--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.2.double.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.2.double.html@@ -17,18 +17,18 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [0, 20, 0, 0]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.2.double.html] [Lines 17-32]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were fixed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/path_list.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/path_list.rs@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ use syn::{Meta, NestedMeta, Path};-use {Error, FromMeta, Result};+use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result}; /// A list of `syn::Path` instances. This type is used to extract a list of paths from an /// attribute.@@ -27,7 +27,16 @@     /// Create a new `Vec` containing the string representation of each path.     pub fn to_strings(&self) -> Vec<String> {-        self.0.iter().map(|p| p.segments.iter().map(|s| s.ident.to_string()).collect::<Vec<String>>().join("::")).collect()+        self.0+            .iter()+            .map(|p| {+                p.segments+                    .iter()+                    .map(|s| s.ident.to_string())+                    .collect::<Vec<String>>()+                    .join("::")+            })+            .collect()     } }@@ -63,9 +72,9 @@ #[cfg(test)] mod tests {     use super::PathList;+    use crate::FromMeta;     use proc_macro2::TokenStream;     use syn::{Attribute, Meta};-    use FromMeta;     /// parse a string as a syn::Meta instance.     fn pm(tokens: TokenStream) -> ::std::result::Result<Meta, String> {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily code style improvements and module import organization. Here's my analysis:

1. First change (import statement update):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [Module Import Organization] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/path_list.rs] [Lines 3]
    Old Code: `use {Error, FromMeta, Result};`
    Fixed Code: `use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result};`
    Note: This is just a style/organization change, not a security fix

2. Second change (method formatting):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [Code Formatting] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/path_list.rs] [Lines 27-36]
    Old Code: Single-line complex chained iterator operations
    Fixed Code: Properly formatted multi-line version of same logic
    Note: This improves readability but doesn't address any security issue

3. Third change (test module imports):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [Test Module Organization] [third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/path_list.rs] [Lines 63-66]
    Old Code: Mixed import styles in test module
    Fixed Code: Consistent crate-relative imports
    Note: This is purely organizational

None of these changes appear to address security vulnerabilities. They seem to be code quality improvements focused on:
- Consistent use of crate-relative imports
- Better code formatting
- Test module organization

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are all related to code style and maintainability rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/dev/code_organization.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/dev/code_organization.md@@ -1,9 +1,4 @@ # FOG code organization--```{note}-Project FOG is currently being designed and implemented.-This documentation is incomplete and may change significantly before FOG is usable inside mozilla-central.-``` ![Modules of Project FOG](images/fog-modules.svg)

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a documentation change rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Documentation Update] [toolkit/components/glean/docs/dev/code_organization.md] [Lines 1-9]
[Old Code]
```{note}
Project FOG is currently being designed and implemented.
This documentation is incomplete and may change significantly before FOG is usable inside mozilla-central.
```

[Fixed Code]
[Note block was completely removed]

Additional Details:
- This is purely a documentation change removing a note about the project being in development
- No code changes were made that would affect security
- No actual vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff
- The change appears to be updating documentation to reflect that the project is now stable/usable in mozilla-central

The diff shows no evidence of any security vulnerabilities being fixed - it's simply removing outdated documentation text.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/public/Utility.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/public/Utility.h@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@   THREAD_TYPE_ION_FREE,              // 9   THREAD_TYPE_WASM_GENERATOR_TIER2,  // 10   THREAD_TYPE_WORKER,                // 11+  THREAD_TYPE_DELAZIFY,              // 12+  THREAD_TYPE_DELAZIFY_FREE,         // 13   THREAD_TYPE_MAX                    // Used to check shell function arguments };

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [js/public/Utility.h] [Lines 66-68]
[Old Code]
  THREAD_TYPE_ION_FREE,              // 9
  THREAD_TYPE_WASM_GENERATOR_TIER2,  // 10
  THREAD_TYPE_WORKER,                // 11
[Fixed Code]
  THREAD_TYPE_ION_FREE,              // 9
  THREAD_TYPE_WASM_GENERATOR_TIER2,  // 10
  THREAD_TYPE_WORKER,                // 11
  THREAD_TYPE_DELAZIFY,              // 12
  THREAD_TYPE_DELAZIFY_FREE,         // 13

