--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/test/mochitest/test_bfcache_plus_hash.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/test/mochitest/test_bfcache_plus_hash.html@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ <a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=646641">Mozilla Bug 646641</a> <p id="display"></p> <div id="content" style="display: none">-  + </div> <pre id="test"> <script type="application/javascript">@@ -57,71 +57,91 @@   expectedPageshowNum = n; }-function* test() {-  window.open("file_bfcache_plus_hash_1.html", "", "noopener");-  waitForLoad(1);-  waitForShow(1);-  yield undefined;-  yield undefined;-  bc1.postMessage("pushState");-  waitForLoad(2);-  waitForShow(2);-  yield undefined;-  yield undefined;+function executeTest() {+  function* test() {+    window.open("file_bfcache_plus_hash_1.html", "", "noopener");+    waitForLoad(1);+    waitForShow(1);+    yield undefined;+    yield undefined;-  // Now go back 2.  The first page should be retrieved from bfcache.-  bc2.postMessage("go-2");-  waitForShow(1);-  yield undefined;+    bc1.postMessage("pushState");-  bc1.postMessage("close");+    waitForLoad(2);+    waitForShow(2);+    yield undefined;+    yield undefined;++    // Now go back 2.  The first page should be retrieved from bfcache.+    bc2.postMessage("go-2");+    waitForShow(1);+    yield undefined;++    bc1.postMessage("close");+  }++  var bc1 = new BroadcastChannel("bug646641_1");+  var bc2 = new BroadcastChannel("bug646641_2");+  bc1.onmessage = (msgEvent) => {+    var msg = msgEvent.data.message;+    var n = msgEvent.data.num;+    if (msg == "childLoad") {+      if (n == expectedLoadNum) {+        debug("Got load " + n);+        expectedLoadNum = -1;++        // Spin the event loop before calling gGen.next() so the generator runs+        // outside the onload handler.  This prevents us from encountering all+        // sorts of docshell quirks.+        setTimeout(function() { gGen.next(); }, 0);+      } else {+        debug("Got unexpected load " + n);+        ok(false, "Got unexpected load " + n);+      }+    } else if (msg == "childPageshow") {+      if (n == expectedPageshowNum) {+        debug("Got expected pageshow " + n);+        expectedPageshowNum = -1;+        ok(true, "Got expected pageshow " + n);+        setTimeout(function() { gGen.next(); }, 0);+      } else {+        debug("Got unexpected pageshow " + n);+        ok(false, "Got unexpected pageshow " + n);+      }+    } else if (msg == "closed") {+      bc1.close();+      bc2.close();+      SimpleTest.finish();+    }+  }++  bc2.onmessage = bc1.onmessage;++  var gGen = test();++  // If Fission is disabled, the pref is no-op.+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]]}, () => {+    gGen.next();+  });+}+if (isXOrigin) {+  // Bug 1746646: Make mochitests work with TCP enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)+  // Acquire storage access permission here so that the BroadcastChannel used to+  // communicate with the opened windows works in xorigin tests. Otherwise,+  // the iframe containing this page is isolated from first-party storage access,+  // which isolates BroadcastChannel communication.+  SpecialPowers.wrap(document).notifyUserGestureActivation();+  SpecialPowers.addPermission("storageAccessAPI", true, window.location.href).then(() => {+    SpecialPowers.wrap(document).requestStorageAccess().then(() => {+      executeTest();+    });+  });+} else {+  executeTest(); }-var bc1 = new BroadcastChannel("bug646641_1");-var bc2 = new BroadcastChannel("bug646641_2");-bc1.onmessage = (msgEvent) => {-  var msg = msgEvent.data.message;-  var n = msgEvent.data.num;-  if (msg == "childLoad") {-    if (n == expectedLoadNum) {-      debug("Got load " + n);-      expectedLoadNum = -1;--      // Spin the event loop before calling gGen.next() so the generator runs-      // outside the onload handler.  This prevents us from encountering all-      // sorts of docshell quirks.-      setTimeout(function() { gGen.next(); }, 0);-    } else {-      debug("Got unexpected load " + n);-      ok(false, "Got unexpected load " + n);-    }-  } else if (msg == "childPageshow") {-    if (n == expectedPageshowNum) {-      debug("Got expected pageshow " + n);-      expectedPageshowNum = -1;-      ok(true, "Got expected pageshow " + n);-      setTimeout(function() { gGen.next(); }, 0);-    } else {-      debug("Got unexpected pageshow " + n);-      ok(false, "Got unexpected pageshow " + n);-    }-  } else if (msg == "closed") {-    bc1.close();-    bc2.close();-    SimpleTest.finish();-  }-}--bc2.onmessage = bc1.onmessage;--var gGen = test();--// If Fission is disabled, the pref is no-op.-SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]]}, () => {-  gGen.next();-}); </script> </pre>

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily structural/organizational, with the main test logic being wrapped in an `executeTest()` function and adding support for cross-origin testing scenarios.

