--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.h@@ -214,7 +214,16 @@   already_AddRefed<mozilla::psm::PVerifySSLServerCertParent>   AllocPVerifySSLServerCertParent(-      const ByteArray& aServerCert, const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain,+      const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,+      const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,+      const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,+      const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,+      const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,+      const uint32_t& aProviderFlags,+      const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) override;++  mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvPVerifySSLServerCertConstructor(+      PVerifySSLServerCertParent* aActor, nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,       const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,       const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,       const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,@@ -223,16 +232,6 @@       const uint32_t& aProviderFlags,       const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) override;-  mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvPVerifySSLServerCertConstructor(-      PVerifySSLServerCertParent* aActor, const ByteArray& aServerCert,-      nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,-      const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,-      const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,-      const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,-      const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,-      const uint32_t& aProviderFlags,-      const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) override;-   PBroadcastChannelParent* AllocPBroadcastChannelParent(       const PrincipalInfo& aPrincipalInfo, const nsCString& aOrigin,       const nsString& aChannel) override;

I'll analyze the provided code diff following the specified format. The changes appear to be related to SSL certificate verification in Firefox's IPC (Inter-Process Communication) implementation.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Parameter Reordering/Validation Issue] [ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.h] [Lines 214-232]
    Old Code:
    ```
    AllocPVerifySSLServerCertParent(
        const ByteArray& aServerCert, const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain,
        const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,
        const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,
        const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,
        const uint32_t& aProviderFlags,
        const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) override;
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```
    AllocPVerifySSLServerCertParent(
        const nsTArray<ByteArray>& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,
        const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,
        const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,
        const uint32_t& aProviderFlags,
        const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) override;
    ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Parameter Validation Issue] [ipc/glue/BackgroundParentImpl.h] [Lines 223-232]
    Old Code:
    ```
    RecvPVerifySSLServerCertConstructor(
        PVerifySSLServerCertParent* aActor, const ByteArray& aServerCert,
        nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain, const nsCString& aHostName,
        const int32_t& aPort, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,
        const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,
        const uint32_t& aProviderFlags,
        const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) override;
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```
    RecvPVerifySSLServerCertConstructor(
        PVerifySSLServerCertParent* aActor, nsTArray<ByteArray>&& aPeerCertChain,
        const nsCString& aHostName, const int32_t& aPort,
        const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aStapledOCSPResponse,
        const Maybe<ByteArray>& aSctsFromTLSExtension,
        const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfoArg>& aDcInfo,
        const uint32_t& aProviderFlags,
        const uint32_t& aCertVerifierFlags) override;
    ```

The main changes involve:
1. Removing the `aServerCert` parameter from both functions
2. Reordering parameters in `AllocPVerifySSLServerCertParent`
3. Changing how the certificate chain is passed in `RecvPVerifySSLServerCertConstructor`

While I can't identify a specific named vulnerability from these changes, they appear to be security-related modifications to the SSL certificate verification process. The removal of the server certificate parameter suggests a potential change in how certificate verification is handled, possibly to prevent some form of certificate spoofing or validation bypass. However, without more context about the security issue being addressed, I can't be certain about the exact vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.toStringFunctionCallback.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.toStringFunctionCallback.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = { toString: function() { return "#008000"; } }; _assertSame(ctx.fillStyle, "#008000", "ctx.fillStyle", "\"#008000\"");

Let me analyze the provided code diff for potential security issues.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.toStringFunctionCallback.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, simply renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security-relevant behavior is modified in this change.

No other vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/MediaEnginePrefs.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/MediaEnginePrefs.h@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@         mAgc2Forced(false),         mAgc(0),         mNoise(0),-        mFakeDeviceChangeEventOn(false),         mChannels(0) {}   int32_t mWidth;@@ -55,7 +54,6 @@   bool mAgc2Forced;   int32_t mAgc;   int32_t mNoise;-  bool mFakeDeviceChangeEventOn;   int32_t mChannels;   bool operator==(const MediaEnginePrefs& aRhs) {

