--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBReader.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBReader.cpp@@ -22,20 +22,15 @@ namespace mozilla { namespace dom {-NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_INHERITED(ReadableStreamBYOBReader,-                                   ReadableStreamGenericReader,-                                   mReadIntoRequests)+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE_INHERITED(ReadableStreamBYOBReader,+                                                ReadableStreamGenericReader,+                                                mReadIntoRequests) NS_IMPL_ADDREF_INHERITED(ReadableStreamBYOBReader, ReadableStreamGenericReader) NS_IMPL_RELEASE_INHERITED(ReadableStreamBYOBReader, ReadableStreamGenericReader) NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(ReadableStreamBYOBReader)   NS_WRAPPERCACHE_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END_INHERITING(ReadableStreamGenericReader)--NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_BEGIN_INHERITED(ReadableStreamBYOBReader,-                                               ReadableStreamGenericReader)-  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_PRESERVED_WRAPPER-NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_END JSObject* ReadableStreamBYOBReader::WrapObject(     JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) {@@ -104,9 +99,17 @@     //     // chunk steps, given chunk:     //         Resolve promise with «[ "value" → chunk, "done" → false ]».++    // We need to wrap this as the chunk could have come from+    // another compartment.+    JS::RootedObject chunk(aCx, &aChunk.toObject());+    if (!JS_WrapObject(aCx, &chunk)) {+      return;+    }+     ReadableStreamBYOBReadResult result;     result.mValue.Construct();-    result.mValue.Value().Init(&aChunk.toObject());+    result.mValue.Value().Init(chunk);     result.mDone.Construct(false);     mPromise->MaybeResolve(result);@@ -114,14 +117,23 @@   void CloseSteps(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aChunk,                   ErrorResult& errorResult) override {-    MOZ_ASSERT(aChunk.isObject());+    MOZ_ASSERT(aChunk.isObject() || aChunk.isUndefined());     // https://streams.spec.whatwg.org/#byob-reader-read Step 6.     //     // close steps, given chunk:     // Resolve promise with «[ "value" → chunk, "done" → true ]».     ReadableStreamBYOBReadResult result;-    result.mValue.Construct();-    result.mValue.Value().Init(&aChunk.toObject());+    if (aChunk.isObject()) {+      // We need to wrap this as the chunk could have come from+      // another compartment.+      JS::RootedObject chunk(aCx, &aChunk.toObject());+      if (!JS_WrapObject(aCx, &chunk)) {+        return;+      }++      result.mValue.Construct();+      result.mValue.Value().Init(chunk);+    }     result.mDone.Construct(true);     mPromise->MaybeResolve(result);@@ -194,7 +206,7 @@     const ArrayBufferView& aArray, ErrorResult& aRv) {   AutoJSAPI jsapi;   if (!jsapi.Init(GetParentObject())) {-    // MG:XXX: Do I need to have reported this error to aRv?+    aRv.ThrowUnknownError("Internal error");     return nullptr;   }   JSContext* cx = jsapi.cx();@@ -259,18 +271,65 @@   return promise.forget(); }+// https://streams.spec.whatwg.org/#abstract-opdef-readablestreambyobreadererrorreadintorequests+void ReadableStreamBYOBReaderErrorReadIntoRequests(+    JSContext* aCx, ReadableStreamBYOBReader* aReader,+    JS::Handle<JS::Value> aError, ErrorResult& aRv) {+  // Step 1. Let readIntoRequests be reader.[[readIntoRequests]].+  LinkedList<RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest>> readIntoRequests =+      std::move(aReader->ReadIntoRequests());++  // Step 2. Set reader.[[readIntoRequests]] to a new empty list.+  // Note: The std::move already cleared this anyway.+  aReader->ReadIntoRequests().clear();++  // Step 3. For each readIntoRequest of readIntoRequests,+  while (RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest> readIntoRequest =+             readIntoRequests.popFirst()) {+    // Step 3.1. Perform readIntoRequest’s error steps, given e.+    readIntoRequest->ErrorSteps(aCx, aError, aRv);+    if (aRv.Failed()) {+      return;+    }+  }+}++// https://streams.spec.whatwg.org/#abstract-opdef-readablestreambyobreaderrelease+void ReadableStreamBYOBReaderRelease(JSContext* aCx,+                                     ReadableStreamBYOBReader* aReader,+                                     ErrorResult& aRv) {+  // Step 1. Perform ! ReadableStreamReaderGenericRelease(reader).+  ReadableStreamReaderGenericRelease(aReader, aRv);+  if (aRv.Failed()) {+    return;+  }++  // Step 2. Let e be a new TypeError exception.+  ErrorResult rv;+  rv.ThrowTypeError("Releasing lock");+  JS::Rooted<JS::Value> error(aCx);+  MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(ToJSValue(aCx, std::move(rv), &error));++  // Step 3. Perform ! ReadableStreamBYOBReaderErrorReadIntoRequests(reader, e).+  ReadableStreamBYOBReaderErrorReadIntoRequests(aCx, aReader, error, aRv);+}+ // https://streams.spec.whatwg.org/#byob-reader-release-lock void ReadableStreamBYOBReader::ReleaseLock(ErrorResult& aRv) {-  if (!GetStream()) {-    return;-  }--  if (!ReadIntoRequests().isEmpty()) {-    aRv.ThrowTypeError("ReadIntoRequests not empty");-    return;-  }--  ReadableStreamReaderGenericRelease(this, aRv);+  // Step 1. If this.[[stream]] is undefined, return.+  if (!mStream) {+    return;+  }++  AutoJSAPI jsapi;+  if (!jsapi.Init(mGlobal)) {+    return aRv.ThrowUnknownError("Internal error");+  }+  JSContext* cx = jsapi.cx();++  // Step 2. Perform ! ReadableStreamBYOBReaderRelease(this).+  RefPtr<ReadableStreamBYOBReader> thisRefPtr = this;+  ReadableStreamBYOBReaderRelease(cx, thisRefPtr, aRv); } // https://streams.spec.whatwg.org/#acquire-readable-stream-byob-reader

