup.py@@ -2,29 +2,23 @@ # License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.-from __future__ import absolute_import from setuptools import setup, find_packages-import sys version = "0.6" deps = [ "httplib2 == 0.9.2", "mozfile >= 1.2",- "mozhttpd == 0.7",- "mozinfo >= 0.10",- "mozinstall == 1.16",- "mozprocess == 0.26",+ "wptserve >= 3.0",+ "mozinfo >= 1.2",+ "mozinstall == 2.0.1",+ "mozprocess == 1.3", "mozprofile ~= 2.1",- "mozrunner ~= 7.2",- "mozversion == 1.5",+ "mozrunner ~= 8.2",+ "mozversion == 2.3", "PyYAML >= 4.0", ]--# we only support python 2.6+ right now-assert sys.version_info[0] == 2-assert sys.version_info[1] >= 6 setup( name="tps",
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Dependency Version Pinning [File] testing/tps/setup.py [Lines] Dependency specifications [Old Code] ``` "httplib2 == 0.9.2", "mozfile >= 1.2", "mozhttpd == 0.7", "mozinfo >= 0.10", "mozinstall == 1.16", "mozprocess == 0.26", "mozprofile ~= 2.1", "mozrunner ~= 7.2", "mozversion == 1.5", ``` [Fixed Code] ``` "httplib2 == 0.9.2", "mozfile >= 1.2", "wptserve >= 3.0", "mozinfo >= 1.2", "mozinstall == 2.0.1", "mozprocess == 1.3", "mozprofile ~= 2.1", "mozrunner ~= 8.2", "mozversion == 2.3", ``` Additional Details: Multiple dependencies were updated to newer versions, which likely include security fixes. The change from mozhttpd to wptserve suggests a more secure alternative was chosen. 2. Vulnerability Existed: yes Python 2 Deprecation [File] testing/tps/setup.py [Lines] Version assertions removed [Old Code] ``` # we only support python 2.6+ right now assert sys.version_info[0] == 2 assert sys.version_info[1] >= 6 ``` [Fixed Code] (Removed entirely) Additional Details: The removal of Python 2-specific checks suggests migration to Python 3, which is more secure and supported. Python 2 has known security vulnerabilities as it's no longer maintained. 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Absolute Import Removal [File] testing/tps/setup.py [Lines] Import statement [Old Code] `from __future__ import absolute_import` [Fixed Code] (Removed entirely) Additional Details: While this change aligns with Python 3 compatibility (where absolute imports are default), it's unclear if this directly relates to a security fix or just code modernization.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.closed.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.closed.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.lineJoin = 'miter'; ctx.roundRect(100, 50, 100, 100, [0]); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.closed.html] [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't address any security issues but rather improves code consistency or readability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/schemas/metrics.2-0-0.schema.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/schemas/metrics.2-0-0.schema.yaml@@ -434,10 +434,14 @@ unit: title: Unit description: |- The unit of the metric, for metrics that don't already require a- meaningful unit, such as `time_unit`.+ The unit of the metric.+ This is only required for metrics+ that don't already require a meaningful unit, e.g. `quantity` This is provided for informational purposes only and doesn't have any effect on data collection.++ Metric types like `timespan`, `datetime`+ and `timing_distribution` take a `time_unit` instead. type: string no_lint:@@ -538,7 +542,7 @@ - not: description: "'tags' is reserved as a category name." const: tags- - enum: ['$schema']+ - enum: ['$schema', '$tags'] properties: $schema:@@ -549,6 +553,14 @@ title: Lint checks to skip globally description: | This parameter lists any lint checks to skip for this whole file.+ type: array+ items:+ type: string++ $tags:+ title: Tags that apply to the whole file+ description: |+ This denotes the list of tags that apply to all metrics in this file. type: array items: type: string@@ -685,3 +697,27 @@ Built-in pings are not allowed." pattern: "^(metrics|baseline|events|deletion-request|default|glean_.*)$"++ -+ if:+ # This is a schema check:+ # This is true when the checked YAML passes the schema validation.+ #+ # If it has a datetime/timing_distribution/timespan type+ # AND has a `unit` property, then...+ properties:+ type:+ enum:+ - datetime+ - timing_distribution+ - timespan+ required:+ - unit+ # ... then `time_unit` is required,+ # because that's the only way we can force this to fail.+ then:+ required:+ - time_unit+ description: |+ This metric type uses the (optional) `time_unit` parameter,+ not `unit`.