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Fake Device Event Vulnerability] [dom/media/webrtc/MediaEnginePrefs.h] [Lines 38,55]
   [Old Code]
   mFakeDeviceChangeEventOn(false),
   ...
   bool mFakeDeviceChangeEventOn;
   [Fixed Code]
   (Removed entirely)

Additional Details:
- The removal of `mFakeDeviceChangeEventOn` suggests it might have been related to some device event simulation functionality
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a cleanup
- The name suggests it could have been used to simulate device change events, which might have security implications if abused
- Since this is a boolean flag being removed, it might have been part of testing/debugging code that was deemed unnecessary or potentially risky

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/ipc/ContentCompositorBridgeParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/ipc/ContentCompositorBridgeParent.h@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ #include "mozilla/layers/CompositorThread.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"-namespace mozilla {-namespace webgpu {-class PWebGPUParent;-}  // namespace webgpu--namespace layers {+namespace mozilla::layers { class CompositorOptions;@@ -83,6 +78,8 @@       const uint32_t& aStartIndex, nsTArray<float>* intervals) override {     return IPC_OK();   }++  mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvNotifyMemoryPressure() override;   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvCheckContentOnlyTDR(       const uint32_t& sequenceNum, bool* isContentOnlyTDR) override;@@ -167,9 +164,6 @@       const WindowKind& aWindowKind) override;   bool DeallocPWebRenderBridgeParent(PWebRenderBridgeParent* aActor) override;-  webgpu::PWebGPUParent* AllocPWebGPUParent() override;-  bool DeallocPWebGPUParent(webgpu::PWebGPUParent* aActor) override;-   void ObserveLayersUpdate(LayersId aLayersId, LayersObserverEpoch aEpoch,                            bool aActive) override;@@ -194,7 +188,6 @@   RefPtr<CanvasTranslator> mCanvasTranslator; };-}  // namespace layers-}  // namespace mozilla+}  // namespace mozilla::layers #endif  // mozilla_layers_ContentCompositorBridgeParent_h

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily namespace and code organization changes, along with the removal of WebGPU-related code. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Namespace reorganization and WebGPU code removal [gfx/layers/ipc/ContentCompositorBridgeParent.h] [Lines 12-17, 167-168, 194]
   Old Code:
   ```cpp
   namespace mozilla {
   namespace webgpu {
   class PWebGPUParent;
   }  // namespace webgpu
   
   namespace layers {
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```cpp
   namespace mozilla::layers {
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   WebGPU parent allocation removal [gfx/layers/ipc/ContentCompositorBridgeParent.h] [Lines 167-168]
   Old Code:
   ```cpp
   webgpu::PWebGPUParent* AllocPWebGPUParent() override;
   bool DeallocPWebGPUParent(webgpu::PWebGPUParent* aActor) override;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   (removed)

The changes appear to be:
1. Simplifying namespace declarations using C++17 nested namespace syntax
2. Removing WebGPU-related code (likely moved elsewhere)
3. Adding a new RecvNotifyMemoryPressure() method

None of these changes appear to be security-related fixes, but rather code reorganization and feature adjustments. There are no obvious security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-4.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120.0, 100.0%, 50.0%, 20%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-4.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120.0, 100.0%, 50.0%, 20%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120.0, 100.0%, 50.0%, 20%)';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/platforms/wmf/MFTEncoder.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/platforms/wmf/MFTEncoder.cpp@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "MFTEncoder.h" #include "mozilla/Logging.h"+#include "mozilla/WindowsProcessMitigations.h" #include "mozilla/mscom/Utils.h" // Missing from MinGW.@@ -86,6 +87,13 @@ } static UINT32 EnumHW(const GUID& aSubtype, IMFActivate**& aActivates) {+  if (IsWin32kLockedDown()) {+    // Some HW encoders use system calls and crash when locked down.+    // TODO: move HW encoding to RDD.+    MFT_ENC_SLOGD("Don't use HW encoder when win32k locked down.");+    return 0;+  }+   UINT32 num = 0;   MFT_REGISTER_TYPE_INFO inType = {.guidMajorType = MFMediaType_Video,                                    .guidSubtype = MFVideoFormat_NV12};

