--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-size-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-size-002.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-contain-1/#contain-property">   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-paint-size-001-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-size-002.html] [Lines 8]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - this is likely just test cleanup.
3. The "flags" meta tag doesn't appear to have any security implications in this context.
4. No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are involved in this change.

This appears to be a routine maintenance change rather than a security fix. The removal of the empty meta tag doesn't impact security in any way.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/resources/rs-test-templates.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/resources/rs-test-templates.js@@ -251,34 +251,27 @@   }, label + ': getReader() again on the stream should fail');-  promise_test(t => {+  promise_test(async t => {     const streamAndReader = factory();     const stream = streamAndReader.stream;     const reader = streamAndReader.reader;-    reader.read().then(-      t.unreached_func('first read() should not fulfill'),-      t.unreached_func('first read() should not reject')-    );--    reader.read().then(-      t.unreached_func('second read() should not fulfill'),-      t.unreached_func('second read() should not reject')-    );--    reader.closed.then(-      t.unreached_func('closed should not fulfill'),-      t.unreached_func('closed should not reject')-    );--    assert_throws_js(TypeError, () => reader.releaseLock(), 'releaseLock should throw a TypeError');--    assert_true(stream.locked, 'the stream should still be locked');--    return delay(500);--  }, label + ': releasing the lock with pending read requests should throw but the read requests should stay pending');+    const read1 = reader.read();+    const read2 = reader.read();+    const closed = reader.closed;++    reader.releaseLock();++    assert_false(stream.locked, 'the stream should be unlocked');++    await Promise.all([+      promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, read1, 'first read should reject'),+      promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, read2, 'second read should reject'),+      promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, closed, 'closed should reject')+    ]);++  }, label + ': releasing the lock should reject all pending read requests');   promise_test(t => {

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Race Condition or Improper Error Handling [File] [Lines 251-284]
[Old Code]
    promise_test(t => {
    const streamAndReader = factory();
    const stream = streamAndReader.stream;
    const reader = streamAndReader.reader;

    reader.read().then(
      t.unreached_func('first read() should not fulfill'),
      t.unreached_func('first read() should not reject')
    );

    reader.read().then(
      t.unreached_func('second read() should not fulfill'),
      t.unreached_func('second read() should not reject')
    );

    reader.closed.then(
      t.unreached_func('closed should not fulfill'),
      t.unreached_func('closed should not reject')
    );

    assert_throws_js(TypeError, () => reader.releaseLock(), 'releaseLock should throw a TypeError');

    assert_true(stream.locked, 'the stream should still be locked');

    return delay(500);
[Fixed Code]
    promise_test(async t => {
    const streamAndReader = factory();
    const stream = streamAndReader.stream;
    const reader = streamAndReader.reader;

    const read1 = reader.read();
    const read2 = reader.read();
    const closed = reader.closed;

    reader.releaseLock();

    assert_false(stream.locked, 'the stream should be unlocked');

    await Promise.all([
      promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, read1, 'first read should reject'),
      promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, read2, 'second read should reject'),
      promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, closed, 'closed should reject')
    ]);

Additional Details:
The change appears to be more about fixing test behavior expectations than addressing a direct security vulnerability. The old test expected pending read requests to remain pending after releaseLock(), while the new version expects them to be rejected. This could be related to fixing potential race conditions or improper error handling in the stream implementation, but without more context about the actual stream implementation, it's hard to classify this as a specific security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.translate.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.translate.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ ctx.translate(Infinity, Infinity); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -10, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.translate.nonfinite.html [Lines] 17-32
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.translate.nonfinite.html [Lines] 32
   [Old Code]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The test continues to check the same functionality (canvas transformations with non-finite values) with the same assertions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/tokio-timer/tests/queue.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/tokio-timer/tests/queue.rs@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@         let epoch = time.now();         let foo = queue.insert_at("foo", epoch + ms(200));-        let bar = queue.insert_at("bar", epoch + ms(250));+        let _bar = queue.insert_at("bar", epoch + ms(250));         task.enter(|| {             assert_not_ready!(queue);

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
Unused Variable Warning [third_party/rust/tokio-timer/tests/queue.rs] [Lines 390-393]
[Old Code]
let bar = queue.insert_at("bar", epoch + ms(250));
[Fixed Code]
let _bar = queue.insert_at("bar", epoch + ms(250));

Additional Details:
The change appears to be addressing a compiler warning about an unused variable rather than a security vulnerability. The fix adds an underscore prefix to the variable name 'bar' to indicate it's intentionally unused, which is a Rust convention for suppressing unused variable warnings. There's no indication of a security issue being fixed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-051.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-051.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-contain-1/#containment-size">   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-size-051-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   td

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-size-051.html [Lines] 8
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
- There are no obvious security vulnerabilities being addressed here (no XSS, injection, or other common web vulnerabilities in this change).
- The change is likely related to test configuration rather than security hardening.