Additional Details:
- The diff shows an addition of two new thread types (DELAZIFY and DELAZIFY_FREE) to an enum
- This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix
- No obvious security vulnerabilities are being patched in this change
- The change is likely related to adding support for new thread types in the JavaScript engine
- No CVE or known vulnerability is associated with this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-tabs-base.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-tabs-base.js@@ -676,29 +676,47 @@   /**    * Query each content process hosting subframes of the tab, return results.+   *    * @param {string} message    * @param {object} options-   * @param {number} options.frameID-   * @param {boolean} options.allFrames+   *        These options are also sent to the message handler in the+   *        `ExtensionContentChild`.+   * @param {number[]} options.frameIds+   *        When omitted, all frames will be queried.+   * @param {boolean} options.returnResultsWithFrameIds    * @returns {Promise[]}    */   async queryContent(message, options) {-    let { allFrames, frameID } = options;+    let { frameIds } = options;     /** @type {Map<nsIDOMProcessParent, innerWindowId[]>} */     let byProcess = new DefaultMap(() => []);+    // We use this set to know which frame IDs are potentially invalid (as in+    // not found when visiting the tab's BC tree below) when frameIds is a+    // non-empty list of frame IDs.+    let frameIdsSet = new Set(frameIds);     // Recursively walk the tab's BC tree, find all frames, group by process.     function visit(bc) {       let win = bc.currentWindowGlobal;-      if (win?.domProcess && (!frameID || frameID === bc.id)) {+      let frameId = bc.parent ? bc.id : 0;++      if (win?.domProcess && (!frameIds || frameIdsSet.has(frameId))) {         byProcess.get(win.domProcess).push(win.innerWindowId);-      }-      if (allFrames || (frameID && !byProcess.size)) {+        frameIdsSet.delete(frameId);+      }++      if (!frameIds || frameIdsSet.size > 0) {         bc.children.forEach(visit);       }     }     visit(this.browsingContext);++    if (frameIdsSet.size > 0) {+      throw new ExtensionError(+        `Invalid frame IDs: [${Array.from(frameIdsSet).join(", ")}].`+      );+    }     let promises = Array.from(byProcess.entries(), ([proc, windows]) =>       proc.getActor("ExtensionContent").sendQuery(message, { windows, options })@@ -715,15 +733,15 @@     results = results.flat();     if (!results.length) {-      if (frameID) {-        throw new ExtensionError("Frame not found, or missing host permission");-      }--      let frames = allFrames ? ", and any iframes" : "";-      throw new ExtensionError(`Missing host permission for the tab${frames}`);-    }--    if (!allFrames && results.length > 1) {+      let errorMessage = "Missing host permission for the tab";+      if (!frameIds || frameIds.length > 1 || frameIds[0] !== 0) {+        errorMessage += " or frames";+      }++      throw new ExtensionError(errorMessage);+    }++    if (frameIds && frameIds.length === 1 && results.length > 1) {       throw new ExtensionError("Internal error: multiple windows matched");     }@@ -787,12 +805,15 @@       }       options[`${kind}Paths`].push(url);     }+     if (details.allFrames) {-      options.allFrames = details.allFrames;-    }-    if (details.frameId !== null) {-      options.frameID = details.frameId;-    }+      options.allFrames = true;+    } else if (details.frameId !== null) {+      options.frameIds = [details.frameId];+    } else if (!details.allFrames) {+      options.frameIds = [0];+    }+     if (details.matchAboutBlank) {       options.matchAboutBlank = details.matchAboutBlank;     }@@ -808,6 +829,10 @@     }     options.wantReturnValue = true;++    // The scripting API (defined in `parent/ext-scripting.js`) has its own+    // `execute()` function that calls `queryContent()` as well. Make sure to+    // keep both in sync when relevant.     return this.queryContent("Execute", options);   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Input Validation Vulnerability] [toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-tabs-base.js] [Lines 676-715]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   async queryContent(message, options) {
     let { allFrames, frameID } = options;
     // ... no validation of frameID
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   async queryContent(message, options) {
     let { frameIds } = options;
     let frameIdsSet = new Set(frameIds);
     // ... added validation for frame IDs
     if (frameIdsSet.size > 0) {
       throw new ExtensionError(
         `Invalid frame IDs: [${Array.from(frameIdsSet).join(", ")}].`
       );
     }
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The fix adds validation for frame IDs, which could prevent potential security issues from invalid input.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak Vulnerability] [toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-tabs-base.js] [Lines 715-730]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   if (frameID) {
     throw new ExtensionError("Frame not found, or missing host permission");
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   let errorMessage = "Missing host permission for the tab";
   if (!frameIds || frameIds.length > 1 || frameIds[0] !== 0) {
     errorMessage += " or frames";
   }
   throw new ExtensionError(errorMessage);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The error message handling was changed to be more precise about permission issues, which might help prevent information leakage about internal frame structures.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Parameter Handling Issue] [toolkit/components/extensions/parent/ext-tabs-base.js] [Lines 787-815]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   if (details.allFrames) {
     options.allFrames = details.allFrames;
   }
   if (details.frameId !== null) {
     options.frameID = details.frameId;
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   if (details.allFrames) {
     options.allFrames = true;
   } else if (details.frameId !== null) {
     options.frameIds = [details.frameId];
   } else if (!details.allFrames) {
     options.frameIds = [0];
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The parameter handling was made more explicit and consistent, which could prevent potential security issues from inconsistent parameter states.