Here's my analysis following the requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in this diff
   File: docshell/test/mochitest/test_bfcache_plus_hash.html
   The changes are primarily structural improvements and cross-origin test support

The main changes are:
1. Wrapping the test logic in an `executeTest()` function
2. Adding cross-origin test support with storage access permission handling
3. Some whitespace cleanup (removing extra spaces)

These changes don't appear to address any specific security vulnerabilities but rather improve test functionality and organization. The cross-origin handling additions are related to test reliability rather than security fixes.

If I were to speculate about potential security implications, the cross-origin changes might relate to preventing test flakiness in environments with strict cookie policies, but this isn't fixing an actual vulnerability, just making the tests more robust.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.reflect.setidl.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.reflect.setidl.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 120;-offscreenCanvas.height = 60;-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 120, "offscreenCanvas.width", "120");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 60, "offscreenCanvas.height", "60");+canvas.width = 120;+canvas.height = 60;+_assertSame(canvas.width, 120, "canvas.width", "120");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 60, "canvas.height", "60"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas`. The functionality remains exactly the same.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.reflect.setidl.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    offscreenCanvas.width = 120;
    offscreenCanvas.height = 60;
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 120, "offscreenCanvas.width", "120");
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 60, "offscreenCanvas.height", "60");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    canvas.width = 120;
    canvas.height = 60;
    _assertSame(canvas.width, 120, "canvas.width", "120");
    _assertSame(canvas.height, 60, "canvas.height", "60");