Analyzing the provided code diff, I've identified several security-related changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Cross-Compartment Wrapping Issue [dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBReader.cpp] [Lines 104-114]
[Old Code]
    ReadableStreamBYOBReadResult result;
    result.mValue.Construct();
    result.mValue.Value().Init(&aChunk.toObject());
[Fixed Code]
    JS::RootedObject chunk(aCx, &aChunk.toObject());
    if (!JS_WrapObject(aCx, &chunk)) {
      return;
    }
    ReadableStreamBYOBReadResult result;
    result.mValue.Construct();
    result.mValue.Value().Init(chunk);

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Cross-Compartment Wrapping Issue [dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBReader.cpp] [Lines 117-127]
[Old Code]
    ReadableStreamBYOBReadResult result;
    result.mValue.Construct();
    result.mValue.Value().Init(&aChunk.toObject());
[Fixed Code]
    if (aChunk.isObject()) {
      JS::RootedObject chunk(aCx, &aChunk.toObject());
      if (!JS_WrapObject(aCx, &chunk)) {
        return;
      }
      result.mValue.Construct();
      result.mValue.Value().Init(chunk);
    }

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Error Handling Improvement [dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBReader.cpp] [Lines 194-196]
[Old Code]
    if (!jsapi.Init(GetParentObject())) {
      // MG:XXX: Do I need to have reported this error to aRv?
      return nullptr;
    }
[Fixed Code]
    if (!jsapi.Init(GetParentObject())) {
      aRv.ThrowUnknownError("Internal error");
      return nullptr;
    }

4. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Incomplete Lock Release Implementation [dom/streams/ReadableStreamBYOBReader.cpp] [Lines 259-271]
[Old Code]
    if (!GetStream()) {
      return;
    }
    if (!ReadIntoRequests().isEmpty()) {
      aRv.ThrowTypeError("ReadIntoRequests not empty");
      return;
    }
    ReadableStreamReaderGenericRelease(this, aRv);
[Fixed Code]
    if (!mStream) {
      return;
    }
    AutoJSAPI jsapi;
    if (!jsapi.Init(mGlobal)) {
      return aRv.ThrowUnknownError("Internal error");
    }
    JSContext* cx = jsapi.cx();
    RefPtr<ReadableStreamBYOBReader> thisRefPtr = this;
    ReadableStreamBYOBReaderRelease(cx, thisRefPtr, aRv);

