Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/reducers/requests.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/reducers/requests.js@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ REMOVE_SELECTED_CUSTOM_REQUEST, RIGHT_CLICK_REQUEST, SELECT_REQUEST,+ PRESELECT_REQUEST, SEND_CUSTOM_REQUEST, TOGGLE_RECORDING, UPDATE_REQUEST,@@ -33,6 +34,8 @@ requests: [], // Selected request ID selectedId: null,+ // Right click request represents the last request that was clicked+ clickedRequestId: null, // @backward-compact { version 85 } The preselectedId can either be // the actor id on old servers, or the resourceId on new ones. preselectedId: null,@@ -76,14 +79,9 @@ // Select specific request. case SELECT_REQUEST: {- // Selected request represents the last request that was clicked- // before the context menu is shown- const clickedRequest = state.requests.find(- needle => needle.id === action.id- ); return { ...state,- clickedRequest,+ clickedRequestId: action.id, selectedId: action.id, }; }@@ -98,12 +96,16 @@ } case RIGHT_CLICK_REQUEST: {- const clickedRequest = state.requests.find(- needle => needle.id === action.id- ); return { ...state,- clickedRequest,+ clickedRequestId: action.id,+ };+ }++ case PRESELECT_REQUEST: {+ return {+ ...state,+ preselectedId: action.id, }; }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential State Management Issue] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/reducers/requests.js] [Lines 17,33,76-98]
[Old Code]
```javascript
// Selected request represents the last request that was clicked
// before the context menu is shown
const clickedRequest = state.requests.find(
needle => needle.id === action.id
);
return {
...state,
clickedRequest,
selectedId: action.id,
};
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
return {
...state,
clickedRequestId: action.id,
selectedId: action.id,
};
```
Additional Details: The change moves from storing the entire request object to just storing the ID, which could prevent potential issues with stale object references or unintended mutations, but it's not clear if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Race Condition] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/reducers/requests.js] [Lines 33,98-104]
[Old Code]
```javascript
// No explicit handling for preselectedId in original code
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
case PRESELECT_REQUEST: {
return {
...state,
preselectedId: action.id,
};
}
```
Additional Details: The addition of explicit PRESELECT_REQUEST handling suggests there might have been potential race conditions or inconsistent state issues when preselecting requests, but this doesn't appear to be fixing a known vulnerability.
Note: The changes appear to be primarily architectural improvements rather than direct security fixes. The modifications:
1. Separate the storage of clicked request ID from the request object
2. Add explicit state management for preselected requests
3. Clean up the state management logic
However, none of these changes clearly correspond to known vulnerability patterns or CVE fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-margin-box-border-radius-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-margin-box-border-radius-003.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values"> <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-margin-box-border-radius-003-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the margin-box and border-radius value."> <style> .container {
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't indicate any security vulnerability being fixed.
Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change is a minor HTML cleanup.
Additional Details:
- The diff only removes an empty `<meta name="flags" content="">` tag
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No security-related functionality was modified
- No vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either the old or new code
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/forms/nsListControlFrame.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/forms/nsListControlFrame.h@@ -24,17 +24,13 @@ #include "nsISelectControlFrame.h" #include "nsSelectsAreaFrame.h"-// X.h defines KeyPress-#ifdef KeyPress-# undef KeyPress-#endif- class nsComboboxControlFrame; class nsPresContext;-class nsListEventListener; namespace mozilla { class PresShell;+class HTMLSelectEventListener;+ namespace dom { class Event; class HTMLOptionElement;@@ -86,6 +82,10 @@ nsContainerFrame* GetContentInsertionFrame() final;+ int32_t GetEndSelectionIndex() const { return mEndSelectionIndex; }++ mozilla::dom::HTMLOptionElement* GetCurrentOption() const;+ bool IsFrameOfType(uint32_t aFlags) const final { return nsHTMLScrollFrame::IsFrameOfType( aFlags & ~(nsIFrame::eReplaced | nsIFrame::eReplacedContainsBlock));@@ -108,9 +108,7 @@ mozilla::a11y::AccType AccessibleType() final; #endif- void SetComboboxFrame(nsIFrame* aComboboxFrame); int32_t GetSelectedIndex();- HTMLOptionElement* GetCurrentOption(); /** * Gets the text of the currently selected item.@@ -122,25 +120,7 @@ void CaptureMouseEvents(bool aGrabMouseEvents); nscoord GetBSizeOfARow(); uint32_t GetNumberOfOptions();- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT_BOUNDARY void AboutToDropDown();-- /**- * @note This method might destroy the frame, pres shell and other objects.- */- void AboutToRollup();-- /**- * Dispatch a DOM oninput and onchange event synchroniously.- * @note This method might destroy the frame, pres shell and other objects.- */- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- void FireOnInputAndOnChange();-- /**- * Makes aIndex the selected option of a combobox list.- * @note This method might destroy the frame, pres shell and other objects.- */- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT_BOUNDARY void ComboboxFinish(int32_t aIndex);+ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT_BOUNDARY void OnContentReset(); // nsISelectControlFrame@@ -164,17 +144,19 @@ * @note These methods might destroy the frame, pres shell and other objects. */ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- nsresult MouseDown(mozilla::dom::Event* aMouseEvent);- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- nsresult MouseUp(mozilla::dom::Event* aMouseEvent);- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- nsresult MouseMove(mozilla::dom::Event* aMouseEvent);+ nsresult HandleLeftButtonMouseDown(mozilla::dom::Event* aMouseEvent);+ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT+ nsresult HandleLeftButtonMouseUp(mozilla::dom::Event* aMouseEvent); MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT nsresult DragMove(mozilla::dom::Event* aMouseEvent); MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- nsresult KeyDown(mozilla::dom::Event* aKeyEvent);- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- nsresult KeyPress(mozilla::dom::Event* aKeyEvent);++ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT+ bool PerformSelection(int32_t aClickedIndex, bool aIsShift, bool aIsControl);+ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT+ void UpdateSelectionAfterKeyEvent(int32_t aNewIndex, uint32_t aCharCode,+ bool aIsShift, bool aIsControlOrMeta,+ bool aIsControlSelectMode); /** * Returns the options collection for mContent, if any.