Note: While I couldn't identify specific named vulnerabilities, these changes appear to improve input validation and error handling, which are generally security-positive modifications. The changes make the code more robust against potential invalid inputs and edge cases.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/Caches.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/Caches.h@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "vm/JSObject.h" #include "vm/JSScript.h" #include "vm/NativeObject.h"+#include "vm/StencilCache.h"  // js::StencilCache namespace js {@@ -120,10 +121,19 @@ class RuntimeCaches {  public:-  js::GSNCache gsnCache;-  js::UncompressedSourceCache uncompressedSourceCache;-  js::EvalCache evalCache;-  js::StringToAtomCache stringToAtomCache;+  GSNCache gsnCache;+  UncompressedSourceCache uncompressedSourceCache;+  EvalCache evalCache;+  StringToAtomCache stringToAtomCache;++  // This cache is used to store the result of delazification compilations which+  // might be happening off-thread. The main-thread will concurrently read the+  // content of this cache to avoid delazification, or fallback on running the+  // delazification on the main-thread.+  //+  // Main-thread results are not stored in the StencilCache as there is no other+  // consumer.+  StencilCache delazificationCache;   void sweepAfterMinorGC(JSTracer* trc) { evalCache.traceWeak(trc); } #ifdef JSGC_HASH_TABLE_CHECKS@@ -135,10 +145,13 @@     stringToAtomCache.purge();   }+  void purgeStencils() { delazificationCache.clearAndDisable(); }+   void purge() {     purgeForCompaction();     gsnCache.purge();     uncompressedSourceCache.purge();+    purgeStencils();   } };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Management Issue] [js/src/vm/Caches.h] [Lines 120-145]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   class RuntimeCaches {
    public:
     js::GSNCache gsnCache;
     js::UncompressedSourceCache uncompressedSourceCache;
     js::EvalCache evalCache;
     js::StringToAtomCache stringToAtomCache;
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   class RuntimeCaches {
    public:
     GSNCache gsnCache;
     UncompressedSourceCache uncompressedSourceCache;
     EvalCache evalCache;
     StringToAtomCache stringToAtomCache;
     StencilCache delazificationCache;
   ```

   Additional Details:  
   The diff adds a new `StencilCache` member and corresponding cleanup methods. While this isn't fixing a known vulnerability, adding new caches without proper cleanup could potentially lead to memory leaks or other issues if not handled correctly. The patch includes proper cleanup methods (`purgeStencils()`), so this appears to be a proactive addition rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Race Condition] [js/src/vm/Caches.h] [Lines 120-145]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   // (No mention of thread-safety or concurrent access)
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   // This cache is used to store the result of delazification compilations which
   // might be happening off-thread. The main-thread will concurrently read the
   // content of this cache...
   ```