The changes primarily address:
1. Cross-compartment security issues by properly wrapping objects
2. Improved error handling by properly reporting initialization failures
3. More complete implementation of lock release functionality following the spec
4. Removal of potentially unsafe trace operations (NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_* macros)

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/siphasher/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/siphasher/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"COPYING":"2667c3da82a038bfbbd64cdb0fde6ecabda683e473fc1c10cc2b31c1c65e7fb6","Cargo.toml":"aff55aa2a246d0476405d0082858528726db4d3437acf9bfd1e6841804105073","README.md":"c0ffa167eca7e8aa8efc05c0514234aff3f522fc2e327edf6f86d4fbfa8502a8","src/lib.rs":"dac421e799bfb49f9721af1083101af6846fef78268362172450f2a2c0f6250c","src/sip.rs":"3bb394ccaf38c604033aaafc5de632634f50d17368181ed6cd37bce78f3f06e8","src/sip128.rs":"b94199088f4ceddd92aef5cc636fc49f23bb1b84174138de77dcdf82408fe413","src/tests.rs":"0195439c356f3557cf83dab2a8e6adbe5eac1c9f6ba66bf27b3c2e40f9345066","src/tests128.rs":"b85b8893c14a3b4ea782d2084b6de414456ef6dd0b55d1c29c68a3e46516d07c"},"package":"533494a8f9b724d33625ab53c6c4800f7cc445895924a8ef649222dcb76e938b"}+{"files":{"COPYING":"2667c3da82a038bfbbd64cdb0fde6ecabda683e473fc1c10cc2b31c1c65e7fb6","Cargo.toml":"8da86a3a330dc2b1a48657b71349f23ba7636c775239f9cc8f4f9fc2bea13b76","README.md":"c0ffa167eca7e8aa8efc05c0514234aff3f522fc2e327edf6f86d4fbfa8502a8","src/lib.rs":"dac421e799bfb49f9721af1083101af6846fef78268362172450f2a2c0f6250c","src/sip.rs":"e7fb94566cdaf25c15424dd663c2c4f267e4821b1d4fd04ede9f6c4206a41381","src/sip128.rs":"5de9afdc224c143f3835cc4519b83a6a51fafbd350f61c5ece44fb3b72bc407a","src/tests.rs":"0195439c356f3557cf83dab2a8e6adbe5eac1c9f6ba66bf27b3c2e40f9345066","src/tests128.rs":"b85b8893c14a3b4ea782d2084b6de414456ef6dd0b55d1c29c68a3e46516d07c"},"package":"ba1eead9e94aa5a2e02de9e7839f96a007f686ae7a1d57c7797774810d24908a"}=========taskcluster/ci/packages/debian.yml========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/packages/debian.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/packages/debian.yml@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@         dsc:             url: http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/20211022T144903Z/pool/main/v/valgrind/valgrind_3.18.1-1.dsc             sha256: 6f2606862134b6387cdbe070920728fdb84c6ffa85308ca6f36222717a87aadf+        patch: valgrind.diff deb10-python-zstandard:     description: "python-zstandard for Debian buster"

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. For the first file (third_party/rust/siphasher/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name] [third_party/rust/siphasher/.cargo-checksum.json] [Entire file]
    [Old checksums and package hash]
    [New checksums and package hash]
    Note: The checksums and package hash have changed, but without seeing the actual code changes in the referenced files, we can't determine if this was a security fix or just routine updates.

2. For the second file (taskcluster/ci/packages/debian.yml):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name] [taskcluster/ci/packages/debian.yml] [Lines 47-48]
    [Original valgrind configuration without patch]
    [Updated valgrind configuration with patch reference]
    Note: The addition of a patch for valgrind could indicate a security fix, but without seeing the patch contents or knowing what it addresses, we can't be certain.

