--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/raptor/raptor/browsertime/android.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/raptor/raptor/browsertime/android.py@@ -79,11 +79,6 @@                     "--browser",                     "firefox",                     "--android",-                    # Work around a `selenium-webdriver` issue where Browsertime-                    # fails to find a Firefox binary even though we're going to-                    # actually do things on an Android device.-                    "--firefox.binaryPath",-                    self.browsertime_node,                     "--firefox.android.package",                     self.config["binary"],                     "--firefox.android.activity",

I'll analyze the code diff according to the provided format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Hardcoded Binary Path Issue] [testing/raptor/raptor/browsertime/android.py] [Lines 79-86]
[Old Code]
                    "--browser",
                    "firefox",
                    "--android",
                    # Work around a `selenium-webdriver` issue where Browsertime
                    # fails to find a Firefox binary even though we're going to
                    # actually do things on an Android device.
                    "--firefox.binaryPath",
                    self.browsertime_node,
                    "--firefox.android.package",
[Fixed Code]
                    "--browser",
                    "firefox",
                    "--android",
                    "--firefox.android.package",

Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of the `--firefox.binaryPath` argument and its associated value `self.browsertime_node`. While not clearly a security vulnerability, hardcoding or passing binary paths can sometimes lead to path traversal or binary hijacking issues if not properly validated. The removal suggests this was an unnecessary workaround that might have posed a potential risk if the binary path wasn't properly sanitized. However, without more context about how `self.browsertime_node` was set, I can't be certain this was an actual vulnerability.

No other clear vulnerabilities are evident in this diff. The change appears to be primarily about removing an unnecessary workaround rather than fixing a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/headless/HeadlessWidget.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/headless/HeadlessWidget.h@@ -70,8 +70,7 @@   virtual void Resize(double aX, double aY, double aWidth, double aHeight,                       bool aRepaint) override;   virtual void SetSizeMode(nsSizeMode aMode) override;-  virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen,-                                  nsIScreen* aTargetScreen = nullptr) override;+  virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) override;   virtual void Enable(bool aState) override;   virtual bool IsEnabled() const override;   virtual void SetFocus(Raise, mozilla::dom::CallerType aCallerType) override;

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential API Security Risk [File] widget/headless/HeadlessWidget.h [Lines] 70-71  
[Old Code]  
virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen* aTargetScreen = nullptr) override;  
[Fixed Code]  
virtual nsresult MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) override;  

Additional Details:  
The change removes the optional screen parameter from the MakeFullScreen method. While this might not be a direct security vulnerability, it could be related to:  
1. Preventing potential screen-related attacks (like clickjacking across screens)  
2. Simplifying the API to reduce attack surface  
3. Removing a potential null pointer dereference risk  
However, without more context about how this method was used, I can't be certain if this was a security fix or just an API simplification.  

Note: There might be other security implications not visible from this single diff. The change could be part of a larger security hardening effort.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(0, 50, 100, 0); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability was found in this diff. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't affect security.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes in the `_assertPixel` call (line 23) are simply updating the variable name to match the renamed variable, which doesn't impact security.

The diff shows only variable naming changes with no security implications:
- Old variable name: `offscreenCanvas`
- New variable name: `canvas`
- All functionality remains identical, just using the new variable name

No known vulnerabilities (such as XSS, injection, etc.) are introduced or fixed by these changes. The modifications appear to be code style/readability improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.transform.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.transform.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.scale(10, 10); ctx.translate(0, 5); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, -5, 10, 5);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.transform.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-input-011.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-input-011.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/selection-input-011-ref.html">   <!-- Allow different antialiased pixels on the focus ring. -->   <meta name="fuzzy" content="0-5;0-255">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <style>   input

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/selection-input-011.html [Lines] 9
[Old Code]
  <meta content="" name="flags">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
2. The "flags" meta tag doesn't seem to have any security implications in this context.
3. The modification appears to be a cleanup of unused or unnecessary markup rather than a security fix.
4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/extra-height-given-to-all-row-groups-005.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/extra-height-given-to-all-row-groups-005.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-tables-3/#height-distribution-algorithm"> <link rel="match" href="../../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht"> <link rel="bookmark" href="https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=708345" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="height of rows in tfoot are increased to match table height" /> <title> all row groups receive extra height distribution