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Schema Validation Improvement [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/schemas/metrics.2-0-0.schema.yaml] [Lines 434-442, 685-697]
Old Code:
```yaml
unit:
title: Unit
description: |
The unit of the metric, for metrics that don't already require a
meaningful unit, such as `time_unit`.
This is provided for informational purposes only and doesn't have any
effect on data collection.
```
Fixed Code:
```yaml
unit:
title: Unit
description: |
The unit of the metric.
This is only required for metrics
that don't already require a meaningful unit, e.g. `quantity`
This is provided for informational purposes only and doesn't have any
effect on data collection.
Metric types like `timespan`, `datetime`
and `timing_distribution` take a `time_unit` instead.
```
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Schema Validation Improvement [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/schemas/metrics.2-0-0.schema.yaml] [Lines 538]
Old Code:
```yaml
- enum: ['$schema']
```
Fixed Code:
```yaml
- enum: ['$schema', '$tags']
```
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
New Feature Addition [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/schemas/metrics.2-0-0.schema.yaml] [Lines 553-563]
Old Code:
(No equivalent code existed)
Fixed Code:
```yaml
$tags:
title: Tags that apply to the whole file
description: |
This denotes the list of tags that apply to all metrics in this file.
type: array
items:
type: string
```
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Schema Validation Improvement [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/schemas/metrics.2-0-0.schema.yaml] [Lines 685-697]
Old Code:
(No equivalent code existed)
Fixed Code:
```yaml
-
if:
# This is a schema check:
# This is true when the checked YAML passes the schema validation.
#
# If it has a datetime/timing_distribution/timespan type
# AND has a `unit` property, then...
properties:
type:
enum:
- datetime
- timing_distribution
- timespan
required:
- unit
# ... then `time_unit` is required,
# because that's the only way we can force this to fail.
then:
required:
- time_unit
description: |
This metric type uses the (optional) `time_unit` parameter,
not `unit`.
```
Note: While these changes appear to be schema validation improvements and feature additions rather than direct security fixes, they could potentially prevent misconfigurations that might lead to security issues. However, without more context about the specific security implications, I've marked all findings as "not sure".
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-177b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-177b.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found --> <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-color.xht"/>- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <div>
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-177b.xml] [Lines 9] [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] [Removed line] Additional Details: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications. 2. This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix. 3. The empty flags meta tag wasn't serving any apparent purpose in the test case. 4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change. The modification seems to be part of routine maintenance rather than addressing a security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/public/ErrorReport.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/public/ErrorReport.h@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #define js_ErrorReport_h #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" // MOZ_ASSERT+#include "mozilla/Maybe.h" // mozilla::Maybe #include <iterator> // std::input_iterator_tag, std::iterator #include <stdarg.h>@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ #include "js/CharacterEncoding.h" // JS::ConstUTF8CharsZ #include "js/RootingAPI.h" // JS::HandleObject, JS::RootedObject #include "js/UniquePtr.h" // js::UniquePtr+#include "js/Value.h" // JS::Value #include "js/Vector.h" // js::Vector struct JS_PUBLIC_API JSContext;@@ -478,7 +480,8 @@ extern JS_PUBLIC_API bool CreateError( JSContext* cx, JSExnType type, HandleObject stack, HandleString fileName, uint32_t lineNumber, uint32_t columnNumber, JSErrorReport* report,- HandleString message, MutableHandleValue rval);+ HandleString message, Handle<mozilla::Maybe<Value>> cause,+ MutableHandleValue rval); } /* namespace JS */
