Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.conic.positive.rotation.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.conic.positive.rotation.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); const g = ctx.createConicGradient(3*Math.PI/2, 50, 25); // It's red in the upper right region and green on the lower left region@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ g.addColorStop(0.75, "#f00"); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,40, 0,255,0,255, "75,40", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,40, 0,255,0,255, "75,40", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 28-29]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,40, 0,255,0,255, "75,40", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,15, 255,0,0,255, "25,15", "255,0,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,40, 0,255,0,255, "75,40", "0,255,0,255");
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, simply renaming the variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed or introduced by this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-14b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-14b.xml@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found --> <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-background.xht"/>- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <p class="t1">This line should be green.</p>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-14b.xml [Lines] 14 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional notes: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. - This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix. - No known vulnerability patterns or security issues are evident in this change. - The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce any new attack vectors.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/base/nsTraceRefcnt.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/base/nsTraceRefcnt.cpp@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include "mozilla/CycleCollectedJSContext.h" #include "mozilla/IntegerPrintfMacros.h" #include "mozilla/Path.h"+#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h" #include "nsXPCOMPrivate.h" #include "nscore.h"@@ -193,25 +194,26 @@ }; #ifdef DEBUG-static const char kStaticCtorDtorWarning[] =- "XPCOM objects created/destroyed from static ctor/dtor";--static void AssertActivityIsLegal() {+static void AssertActivityIsLegal(const char* aType, const char* aAction) { if (gActivityTLS == BAD_TLS_INDEX || PR_GetThreadPrivate(gActivityTLS)) {+ char buf[1024];+ SprintfLiteral(buf, "XPCOM object %s %s from static ctor/dtor", aType,+ aAction);+ if (PR_GetEnv("MOZ_FATAL_STATIC_XPCOM_CTORS_DTORS")) {- MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE(kStaticCtorDtorWarning);+ MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s", buf); } else {- NS_WARNING(kStaticCtorDtorWarning);- }- }-}-# define ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL \- do { \- AssertActivityIsLegal(); \+ NS_WARNING(buf);+ }+ }+}+# define ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL(type_, action_) \+ do { \+ AssertActivityIsLegal(type_, action_); \ } while (0) #else-# define ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL \- do { \+# define ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL(type_, action_) \+ do { \ } while (0) #endif // DEBUG@@ -878,7 +880,7 @@ EXPORT_XPCOM_API(MOZ_NEVER_INLINE void) NS_LogAddRef(void* aPtr, nsrefcnt aRefcnt, const char* aClass, uint32_t aClassSize) {- ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL;+ ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL(aClass, "addrefed"); if (!gInitialized) { InitTraceLog(); }@@ -931,7 +933,7 @@ EXPORT_XPCOM_API(MOZ_NEVER_INLINE void) NS_LogRelease(void* aPtr, nsrefcnt aRefcnt, const char* aClass) {- ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL;+ ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL(aClass, "released"); if (!gInitialized) { InitTraceLog(); }@@ -988,7 +990,7 @@ EXPORT_XPCOM_API(MOZ_NEVER_INLINE void) NS_LogCtor(void* aPtr, const char* aType, uint32_t aInstanceSize) {- ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL;+ ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL(aType, "constructed"); if (!gInitialized) { InitTraceLog(); }@@ -1024,7 +1026,7 @@ EXPORT_XPCOM_API(MOZ_NEVER_INLINE void) NS_LogDtor(void* aPtr, const char* aType, uint32_t aInstanceSize) {- ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL;+ ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL(aType, "destroyed"); if (!gInitialized) { InitTraceLog(); }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Buffer Overflow Potential [xpcom/base/nsTraceRefcnt.cpp] [Lines 196-200]
Old Code:
```
static void AssertActivityIsLegal() {
if (gActivityTLS == BAD_TLS_INDEX || PR_GetThreadPrivate(gActivityTLS)) {
if (PR_GetEnv("MOZ_FATAL_STATIC_XPCOM_CTORS_DTORS")) {
MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE(kStaticCtorDtorWarning);
} else {
NS_WARNING(kStaticCtorDtorWarning);
}
}
}
```
Fixed Code:
```
static void AssertActivityIsLegal(const char* aType, const char* aAction) {
if (gActivityTLS == BAD_TLS_INDEX || PR_GetThreadPrivate(gActivityTLS)) {
char buf[1024];
SprintfLiteral(buf, "XPCOM object %s %s from static ctor/dtor", aType,
aAction);
if (PR_GetEnv("MOZ_FATAL_STATIC_XPCOM_CTORS_DTORS")) {
MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s", buf);
} else {
NS_WARNING(buf);
}
}
}
```
Details: The change introduces a fixed-size buffer (1024 bytes) and uses SprintfLiteral which is safer than sprintf. However, there's potential for buffer overflow if aType and aAction combined are too long, though the risk is mitigated by the large buffer size and the likely controlled nature of these inputs.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Information Leakage [xpcom/base/nsTraceRefcnt.cpp] [Lines 878, 931, 988, 1026]
Old Code:
```
ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL;
```
Fixed Code:
```
ASSERT_ACTIVITY_IS_LEGAL(aClass, "addrefed");
```
Details: The original code provided less context in its warning messages about illegal XPCOM activities. The new version includes specific information about which object type and what action was being performed, which helps with debugging and security analysis. While not a direct vulnerability fix, this improves security by providing better diagnostic information.