The diffs show changes that could potentially be security-related (especially the valgrind patch addition), but without more context about what changed in the actual source files or what the valgrind.diff contains, we can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating all references to this variable. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch1.worker.js] [Lines 13-48]
[Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas']
[Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas']

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-overlay-and-grammar-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-overlay-and-grammar-001.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-painting">   <link rel="match" href="reference/selection-overlay-and-grammar-001-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta name="assert" content="In this test, the div::selection pseudo-element must be drawn over the div::grammar-error overlay.">   <link rel="stylesheet" href="support/highlights.css">

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 10]
   [Old Code] `<meta content="" name="flags">`
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability.
- The "flags" meta tag was commonly used in test files to specify test conditions but wasn't serving any security purpose here.
- No known vulnerabilities (like XSS, injection, etc.) are being addressed by this change.
- The modification appears to be a cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-z-index-fractions-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-z-index-fractions-001.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Gérard Talbot" href="http://www.gtalbot.org/BrowserBugsSection/css21testsuite/">   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-values-4/#calc-range">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta content="This test verifies how 2 calc() functions are computed for 'z-index' when involved expressions end up being numbers halfway between adjacent integers." name="assert">   <script src="/resources/testharness.js"></script>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-z-index-fractions-001.html [Lines] 7
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (removed line)

Additional Analysis:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
- This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup or test improvement
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

The change seems to be removing unnecessary test metadata rather than addressing any security concerns. There's no indication of a vulnerability being fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-41.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-41.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ ]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>You should see before this paragraph the words GENERATED CONTENT over green background</p>

Let me analyze the diff according to your instructions:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-41.xml] [Lines 6]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: [removed]]

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here.
3. The change seems more like test cleanup rather than a security fix.
4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

The modification appears to be a benign cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix. The removed tag was empty and didn't contain any potentially dangerous content.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/compare_locales/compare_locales/checks/android.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/compare_locales/compare_locales/checks/android.py@@ -251,3 +251,15 @@                 "Mismatching formatter",                 "android"             )+    # All parameters used in the reference are expected to be included.+    # Warn if this isn't the case.+    for order in params:+        if order not in sorted(lparams):+            yield (+                "warning",+                0,+                "Formatter %{}${} not found in translation".format(+                    order, params[order]+                ),+                "android",+            )

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Missing Parameter Validation] [third_party/python/compare_locales/compare_locales/checks/android.py] [Lines 251-263]  
[Old Code]  
```python
                "Mismatching formatter",
                "android"
            )
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```python
                "Mismatching formatter",
                "android"
            )
    # All parameters used in the reference are expected to be included.
    # Warn if this isn't the case.
    for order in params:
        if order not in sorted(lparams):
            yield (
                "warning",
                0,
                "Formatter %{}${} not found in translation".format(
                    order, params[order]
                ),
                "android",
            )
```

Additional Details:  
1. The diff adds validation to check if all parameters used in the reference are included in the translation
2. While this isn't a classic security vulnerability, it improves input validation which could potentially prevent issues with malformed input
3. The change appears to be more of a robustness improvement than a direct security fix
4. The warning message could potentially expose parameter values, but this appears to be an intended feature for debugging purposes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/search/tests/xpcshell/test_getSubmission_params.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/search/tests/xpcshell/test_getSubmission_params.js@@ -51,13 +51,6 @@   check("{startPage}", "1");   check("{startPage?}", "");-  check("{moz:distributionID}", "");-  Services.prefs.setCharPref("browser.search.distributionID", "xpcshell");-  check("{moz:distributionID}", "xpcshell");-  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("browser.search.official", true);-  check("{moz:official}", "official");-  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("browser.search.official", false);-  check("{moz:official}", "unofficial");   check("{moz:locale}", Services.locale.requestedLocale);   url.template = prefix + "{moz:date}";@@ -95,8 +88,6 @@   let check = checkSubstitution.bind(this, url, prefix, engine);   // Test moz: parameters (only supported for built-in engines, ie _isDefault == true).-  check("{moz:distributionID}", "{moz:distributionID}");-  check("{moz:official}", "{moz:official}");   check("{moz:locale}", "{moz:locale}");   await promiseAfterSettings();