@@ -184,8 +166,6 @@ * Returns the HTMLOptionElement for a given index in mContent's collection. */ HTMLOptionElement* GetOption(uint32_t aIndex) const;-- static void ComboboxFocusSet(); // Helper bool IsFocused() { return this == mFocused; }@@ -223,25 +203,9 @@ } /**- * Return whether the list is in dropdown mode.- */- bool IsInDropDownMode() const;-- /** * Return the number of displayed rows in the list. */ uint32_t GetNumDisplayRows() const { return mNumDisplayRows; }-- /**- * Return true if the drop-down list can display more rows.- * (always false if not in drop-down mode)- */- bool GetDropdownCanGrow() const { return mDropdownCanGrow; }-- /**- * Frees statics owned by this class.- */- static void Shutdown(); #ifdef ACCESSIBILITY /**@@ -254,13 +218,6 @@ #endif protected:- /**- * Return the first non-disabled option starting at aFromIndex (inclusive).- * @param aFoundIndex if non-null, set to the index of the returned option- */- HTMLOptionElement* GetNonDisabledOptionFrom(int32_t aFromIndex,- int32_t* aFoundIndex = nullptr);- /** * Updates the selected text in a combobox and then calls FireOnChange(). * @note This method might destroy the frame, pres shell and other objects.@@ -277,12 +234,7 @@ nsGkAtoms::multiple); }- /**- * Toggles (show/hide) the combobox dropdown menu.- * @note This method might destroy the frame, pres shell and other objects.- */- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- void DropDownToggleKey(mozilla::dom::Event* aKeyEvent);+ mozilla::dom::HTMLSelectElement& Select() const; /** * @return true if the <option> at aIndex is selectable by the user.@@ -298,27 +250,6 @@ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ScrollToFrame(HTMLOptionElement& aOptElement); MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ScrollToIndex(int32_t anIndex);-- /**- * When the user clicks on the comboboxframe to show the dropdown- * listbox, they then have to move the mouse into the list. We don't- * want to process those mouse events as selection events (i.e., to- * scroll list items into view). So we ignore the events until- * the mouse moves below our border-inner-edge, when- * mItemSelectionStarted is set.- *- * @param aPoint relative to this frame- */- bool IgnoreMouseEventForSelection(mozilla::dom::Event* aEvent);-- /**- * If the dropdown is showing and the mouse has moved below our- * border-inner-edge, then set mItemSelectionStarted.- */- void UpdateInListState(mozilla::dom::Event* aEvent);- void AdjustIndexForDisabledOpt(int32_t aStartIndex, int32_t& anNewIndex,- int32_t aNumOptions, int32_t aDoAdjustInc,- int32_t aDoAdjustIncNext); /** * Resets the select back to it's original default values;@@ -340,7 +271,6 @@ int32_t& aCurIndex); bool CheckIfAllFramesHere();- bool IsLeftButton(mozilla::dom::Event* aMouseEvent); // guess at a row block size based on our own style. nscoord CalcFallbackRowBSize(float aFontSizeInflation);@@ -353,15 +283,6 @@ // Dropped down stuff void SetComboboxItem(int32_t aIndex);- /**- * Method to reflow ourselves as a dropdown list. This differs from- * reflow as a listbox because the criteria for needing a second- * pass are different. This will be called from Reflow() as needed.- */- void ReflowAsDropdown(nsPresContext* aPresContext, ReflowOutput& aDesiredSize,- const ReflowInput& aReflowInput,- nsReflowStatus& aStatus);- // Selection bool SetOptionsSelectedFromFrame(int32_t aStartIndex, int32_t aEndIndex, bool aValue, bool aClearAll);@@ -372,20 +293,17 @@ bool ExtendedSelection(int32_t aStartIndex, int32_t aEndIndex, bool aClearAll); MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- bool PerformSelection(int32_t aClickedIndex, bool aIsShift, bool aIsControl);- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT bool HandleListSelection(mozilla::dom::Event* aDOMEvent, int32_t selectedIndex); void InitSelectionRange(int32_t aClickedIndex);- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT- void PostHandleKeyEvent(int32_t aNewIndex, uint32_t aCharCode, bool aIsShift,- bool aIsControlOrMeta); public: nsSelectsAreaFrame* GetOptionsContainer() const { return static_cast<nsSelectsAreaFrame*>(GetScrolledFrame()); }+ static constexpr int32_t kNothingSelected = -1;+ protected: nscoord BSizeOfARow() { return GetOptionsContainer()->BSizeOfARow(); }@@ -393,22 +311,13 @@ * @return how many displayable options/optgroups this frame has. */ uint32_t GetNumberOfRows();-- nsView* GetViewInternal() const final { return mView; }- void SetViewInternal(nsView* aView) final { mView = aView; } // Data Members int32_t mStartSelectionIndex; int32_t mEndSelectionIndex;- nsComboboxControlFrame* mComboboxFrame;-- // The view is only created (& non-null) if IsInDropDownMode() is true.- nsView* mView;- uint32_t mNumDisplayRows; bool mChangesSinceDragStart : 1;- bool mButtonDown : 1; // Has the user selected a visible item since we showed the dropdown? bool mItemSelectionStarted : 1;@@ -419,9 +328,6 @@ bool mNeedToReset : 1; bool mPostChildrenLoadedReset : 1;- // bool value for multiple discontiguous selection- bool mControlSelectMode : 1;- // True if we're in the middle of a reflow and might need a second // pass. This only happens for auto heights. bool mMightNeedSecondPass : 1;@@ -431,10 +337,6 @@ * Set to false at the end of DidReflow. */ bool mHasPendingInterruptAtStartOfReflow : 1;-- // True if the drop-down can show more rows. Always false if this list- // is not in drop-down mode.- bool mDropdownCanGrow : 1; // True if the selection can be set to nothing or disabled options. bool mForceSelection : 1;@@ -449,33 +351,13 @@ // are translucent. nscolor mLastDropdownBackstopColor;- RefPtr<nsListEventListener> mEventListener;+ RefPtr<mozilla::HTMLSelectEventListener> mEventListener; static nsListControlFrame* mFocused;- static mozilla::StaticAutoPtr<nsString> sIncrementalString; #ifdef DO_REFLOW_COUNTER int32_t mReflowId; #endif-- private:- // for incremental typing navigation- static nsAString& GetIncrementalString();- static DOMTimeStamp gLastKeyTime;-- class MOZ_RAII AutoIncrementalSearchResetter {- public:- AutoIncrementalSearchResetter() : mCancelled(false) {}- ~AutoIncrementalSearchResetter() {- if (!mCancelled) {- nsListControlFrame::GetIncrementalString().Truncate();- }- }- void Cancel() { mCancelled = true; }-- private:- bool mCancelled;- }; }; #endif /* nsListControlFrame_h___ */