The main security improvement appears to be in better error reporting and safer string handling, though no clear, specific vulnerabilities were fixed. The changes primarily improve robustness and debugging capabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/generic/nsGridContainerFrame.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/generic/nsGridContainerFrame.cpp@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ using SizingConstraint = nsGridContainerFrame::SizingConstraint; using GridItemCachedBAxisMeasurement = nsGridContainerFrame::CachedBAxisMeasurement;++static mozilla::LazyLogModule gGridContainerLog("GridContainer");+#define GRID_LOG(...) \+ MOZ_LOG(gGridContainerLog, LogLevel::Debug, (__VA_ARGS__)); static const int32_t kMaxLine = StyleMAX_GRID_LINE; static const int32_t kMinLine = StyleMIN_GRID_LINE;@@ -5032,6 +5036,8 @@ childSize.ISize(wm) = aChild->ISize(wm); nsContainerFrame::FinishReflowChild(aChild, pc, childSize, &childRI, wm, LogicalPoint(wm), nsSize(), flags);+ GRID_LOG("[perf] MeasuringReflow accepted cached value=%d, child=%p",+ cachedMeasurement.BSize(), aChild); return cachedMeasurement.BSize(); } }@@ -5054,12 +5060,22 @@ childSize.BSize(wm)); aChild->SetProperty(GridItemCachedBAxisMeasurement::Prop(), cachedMeasurement);+ GRID_LOG("[perf] MeasuringReflow created new cached value=%d, child=%p",+ cachedMeasurement.BSize(), aChild); } else if (found) { if (GridItemCachedBAxisMeasurement::CanCacheMeasurement(aChild, aCBSize)) { cachedMeasurement.Update(aChild, aCBSize, childSize.BSize(wm));+ GRID_LOG(+ "[perf] MeasuringReflow rejected but updated cached value=%d, "+ "child=%p",+ cachedMeasurement.BSize(), aChild); } else { aChild->RemoveProperty(GridItemCachedBAxisMeasurement::Prop());+ GRID_LOG(+ "[perf] MeasuringReflow rejected and removed cached value, "+ "child=%p",+ aChild); } } }
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the required format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] layout/generic/nsGridContainerFrame.cpp [Lines] 51-60, 5032-5054, 5054-5076 [Old Code] No logging statements present [Fixed Code] Added logging statements for performance monitoring (GRID_LOG) 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] layout/generic/nsGridContainerFrame.cpp [Lines] 5032-5076 [Old Code] No cache measurement logging [Fixed Code] Added detailed logging for cache measurement operations The changes appear to be focused on adding performance logging functionality rather than addressing security vulnerabilities. The modifications: 1. Introduce a new logging module (gGridContainerLog) 2. Add logging macros (GRID_LOG) 3. Add detailed logging for cache measurement operations in the MeasuringReflow function These changes seem to be performance monitoring improvements rather than security fixes. No actual security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1512008.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1512008.js@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") ignoreUnhandledRejections(); Object.defineProperty(Promise, Symbol.species, {
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Test Reliability Issue] [js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1512008.js] [Lines 1]
[Old Code]
ignoreUnhandledRejections();
[Fixed Code]
// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream")
ignoreUnhandledRejections();
Additional Details:
The change adds a conditional skip to the test, checking for ReadableStream availability. This appears to be a test reliability improvement rather than a direct security fix. The modification prevents the test from running in environments where ReadableStream isn't available, which could prevent test failures but doesn't directly address a security vulnerability. The original code might have caused test failures in certain environments, but this doesn't necessarily indicate a security vulnerability was fixed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.winding.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.winding.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring with no security implications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.winding.1.html] [Lines 17-18, 35]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, with no impact on security. The functionality remains exactly the same.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/test_runner/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/test_runner/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml@@ -19,8 +19,11 @@ android:theme="@style/AppTheme" android:name="androidx.multidex.MultiDexApplication"> <uses-library android:name="android.test.runner" android:required="false"/>- <activity android:name=".TestRunnerActivity" android:exported="true"/>- <activity-alias android:name=".App" android:targetActivity=".TestRunnerActivity">+ <activity android:name=".TestRunnerActivity"+ android:configChanges="orientation|screenSize"+ android:exported="true"/>+ <activity-alias android:name=".App" android:targetActivity=".TestRunnerActivity"+ android:exported="true"> <intent-filter> <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/> <action android:name="org.mozilla.geckoview.test_runner.XPCSHELL_TEST"/>
Here's the analysis following the required format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Improper Activity Export [File] mobile/android/test_runner/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml [Lines] 19-22
[Old Code]
<activity-alias android:name=".App" android:targetActivity=".TestRunnerActivity">
[Fixed Code]
<activity-alias android:name=".App" android:targetActivity=".TestRunnerActivity"
android:exported="true">
Additional Details: The activity-alias was missing the explicit exported flag, which could lead to potential unauthorized access. Android 12+ requires explicit declaration of exported components.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Configuration Change Vulnerability [File] mobile/android/test_runner/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml [Lines] 19-20
[Old Code]
<activity android:name=".TestRunnerActivity" android:exported="true"/>
[Fixed Code]
<activity android:name=".TestRunnerActivity"
android:configChanges="orientation|screenSize"
android:exported="true"/>
Additional Details: The addition of configChanges might be related to security, but it's more likely a performance/behavior change. Without more context, it's unclear if this addresses a specific vulnerability.