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removal of Distribution ID and Official Status Parameters] [toolkit/components/search/tests/xpcshell/test_getSubmission_params.js] [Lines 51-58, 95-96]
[Old Code]
  check("{moz:distributionID}", "");
  Services.prefs.setCharPref("browser.search.distributionID", "xpcshell");
  check("{moz:distributionID}", "xpcshell");
  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("browser.search.official", true);
  check("{moz:official}", "official");
  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("browser.search.official", false);
  check("{moz:official}", "unofficial");
  ...
  check("{moz:distributionID}", "{moz:distributionID}");
  check("{moz:official}", "{moz:official}");
[Fixed Code]
[These lines were completely removed]

Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of test cases related to {moz:distributionID} and {moz:official} parameters. While this appears to be a security-related change (removing potentially sensitive information), I cannot definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed. This could be related to privacy concerns or reducing attack surface by removing unnecessary parameters, but without more context about why these were removed, I can't name a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libdav1d/moz.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libdav1d/moz.yaml@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@   # Human-readable identifier for this version/release   # Generally "version NNN", "tag SSS", "bookmark SSS"-  release: commit 7b99b0e17fbd86f0847684798b182f9122545580 (2021-12-03T21:51:14.000+01:00).+  release: commit b562b7f648e26e64fae892495527b5b275d53183 (2022-01-10T14:49:11.000+00:00).   # Revision to pull in   # Must be a long or short commit SHA (long preferred)-  revision: 7b99b0e17fbd86f0847684798b182f9122545580+  revision: b562b7f648e26e64fae892495527b5b275d53183   # The package's license, where possible using the mnemonic from   # https://spdx.org/licenses/@@ -64,3 +64,4 @@       with: '{revision}'       file: '{yaml_dir}/vcs_version.h'+

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Dependency Update] [media/libdav1d/moz.yaml] [Lines 20,23]
    [Old Code]
    release: commit 7b99b0e17fbd86f0847684798b182f9122545580 (2021-12-03T21:51:14.000+01:00).
    revision: 7b99b0e17fbd86f0847684798b182f9122545580
    [Fixed Code]
    release: commit b562b7f648e26e64fae892495527b5b275d53183 (2022-01-10T14:49:11.000+00:00).
    revision: b562b7f648e26e64fae892495527b5b275d53183

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a routine dependency update from one commit to another in the libdav1d library
- Without knowing the specific changes between these two commits, I can't determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability
- The update spans about 5 weeks (Dec 2021 to Jan 2022), which could include security fixes
- The only other change is a blank line addition at the end of the file (line 64), which is purely formatting

Note: To determine if this was specifically a security fix, we would need to examine:
1. The changelog between these two libdav1d commits
2. Any security advisories related to libdav1d during this period
3. Firefox's release notes mentioning security fixes in this component

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/search/extensions/yahoo-jp-auctions/manifest.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/search/extensions/yahoo-jp-auctions/manifest.json@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@   "name": "ヤフオク!",   "description": "ヤフオク! 検索",   "manifest_version": 2,-  "version": "1.2",+  "version": "1.3",   "applications": {     "gecko": {       "id": "[email protected]"@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@       "encoding": "EUC-JP",       "search_url": "https://auctions.yahoo.co.jp/search/search",       "search_form": "https://auctions.yahoo.co.jp/",-      "search_url_get_params": "p={searchTerms}&ei=EUC-JP&fr=mozff&rls={moz:distributionID}:ja-JP:{moz:official}"+      "search_url_get_params": "p={searchTerms}&ei=EUC-JP&fr=mozff"     }   } }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak] [browser/components/search/extensions/yahoo-jp-auctions/manifest.json] [Lines 21]  
   [Old Code]  
   `"search_url_get_params": "p={searchTerms}&ei=EUC-JP&fr=mozff&rls={moz:distributionID}:ja-JP:{moz:official}"`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `"search_url_get_params": "p={searchTerms}&ei=EUC-JP&fr=mozff"`  

   Additional Details: The removed parameter `rls={moz:distributionID}:ja-JP:{moz:official}` could potentially leak browser/distribution information to the search provider. While not a confirmed vulnerability, removing such identifiers is generally good for privacy.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [Version Bump] [browser/components/search/extensions/yahoo-jp-auctions/manifest.json] [Lines 2]  
   [Old Code]  
   `"version": "1.2",`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `"version": "1.3",`  

   Additional Details: While version bumps aren't vulnerabilities themselves, they typically indicate security fixes or other important changes. The version increment suggests some change was made that warranted a version update, possibly including the parameter removal mentioned above.

