Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/ipc/DocAccessibleChildBase.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/ipc/DocAccessibleChildBase.h@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ const uint64_t& aID, const uint64_t& aCacheDomain, AccAttributes* aFields) override;+ virtual mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvDoActionAsync(+ const uint64_t& aID, const uint8_t& aIndex) override;+ protected: static void FlattenTree(LocalAccessible* aRoot, nsTArray<LocalAccessible*>& aTree);
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Missing IPC Message Handler [File] accessible/ipc/DocAccessibleChildBase.h [Lines] Added around line 63 [Old Code] (No corresponding function existed before) [Fixed Code] virtual mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvDoActionAsync( const uint64_t& aID, const uint8_t& aIndex) override; Additional Details: The diff shows the addition of a new IPC message handler RecvDoActionAsync. While this could be simply a new feature addition, it might also indicate a security fix if: 1. This was added to properly handle an IPC message that was previously unhandled (which could lead to security issues) 2. The message was previously handled improperly or unsafely elsewhere 3. This is part of a broader security patch adding proper validation for IPC messages Without more context about the surrounding changes or the bug being fixed, I can't be certain if this represents a security fix. However, IPC message handlers are security-sensitive components, so their addition or modification often relates to security improvements. Note: There isn't enough information to identify a specific CVE or vulnerability name, but IPC-related changes are always worth scrutinizing for security implications.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/builtins.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/builtins.rs@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Error, ErrorKind, Parser, Result, }; use crate::{- BinaryOperator, Block, Constant, ConstantInner, DerivativeAxis, Expression, Handle, ImageClass,+ BinaryOperator, Block, Constant, DerivativeAxis, Expression, Handle, ImageClass, ImageDimension, ImageQuery, MathFunction, Module, RelationalFunction, SampleLevel,- ScalarKind as Sk, ScalarValue, Span, Type, TypeInner, VectorSize,+ ScalarKind as Sk, Span, Type, TypeInner, VectorSize, }; impl Module {@@ -535,8 +535,8 @@ "asinh" => MacroCall::MathFunction(MathFunction::Asinh), "acosh" => MacroCall::MathFunction(MathFunction::Acosh), "atanh" => MacroCall::MathFunction(MathFunction::Atanh),- "radians" => MacroCall::ConstMultiply(std::f64::consts::PI / 180.0),- "degrees" => MacroCall::ConstMultiply(180.0 / std::f64::consts::PI),+ "radians" => MacroCall::MathFunction(MathFunction::Radians),+ "degrees" => MacroCall::MathFunction(MathFunction::Degrees), "floatBitsToInt" => MacroCall::BitCast(Sk::Sint), "floatBitsToUint" => MacroCall::BitCast(Sk::Uint), "dFdx" | "dFdxFine" | "dFdxCoarse" => {@@ -630,12 +630,15 @@ )) } }- "bitCount" | "bitfieldReverse" | "bitfieldExtract" | "bitfieldInsert" => {+ "bitCount" | "bitfieldReverse" | "bitfieldExtract" | "bitfieldInsert" | "findLSB"+ | "findMSB" => { let fun = match name { "bitCount" => MathFunction::CountOneBits, "bitfieldReverse" => MathFunction::ReverseBits, "bitfieldExtract" => MathFunction::ExtractBits, "bitfieldInsert" => MathFunction::InsertBits,+ "findLSB" => MathFunction::FindLsb,+ "findMSB" => MathFunction::FindMsb, _ => unreachable!(), };@@ -1548,7 +1551,6 @@ Splatted(MathFunction, Option<VectorSize>, usize), MixBoolean, Clamp(Option<VectorSize>),- ConstMultiply(f64), BitCast(Sk), Derivate(DerivativeAxis), }@@ -1865,30 +1867,6 @@ body, )) }- MacroCall::ConstMultiply(value) => {- let constant = parser.module.constants.fetch_or_append(- Constant {- name: None,- specialization: None,- inner: ConstantInner::Scalar {- width: 4,- value: ScalarValue::Float(value),- },- },- Span::default(),- );- let right =- ctx.add_expression(Expression::Constant(constant), Span::default(), body);- Ok(ctx.add_expression(- Expression::Binary {- op: BinaryOperator::Multiply,- left: args[0],- right,- },- Span::default(),- body,- ))- } MacroCall::BitCast(kind) => Ok(ctx.add_expression( Expression::As { expr: args[0],@@ -1930,6 +1908,7 @@ Expression::ImageSample { image, sampler,+ gather: None, //TODO coordinate: comps.coordinate, array_index, offset,
Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the identified security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Arithmetic Precision Issue] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/builtins.rs] [Lines 535-536] [Old Code] ```rust "radians" => MacroCall::ConstMultiply(std::f64::consts::PI / 180.0), "degrees" => MacroCall::ConstMultiply(180.0 / std::f64::consts::PI), ``` [Fixed Code] ```rust "radians" => MacroCall::MathFunction(MathFunction::Radians), "degrees" => MacroCall::MathFunction(MathFunction::Degrees), ``` Additional Details: The change replaces direct floating-point arithmetic with dedicated math functions, potentially improving precision and avoiding floating-point errors. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Missing Bit Manipulation Functions] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/builtins.rs] [Lines 630-636] [Old Code] ```rust "bitCount" | "bitfieldReverse" | "bitfieldExtract" | "bitfieldInsert" => { let fun = match name { "bitCount" => MathFunction::CountOneBits, "bitfieldReverse" => MathFunction::ReverseBits, "bitfieldExtract" => MathFunction::ExtractBits, "bitfieldInsert" => MathFunction::InsertBits, ``` [Fixed Code] ```rust "bitCount" | "bitfieldReverse" | "bitfieldExtract" | "bitfieldInsert" | "findLSB" | "findMSB" => { let fun = match name { "bitCount" => MathFunction::CountOneBits, "bitfieldReverse" => MathFunction::ReverseBits, "bitfieldExtract" => MathFunction::ExtractBits, "bitfieldInsert" => MathFunction::InsertBits, "findLSB" => MathFunction::FindLsb, "findMSB" => MathFunction::FindMsb, ``` Additional Details: Added support for findLSB and findMSB bit manipulation functions, potentially preventing undefined behavior when these functions were called. 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Removed Unused Constant Multiplication] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/builtins.rs] [Lines 1548] [Old Code] ```rust ConstMultiply(f64), ``` [Fixed Code] ```rust (removed from enum) ``` Additional Details: The removal of the ConstMultiply variant suggests it was either unused or potentially unsafe, though the exact security implications are unclear. 4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Image Sampling Safety] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/builtins.rs] [Lines 1930] [Old Code] ```rust Expression::ImageSample { image, sampler, coordinate: comps.coordinate, array_index, offset, ``` [Fixed Code] ```rust Expression::ImageSample { image, sampler, gather: None, //TODO coordinate: comps.coordinate, array_index, offset, ``` Additional Details: Added explicit gather parameter to image sampling, potentially preventing undefined behavior in texture sampling operations. Note: While these changes appear to improve code safety and functionality, I couldn't identify any specific, known vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes seem more like general improvements and feature additions rather than direct security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/moz_yaml.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/moz_yaml.py@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ # Bugzilla email address for a maintainer of the library, used for needinfos maintainer-bz: [email protected]+ # Optional: A query string for ./mach try fuzzy. If omitted ./mach try auto will be used+ fuzzy-query: media+ # The tasks that Updatebot can run. Only one of each task is currently permitted # optional tasks:@@ -166,16 +169,22 @@ # List of patch files to apply after vendoring. Applied in the order # specified, and alphabetically if globbing is used. Patches must apply- # cleanly before changes are pushed+ # cleanly before changes are pushed.+ # Patch files should be relative to the vendor-directory rather than the gecko+ # root directory. # All patch files are implicitly added to the keep file list. # optional patches: - file - path/to/file - path/*.patch-- # List of files that are not deleted while vendoring- # Implicitly contains "moz.yaml", any files referenced as patches+ - path/** # Captures all files and subdirectories below path+ - path/* # Captures all files but _not_ subdirectories below path. Equivalent to `path/`++ # List of files that are not removed from the destination directory while vendoring+ # in a new version of the library. Intended for mozilla files not present in upstream.+ # Implicitly contains "moz.yaml", "moz.build", and any files referenced in+ # "patches" # optional keep: - file@@ -183,7 +192,7 @@ - another/path - *.mozilla- # Files/paths that will not be vendored from source repository+ # Files/paths that will not be vendored from the upstream repository # Implicitly contains ".git", and ".gitignore" # optional exclude:@@ -193,8 +202,8 @@ - docs - src/*.test- # Files/paths that will always be vendored, even if they would- # otherwise be excluded by "exclude".+ # Files/paths that will always be vendored from source repository, even if+ # they would otherwise be excluded by "exclude". # optional include: - file@@ -372,6 +381,7 @@ "updatebot": { Required("maintainer-phab"): All(str, Length(min=1)), Required("maintainer-bz"): All(str, Length(min=1)),+ "fuzzy-query": All(str, Length(min=1)), "tasks": All( UpdatebotTasks(), [
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific security vulnerability was fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be documentation improvements and feature additions (like the fuzzy-query field) rather than security fixes. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no The changes to the patches, keep, exclude, and include sections are clarifications of existing functionality and don't represent security fixes. The modifications are: - Added more detailed documentation about patch file paths - Clarified behavior of wildcards in paths - Improved documentation about what files are kept during vendoring 3. Vulnerability Existed: no The addition of the "fuzzy-query" field is a new feature for try server selection and doesn't appear to be security-related. The changes are primarily: 1. Documentation improvements 2. Added new optional configuration field 3. Clarified path matching behavior 4. Improved schema validation with the new field No security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The modifications seem focused on improving functionality and documentation clarity rather than addressing security issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1503399-2.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1503399-2.js@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") // Don't assert if the wrapper that's the value of reader.[[stream]] gets nuked. load(libdir + "asserts.js");
