--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/windows/TSFTextStore.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/windows/TSFTextStore.cpp@@ -7061,6 +7061,9 @@   return TSFStaticSink::IsGoogleJapaneseInputActive(); }+// static+bool TSFTextStore::IsATOKActive() { return TSFStaticSink::IsATOKActive(); }+ /******************************************************************************  *  TSFTextStore::Content  *****************************************************************************/

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability [File] widget/windows/TSFTextStore.cpp [Lines] 7061+
[Old Code]
(No previous implementation of IsATOKActive)
[Fixed Code]
// static
bool TSFTextStore::IsATOKActive() { return TSFStaticSink::IsATOKActive(); }

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple addition of a new static method to check if ATOK (a Japanese IME) is active. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - it's just adding new functionality. The change is purely additive and doesn't modify any existing security-relevant code paths.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/zero.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/zero.rs@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@     let (s, r) = bounded(0);     assert_eq!(s.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), true);+    assert!(s.is_empty());+    assert!(s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), true);+    assert!(r.is_empty());+    assert!(r.is_full());     scope(|scope| {         scope.spawn(|_| s.send(0).unwrap());@@ -48,11 +48,11 @@     .unwrap();     assert_eq!(s.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), true);+    assert!(s.is_empty());+    assert!(s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), true);+    assert!(r.is_empty());+    assert!(r.is_full()); } #[test]@@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ #[test] fn len() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 25_000;     let (s, r) = bounded(0);@@ -249,6 +252,9 @@ #[test] fn spsc() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 100_000;     let (s, r) = bounded(0);@@ -271,6 +277,9 @@ #[test] fn mpmc() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 25_000;     const THREADS: usize = 4;@@ -303,6 +312,9 @@ #[test] fn stress_oneshot() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 10_000;     for _ in 0..COUNT {@@ -316,6 +328,7 @@     } }+#[cfg_attr(miri, ignore)] // Miri is too slow #[test] fn stress_iter() {     const COUNT: usize = 1000;@@ -383,8 +396,11 @@     .unwrap(); }+#[cfg_attr(miri, ignore)] // Miri is too slow #[test] fn drops() {+    const RUNS: usize = 100;+     static DROPS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);     #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]@@ -398,7 +414,7 @@     let mut rng = thread_rng();-    for _ in 0..100 {+    for _ in 0..RUNS {         let steps = rng.gen_range(0..3_000);         DROPS.store(0, Ordering::SeqCst);@@ -428,6 +444,9 @@ #[test] fn fairness() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 10_000;     let (s1, r1) = bounded::<()>(0);@@ -459,6 +478,9 @@ #[test] fn fairness_duplicates() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 10_000;     let (s, r) = bounded::<()>(0);@@ -517,6 +539,9 @@ #[test] fn channel_through_channel() {+    #[cfg(miri)]+    const COUNT: usize = 100;+    #[cfg(not(miri))]     const COUNT: usize = 1000;     type T = Box<dyn Any + Send>;

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Style Improvement [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/zero.rs] [Lines 35-48]
   Old Code:
   ```
   assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), true);
   assert_eq!(s.is_full(), true);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   assert!(s.is_empty());
   assert!(s.is_full());
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Optimization [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/zero.rs] [Multiple locations]
   Old Code:
   ```
   const COUNT: usize = 25_000;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   #[cfg(miri)]
   const COUNT: usize = 100;
   #[cfg(not(miri))]
   const COUNT: usize = 25_000;
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Performance Improvement [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/zero.rs] [Lines 328, 396]
   Old Code:
   ```
   #[test]
   fn stress_iter() {
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   #[cfg_attr(miri, ignore)] // Miri is too slow
   #[test]
   fn stress_iter() {
   ```

4. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Clarity Improvement [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/zero.rs] [Lines 396-414]
   Old Code:
   ```
   for _ in 0..100 {
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   const RUNS: usize = 100;
   for _ in 0..RUNS {
   ```

The changes appear to be primarily focused on:
1. Improving code style by using more idiomatic Rust assertions
2. Optimizing test performance for Miri (Rust's experimental interpreter)
3. Making test constants more configurable
4. Improving code readability by using named constants