The changes don't address any security issues but rather improve code consistency or readability by using a shorter variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/async-task/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/async-task/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"c4c2357aca3a55880f58ce71001fe55a2ad5b08c272cbbeb5f55888b3c405a8a","Cargo.lock":"a0bcb2e3475e6b59771885f1cf0d2e90192e408a131db86d73ce245176924986","Cargo.toml":"a62cd371c630cfb67b1e942c5a9088ef0e42c05633b3caa780ef9d189c7846f1","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"0aba4f4b778650826a1d565551c6d7e96898e2ceb76ee6673232adbd075fec0a","benches/spawn.rs":"9272992dbc058734be04e4b1c0c92fa16f62eebe062c2ce74bbedfae1ce36689","examples/spawn-local.rs":"729d6b8ef55fad9387e8912567160766fb00c3880a7acbdcab7316aefe7811c3","examples/spawn-on-thread.rs":"90c5ffcbe11b847a9201a83ac2f036bf1721dfe971708781a0769ef8354e87c9","examples/spawn.rs":"360c86d609eea98333ba6284ebf8eeb73acc651f07d30b0dd5879757b4bf6125","src/header.rs":"956b92793bd20ef94b300cda3e7e9e70cadcbd6f5b57c7f0053e6f81e6002867","src/lib.rs":"04bb2ea9bf584f57295f090c3d49489d3f7b019942f3872cecc0f4935cb4a080","src/raw.rs":"6c3650d79e39f898826ddebd0eea37305b1013e427eaff331e7da3c71da247ab","src/runnable.rs":"df5975f32539733b3df989c120f80ea3cd5a645be782b166f3f334835ace4d91","src/state.rs":"73ec4b98e8519faad882c1ee19711066a9e2a9b2cf9441436f145c8597e2b93d","src/task.rs":"2e6093650fdb637baeacc9257e813f78c38eec79b8f689370b206a06d4122bfa","src/utils.rs":"233350fa35223b286d144194b04c0549c3b7d2e378e1f61d7d31a807e1416d17","tests/basic.rs":"dfe397fddbe73226b419bdc93ad5de217246bbb4e6f735e4932f6dc415ada06f","tests/cancel.rs":"c0970386cfca05e27f113f62781eee6825dc1bd8632e7a760759123bb0d06f3a","tests/join.rs":"88080b81e3b932571deeb2ff7adc3dabb2e14522b012e4dd6c76bca454f7f518","tests/panic.rs":"283c70daee381798f5a210c1995b1075d3320a78ad0c7007db7b534d2d03d43d","tests/ready.rs":"a899d303f51f289c0f98830f41061ca62e0d57e3aa0f061981b0a28eeb05de2e","tests/waker_panic.rs":"cc4a5207bf28a6cf3fd41a5a8f13d371db42ef7561b6e71dd9853f7f94f8a3f4","tests/waker_pending.rs":"c1511b616770fc1870b3a9e203934a3239ad0e31c6bcb5dd7e9acfd9c9e4e1ef","tests/waker_ready.rs":"5a2e19e9642cb2a631dbbeec4f84dbe79d8eeafaac32cb65192f64922085724b"},"package":"e91831deabf0d6d7ec49552e489aed63b7456a7a3c46cff62adad428110b0af0"}+{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"c4c2357aca3a55880f58ce71001fe55a2ad5b08c272cbbeb5f55888b3c405a8a","Cargo.toml":"e10e2b49a756cd051f1b642c51df4a8387965078c2fd4c885f6388a66c6ab56d","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"23f18e03dc49df91622fe2a76176497404e46ced8a715d9d2b67a7446571cca3","README.md":"91a65b44a1692a16fa2d2f5bb424e78177f0c0ca0051e93db20443568377d5e5","benches/spawn.rs":"9272992dbc058734be04e4b1c0c92fa16f62eebe062c2ce74bbedfae1ce36689","examples/spawn-local.rs":"729d6b8ef55fad9387e8912567160766fb00c3880a7acbdcab7316aefe7811c3","examples/spawn-on-thread.rs":"90c5ffcbe11b847a9201a83ac2f036bf1721dfe971708781a0769ef8354e87c9","examples/spawn.rs":"360c86d609eea98333ba6284ebf8eeb73acc651f07d30b0dd5879757b4bf6125","src/header.rs":"956b92793bd20ef94b300cda3e7e9e70cadcbd6f5b57c7f0053e6f81e6002867","src/lib.rs":"f579f26e7b7b7c521f280ec876202650f4bac4d573734f40f05204d74327ed73","src/raw.rs":"6c3650d79e39f898826ddebd0eea37305b1013e427eaff331e7da3c71da247ab","src/runnable.rs":"24a2e33464a17bff4828e655ac77a6c7b87a335f35f8dc00b614d7542bdaf955","src/state.rs":"73ec4b98e8519faad882c1ee19711066a9e2a9b2cf9441436f145c8597e2b93d","src/task.rs":"5e822d51335139d9fa49655027150de43dd72fd6852a41c0bcb3f9e5dcae0e4b","src/utils.rs":"233350fa35223b286d144194b04c0549c3b7d2e378e1f61d7d31a807e1416d17","tests/basic.rs":"2346fc837af82d1f76f1dc2c799b0b4b35b92e61455b40e37d2698e87be84a42","tests/cancel.rs":"3316abbad56d06e1690e7d547aeec4acf3f4e2a84607684f840d6cb13ec5b057","tests/join.rs":"815e628cb77f1d42bdc0455a71818278e0a8b381efc090f8f843115b23ea734a","tests/panic.rs":"22bf21ce9a0b6d5558a54207a86aa2c3b13475aacccce7f619427056660fa427","tests/ready.rs":"357112e398d1f982585c76c2f49325ab1f2673f026c120fb10d9b92ee42188af","tests/waker_panic.rs":"9777f381d3c9a98fef9e480345d2df18dec286118fef5f7f18033b08a43e0cec","tests/waker_pending.rs":"40dcf6eac4f0902e888657883be411bb376ab7db53a3c720a84fe122539508e6","tests/waker_ready.rs":"4b230ebf2af301058771d78350bbb558f96eafaa2aee18ec5cfed74d5e3f3628"},"package":null}=========layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-001.html========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-001.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. First diff (async-task/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This appears to be a standard dependency checksum update with no security implications. The changes are:
    - Updated checksums for various files
    - Removed Cargo.lock
    - Changed package hash to null
    - No security vulnerabilities are evident in this checksum update

2. Second diff (grid-fragmentation-001.html):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is purely a visual/style change:
    - Changed border style from "2px dashed" to "2px solid salmon"
    - No security implications in this cosmetic change