No other vulnerabilities were found in this small diff. The change appears to be minor HTML cleanup in a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/signed_artifacts.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/signed_artifacts.py@@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ def get_geckoview_artifacts_to_sign(config, job):-    upstream_artifacts = get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(config, job)+    upstream_artifacts = []+    for package in job["attributes"]["maven_packages"]:+        upstream_artifacts += get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(config, job, package)     return [         path         for upstream_artifact in upstream_artifacts

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Exposure] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/signed_artifacts.py] [Lines 186-189]
   [Old Code]
   def get_geckoview_artifacts_to_sign(config, job):
       upstream_artifacts = get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(config, job)
   
   [Fixed Code]
   def get_geckoview_artifacts_to_sign(config, job):
       upstream_artifacts = []
       for package in job["attributes"]["maven_packages"]:
           upstream_artifacts += get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(config, job, package)

Additional Details:
- The change appears to modify how artifacts are collected for signing by iterating through maven_packages
- While this could potentially relate to security (artifact signing process), I can't determine a specific vulnerability from the diff alone
- The modification might be related to more granular control over which packages get signed, but without more context about the threat model, I can't confirm if this fixes a specific vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.clip.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.clearRect.clip.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.clearRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 16, 16);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 28]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call accordingly

These changes don't address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/config/check_spidermonkey_style.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/config/check_spidermonkey_style.py@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@         "frontend/smoosh_generated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR         "gc/StatsPhasesGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR         "gc/StatsPhasesGenerated.inc",  # generated in $OBJDIR+        "jit/AtomicOperationsGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR         "jit/CacheIROpsGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR         "jit/LIROpsGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR         "jit/MIROpsGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [config/check_spidermonkey_style.py] [Lines 65]
[Old Code]
        "frontend/smoosh_generated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR
        "gc/StatsPhasesGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR
        "gc/StatsPhasesGenerated.inc",  # generated in $OBJDIR
        "jit/CacheIROpsGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR
[Fixed Code]
        "frontend/smoosh_generated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR
        "gc/StatsPhasesGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR
        "gc/StatsPhasesGenerated.inc",  # generated in $OBJDIR
        "jit/AtomicOperationsGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR
        "jit/CacheIROpsGenerated.h",  # generated in $OBJDIR

Additional Details:
- The change simply adds "jit/AtomicOperationsGenerated.h" to the list of generated files that should be excluded from style checking
- This appears to be a routine maintenance update rather than a security fix
- No actual code logic was changed, just a configuration list update
- No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are present in this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/examples/automatic_bounds.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/examples/automatic_bounds.rs@@ -1,9 +1,4 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;--extern crate syn;--use darling::FromDeriveInput;+use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta}; #[derive(FromMeta, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] enum Volume {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 1-9]
[Old Code]
#[macro_use]
extern crate darling;

extern crate syn;

use darling::FromDeriveInput;
[Fixed Code]
use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};

Analysis:
1. The changes are primarily dependency-related and code style improvements
2. No security-related patterns (input validation, sanitization, etc.) were modified
3. The changes involve:
   - Removing explicit extern crate declarations (now handled by Rust 2018 edition)
   - Consolidating imports
   - Adding FromMeta trait to the imports
4. These changes don't indicate any security fixes, just modernization of the code

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be routine maintenance and code cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.canvas.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.canvas.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 25);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.canvas.html
    Changes were variable renaming only:
    Old variable name: offscreenCanvas
    New variable name: canvas

The changes don't show any security fixes, just variable naming improvements. All the functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name. The pixel assertions and canvas operations are identical in behavior, just using the renamed variable.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-42.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-42.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ ]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>You should see after this paragraph the words GENERATED CONTENT over green background</p>

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-42.xml] [Lines 6]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a minor cleanup or test configuration change.
3. The "flags" meta tag doesn't appear to have any security implications in this context.
4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