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [js/public/ErrorReport.h] [Lines 478-480]
[Old Code]
```cpp
extern JS_PUBLIC_API bool CreateError(
JSContext* cx, JSExnType type, HandleObject stack, HandleString fileName,
uint32_t lineNumber, uint32_t columnNumber, JSErrorReport* report,
HandleString message, MutableHandleValue rval);
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
extern JS_PUBLIC_API bool CreateError(
JSContext* cx, JSExnType type, HandleObject stack, HandleString fileName,
uint32_t lineNumber, uint32_t columnNumber, JSErrorReport* report,
HandleString message, Handle<mozilla::Maybe<Value>> cause,
MutableHandleValue rval);
```
Additional Details: The change adds a new `cause` parameter of type `Handle<mozilla::Maybe<Value>>` to the `CreateError` function. While this doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability, it could be related to improved error handling or error cause propagation, which might help prevent certain types of error-related security issues. The use of `mozilla::Maybe` suggests better handling of optional values, which could prevent null/undefined-related issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/marker-line-height.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/marker-line-height.html@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ <link rel="match" href="marker-line-height-ref.html"> <meta name="assert" content="Checks that ::marker supports 'line-height', both explicitly set or inherited from an ancestor"> <style>+::marker { font-family: inherit; } ol { float: left; width: 50px;
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/marker-line-height.html] [Lines 7]
[Old Code: No specific ::marker font-family declaration]
[Fixed Code: Added ::marker { font-family: inherit; }]
Additional analysis:
1. This appears to be a test file modification rather than production code
2. The change adds a CSS rule to ensure markers inherit font-family
3. No security implications are apparent in this change
4. The modification seems related to test case completeness rather than security
The diff shows a purely functional/behavioral change to a test case, not a security fix. The addition of `font-family: inherit` for markers is a styling improvement that doesn't address any known vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-046.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-046.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes"> <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-046-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the basic shape ellipse(closest-side farthest-side at top 40px right 60px) border-box"> <style> .container {
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-046.html [Lines 9] Old Code: <meta name="flags" content=""> Fixed Code: (line removed) Additional Details: The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of test configuration. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here. The modification doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations, input handling, or potential attack vectors.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/chrome/geckoview/geckoview.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/chrome/geckoview/geckoview.js@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ var { Services } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm"); XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetters(this, {+ Blocklist: "resource://gre/modules/Blocklist.jsm", E10SUtils: "resource://gre/modules/E10SUtils.jsm", EventDispatcher: "resource://gre/modules/Messaging.jsm", GeckoViewActorManager: "resource://gre/modules/GeckoViewActorManager.jsm",@@ -791,6 +792,12 @@ Services.fog.registerCustomPings(); });+ InitLater(() => {+ // Initialize the blocklist module.+ // TODO bug 1730026: this runs too often. It should run once.+ Blocklist.loadBlocklistAsync();+ });+ // This should always go last, since the idle tasks (except for the ones with // timeouts) should execute in order. Note that this observer notification is // not guaranteed to fire, since the window could close before we get here.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
Missing Blocklist Initialization [mobile/android/chrome/geckoview/geckoview.js] [Lines 791-792]
[Old Code]
(No blocklist initialization present)
[Fixed Code]
InitLater(() => {
// Initialize the blocklist module.
// TODO bug 1730026: this runs too often. It should run once.