I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format. The changes appear to be primarily refactoring and cleanup, but I'll look for any security-related modifications. 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Event Listener Security Improvement [layout/forms/nsListControlFrame.h] [Lines related to mEventListener] Old Code: RefPtr<nsListEventListener> mEventListener; Fixed Code: RefPtr<mozilla::HTMLSelectEventListener> mEventListener; Details: The change from a custom nsListEventListener to a more standardized HTMLSelectEventListener might indicate a security improvement in event handling, but without seeing the implementation details of both classes, I can't be certain. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Input Validation Improvement [layout/forms/nsListControlFrame.h] [Lines related to mouse/key event handling] Old Code: Various MouseDown/MouseUp/KeyPress handlers Fixed Code: More specific HandleLeftButtonMouseDown/HandleLeftButtonMouseUp and updated key handling methods Details: The change from generic event handlers to more specific ones could indicate better input validation and security against malicious events, but this might just be a refactoring. 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Memory Safety Improvement [layout/forms/nsListControlFrame.h] [Lines related to static members] Old Code: Various static members including sIncrementalString and gLastKeyTime Fixed Code: Removed static members Details: Removal of static members could potentially address memory safety or thread safety issues, but this might just be cleanup. The diff appears to be primarily a large refactoring of the list control frame code, with many methods being removed or reorganized. While there are no obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed (like buffer overflows or injection vulnerabilities), the changes do seem to improve the code organization and potentially make the event handling more robust. Without more context about the specific security issues being addressed, it's difficult to identify definitive security fixes in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/gc/Barrier.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/gc/Barrier.h@@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ template <typename T> struct InternalBarrierMethods<T*> {+ static_assert(std::is_base_of_v<gc::Cell, T>, "Expected a GC thing type");+ static bool isMarkable(const T* v) { return v != nullptr; } static void preBarrier(T* v) { gc::PreWriteBarrier(v); }@@ -366,13 +368,13 @@ // If the target needs an entry, add it. js::gc::StoreBuffer* sb;- if ((next.isObject() || next.isString() || next.isBigInt()) &&+ if (next.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() && (sb = next.toGCThing()->storeBuffer())) { // If we know that the prev has already inserted an entry, we can // skip doing the lookup to add the new entry. Note that we cannot // safely assert the presence of the entry because it may have been // added via a different store buffer.- if ((prev.isObject() || prev.isString() || prev.isBigInt()) &&+ if (prev.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() && prev.toGCThing()->storeBuffer()) { return; }@@ -380,7 +382,7 @@ return; } // Remove the prev entry if the new value does not need it.- if ((prev.isObject() || prev.isString() || prev.isBigInt()) &&+ if (prev.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() && (sb = prev.toGCThing()->storeBuffer())) { sb->unputValue(vp); }@@ -749,6 +751,64 @@ } };+/*+ * A pre-barriered heap pointer, for use inside the JS engine.+ *+ * Similar to GCPtr, but used for a pointer to a malloc-allocated structure+ * containing GC thing pointers.+ *+ * It must only be stored in memory that has GC lifetime. It must not be used in+ * contexts where it may be implicitly moved or deleted, e.g. most containers.+ *+ * A post-barrier is unnecessary since malloc-allocated structures cannot be in+ * the nursery.+ */+template <class T>+class GCStructPtr : public BarrieredBase<T> {+ public:+ // This is sometimes used to hold tagged pointers.+ static constexpr uintptr_t MaxTaggedPointer = 0x2;++ GCStructPtr() : BarrieredBase<T>(JS::SafelyInitialized<T>::create()) {}++ // Implicitly adding barriers is a reasonable default.+ MOZ_IMPLICIT GCStructPtr(const T& v) : BarrieredBase<T>(v) {}++ GCStructPtr(const GCStructPtr<T>& other) : BarrieredBase<T>(other) {}++ GCStructPtr(GCStructPtr<T>&& other) : BarrieredBase<T>(other.release()) {}++ ~GCStructPtr() {+ // No barriers are necessary as this only happens when the GC is sweeping.+ MOZ_ASSERT_IF(isTraceable(),+ CurrentThreadIsGCSweeping() || CurrentThreadIsGCFinalizing());+ }++ void init(const T& v) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(this->get() == JS::SafelyInitialized<T>());+ AssertTargetIsNotGray(v);+ this->value = v;+ }++ void set(JS::Zone* zone, const T& v) {+ pre(zone);+ this->value = v;+ }++ T get() const { return this->value; }+ operator T() const { return get(); }+ T operator->() const { return get(); }++ protected:+ bool isTraceable() const { return uintptr_t(get()) > MaxTaggedPointer; }++ void pre(JS::Zone* zone) {+ if (isTraceable()) {+ PreWriteBarrier(zone, get());+ }+ }+};+ } // namespace js namespace JS {@@ -933,8 +993,7 @@ #ifdef DEBUG assertPreconditionForPostWriteBarrier(owner, kind, slot, target); #endif- if (this->value.isObject() || this->value.isString() ||- this->value.isBigInt()) {+ if (this->value.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing()) { gc::Cell* cell = this->value.toGCThing(); if (cell->storeBuffer()) { cell->storeBuffer()->putSlot(owner, kind, slot, 1);
Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following security-related changes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Type Confusion Vulnerability [File] js/src/gc/Barrier.h [Lines] 334-336
[Old Code]
template <typename T>
struct InternalBarrierMethods<T*> {
[Fixed Code]
template <typename T>
struct InternalBarrierMethods<T*> {
static_assert(std::is_base_of_v<gc::Cell, T>, "Expected a GC thing type");
This change adds a static assertion to ensure the template type T is derived from gc::Cell, preventing potential type confusion issues where non-GC types might be incorrectly used with these barrier methods.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Safety Vulnerability [File] js/src/gc/Barrier.h [Lines] 366-382
[Old Code]
if ((next.isObject() || next.isString() || next.isBigInt()) &&
if ((prev.isObject() || prev.isString() || prev.isBigInt()) &&
if ((prev.isObject() || prev.isString() || prev.isBigInt()) &&
[Fixed Code]
if (next.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() &&
if (prev.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() &&
if (prev.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() &&
The changes replace specific type checks with a more comprehensive isNurseryAllocatableGCThing() check, ensuring proper memory handling for all nursery-allocatable GC things, not just objects, strings, and bigints.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Memory Safety Issue [File] js/src/gc/Barrier.h [Lines] 751-816
[Old Code]
(No equivalent code existed before)
[Fixed Code]
(New GCStructPtr class implementation)
The addition of the GCStructPtr class appears to be a new feature rather than a security fix, but it includes safety assertions and proper barrier handling that could prevent memory safety issues. Without more context about why this was added, I'm uncertain if it fixes a specific vulnerability.
4. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Safety Vulnerability [File] js/src/gc/Barrier.h [Lines] 993-996
[Old Code]
if (this->value.isObject() || this->value.isString() ||
this->value.isBigInt()) {
[Fixed Code]
if (this->value.isNurseryAllocatableGCThing()) {
Similar to change #2, this replaces specific type checks with a more comprehensive check, ensuring proper memory handling for all nursery-allocatable GC things in post-write barrier operations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.shared.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.shared.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var ctx2 = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx2.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.shared.html [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx2.fillStyle = '#0f0';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
var ctx2 = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx2.fillStyle = '#0f0';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this change.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/compiler-rt.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/toolchain/compiler-rt.yml@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@ run: arguments: - aarch64-linux-android- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json resources:- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json fetches: fetch: - clang-13 toolchain:- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1 - linux64-android-ndk-linux-repack android-arm-compiler-rt-13:@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ run: arguments: - armv7-linux-android- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json resources:- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json fetches: fetch: - clang-13 toolchain:- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1 - linux64-android-ndk-linux-repack android-x86-compiler-rt-13:@@ -52,14 +52,14 @@ run: arguments: - i686-linux-android- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json resources:- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json fetches: fetch: - clang-13 toolchain:- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1 - linux64-android-ndk-linux-repack android-x64-compiler-rt-13:@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ run: arguments: - x86_64-linux-android- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json resources:- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json fetches: fetch: - clang-13 toolchain:- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1 - linux64-android-ndk-linux-repack linux64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13:@@ -86,15 +86,15 @@ run: arguments: - aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json resources:- - 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json fetches: fetch: - clang-13 toolchain: - linux64-binutils- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1 - sysroot-aarch64-linux-gnu macosx64-x64-compiler-rt-13:@@ -104,12 +104,15 @@ run: arguments: - x86_64-apple-darwin+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json+ resources:+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json fetches: fetch: - clang-13 toolchain:- - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-cctools-port+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1 - macosx64-sdk-11.0 macosx64-aarch64-compiler-rt-13:@@ -119,13 +122,60 @@ run: arguments: - aarch64-apple-darwin+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json+ resources:+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json fetches: fetch: - clang-13 toolchain:- - linux64-cctools-port-clang-13- - linux64-clang-13+ - linux64-cctools-port+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1 - macosx64-sdk-11.0++win32-compiler-rt-13:+ description: "win32 x86 Compiler-rt for Clang 13 toolchain build"+ treeherder:+ symbol: TW32(crt-13)+ worker:+ env:+ TOOLTOOL_MANIFEST: "browser/config/tooltool-manifests/vs2017-15.9.manifest"+ run:+ arguments:+ - i686-pc-windows-msvc+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json+ resources:+ - 'taskcluster/scripts/misc/tooltool-download.sh'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json+ tooltool-downloads: internal+ fetches:+ fetch:+ - clang-13+ toolchain:+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1+ - linux64-liblowercase++win64-compiler-rt-13:+ description: "win64 x64 Compiler-rt for Clang 13 toolchain build"+ treeherder:+ symbol: TW64(crt-13)+ worker:+ env:+ TOOLTOOL_MANIFEST: "browser/config/tooltool-manifests/vs2017-15.9.manifest"+ run:+ arguments:+ - x86_64-pc-windows-msvc+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json+ resources:+ - 'taskcluster/scripts/misc/tooltool-download.sh'+ - build/build-clang/clang-13.json+ tooltool-downloads: internal+ fetches:+ fetch:+ - clang-13+ toolchain:+ - linux64-clang-13-stage1+ - linux64-liblowercase wasm32-wasi-compiler-rt-13: description: "wasm32-wasi Compiler-rt for Clang 13 toolchain build"
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security fixes. The main changes involve updating patch files and toolchain configurations.
1. First vulnerability analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Patch File Update [File] taskcluster/ci/toolchain/compiler-rt.yml [Lines] 18-21, 35-38, 52-55, 69-72, 86-89, 104-107, 119-122
[Old Code]
- 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'
resources:
- 'build/build-clang/find_symbolizer_linux_clang_10.patch'
[Fixed Code]
- build/build-clang/clang-13.json
resources:
- build/build-clang/clang-13.json
2. Second vulnerability analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Toolchain Configuration Update [File] taskcluster/ci/toolchain/compiler-rt.yml [Lines] 24, 41, 58, 75, 92, 113, 126
[Old Code]
- linux64-clang-13
[Fixed Code]
- linux64-clang-13-stage1
3. Third vulnerability analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Windows Toolchain Addition [File] taskcluster/ci/toolchain/compiler-rt.yml [Lines] 133-169 (new sections)
[Old Code]
(No Windows configurations present)
[Fixed Code]
(Added win32 and win64 configurations with new toolchain references)
The changes appear to be primarily configuration updates rather than direct security fixes. The switch from a specific patch file to a JSON configuration might indicate a move to a more maintainable configuration system, but without seeing the contents of the old patch file or new JSON file, I can't determine if this addresses any specific vulnerability.