The modification seems to be part of routine test file maintenance rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.dompointinit.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.dompointinit.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ ctx.fill(); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.dompointinit.worker.js
Lines: Changes throughout the file
Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas'
Fixed Code: Changed to variable name 'canvas'

Additional notes:
1. This appears to be a code style/readability change rather than a security fix
2. No security-relevant functionality was modified
3. The changes don't affect any security boundaries or input validation
4. All assertions and test logic remain identical, only variable names changed

The diff shows no evidence of any security vulnerabilities being addressed. The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/image/imgLoader.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/image/imgLoader.cpp@@ -992,7 +992,8 @@       // PutIntoCache will set this to false.       mEvicted(true),       mHasNoProxies(true),-      mForcePrincipalCheck(forcePrincipalCheck) {}+      mForcePrincipalCheck(forcePrincipalCheck),+      mHasNotified(false) {} imgCacheEntry::~imgCacheEntry() {   LOG_FUNC(gImgLog, "imgCacheEntry::~imgCacheEntry()");@@ -1901,6 +1902,11 @@     imgCacheEntry* aEntry, imgRequest* request, nsIURI* aURI,     nsIReferrerInfo* aReferrerInfo, Document* aLoadingDocument,     nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal, CORSMode aCORSMode) {+  if (aEntry->HasNotified()) {+    return;+  }+  aEntry->SetHasNotified();+   nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> newChannel;   bool forcePrincipalCheck;   nsresult rv =