Blocklist.loadBlocklistAsync();
});
Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to missing security protections. The addition of Blocklist initialization suggests that previously, the application wasn't properly loading its blocklist module, which is crucial for security as it prevents loading of malicious or vulnerable extensions/add-ons. While not a classic vulnerability name, this would fall under "Insufficient Security Controls" or "Missing Security Mechanism". The TODO comment suggests there's still room for improvement in the implementation.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.shape.start.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.shape.start.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 25); ctx.arcTo(200, 25, 200, 50, 10); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 28-33]
[Old Code]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been updated.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/templates.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/templates.yaml@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {- var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);- var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext(%(context_args)s);+ var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+ var ctx = canvas.getContext(%(context_args)s); %(code)s });@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {- var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);- var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext(%(context_args)s);+ var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+ var ctx = canvas.getContext(%(context_args)s); %(code)s });
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/tools/templates.yaml] [Lines 18-19, 42-43] Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext(%(context_args)s); Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext(%(context_args)s); Additional Details: - The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. - No security vulnerability is being addressed here, just a variable name change. - The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name differs. - This doesn't appear to fix any security issues, just improves code readability/maintainability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/thebes/gfxFont.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/thebes/gfxFont.h@@ -1631,7 +1631,7 @@ gfxFloat aveCharWidth; gfxFloat spaceWidth;- gfxFloat zeroWidth; // -1 if there was no zero glyph+ gfxFloat zeroWidth; // -1 if there was no zero glyph gfxFloat ideographicWidth; // -1 if kWaterIdeograph is not supported gfxFloat ZeroOrAveCharWidth() const {
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The change appears to be purely cosmetic (alignment/formatting) with no functional impact.
Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change is purely cosmetic formatting adjustment.
Additional Details:
- The change only adjusts whitespace/alignment of a comment
- No functional code changes were made
- No security implications from this change
- No known vulnerability patterns in this modification
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.h@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #define SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(b) ((b)->space - (b)->len) SECStatus sslBuffer_Grow(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int newLen);+SECStatus sslBuffer_Fill(sslBuffer *b, PRUint8 c, size_t len); SECStatus sslBuffer_Append(sslBuffer *b, const void *data, unsigned int len); SECStatus sslBuffer_AppendNumber(sslBuffer *b, PRUint64 v, unsigned int size); SECStatus sslBuffer_AppendVariable(sslBuffer *b, const PRUint8 *data,
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Buffer Initialization Issue] [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.h] [Lines 38-39] [Old Code] SECStatus sslBuffer_Grow(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int newLen); [Fixed Code] SECStatus sslBuffer_Grow(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int newLen); SECStatus sslBuffer_Fill(sslBuffer *b, PRUint8 c, size_t len); Additional Details: The diff shows the addition of a new function `sslBuffer_Fill()` which appears to be designed to fill a buffer with a specific byte pattern. While this isn't fixing an obvious vulnerability, the addition of such a function could be related to security hardening by: 1. Ensuring proper initialization of buffers (preventing information leaks) 2. Providing a safe way to fill buffers with known values 3. Potentially replacing less secure manual buffer filling operations However, without seeing the implementation or the context of why this was added, we can't be certain if it's fixing a specific vulnerability or just adding functionality. The change could be related to defense in depth rather than fixing a specific vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/protocol/http/SpeculativeTransaction.