No security vulnerabilities were found in either diff. The changes appear to be routine updates and style modifications rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0%, 100%, 50%)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsl-1.worker.js [Lines] 13-21
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0%, 100%, 50%)'; } catch (e) { }
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
   try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0%, 100%, 50%)'; } catch (e) { }
   ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding references. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.3.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 50; ctx.fillRect(-50, 0, 50, 50); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.3.worker.js [Lines] 13-29
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or brevity. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect the functionality or introduce/remove any security-related features. The actual canvas operations and assertions remain the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/gc/bug-1505622.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/gc/bug-1505622.js@@ -3,13 +3,11 @@ // Turn of any zeal which will disrupt GC number checks. gczeal(0);-// Get initial heap size and limit.-gc();-const initialSize = gcparam("gcBytes");-const initialMaxSize = gcparam("maxBytes");+function allocUntilFail() {+  gc(null, 'shrinking');-function allocUntilFail() {-  gc();+  const initialSize = gcparam("gcBytes");+  const initialMaxSize = gcparam("maxBytes");   const initGCNumber = gcparam("majorGCNumber");   // Set a small heap limit.

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [js/src/jit-test/tests/gc/bug-1505622.js] [Lines 5-7 vs 5-8]
   Old Code:
   // Get initial heap size and limit.
   gc();
   const initialSize = gcparam("gcBytes");
   const initialMaxSize = gcparam("maxBytes");

   Fixed Code:
   function allocUntilFail() {
     gc(null, 'shrinking');
   
     const initialSize = gcparam("gcBytes");
     const initialMaxSize = gcparam("maxBytes");

Additional Details:
- The change moves the heap size measurement inside the function and adds a 'shrinking' parameter to gc()
- While not clearly a security fix, this could potentially relate to preventing information leaks about memory state
- The exact security impact is unclear without more context about the test case

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Management Issue] [js/src/jit-test/tests/gc/bug-1505622.js] [Lines 3-10]
   Old Code:
   // Turn of any zeal which will disrupt GC number checks.
   gczeal(0);
   
   // Get initial heap size and limit.
   gc();
   const initialSize = gcparam("gcBytes");
   const initialMaxSize = gcparam("maxBytes");
   
   function allocUntilFail() {
     gc();

   Fixed Code:
   // Turn of any zeal which will disrupt GC number checks.
   gczeal(0);
   
   function allocUntilFail() {
     gc(null, 'shrinking');
   
     const initialSize = gcparam("gcBytes");
     const initialMaxSize = gcparam("maxBytes");

Additional Details:
- The restructuring of the memory measurement code might relate to more reliable memory management
- The addition of 'shrinking' parameter suggests more controlled garbage collection behavior
- Could potentially address memory-related vulnerabilities but the exact impact is unclear

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/base/nsJSEnvironment.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/base/nsJSEnvironment.h@@ -57,17 +57,17 @@   enum IsShrinking { ShrinkingGC, NonShrinkingGC };-  enum IsIncremental { IncrementalGC, NonIncrementalGC };-   // Setup all the statics etc - safe to call multiple times after Startup().   static void EnsureStatics();   static void SetLowMemoryState(bool aState);   static void GarbageCollectNow(JS::GCReason reason,-                                IsIncremental aIncremental = NonIncrementalGC,-                                IsShrinking aShrinking = NonShrinkingGC,-                                int64_t aSliceMillis = 0);+                                IsShrinking aShrinking = NonShrinkingGC);++  static void RunIncrementalGCSlice(JS::GCReason aReason,+                                    IsShrinking aShrinking,+                                    mozilla::TimeDuration aBudget);   static void CycleCollectNow(mozilla::CCReason aReason,                               nsICycleCollectorListener* aListener = nullptr);

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Management Issue] [dom/base/nsJSEnvironment.h] [Lines 57-67]
[Old Code]
  static void GarbageCollectNow(JS::GCReason reason,
                                IsIncremental aIncremental = NonIncrementalGC,
                                IsShrinking aShrinking = NonShrinkingGC,
                                int64_t aSliceMillis = 0);
[Fixed Code]
  static void GarbageCollectNow(JS::GCReason reason,
                                IsShrinking aShrinking = NonShrinkingGC);

  static void RunIncrementalGCSlice(JS::GCReason aReason,
                                    IsShrinking aShrinking,
                                    mozilla::TimeDuration aBudget);

Additional Details:
The change involves restructuring how garbage collection is handled, splitting it into two separate functions. While this appears to be a memory management improvement, I cannot definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed. The change might be related to better control over garbage collection timing and slices, which could potentially address memory-related security issues, but without more context, I can't be certain.