The toolchain changes from 'linux64-clang-13' to 'linux64-clang-13-stage1' might indicate a more secure build process, but again, without internal knowledge of these toolchains, I can't confirm if this addresses any specific vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/style/test/property_database.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/style/test/property_database.js@@ -6126,6 +6126,7 @@ domProp: "lineHeight", inherited: true, type: CSS_TYPE_LONGHAND,+ applies_to_marker: true, applies_to_first_letter: true, applies_to_first_line: true, applies_to_placeholder: true,
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability [File] layout/style/test/property_database.js [Lines] 6126 Old Code: ``` domProp: "lineHeight", inherited: true, type: CSS_TYPE_LONGHAND, applies_to_first_letter: true, applies_to_first_line: true, applies_to_placeholder: true, ``` Fixed Code: ``` domProp: "lineHeight", inherited: true, type: CSS_TYPE_LONGHAND, applies_to_marker: true, applies_to_first_letter: true, applies_to_first_line: true, applies_to_placeholder: true, ``` Additional Details: - The change simply adds a new property `applies_to_marker: true` to the CSS property database configuration for lineHeight - This appears to be a feature enhancement rather than a security fix - No known vulnerabilities are being addressed by this change - The modification is in a test file, which typically wouldn't contain security fixes that affect production code
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/base/AvailableMemoryWatcherLinux.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/base/AvailableMemoryWatcherLinux.cpp@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ void StartPolling(const MutexAutoLock&); void StopPolling(const MutexAutoLock&); void ShutDown(const MutexAutoLock&);+ void UpdateCrashAnnotation(const MutexAutoLock&); static bool IsMemoryLow(); nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimer;@@ -89,6 +90,9 @@ mThread = thread; MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);+ // Set the crash annotation to its initial state.+ UpdateCrashAnnotation(lock);+ StartPolling(lock); return NS_OK;@@ -182,6 +186,7 @@ MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex); if (!mUnderMemoryPressure) { mUnderMemoryPressure = true;+ UpdateCrashAnnotation(lock); // Poll more frequently under memory pressure. StartPolling(lock); }@@ -194,6 +199,12 @@ [self = RefPtr{this}]() { self->mTabUnloader->UnloadTabAsync(); })); }+void nsAvailableMemoryWatcher::UpdateCrashAnnotation(const MutexAutoLock&) {+ CrashReporter::AnnotateCrashReport(+ CrashReporter::Annotation::LinuxUnderMemoryPressure,+ mUnderMemoryPressure);+}+ // If memory is not low, we may need to dispatch an // event for it if we have been under memory pressure. // We can also adjust our polling interval.@@ -203,6 +214,7 @@ RecordTelemetryEventOnHighMemory(); NS_NotifyOfEventualMemoryPressure(MemoryPressureState::NoPressure); mUnderMemoryPressure = false;+ UpdateCrashAnnotation(lock); } StartPolling(lock); }
Here is the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Crash Report Information Leak] [xpcom/base/AvailableMemoryWatcherLinux.cpp] [Lines 40,89,182,186,199,203,214] [Old Code] No explicit annotation of memory pressure state in crash reports [Fixed Code] Added UpdateCrashAnnotation() function and calls to annotate memory pressure state in crash reports 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Race Condition in Memory State Reporting] [xpcom/base/AvailableMemoryWatcherLinux.cpp] [Lines 182-186, 203-214] [Old Code] Memory pressure state changes without immediate crash report updates [Fixed Code] Added synchronized UpdateCrashAnnotation calls when memory pressure state changes The changes primarily add crash report annotations for memory pressure states, which could be related to security in terms of: 1. Ensuring proper state is captured in crash reports for debugging 2. Preventing potential information leaks by properly annotating system states 3. Maintaining consistency between actual state and reported state However, without more context about the threat model and specific vulnerabilities being addressed, it's difficult to definitively classify these as security fixes versus general robustness improvements. The changes appear to be more about improving diagnostic capabilities than fixing active vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.multiple.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.multiple.html@@ -17,19 +17,19 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 200;+canvas.width = 200; var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 200, 0); g.addColorStop(0, '#ff0'); g.addColorStop(0.5, '#0ff'); g.addColorStop(1, '#f0f'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 200, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,255,127,255, "50,25", "127,255,127,255", 3);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 100,25, 0,255,255,255, "100,25", "0,255,255,255", 3);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 150,25, 127,127,255,255, "150,25", "127,127,255,255", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,255,127,255, "50,25", "127,255,127,255", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 100,25, 0,255,255,255, "100,25", "0,255,255,255", 3);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 150,25, 127,127,255,255, "150,25", "127,127,255,255", 3); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas` and all subsequent references were updated accordingly. The functionality remains the same. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. Additional Details: - The diff shows no changes in security-sensitive operations - No security-related functions or patterns were modified - The test assertions remain identical in functionality, only the variable name changed Since no actual security fixes were made, I cannot identify any specific vulnerabilities that were addressed. The changes appear to be part of code maintenance rather than security patching.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-core/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-core/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"c72d3883e5ac0b8b719041a29fec1c89bf24508e674f871d3390cb8dc1209d99","LICENSE-APACHE":"275c491d6d1160553c32fd6127061d7f9606c3ea25abfad6ca3f6ed088785427","LICENSE-MIT":"6652c868f35dfe5e8ef636810a4e576b9d663f3a17fb0f5613ad73583e1b88fd","README.md":"e8258273fed6f1796485777655118f2369fd3f000191e9d8cdbd10bf052946a9","build.rs":"f6e21c09f18cc405bd7048cb7a2958f92d5414b9ca6b301d137e120a84fa020a","no_atomic_cas.rs":"ff8be002b49a5cd9e4ca0db17b1c9e6b98e55f556319eb6b953dd6ff52c397a6","src/future.rs":"0cb559fad0d43566dab959e929c4631c25cf749e2e29a5444fbcad464c9262ae","src/lib.rs":"eacd5816fbb914ca061d49ff6203723ebbe639eb7c45ebfa8a0613069d174111","src/stream.rs":"f1c7ab84161c5d5b424655b257fc3183eb6f2ed5324ba4006a70f9a4b0dc8872","src/task/__internal/atomic_waker.rs":"4ca94b25d3bcf4db863f008224cc4797dbbe7c93495a1abb232048846694a716","src/task/__internal/mod.rs":"7d0d297f58987b05ffa152605feb78ddc9b6e5168e7d621ec36dfbee558e4bec","src/task/mod.rs":"e213602a2fe5ae78ad5f1ca20e6d32dcbab17aba5b6b072fb927a72da99b4a11","src/task/poll.rs":"74c2717c1f9a37587a367da1b690d1cd2312e95dbaffca42be4755f1cd164bb8"},"package":"629316e42fe7c2a0b9a65b47d159ceaa5453ab14e8f0a3c5eedbb8cd55b4a445"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"a167cc2eb28add765dbe69220643c977744f206230321ac071e4bbb39981c8b9","LICENSE-APACHE":"275c491d6d1160553c32fd6127061d7f9606c3ea25abfad6ca3f6ed088785427","LICENSE-MIT":"6652c868f35dfe5e8ef636810a4e576b9d663f3a17fb0f5613ad73583e1b88fd","README.md":"e8258273fed6f1796485777655118f2369fd3f000191e9d8cdbd10bf052946a9","build.rs":"f6e21c09f18cc405bd7048cb7a2958f92d5414b9ca6b301d137e120a84fa020a","no_atomic_cas.rs":"ff8be002b49a5cd9e4ca0db17b1c9e6b98e55f556319eb6b953dd6ff52c397a6","src/future.rs":"0cb559fad0d43566dab959e929c4631c25cf749e2e29a5444fbcad464c9262ae","src/lib.rs":"eacd5816fbb914ca061d49ff6203723ebbe639eb7c45ebfa8a0613069d174111","src/stream.rs":"f1c7ab84161c5d5b424655b257fc3183eb6f2ed5324ba4006a70f9a4b0dc8872","src/task/__internal/atomic_waker.rs":"4ca94b25d3bcf4db863f008224cc4797dbbe7c93495a1abb232048846694a716","src/task/__internal/mod.rs":"7d0d297f58987b05ffa152605feb78ddc9b6e5168e7d621ec36dfbee558e4bec","src/task/mod.rs":"e213602a2fe5ae78ad5f1ca20e6d32dcbab17aba5b6b072fb927a72da99b4a11","src/task/poll.rs":"74c2717c1f9a37587a367da1b690d1cd2312e95dbaffca42be4755f1cd164bb8"},"package":"d0c8ff0461b82559810cdccfde3215c3f373807f5e5232b71479bff7bb2583d7"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-over.worker.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-over.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-over.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) { createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => { ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze each file for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. For the first file (futures-core/.cargo-checksum.json):
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found. This appears to be a routine checksum update for package dependencies. The changes in checksums don't indicate any security fixes, just version updates.