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The diff shows the removal of a meta tag with empty flags attribute, which appears to be a test configuration change rather than a security fix.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/height-distribution/extra-height-given-to-all-row-groups-005.html] [Lines 4]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Removed]

This appears to be a test file cleanup/update rather than a security fix. The change removes an unused or unnecessary meta tag from the test HTML file. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/Element.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/Element.cpp@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/HTMLTemplateElement.h" #include "mozilla/dom/KeyframeAnimationOptionsBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/KeyframeEffect.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/MouseEvent.h" #include "mozilla/dom/MouseEventBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/MutationEventBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/MutationObservers.h"@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/ShadowRoot.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Text.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WindowBinding.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/XULCommandEvent.h" #include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h" #include "mozilla/gfx/BasePoint.h" #include "mozilla/gfx/BaseRect.h"@@ -3068,12 +3070,51 @@   } }+// This dispatches a 'chromelinkclick' CustomEvent to chrome-only listeners,+// so that frontend can handle middle-clicks and ctrl/cmd/shift/etc.-clicks+// on links, without getting a call for every single click the user makes.+// Only supported for click or auxclick events.+void Element::DispatchChromeOnlyLinkClickEvent(+    EventChainPostVisitor& aVisitor) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(aVisitor.mEvent->mMessage == eMouseAuxClick ||+                 aVisitor.mEvent->mMessage == eMouseClick,+             "DispatchChromeOnlyLinkClickEvent supports only click and "+             "auxclick source events");+  Document* doc = OwnerDoc();+  RefPtr<XULCommandEvent> event =+      new XULCommandEvent(doc, aVisitor.mPresContext, nullptr);+  RefPtr<dom::Event> mouseDOMEvent = aVisitor.mDOMEvent;+  if (!mouseDOMEvent) {+    mouseDOMEvent = EventDispatcher::CreateEvent(+        aVisitor.mEvent->mOriginalTarget, aVisitor.mPresContext,+        aVisitor.mEvent, u""_ns);+    NS_ADDREF(aVisitor.mDOMEvent = mouseDOMEvent);+  }++  MouseEvent* mouseEvent = mouseDOMEvent->AsMouseEvent();+  event->InitCommandEvent(+      u"chromelinkclick"_ns, /* CanBubble */ true,+      /* Cancelable */ true, nsGlobalWindowInner::Cast(doc->GetInnerWindow()),+      0, mouseEvent->CtrlKey(), mouseEvent->AltKey(), mouseEvent->ShiftKey(),+      mouseEvent->MetaKey(), mouseEvent->Button(), mouseDOMEvent,+      mouseEvent->MozInputSource(), IgnoreErrors());+  // Note: we're always trusted, but the event we pass as the `sourceEvent`+  // might not be. Frontend code will check that event's trusted property to+  // make that determination; doing it this way means we don't also start+  // acting on web-generated custom 'chromelinkclick' events which would+  // provide additional attack surface for a malicious actor.+  event->SetTrusted(true);+  event->WidgetEventPtr()->mFlags.mOnlyChromeDispatch = true;+  DispatchEvent(*event);+}+ nsresult Element::PostHandleEventForLinks(EventChainPostVisitor& aVisitor) {   // Optimisation: return early if this event doesn't interest us.   // IMPORTANT: this switch and the switch below it must be kept in sync!   switch (aVisitor.mEvent->mMessage) {     case eMouseDown:     case eMouseClick:+    case eMouseAuxClick:     case eLegacyDOMActivate:     case eKeyPress:       break;@@ -3128,24 +3169,28 @@     case eMouseClick: {       WidgetMouseEvent* mouseEvent = aVisitor.mEvent->AsMouseEvent();       if (mouseEvent->IsLeftClickEvent()) {-        if (mouseEvent->IsControl() || mouseEvent->IsMeta() ||-            mouseEvent->IsAlt() || mouseEvent->IsShift()) {-          break;+        if (!mouseEvent->IsControl() && !mouseEvent->IsMeta() &&+            !mouseEvent->IsAlt() && !mouseEvent->IsShift()) {+          // The default action is simply to dispatch DOMActivate+          nsEventStatus status = nsEventStatus_eIgnore;+          // DOMActivate event should be trusted since the activation is+          // actually occurred even if the cause is an untrusted click event.+          InternalUIEvent actEvent(true, eLegacyDOMActivate, mouseEvent);+          actEvent.mDetail = 1;++          rv = EventDispatcher::Dispatch(this, aVisitor.mPresContext, &actEvent,+                                         nullptr, &status);+          if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {+            aVisitor.mEventStatus = nsEventStatus_eConsumeNoDefault;+          }         }-        // The default action is simply to dispatch DOMActivate-        nsEventStatus status = nsEventStatus_eIgnore;-        // DOMActive event should be trusted since the activation is actually-        // occurred even if the cause is an untrusted click event.-        InternalUIEvent actEvent(true, eLegacyDOMActivate, mouseEvent);-        actEvent.mDetail = 1;--        rv = EventDispatcher::Dispatch(this, aVisitor.mPresContext, &actEvent,-                                       nullptr, &status);-        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {-          aVisitor.mEventStatus = nsEventStatus_eConsumeNoDefault;-        }+        DispatchChromeOnlyLinkClickEvent(aVisitor);       }+      break;+    }+    case eMouseAuxClick: {+      DispatchChromeOnlyLinkClickEvent(aVisitor);       break;     }     case eLegacyDOMActivate: {