No security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes - they are all test-related improvements and optimizations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/unicode-normalization/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/unicode-normalization/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"COPYRIGHT":"23860c2a7b5d96b21569afedf033469bab9fe14a1b24a35068b8641c578ce24d","Cargo.toml":"b262a0a92fca7f012aefc1d72eeb8923d93711f0b3a916315a0dc41584ec82fb","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"7b63ecd5f1902af1b63729947373683c32745c16a10e8e6292e2e2dcd7e90ae0","README.md":"4f0f6696be822c6e05c38ada717f1d99790b18f46d88ba4c029e80be93e735d8","scripts/unicode.py":"faff0551e945cfb13b345f21256a53c96f85e0b0d81df6e165b8b62aa8eaa8e9","scripts/unicode_gen_normtests.py":"da891d433fa58068747a1cd121774435b7d486394ce5c85c8079b227d20ea507","src/decompose.rs":"19399cb186245a973a5235118cd3a19e1834926cff4709b0d8a9cc9eea594be3","src/lib.rs":"3a2b271fa833f159d899875a88172b053a7a57c0d9786d5c6ac96fd82c6d7efb","src/normalize.rs":"06580af2b630c17da50e36aaafb9f0e3a728d5ee1de45d6ac1f3043ca723e670","src/recompose.rs":"936bf16efe318f06040bd3a8d2085a4c2e68a03c91d98b7e349f090f88752f9f","src/tables.rs":"566c4b764fa9d21abc8668681821c0bcbb3c54b1956795dc58be506f5540ced7","src/test.rs":"83a05c7dd030069cc1baff70c9933ef3ee65b9aeda4ca32cbbcc1d4c1a33979f","src/testdata.rs":"8def8bcd8a24c700881c57eab78c6fdf19295969f4783eb4a138f25616519d75"},"package":"51ccda9ef9efa3f7ef5d91e8f9b83bbe6955f9bf86aec89d5cce2c874625920f"}+{"files":{"COPYRIGHT":"23860c2a7b5d96b21569afedf033469bab9fe14a1b24a35068b8641c578ce24d","Cargo.toml":"de7af66ede1e1b369adcdf82174fd97782a26cf11d66deb2bdb518741675e15a","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"7b63ecd5f1902af1b63729947373683c32745c16a10e8e6292e2e2dcd7e90ae0","README.md":"4e01af0960f3a9abb8a06b64bc903d730a9b285098ec9a1af9bceb135d08a660","benches/bench.rs":"eb8b04b99ac55f8583893ff23385194002472e9b5182e3c74636b989caa163db","scripts/unicode.py":"06e074696ea85b24a82bcad360b7ec765e4bd9ebc574e722689ea2434e8a0548","src/decompose.rs":"7cf48297bfeace89e43e7a0402ca05f4d508c732bf7befddf63ad1e95d14c8c4","src/lib.rs":"5cb3d00fffe5c3cb8f0f1cb4317894946c93247e08f7c612275bfd8948db7a02","src/normalization_tests.rs":"de293b9aa396b1b4235b7bfb460e216e2dc874f4ee58bbf54458173e22363cb1","src/normalize.rs":"82f1a3511432349799b42a360ef4a993a4df7e492d88fdc918adf317317c0ed6","src/quick_check.rs":"73335b915e483604c7d10491bc925fda1bbd29e32ce5dd7529cbe4982034780a","src/recompose.rs":"bf04c41bbcfce4717944f1974b87b97619ba66ca7ebec86745dd53493564e170","src/stream_safe.rs":"18f48fbb6afaa6d75289fe1c473bf9e610e76b3119acf7358b1b12d77b0a85fa","src/tables.rs":"c9c0a7cbdd27c11eb444de215153ba02e08cb9cd485c09855005bf23d30f8502","src/test.rs":"5b51a97954f053c251181277faf7ca8ab8f1a7167104f535fbfad97568442571"},"package":"6a0180bc61fc5a987082bfa111f4cc95c4caff7f9799f3e46df09163a937aa25"}=========gfx/layers/GLImages.h========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/GLImages.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/GLImages.h@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@   SurfaceTextureImage* AsSurfaceTextureImage() override { return this; }+  Maybe<SurfaceDescriptor> GetDesc() override;+   void RegisterSetCurrentCallback(UniquePtr<SetCurrentCallback> aCallback) {     mSetCurrentCallback = std::move(aCallback);   }

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. For the first file (unicode-normalization/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found in checksum file update
    [Old checksum values]
    [Updated checksum values]

2. For the second file (gfx/layers/GLImages.h):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Missing Override Vulnerability [gfx/layers/GLImages.h] [Lines around 59]
    [Previous code without GetDesc() override]
    [Added GetDesc() override declaration]