   Additional Details:  
   The added comments mention concurrent access patterns, suggesting the need for thread safety. While not a direct fix, this addition indicates awareness of potential race conditions that could lead to security issues if not properly handled.

Note: The diff primarily adds functionality rather than fixing known vulnerabilities. The security implications would depend on the implementation details of the new `StencilCache` class and its thread-safety mechanisms, which aren't visible in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.initial.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.initial.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.initial.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c@@ -5525,7 +5525,7 @@     if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) {         if (extensionBuf.len) {-            rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(ss, chBuf.len, &extensionBuf);+            rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf);             if (rv != SECSuccess) {                 goto loser; /* err set by tls13_MaybeGreaseEch. */             }@@ -9809,21 +9809,26 @@         return SECFailure;     }     if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(extensionBuf)) {+        /* Directly copy the extensions */         rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(messageBuf, extensionBuf, 2);         if (rv != SECSuccess) {             return SECFailure;         }     }-    if (!helloRetry && ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_ech_is_inner_xtn)) {+    if (ss->xtnData.ech && ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn) {         /* Signal ECH acceptance if we handled handled both CHOuter/CHInner (i.e.          * in shared mode), or if we received a CHInner in split/backend mode. */         if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) {-            return tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),-                                              SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));-        }-    }-+            if (helloRetry) {+                return tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),+                                                     SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));+            } else {+                return tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),+                                                  SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));+            }+        }+    }     return SECSuccess; }@@ -13499,6 +13504,7 @@     ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL;     ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL;     ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE;+    ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_FALSE;     PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space);     ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL;

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Buffer Overflow Potential [File] security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c [Lines 5525]
[Old Code]
rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(ss, chBuf.len, &extensionBuf);
[Fixed Code]
rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf);
[Details] The change passes the buffer structure instead of just its length, which is safer as the function can properly validate bounds.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Inconsistent ECH State Handling [File] security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c [Lines 9809-9826]
[Old Code]
if (!helloRetry && ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_ech_is_inner_xtn)) {
    if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) {
        return tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),
                                          SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));
    }
}
[Fixed Code]
if (ss->xtnData.ech && ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn) {
    if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) {
        if (helloRetry) {
            return tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),
                                                 SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));
        } else {
            return tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf),
                                              SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf));
        }
    }
}
[Details] The fix improves ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) state handling by adding proper checks for helloRetry and using more specific state flags.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
State Initialization Improvement [File] security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c [Lines 13499-13504]
[Old Code]
ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE;
[Fixed Code]
ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE;
ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_FALSE;
[Details] The addition of echDecided flag suggests better state tracking, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving robustness.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_comparator.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_comparator.h@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ // Computes the score given images in any RGB color model, optionally with // alpha channel. float ComputeScore(const ImageBundle& rgb0, const ImageBundle& rgb1,-                   Comparator* comparator, ImageF* diffmap = nullptr,-                   ThreadPool* pool = nullptr);+                   Comparator* comparator, const JxlCmsInterface& cms,+                   ImageF* diffmap = nullptr, ThreadPool* pool = nullptr); }  // namespace jxl

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Missing Color Management System (CMS) Parameter] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/enc_comparator.h] [Lines 44-48]  
[Old Code]  
`float ComputeScore(const ImageBundle& rgb0, const ImageBundle& rgb1, Comparator* comparator, ImageF* diffmap = nullptr, ThreadPool* pool = nullptr);`  
[Fixed Code]  
`float ComputeScore(const ImageBundle& rgb0, const ImageBundle& rgb1, Comparator* comparator, const JxlCmsInterface& cms, ImageF* diffmap = nullptr, ThreadPool* pool = nullptr);`  