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Event Handling Security Improvement] [dom/base/Element.cpp] [Lines 3068-3128]
   [Old Code]
   The old code handled mouse clicks without special handling for aux clicks or chrome-only events, and had a simpler condition check for modifier keys.

   [Fixed Code]
   The new code adds:
   - Support for eMouseAuxClick events
   - A new DispatchChromeOnlyLinkClickEvent function that creates a trusted XULCommandEvent
   - More secure event handling by:
     * Explicitly checking for modifier keys
     * Only allowing chrome dispatch for certain events
     * Maintaining trust chain from source events

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential XSS Prevention] [dom/base/Element.cpp] [Lines 3128-3169]
   [Old Code]
   The old code would process all left-click events the same way, regardless of modifier keys.

   [Fixed Code]
   The new code:
   - Inverts the modifier key check logic to be more explicit
   - Only dispatches DOMActivate for simple clicks (no modifiers)
   - Always dispatches chrome-only events for clicks with modifiers
   - Adds specific handling for aux clicks

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Event Trust Chain Security] [dom/base/Element.cpp] [Lines 3068-3100]
   [Old Code]
   No explicit handling of event trust propagation.

   [Fixed Code]
   The new DispatchChromeOnlyLinkClickEvent function:
   - Explicitly marks the new event as trusted
   - Notes that frontend code will check the source event's trusted property
   - Prevents acting on web-generated custom events
   - Sets mOnlyChromeDispatch flag

Note: While no specific named vulnerabilities are identified, these changes appear to improve security by:
1. Better isolating chrome-only event handling
2. More carefully managing event trust propagation
3. Adding explicit handling for different click types
4. Preventing potential misuse of modifier key combinations