Additional notes:
- The first change appears to be a routine update of checksums for the unicode-normalization package, which doesn't indicate any security fixes.
- The second change adds a method override declaration. While this could potentially be related to fixing a security issue (like fixing improper inheritance that could lead to undefined behavior), there's not enough context to confirm this was specifically a security fix. The change could also be purely functional in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.convolveMatrix.exceptions.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.convolveMatrix.exceptions.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { new CanvasFilter({filter: "convolveMatrix"}); }); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { new CanvasFilter({filter: "convolveMatrix", divisor: 2}); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/filters/2d.filter.canvasFilterObject.convolveMatrix.exceptions.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect the functionality or introduce any security-related fixes. The test assertions remain the same, only the variable name was changed for better readability or consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-min-width-block-intrinsic-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-min-width-block-intrinsic-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-min-width-block-intrinsic-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { font-size: 10px }

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Meta Tag Removal [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-min-width-block-intrinsic-1.html] [Lines 5]
    [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code] (removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
- The "flags" meta tag was likely used for test configuration and its removal doesn't impact security.
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
- The modification appears to be a cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix.

No other changes were present in the diff to analyze. The modification is too trivial to constitute a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-025.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/inset/shape-outside-inset-025.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-inset-025-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the inset(10px round 60px 0/ 40px 0) border-box value under vertical-lr writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags", which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerabilities are evident in this change
- The modification is part of web platform test maintenance, not a security patch

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.copy.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.copy.worker.js@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'copy';         ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-35]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);
    ```
    Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. No security implications are evident in this change.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Assertion Update [File] [Lines 35]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);
    ```
    Additional Details: This change simply updates the assertion to use the renamed variable (`canvas` instead of `offscreenCanvas`). No security vulnerability is addressed here.

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, with no identifiable security fixes or vulnerabilities being addressed. The modifications are consistent throughout the file, maintaining the same functionality while improving variable naming consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/ipc/GPUProcessHost.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/ipc/GPUProcessHost.cpp@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ void GPUProcessHost::KillHard(const char* aReason) {   ProcessHandle handle = GetChildProcessHandle();-  if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER, false)) {+  if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER)) {     NS_WARNING("failed to kill subprocess!");   }

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Improper Process Termination] [gfx/ipc/GPUProcessHost.cpp] [Lines 228]
   [Old Code]
   if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER, false)) {
   [Fixed Code]
   if (!base::KillProcess(handle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER)) {

Additional Details:
- The change removes the 'false' parameter from the KillProcess call, which likely controlled whether to wait for process termination.
- Without knowing the exact semantics of this parameter, it's unclear if this was a security issue.
- The change might relate to making process termination more reliable, but we can't confirm a specific vulnerability was fixed.
- No specific CVE or vulnerability name is immediately apparent from this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-margin-box-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-margin-box-001.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-margin-box-001-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the margin-box value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
- The removed tag didn't contain any sensitive information or pose any security risk.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change.
- This appears to be part of general code maintenance rather than addressing a specific security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.3.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 0); ctx.arc(100, 0, 150, (512+1/2)*Math.PI, (1024-1)*Math.PI, true); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 23]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are simply renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. There are no security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.animated.poster.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.animated.poster.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.animated.poster.html [Lines] 18-33
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.animated.poster.html [Lines] 33
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring (renaming 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') rather than security fixes. No actual security vulnerabilities are addressed in this diff. The changes maintain the same functionality while improving code consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-003.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ 		<link rel="author" href="http://opera.com" title="Opera Software ASA"> 		<link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-conditional/#at-supports"> 		<link rel="match" href="at-supports-001-ref.html">-		<meta name="flags" content=""> 		<style> 			div { 				background-color:red;

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-003.html] [Lines 6]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be test cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with empty meta tags
- The change doesn't introduce any new security concerns
- The modification is likely related to test configuration rather than security

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The change is minor and doesn't appear to address any security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/image/imgRequest.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/image/imgRequest.cpp@@ -556,8 +556,7 @@   //   // We have the original URI in the cache key though, probably we should be   // using that instead of relying on Init() getting called.-  auto info = nsContentUtils::GetSubresourceCacheValidationInfo(-      aRequest, uri, nsContentUtils::SubresourceKind::Image);+  auto info = nsContentUtils::GetSubresourceCacheValidationInfo(aRequest, uri);   // Expiration time defaults to 0. We set the expiration time on our entry if   // it hasn't been set yet.