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Win32k Lockdown Bypass Vulnerability [dom/media/platforms/wmf/MFTEncoder.cpp] [Lines 86-93]
[Old Code]
static UINT32 EnumHW(const GUID& aSubtype, IMFActivate**& aActivates) {
  UINT32 num = 0;
  MFT_REGISTER_TYPE_INFO inType = {.guidMajorType = MFMediaType_Video,
                                   .guidSubtype = MFVideoFormat_NV12};
[Fixed Code]
static UINT32 EnumHW(const GUID& aSubtype, IMFActivate**& aActivates) {
  if (IsWin32kLockedDown()) {
    // Some HW encoders use system calls and crash when locked down.
    // TODO: move HW encoding to RDD.
    MFT_ENC_SLOGD("Don't use HW encoder when win32k locked down.");
    return 0;
  }

  UINT32 num = 0;
  MFT_REGISTER_TYPE_INFO inType = {.guidMajorType = MFMediaType_Video,
                                   .guidSubtype = MFVideoFormat_NV12};

Additional Details:
The fix addresses a security issue where hardware encoders could potentially bypass Win32k lockdown restrictions. The vulnerability occurs when hardware encoders make system calls that could crash the system when Win32k is locked down. The fix adds a check for Win32k lockdown status before attempting to use hardware encoders, preventing potential system instability or security bypass. The comment suggests this is a temporary fix until hardware encoding can be moved to the RDD (Remote Data Decoder) process.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/adapter.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/adapter.rs@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@         let mut features = wgt::Features::empty()             | wgt::Features::TEXTURE_ADAPTER_SPECIFIC_FORMAT_FEATURES-            | wgt::Features::CLEAR_COMMANDS;+            | wgt::Features::CLEAR_TEXTURE;         features.set(             wgt::Features::ADDRESS_MODE_CLAMP_TO_BORDER,             extensions.contains("GL_EXT_texture_border_clamp"),@@ -442,7 +442,8 @@         let r = renderer.to_lowercase();         // Check for Mesa sRGB clear bug. See         // [`super::PrivateCapabilities::MESA_I915_SRGB_SHADER_CLEAR`].-        if r.contains("mesa")+        if context.is_owned()+            && r.contains("mesa")             && r.contains("intel")             && r.split(&[' ', '(', ')'][..])                 .any(|substr| substr.len() == 3 && substr.chars().nth(2) == Some('l'))@@ -575,9 +576,11 @@     ) -> crate::TextureFormatCapabilities {         use crate::TextureFormatCapabilities as Tfc;         use wgt::TextureFormat as Tf;+         // The storage types are sprinkled based on section         // "TEXTURE IMAGE LOADS AND STORES" of GLES-3.2 spec.-        let unfiltered_color = Tfc::SAMPLED | Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT;+        let unfiltered_color =+            Tfc::SAMPLED | Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT | Tfc::MULTISAMPLE | Tfc::MULTISAMPLE_RESOLVE;         let filtered_color = unfiltered_color | Tfc::SAMPLED_LINEAR | Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT_BLEND;         match format {             Tf::R8Unorm | Tf::R8Snorm => filtered_color,

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format.

1. First change:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Feature Flag Change [File] [Lines 286-287]
    [Old Code]
    let mut features = wgt::Features::empty()
        | wgt::Features::TEXTURE_ADAPTER_SPECIFIC_FORMAT_FEATURES
        | wgt::Features::CLEAR_COMMANDS;
    [Fixed Code]
    let mut features = wgt::Features::empty()
        | wgt::TEXTURE_ADAPTER_SPECIFIC_FORMAT_FEATURES
        | wgt::Features::CLEAR_TEXTURE;

    Note: This appears to be a feature flag change from CLEAR_COMMANDS to CLEAR_TEXTURE, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just a functional change.

2. Second change:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Missing Context Ownership Check [File] [Lines 442-443]
    [Old Code]
    if r.contains("mesa")
        && r.contains("intel")
    [Fixed Code]
    if context.is_owned()
        && r.contains("mesa")
        && r.contains("intel")

    Note: This adds a context ownership check before checking for the Mesa sRGB clear bug. This could potentially prevent some security issues related to unvalidated context access.