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/protocol/http/SpeculativeTransaction.cpp@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ LOG(("SpeculativeTransaction::OnHTTPSRRAvailable [this=%p]", this)); if (!aHTTPSSVCRecord || !aHighestPriorityRecord) {+ gHttpHandler->ConnMgr()->DoSpeculativeConnection(this, false); return NS_OK; }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Connection Handling Issue] [netwerk/protocol/http/SpeculativeTransaction.cpp] [Lines 48-49]
[Old Code]
```cpp
if (!aHTTPSSVCRecord || !aHighestPriorityRecord) {
return NS_OK;
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
if (!aHTTPSSVCRecord || !aHighestPriorityRecord) {
gHttpHandler->ConnMgr()->DoSpeculativeConnection(this, false);
return NS_OK;
}
```
Additional Details:
The fix adds a call to `DoSpeculativeConnection` with `false` parameter when certain records are not available. While this doesn't clearly match any known vulnerability pattern, it appears to be fixing a potential resource handling issue where speculative connections might not be properly cleaned up when certain conditions aren't met. The change ensures proper connection management even in failure cases. Without more context, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability, but this appears to be a robustness improvement in connection handling.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.h@@ -104,9 +104,6 @@ friend class ProtocolFuzzerHelper; #endif- class CxxStackFrame;- class InterruptFrame;- typedef mozilla::Monitor Monitor; // We could templatize the actor type but it would unnecessarily@@ -147,7 +144,6 @@ static constexpr int32_t kNoTimeout = INT32_MIN; typedef IPC::Message Message;- typedef IPC::MessageInfo MessageInfo; typedef mozilla::ipc::Transport Transport; using ScopedPort = mozilla::ipc::ScopedPort;@@ -155,6 +151,11 @@ ~MessageChannel(); IToplevelProtocol* Listener() const { return mListener; }++ // Returns the event target which the worker lives on and must be used for+ // operations on the current thread. Only safe to access after the+ // MessageChannel has been opened.+ nsISerialEventTarget* GetWorkerEventTarget() const { return mWorkerThread; } // "Open" a connection using an existing ScopedPort. The ScopedPort must be // valid and connected to a remote.@@ -251,9 +252,6 @@ // Synchronously send |msg| (i.e., wait for |reply|) bool Send(UniquePtr<Message> aMsg, Message* aReply);- // Make an Interrupt call to the other side of the channel- bool Call(UniquePtr<Message> aMsg, Message* aReply);- bool CanSend() const; // Remove and return a callback that needs reply@@ -272,7 +270,7 @@ void SetReplyTimeoutMs(int32_t aTimeoutMs);- bool IsOnCxxStack() const { return !mCxxStackFrames.empty(); }+ bool IsOnCxxStack() const { return mOnCxxStack; } void CancelCurrentTransaction();@@ -318,10 +316,9 @@ #ifdef OS_WIN struct MOZ_STACK_CLASS SyncStackFrame {- SyncStackFrame(MessageChannel* channel, bool interrupt);+ explicit SyncStackFrame(MessageChannel* channel); ~SyncStackFrame();- bool mInterrupt; bool mSpinNestedEvents; bool mListenerNotified; MessageChannel* mChannel;@@ -372,13 +369,11 @@ void Clear();- bool InterruptEventOccurred(); bool HasPendingEvents(); void ProcessPendingRequests(AutoEnterTransaction& aTransaction); bool ProcessPendingRequest(Message&& aUrgent);- void MaybeUndeferIncall(); void EnqueuePendingMessages(); // Dispatches an incoming message to its appropriate handler.@@ -389,8 +384,6 @@ void DispatchSyncMessage(ActorLifecycleProxy* aProxy, const Message& aMsg, Message*& aReply); void DispatchAsyncMessage(ActorLifecycleProxy* aProxy, const Message& aMsg);- void DispatchInterruptMessage(ActorLifecycleProxy* aProxy, Message&& aMsg,- size_t aStackDepth); // Return true if the wait ended because a notification was received. //@@ -403,7 +396,6 @@ // So in sum: true is a meaningful return value; false isn't, // necessarily. bool WaitForSyncNotify(bool aHandleWindowsMessages);- bool WaitForInterruptNotify(); bool WaitResponse(bool aWaitTimedOut);@@ -413,59 +405,19 @@ void CancelTransaction(int transaction); void RepostAllMessages();-- // The "remote view of stack depth" can be different than the- // actual stack depth when there are out-of-turn replies. When we- // receive one, our actual Interrupt stack depth doesn't decrease, but- // the other side (that sent the reply) thinks it has. So, the- // "view" returned here is |stackDepth| minus the number of- // out-of-turn replies.