The changes suggest defense-in-depth improvements rather than fixes for specific known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/platform/windows/font.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender/src/platform/windows/font.rs@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ use api::{FontInstanceFlags, FontKey, FontRenderMode, FontVariation}; use api::{ColorU, GlyphDimensions, NativeFontHandle}; use dwrote;-use crate::gamma_lut::ColorLut;+use crate::gamma_lut::{ColorLut, GammaLut}; use crate::glyph_rasterizer::{FontInstance, FontTransform, GlyphKey};+use crate::glyph_rasterizer::{GlyphFormat, GlyphRasterError, GlyphRasterResult, RasterizedGlyph};+use crate::glyph_rasterizer::apply_multistrike_bold; use crate::internal_types::{FastHashMap, FastHashSet, ResourceCacheError};-use crate::glyph_rasterizer::{GlyphFormat, GlyphRasterError, GlyphRasterResult, RasterizedGlyph};-use crate::gamma_lut::GammaLut; use std::borrow::Borrow; use std::collections::hash_map::Entry; use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};@@ -254,9 +254,8 @@                 let r = pixel[0];                 let g = pixel[1];                 let b = pixel[2];-                print!("({}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b,);-            }-            println!();+                debug!("({}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b,);+            }         }     }@@ -378,7 +377,7 @@         font: &FontInstance,         key: &GlyphKey,     ) -> Option<GlyphDimensions> {-        let (size, _, bitmaps, transform) = Self::get_glyph_parameters(font, key);+        let (size, x_scale, y_scale, bitmaps, transform) = Self::get_glyph_parameters(font, key);         let (_, _, bounds) = self.create_glyph_analysis(font, key, size, transform, bitmaps).ok()?;         let width = (bounds.right - bounds.left) as i32;@@ -389,6 +388,14 @@         if width == 0 || height == 0 {             return None;         }++        let (strike_scale, pixel_step) = if bitmaps {+            (y_scale, 1.0)+        } else {+            (x_scale, y_scale / x_scale)+        };+        let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(FontInstanceFlags::MULTISTRIKE_BOLD, strike_scale);+        let extra_width = extra_strikes as f64 * pixel_step;         let face = self.get_font_face(font);         face.get_design_glyph_metrics(&[key.index() as u16], false)@@ -402,9 +409,9 @@                 GlyphDimensions {                     left: bounds.left,                     top: -bounds.top,-                    width,+                    width: width + extra_width.ceil() as i32,                     height,-                    advance,+                    advance: advance + extra_width as f32,                 }             })     }@@ -419,14 +426,9 @@         render_mode: FontRenderMode,         bitmaps: bool,         subpixel_bgr: bool,-        texture_padding: bool,-    ) -> Vec<u8> {-        let (buffer_width, buffer_height, padding) = if texture_padding {-            (width + 2, height + 2, 1)-        } else {-            (width, height, 0)-        };-+        padding: usize,+    ) -> (Vec<u8>, bool) {+        let (buffer_width, buffer_height) = (width + padding * 2, height + padding * 2);         let buffer_length = buffer_width * buffer_height * 4;         let mut bgra_pixels: Vec<u8> = vec![0; buffer_length];@@ -446,6 +448,7 @@                         bgra_pixels[offset + 3] = alpha;                     }                 }+                (bgra_pixels, false)             }             (_, FontRenderMode::Subpixel, false) => {                 assert!(width * height * 3 == pixels.len());@@ -465,6 +468,7 @@                         bgra_pixels[offset + 3] = 0xff;                     }                 }+                (bgra_pixels, true)             }             _ => {                 assert!(width * height * 3 == pixels.len());@@ -482,9 +486,9 @@                         bgra_pixels[offset + 3] = alpha;                     }                 }-            }-        };-        bgra_pixels+                (bgra_pixels, false)+            }+        }     }     pub fn prepare_font(font: &mut FontInstance) {@@ -504,8 +508,9 @@         }     }-    fn get_glyph_parameters(font: &FontInstance, key: &GlyphKey) -> (f32, f64, bool, Option<dwrote::DWRITE_MATRIX>) {-        let (_, y_scale) = font.transform.compute_scale().unwrap_or((1.0, 1.0));+    fn get_glyph_parameters(font: &FontInstance, key: &GlyphKey)+                            -> (f32, f64, f64, bool, Option<dwrote::DWRITE_MATRIX>) {+        let (x_scale, y_scale) = font.transform.compute_scale().unwrap_or((1.0, 1.0));         let scaled_size = font.size.to_f64_px() * y_scale;         let bitmaps = is_bitmap_font(font);         let (mut shape, (mut x_offset, mut y_offset)) = if bitmaps {@@ -543,14 +548,14 @@         } else {             None         };-        (scaled_size as f32, y_scale, bitmaps, transform)+        (scaled_size as f32, x_scale, y_scale, bitmaps, transform)     }     pub fn rasterize_glyph(&mut self, font: &FontInstance, key: &GlyphKey) -> GlyphRasterResult {-        let (size, y_scale, bitmaps, transform) = Self::get_glyph_parameters(font, key);+        let (size, x_scale, y_scale, bitmaps, transform) = Self::get_glyph_parameters(font, key);         let (analysis, texture_type, bounds) = self.create_glyph_analysis(font, key, size, transform, bitmaps)                                                    .or(Err(GlyphRasterError::LoadFailed))?;-        let width = (bounds.right - bounds.left) as i32;+        let mut width = (bounds.right - bounds.left) as i32;         let height = (bounds.bottom - bounds.top) as i32;         // Alpha texture bounds can sometimes return an empty rect         // Such as for spaces@@ -559,10 +564,37 @@         }         let pixels = analysis.create_alpha_texture(texture_type, bounds).or(Err(GlyphRasterError::LoadFailed))?;-        let mut bgra_pixels = self.convert_to_bgra(&pixels, width as usize, height as usize,-                                                   texture_type, font.render_mode, bitmaps,-                                                   font.flags.contains(FontInstanceFlags::SUBPIXEL_BGR),-                                                   font.use_texture_padding());+        let padding = if font.use_texture_padding() { 1 } else { 0 };+        let (mut bgra_pixels, is_subpixel) = self.convert_to_bgra(+            &pixels,+            width as usize,+            height as usize,+            texture_type,+            font.render_mode,+            bitmaps,+            font.flags.contains(FontInstanceFlags::SUBPIXEL_BGR),+            padding as usize,+        );++        // Apply multistrike bold, if necessary, and replace the current pixels with it.+        let (strike_scale, pixel_step) = if bitmaps {+            (y_scale, 1.0)+        } else {+            (x_scale, y_scale / x_scale)+        };+        let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(FontInstanceFlags::MULTISTRIKE_BOLD, strike_scale);+        if extra_strikes > 0 {+            let (bold_pixels, bold_width) = apply_multistrike_bold(+                &bgra_pixels,+                (width + padding * 2) as usize,+                height as usize,+                is_subpixel,+                extra_strikes,+                pixel_step,+            );+            width = bold_width as i32 - padding * 2;+            bgra_pixels = bold_pixels;+        }         let FontInstancePlatformOptions { gamma, contrast, cleartype_level, .. } =             font.platform_options.unwrap_or_default();@@ -574,11 +606,10 @@                     gamma as f32 / 100.0,                     gamma as f32 / 100.0,                 ));-        if bitmaps || texture_type == dwrote::DWRITE_TEXTURE_ALIASED_1x1 ||-           font.render_mode != FontRenderMode::Subpixel {+        if is_subpixel {+            gamma_lut.preblend_scaled(&mut bgra_pixels, font.color, cleartype_level);+        } else {             gamma_lut.preblend(&mut bgra_pixels, font.color);-        } else {-            gamma_lut.preblend_scaled(&mut bgra_pixels, font.color, cleartype_level);         }         let format = if bitmaps {@@ -589,7 +620,6 @@             font.get_glyph_format()         };-        let padding = if font.use_texture_padding() { 1 } else { 0 };         Ok(RasterizedGlyph {             left: (bounds.left - padding) as f32,             top: (-bounds.top + padding) as f32,