Note: The removal of the IsIncremental enum and the restructuring of GC functions suggests a change in garbage collection strategy, but this could be either a security fix or a performance optimization. More context would be needed to determine if this was addressing a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.componentTransfer.gamma.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.componentTransfer.gamma.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // From https://www.w3.org/TR/SVG11/filters.html#feComponentTransferElement function getColor(inputColor, amplitude, exponent, offset) {@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@     let outputColor = getColor(color, amplitudes, exponents, offsets);     ctx.fillStyle = `rgb(${color[0]}, ${color[1]}, ${color[2]})`;     ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 10, 10);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2); } t.done();

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 50]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 50]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5, 5, outputColor[0],outputColor[1],outputColor[2],255, "5,5", `${outputColor[0]},${outputColor[1]},${outputColor[2]}`, 2);
   ```

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating its references. There are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The changes are consistent throughout the file and don't affect the functionality or security of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/src/fg_apply_tmpl.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/src/fg_apply_tmpl.c@@ -91,11 +91,11 @@ #ifndef UNIT_TEST void bitfn(dav1d_apply_grain)(const Dav1dFilmGrainDSPContext *const dsp,                               Dav1dPicture *const out,-                              Dav1dPicture *const in)+                              const Dav1dPicture *const in) {     const Dav1dFilmGrainData *const data = &out->frame_hdr->film_grain.data;-    entry grain_lut[3][GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1][GRAIN_WIDTH];+    ALIGN_STK_16(entry, grain_lut, 3,[GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1][GRAIN_WIDTH]);     uint8_t scaling[3][SCALING_SIZE]; #if BITDEPTH != 8     const int bitdepth_max = (1 << out->p.bpc) - 1;

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Alignment Issue] [third_party/dav1d/src/fg_apply_tmpl.c] [Lines 91-96]
   [Old Code]
   entry grain_lut[3][GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1][GRAIN_WIDTH];
   [Fixed Code]
   ALIGN_STK_16(entry, grain_lut, 3,[GRAIN_HEIGHT + 1][GRAIN_WIDTH]);

   Additional Details: The change adds memory alignment (ALIGN_STK_16) to the grain_lut array. While not a direct security vulnerability, proper memory alignment can prevent potential performance issues or alignment-related crashes on some architectures.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Const Correctness Issue] [third_party/dav1d/src/fg_apply_tmpl.c] [Lines 90-93]
   [Old Code]
   Dav1dPicture *const in)
   [Fixed Code]
   const Dav1dPicture *const in)

   Additional Details: The change adds const qualifier to the input parameter. While not a security vulnerability per se, it improves code safety by preventing accidental modification of input data. This could potentially prevent bugs that might lead to security issues in more complex scenarios.

Note: Neither change appears to address a direct, known security vulnerability, but both improve code safety and robustness, which can indirectly prevent potential security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgba-5.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgba-5.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 0, 0, 1,)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be variable renaming and don't relate to security issues. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely variable name changes from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and don't affect security. The test logic remains the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/quote/tests/ui/wrong-type-span.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/quote/tests/ui/wrong-type-span.rs@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@ fn main() {     let span = "";-    let x = 0;+    let x = 0i32;     quote_spanned!(span=> #x); }

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [third_party/rust/quote/tests/ui/wrong-type-span.rs] [Lines 2-6]
[Old Code]
    let span = "";
    let x = 0;
    quote_spanned!(span=> #x);
[Fixed Code]
    let span = "";
    let x = 0i32;
    quote_spanned!(span=> #x);

Additional Details:
The change appears to be a type specification improvement rather than a security fix. The modification adds an explicit type suffix (`i32`) to the integer literal `0`. This is likely for better type clarity or to fix a compilation warning/error, but doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability. The test file is part of Rust's quote macro testing infrastructure, and this change seems related to type system correctness rather than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-037.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-037.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-circle-036-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the basic shape circle(closest-side at center) border-box value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. This appears to be a test file modification where a blank flags meta tag was removed.

The diff shows:
- Removal of an empty `<meta name="flags" content="">` tag
- No other security-relevant changes
- The file is a CSS shapes test case (shape-outside-circle-037.html)

This change doesn't appear to be security-related but rather a cleanup of test metadata. The flags meta tag was likely used for test configuration and its removal doesn't impact security.