- //- // Only called from the worker thread.- size_t RemoteViewOfStackDepth(size_t stackDepth) const {- AssertWorkerThread();- return stackDepth - mOutOfTurnReplies.size();- } int32_t NextSeqno() { AssertWorkerThread(); return (mSide == ChildSide) ? --mNextSeqno : ++mNextSeqno; }- // This helper class manages mCxxStackDepth on behalf of MessageChannel.- // When the stack depth is incremented from zero to non-zero, it invokes- // a callback, and similarly for when the depth goes from non-zero to zero.- void EnteredCxxStack();- void ExitedCxxStack();-- void EnteredCall();- void ExitedCall();-- void EnteredSyncSend();- void ExitedSyncSend();- void DebugAbort(const char* file, int line, const char* cond, const char* why, bool reply = false);- // This method is only safe to call on the worker thread, or in a- // debugger with all threads paused.- void DumpInterruptStack(const char* const pfx = "") const;- void AddProfilerMarker(const IPC::Message& aMessage, MessageDirection aDirection); private:- // Called from both threads- size_t InterruptStackDepth() const {- mMonitor->AssertCurrentThreadOwns();- return mInterruptStack.size();- }-- bool AwaitingInterruptReply() const {- mMonitor->AssertCurrentThreadOwns();- return !mInterruptStack.empty();- }- // Returns true if we're dispatching an async message's callback. bool DispatchingAsyncMessage() const { AssertWorkerThread();@@ -501,7 +453,6 @@ bool WasTransactionCanceled(int transaction); bool ShouldDeferMessage(const Message& aMsg);- bool ShouldDeferInterruptMessage(const Message& aMsg, size_t aStackDepth); void OnMessageReceivedFromLink(Message&& aMsg); void OnChannelErrorFromLink();@@ -572,7 +523,6 @@ void RunMessage(MessageTask& aTask); typedef LinkedList<RefPtr<MessageTask>> MessageQueue;- typedef std::map<size_t, Message> MessageMap; typedef std::map<size_t, UniquePtr<UntypedCallbackHolder>> CallbackMap; typedef IPC::Message::msgid_t msgid_t;@@ -695,38 +645,11 @@ // Queue of all incoming messages. //- // If both this side and the other side are functioning correctly, the queue- // can only be in certain configurations. Let- //- // |A<| be an async in-message,- // |S<| be a sync in-message,- // |C<| be an Interrupt in-call,- // |R<| be an Interrupt reply.- //- // The queue can only match this configuration- //- // A<* (S< | C< | R< (?{mInterruptStack.size() == 1} A<* (S< | C<)))- //- // The other side can send as many async messages |A<*| as it wants before- // sending us a blocking message.- //- // The first case is |S<|, a sync in-msg. The other side must be blocked,- // and thus can't send us any more messages until we process the sync+ // If both this side and the other side are functioning correctly, the other+ // side can send as many async messages as it wants before sending us a+ // blocking message. After sending a blocking message, the other side must be+ // blocked, and thus can't send us any more messages until we process the sync // in-msg.- //- // The second case is |C<|, an Interrupt in-call; the other side must be- // blocked. (There's a subtlety here: this in-call might have raced with an- // out-call, but we detect that with the mechanism below,- // |mRemoteStackDepth|, and races don't matter to the queue.)- //- // Final case, the other side replied to our most recent out-call |R<|.- // If that was the *only* out-call on our stack,- // |?{mInterruptStack.size() == 1}|, then other side "finished with us,"- // and went back to its own business. That business might have included- // sending any number of async message |A<*| until sending a blocking- // message |(S< | C<)|. If we had more than one Interrupt call on our- // stack, the other side *better* not have sent us another blocking- // message, because it's blocked on a reply from us. // MessageQueue mPending;@@ -735,63 +658,13 @@ // context). size_t mMaybeDeferredPendingCount = 0;- // Stack of all the out-calls on which this channel is awaiting responses.- // Each stack refers to a different protocol and the stacks are mutually- // exclusive: multiple outcalls of the same kind cannot be initiated while- // another is active.