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Race Condition Prevention [File] image/imgLoader.cpp [Lines] 992, 1901-1906  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   mForcePrincipalCheck(forcePrincipalCheck) {}
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   mForcePrincipalCheck(forcePrincipalCheck),
   mHasNotified(false) {}
   ```
   [Additional Code Added]  
   ```cpp
   if (aEntry->HasNotified()) {
     return;
   }
   aEntry->SetHasNotified();
   ```

Additional Details:  
The diff shows the addition of a notification flag (`mHasNotified`) and checks to prevent duplicate processing. While not explicitly fixing a known vulnerability, this appears to be a preventative measure against potential race conditions or duplicate notifications in image loading. The change ensures certain operations are only performed once per cache entry.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.edge.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.edge.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.rect(0, 0, 20, 20); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(0, 0), true, "ctx.isPointInPath(0, 0)", "true");

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.edge.html [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name refactoring from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name was changed for better clarity/consistency
- No CVEs or known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.transform.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.transform.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.transform.worker.js [Lines] 14-32  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   // ... other code ...
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   // ... other code ...
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` with no security implications. No known vulnerability is being addressed here.

The diff shows only a variable name change with no functional modifications or security-related fixes. The change appears to be for code consistency or readability rather than addressing any security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/marionette/harness/marionette_harness/tests/harness_unit/conftest.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/marionette/harness/marionette_harness/tests/harness_unit/conftest.py@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@     """Mock marionette instance"""     marionette = MagicMock(spec=dir(Marionette()))     if "has_crashed" in request.funcargnames:-        marionette.check_for_crash.return_value = request.getfuncargvalue("has_crashed")+        marionette.check_for_crash.return_value = request.getfixturevalue("has_crashed")     return marionette

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
Deprecated Function Usage [File] [Lines 97-100]
[Old Code]
marionette.check_for_crash.return_value = request.getfuncargvalue("has_crashed")
[Fixed Code]
marionette.check_for_crash.return_value = request.getfixturevalue("has_crashed")

Additional Details:
This appears to be a maintenance update rather than a security fix. The change replaces the deprecated `getfuncargvalue()` method with the newer `getfixturevalue()` method in pytest. There's no clear security vulnerability being addressed here - it's simply updating to use the current recommended API. The functionality remains the same, just using a newer method name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/painting/RetainedDisplayListBuilder.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/painting/RetainedDisplayListBuilder.cpp@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "RetainedDisplayListBuilder.h"+#include "mozilla/Attributes.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_layout.h" #include "nsIFrame.h" #include "nsIFrameInlines.h"@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ void RetainedDisplayListData::AddModifiedFrame(nsIFrame* aFrame) {   MOZ_ASSERT(!aFrame->IsFrameModified());-  Flags(aFrame) |= RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlags::Modified;+  Flags(aFrame) += RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlag::Modified;   mModifiedFramesCount++; }@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@       }       if (invalidate) {+        DL_LOGV("Invalidating item %p (%s)", i, i->Name());         i->FrameForInvalidation()->MarkNeedsDisplayItemRebuild();         if (i->GetDependentFrame()) {           i->GetDependentFrame()->MarkNeedsDisplayItemRebuild();@@ -355,8 +357,8 @@   return true; }-void RetainedDisplayListBuilder::IncrementSubDocPresShellPaintCount(-    nsDisplayItem* aItem) {+void IncrementPresShellPaintCount(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder,+                                  nsDisplayItem* aItem) {   MOZ_ASSERT(aItem->GetType() == DisplayItemType::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT);   nsSubDocumentFrame* subDocFrame =@@ -366,7 +368,12 @@   PresShell* presShell = subDocFrame->GetSubdocumentPresShellForPainting(0);   MOZ_ASSERT(presShell);-  mBuilder.IncrementPresShellPaintCount(presShell);+  aBuilder->IncrementPresShellPaintCount(presShell);+}++void RetainedDisplayListBuilder::IncrementSubDocPresShellPaintCount(+    nsDisplayItem* aItem) {+  IncrementPresShellPaintCount(&mBuilder, aItem); } static Maybe<const ActiveScrolledRoot*> SelectContainerASR(@@ -911,15 +918,15 @@       nsIFrame* frame = it.Key();       const RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlags& flags = it.Data();-      if (flags & RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlags::Modified) {+      if (flags.contains(RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlag::Modified)) {         aModifiedFrames->AppendElement(frame);       }-      if (flags & RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlags::HasProps) {+      if (flags.contains(RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlag::HasProps)) {         aFramesWithProps->AppendElement(frame);       }-      if (flags & RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlags::HadWillChange) {+      if (flags.contains(RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlag::HadWillChange)) {         aBuilder->RemoveFromWillChangeBudgets(frame);       }     }@@ -1401,6 +1408,7 @@     }     f->SetFrameIsModified(false);+    f->SetHasModifiedDescendants(false);   } }@@ -1424,6 +1432,209 @@                                 &framesWithProps.Frames()); }+namespace RDLUtils {++MOZ_NEVER_INLINE_DEBUG void AssertFrameSubtreeUnmodified(+    const nsIFrame* aFrame) {+  for (const auto& childList : aFrame->ChildLists()) {+    for (nsIFrame* child : childList.mList) {+      MOZ_ASSERT(!aFrame->IsFrameModified());+      MOZ_ASSERT(!aFrame->HasModifiedDescendants());+      AssertFrameSubtreeUnmodified(child);+    }+  }+}++MOZ_NEVER_INLINE_DEBUG void AssertDisplayListUnmodified(nsDisplayList* aList) {+  for (nsDisplayItem* item : *aList) {+    AssertDisplayItemUnmodified(item);+  }+}++MOZ_NEVER_INLINE_DEBUG void AssertDisplayItemUnmodified(nsDisplayItem* aItem) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(!aItem->HasDeletedFrame());+  MOZ_ASSERT(!AnyContentAncestorModified(aItem->FrameForInvalidation()));++  if (aItem->GetChildren()) {+    AssertDisplayListUnmodified(aItem->GetChildren());+  }+}++}  // namespace RDLUtils++namespace RDL {++void MarkAncestorFrames(nsIFrame* aFrame,+                        nsTArray<nsIFrame*>& aOutFramesWithProps) {+  nsIFrame* frame = nsLayoutUtils::GetDisplayListParent(aFrame);+  while (frame && !frame->HasModifiedDescendants()) {+    aOutFramesWithProps.AppendElement(frame);+    frame->SetHasModifiedDescendants(true);+    frame = nsLayoutUtils::GetDisplayListParent(frame);+  }+}++/**+ * Iterates over the modified frames array and updates the frame tree flags+ * so that container frames know whether they have modified descendant frames.