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format. Here are the identified vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Information Leak Vulnerability [gfx/wr/webrender/src/platform/windows/font.rs] [Lines 254-258]
[Old Code]
                let r = pixel[0];
                let g = pixel[1];
                let b = pixel[2];
                print!("({}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b,);
            }
            println!();
[Fixed Code]
                let r = pixel[0];
                let g = pixel[1];
                let b = pixel[2];
                debug!("({}, {}, {}) ", r, g, b,);
            }

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Integer Overflow Vulnerability [gfx/wr/webrender/src/platform/windows/font.rs] [Lines 389-402]
[Old Code]
        let width = (bounds.right - bounds.left) as i32;
        let height = (bounds.bottom - bounds.top) as i32;
        // Alpha texture bounds can sometimes return an empty rect
        // Such as for spaces
        if width == 0 || height == 0 {
            return None;
        }
[Fixed Code]
        let width = (bounds.right - bounds.left) as i32;
        let height = (bounds.bottom - bounds.top) as i32;
        // Alpha texture bounds can sometimes return an empty rect
        // Such as for spaces
        if width == 0 || height == 0 {
            return None;
        }

        let (strike_scale, pixel_step) = if bitmaps {
            (y_scale, 1.0)
        } else {
            (x_scale, y_scale / x_scale)
        };
        let extra_strikes = font.get_extra_strikes(FontInstanceFlags::MULTISTRIKE_BOLD, strike_scale);
        let extra_width = extra_strikes as f64 * pixel_step;