3. Third change:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Texture Format Capabilities Expansion [File] [Lines 575-576]
    [Old Code]
    let unfiltered_color = Tfc::SAMPLED | Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT;
    [Fixed Code]
    let unfiltered_color =
        Tfc::SAMPLED | Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT | Tfc::MULTISAMPLE | Tfc::MULTISAMPLE_RESOLVE;

    Note: This expands the texture format capabilities, but it's unclear if this is fixing a security issue or just adding functionality.

The most significant potential security fix appears to be the addition of the context ownership check in the second change, which could prevent unauthorized access or operations on unowned contexts.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.wrongtype.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.wrongtype.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.drawImage(undefined, 0, 0); }); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.drawImage(0, 0, 0); });

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.wrongtype.worker.js] [Lines 14-15]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes were identified
- The test continues to check for proper type checking in drawImage calls
- The functionality remains identical, only the variable name was changed for clarity/consistency

No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff. The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/initial.reset.transform.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/initial.reset.transform.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 100;+canvas.width = 100; ctx.scale(0.1, 0.1);-offscreenCanvas.width = 100;+canvas.width = 100; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and not related to security issues. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

offscreenCanvas.width = 100;
ctx.scale(0.1, 0.1);
offscreenCanvas.width = 100;
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

canvas.width = 100;
ctx.scale(0.1, 0.1);
canvas.width = 100;
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the code, which doesn't appear to address any security concerns. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/highlight-z-index-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/highlight-z-index-002.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-painting">   <link rel="match" href="highlight-z-index-002-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta name="assert" content="This test checks that the ::selection pseudo-element must be drawn below an absolutely positioned element. In this test, such absolutely positioned element is a preceding sibling element.">   <style>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 8]
   [Old Code]
   <meta content="" name="flags">
   [Fixed Code]
   (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
- There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here. The change seems to be removing an unused or unnecessary HTML meta tag.
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either the old or new code.
- The change is part of a test file update, likely improving test clarity or removing obsolete elements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.basic.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.clip.basic.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff content, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-relevant modifications.

Analysis for each change:

1. Variable renaming (first change):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Variable renaming (second change):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Line 27]
    [Old Code]
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security implications in these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.transparent.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.transparent.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d');@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#f00'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, -50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.canvas.transparent.1.html] [Lines 17-18, 27]  
   Old Code:  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```  
   Additional Details: The changes appear to be variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) for consistency or clarity, not security-related fixes.

The diff shows only variable name changes without any security implications. No vulnerabilities were identified or fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_encrypted_client_hello.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_encrypted_client_hello.js@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ // Public name: ech-public.example.com const ECH_CONFIG_FIXED =-  "AEv+CgBHTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAwBkABZlY2gtcHVibGljLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAA=";+  "AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAA2QWZWNoLXB1YmxpYy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA"; // Public name: ech-public.example.com, Unsupported AEAD to prompt retry_configs from a trusted host. const ECH_CONFIG_TRUSTED_RETRY =-  "AEv+CgBHTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAQBkABZlY2gtcHVibGljLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAA=";+  "AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAMAA2QWZWNoLXB1YmxpYy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA"; // Public name: selfsigned.example.com. Unsupported AEAD to prompt retry_configs from an untrusted host. const ECH_CONFIG_UNTRUSTED_RETRY =-  "AEv+CgBHTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAQBkABZzZWxmc2lnbmVkLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAA=";+  "AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAMAA2QWc2VsZnNpZ25lZC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA"; function shouldBeAcceptedEch(aTransportSecurityInfo) {   Assert.ok(

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential ECH Configuration Vulnerability] [security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_encrypted_client_hello.js] [Lines 12-24]
[Old Code]
const ECH_CONFIG_FIXED =
  "AEv+CgBHTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAwBkABZlY2gtcHVibGljLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAA=";
const ECH_CONFIG_TRUSTED_RETRY =
  "AEv+CgBHTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAQBkABZlY2gtcHVibGljLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAA=";
const ECH_CONFIG_UNTRUSTED_RETRY =
  "AEv+CgBHTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAQBkABZzZWxmc2lnbmVkLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAAA=";