2. For the second file (2d.composite.image.source-over.worker.js):
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Variable Shadowing Issue [File] [Lines 13-14, 32]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 219,255,36,223, "50,25", "219,255,36,223", 5);
Note: The change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' might be addressing potential variable shadowing or naming consistency issues, though this doesn't appear to be a direct security fix. The impact on security is unclear.
No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The modifications appear to be either routine updates or code style improvements rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.2.dompointinit.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.2.dompointinit.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and the corresponding updates to the variable name in the `_assertPixel` calls. There are no changes to security-related functionality or potential vulnerabilities being addressed.
Here's the structured response:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); etc.]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); etc.]
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't relate to any security fixes. The test functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.top.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.cone.top.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#0f0'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-48]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/nsBaseWidget.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/nsBaseWidget.cpp@@ -754,8 +754,7 @@ // Put the window into full-screen mode // //--------------------------------------------------------------------------void nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen,- nsIScreen* aScreen) {+void nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) { HideWindowChrome(aFullScreen); if (aFullScreen) {@@ -765,10 +764,7 @@ *mOriginalBounds = GetScreenBounds(); // Move to top-left corner of screen and size to the screen dimensions- nsCOMPtr<nsIScreen> screen = aScreen;- if (!screen) {- screen = GetWidgetScreen();- }+ nsCOMPtr<nsIScreen> screen = GetWidgetScreen(); if (screen) { int32_t left, top, width, height; if (NS_SUCCEEDED(@@ -788,8 +784,8 @@ } }-nsresult nsBaseWidget::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen* aScreen) {- InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen, aScreen);+nsresult nsBaseWidget::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) {+ InfallibleMakeFullScreen(aFullScreen); return NS_OK; }@@ -1671,12 +1667,7 @@ } void nsBaseWidget::NotifyThemeChanged(ThemeChangeKind aKind) {- if (!mWidgetListener) {- return;- }- if (PresShell* presShell = mWidgetListener->GetPresShell()) {- presShell->ThemeChanged(aKind);- }+ LookAndFeel::NotifyChangedAllWindows(aKind); } void nsBaseWidget::NotifyUIStateChanged(UIStateChangeType aShowFocusRings) {
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Parameter Injection Vulnerability [File] [Lines 754-788]
[Old Code]
void nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen* aScreen) {
...
nsCOMPtr<nsIScreen> screen = aScreen;
if (!screen) {
screen = GetWidgetScreen();
}
[Fixed Code]
void nsBaseWidget::InfallibleMakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) {
...
nsCOMPtr<nsIScreen> screen = GetWidgetScreen();
Additional Details: The removal of the aScreen parameter could indicate a security fix where an external screen parameter was being accepted without proper validation, potentially allowing injection of malicious screen objects. However, without more context, this is uncertain.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Theme Change Notification Vulnerability [File] [Lines 1671-1675]
[Old Code]
if (!mWidgetListener) {
return;
}
if (PresShell* presShell = mWidgetListener->GetPresShell()) {
presShell->ThemeChanged(aKind);
}
[Fixed Code]
LookAndFeel::NotifyChangedAllWindows(aKind);
Additional Details: The change in theme notification handling might address a security issue where theme changes weren't being properly propagated to all windows, potentially leaving some windows in an inconsistent state. However, this could also be just a functional change.
Note: While these changes could potentially address security issues, without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being fixed or the threat model, it's difficult to definitively identify them as security fixes. The changes appear to be more about improving reliability and consistency in the code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/helpers.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/helpers.js@@ -197,10 +197,11 @@ * any type of popup in the browser. This function waits for one of those events, and * checks that the viewId of the popup is PanelUI-profiler *+ * @param {Window} window * @param {"popupshown" | "popuphidden"} eventName * @returns {Promise<void>} */-function waitForProfilerPopupEvent(eventName) {+function waitForProfilerPopupEvent(window, eventName) { return new Promise(resolve => { function handleEvent(event) { if (event.target.getAttribute("viewId") === "PanelUI-profiler") {@@ -218,13 +219,14 @@ * * This function toggles the profiler menu button, and then uses user gestures * to click it open. It waits a tick to make sure it has a chance to initialize.+ * @param {Window} window * @return {Promise<void>} */ async function _toggleOpenProfilerPopup(window) { info("Toggle open the profiler popup."); info("> Find the profiler menu button.");- const profilerDropmarker = document.getElementById(+ const profilerDropmarker = window.document.getElementById( "profiler-button-dropmarker" ); if (!profilerDropmarker) {@@ -233,10 +235,10 @@ ); }- const popupShown = waitForProfilerPopupEvent("popupshown");+ const popupShown = waitForProfilerPopupEvent(window, "popupshown"); info("> Trigger a click on the profiler button dropmarker.");- await EventUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(profilerDropmarker, {});+ await EventUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(profilerDropmarker, {}, window); if (profilerDropmarker.getAttribute("open") !== "true") { throw new Error(@@ -255,10 +257,11 @@ * Do not use this directly in a test. Prefer withPopupOpen. * * This function uses a keyboard shortcut to close the profiler popup.+ * @param {Window} window * @return {Promise<void>} */ async function _closePopup(window) {- const popupHiddenPromise = waitForProfilerPopupEvent("popuphidden");+ const popupHiddenPromise = waitForProfilerPopupEvent(window, "popuphidden"); info("> Trigger an escape key to hide the popup"); EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Escape");@@ -292,7 +295,7 @@ async function openPopupAndEnsureCloses(window, callback) { await _toggleOpenProfilerPopup(window); // We want to ensure the popup gets closed by the test, during the callback.- const popupHiddenPromise = waitForProfilerPopupEvent("popuphidden");+ const popupHiddenPromise = waitForProfilerPopupEvent(window, "popuphidden"); await callback(); info("> Verifying that the popup was closed by the test."); await popupHiddenPromise;@@ -465,13 +468,17 @@ * devtools panel's document, the * second parameter is the opened tab's * document.+ * @param {Window} [aWindow] The browser's window object we target * @returns {Promise<void>} */-async function withDevToolsPanel(url, callback) {- if (typeof url !== "string" && !callback) {+async function withDevToolsPanel(url, callback, aWindow = window) {+ if (typeof url === "function") {+ aWindow = callback ?? window; callback = url; url = "about:blank"; }++ const { gBrowser } = aWindow; SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [["devtools.performance.new-panel-enabled", "true"]],
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential DOM-based XSS or Window Object Injection] [devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/helpers.js] [Lines 197-219, 218-244, 255-266, 292-298, 465-476]
[Old Code]
function waitForProfilerPopupEvent(eventName) {
const profilerDropmarker = document.getElementById(
async function withDevToolsPanel(url, callback) {
if (typeof url !== "string" && !callback) {
[Fixed Code]
function waitForProfilerPopupEvent(window, eventName) {
const profilerDropmarker = window.document.getElementById(
async function withDevToolsPanel(url, callback, aWindow = window) {
if (typeof url === "function") {
aWindow = callback ?? window;
Additional Details: The changes introduce explicit window parameter passing instead of relying on implicit global window object. This could potentially prevent window object injection attacks, though the context suggests this is more about test reliability than security.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Event Handler Injection] [devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/helpers.js] [Lines 197-219]
[Old Code]
function waitForProfilerPopupEvent(eventName) {
return new Promise(resolve => {
function handleEvent(event) {
[Fixed Code]
function waitForProfilerPopupEvent(window, eventName) {
return new Promise(resolve => {
function handleEvent(event) {
Additional Details: The change adds explicit window context for event handling, which could prevent potential event handler injection if the window object was compromised, though this appears to be test code.
3. Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [devtools/client/performance-new/test/browser/helpers.js] [Various]
Additional Details: Most changes appear to be test code improvements rather than security fixes, including better parameter handling and explicit window object passing. The modifications improve code reliability but don't appear to address specific security vulnerabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepTrack.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepTrack.cpp@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ const std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>>& prototype) { mPrototypeCodecs.clear(); for (const auto& prototypeCodec : prototype) {- if (prototypeCodec->mType == mType) {+ if (prototypeCodec->Type() == mType) { mPrototypeCodecs.emplace_back(prototypeCodec->Clone()); mPrototypeCodecs.back()->mDirection = mDirection; }@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ // We do not modify mPrototypeCodecs here, since we're only creating an // answer. Once offer/answer concludes, we will update mPrototypeCodecs. std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>> codecs =- NegotiateCodecs(offer, true);+ NegotiateCodecs(offer, true, Nothing()); if (codecs.empty()) { return; }@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ bool JsepTrack::IsRtxEnabled( const std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>>& codecs) const { for (const auto& codec : codecs) {- if (codec->mType == SdpMediaSection::kVideo &&+ if (codec->Type() == SdpMediaSection::kVideo && static_cast<const JsepVideoCodecDescription*>(codec.get()) ->mRtxEnabled) { return true;@@ -395,7 +395,8 @@ } std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>> JsepTrack::NegotiateCodecs(- const SdpMediaSection& remote, bool isOffer) {+ const SdpMediaSection& remote, bool remoteIsOffer,+ Maybe<const SdpMediaSection&> local) { std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>> negotiatedCodecs; std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>> newPrototypeCodecs;@@ -408,13 +409,13 @@ // First codec of ours that matches. See if we can negotiate it. UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription> clone(codec->Clone());- if (clone->Negotiate(fmt, remote, isOffer)) {+ if (clone->Negotiate(fmt, remote, remoteIsOffer, local)) { // If negotiation succeeded, remember the payload type the other side // used for reoffers. codec->mDefaultPt = fmt; // Remember whether we negotiated rtx and the associated pt for later.- if (codec->mType == SdpMediaSection::kVideo) {+ if (codec->Type() == SdpMediaSection::kVideo) { JsepVideoCodecDescription* videoCodec = static_cast<JsepVideoCodecDescription*>(codec.get()); JsepVideoCodecDescription* cloneVideoCodec =@@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ } void JsepTrack::Negotiate(const SdpMediaSection& answer,- const SdpMediaSection& remote) {+ const SdpMediaSection& remote,+ const SdpMediaSection& local) { std::vector<UniquePtr<JsepCodecDescription>> negotiatedCodecs =- NegotiateCodecs(remote, &answer != &remote);+ NegotiateCodecs(remote, &answer != &remote, SomeRef(local)); UniquePtr<JsepTrackNegotiatedDetails> negotiatedDetails = MakeUnique<JsepTrackNegotiatedDetails>();
I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security findings following the specified format. 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Type Confusion Vulnerability] [dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepTrack.cpp] [Lines 64, 209, 409] [Old Code] `if (prototypeCodec->mType == mType)` `if (codec->mType == SdpMediaSection::kVideo` [Fixed Code] `if (prototypeCodec->Type() == mType)` `if (codec->Type() == SdpMediaSection::kVideo` Additional Details: The changes replace direct member variable access (mType) with a method call (Type()). This could indicate a fix for potential type confusion issues where the type might need validation or proper encapsulation. However, without more context about the JsepCodecDescription class, I can't be certain if this was an actual vulnerability. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Missing Parameter Validation] [dom/media/webrtc/jsep/JsepTrack.cpp] [Lines 94, 395, 527] [Old Code] `NegotiateCodecs(offer, true)` `NegotiateCodecs(const SdpMediaSection& remote, bool isOffer)` `Negotiate(const SdpMediaSection& answer, const SdpMediaSection& remote)` [Fixed Code] `NegotiateCodecs(offer, true, Nothing())` `NegotiateCodecs(const SdpMediaSection& remote, bool remoteIsOffer, Maybe<const SdpMediaSection&> local)` `Negotiate(const SdpMediaSection& answer, const SdpMediaSection& remote, const SdpMediaSection& local)` Additional Details: The changes add a new parameter to several methods, suggesting that additional validation or context might be needed during codec negotiation. This could potentially address security issues related to missing validation of local parameters during WebRTC negotiations, but without more context about the security implications of the missing parameter, I can't be certain.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/test/unit/test_httpssvc_retry_without_ech.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/test/unit/test_httpssvc_retry_without_ech.js@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ add_task(async function testRetryWithoutECH() { const ECH_CONFIG_FIXED =- "AFL+CgBOTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAwBkAB1kZWxlZ2F0ZWQtZW5hYmxlZC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA";+ "AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAA2QWZWNoLXB1YmxpYy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA"; trrServer = new TRRServer(); await trrServer.start();
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential ECH Configuration Vulnerability] [netwerk/test/unit/test_httpssvc_retry_without_ech.js] [Lines 73]
[Old Code]
"AFL+CgBOTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAwBkAB1kZWxlZ2F0ZWQtZW5hYmxlZC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA"
[Fixed Code]
"AEn+DQBFTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAA2QWZWNoLXB1YmxpYy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA"
Additional Details:
- The change appears to modify an ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) configuration string
- The old configuration referenced "delegated-enabled.example.com" while the new one references "ech-public.example.com"
- Without more context about the ECH implementation and the specific security implications of this configuration change, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just updating test data
- The change might be related to improving ECH security or compatibility, but we can't confirm a specific vulnerability from this diff alone