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Cache Validation Information Leak [File] image/imgRequest.cpp [Lines] 556-557
[Old Code]
auto info = nsContentUtils::GetSubresourceCacheValidationInfo(
      aRequest, uri, nsContentUtils::SubresourceKind::Image);
[Fixed Code]
auto info = nsContentUtils::GetSubresourceCacheValidationInfo(aRequest, uri);

Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to unnecessary information disclosure in cache validation. The old code was explicitly specifying the resource type (Image) when requesting cache validation information, which could potentially leak information about the application's internal structure or resource handling. The fixed version removes this explicit type specification, making the call more generic and reducing information exposure. While not a critical security flaw, this could be considered an information disclosure issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/ScreenLength.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/ScreenLength.java@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ public class ScreenLength {   @Retention(RetentionPolicy.SOURCE)   @IntDef({PIXEL, VISUAL_VIEWPORT_WIDTH, VISUAL_VIEWPORT_HEIGHT, DOCUMENT_WIDTH, DOCUMENT_HEIGHT})-  /* package */ @interface ScreenLengthType {}+  public @interface ScreenLengthType {}   /** Pixel units. */   public static final int PIXEL = 0;

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Access Control Issue] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/geckoview/ScreenLength.java] [Lines 17]
   Old Code: `/* package */ @interface ScreenLengthType {}`
   Fixed Code: `public @interface ScreenLengthType {}`

Additional details:
- The change modifies the visibility of the `ScreenLengthType` annotation from package-private to public
- While this isn't a classic vulnerability, it could potentially affect security if:
  * The annotation was intentionally restricted to package access for security reasons
  * Making it public could allow broader access than intended
- Without more context about how this annotation is used, we can't be certain if this was a security fix or just a visibility adjustment

No clear vulnerability name applies here, but it's worth noting the access control change. The impact would depend on how this annotation is used in the codebase.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nv/ray_tracing.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nv/ray_tracing.rs@@ -8,18 +8,16 @@ #[derive(Clone)] pub struct RayTracing {     handle: vk::Device,-    ray_tracing_fn: vk::NvRayTracingFn,+    fp: vk::NvRayTracingFn, } impl RayTracing {     pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {-        let ray_tracing_fn = vk::NvRayTracingFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+        let handle = device.handle();+        let fp = vk::NvRayTracingFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: device.handle(),-            ray_tracing_fn,-        }+        Self { handle, fp }     }     pub unsafe fn get_properties(@@ -41,7 +39,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::AccelerationStructureNV> {         let mut accel_struct = mem::zeroed();-        self.ray_tracing_fn+        self.fp             .create_acceleration_structure_nv(                 self.handle,                 create_info,@@ -57,7 +55,7 @@         accel_struct: vk::AccelerationStructureNV,         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) {-        self.ray_tracing_fn.destroy_acceleration_structure_nv(+        self.fp.destroy_acceleration_structure_nv(             self.handle,             accel_struct,             allocation_callbacks.as_raw_ptr(),@@ -70,12 +68,11 @@         info: &vk::AccelerationStructureMemoryRequirementsInfoNV,     ) -> vk::MemoryRequirements2KHR {         let mut requirements = mem::zeroed();-        self.ray_tracing_fn-            .get_acceleration_structure_memory_requirements_nv(-                self.handle,-                info,-                &mut requirements,-            );+        self.fp.get_acceleration_structure_memory_requirements_nv(+            self.handle,+            info,+            &mut requirements,+        );         requirements     }@@ -84,13 +81,13 @@         &self,         bind_info: &[vk::BindAccelerationStructureMemoryInfoNV],     ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.ray_tracing_fn+        self.fp             .bind_acceleration_structure_memory_nv(                 self.handle,                 bind_info.len() as u32,                 bind_info.as_ptr(),             )-            .into()+            .result()     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCmdBuildAccelerationStructureNV.html>"]@@ -106,7 +103,7 @@         scratch: vk::Buffer,         scratch_offset: vk::DeviceSize,     ) {-        self.ray_tracing_fn.cmd_build_acceleration_structure_nv(+        self.fp.cmd_build_acceleration_structure_nv(             command_buffer,             info,             instance_data,@@ -127,7 +124,7 @@         src: vk::AccelerationStructureNV,         mode: vk::CopyAccelerationStructureModeNV,     ) {-        self.ray_tracing_fn+        self.fp             .cmd_copy_acceleration_structure_nv(command_buffer, dst, src, mode);     }@@ -150,7 +147,7 @@         height: u32,         depth: u32,     ) {-        self.ray_tracing_fn.cmd_trace_rays_nv(+        self.fp.cmd_trace_rays_nv(             command_buffer,             raygen_shader_binding_table_buffer,             raygen_shader_binding_offset,@@ -177,7 +174,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<Vec<vk::Pipeline>> {         let mut pipelines = vec![mem::zeroed(); create_info.len()];-        self.ray_tracing_fn+        self.fp             .create_ray_tracing_pipelines_nv(                 self.handle,                 pipeline_cache,@@ -197,7 +194,7 @@         group_count: u32,         data: &mut [u8],     ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.ray_tracing_fn+        self.fp             .get_ray_tracing_shader_group_handles_nv(                 self.handle,                 pipeline,@@ -206,7 +203,7 @@                 data.len(),                 data.as_mut_ptr() as *mut std::ffi::c_void,             )-            .into()+            .result()     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetAccelerationStructureHandleNV.html>"]@@ -216,7 +213,7 @@     ) -> VkResult<u64> {         let mut handle: u64 = 0;         let handle_ptr: *mut u64 = &mut handle;-        self.ray_tracing_fn+        self.fp             .get_acceleration_structure_handle_nv(                 self.handle,                 accel_struct,@@ -235,22 +232,21 @@         query_pool: vk::QueryPool,         first_query: u32,     ) {-        self.ray_tracing_fn-            .cmd_write_acceleration_structures_properties_nv(-                command_buffer,-                structures.len() as u32,-                structures.as_ptr(),-                query_type,-                query_pool,-                first_query,-            );+        self.fp.cmd_write_acceleration_structures_properties_nv(+            command_buffer,+            structures.len() as u32,+            structures.as_ptr(),+            query_type,+            query_pool,+            first_query,+        );     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCompileDeferredNV.html>"]     pub unsafe fn compile_deferred(&self, pipeline: vk::Pipeline, shader: u32) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.ray_tracing_fn+        self.fp             .compile_deferred_nv(self.handle, pipeline, shader)-            .into()+            .result()     }     pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {@@ -258,7 +254,7 @@     }     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::NvRayTracingFn {-        &self.ray_tracing_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device {