Let me analyze the code diff according to your instructions: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Test Reliability Issue] [js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1503399-2.js] [Lines 1] [Old Code] // Don't assert if the wrapper that's the value of reader.[[stream]] gets nuked. [Fixed Code] // |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") // Don't assert if the wrapper that's the value of reader.[[stream]] gets nuked. Additional Details: - The change adds a test directive to skip the test if the environment doesn't have ReadableStream - This appears to be a test reliability improvement rather than a security fix - The original test might have failed in environments without ReadableStream - No clear security vulnerability is being fixed here, just making the test more robust Note: Without more context about what this test is verifying, it's hard to determine if there was an underlying security issue being addressed. The change appears to be primarily about test reliability rather than fixing a vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(0, 50, 100, 0); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.zero.1.html] [Lines 17-18, 27] [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)] [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(canvas, ...)] The changes don't affect security in any way - they're just variable renaming with no impact on functionality or security posture. No known vulnerability patterns are present in either the old or new code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/source-tree.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/source-tree.js@@ -32,11 +32,3 @@ expanded: new Set(action.expanded), }; }--export function getExpandedState(state) {- return state.sourceTree.expanded;-}--export function getFocusedSourceItem(state) {- return state.sourceTree.focusedItem;-}
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/source-tree.js] [Lines 32-40] [Old Code] export function getExpandedState(state) { return state.sourceTree.expanded; } export function getFocusedSourceItem(state) { return state.sourceTree.focusedItem; } [Fixed Code] [Entire functions removed] Additional Details: The diff shows removal of two utility functions that were exposing internal state of the source tree. While this isn't fixing a specific named vulnerability, it's a good practice change that reduces the attack surface by removing unnecessary state exposure. The change appears to be part of a refactoring or security hardening effort rather than fixing a specific vulnerability. No known vulnerabilities (like XSS, injection, etc.) are being fixed here, just removal of potentially unnecessary state accessors. The change follows the principle of least privilege by not exposing more state than necessary.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transitions/transition-property-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transitions/transition-property-002.html@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ // syntax: none | [ all | <IDENT> ] [ ‘,’ [ all | <IDENT> ] ]* var values = {- 'none, all' : 'none, all',- 'all, none' : 'all, none',+ 'none, all' : 'all',+ 'all, none' : 'all', 'foobar' : 'foobar', 'all, foobar' : 'all, foobar', 'foobar, all' : 'foobar, all',
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be related to test case expectations rather than security fixes. Answer Format for Each Vulnerability: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerabilities found in this diff. The changes appear to be test case expectation updates. Additional Details: - The changes modify expected values in a CSS transition test case - The modification changes how 'none, all' and 'all, none' combinations are handled - This appears to be a specification compliance update rather than a security fix The changes are: 1. Changed expected result for 'none, all' from 'none, all' to 'all' 2. Changed expected result for 'all, none' from 'all, none' to 'all' These changes don't indicate any security vulnerabilities being addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/JSObject.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/JSObject.h@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ return shape()->hasObjectFlag(flag); }+ bool hasAnyFlag(js::ObjectFlags flags) const {+ return shape()->objectFlags().hasAnyFlag(flags);+ }+ // Change this object's shape for a prototype mutation. // // Note: the caller must ensure the object has a mutable proto, is extensible,@@ -193,6 +197,14 @@ } static bool setIsUsedAsPrototype(JSContext* cx, JS::HandleObject obj) { return setFlag(cx, obj, js::ObjectFlag::IsUsedAsPrototype);+ }++ bool useWatchtowerTestingCallback() const {+ return hasFlag(js::ObjectFlag::UseWatchtowerTestingCallback);+ }+ static bool setUseWatchtowerTestingCallback(JSContext* cx,+ JS::HandleObject obj) {+ return setFlag(cx, obj, js::ObjectFlag::UseWatchtowerTestingCallback); } inline bool isBoundFunction() const;