Note: The main change appears to be the removal of potentially sensitive information being sent in search queries, which improves user privacy. However, without more context about what `{moz:distributionID}` and `{moz:official}` contained, we can't definitively classify this as a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.emptystring.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.emptystring.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas2.getContext(""); });

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security issues:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 13-16]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas2.getContext(""); });
    
    [Fixed Code]
    (same as old code - no changes)

Analysis:
1. The first change is just a variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
2. The second part shows testing for proper error handling when passing an empty string to getContext(), which is good practice but doesn't indicate a vulnerability was fixed.
3. The diff appears to be primarily a test case modification rather than a security fix. The test verifies that passing an empty string to getContext() throws a TypeError as expected.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be test improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/blending.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/blending.h@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ namespace jxl {-Status PerformBlending(const float* const* bg, const float* const* fg,-                       float* const* out, size_t xsize,-                       const PatchBlending& color_blending,-                       const PatchBlending* ec_blending,-                       const std::vector<ExtraChannelInfo>& extra_channel_info);+void PerformBlending(const float* const* bg, const float* const* fg,+                     float* const* out, size_t x0, size_t xsize,+                     const PatchBlending& color_blending,+                     const PatchBlending* ec_blending,+                     const std::vector<ExtraChannelInfo>& extra_channel_info); class ImageBlender {  public:

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Error Handling Removal] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/blending.h] [Lines 11-15]
    [Old Code]
    Status PerformBlending(const float* const* bg, const float* const* fg,
                       float* const* out, size_t xsize,
                       const PatchBlending& color_blending,
                       const PatchBlending* ec_blending,
                       const std::vector<ExtraChannelInfo>& extra_channel_info);
    [Fixed Code]
    void PerformBlending(const float* const* bg, const float* const* fg,
                     float* const* out, size_t x0, size_t xsize,
                     const PatchBlending& color_blending,
                     const PatchBlending* ec_blending,
                     const std::vector<ExtraChannelInfo>& extra_channel_info);

    Additional Details: The change from returning Status to void might indicate removal of error handling, which could potentially lead to unhandled error conditions. However, without seeing the implementation, we can't be certain if this is actually a security issue.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Boundary Check Improvement] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/blending.h] [Lines 11-15]
    [Old Code]
    Status PerformBlending(..., size_t xsize, ...);
    [Fixed Code]
    void PerformBlending(..., size_t x0, size_t xsize, ...);

    Additional Details: The addition of x0 parameter suggests better boundary control in the blending operation, which could prevent potential buffer overflows. However, without seeing the implementation, we can't confirm if this was actually fixing a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/mq-gamut-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/mq-gamut-002.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://github.com/w3c/csswg-drafts/issues/276"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht"> <meta name="assert" content="the p3 color-gamut is syntactically supported">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div {     width: 100px;

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5-6]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns or security issues are addressed by this change

The modification is minor and doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being fixed. It's likely just removing unused or unnecessary metadata from the test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/serde_yaml/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/serde_yaml/src/lib.rs@@ -65,15 +65,18 @@ //! } //! ```-#![doc(html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/serde_yaml/0.8.21")]+#![doc(html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/serde_yaml/0.8.23")] #![deny(missing_docs)] // Suppressed clippy_pedantic lints #![allow(+    // buggy+    clippy::question_mark, // https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/7859     // private Deserializer::next     clippy::should_implement_trait,     // things are often more readable this way     clippy::cast_lossless,     clippy::if_not_else,+    clippy::manual_assert,     clippy::match_same_arms,     clippy::module_name_repetitions,     clippy::needless_pass_by_value,@@ -81,6 +84,7 @@     clippy::redundant_else,     clippy::single_match_else,     // code is acceptable+    clippy::blocks_in_if_conditions,     clippy::cast_possible_wrap,     clippy::cast_precision_loss,     clippy::doc_markdown,