No specific vulnerability names apply as this isn't a security fix. The change is more likely related to test maintenance or standardization.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 32-33]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't relate to any security fixes. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.exp.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.exp.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = '100e1';-offscreenCanvas.height = '100e1';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 1000.0, "offscreenCanvas.width", "1000.0");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 1000.0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "1000.0");+canvas.width = '100e1';+canvas.height = '100e1';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 1000.0, "canvas.width", "1000.0");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 1000.0, "canvas.height", "1000.0"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-21]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    offscreenCanvas.width = '100e1';
    offscreenCanvas.height = '100e1';
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 1000.0, "offscreenCanvas.width", "1000.0");
    _assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 1000.0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "1000.0");

    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    canvas.width = '100e1';
    canvas.height = '100e1';
    _assertSame(canvas.width, 1000.0, "canvas.width", "1000.0");
    _assertSame(canvas.height, 1000.0, "canvas.height", "1000.0");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The functionality remains the same, just with different variable naming. No security vulnerabilities were fixed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/system/tests/ioutils/test_ioutils_read_write.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/system/tests/ioutils/test_ioutils_read_write.html@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@     const { OS } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/osfile.jsm");     add_task(async function test_read_failure() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const doesNotExist = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "does_not_exist.tmp");+      const doesNotExist = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "does_not_exist.tmp");       await Assert.rejects(         IOUtils.read(doesNotExist),         /Could not open the file at .*/,@@ -31,10 +30,8 @@     });     add_task(async function test_write_no_overwrite() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-       // Make a new file, and try to write to it with overwrites disabled.-      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_overwrite.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_overwrite.tmp");       const untouchableContents = new TextEncoder().encode("Can't touch this!\n");       let exists = await IOUtils.exists(tmpFileName);@@ -75,10 +72,8 @@     add_task(async function test_write_with_backup() {       info("Test backup file option with non-existing file");-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-       let fileContents = new TextEncoder().encode("Original file contents");-      let destFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_write_with_backup_option.tmp");+      let destFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_write_with_backup_option.tmp");       let backupFileName = destFileName + ".backup";       let bytesWritten =         await IOUtils.write(destFileName, fileContents, {@@ -125,12 +120,10 @@     add_task(async function test_write_with_backup_and_tmp() {       info("Test backup with tmp and backup file options, non-existing destination");-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-       let fileContents = new TextEncoder().encode("Original file contents");-      let destFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_write_with_backup_and_tmp_options.tmp");+      let destFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_write_with_backup_and_tmp_options.tmp");       let backupFileName = destFileName + ".backup";-      let tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "temp_file.tmp");+      let tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "temp_file.tmp");       let bytesWritten =         await IOUtils.write(destFileName, fileContents, {           backupFile: backupFileName,@@ -204,9 +197,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_partial_read() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();--      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_partial_read.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_partial_read.tmp");       const bytes = Uint8Array.of(...new Array(50).keys());       const bytesWritten = await IOUtils.write(tmpFileName, bytes);       is(@@ -234,10 +225,7 @@     add_task(async function test_empty_read_and_write() {       // Trying to write an empty file isn't very useful, but it should still       // succeed.--      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();--      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_empty.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_empty.tmp");       const emptyByteArray = new Uint8Array(0);       const bytesWritten = await IOUtils.write(         tmpFileName,@@ -260,10 +248,8 @@     add_task(async function test_full_read_and_write() {       // Write a file.-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-       info("Test writing to a new binary file");-      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_numbers.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_numbers.tmp");       const bytes = Uint8Array.of(...new Array(50).keys());       const bytesWritten = await IOUtils.write(tmpFileName, bytes);       is(@@ -317,8 +303,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_lz4() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_lz4.