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new functionality rather than fixing security issues. Here's my analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No vulnerability found [File] js/src/vm/JSObject.h [Lines] 170-197 [Old Code] (No equivalent code existed before) [Fixed Code] bool hasAnyFlag(js::ObjectFlags flags) const { return shape()->objectFlags().hasAnyFlag(flags); } 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No vulnerability found [File] js/src/vm/JSObject.h [Lines] 197-204 [Old Code] (No equivalent code existed before) [Fixed Code] bool useWatchtowerTestingCallback() const { return hasFlag(js::ObjectFlag::UseWatchtowerTestingCallback); } static bool setUseWatchtowerTestingCallback(JSContext* cx, JS::HandleObject obj) { return setFlag(cx, obj, js::ObjectFlag::UseWatchtowerTestingCallback); } The changes appear to be: 1. Adding a new method `hasAnyFlag()` to check multiple object flags at once 2. Adding new methods related to "Watchtower Testing Callback" functionality These appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes. No known vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-3.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 20%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. For completeness, here's the analysis following the requested format: Vulnerability Existed: no [No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-3.worker.js] [Lines 13-21] [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 20%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 20%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,51, "50,25", "0,255,0,51"); The changes are: 1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` 2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call 3. No functional or security-related changes were made
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/proc-macro2/src/parse.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/proc-macro2/src/parse.rs@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ let first = match input.bytes().next() { Some(first) => first, None => match stack.last() {- None => return Ok(TokenStream { inner: trees }),+ None => return Ok(TokenStream::from(trees)), #[cfg(span_locations)] Some((lo, _frame)) => { return Err(LexError {@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ return Err(lex_error(input)); } input = input.advance(1);- let mut g = Group::new(open_delimiter, TokenStream { inner: trees });+ let mut g = Group::new(open_delimiter, TokenStream::from(trees)); g.set_span(Span { #[cfg(span_locations)] lo,@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ for tt in &mut stream { tt.set_span(span); }- let group = Group::new(Delimiter::Bracket, stream.into_iter().collect());+ let group = Group::new(Delimiter::Bracket, TokenStream::from(stream)); trees.push(crate::Group::_new_stable(group).into()); for tt in &mut trees { tt.set_span(span);
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/proc-macro2/src/parse.rs] [Lines 168, 209, 819] [Old Code] return Ok(TokenStream { inner: trees }) let mut g = Group::new(open_delimiter, TokenStream { inner: trees }) let group = Group::new(Delimiter::Bracket, stream.into_iter().collect()) [Fixed Code] return Ok(TokenStream::from(trees)) let mut g = Group::new(open_delimiter, TokenStream::from(trees)) let group = Group::new(Delimiter::Bracket, TokenStream::from(stream)) Additional Details: The changes appear to be related to how TokenStream objects are constructed, replacing direct struct initialization with the `from()` method. While this might suggest potential memory safety improvements (common in Rust when moving from direct struct access to safe constructors), there's no clear vulnerability name or CVE associated with these changes. The modifications could be related to internal API consistency or potential security hardening, but without more context about the TokenStream implementation, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.transform.3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.transform.3.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createRadialGradient(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11.2); g.addColorStop(0, '#0f0');@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ ctx.translate(50, 25); ctx.scale(10, 10); ctx.fillRect(-5, -2.5, 10, 5);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 26-28] [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255"); [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255"); The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security-related changes in this diff, and the functionality remains exactly the same. The assertions and canvas operations are identical, just using a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/file-system-access/script-tests/FileSystemDirectoryHandle-move.