The first vulnerability is clear - it fixes an information leak by changing print! to debug! statements. The second potential issue is less clear - while the code adds calculations for extra width, it's not immediately obvious if this could lead to integer overflow, but it's worth noting the change in how width calculations are handled.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.unaffected.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.unaffected.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable usage in the assertions. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 34-35]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/fronts/walker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/fronts/walker.js@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ "use strict";+const Services = require("Services"); const {   FrontClassWithSpec,   types,@@ -338,6 +339,27 @@       return super.children(node, options);     }     const target = await node.connectToFrame();++    // We had several issues in the past where `connectToFrame` was returning the same+    // target as the owner document one, which led to the inspector being broken.+    // Ultimately, we shouldn't get to this point (fix should happen in connectToFrame or+    // on the server, e.g. for Bug 1752342), but at least this will serve as a safe guard+    // so we don't freeze/crash the inspector.+    if (+      target == this.targetFront &&+      Services.prefs.getBoolPref(+        "devtools.testing.bypass-walker-children-iframe-guard",+        false+      ) !== true+    ) {+      console.warn("connectToFrame returned an unexpected target");+      return {+        nodes: [],+        hasFirst: true,+        hasLast: true,+      };+    }+     const walker = (await target.getFront("inspector")).walker;     // Finally retrieve the NodeFront of the remote frame's document

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Frame Connection Handling [File] devtools/client/fronts/walker.js [Lines 338-339, added 340-359]
[Old Code]
const target = await node.connectToFrame();
[Fixed Code]
const target = await node.connectToFrame();

// We had several issues in the past where `connectToFrame` was returning the same
// target as the owner document one, which led to the inspector being broken.
// Ultimately, we shouldn't get to this point (fix should happen in connectToFrame or
// on the server, e.g. for Bug 1752342), but at least this will serve as a safe guard
// so we don't freeze/crash the inspector.
if (
  target == this.targetFront &&
  Services.prefs.getBoolPref(
    "devtools.testing.bypass-walker-children-iframe-guard",
    false
  ) !== true
) {
  console.warn("connectToFrame returned an unexpected target");
  return {
    nodes: [],
    hasFirst: true,
    hasLast: true,
  };
}

Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to improper frame connection handling that could lead to inspector freezing/crashing. The fix adds a safeguard to handle cases where connectToFrame() returns the same target as the owner document, which was causing issues. The comment references Bug 1752342, suggesting this was a known security/reliability issue. The fix includes both a direct check and a pref-based bypass option for testing purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/components/request-details/NetworkDetailsBar.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/components/request-details/NetworkDetailsBar.js@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ "use strict"; const { createFactory } = require("devtools/client/shared/vendor/react");+const Services = require("Services"); const PropTypes = require("devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-prop-types"); const dom = require("devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom-factories"); const {@@ -48,10 +49,18 @@     return null;   }+  const newEditAndResendPref = Services.prefs.getBoolPref(+    "devtools.netmonitor.features.newEditAndResend"+  );+   return div(     { className: "network-details-bar" },-    !request.isCustom-      ? TabboxPanel({+    request.isCustom && !newEditAndResendPref+      ? CustomRequestPanel({+          connector,+          request,+        })+      : TabboxPanel({           activeTabId,           cloneSelectedRequest,           connector,@@ -62,10 +71,6 @@           toggleNetworkDetails,           openNetworkDetails,           targetSearchResult,-        })-      : CustomRequestPanel({-          connector,-          request,         })   ); }

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Feature Flag Security] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/components/request-details/NetworkDetailsBar.js] [Lines 48-71]
   [Old Code]
   return div(
     { className: "network-details-bar" },
     !request.isCustom
       ? TabboxPanel({
           activeTabId,
           cloneSelectedRequest,
           connector,
           request,
           sourceMapURLService,
           toggleNetworkDetails,
           openNetworkDetails,
           targetSearchResult,
         })
       : CustomRequestPanel({
           connector,
           request,
         })
   );

   [Fixed Code]
   const newEditAndResendPref = Services.prefs.getBoolPref(
     "devtools.netmonitor.features.newEditAndResend"
   );

   return div(
     { className: "network-details-bar" },
     request.isCustom && !newEditAndResendPref
       ? CustomRequestPanel({
           connector,
           request,
         })
       : TabboxPanel({
           activeTabId,
           cloneSelectedRequest,
           connector,
           request,
           sourceMapURLService,
           toggleNetworkDetails,
           openNetworkDetails,
           targetSearchResult,
         })
   );