Note: The first vulnerability is clear - the activity-alias was missing the exported flag which is a security requirement in newer Android versions. The second change might be security-related but could also be purely functional.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-002.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Xin Liu" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="4.7. device-aspect-ratio" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#device-aspect-ratio"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'device-aspect-ratio' property with prefix 'max' set '0/0' (which is converted into '1/0') is infinite that means the style sheet specified by 'max-device-aspect-ratio' will be applied."> <style> div {
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-002.html [Lines] 5 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content=""> [Fixed Code] (removed) Additional Details: This change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's likely just a cleanup of unnecessary test markup. The removal doesn't relate to any known security issues or vulnerability patterns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/base/nsMemoryReporterManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/base/nsMemoryReporterManager.cpp@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/MemoryReportTypes.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h" #include "mozilla/gfx/GPUProcessManager.h"+#include "mozilla/ipc/UtilityProcessManager.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/FileDescriptorUtils.h" #ifdef XP_WIN@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ #endif using namespace mozilla;+using namespace mozilla::ipc; using namespace dom; #if defined(MOZ_MEMORY)@@ -1808,6 +1810,14 @@ } }+ if (RefPtr<UtilityProcessManager> utility =+ UtilityProcessManager::GetIfExists()) {+ if (RefPtr<MemoryReportingProcess> proc =+ utility->GetProcessMemoryReporter()) {+ s->mChildrenPending.AppendElement(proc.forget());+ }+ }+ if (!s->mChildrenPending.IsEmpty()) { nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> timer; rv = NS_NewTimerWithFuncCallback(
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Leak] [xpcom/base/nsMemoryReporterManager.cpp] [Lines 1808-1816]
[Old Code]
[Fixed Code]
if (RefPtr<UtilityProcessManager> utility =
UtilityProcessManager::GetIfExists()) {
if (RefPtr<MemoryReportingProcess> proc =
utility->GetProcessMemoryReporter()) {
s->mChildrenPending.AppendElement(proc.forget());
}
}
Additional Details:
- The change adds memory reporting for UtilityProcessManager
- The use of `forget()` with `AppendElement()` could potentially be a memory management issue if not handled correctly, but this appears to be a standard pattern in the codebase
- No clear vulnerability is introduced or fixed, but the change improves memory reporting capabilities
- The modification appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix
Note: Without more context about the overall memory management system and how `forget()` is used elsewhere in the codebase, it's difficult to determine if there was an actual vulnerability being fixed. The change appears to be adding support for utility process memory reporting rather than fixing a specific security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/payments/res/components/address-option.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/payments/res/components/address-option.js@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../../browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/+/* import-globals-from /browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/ import ObservedPropertiesMixin from "../mixins/ObservedPropertiesMixin.js"; import RichOption from "./rich-option.js"; /* import-globals-from ../unprivileged-fallbacks.js */
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Path Traversal or Improper Resource Access] [browser/components/payments/res/components/address-option.js] [Lines 2] [Old Code: /* import-globals-from ../../../../../browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/] [Fixed Code: /* import-globals-from /browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/] Additional Details: - The change involves modifying the path specification for an imported file - The old code used a relative path (../../../../../) which could potentially be more vulnerable to path traversal issues - The new code uses an absolute path (/browser/...) which is generally more secure and explicit - However, without more context about the application's file structure and security model, I can't be certain if this was actually fixing a security vulnerability or just improving code maintainability
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.alpha.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.alpha.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d');@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.shadowColor = '#00f'; ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, -50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and consistency improvements. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.alpha.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 25]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency and update all references to it. There are no security implications in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-canvasImageSource.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-canvasImageSource.html@@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ test(t => { let button = document.querySelector('button'); let bgImage = button.computedStyleMap().get('background-image');- assert_throws_dom('SecurityError', _ => { new VideoFrame(bgImage); },+ assert_throws_dom('SecurityError', _ => { new VideoFrame(bgImage, {timestamp: 0}); }, 'CSSImageValues are currently always tainted'); }, 'CSSImageValue constructed VideoFrame'); test(t => {- let frame = new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('img'));+ let frame = new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('img'), {timestamp: 0}); let canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(frame.displayWidth, frame.displayHeight); let ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.drawImage(frame, 0, 0);@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ }, 'Image element constructed VideoFrame'); test(t => {- let frame = new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('image'));+ let frame = new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('image'), {timestamp: 0}); let canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(frame.displayWidth, frame.displayHeight); let ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.drawImage(frame, 0, 0);@@ -89,12 +89,7 @@ frame.close(); }, 'SVGImageElement constructed VideoFrame');-test(t => {- let canvas = document.querySelector('canvas');- canvas.width = 320;- canvas.height = 240;-- // Draw and verify four colors image.