+ * Frames that were marked modified are added to |aOutFramesWithProps|, so that+ * the modified status can be cleared after the display list build.+ */+void MarkAllAncestorFrames(const nsTArray<nsIFrame*>& aModifiedFrames,+                           nsTArray<nsIFrame*>& aOutFramesWithProps) {+  nsAutoString frameName;+  DL_LOGI("RDL - Modified frames: %zu", aModifiedFrames.Length());+  for (nsIFrame* frame : aModifiedFrames) {+#ifdef DEBUG+    frame->GetFrameName(frameName);+#endif+    DL_LOGV("RDL - Processing modified frame: %p (%s)", frame,+            NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(frameName).get());++    MarkAncestorFrames(frame, aOutFramesWithProps);+  }+}++/**+ * Marks the given display item |aItem| as reuseable container, and updates the+ * bounds in case some child items were destroyed.+ */+MOZ_NEVER_INLINE_DEBUG void ReuseStackingContextItem(+    nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder, nsDisplayItem* aItem) {+  aItem->SetPreProcessed();++  if (aItem->HasChildren()) {+    aItem->UpdateBounds(aBuilder);+  }++  aBuilder->AddReusableDisplayItem(aItem);+  DL_LOGD("Reusing display item %p", aItem);+}++bool IsSupportedFrameType(const nsIFrame* aFrame) {+  // The way table backgrounds are handled makes these frames incompatible with+  // this retained display list approach.+  if (aFrame->IsTableColFrame()) {+    return false;+  }++  if (aFrame->IsTableColGroupFrame()) {+    return false;+  }++  if (aFrame->IsTableRowFrame()) {+    return false;+  }++  if (aFrame->IsTableRowGroupFrame()) {+    return false;+  }++  if (aFrame->IsTableCellFrame()) {+    return false;+  }++  // Everything else should work.+  return true;+}++bool IsReuseableStackingContextItem(nsDisplayItem* aItem) {+  if (!IsSupportedFrameType(aItem->Frame())) {+    return false;+  }++  if (!aItem->IsReusable()) {+    return false;+  }++  const nsIFrame* frame = aItem->FrameForInvalidation();+  return !frame->HasModifiedDescendants() && !frame->GetPrevContinuation() &&+         !frame->GetNextContinuation();+}++/**+ * Recursively visits every display item of the display list and destroys all+ * display items that depend on deleted or modified frames.+ * The stacking context display items for unmodified frame subtrees are kept+ * linked and collected in given |aOutItems| array.+ */+void CollectStackingContextItems(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder,+                                 nsDisplayList* aList, nsIFrame* aOuterFrame,+                                 int aDepth = 0, bool aParentReused = false) {+  nsDisplayList out;++  while (nsDisplayItem* item = aList->RemoveBottom()) {+    if (DL_LOG_TEST(LogLevel::Debug)) {+      DL_LOGD(+          "%*s Preprocessing item %p (%s) (frame: %p) "+          "(children: %d) (depth: %d) (parentReused: %d)",+          aDepth, "", item, item->Name(),+          item->HasDeletedFrame() ? nullptr : item->Frame(),+          item->GetChildren() ? item->GetChildren()->Count() : 0, aDepth,+          aParentReused);+    }++    if (!item->CanBeReused() || item->HasDeletedFrame() ||+        AnyContentAncestorModified(item->FrameForInvalidation(), aOuterFrame)) {+      DL_LOGD("%*s Deleted modified or temporary item %p", aDepth, "", item);+      item->Destroy(aBuilder);+      continue;+    }++    MOZ_ASSERT(!AnyContentAncestorModified(item->FrameForInvalidation()));+    MOZ_ASSERT(!item->IsPreProcessed());+    item->InvalidateCachedChildInfo(aBuilder);+#ifdef MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT_ENABLED+    item->SetMergedPreProcessed(false, true);+#endif+    item->SetReused(true);++    const bool isStackingContextItem = IsReuseableStackingContextItem(item);++    if (item->GetChildren()) {+      CollectStackingContextItems(aBuilder, item->GetChildren(), item->Frame(),+                                  aDepth + 1,+                                  aParentReused || isStackingContextItem);+    }++    if (aParentReused) {+      // Keep the contents of the current container item linked.+      RDLUtils::AssertDisplayItemUnmodified(item);+      out.AppendToTop(item);+    } else if (isStackingContextItem) {+      // |item| is a stacking context item that can be reused.+      ReuseStackingContextItem(aBuilder, item);+    } else {+      // |item| is inside a container item that will be destroyed later.+      DL_LOGD("%*s Deleted unused item %p", aDepth, "", item);+      item->Destroy(aBuilder);+      continue;+    }++    if (item->GetType() == DisplayItemType::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {+      IncrementPresShellPaintCount(aBuilder, item);+    }+  }++  aList->AppendToTop(&out);+  aList->RestoreState();+}++}  // namespace RDL++bool RetainedDisplayListBuilder::TrySimpleUpdate(+    const nsTArray<nsIFrame*>& aModifiedFrames,+    nsTArray<nsIFrame*>& aOutFramesWithProps) {+  if (!mBuilder.IsReusingStackingContextItems()) {+    return false;+  }++  RDL::MarkAllAncestorFrames(aModifiedFrames, aOutFramesWithProps);+  RDL::CollectStackingContextItems(&mBuilder, &mList, RootReferenceFrame());++  return true;+}+ PartialUpdateResult RetainedDisplayListBuilder::AttemptPartialUpdate(     nscolor aBackstop) {   DL_LOGI("RDL - AttemptPartialUpdate, root frame: %p", RootReferenceFrame());@@ -1436,33 +1647,44 @@   }   InvalidateCaretFramesIfNeeded();--  mBuilder.EnterPresShell(mBuilder.RootReferenceFrame());   // We set the override dirty regions during ComputeRebuildRegion or in   // DisplayPortUtils::InvalidateForDisplayPortChange. The display port change   // also marks the frame modified, so those regions are cleared here as well.   AutoClearFramePropsArray modifiedFrames(64);-  AutoClearFramePropsArray framesWithProps;+  AutoClearFramePropsArray framesWithProps(64);   GetModifiedAndFramesWithProps(&mBuilder, &modifiedFrames.Frames(),                                 &framesWithProps.Frames());-  // Do not allow partial builds if the |ShouldBuildPartial()| heuristic fails.-  bool shouldBuildPartial = ShouldBuildPartial(modifiedFrames.Frames());+  if (!ShouldBuildPartial(modifiedFrames.Frames())) {+    // Do not allow partial builds if the |ShouldBuildPartial()| heuristic+    // fails.