Additional Details:
- The change introduces a feature flag check for "devtools.netmonitor.features.newEditAndResend"
- The logic for displaying panels has been reversed and now depends on both request.isCustom and the feature flag
- While this doesn't appear to fix a specific vulnerability, it could be related to security if the feature flag controls access to sensitive functionality
- The change might be preparing for a security-related feature rollout, but without more context about what "newEditAndResend" does, I can't be certain

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.pattern.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.pattern.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.pattern.basic.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
1. The change appears to be purely a variable name refactoring (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`).
2. No security-related changes are evident in this diff.
3. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.
4. The XMLHttpRequest usage shown in the diff doesn't appear to have security implications as it's just part of the test setup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.3.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(50, 25, 50, 0, 2*Math.PI + 1e-4, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming Refactoring [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.twopie.3.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 23]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications to this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name is different. No security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/wr/webrender_api/src/display_list.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/wr/webrender_api/src/display_list.rs@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ // local imports use crate::display_item as di; use crate::display_item_cache::*;-use crate::{PipelineId, PropertyBinding};+use crate::{APZScrollGeneration, HasScrollLinkedEffect, PipelineId, PropertyBinding}; use crate::gradient_builder::GradientBuilder; use crate::color::ColorF; use crate::font::{FontInstanceKey, GlyphInstance, GlyphOptions};@@ -1707,6 +1707,7 @@                 kind: di::ReferenceFrameKind::Transform {                     is_2d_scale_translation: false,                     should_snap: false,+                    paired_with_perspective: false,                 },                 id,                 key,@@ -1882,6 +1883,8 @@         content_rect: LayoutRect,         frame_rect: LayoutRect,         external_scroll_offset: LayoutVector2D,+        scroll_offset_generation: APZScrollGeneration,+        has_scroll_linked_effect: HasScrollLinkedEffect,         key: di::SpatialTreeItemKey,     ) -> di::SpatialId {         let scroll_frame_id = self.generate_spatial_index();@@ -1901,6 +1904,8 @@             scroll_frame_id,             external_id,             external_scroll_offset,+            scroll_offset_generation,+            has_scroll_linked_effect,             key,         });

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Scroll-Linked Effect Vulnerability] [gfx/wr/webrender_api/src/display_list.rs] [Lines 1882-1904]
[Old Code]
        content_rect: LayoutRect,
        frame_rect: LayoutRect,
        external_scroll_offset: LayoutVector2D,
        key: di::SpatialTreeItemKey,
[Fixed Code]
        content_rect: LayoutRect,
        frame_rect: LayoutRect,
        external_scroll_offset: LayoutVector2D,
        scroll_offset_generation: APZScrollGeneration,
        has_scroll_linked_effect: HasScrollLinkedEffect,
        key: di::SpatialTreeItemKey,

Additional Details:
- The diff adds two new parameters related to scrolling behavior: `scroll_offset_generation` and `has_scroll_linked_effect`
- This suggests a potential fix for scroll-related issues, possibly addressing scroll-linked effects that could cause security or performance problems
- Without more context, I can't confirm if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving functionality

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Reference Frame Vulnerability] [gfx/wr/webrender_api/src/display_list.rs] [Lines 1707-1711]
[Old Code]
                kind: di::ReferenceFrameKind::Transform {
                    is_2d_scale_translation: false,
                    should_snap: false,
                },
[Fixed Code]
                kind: di::ReferenceFrameKind::Transform {
                    is_2d_scale_translation: false,
                    should_snap: false,
                    paired_with_perspective: false,
                },

Additional Details:
- The diff adds a new field `paired_with_perspective` to the transform reference frame
- This could potentially relate to security issues around perspective transforms or reference frame handling
- Without more context about why this was added, I can't confirm if it was fixing a specific vulnerability

Note: Both changes appear to be adding new functionality rather than directly patching security vulnerabilities, but they could be related to preventing potential security issues in the rendering pipeline.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.underflow.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.underflow.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); for (var i = 0; i < 16; ++i)     ctx.restore();

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Stack Underflow] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.underflow.worker.js] [Lines 13-16]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

for (var i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
    ctx.restore();
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

for (var i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
    ctx.restore();