+function drawFourColors(canvas) { let ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#FFFF00'; // yellow ctx.fillRect(0, 0, canvas.width / 2, canvas.height / 2);@@ -105,12 +100,43 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#00FF00'; // green ctx.fillRect(canvas.width / 2, canvas.height / 2, canvas.width / 2, canvas.height / 2);+}++test(t => {+ let canvas = document.querySelector('canvas');+ canvas.width = 320;+ canvas.height = 240;++ // Draw and verify four colors image.+ drawFourColors(canvas);+ let ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); verifyFourColorsImage(canvas.width, canvas.height, ctx);- let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas);+ let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0}); ctx.clearRect(0, 0, canvas.width, canvas.height); ctx.drawImage(frame, 0, 0); verifyFourColorsImage(canvas.width, canvas.height, ctx); frame.close(); }, 'Canvas element constructed VideoFrame');++test(t => {+ let canvas = document.querySelector('canvas');+ canvas.width = 320;+ canvas.height = 240;++ // Draw and verify four colors image.+ drawFourColors(canvas);+ let ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');+ verifyFourColorsImage(canvas.width, canvas.height, ctx);++ // Set a different timestamp to try and ensure the same frame isn't reused.+ let frame = new VideoFrame(canvas, {timestamp: 0});+ let frame_copy = new VideoFrame(frame, {timestamp: 1});+ frame.close();++ ctx.clearRect(0, 0, canvas.width, canvas.height);+ ctx.drawImage(frame_copy, 0, 0);+ verifyFourColorsImage(canvas.width, canvas.height, ctx);+ frame_copy.close();+}, 'Copy of canvas element constructed VideoFrame'); </script>
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Timestamp Validation] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-canvasImageSource.html] [Lines 67, 80, 89]
[Old Code]
`new VideoFrame(bgImage);`
`new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('img'));`
`new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('image'));`
[Fixed Code]
`new VideoFrame(bgImage, {timestamp: 0});`
`new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('img'), {timestamp: 0});`
`new VideoFrame(document.querySelector('image'), {timestamp: 0});`
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Reuse Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/webcodecs/videoFrame-canvasImageSource.html] [Lines 89-120]
[Old Code]
[No explicit handling of frame reuse]
[Fixed Code]
[Added test case with explicit timestamp handling to prevent frame reuse]
The changes primarily focus on:
1. Adding explicit timestamp parameters to VideoFrame constructors
2. Adding explicit test cases for frame copying with different timestamps
3. Refactoring common drawing code into a shared function
While these changes improve the robustness of the tests, I can't identify any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes seem more related to test completeness and reliability rather than security fixes. The addition of timestamps might relate to preventing potential timing-related issues, but this is speculative.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/bumpalo/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/bumpalo/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"fb807cac318c99faa6fe40bcb6ddefd867c2048b9f2badd813281ddc808191b8","Cargo.toml":"74ed9ce9af6ed0be99c388989ab7e919ca1272fdd7e8a0d223506c790a74f1d5","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"65f94e99ddaf4f5d1782a6dae23f35d4293a9a01444a13135a6887017d353cee","README.md":"84d13918b74c4175683118042305b0a4ff90333da9abf214bcf46d9b546ae319","README.tpl":"ec385000e14590a306855e7893daed0168102f33166bdc1e5cf5fa5599dac03f","src/alloc.rs":"ab0f23fa11c26efdd8f0596ebdf0e3faa75d097881fb59639b0fb23340c106bc","src/boxed.rs":"d18d363677a97a73225cb5c5b90e6187f7b5aae93979a41e40417fdd5a3f9975","src/collections/collect_in.rs":"243799901b950687d6e78220958cfb3484faefefafd5892e03d1564617842812","src/collections/mod.rs":"0fa36a7a5f2b5916b8e3bf4e2804e87c5f7716c87c719a9ab465d377e6272170","src/collections/raw_vec.rs":"11395868cfd0802fab3fe43417751a5755abb516136923e6d8fdbc2f0ff49d19","src/collections/str/lossy.rs":"c5d62b16e01071e2a574ae41ef6693ad12f1e6c786c5d38f7a13ebd6cb23c088","src/collections/str/mod.rs":"d82a8bd417fbf52a589d89a16ea2a0ac4f6ac920c3976ab1f5b6ac0c8493c4f2","src/collections/string.rs":"d4e6c74d7431fa2548ac10290afef6bcdefbf110c6343f0c0244306c11370b8c","src/collections/vec.rs":"8f445224c914c7a4f532636798f2b6ac254e650aa58aa57bd61aee1003d7f6af","src/lib.rs":"05bee63bd4bbfcf09a31b6511b5ec3f56ea1e973d079b398ff15d77be9a13d4a"},"package":"8f1e260c3a9040a7c19a12468758f4c16f31a81a1fe087482be9570ec864bb6c"}+{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"31820be449d15a59a3fd124c89c5c5108bd8934fbd1c11d8d31cca3f9b082aee","Cargo.toml":"9a34d33f35a8271f6fed49f54b096ed9dcf80dd899f60205cf58962529abb4b9","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"65f94e99ddaf4f5d1782a6dae23f35d4293a9a01444a13135a6887017d353cee","README.md":"9a3b4407bab9fdf0f4a2acf5c2d3876f4c78fd25f1b8159462f07343a234fc8e","src/alloc.rs":"ab0f23fa11c26efdd8f0596ebdf0e3faa75d097881fb59639b0fb23340c106bc","src/boxed.rs":"a0dcc1b5691e4a445f35fe84be46a938515dfdca1651396b880682547ae91292","src/collections/collect_in.rs":"243799901b950687d6e78220958cfb3484faefefafd5892e03d1564617842812","src/collections/mod.rs":"0fa36a7a5f2b5916b8e3bf4e2804e87c5f7716c87c719a9ab465d377e6272170","src/collections/raw_vec.rs":"11395868cfd0802fab3fe43417751a5755abb516136923e6d8fdbc2f0ff49d19","src/collections/str/lossy.rs":"c5d62b16e01071e2a574ae41ef6693ad12f1e6c786c5d38f7a13ebd6cb23c088","src/collections/str/mod.rs":"d82a8bd417fbf52a589d89a16ea2a0ac4f6ac920c3976ab1f5b6ac0c8493c4f2","src/collections/string.rs":"d4e6c74d7431fa2548ac10290afef6bcdefbf110c6343f0c0244306c11370b8c","src/collections/vec.rs":"d8d997589a7449f14cdd21fb85583f6c94eb0d3ea2c832d3c4c570e92a0a5cdd","src/lib.rs":"835cbcfa2ac45d9d8d40a13258922419027f60c9481e2cbc1b22690edea2f481"},"package":"a4a45a46ab1f2412e53d3a0ade76ffad2025804294569aae387231a0cd6e0899"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.3.worker.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.3.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(-100, 25); ctx.arcTo(0, 25, -200, 25, 1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. For the first file (third_party/rust/bumpalo/.cargo-checksum.json):
Vulnerability Existed: no
This is a checksum file update for the bumpalo Rust crate. The changes are hash updates for various files, which is a normal maintenance activity and doesn't indicate any security fixes.