Additional Details:  
The change adds a required `JxlCmsInterface& cms` parameter to the `ComputeScore` function. While this isn't a classic security vulnerability, it could potentially relate to color management security if the previous version was performing color conversions without proper CMS handling. The addition suggests the function now properly handles color management, which could prevent potential color-related security issues in image processing. However, without more context about how this function is used, we can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.fontKerning.with.uppercase.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.drawing.style.fontKerning.with.uppercase.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertSame(ctx.fontKerning, "auto", "ctx.fontKerning", "\"auto\""); ctx.fontKerning = "Normal";

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes are visible in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- The test case continues to perform the same font kerning assertion checks

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/ipc/GPUParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/ipc/GPUParent.cpp@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ #  include "skia/include/ports/SkTypeface_cairo.h" #endif #ifdef ANDROID+#  include "mozilla/layers/AndroidHardwareBuffer.h" #  include "skia/include/ports/SkTypeface_cairo.h" #endif #include "ChildProfilerController.h"@@ -334,6 +335,13 @@   // false to match gfxAndroidPlatform::FontHintingEnabled(). We must   // hardcode this value because we do not have a gfxPlatform instance.   SkInitCairoFT(false);++  if (gfxVars::UseAHardwareBufferContent() ||+      gfxVars::UseAHardwareBufferSharedSurface()) {+    layers::AndroidHardwareBufferApi::Init();+    layers::AndroidHardwareBufferManager::Init();+  }+ #endif   // Make sure to do this *after* we update gfxVars above.

Based on the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Initialization] [gfx/ipc/GPUParent.cpp] [Lines 335-341]
[Old Code]
  SkInitCairoFT(false);
#endif
[Fixed Code]
  SkInitCairoFT(false);

  if (gfxVars::UseAHardwareBufferContent() ||
      gfxVars::UseAHardwareBufferSharedSurface()) {
    layers::AndroidHardwareBufferApi::Init();
    layers::AndroidHardwareBufferManager::Init();
  }

#endif

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows added initialization code for Android hardware buffer functionality when certain conditions are met (UseAHardwareBufferContent or UseAHardwareBufferSharedSurface).
2. While this isn't a direct security fix for a known vulnerability, missing initialization of critical components could potentially lead to security issues if the uninitialized components are used.
3. The change ensures proper initialization of Android hardware buffer APIs before they might be used, which could prevent potential crashes or undefined behavior.
4. Without more context about how these components are used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code robustness.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/wasm/jsapi/exception/getArg.tentative.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/wasm/jsapi/exception/getArg.tentative.any.js@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ test(() => {   const tag = new WebAssembly.Tag({ parameters: [] });   const exn = new WebAssembly.Exception(tag, []);-  assert_throws_js(RangeError, () => exn.getArg(tag, 1));+  assert_throws_js(TypeError, () => exn.getArg(tag, 1)); }, "Index out of bounds"); test(() => {

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [testing/web-platform/tests/wasm/jsapi/exception/getArg.tentative.any.js] [Lines 20]
[Old Code]
assert_throws_js(RangeError, () => exn.getArg(tag, 1));
[Fixed Code]
assert_throws_js(TypeError, () => exn.getArg(tag, 1));

Additional Details:
The change modifies the expected error type from RangeError to TypeError when accessing an out-of-bounds index in a WebAssembly Exception's argument. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability fix, it might represent an improvement in error handling consistency or correctness. The change suggests the developers determined that TypeError is more appropriate than RangeError for this specific case of invalid argument access in WebAssembly exceptions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/frontend/svgs.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/frontend/svgs.md@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # Panel SVGs-These are the guidelines for creating devtools SVGs to make sure they're as small and neatly formatted as possible. The Mozilla Developer SVG guidelines can be found [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/SVG_Guidelines).+These are the guidelines for creating devtools SVGs to make sure they're as small and neatly formatted as possible. The Mozilla Developer SVG guidelines can be found [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/SVG). ## Explanation of Pixel Grid Since so many of our SVGs appear so small, designing them on the pixel grid will help them not appear fuzzy when they're sized down to 16x16 pixels. There is program-specific documentation in both the [Illustrator](#illustrator) and [Sketch](#sketch) sections.