Additional Details:
1. The main change is just a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`, which doesn't appear to be security-related.
2. The test case appears to be testing canvas state stack underflow by calling `restore()` more times than `save()` was called.
3. While this tests for a potential vulnerability (stack underflow), the diff itself doesn't show a security fix - it's just a variable rename in a test file.
4. The vulnerability being tested might be "Canvas State Stack Underflow", but this is just a test case rather than an actual fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-percent-008.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/transform-percent-008.html@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@     transformed element's border box.  This test adds a thicker border plus     margin and padding to make any discrepancies more evident.">     <link rel="match" href="transform-percent-ref.html">-    <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=0-99;totalPixels=0-416">+    <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=0-102;totalPixels=0-416">     <link rel="mismatch" href="transform-percent-notref.html">     <style>       div {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
    Old Code: <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=0-99;totalPixels=0-416">
    Fixed Code: <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=0-102;totalPixels=0-416">

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a test case modification where the acceptable difference threshold (maxDifference) was increased from 0-99 to 0-102
- The change relates to visual rendering tolerance in test cases, not security functionality
- No security-related vulnerabilities (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this diff
- The modification is likely related to adjusting test parameters to account for rendering differences between browser versions

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/webauthn/tests/browser/browser_webauthn_prompts.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/webauthn/tests/browser/browser_webauthn_prompts.js@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@   // Request a new credential and wait for the prompt.   let active = true;-  let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab, "indirect", {})+  let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab, "none", {})     .then(arrivingHereIsBad)     .catch(expectAbortError)     .then(() => (active = false));@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@   // Request a new credential and wait for the prompt.   let active = true;-  let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab_one, "indirect", {})+  let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab_one, "none", {})     .then(arrivingHereIsBad)     .catch(expectAbortError)     .then(() => (active = false));@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@   // Request a new credential and wait for the prompt.   let active = true;-  let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab, "indirect", {})+  let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab, "none", {})     .then(arrivingHereIsBad)     .catch(expectAbortError)     .then(() => (active = false));

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    WebAuthn Attestation Conveyance Preference Change [dom/webauthn/tests/browser/browser_webauthn_prompts.js] [Lines 68, 133, 179]
    Old Code: `let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab, "indirect", {})`
    Fixed Code: `let request = promiseWebAuthnMakeCredential(tab, "none", {})`

Additional Details:
- The change modifies the attestation conveyance preference from "indirect" to "none" in WebAuthn credential creation tests
- "indirect" attestation could potentially leak device information, while "none" provides better privacy
- This appears to be a privacy improvement rather than a direct security vulnerability fix
- The change is consistent across multiple test cases in the file
- Without more context about the specific WebAuthn implementation, it's hard to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving test cases

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-out.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-out.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,32, "50,25", "0,255,255,32", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,32, "50,25", "0,255,255,32", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.destination-out.html [Lines 17-18, 36]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,32, "50,25", "0,255,255,32", 5);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,32, "50,25", "0,255,255,32", 5);

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are evident in this diff
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name was changed for consistency or clarity
- No CVEs or known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionAPIRequestForwarder.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionAPIRequestForwarder.cpp@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/ClonedErrorHolderBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ExtensionBrowserBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/FunctionBinding.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "mozilla/dom/SerializedStackHolder.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerInfo.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerManager.h"

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Header Inclusion Change] [ExtensionAPIRequestForwarder.cpp] [Lines 14]
[Old Code]
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
[Fixed Code]
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h"

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a header file inclusion change from WorkerPrivate.h to WorkerScope.h
- Without more context about how these headers are used in the file, it's difficult to determine if this fixes a specific security vulnerability
- The change might be related to better encapsulation or updated worker APIs, but doesn't clearly indicate a security fix
- The modification could be part of architectural improvements rather than a direct security patch

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/themes/osx/global/dirListing/dirListing.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/themes/osx/global/dirListing/dirListing.css@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@   color: -moz-dialogtext;   font: message-box;   padding-inline: 2em;+  color-scheme: light dark; } body {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this CSS diff. The change only adds a `color-scheme` property to support light/dark mode.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[File] toolkit/themes/osx/global/dirListing/dirListing.css [Lines] 7
[Old Code]
  color: -moz-dialogtext;
  font: message-box;
  padding-inline: 2em;
[Fixed Code]
  color: -moz-dialogtext;
  font: message-box;
  padding-inline: 2em;
  color-scheme: light dark;

The change is purely a visual/UX improvement to support dark mode and doesn't address any security vulnerability. CSS changes rarely involve security fixes unless they're related to clickjacking protections or similar issues, which isn't the case here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.