2. For the second file (testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.collinear.3.worker.js):
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes are purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't indicate any security fixes. This appears to be a code style/consistency change.
No security vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff. The changes appear to be routine updates and code maintenance rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.cpp@@ -1700,7 +1700,8 @@ aPromise->AppendNativeHandler(handler); }- void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+ void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override { if (NS_WARN_IF(!aValue.isObject())) { mXHR->LocalFileToBlobCompleted(nullptr); return;@@ -1715,7 +1716,8 @@ mXHR->LocalFileToBlobCompleted(blob->Impl()); }- void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+ void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override { mXHR->LocalFileToBlobCompleted(nullptr); }@@ -2813,6 +2815,10 @@ ErrorResult& aRv) { NOT_CALLABLE_IN_SYNC_SEND_RV+ if (!CanSend(aRv)) {+ return;+ }+ if (aData.IsNull()) { SendInternal(nullptr, false, aRv); return;@@ -2880,32 +2886,41 @@ return NS_OK; }+bool XMLHttpRequestMainThread::CanSend(ErrorResult& aRv) {+ if (!mPrincipal) {+ aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);+ return false;+ }++ // Step 1+ if (mState != XMLHttpRequest_Binding::OPENED) {+ aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError("XMLHttpRequest state must be OPENED.");+ return false;+ }++ // Step 2+ if (mFlagSend) {+ aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError("XMLHttpRequest must not be sending.");+ return false;+ }++ if (NS_FAILED(CheckCurrentGlobalCorrectness())) {+ aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_STATE_XHR_HAS_INVALID_CONTEXT);+ return false;+ }++ return true;+}+ void XMLHttpRequestMainThread::SendInternal(const BodyExtractorBase* aBody, bool aBodyIsDocumentOrString, ErrorResult& aRv) { MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());- if (!mPrincipal) {- aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);- return;- }-- // Step 1- if (mState != XMLHttpRequest_Binding::OPENED) {- aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError("XMLHttpRequest state must be OPENED.");- return;- }-- // Step 2- if (mFlagSend) {- aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError("XMLHttpRequest must not be sending.");- return;- }-- if (NS_FAILED(CheckCurrentGlobalCorrectness())) {- aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_STATE_XHR_HAS_INVALID_CONTEXT);- return;- }+ // We expect that CanSend has been called before we get here!+ // We cannot move the remaining two checks below there because+ // MaybeSilentSendFailure can cause unexpected side effects if called+ // too early. // If open() failed to create the channel, then throw a network error // as per spec. We really should create the channel here in send(), but
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: yes Improper State Validation in XMLHttpRequest [dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.cpp] [Lines 2813-2886] [Old Code] The Send() method lacked proper state validation before proceeding with the request. The checks were only performed in SendInternal() after some processing had already occurred. [Fixed Code] Added CanSend() method to properly validate state before processing requests, including: - Principal check - OPENED state verification - Send flag check - Global context validation The Send() method now calls CanSend() before proceeding with any request processing. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Error Handling Improvement [dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.cpp] [Lines 1700-1716] [Old Code] void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override [Fixed Code] void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override While this appears to be an improvement in error handling, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability or just general code improvement. 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Error Handling Improvement [dom/xhr/XMLHttpRequestMainThread.cpp] [Lines 1715-1716] [Old Code] void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override [Fixed Code] void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) override Similar to the ResolvedCallback change, this adds better error handling but it's not clear if it addresses a specific vulnerability. The most significant security fix appears to be the first one, which properly validates the XHR state before processing requests. The other changes appear to be general code improvements rather than specific vulnerability fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/rewriting/ThirdPartyPaths.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/rewriting/ThirdPartyPaths.txt@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ media/libvpx/ media/libwebp/ media/libyuv/+media/mozva/va media/mp4parse-rust/ media/openmax_dl/ media/openmax_il/
Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a simple addition to a third-party paths list rather than a security fix. However, I'll analyze it according to the requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [tools/rewriting/ThirdPartyPaths.txt] [Lines 119-119] [Old Code: media/libyuv/] [Fixed Code: media/libyuv/ +media/mozva/va] Additional Notes: 1. This is simply adding a new path (media/mozva/va) to the ThirdPartyPaths.txt file 2. There's no indication this change fixes any security vulnerability 3. The file appears to be a tracking list of third-party code paths rather than security-sensitive code 4. No old code was removed or modified, only a new entry was added The change appears to be routine maintenance rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/shared/specs/descriptors/tab.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/shared/specs/descriptors/tab.js@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ getWatcher: { request: { isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled: Option(0, "boolean"),+ isPopupDebuggingEnabled: Option(0, "boolean"), }, response: RetVal("watcher"), },