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/canvas/OffscreenCanvas.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/canvas/OffscreenCanvas.cpp@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/BlobImpl.h" #include "mozilla/dom/OffscreenCanvasBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/OffscreenCanvasDisplayHelper.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/OffscreenCanvasRenderingContext2D.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Promise.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h"@@ -118,6 +119,9 @@ CanvasContextType contextType; switch (aContextId) {+ case OffscreenRenderingContextId::_2d:+ contextType = CanvasContextType::OffscreenCanvas2D;+ break; case OffscreenRenderingContextId::Bitmaprenderer: contextType = CanvasContextType::ImageBitmap; break;@@ -144,10 +148,15 @@ return; }- int32_t childId = 0;+ Maybe<int32_t> childId; MOZ_ASSERT(mCurrentContext); switch (mCurrentContextType) {+ case CanvasContextType::OffscreenCanvas2D:+ aResult.SetValue().SetAsOffscreenCanvasRenderingContext2D() =+ *static_cast<OffscreenCanvasRenderingContext2D*>(+ mCurrentContext.get());+ break; case CanvasContextType::ImageBitmap: aResult.SetValue().SetAsImageBitmapRenderingContext() = *static_cast<ImageBitmapRenderingContext*>(mCurrentContext.get());@@ -157,7 +166,7 @@ auto* webgl = static_cast<ClientWebGLContext*>(mCurrentContext.get()); WebGLChild* webglChild = webgl->GetChild(); if (webglChild) {- childId = webglChild->Id();+ childId.emplace(webglChild->Id()); } aResult.SetValue().SetAsWebGLRenderingContext() = *webgl; break;@@ -305,6 +314,12 @@ return nullptr; }+ if (mNeutered) {+ aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError(+ "Cannot get blob from placeholder canvas transferred to worker.");+ return nullptr;+ }+ nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = GetOwnerGlobal(); RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, aRv);@@ -327,6 +342,9 @@ CanvasRenderingContextHelper::ToBlob(callback, type, encodeOptions, /* aUsingCustomOptions */ false, usePlaceholder, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ promise->MaybeReject(std::move(aRv));+ } return promise.forget(); }@@ -338,6 +356,12 @@ // do a trust check if this is a write-only canvas if (mIsWriteOnly) { aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);+ return nullptr;+ }++ if (mNeutered) {+ aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError(+ "Cannot get blob from placeholder canvas transferred to worker."); return nullptr; }@@ -390,7 +414,7 @@ return true; }- return StaticPrefs::gfx_offscreencanvas_enabled();+ return CanvasUtils::IsOffscreenCanvasEnabled(aCx, aObj); } NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_INHERITED(OffscreenCanvas, DOMEventTargetHelper,
I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security fixes following the specified format.
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Safety Issue [dom/canvas/OffscreenCanvas.cpp] [Lines 144-166]
Old Code:
int32_t childId = 0;
[...]
case CanvasContextType::WebGL1:
case CanvasContextType::WebGL2: {
auto* webgl = static_cast<ClientWebGLContext*>(mCurrentContext.get());
WebGLChild* webglChild = webgl->GetChild();
if (webglChild) {
childId = webglChild->Id();
}
Fixed Code:
Maybe<int32_t> childId;
[...]
case CanvasContextType::WebGL1:
case CanvasContextType::WebGL2: {
auto* webgl = static_cast<ClientWebGLContext*>(mCurrentContext.get());
WebGLChild* webglChild = webgl->GetChild();
if (webglChild) {
childId.emplace(webglChild->Id());
}
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Invalid State Handling [dom/canvas/OffscreenCanvas.cpp] [Lines 305-327]
Old Code:
if (mIsWriteOnly) {
aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return nullptr;
}
Fixed Code:
if (mIsWriteOnly) {
aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return nullptr;
}
if (mNeutered) {
aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError(
"Cannot get blob from placeholder canvas transferred to worker.");
return nullptr;
}
3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Error Handling [dom/canvas/OffscreenCanvas.cpp] [Lines 327-342]
Old Code:
CanvasRenderingContextHelper::ToBlob(callback, type, encodeOptions,
/* aUsingCustomOptions */ false,
usePlaceholder, aRv);
Fixed Code:
CanvasRenderingContextHelper::ToBlob(callback, type, encodeOptions,
/* aUsingCustomOptions */ false,
usePlaceholder, aRv);
if (aRv.Failed()) {
promise->MaybeReject(std::move(aRv));
}
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Feature Control [dom/canvas/OffscreenCanvas.cpp] [Lines 390-414]
Old Code:
return StaticPrefs::gfx_offscreencanvas_enabled();
Fixed Code:
return CanvasUtils::IsOffscreenCanvasEnabled(aCx, aObj);
The changes appear to address several security concerns:
1. Memory safety by using Maybe<int32_t> instead of raw int32_t
2. Added validation for neutered canvas state
3. Improved error handling for blob operations
4. Potentially more secure feature control (though I'm not certain about the security impact of this change)
The most clear vulnerabilities addressed are:
- Potential memory safety issues with uninitialized/improperly handled WebGL child IDs
- Missing state validation that could lead to security issues when working with transferred canvases
- Incomplete error handling that could lead to unhandled exceptions
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.destination-in.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.destination-in.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-in'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.
Here's the analysis following the requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 22]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5);
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,255,255, "50,25", "0,255,255,255", 5);
The changes simply rename the variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or readability purposes, without any security implications. No security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.bottom.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.bottom.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.textBaseline = 'bottom'; ctx.fillText('CC', 0, 50);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2); }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.baseline.bottom.html [Lines] 17-31
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.negative.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.negative.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.arcTo(0, 0, 0, 0, -1); }); t.done();
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.negative.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
The change simply renames the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` without altering any security-relevant functionality. The test continues to check for the same INDEX_SIZE_ERR exception when calling arcTo with negative radius.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.