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be related to documentation updates and clippy lint allowances. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [third_party/rust/serde_yaml/src/lib.rs] [Lines 65, various]
[Old Code]
Various clippy allowances and doc URL
[Fixed Code]
Updated clippy allowances and doc URL version

The changes include:
1. Updated documentation URL version from 0.8.21 to 0.8.23
2. Added new clippy lint allowances (question_mark, manual_assert, blocks_in_if_conditions)
3. Added a comment about a buggy clippy lint

These changes appear to be maintenance-related rather than security fixes. No actual code logic was modified that would indicate a security vulnerability was addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.large.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.large.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata = ctx.createImageData(1000, 2000); _assertSame(imgdata.data.length, imgdata.width*imgdata.height*4, "imgdata.data.length", "imgdata.width*imgdata.height*4");

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable name changes (offscreenCanvas → canvas)
- No security-related functionality was modified
- The test still performs the same assertion checking image data dimensions
- No known vulnerability patterns (like buffer overflows, XSS, etc.) are present in this change

The modification seems to be a simple code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix. The test continues to verify that createImageData() correctly handles large dimensions by checking the resulting data buffer size matches expected dimensions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/editor/libeditor/HTMLEditorDataTransfer.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/editor/libeditor/HTMLEditorDataTransfer.cpp@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ namespace mozilla { using namespace dom;+using EmptyCheckOption = HTMLEditUtils::EmptyCheckOption; using LeafNodeType = HTMLEditUtils::LeafNodeType; #define kInsertCookie "_moz_Insert Here_moz_"@@ -363,6 +364,18 @@       DocumentFragment& aDocumentFragmentForContext);   static void RemoveHeadChildAndStealBodyChildsChildren(nsINode& aNode);++  /**+   * This is designed for a helper class to remove disturbing nodes at inserting+   * the HTML fragment into the DOM tree.  This walks the children and if some+   * elements do not have enough children, e.g., list elements not having+   * another visible list elements nor list item elements,+   * will be removed.+   *+   * @param aNode       Should not be a node whose mutation may be observed by+   *                    JS.+   */+  static void RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment(nsINode& aNode);   enum class NodesToRemove {     eAll,@@ -744,8 +757,8 @@     return lastInsertedPoint.inspectErr();   }-  mHTMLEditor.TopLevelEditSubActionDataRef()-      .mNeedsToCleanUpEmptyInlineElements = false;+  mHTMLEditor.TopLevelEditSubActionDataRef().mNeedsToCleanUpEmptyElements =+      false;   if (!lastInsertedPoint.inspect().IsSet()) {     return NS_OK;@@ -3239,6 +3252,51 @@ } // static+void HTMLEditor::HTMLWithContextInserter::FragmentFromPasteCreator::+    RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment(nsINode& aNode) {+  nsIContent* child = aNode.GetFirstChild();+  while (child) {+    bool isEmptyNodeShouldNotInserted = false;+    if (HTMLEditUtils::IsAnyListElement(child)) {+      // Current limitation of HTMLEditor:+      //   Cannot put caret in a list element which does not have list item+      //   element even as a descendant.  I.e., HTMLEditor does not support+      //   editing in such empty list element, and does not support to delete+      //   it from outside.  Therefore, HTMLWithContextInserter should not+      //   insert empty list element.+      isEmptyNodeShouldNotInserted = HTMLEditUtils::IsEmptyNode(+          *child,+          {// Although we don't check relation between list item element+           // and parent list element, but it should not be a problem in the+           // wild because appearing such invalid list element is an edge case+           // and anyway HTMLEditor supports editing in them.+           EmptyCheckOption::TreatListItemAsVisible,+           // Ignore editable state because non-editable list item element+           // may make the list element visible.  Although HTMLEditor does not+           // support to edit list elements which have only non-editable list+           // item elements, but it should be deleted from outside.+           // TODO: Currently, HTMLEditor does not support deleting such list+           //       element with Backspace.  We should fix this.+           EmptyCheckOption::IgnoreEditableState});+    }+    // TODO: Perhaps, we should delete <table>s if they have no <td>/<th>+    //       element, or something other elements which must have specific+    //       children but they don't.+    if (isEmptyNodeShouldNotInserted) {+      nsIContent* nextChild = child->GetNextSibling();+      OwningNonNull<nsIContent> removingChild(*child);+      removingChild->Remove();+      child = nextChild;+      continue;+    }+    if (child->HasChildNodes()) {+      RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment(*child);+    }+    child = child->GetNextSibling();+  }+}++// static bool HTMLEditor::HTMLWithContextInserter::FragmentFromPasteCreator::     IsInsertionCookie(const nsIContent& aContent) {   // Is this child the magical cookie?@@ -3389,6 +3447,9 @@   FragmentFromPasteCreator::RemoveHeadChildAndStealBodyChildsChildren(       aDocumentFragmentForPastedHTML);+  FragmentFromPasteCreator::RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment(+      aDocumentFragmentForPastedHTML);+   // unite the two trees   IgnoredErrorResult ignoredError;   aTargetContentOfContextForPastedHTML.AppendChild(@@ -3415,6 +3476,9 @@     PostProcessFragmentForPastedHTMLWithoutContext(         DocumentFragment& aDocumentFragmentForPastedHTML) {   FragmentFromPasteCreator::RemoveHeadChildAndStealBodyChildsChildren(+      aDocumentFragmentForPastedHTML);++  FragmentFromPasteCreator::RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment(       aDocumentFragmentForPastedHTML);   const nsresult rv = FragmentFromPasteCreator::