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Disclosure] [devtools/shared/specs/descriptors/tab.js] [Lines 28-31]
[Old Code]
```javascript
getWatcher: {
request: {
isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled: Option(0, "boolean"),
},
response: RetVal("watcher"),
},
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
getWatcher: {
request: {
isServerTargetSwitchingEnabled: Option(0, "boolean"),
isPopupDebuggingEnabled: Option(0, "boolean"),
},
response: RetVal("watcher"),
},
```
Additional Details:
- The diff shows an addition of a new option `isPopupDebuggingEnabled` to the request parameters
- While this doesn't directly show a security vulnerability being fixed, adding debugging capabilities could potentially relate to security if:
- It was added to control access to sensitive debugging information
- It helps prevent unauthorized access to debugging features
- Without more context about how this option is used, we can't be certain if it fixes a specific vulnerability
- The Option() wrapper suggests some level of parameter validation is in place
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webaudio/ScriptProcessorNode.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webaudio/ScriptProcessorNode.cpp@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ void ScriptProcessorNode::EventListenerRemoved(nsAtom* aType) { AudioNode::EventListenerRemoved(aType);- if (aType == nsGkAtoms::onaudioprocess) {+ if (aType == nsGkAtoms::onaudioprocess && mTrack) { UpdateConnectedStatus(); } }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Null Pointer Dereference [File] dom/media/webaudio/ScriptProcessorNode.cpp [Lines] 505
[Old Code]
```cpp
if (aType == nsGkAtoms::onaudioprocess) {
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
if (aType == nsGkAtoms::onaudioprocess && mTrack) {
```
Additional Details:
The fix adds a null check for `mTrack` before calling `UpdateConnectedStatus()`. While this prevents a potential null pointer dereference, we can't be certain if this was actually exploitable or just a defensive programming improvement. The vulnerability would depend on whether `UpdateConnectedStatus()` requires `mTrack` to be valid and whether there were code paths that could trigger this condition with a null `mTrack`.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/ast/data.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/ast/data.rs@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ use std::{slice, vec};-use syn;--use usage::{+use proc_macro2::{Span, TokenStream};+use quote::ToTokens;+use syn::spanned::Spanned;++use crate::usage::{ self, IdentRefSet, IdentSet, LifetimeRefSet, LifetimeSet, UsesLifetimes, UsesTypeParams, };-use {Error, FromField, FromVariant, Result};+use crate::{Error, FromField, FromVariant, Result}; /// A struct or enum body. ///@@ -18,16 +20,33 @@ impl<V, F> Data<V, F> { /// Creates an empty body of the same shape as the passed-in body.+ ///+ /// # Panics+ /// This function will panic if passed `syn::Data::Union`. pub fn empty_from(src: &syn::Data) -> Self { match *src { syn::Data::Enum(_) => Data::Enum(vec![]), syn::Data::Struct(ref vd) => Data::Struct(Fields::empty_from(&vd.fields)),- syn::Data::Union(_) => unreachable!(),+ syn::Data::Union(_) => panic!("Unions are not supported"),+ }+ }++ /// Creates an empty body of the same shape as the passed-in body.+ ///+ /// `darling` does not support unions; calling this function with a union body will return an error.+ pub fn try_empty_from(src: &syn::Data) -> Result<Self> {+ match *src {+ syn::Data::Enum(_) => Ok(Data::Enum(vec![])),+ syn::Data::Struct(ref vd) => Ok(Data::Struct(Fields::empty_from(&vd.fields))),+ // This deliberately doesn't set a span on the error message, as the error is most useful if+ // applied to the call site of the offending macro. Given that the message is very generic,+ // putting it on the union keyword ends up being confusing.+ syn::Data::Union(_) => Err(Error::custom("Unions are not supported")), } } /// Creates a new `Data<&'a V, &'a F>` instance from `Data<V, F>`.- pub fn as_ref<'a>(&'a self) -> Data<&'a V, &'a F> {+ pub fn as_ref(&self) -> Data<&V, &F> { match *self { Data::Enum(ref variants) => Data::Enum(variants.iter().collect()), Data::Struct(ref data) => Data::Struct(data.as_ref()),@@ -118,7 +137,10 @@ } } syn::Data::Struct(ref data) => Ok(Data::Struct(Fields::try_from(&data.fields)?)),- syn::Data::Union(_) => unreachable!(),+ // This deliberately doesn't set a span on the error message, as the error is most useful if+ // applied to the call site of the offending macro. Given that the message is very generic,+ // putting it on the union keyword ends up being confusing.+ syn::Data::Union(_) => Err(Error::custom("Unions are not supported")), } } }@@ -150,18 +172,35 @@ } /// Equivalent to `syn::Fields`, but replaces the AST element with a generic.-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]+#[derive(Debug, Clone)] pub struct Fields<T> { pub style: Style, pub fields: Vec<T>,+ span: Option<Span>,+ __nonexhaustive: (), } impl<T> Fields<T> {+ /// Creates a new [`Fields`] struct.+ pub fn new(style: Style, fields: Vec<T>) -> Self {+ Self {+ style,+ fields,+ span: None,+ __nonexhaustive: (),+ }+ }++ /// Adds a [`Span`] to [`Fields`].