+    mBuilder.SetPartialBuildFailed(true);+    return PartialUpdateResult::Failed;+  }   nsRect modifiedDirty;   nsDisplayList modifiedDL;   nsIFrame* modifiedAGR = nullptr;   PartialUpdateResult result = PartialUpdateResult::NoChange;-  if (!shouldBuildPartial ||-      !ComputeRebuildRegion(modifiedFrames.Frames(), &modifiedDirty,-                            &modifiedAGR, framesWithProps.Frames()) ||-      !PreProcessDisplayList(&mList, modifiedAGR, result,-                             mBuilder.RootReferenceFrame(), nullptr)) {-    mBuilder.SetPartialBuildFailed(true);-    mBuilder.LeavePresShell(mBuilder.RootReferenceFrame(), nullptr);-    mList.DeleteAll(&mBuilder);-    return PartialUpdateResult::Failed;+  const bool simpleUpdate =+      TrySimpleUpdate(modifiedFrames.Frames(), framesWithProps.Frames());++  mBuilder.EnterPresShell(RootReferenceFrame());++  if (!simpleUpdate) {+    if (!ComputeRebuildRegion(modifiedFrames.Frames(), &modifiedDirty,+                              &modifiedAGR, framesWithProps.Frames()) ||+        !PreProcessDisplayList(&mList, modifiedAGR, result,+                               RootReferenceFrame(), nullptr)) {+      DL_LOGI("RDL - Partial update aborted");+      mBuilder.SetPartialBuildFailed(true);+      mBuilder.LeavePresShell(RootReferenceFrame(), nullptr);+      mList.DeleteAll(&mBuilder);+      return PartialUpdateResult::Failed;+    }+  } else {+    modifiedDirty = mBuilder.GetVisibleRect();   }   // This is normally handled by EnterPresShell, but we skipped it so that we@@ -1499,6 +1721,7 @@   if (mBuilder.PartialBuildFailed()) {     DL_LOGI("RDL - Partial update failed!");     mBuilder.LeavePresShell(RootReferenceFrame(), nullptr);+    mBuilder.ClearReuseableDisplayItems();     mList.DeleteAll(&mBuilder);     modifiedDL.DeleteAll(&mBuilder);     Metrics()->mPartialUpdateFailReason = PartialUpdateFailReason::Content;@@ -1519,15 +1742,26 @@   // we call RestoreState on nsDisplayWrapList it resets the clip to the base   // clip, and we need the UpdateBounds call (within MergeDisplayLists) to   // move it to the correct inner clip.-  Maybe<const ActiveScrolledRoot*> dummy;-  if (MergeDisplayLists(&modifiedDL, &mList, &mList, dummy)) {+  if (!simpleUpdate) {+    Maybe<const ActiveScrolledRoot*> dummy;+    if (MergeDisplayLists(&modifiedDL, &mList, &mList, dummy)) {+      result = PartialUpdateResult::Updated;+    }+  } else {+    MOZ_ASSERT(mList.IsEmpty());+    mList = std::move(modifiedDL);+    mBuilder.ClearReuseableDisplayItems();     result = PartialUpdateResult::Updated;   }-  // printf_stderr("Painting --- Merged list:\n");-  // nsIFrame::PrintDisplayList(&mBuilder, mList);--  mBuilder.LeavePresShell(mBuilder.RootReferenceFrame(), List());+#if 0+  if (DL_LOG_TEST(LogLevel::Verbose)) {+    printf_stderr("Painting --- Display list:\n");+    nsIFrame::PrintDisplayList(&mBuilder, mList);+  }+#endif++  mBuilder.LeavePresShell(RootReferenceFrame(), List());   return result; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Integer Overflow] [File: layout/painting/RetainedDisplayListBuilder.cpp] [Lines: 74-75]
   [Old Code]
   Flags(aFrame) |= RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlags::Modified;
   [Fixed Code]
   Flags(aFrame) += RetainedDisplayListData::FrameFlag::Modified;
   Additional Details: The change from bitwise OR to addition could be related to preventing potential integer overflow issues, though the exact security impact isn't clear.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [File: layout/painting/RetainedDisplayListBuilder.cpp] [Lines: 112]
   [Old Code]
   if (invalidate) {
   [Fixed Code]
   if (invalidate) {
       DL_LOGV("Invalidating item %p (%s)", i, i->Name());
   Additional Details: Added debug logging which could help identify potential information leaks during invalidation, though this is more of a debugging improvement than a direct security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [File: layout/painting/RetainedDisplayListBuilder.cpp] [Lines: 1401]
   [Old Code]
   f->SetFrameIsModified(false);
   [Fixed Code]
   f->SetFrameIsModified(false);
   f->SetHasModifiedDescendants(false);
   Additional Details: Added clearing of modified descendants flag which could prevent potential memory safety issues from propagating incorrect frame states.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Race Condition] [File: layout/painting/RetainedDisplayListBuilder.cpp] [Lines: 355-368]
   [Old Code]
   void RetainedDisplayListBuilder::IncrementSubDocPresShellPaintCount(
       nsDisplayItem* aItem) {
   [Fixed Code]
   void IncrementPresShellPaintCount(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder,
                                   nsDisplayItem* aItem) {
   Additional Details: The refactoring of paint count increment logic could be related to preventing potential race conditions in multi-process scenarios.

Note: While several changes were made that could potentially improve security (better state management, added assertions, improved logging), none of them clearly correspond to known vulnerability patterns. The changes appear to be primarily focused on improving robustness and maintainability of the display list building code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/perf.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/perf.js@@ -32,12 +32,7 @@     // for historical reasons, and could be merged into this class.     this.bridge = new ActorReadyGeckoProfilerInterface();-    _bridgeEvents(this, [-      "profile-locked-by-private-browsing",-      "profile-unlocked-from-private-browsing",-      "profiler-started",-      "profiler-stopped",-    ]);+    _bridgeEvents(this, ["profiler-started", "profiler-stopped"]);   },   destroy: function(conn) {@@ -54,6 +49,5 @@   getProfileAndStopProfiler: actorBridgeWithSpec("getProfileAndStopProfiler"),   isActive: actorBridgeWithSpec("isActive"),   isSupportedPlatform: actorBridgeWithSpec("isSupportedPlatform"),-  isLockedForPrivateBrowsing: actorBridgeWithSpec("isLockedForPrivateBrowsing"),   getSupportedFeatures: actorBridgeWithSpec("getSupportedFeatures"), });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak] [devtools/server/actors/perf.js] [Lines 32-37]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```
   _bridgeEvents(this, [
     "profile-locked-by-private-browsing",
     "profile-unlocked-from-private-browsing",
     "profiler-started",
     "profiler-stopped",
   ]);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```
   _bridgeEvents(this, ["profiler-started", "profiler-stopped"]);
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak] [devtools/server/actors/perf.js] [Line 54]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```
   isLockedForPrivateBrowsing: actorBridgeWithSpec("isLockedForPrivateBrowsing"),
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```
   [This line was completely removed]
   ```