[Fixed Code]
const ECH_CONFIG_FIXED =
  "AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAA2QWZWNoLXB1YmxpYy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA";
const ECH_CONFIG_TRUSTED_RETRY =
  "AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAMAA2QWZWNoLXB1YmxpYy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA";
const ECH_CONFIG_UNTRUSTED_RETRY =
  "AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAMAA2QWc2VsZnNpZ25lZC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA";

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be updates to ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) configuration strings
- The format has changed from "AEv+CgBHTQ" to "AEn+DQBFTQ"
- The encoded strings now use "2QW" instead of "kAB" for the domain name encoding
- This is likely related to ECH specification updates rather than a direct security fix
- Without knowing the exact ECH specification details, I can't be certain if this fixes a vulnerability or just updates to a new format

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/ios_surface.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/ios_surface.rs@@ -1,29 +1,23 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk; use crate::RawPtr;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct IOSSurface {     handle: vk::Instance,-    ios_surface_fn: vk::MvkIosSurfaceFn,+    fp: vk::MvkIosSurfaceFn, } impl IOSSurface {-    pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {-        let surface_fn = vk::MvkIosSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+    pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+        let handle = instance.handle();+        let fp = vk::MvkIosSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: instance.handle(),-            ios_surface_fn: surface_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::MvkIosSurfaceFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCreateIOSSurfaceMVK.html>"]@@ -33,7 +27,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::SurfaceKHR> {         let mut surface = mem::zeroed();-        self.ios_surface_fn+        self.fp             .create_ios_surface_mvk(                 self.handle,                 create_info,@@ -43,8 +37,12 @@             .result_with_success(surface)     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::MvkIosSurfaceFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::MvkIosSurfaceFn {-        &self.ios_surface_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily structural/refactoring changes rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis:

1. First potential change to examine:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability found, refactoring change] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/ios_surface.rs] [Lines 1-43]
    [Old Code: Used EntryCustom<L> and ios_surface_fn naming]
    [Fixed Code: Uses Entry and fp naming]

2. Second change to examine:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability found, function reordering] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/ios_surface.rs] [Lines 16-20,43-47]
    [Old Code: name() function was between new() and create_ios_surface_mvk()]
    [Fixed Code: name() function moved after create_ios_surface_mvk()]

The changes appear to be:
1. Changing from EntryCustom<L> to Entry (generic parameter removed)
2. Renaming ios_surface_fn to fp (likely just a naming convention change)
3. Reordering of functions (no functional impact)
4. Simplification of the new() function implementation

None of these changes appear to address security vulnerabilities - they seem to be code quality/refactoring improvements. The unsafe block remains the same (loading Vulkan functions via get_instance_proc_addr), but this is a necessary unsafe operation in Vulkan bindings.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/constants.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/constants.rs@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ pub const MAX_EXTENSION_NAME_SIZE: usize = 256; pub const MAX_DESCRIPTION_SIZE: usize = 256; pub const MAX_MEMORY_TYPES: usize = 32;+#[doc = "The maximum number of unique memory heaps, each of which supporting 1 or more memory types"] pub const MAX_MEMORY_HEAPS: usize = 16; pub const LOD_CLAMP_NONE: f32 = 1000.00; pub const REMAINING_MIP_LEVELS: u32 = !0;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No Vulnerability Found [third_party/rust/ash/src/vk/constants.rs] [Lines 5-6]
    [Old Code]
    pub const MAX_MEMORY_HEAPS: usize = 16;
    [Fixed Code]
    #[doc = "The maximum number of unique memory heaps, each of which supporting 1 or more memory types"]
    pub const MAX_MEMORY_HEAPS: usize = 16;

Analysis:
- The change only adds a documentation comment (doc attribute) to the constant
- No functional changes were made to the code
- No security-related modifications were implemented
- The change appears to be purely for documentation purposes