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/file-system-access/script-tests/FileSystemDirectoryHandle-move.js@@ -1,6 +1,32 @@ // META: script=resources/test-helpers.js 'use strict';++directory_test(async (t, root) => {+ const dir = await root.getDirectoryHandle('dir-before', {create: true});+ await dir.move('dir-after');++ assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(root), ['dir-after/']);+ assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(dir), []);+}, 'move(name) to rename an empty directory');++directory_test(async (t, root) => {+ const dir = await root.getDirectoryHandle('dir-before', {create: true});+ await promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, dir.move(''));++ assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(root), ['dir-before/']);+ assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(dir), []);+}, 'move("") to rename an empty directory fails');++directory_test(async (t, root) => {+ const dir = await root.getDirectoryHandle('dir-before', {create: true});+ await createFileWithContents(t, 'file-in-dir', 'abc', dir);+ await dir.move('dir-after');++ assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(root), ['dir-after/']);+ assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(dir), ['file-in-dir']);+}, 'move(name) to rename a non-empty directory');+ directory_test(async (t, root) => { const dir = await root.getDirectoryHandle('dir-before', {create: true});
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for security vulnerabilities. The diff shows new test cases being added for the `move()` operation in the FileSystemDirectoryHandle API. 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Input Validation Issue] [FileSystemDirectoryHandle-move.js] [Lines 10-16] [Old Code] (none, new test case added) [Fixed Code] ``` directory_test(async (t, root) => { const dir = await root.getDirectoryHandle('dir-before', {create: true}); await promise_rejects_js(t, TypeError, dir.move('')); assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(root), ['dir-before/']); assert_array_equals(await getSortedDirectoryEntries(dir), []); }, 'move("") to rename an empty directory fails'); ``` Additional Details: The test case verifies that moving to an empty string name fails with TypeError. This suggests there might have been a potential input validation issue where empty strings weren't properly handled, but we can't be certain from just the test code. 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Directory Traversal Potential] [FileSystemDirectoryHandle-move.js] [Lines 1-28] [Old Code] (none, new test cases added) [Fixed Code] (multiple new test cases for move operation) Additional Details: The new test cases verify basic move operations but don't test for potential directory traversal attacks (e.g., using '../' in paths). While this might indicate the tests are incomplete, we can't determine if there was an actual vulnerability from just this diff. The diff primarily adds test cases for the `move()` operation, including: - Moving empty directories - Handling empty string names - Moving non-empty directories While these tests improve validation coverage, we can't definitively say they're fixing existing vulnerabilities without seeing the actual implementation changes. The tests suggest the developers are considering edge cases, but we'd need to see the implementation code to identify any actual vulnerabilities that were fixed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-style-counters-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-style-counters-001.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-style-counters-001-ref.html"> <meta content="This test checks that when an element has 'contain: style', then counters which may be affecting its subtree are reset to 0 for such scope." name="assert">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <style> div#create-counter
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-style-counters-001.html] [Lines 8] [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">] [Fixed Code: (line removed)] Additional Details: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test configuration metadata 2. There's no indication this relates to any security vulnerability 3. The change seems to be more about test cleanup than security fixes 4. No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are involved in this change The modification appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than addressing any security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex6.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex6.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '#fg0000'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex6.worker.js [Lines] 13-21 [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '#fg0000'; } catch (e) { } ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '#fg0000'; } catch (e) { } ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') and don't indicate any security fixes. The test's functionality remains the same, just with a more concise variable name. There's no evidence of any security vulnerability being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/telemetry/core/TelemetryOrigin.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/telemetry/core/TelemetryOrigin.cpp@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ n += gMetricToOriginBag->ShallowSizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf); for (const auto& origins : gMetricToOriginBag->Values()) { // The string hashkey and count should both be contained by the hashtable.- n += origins.ShallowSizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf);+ n += origins.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf); } // The string hashkey and ID should both be contained within the hashtable.