- std::stack<MessageInfo> mInterruptStack;-- // This is what we think the Interrupt stack depth is on the "other side" of- // this Interrupt channel. We maintain this variable so that we can detect- // racy Interrupt calls. With each Interrupt out-call sent, we send along- // what *we* think the stack depth of the remote side is *before* it will- // receive the Interrupt call.- //- // After sending the out-call, our stack depth is "incremented" by pushing- // that pending message onto mPending.- //- // Then when processing an in-call |c|, it must be true that- //- // mInterruptStack.size() == c.remoteDepth- //- // I.e., my depth is actually the same as what the other side thought it- // was when it sent in-call |c|. If this fails to hold, we have detected- // racy Interrupt calls.- //- // We then increment mRemoteStackDepth *just before* processing the- // in-call, since we know the other side is waiting on it, and decrement- // it *just after* finishing processing that in-call, since our response- // will pop the top of the other side's |mPending|.- //- // One nice aspect of this race detection is that it is symmetric; if one- // side detects a race, then the other side must also detect the same race.- size_t mRemoteStackDepthGuess = 0;-- // Approximation of code frames on the C++ stack. It can only be- // interpreted as the implication:- //- // !mCxxStackFrames.empty() => MessageChannel code on C++ stack- //- // This member is only accessed on the worker thread, and so is not- // protected by mMonitor. It is managed exclusively by the helper- // |class CxxStackFrame|.- mozilla::Vector<InterruptFrame> mCxxStackFrames;-- // Did we process an Interrupt out-call during this stack? Only meaningful in- // ExitedCxxStack(), from which this variable is reset.- bool mSawInterruptOutMsg = false;-- // Map of replies received "out of turn", because of Interrupt- // in-calls racing with replies to outstanding in-calls. See- // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=521929.- MessageMap mOutOfTurnReplies;+ // Is there currently MessageChannel logic for this channel on the C++ stack?+ // This member is only accessed on the worker thread, and so is not protected+ // by mMonitor.+ bool mOnCxxStack = false; // Map of async Callbacks that are still waiting replies. CallbackMap mPendingResponses;-- // Stack of Interrupt in-calls that were deferred because of race- // conditions.- std::stack<Message> mDeferred; #ifdef OS_WIN HANDLE mEvent;
Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the security-related findings:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
**Removal of Interrupt Message Handling** [ipc/glue/MessageChannel.h] [Multiple lines]
The diff shows extensive removal of interrupt message handling code including:
- Removal of `Call()` method for interrupt calls
- Removal of `DispatchInterruptMessage()`
- Removal of `WaitForInterruptNotify()`
- Removal of interrupt stack management code (`mInterruptStack`, `mRemoteStackDepthGuess`, etc.)
This appears to be a fix for potential race conditions and message ordering vulnerabilities in the interrupt handling mechanism.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
**Simplified Stack Tracking** [ipc/glue/MessageChannel.h] [Lines around 272, 684]
Old Code:
```cpp
bool IsOnCxxStack() const { return !mCxxStackFrames.empty(); }
// ...
mozilla::Vector<InterruptFrame> mCxxStackFrames;
```
Fixed Code:
```cpp
bool IsOnCxxStack() const { return mOnCxxStack; }
// ...
bool mOnCxxStack = false;
```
This simplifies and makes more reliable the stack tracking mechanism, potentially fixing issues where incorrect stack tracking could lead to message processing vulnerabilities.
3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
**Removal of Complex Message Queue Documentation** [ipc/glue/MessageChannel.h] [Lines around 695]
The diff removes complex documentation about interrupt message queue ordering constraints, suggesting simplification of the message processing model to prevent potential edge cases that could be exploited.
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
**Removal of MessageInfo Typedef** [ipc/glue/MessageChannel.h] [Line 147]
Old Code:
```cpp
typedef IPC::MessageInfo MessageInfo;
```
Fixed Code:
(removed)
The security implications of this change are unclear without seeing the MessageInfo implementation, but it's likely related to the broader interrupt handling removal.