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/docs/contributor/frontend/svgs.md [Lines] 1
    [Old Code] The Mozilla Developer SVG guidelines can be found [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/SVG_Guidelines).
    [Fixed Code] The Mozilla Developer SVG guidelines can be found [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/SVG).

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple documentation update where the URL to SVG guidelines was updated to a more current/relevant location.
- No security-related changes were made - this is purely a documentation link update.
- The old link redirected to the new one, so there wasn't even a broken link issue being fixed.
- No code or security-relevant content was modified in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/get_memory_requirements2.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/get_memory_requirements2.rs@@ -7,22 +7,16 @@ #[derive(Clone)] pub struct GetMemoryRequirements2 {     handle: vk::Device,-    get_memory_requirements2_fn: vk::KhrGetMemoryRequirements2Fn,+    fp: vk::KhrGetMemoryRequirements2Fn, } impl GetMemoryRequirements2 {     pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {-        let get_memory_requirements2_fn = vk::KhrGetMemoryRequirements2Fn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+        let handle = device.handle();+        let fp = vk::KhrGetMemoryRequirements2Fn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: device.handle(),-            get_memory_requirements2_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::KhrGetMemoryRequirements2Fn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetBufferMemoryRequirements2KHR.html>"]@@ -31,7 +25,7 @@         info: &vk::BufferMemoryRequirementsInfo2KHR,         memory_requirements: &mut vk::MemoryRequirements2KHR,     ) {-        self.get_memory_requirements2_fn+        self.fp             .get_buffer_memory_requirements2_khr(self.handle, info, memory_requirements);     }@@ -41,43 +35,49 @@         info: &vk::ImageMemoryRequirementsInfo2KHR,         memory_requirements: &mut vk::MemoryRequirements2KHR,     ) {-        self.get_memory_requirements2_fn+        self.fp             .get_image_memory_requirements2_khr(self.handle, info, memory_requirements);     }+    /// Retrieve the number of elements to pass to [`Self::get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2()`]     pub unsafe fn get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_len(         &self,         info: &vk::ImageSparseMemoryRequirementsInfo2KHR,     ) -> usize {         let mut count = 0;-        self.get_memory_requirements2_fn-            .get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_khr(-                self.handle,-                info,-                &mut count,-                ptr::null_mut(),-            );+        self.fp.get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_khr(+            self.handle,+            info,+            &mut count,+            ptr::null_mut(),+        );         count as usize     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetImageSparseMemoryRequirements2KHR.html>"]+    ///+    /// Call [`Self::get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_len()`] to query the number of elements to pass to `out`.+    /// Be sure to [`Default::default()`]-initialize these elements and optionally set their `p_next` pointer.     pub unsafe fn get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2(         &self,         info: &vk::ImageSparseMemoryRequirementsInfo2KHR,-        sparse_memory_requirements: &mut [vk::SparseImageMemoryRequirements2KHR],+        out: &mut [vk::SparseImageMemoryRequirements2KHR],     ) {-        let mut count = sparse_memory_requirements.len() as u32;-        self.get_memory_requirements2_fn-            .get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_khr(-                self.handle,-                info,-                &mut count,-                sparse_memory_requirements.as_mut_ptr(),-            );+        let mut count = out.len() as u32;+        self.fp.get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_khr(+            self.handle,+            info,+            &mut count,+            out.as_mut_ptr(),+        );+    }++    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::KhrGetMemoryRequirements2Fn::name()     }     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrGetMemoryRequirements2Fn {-        &self.get_memory_requirements2_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines]  
[Old Code]  
[Fixed Code]  
The changes appear to be primarily refactoring (renaming `get_memory_requirements2_fn` to `fp` and reorganizing code structure) rather than security fixes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential unsafe pointer usage [File] Lines 45-50, 63-68  
[Old Code]  
```rust
self.get_memory_requirements2_fn
    .get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_khr(
        self.handle,
        info,
        &mut count,
        ptr::null_mut(),
    );
```
[Fixed Code]  
```rust
self.fp.get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_khr(
    self.handle,
    info,
    &mut count,
    ptr::null_mut(),
);
```
The code continues to use unsafe pointer operations, but there's no clear evidence this was changed for security reasons. The pattern remains similar, just with the renamed field.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no  
Documentation improvement [File] Lines 54-56  
[Old Code]  
No documentation about initialization requirements  
[Fixed Code]  
```rust
/// Call [`Self::get_image_sparse_memory_requirements2_len()`] to query the number of elements to pass to `out`.
/// Be sure to [`Default::default()`]-initialize these elements and optionally set their `p_next` pointer.
```
This is a documentation improvement rather than a security fix, though it does help prevent potential misuse of the API.