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes. Here are the findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Incomplete HTML Sanitization] [editor/libeditor/HTMLEditorDataTransfer.cpp] [Lines 3239-3292]
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment)
[Fixed Code]
Added new method RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment that removes potentially problematic HTML elements like empty list elements during paste operations.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Variable Renaming for Clarity] [editor/libeditor/HTMLEditorDataTransfer.cpp] [Lines 744-745]
[Old Code]
mHTMLEditor.TopLevelEditSubActionDataRef().mNeedsToCleanUpEmptyInlineElements = false;
[Fixed Code]
mHTMLEditor.TopLevelEditSubActionDataRef().mNeedsToCleanUpEmptyElements = false;

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Additional HTML Sanitization] [editor/libeditor/HTMLEditorDataTransfer.cpp] [Lines 3389-3390, 3415-3416]
[Old Code]
Only removed head child and stole body child's children
[Fixed Code]
Added additional sanitization step with RemoveIncompleteDescendantsFromInsertingFragment for both with-context and without-context paste operations

Note: While these changes appear to be security-related (particularly the HTML sanitization improvements), without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed, I can't definitively state what vulnerabilities existed. The changes do appear to strengthen the HTML sanitization during paste operations, which could prevent potential XSS or content manipulation vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.stroke.join.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.stroke.join.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(-150, -50); ctx.lineTo(-151, -100); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring without any security implications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-30]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
...
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
...

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't affect security. This appears to be a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.canvas.readonly.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.canvas.readonly.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var d = ctx.canvas;

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.canvas.readonly.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There doesn't seem to be any security vulnerability being fixed here, just a code style/consistency improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same.

The rest of the diff shows unchanged code where another `offscreenCanvas2` variable is declared, suggesting this might be part of a larger effort to standardize variable naming conventions in the codebase. No security implications are visible in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-023-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-023-ref.html@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The change appears to be purely cosmetic/visual, modifying the border style from dashed to solid salmon color. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability [File] [Lines 21]
    [Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
    [Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;

Additional notes:
1. The change is in a reftest (reference test) HTML file, which is used for visual regression testing
2. The modification only affects the visual presentation (border style and color)
3. No security-related patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change
4. The file appears to be part of CSS grid layout testing infrastructure

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/generic-sensor/META.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/generic-sensor/META.yml@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ spec: https://w3c.github.io/sensors/ suggested_reviewers:-  - zqzhang   - riju   - rakuco   - Honry

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/generic-sensor/META.yml] [Lines 2-3]
[Old Code]
  - zqzhang
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
1. The change only involves removing a suggested reviewer from a test file's metadata.
2. This appears to be an administrative/team change rather than a security fix.
3. No code execution or security-related functionality was modified.
4. The file in question is a YAML configuration file for test metadata.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change is purely organizational in nature, removing a reviewer from the suggested reviewers list.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.