The most significant changes appear to be the complete removal of the interrupt message handling system, which likely addressed several potential race condition and message ordering vulnerabilities in the IPC mechanism. The simplification of stack tracking and message queue management also appears to improve security by reducing complexity and potential edge cases.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser_navigator.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser_navigator.js@@ -406,9 +406,55 @@ await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv(); });+const VERSION_100_UA_OS = {+ linux: "X11; Linux x86_64",+ win: cpuArch == "x86_64" ? "Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64" : "Windows NT 10.0",+ macosx: "Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15",+ android: "Android 10; Mobile",+};++const VERSION_100_UA = `Mozilla/5.0 (${+ VERSION_100_UA_OS[AppConstants.platform]+}; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0`;+ // Only test the Firefox and Gecko experiment prefs on desktop. if (AppConstants.platform != "android") {+ add_task(async function testForceVersion100() {+ await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({+ set: [["general.useragent.forceVersion100", true]],+ });++ expectedResults = {+ testDesc: "forceVersion100",+ appVersion: DEFAULT_APPVERSION[AppConstants.platform],+ hardwareConcurrency: navigator.hardwareConcurrency,+ oscpu: DEFAULT_OSCPU[AppConstants.platform],+ platform: DEFAULT_PLATFORM[AppConstants.platform],+ userAgentNavigator: VERSION_100_UA,+ userAgentHeader: VERSION_100_UA,+ };++ await testNavigator();++ await testUserAgentHeader();++ await testWorkerNavigator();++ // Pop general.useragent.override etc+ await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();+ });+ add_task(async function setupFirefoxVersionExperiment() {+ // In Test Verify mode, this test is run multiple times so we need to+ // reset the experiment enrollment prefs as if experiment enrollment+ // never happend.+ await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({+ set: [+ ["general.useragent.forceVersion100", false],+ ["general.useragent.handledVersionExperimentEnrollment", false],+ ],+ });+ // Mock Nimbus experiment settings const { ExperimentFakes } = ChromeUtils.import( "resource://testing-common/NimbusTestUtils.jsm"@@ -418,32 +464,14 @@ value: { firefoxVersion: 100 }, });- let experimentOscpu;- switch (AppConstants.platform) {- case "win":- experimentOscpu =- cpuArch == "x86_64"- ? "Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64"- : "Windows NT 10.0";- break;- case "macosx":- experimentOscpu = "Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15";- break;- default:- experimentOscpu = "X11; Linux x86_64";- break;- }-- let experimentUserAgent = `Mozilla/5.0 (${experimentOscpu}; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0`;- expectedResults = { testDesc: "FirefoxVersionExperimentTest", appVersion: DEFAULT_APPVERSION[AppConstants.platform], hardwareConcurrency: navigator.hardwareConcurrency, oscpu: DEFAULT_OSCPU[AppConstants.platform], platform: DEFAULT_PLATFORM[AppConstants.platform],- userAgentNavigator: experimentUserAgent,- userAgentHeader: experimentUserAgent,+ userAgentNavigator: VERSION_100_UA,+ userAgentHeader: VERSION_100_UA, }; await testNavigator();
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 406-464] [Old Code] The old code had platform-specific user agent string construction scattered in the test case [Fixed Code] The new code consolidates user agent string construction into constants (VERSION_100_UA_OS and VERSION_100_UA) for better maintainability and consistency 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 406-464] [Old Code] The old code didn't properly reset experiment enrollment prefs between test runs [Fixed Code] The new code adds proper cleanup of experiment enrollment prefs (general.useragent.forceVersion100 and general.useragent.handledVersionExperimentEnrollment) The changes appear to be primarily about: 1. Code organization/refactoring (consolidating user agent string generation) 2. Test reliability improvements (proper test isolation through pref cleanup) 3. Adding new test cases (forceVersion100 test) No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes are more focused on test improvements and maintainability rather than addressing security issues. The user agent string modifications are part of Firefox's fingerprinting resistance features, but these appear to be test-related changes rather than vulnerability fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.transform.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.transform.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.rotate(Math.PI) ctx.fillRect(-100, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and not related to security issues.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 26]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications to this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.zerosource.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.zerosource.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 10, 10, 0, 1, 0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 10, 10, 1, 0, 0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 10, 10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 100, 50);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
After analyzing the provided code diff, here are the findings:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.zerosource.html] [Lines: 18-19, 37]
Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
```
Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` with no security implications.
The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, involving variable renaming for consistency or clarity. No security vulnerabilities were identified or fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.