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Memory Measurement Inaccuracy] [TelemetryOrigin.cpp] [Lines 604-606] [Old Code] n += origins.ShallowSizeOfIncludingThis(aMallocSizeOf); [Fixed Code] n += origins.ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis(aMallocSizeOf); Additional Details: The change switches from ShallowSizeOfIncludingThis to ShallowSizeOfExcludingThis when calculating memory usage. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially affect memory accounting accuracy. The comment suggests the measurement should only include the contents (hashkey and count) and not the container itself, which is why the ExcludingThis version is more appropriate. This might be related to more accurate memory tracking rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/content-src/aboutwelcome/aboutwelcome.jsx+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/content-src/aboutwelcome/aboutwelcome.jsx@@ -63,9 +63,11 @@ return ( <ReturnToAMO message_id={props.messageId}+ type={props.type} name={props.name} url={props.url} iconURL={props.iconURL}+ metricsFlowUri={this.state.metricsFlowUri} /> ); }
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Exposure] [browser/components/newtab/content-src/aboutwelcome/aboutwelcome.jsx] [Lines 63-71] [Old Code] return ( <ReturnToAMO message_id={props.messageId} name={props.name} url={props.url} iconURL={props.iconURL} /> ) [Fixed Code] return ( <ReturnToAMO message_id={props.messageId} type={props.type} name={props.name} url={props.url} iconURL={props.iconURL} metricsFlowUri={this.state.metricsFlowUri} /> ) Additional Details: - The changes add two new props being passed to ReturnToAMO component: `type` and `metricsFlowUri` - While not clearly a security vulnerability, adding `metricsFlowUri` could potentially expose sensitive tracking or analytics information if not properly secured - The addition of `type` could potentially be used for type-based attacks if not properly validated - Without seeing the implementation of ReturnToAMO, it's unclear how these new props are used and whether they introduce vulnerabilities No clear vulnerability name can be assigned, but these changes warrant review for potential information exposure or improper data handling.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/widgets/RequestListContextMenu.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/netmonitor/src/widgets/RequestListContextMenu.js@@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ connector, cloneRequest, openDetailsPanelTab,- openDetailsHTTPCustomRequestTab,+ openHTTPCustomRequestTab,+ closeHTTPCustomRequestTab, sendCustomRequest, openStatistics, openRequestInTab,@@ -332,7 +333,8 @@ cloneRequest(id); openDetailsPanelTab(); } else {- openDetailsHTTPCustomRequestTab();+ closeHTTPCustomRequestTab();+ openHTTPCustomRequestTab(); } }); },
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Function Call Order Vulnerability] [devtools/client/netmonitor/src/widgets/RequestListContextMenu.js] [Lines 332-336] [Old Code] openDetailsHTTPCustomRequestTab(); [Fixed Code] closeHTTPCustomRequestTab(); openHTTPCustomRequestTab(); Additional Details: The change suggests a modification in how HTTP custom request tabs are handled. The old code only opened a tab, while the new code first closes any existing tab before opening a new one. This could potentially prevent race conditions or resource leaks, but without more context about the application's behavior, it's unclear if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a robustness improvement. The change does suggest better resource management.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/wasm/WasmCompile.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/wasm/WasmCompile.cpp@@ -54,13 +54,13 @@ }; #if defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86)- MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) <=+ MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) <= (UINT32_MAX >> ARCH_BITS));- return X86 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) << ARCH_BITS);+ return X86 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) << ARCH_BITS); #elif defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64)- MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) <=+ MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) <= (UINT32_MAX >> ARCH_BITS));- return X64 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) << ARCH_BITS);+ return X64 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) << ARCH_BITS); #elif defined(JS_CODEGEN_ARM) MOZ_ASSERT(jit::GetARMFlags() <= (UINT32_MAX >> ARCH_BITS)); return ARM | (jit::GetARMFlags() << ARCH_BITS);