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_lz4.tmp");       info("Test writing lz4 encoded data");       const varyingBytes = Uint8Array.of(...new Array(50).keys());@@ -356,9 +341,8 @@     });     add_task(async function test_lz4_osfile_compat() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const osfileTmpFile = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_compat_osfile.tmp");-      const ioutilsTmpFile = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_compat_ioutils.tmp");+      const osfileTmpFile = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_compat_osfile.tmp");+      const ioutilsTmpFile = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_compat_ioutils.tmp");       info("Test OS.File and IOUtils write the same file with LZ4 compression enabled")       const repeatedBytes = Uint8Array.of(...new Array(50).fill(1));@@ -382,8 +366,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_lz4_bad_call() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_bad_call.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_bad_call.tmp");       info("Test decompression with invalid options");       const varyingBytes = Uint8Array.of(...new Array(50).keys());@@ -399,8 +382,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_lz4_failure() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_fail.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_lz4_fail.tmp");       info("Test decompression of non-lz4 data");       const repeatedBytes = Uint8Array.of(...new Array(50).fill(1));@@ -448,8 +430,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_write_directory() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const fileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_write_directory.tmp");+      const fileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_write_directory.tmp");       const tmpPath = `${fileName}.tmp`;       const bytes = Uint8Array.of(1, 2, 3, 4);@@ -466,8 +447,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_read_offset() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_read_offset.tmp");+      const tmpFileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_read_offset.tmp");       const bytes = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];       const byteArray = Uint8Array.of(...bytes);@@ -515,8 +495,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_write_append() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const fileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_write_append.tmp");+      const fileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_write_append.tmp");       await IOUtils.write(fileName, Uint8Array.of(0, 1, 2, 3, 4));@@ -530,8 +509,7 @@     });     add_task(async function test_write_append_no_create() {-      const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();-      const fileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "test_ioutils_write_append_create.tmp");+      const fileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "test_ioutils_write_append_create.tmp");       await Assert.rejects(         IOUtils.write(fileName, Uint8Array.of(5, 6, 7, 8, 9), { mode: "append" }),

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
The diff shows changes in how temporary directory paths are accessed, but no security vulnerabilities are being fixed. The changes are primarily refactoring to use `PathUtils.tempDir` directly instead of getting it via `PathUtils.getTempDir()`. This appears to be a code simplification rather than a security fix.

For each changed section, the pattern is:
Old Code:
```javascript
const tmpDir = await PathUtils.getTempDir();
const fileName = PathUtils.join(tmpDir, "filename.tmp");
```

Fixed Code:
```javascript
const fileName = PathUtils.join(PathUtils.tempDir, "filename.tmp");
```

This change appears throughout the file in multiple test cases, but doesn't represent a security vulnerability being fixed - it's just a more direct way to access the temporary directory path. The functionality remains the same, just with fewer asynchronous operations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docs/performance/GPU_performance.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docs/performance/GPU_performance.md@@ -5,9 +5,8 @@ ## Tools-PIX - Can do timing of Direct3D calls. Works reasonably well with-Firefox. See also [Debugging With-PIX](/en/Debugging_With_PIX "en/Debugging With PIX").+[PIX](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/pix/introduction/) - Can do+timing of Direct3D calls. Works reasonably well with Firefox. NVIDIA PerfHUD - Last I checked required a special build to be used.

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [docs/performance/GPU_performance.md] [Lines 5-9]
   Old Code: PIX - Can do timing of Direct3D calls. Works reasonably well with Firefox. See also [Debugging With PIX](/en/Debugging_With_PIX "en/Debugging With PIX").
   Fixed Code: [PIX](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/pix/introduction/) - Can do timing of Direct3D calls. Works reasonably well with Firefox.

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely documentation-related, updating a link format and reference to PIX documentation
- No security-related changes were made (no vulnerability fixes, no security hardening)
- The modification is simply improving documentation clarity by using a direct external link instead of an internal reference
- No code changes were made that would affect security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api.js@@ -12,13 +12,6 @@ add_task(async function setup() {   await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();-  // Ensure that the profile-after-change message has been notified,-  // so that ServiceWokerRegistrar is going to be initialized.-  Services.obs.notifyObservers(-    null,-    "profile-after-change",-    "force-serviceworkerrestart-init"-  ); }); add_task(async function test_ext_context_does_have_webidl_bindings() {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Service Worker Initialization Race Condition] [toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/webidl-api/test_ext_webidl_api.js] [Lines 12-17]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();
   // Ensure that the profile-after-change message has been notified,
   // so that ServiceWokerRegistrar is going to be initialized.
   Services.obs.notifyObservers(
     null,
     "profile-after-change",
     "force-serviceworkerrestart-init"
   );
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   await AddonTestUtils.promiseStartupManager();
   ```