This appears to be a documentation improvement rather than a security fix. The constant value remains the same, and no security-related functionality was modified.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/debug_marker.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/debug_marker.rs@@ -6,30 +6,27 @@ #[derive(Clone)] pub struct DebugMarker {-    debug_marker_fn: vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn,+    handle: vk::Device,+    fp: vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn, } impl DebugMarker {     pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {-        let debug_marker_fn = vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+        let handle = device.handle();+        let fp = vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self { debug_marker_fn }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkDebugMarkerSetObjectNameEXT.html>"]     pub unsafe fn debug_marker_set_object_name(         &self,-        device: vk::Device,         name_info: &vk::DebugMarkerObjectNameInfoEXT,     ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.debug_marker_fn-            .debug_marker_set_object_name_ext(device, name_info)-            .into()+        self.fp+            .debug_marker_set_object_name_ext(self.handle, name_info)+            .result()     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCmdDebugMarkerBeginEXT.html>"]@@ -38,14 +35,13 @@         command_buffer: vk::CommandBuffer,         marker_info: &vk::DebugMarkerMarkerInfoEXT,     ) {-        self.debug_marker_fn+        self.fp             .cmd_debug_marker_begin_ext(command_buffer, marker_info);     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCmdDebugMarkerEndEXT.html>"]     pub unsafe fn cmd_debug_marker_end(&self, command_buffer: vk::CommandBuffer) {-        self.debug_marker_fn-            .cmd_debug_marker_end_ext(command_buffer);+        self.fp.cmd_debug_marker_end_ext(command_buffer);     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCmdDebugMarkerInsertEXT.html>"]@@ -54,11 +50,19 @@         command_buffer: vk::CommandBuffer,         marker_info: &vk::DebugMarkerMarkerInfoEXT,     ) {-        self.debug_marker_fn+        self.fp             .cmd_debug_marker_insert_ext(command_buffer, marker_info);     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn {-        &self.debug_marker_fn+        &self.fp+    }++    pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device {+        self.handle     } }

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Device Handle Mismatch [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/debug_marker.rs] [Lines 6-30]
   [Old Code]
   pub struct DebugMarker {
       debug_marker_fn: vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn,
   }
   ...
   pub unsafe fn debug_marker_set_object_name(
       &self,
       device: vk::Device,
       name_info: &vk::DebugMarkerObjectNameInfoEXT,
   ) -> VkResult<()> {
       self.debug_marker_fn
           .debug_marker_set_object_name_ext(device, name_info)
           .into()
   }

   [Fixed Code]
   pub struct DebugMarker {
       handle: vk::Device,
       fp: vk::ExtDebugMarkerFn,
   }
   ...
   pub unsafe fn debug_marker_set_object_name(
       &self,
       name_info: &vk::DebugMarkerObjectNameInfoEXT,
   ) -> VkResult<()> {
       self.fp
           .debug_marker_set_object_name_ext(self.handle, name_info)
           .result()
   }

   Additional Details: The change stores the device handle in the struct and uses it consistently, which might prevent potential device handle mismatches, but it's unclear if this was an actual security issue.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Error Handling Improvement [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/debug_marker.rs] [Lines 20-22]
   [Old Code]
   .debug_marker_set_object_name_ext(device, name_info)
   .into()

   [Fixed Code]
   .debug_marker_set_object_name_ext(self.handle, name_info)
   .result()

   Additional Details: The change from `into()` to `result()` might indicate better error handling, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security issue or just improving code quality.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff, but there are some changes that might relate to potential security improvements. The main changes involve:
1. Storing the device handle in the struct for consistent use
2. Changing error handling from `into()` to `result()`
3. Reorganizing the struct fields and methods

These appear to be more about code organization and safety rather than fixing specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120, 200%, 50%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming). Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.hsl-clamp-1.worker.js
[Lines] 13-14, 20
[Old Code] 
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Using the new variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No functional or security-related changes were made

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-num.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-num.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0,255,0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. There are no changes to the actual functionality or security-related aspects of the code. The test logic remains identical, only the variable name has been modified for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-blended-element-overflow-hidden-and-border-radius.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/compositing/mix-blend-mode/mix-blend-mode-blended-element-overflow-hidden-and-border-radius.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@         <link rel="author" title="Ion Roșca" href="mailto:[email protected]">         <link rel="reviewer" title="Mihai Țică" href="mailto:[email protected]">         <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.fxtf.org/compositing-1/#mix-blend-mode">-        <meta name="flags" content="">         <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that an element having mix-blend-mode, overflow:hidden and border-radius blends correctly with its parent element.">         <link rel="match" href="reference/mix-blend-mode-blended-element-overflow-hidden-and-border-radius-ref.html">         <style type="text/css">