The changes involve removing private browsing-related event bridges and functionality. While not definitively a security vulnerability, this could be related to preventing potential information leaks about private browsing state through the profiler interface. The removal suggests these features might have exposed sensitive information about the user's private browsing status. However, without more context about how these were used, we can't be certain about the exact vulnerability being addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/threads/TaskController.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/threads/TaskController.cpp@@ -144,9 +144,8 @@ // of that stack is significantly less than what we expect.  To offset TSan // stealing our stack space from underneath us, double the default. //-// Note that we don't need this for ASan/MOZ_ASAN because ASan doesn't require-// all the thread-specific state that TSan does.-#if defined(MOZ_TSAN)+// Similarly, ASan requires more stack space due to red-zones.+#if defined(MOZ_TSAN) || defined(MOZ_ASAN) constexpr PRUint32 sStackSize = 2 * sBaseStackSize; #else constexpr PRUint32 sStackSize = sBaseStackSize;

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Stack Size Insufficiency] [xpcom/threads/TaskController.cpp] [Lines 144-149]
[Old Code]
// Note that we don't need this for ASan/MOZ_ASAN because ASan doesn't require
// all the thread-specific state that TSan does.
#if defined(MOZ_TSAN)
[Fixed Code]
// Similarly, ASan requires more stack space due to red-zones.
#if defined(MOZ_TSAN) || defined(MOZ_ASAN)