Additional Details:  
The removed code was forcing a "profile-after-change" notification which could potentially affect Service Worker initialization timing. While this appears to be test code, removing the forced notification might prevent potential race conditions in test environments where Service Worker initialization timing could be artificially manipulated. However, without more context about the broader system, I can't be certain if this was an actual security fix or just a test improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/modular/options.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/modular/options.h@@ -37,7 +37,10 @@       15,  // Find the best decision tree for predictors/predictor per row };-constexpr size_t kNumModularPredictors = static_cast<size_t>(Predictor::Best);+constexpr size_t kNumModularPredictors =+    static_cast<size_t>(Predictor::Average4) + 1;+constexpr size_t kNumModularEncoderPredictors =+    static_cast<size_t>(Predictor::Variable) + 1; static constexpr ssize_t kNumStaticProperties = 2;  // channel, group_id.

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Integer Overflow/Incorrect Array Size Calculation [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/modular/options.h] [Lines 37-40]
[Old Code]
constexpr size_t kNumModularPredictors = static_cast<size_t>(Predictor::Best);
[Fixed Code]
constexpr size_t kNumModularPredictors =
    static_cast<size_t>(Predictor::Average4) + 1;
constexpr size_t kNumModularEncoderPredictors =
    static_cast<size_t>(Predictor::Variable) + 1;

Additional Details:
The change appears to modify how predictor counts are calculated, splitting them into two separate constants. While this doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability, it could potentially relate to fixing:
1. An array bounds issue if Predictor::Best was incorrectly representing the count
2. A potential integer overflow if the previous calculation was incorrect
3. A logic error where different parts of the code needed different predictor counts

However, without more context about the Predictor enum values and how these constants are used, I can't definitively determine if this was fixing a security vulnerability. The change appears to be more about correctness and clarity than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/base/nsLayoutDebugger.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/base/nsLayoutDebugger.cpp@@ -115,6 +115,25 @@     aStream << nsPrintfCString(" hitTestArea(%d,%d,%d,%d)", area.x, area.y,                                area.width, area.height);   }++  auto ReuseStateToString = [](nsDisplayItem::ReuseState aState) {+    switch (aState) {+      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::None:+        return "None";+      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::Reusable:+        return "Reusable";+      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::PreProcessed:+        return "PreProcessed";+      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::Reused:+        return "Reused";+    }++    MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();+    return "";+  };++  aStream << nsPrintfCString(" reuse-state(%s)",+                             ReuseStateToString(aItem->GetReuseState()));   // Display item specific debug info   aItem->WriteDebugInfo(aStream);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding debug functionality for display item reuse states.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/base/nsLayoutDebugger.cpp] [Lines 115-140]
[Old Code]
    aStream << nsPrintfCString(" hitTestArea(%d,%d,%d,%d)", area.x, area.y,
                               area.width, area.height);
  }
[Fixed Code]
    aStream << nsPrintfCString(" hitTestArea(%d,%d,%d,%d)", area.x, area.y,
                               area.width, area.height);
  }

  auto ReuseStateToString = [](nsDisplayItem::ReuseState aState) {
    switch (aState) {
      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::None:
        return "None";
      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::Reusable:
        return "Reusable";
      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::PreProcessed:
        return "PreProcessed";
      case nsDisplayItem::ReuseState::Reused:
        return "Reused";
    }

    MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
    return "";
  };

  aStream << nsPrintfCString(" reuse-state(%s)",
                             ReuseStateToString(aItem->GetReuseState()));

The changes are purely additive, introducing debug output functionality for tracking display item reuse states. There are no security fixes or vulnerability remediations in this diff. The modification is focused on debugging capabilities rather than addressing any security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/aboutconfig/test/browser/head.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/aboutconfig/test/browser/head.js@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const PREF_STRING_DEFAULT_EMPTY = "browser.helperApps.neverAsk.openFile"; const PREF_STRING_DEFAULT_NOTEMPTY = "accessibility.typeaheadfind.soundURL"; const PREF_STRING_DEFAULT_NOTEMPTY_VALUE = "beep";-const PREF_STRING_LOCALIZED_MISSING = "gecko.handlerService.schemes.irc.1.name";+const PREF_STRING_LOCALIZED_MISSING = "intl.menuitems.alwaysappendaccesskeys"; // Other preference names used in tests. const PREF_NEW = "test.aboutconfig.new";

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Preference Name Change] [toolkit/components/aboutconfig/test/browser/head.js] [Lines 17]
    [Old Code] const PREF_STRING_LOCALIZED_MISSING = "gecko.handlerService.schemes.irc.1.name";
    [Fixed Code] const PREF_STRING_LOCALIZED_MISSING = "intl.menuitems.alwaysappendaccesskeys";

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be updating a test preference constant from an IRC-related preference to an internationalization-related preference
- Without more context about the test cases, it's unclear if this was a security fix or just a test maintenance change
- The old preference name ("gecko.handlerService.schemes.irc.1.name") might have been removed or deprecated, but this doesn't necessarily indicate a security vulnerability
- No specific vulnerability name can be associated with this change based on the information provided

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.