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format: Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Information Leak Vulnerability [js/src/wasm/WasmCompile.cpp] [Lines 54-64] [Old Code] ```cpp MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) <= (UINT32_MAX >> ARCH_BITS)); return X86 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) << ARCH_BITS); ... MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) <= (UINT32_MAX >> ARCH_BITS)); return X64 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetSSEVersion()) << ARCH_BITS); ``` [Fixed Code] ```cpp MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) <= (UINT32_MAX >> ARCH_BITS)); return X86 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) << ARCH_BITS); ... MOZ_ASSERT(uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) <= (UINT32_MAX >> ARCH_BITS)); return X64 | (uint32_t(jit::CPUInfo::GetFingerprint()) << ARCH_BITS); ``` Additional Details: - The change replaces `GetSSEVersion()` with `GetFingerprint()` in CPU feature detection - This might be related to preventing potential side-channel attacks or reducing fingerprinting surface - Without more context about the implementation details of these functions, it's hard to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving security posture - The change appears to be moving from a specific CPU feature version check to a more general fingerprinting approach
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.zerocanvas.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.zerocanvas.worker.js@@ -13,24 +13,24 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 0;-offscreenCanvas.height = 10;-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 0, "offscreenCanvas.width", "0");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 10, "offscreenCanvas.height", "10");-assert_throws_dom("INVALID_STATE_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, 'repeat'); });-offscreenCanvas.width = 10;-offscreenCanvas.height = 0;-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 10, "offscreenCanvas.width", "10");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "0");-assert_throws_dom("INVALID_STATE_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, 'repeat'); });-offscreenCanvas.width = 0;-offscreenCanvas.height = 0;-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 0, "offscreenCanvas.width", "0");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 0, "offscreenCanvas.height", "0");-assert_throws_dom("INVALID_STATE_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas, 'repeat'); });+canvas.width = 0;+canvas.height = 10;+_assertSame(canvas.width, 0, "canvas.width", "0");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 10, "canvas.height", "10");+assert_throws_dom("INVALID_STATE_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(canvas, 'repeat'); });+canvas.width = 10;+canvas.height = 0;+_assertSame(canvas.width, 10, "canvas.width", "10");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 0, "canvas.height", "0");+assert_throws_dom("INVALID_STATE_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(canvas, 'repeat'); });+canvas.width = 0;+canvas.height = 0;+_assertSame(canvas.width, 0, "canvas.width", "0");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 0, "canvas.height", "0");+assert_throws_dom("INVALID_STATE_ERR", function() { ctx.createPattern(canvas, 'repeat'); }); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications. Here's the analysis: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.zerocanvas.worker.js Lines: Entire diff Old Code: Uses variable name 'offscreenCanvas' Fixed Code: Uses variable name 'canvas' The changes are consistent throughout the file and maintain the same functionality, just with a different variable name. The test assertions and error checks remain identical in behavior. No security-related fixes were made in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.3.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 50; ctx.fillRect(-50, 0, 50, 50); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 33-34] [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); 2. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 33-34] [Old Code] _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255"); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); [Fixed Code] _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255"); _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The changes seem to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.