The changes appear to be primarily code organization and documentation improvements rather than direct security fixes. The unsafe operations remain but are properly documented in the Vulkan API context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/vendors.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/vendors.js@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ // Modules imported without destructuring import classnames from "classnames";-import move from "lodash-move"; // We cannot directly export literals containing special characters // (eg. "my-module/Test") which is why they are nested in "vendored".@@ -31,7 +30,6 @@   classnames,   "devtools-utils": devtoolsUtils,   "fuzzaldrin-plus": fuzzaldrinPlus,-  "lodash-move": move,   "react-aria-components/src/tabs": reactAriaComponentsTabs,   "react-transition-group/Transition": transition, };

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Removal of Unused/Insecure Dependency] [devtools/client/debugger/src/vendors.js] [Lines 21,31]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   import move from "lodash-move";
   "lodash-move": move,
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   [removed]
   ```  
   Additional Details: The diff shows removal of 'lodash-move' dependency. While this might indicate security concerns (as lodash has had vulnerabilities in the past), we can't be certain without more context whether this was a security fix or just cleanup of unused code.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Dependency Update] [devtools/client/debugger/src/vendors.js] [Lines 21]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   import move from "lodash-move";
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   [removed]
   ```  
   Additional Details: The removal could be part of updating to a newer version of lodash that might have consolidated functionality, potentially addressing security issues in older versions. However, this is speculative without version information.

Note: The diff shows dependency removals but doesn't provide enough context to definitively identify security vulnerabilities. The changes could be security-related (removing potentially vulnerable dependencies) or simply code cleanup. More context about the reasons for these changes would be needed for a definitive assessment.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-042.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-042.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-042-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the right float shape defines an empty float area by the basic shape ellipse(0% 0%) value.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

The diff shows only a minor HTML cleanup change with no apparent security impact. The removed meta tag wasn't serving any security purpose and its removal doesn't introduce or fix any security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/data_review.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/data_review.py@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@             one_line_desc = metric.description.replace("\n", " ")             sensitivity = ", ".join([s.name for s in metric.data_sensitivity])             last_bug = metric.bugs[-1]-            metrics_table += f"{category_name}.{metric_name} | "+            metrics_table += f"`{category_name}.{metric_name}` | "             metrics_table += f"{one_line_desc} | {sensitivity} | {last_bug}\n"             durations.add(metric.expires)

Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential XSS Vulnerability] [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/data_review.py] [Lines 56]
    [metrics_table += f"{category_name}.{metric_name} | "]
    [metrics_table += f"`{category_name}.{metric_name}` | "]

Additional Details:
- The change adds backticks around the metric name in the output string. While this could be a defense against potential XSS if the output is rendered in a markdown or similar context, there's no clear evidence this was an actual security fix.
- The metric names could potentially contain malicious content if not properly sanitized, but the context of how this output is used isn't clear from the diff alone.
- Without seeing the full context of how this string is ultimately rendered, we can't be certain if this was a security fix or just a formatting improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/backend/debugger-api.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/backend/debugger-api.md@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ The Debugger API is a low-level API that provides methods for introspecting and affecting a target environment like a page. You can find JavaScript sources, set breakpoints on them, and more.-This API is completely documented on the [Debugger API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Tools/Debugger-API) MDN page.+This API is completely documented on the [Debugger API](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/devtools-user/debugger-api/) page.