+ pub fn with_span(mut self, span: Span) -> Self {+ if self.span.is_none() {+ self.span = Some(span);+ }+ self+ }+ pub fn empty_from(vd: &syn::Fields) -> Self {- Fields {- style: vd.into(),- fields: Vec::new(),- }+ Self::new(vd.into(), Vec::new()) } /// Splits the `Fields` into its style and fields for further processing.@@ -187,10 +226,12 @@ self.style.is_struct() }- pub fn as_ref<'a>(&'a self) -> Fields<&'a T> {+ pub fn as_ref(&self) -> Fields<&T> { Fields { style: self.style, fields: self.fields.iter().collect(),+ span: self.span,+ __nonexhaustive: (), } }@@ -201,6 +242,8 @@ Fields { style: self.style, fields: self.fields.into_iter().map(map).collect(),+ span: self.span,+ __nonexhaustive: (), } }@@ -221,54 +264,92 @@ impl<F: FromField> Fields<F> { pub fn try_from(fields: &syn::Fields) -> Result<Self> {- let (items, errors) = match *fields {- syn::Fields::Named(ref fields) => {- let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(fields.named.len());- let mut errors = Vec::new();-- for field in &fields.named {- match FromField::from_field(field) {- Ok(val) => items.push(val),- Err(err) => errors.push(if let Some(ref ident) = field.ident {- err.at(ident)- } else {- err- }),+ let (items, errors) = {+ match &fields {+ syn::Fields::Named(fields) => {+ let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(fields.named.len());+ let mut errors = Vec::new();++ for field in &fields.named {+ match FromField::from_field(field) {+ Ok(val) => items.push(val),+ Err(err) => errors.push({+ if let Some(ident) = &field.ident {+ err.at(ident)+ } else {+ err+ }+ }),+ } }++ (items, errors) }-- (items, errors)+ syn::Fields::Unnamed(fields) => {+ let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(fields.unnamed.len());+ let mut errors = Vec::new();++ for field in &fields.unnamed {+ match FromField::from_field(field) {+ Ok(val) => items.push(val),+ Err(err) => errors.push({+ if let Some(ident) = &field.ident {+ err.at(ident)+ } else {+ err+ }+ }),+ }+ }++ (items, errors)+ }+ syn::Fields::Unit => (vec![], vec![]), }- syn::Fields::Unnamed(ref fields) => {- let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(fields.unnamed.len());- let mut errors = Vec::new();-- for field in &fields.unnamed {- match FromField::from_field(field) {- Ok(val) => items.push(val),- Err(err) => errors.push(if let Some(ref ident) = field.ident {- err.at(ident)- } else {- err- }),- }- }-- (items, errors)- }- syn::Fields::Unit => (vec![], vec![]), }; if !errors.is_empty() { Err(Error::multiple(errors)) } else {- Ok(Fields {- style: fields.into(),- fields: items,- })- }- }-}+ Ok(Self::new(fields.into(), items).with_span(fields.span()))+ }+ }+}++impl<T: ToTokens> ToTokens for Fields<T> {+ fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) {+ let fields = &self.fields;+ // An unknown Span should be `Span::call_site()`;+ // https://docs.rs/syn/1.0.12/syn/spanned/trait.Spanned.html#tymethod.span+ let span = self.span.unwrap_or_else(Span::call_site);++ match self.style {+ Style::Struct => {+ let trailing_comma = {+ if fields.is_empty() {+ quote!()+ } else {+ quote!(,)+ }+ };++ tokens.extend(quote_spanned![span => { #(#fields),* #trailing_comma }]);+ }+ Style::Tuple => {+ tokens.extend(quote_spanned![span => ( #(#fields),* )]);+ }+ Style::Unit => {}+ }+ }+}++impl<T: PartialEq> PartialEq for Fields<T> {+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {+ self.style == other.style && self.fields == other.fields+ }+}++impl<T: Eq> Eq for Fields<T> {} impl<T> IntoIterator for Fields<T> { type Item = T;@@ -281,10 +362,7 @@ impl<T> From<Style> for Fields<T> { fn from(style: Style) -> Self {- Fields {- style,- fields: Vec::new(),- }+ Self::new(style, Vec::new()) } }@@ -336,10 +414,7 @@ /// Creates a new `Fields` of the specified style with the passed-in fields. fn with_fields<T, U: Into<Vec<T>>>(self, fields: U) -> Fields<T> {- Fields {- style: self,- fields: fields.into(),- }+ Fields::new(self, fields.into()) } }@@ -358,3 +433,69 @@ } } }++#[cfg(test)]+mod tests {+ use super::*;++ // it is not possible to directly convert a TokenStream into syn::Fields, so you have+ // to convert the TokenStream into DeriveInput first and then pass the syn::Fields to+ // Fields::try_from.+ fn token_stream_to_fields(input: TokenStream) -> Fields<syn::Field> {+ Fields::try_from(&{+ if let syn::Data::Struct(s) = syn::parse2::<syn::DeriveInput>(input).unwrap().data {+ s.fields+ } else {+ panic!();+ }+ })+ .unwrap()+ }++ #[test]+ fn test_style_eq() {+ // `Fields` implements `Eq` manually, so it has to be ensured, that all fields of `Fields`+ // implement `Eq`, this test would fail, if someone accidentally removed the Eq+ // implementation from `Style`.+ struct _AssertEq+ where+ Style: Eq;+ }++ #[test]+ fn test_fields_to_tokens_struct() {+ let reference = quote!(+ {+ executable: String,+ args: Vec<String>,+ env: Vec<String>,+ index: usize,+ optional: Option<String>,+ current_dir: String,+ }+ );+ let input = quote!(+ struct ExampleTest #reference+ );++ let fields = token_stream_to_fields(input);++ let mut result = quote!();+ fields.to_tokens(&mut result);+ assert_eq!(result.to_string(), reference.to_string());+ }++ #[test]+ fn test_fields_to_tokens_tuple() {+ let reference = quote!((u64, usize, &'a T));+ let input = quote!(+ struct ExampleTest #reference;+ );++ let fields = token_stream_to_fields(input);++ let mut result = quote!();+ fields.to_tokens(&mut result);+ assert_eq!(result.to_string(), reference.to_string());+ }+}
I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format. The changes appear to be primarily focused on improving error handling and adding new functionality rather than fixing security vulnerabilities. However, I'll examine the changes carefully.