Additional Details:
1. The change increases stack size when running under ASan (Address Sanitizer) in addition to TSan (Thread Sanitizer)
2. While not explicitly a security fix, insufficient stack space could potentially lead to stack overflow vulnerabilities
3. The comment suggests this is related to instrumentation requirements of sanitizers rather than a direct security fix
4. The change appears to be more about reliability/robustness when running under sanitizers rather than fixing a specific vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/aboutDialog-appUpdater.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/aboutDialog-appUpdater.js@@ -44,16 +44,20 @@     "chrome://browser/locale/browser.properties"   );-  let manualURL = new URL(-    Services.urlFormatter.formatURLPref("app.update.url.manual")-  );--  let manualLink = document.getElementById("manualLink");-  // Strip hash and search parameters for display text.-  manualLink.textContent = manualURL.origin + manualURL.pathname;-  manualLink.href = manualURL.href;--  document.getElementById("failedLink").href = manualURL.href;+  try {+    let manualURL = new URL(+      Services.urlFormatter.formatURLPref("app.update.url.manual")+    );++    let manualLink = document.getElementById("manualLink");+    // Strip hash and search parameters for display text.+    manualLink.textContent = manualURL.origin + manualURL.pathname;+    manualLink.href = manualURL.href;++    document.getElementById("failedLink").href = manualURL.href;+  } catch (e) {+    console.error("Invalid manual update url.", e);+  }   this._appUpdater.check(); }

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
URL Validation Vulnerability [browser/base/content/aboutDialog-appUpdater.js] [Lines 44-58]
[Old Code]
let manualURL = new URL(
  Services.urlFormatter.formatURLPref("app.update.url.manual")
);

let manualLink = document.getElementById("manualLink");
// Strip hash and search parameters for display text.
manualLink.textContent = manualURL.origin + manualURL.pathname;
manualLink.href = manualURL.href;

document.getElementById("failedLink").href = manualURL.href;
[Fixed Code]
try {
  let manualURL = new URL(
    Services.urlFormatter.formatURLPref("app.update.url.manual")
  );

  let manualLink = document.getElementById("manualLink");
  // Strip hash and search parameters for display text.
  manualLink.textContent = manualURL.origin + manualURL.pathname;
  manualLink.href = manualURL.href;

  document.getElementById("failedLink").href = manualURL.href;
} catch (e) {
  console.error("Invalid manual update url.", e);
}

Additional Details:
The fix adds proper error handling around URL construction and usage. The vulnerability could have allowed:
1. Potential XSS if malicious URL was injected through the preference
2. Application crashes if invalid URL format was provided
3. Information leakage through uncaught exceptions
The try-catch block now safely handles invalid URLs and logs errors appropriately.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.