Based on the provided diff, which only shows a documentation URL change, here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/docs/contributor/backend/debugger-api.md [Lines] 2-4
    Old Code: This API is completely documented on the [Debugger API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Tools/Debugger-API) MDN page.
    Fixed Code: This API is completely documented on the [Debugger API](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/devtools-user/debugger-api/) page.

The change appears to be purely a documentation URL update from MDN to Mozilla's source docs, with no security implications. No code changes or security fixes were made in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/services/fxaccounts/FxAccountsCommands.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/services/fxaccounts/FxAccountsCommands.js@@ -350,11 +350,17 @@   }   async _decrypt(ciphertext) {-    let {-      privateKey,-      publicKey,-      authSecret,-    } = await this._getPersistedSendTabKeys();+    let sendTabKeys = await this._getPersistedSendTabKeys();+    if (!sendTabKeys) {+      // If we lost the user's send tab keys for any reason,+      // `generateAndPersistEncryptedSendTabKeys` will regenerate the send tab keys,+      // persist them, then persist an encrypted bundle of the keys.+      // It should be impossible for us to hit this for new devices+      // this was added to recover users who hit Bug 1752609+      await this._generateAndPersistEncryptedSendTabKey();+      sendTabKeys = await this._getPersistedSendTabKeys();+    }+    let { privateKey, publicKey, authSecret } = sendTabKeys;     publicKey = urlsafeBase64Decode(publicKey);     authSecret = urlsafeBase64Decode(authSecret);     ciphertext = new Uint8Array(urlsafeBase64Decode(ciphertext));

Here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Null Pointer Dereference Vulnerability [services/fxaccounts/FxAccountsCommands.js] [Lines 350-360]
[Old Code]
async _decrypt(ciphertext) {
  let {
    privateKey,
    publicKey,
    authSecret,
  } = await this._getPersistedSendTabKeys();
[Fixed Code]
async _decrypt(ciphertext) {
  let sendTabKeys = await this._getPersistedSendTabKeys();
  if (!sendTabKeys) {
    await this._generateAndPersistEncryptedSendTabKey();
    sendTabKeys = await this._getPersistedSendTabKeys();
  }
  let { privateKey, publicKey, authSecret } = sendTabKeys;

Additional Details:
The fix addresses a potential null pointer dereference vulnerability where `_getPersistedSendTabKeys()` could return null or undefined. The old code would attempt to destructure these values directly, which could crash if the keys weren't available. The new code properly handles this case by checking for null/undefined and regenerating the keys if needed (referencing Bug 1752609). This improves both security and reliability by preventing crashes and ensuring encryption keys are always available.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/box-shadow-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/box-shadow-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-backgrounds-3/#box-shadow"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht"> <link rel="bookmark" href="https://crbug.com/1006241" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="box-shadow size and location on a cell with collapsed borders are calculated correctly" /> <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 5-7]
   [Old Code]
   <link rel="bookmark" href="https://crbug.com/1006241" />
   <meta name="flags" content="" />
   <meta name="assert" content="box-shadow size and location on a cell with collapsed borders are calculated correctly" />
   
   [Fixed Code]
   <link rel="bookmark" href="https://crbug.com/1006241" />
   <meta name="assert" content="box-shadow size and location on a cell with collapsed borders are calculated correctly" />

Additional Details:
- The only change is the removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This doesn't appear to be security-related but rather a cleanup of unnecessary code.
- There are no actual security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.
- The change is likely part of general code maintenance rather than a security patch.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.