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily renaming (`ray_tracing_fn` to `fp`) and some minor code style improvements. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nv/ray_tracing.rs] [8-16]
   Old Code: 
   ```rust
   ray_tracing_fn: vk::NvRayTracingFn,
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   fp: vk::NvRayTracingFn,
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nv/ray_tracing.rs] [39-55]
   Old Code: 
   ```rust
   self.ray_tracing_fn
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   self.fp
   ```

The changes are mostly cosmetic and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains the same, just with renamed variables and slightly more concise code in some places. The unsafe blocks and memory operations remain unchanged in their security properties.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/ch-unit-003.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <title>CSS Values and Units Test: support for the ch unit</title> <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="http://florian.rivoal.net/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-values-3/#font-relative-lengths">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <link rel="match" href="reference/ch-unit-001-ref.html"> <meta name="assert" content="In vertical mixed, The ch unit is equal to the used horizontal advance measure of the 0 (ZERO, U+0030) glyph found in the font used to render it."> <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test file maintenance rather than security fixes.

Analysis:
1. The main change is the removal of an empty `meta` tag with `name="flags"` attribute.
2. This appears to be test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
3. No actual code changes that could affect security were made.

Answer:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change appears to be test file maintenance (removing an empty meta tag).

The diff shows only minor test file modifications without any security implications. The removed line was an empty meta tag that likely served no purpose in the test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-3.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsla(0, 0, 50%, 1,)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be variable renaming and test case adjustments rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hsla-3.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely:
1. Renaming variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
2. Using the renamed variable in the _assertPixel call
3. No security implications in these changes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.basic-manual.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.basic-manual.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#000'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 13-14]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security implications or vulnerabilities are apparent in this change
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are affected by this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.shadow.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.shadow.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 0; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. The functionality remains the same.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.shadow.html] [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");]

The changes don't introduce or fix any security issues - they're simply variable name changes that don't affect the security posture of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/webp/decode.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/webp/decode.h@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ // Upon return, the Y buffer has a stride returned as '*stride', while U and V // have a common stride returned as '*uv_stride'. // Return NULL in case of error.-// (*) Also named Y'CbCr. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YCbCr+// (*) Also named Y'CbCr. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YCbCr WEBP_EXTERN uint8_t* WebPDecodeYUV(const uint8_t* data, size_t data_size,                                    int* width, int* height,                                    uint8_t** u, uint8_t** v,

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
HTTP to HTTPS Link Update [File] [Lines]  
media/libwebp/src/webp/decode.h 85  
[Old Code]  
// (*) Also named Y'CbCr. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YCbCr  
[Fixed Code]  
// (*) Also named Y'CbCr. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YCbCr  

Additional Details:  
This change updates an HTTP URL to HTTPS in a comment. While this improves security by using encrypted connections when users follow the reference link, it doesn't represent a fix for a vulnerability in the code itself. The modification is purely a documentation improvement to promote secure browsing.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.