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines]
   [Old Code]
   `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   [Fixed Code]
   (Line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test configuration metadata
- This doesn't appear to be security-related but rather a cleanup of test metadata
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification is in a test file, not production code

No other changes were present in the diff that would indicate security fixes. The rest of the file remains unchanged.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/color-mix-basic-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/color-mix-basic-001.html@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1695376"> <link rel="author" href="mailto:[email protected]" title="Emilio Cobos Álvarez"> <link rel="author" href="https://mozilla.org" title="Mozilla">-<script src="/resources/testharness.js"></script>-<script src="/resources/testharnessreport.js"></script>+<link rel="match" href="color-mix-basic-001-ref.html"> <style>-div { color: black }+div { color: black; }+.test { background-color: red; width: 14em; height: 1em; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0; } </style>-<div id="test"></div>-<div id="ref"></div>+<body> <script> const TEST_CASES = [   ["blue", "red"],@@ -21,46 +20,28 @@   ["currentColor", "rgba(0, 0, 0, .5)"], ];-const testElement = document.getElementById("test");-const refElement = document.getElementById("ref");-const testStyle = getComputedStyle(testElement);-const refStyle = getComputedStyle(refElement);--let animation = null;- for (let [from, to, animationProgress] of TEST_CASES) {   const animationProgressExplicit = animationProgress !== undefined;   animationProgress = animationProgressExplicit ? animationProgress : 0.5;-  test(function() {-    // Set up the ref.-    if (animation) {-      animation.cancel();-    }-    animation = refElement.animate({-      backgroundColor: [from, to],-    }, { duration: 1000 });-    animation.pause();-    animation.currentTime = 1000 * animationProgress;-    let progress = ` ${animationProgress * 100}%`;-    let oneMinusProgress = ` ${(1 - animationProgress) * 100}%`;-    let values = [-      `color-mix(in srgb, ${from}, ${to} ${progress})`,-      `color-mix(in srgb, ${from} ${oneMinusProgress}, ${to})`,-      `color-mix(in srgb, ${from} ${oneMinusProgress}, ${to} ${progress})`,-    ];+  let progress = ` ${animationProgress * 100}%`;+  let oneMinusProgress = ` ${(1 - animationProgress) * 100}%`;+  let values = [+    `color-mix(in srgb, ${from}, ${to} ${progress})`,+    `color-mix(in srgb, ${from} ${oneMinusProgress}, ${to})`,+    `color-mix(in srgb, ${from} ${oneMinusProgress}, ${to} ${progress})`,+  ];-    if (animationProgress == 0.5) {-      values.push(`color-mix(in srgb, ${from}, ${to})`);-    }+  if (animationProgress == 0.5) {+    values.push(`color-mix(in srgb, ${from}, ${to})`);+  }-    for (let value of values) {-      testElement.style.backgroundColor = "";-      testElement.style.backgroundColor = value;--      assert_not_equals(testElement.style.backgroundColor, "", "Should parse " + value);-      assert_equals(testStyle.backgroundColor, refStyle.backgroundColor, "Colors should match for " + value);-    }-  }, `From ${from} to ${to} at ${animationProgress}`);+  for (let value of values) {+    const element = document.createElement("div")+    element.classList.add('test')+    element.style.backgroundColor = value;+    document.body.appendChild(element)+  } } </script>+</body>

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific security vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/color-mix-basic-001.html] [Various lines]
[Old Code]
The original code used testharness.js and testharnessreport.js for testing, with complex animation-based color comparison logic.
[Fixed Code]
The updated code simplifies the test by directly creating div elements with color values and adding them to the DOM, removing the animation-based comparison.

The changes appear to be primarily about simplifying the test case implementation rather than fixing security vulnerabilities. The modifications:
1. Remove testharness dependencies
2. Replace the animation-based comparison with direct element creation
3. Simplify the test structure
4. Add reference matching via link rel="match"

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes seem focused on test methodology improvement rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.