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Improved Error Handling for Unions [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/ast/data.rs] [Lines 18-33, 118-121]
[Old Code]
syn::Data::Union(_) => unreachable!(),
[Fixed Code]
syn::Data::Union(_) => panic!("Unions are not supported")
and
syn::Data::Union(_) => Err(Error::custom("Unions are not supported")),
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
Added Span Handling [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/ast/data.rs] [Lines 150-156, 172-177]
[Old Code]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Fields<T> {
pub style: Style,
pub fields: Vec<T>,
}
[Fixed Code]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Fields<T> {
pub style: Style,
pub fields: Vec<T>,
span: Option<Span>,
__nonexhaustive: (),
}
3. Vulnerability Existed: no
Improved Error Context [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/ast/data.rs] [Lines 264-312]
[Old Code]
let (items, errors) = match *fields {
syn::Fields::Named(ref fields) => {
...
}
syn::Fields::Unnamed(ref fields) => {
...
}
syn::Fields::Unit => (vec![], vec![]),
};
[Fixed Code]
let (items, errors) = {
match &fields {
syn::Fields::Named(fields) => {
...
}
syn::Fields::Unnamed(fields) => {
...
}
syn::Fields::Unit => (vec![], vec![]),
}
};
The changes primarily focus on:
1. Better handling of union types (replacing `unreachable!()` with proper error handling)
2. Adding span information for better error reporting
3. Refactoring code for better maintainability
4. Adding new functionality (ToTokens implementation)
No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes are more about improving robustness and functionality rather than addressing security issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/build_scripts/glean_parser_ext/cpp.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/build_scripts/glean_parser_ext/cpp.py@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import jinja2 import json-from util import generate_metric_ids, generate_ping_ids+from util import generate_metric_ids, generate_ping_ids, get_metrics from glean_parser import util@@ -111,10 +111,13 @@ get_metric_id = generate_metric_ids(objs) get_ping_id = generate_ping_ids(objs)- if len(objs) == 1 and "pings" in objs:+ if "pings" in objs: template_filename = "cpp_pings.jinja2"+ if objs.get("tags"):+ del objs["tags"] else: template_filename = "cpp.jinja2"+ objs = get_metrics(objs) template = util.get_jinja2_template( template_filename,
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak or Data Processing Issue [toolkit/components/glean/build_scripts/glean_parser_ext/cpp.py] [Lines 11, 111-117]
[Old Code]
from util import generate_metric_ids, generate_ping_ids
...
if len(objs) == 1 and "pings" in objs:
template_filename = "cpp_pings.jinja2"
else:
template_filename = "cpp.jinja2"
[Fixed Code]
from util import generate_metric_ids, generate_ping_ids, get_metrics
...
if "pings" in objs:
template_filename = "cpp_pings.jinja2"
if objs.get("tags"):
del objs["tags"]
else:
template_filename = "cpp.jinja2"
objs = get_metrics(objs)
Additional Details:
1. The changes involve:
- Added import of get_metrics function
- Simplified the condition for template selection (removed len check)
- Added handling for "tags" removal when processing pings
- Added metrics processing via get_metrics for non-ping cases
2. While not clearly a security vulnerability, the changes suggest:
- More robust data handling (removing tags when not needed)
- Proper metrics processing through get_metrics function
3. Could potentially relate to:
- Data sanitization (tags removal)
- Proper metric processing
- Template selection logic improvement
Note: Without more context about the data being processed and the purpose of tags removal, it's hard to determine if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code robustness.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/geolocation-reporting.https.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/geolocation-reporting.https.html@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ var check_report_format = (reports, observer) => { let report = reports[0];- assert_equals(report.type, "feature-policy-violation");+ assert_equals(report.type, "permissions-policy-violation"); assert_equals(report.url, document.location.href); assert_equals(report.body.featureId, "geolocation"); assert_equals(report.body.sourceFile, document.location.href);@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ }; new ReportingObserver(t.step_func_done(check_report_format),- {types: ['feature-policy-violation']}).observe();+ {types: ['permissions-policy-violation']}).observe(); navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPosition( t.unreached_func("geolocation should be disabled in this document"),
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Feature Policy to Permissions Policy Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/feature-policy/reporting/geolocation-reporting.https.html] [Lines 10,20]
[Old Code]
`assert_equals(report.type, "feature-policy-violation");`
`{types: ['feature-policy-violation']}).observe();`
[Fixed Code]
`assert_equals(report.type, "permissions-policy-violation");`
`{types: ['permissions-policy-violation']}).observe();`
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be updating the terminology from "feature-policy" to "permissions-policy" which reflects a specification change in the web platform. While this isn't directly fixing a security vulnerability, it's important for maintaining proper policy enforcement. The old terminology might cause compatibility issues or incorrect policy enforcement if not updated. However, I can't definitively say this was fixing a security vulnerability versus just a specification compliance update.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.