--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/enc/frame_enc.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/enc/frame_enc.c@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@   // Roughly refresh the proba eight times per pass   int max_count = (enc->mb_w_ * enc->mb_h_) >> 3;   int num_pass_left = enc->config_->pass;+  int remaining_progress = 40;  // percents   const int do_search = enc->do_search_;   VP8EncIterator it;   VP8EncProba* const proba = &enc->proba_;@@ -805,6 +806,9 @@     uint64_t size_p0 = 0;     uint64_t distortion = 0;     int cnt = max_count;+    // The final number of passes is not trivial to know in advance.+    const int pass_progress = remaining_progress / (2 + num_pass_left);+    remaining_progress -= pass_progress;     VP8IteratorInit(enc, &it);     SetLoopParams(enc, stats.q);     if (is_last_pass) {@@ -832,7 +836,7 @@         StoreSideInfo(&it);         VP8StoreFilterStats(&it);         VP8IteratorExport(&it);-        ok = VP8IteratorProgress(&it, 20);+        ok = VP8IteratorProgress(&it, pass_progress);       }       VP8IteratorSaveBoundary(&it);     } while (ok && VP8IteratorNext(&it));@@ -878,7 +882,8 @@     ok = VP8EmitTokens(&enc->tokens_, enc->parts_ + 0,                        (const uint8_t*)proba->coeffs_, 1);   }-  ok = ok && WebPReportProgress(enc->pic_, enc->percent_ + 20, &enc->percent_);+  ok = ok && WebPReportProgress(enc->pic_, enc->percent_ + remaining_progress,+                                &enc->percent_);   return PostLoopFinalize(&it, ok); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Progress Calculation Fix] [media/libwebp/src/enc/frame_enc.c] [Lines 778-882]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```c
   // Hardcoded progress values (20) used in multiple places
   ok = VP8IteratorProgress(&it, 20);
   ok = ok && WebPReportProgress(enc->pic_, enc->percent_ + 20, &enc->percent_);
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   // Dynamic progress calculation based on remaining passes
   const int pass_progress = remaining_progress / (2 + num_pass_left);
   remaining_progress -= pass_progress;
   ok = VP8IteratorProgress(&it, pass_progress);
   ok = ok && WebPReportProgress(enc->pic_, enc->percent_ + remaining_progress, &enc->percent_);
   ```  
   Additional Details: While not clearly a security vulnerability, the change improves progress calculation accuracy. The old version used hardcoded values which could potentially lead to incorrect progress reporting or infinite loops if the progress never reaches 100%.

The diff primarily shows improvements in progress tracking during encoding passes rather than clear security fixes. The changes make the progress calculation more dynamic and accurate, but I couldn't identify any specific security vulnerabilities that were addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.double.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.double.worker.js@@ -13,18 +13,18 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [20, 0, 0]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and corresponding updates to assertions). Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.1.double.worker.js
    Lines: Entire diff
    Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas'
    Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas'

This appears to be a simple code refactoring change with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name was changed for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mozglue/baseprofiler/core/ProfileJSONWriter.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mozglue/baseprofiler/core/ProfileJSONWriter.cpp@@ -13,18 +13,30 @@ } UniqueJSONStrings::UniqueJSONStrings(const UniqueJSONStrings& aOther,+                                     ProgressLogger aProgressLogger,                                      JSONWriter::CollectionStyle aStyle) {+  using namespace mozilla::literals::ProportionValue_literals;  // For `10_pc`.+   mStringTableWriter.StartBareList(aStyle);   uint32_t count = aOther.mStringHashToIndexMap.count();   if (count != 0) {-    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(mStringHashToIndexMap.reserve(count));-    for (auto iter = aOther.mStringHashToIndexMap.iter(); !iter.done();-         iter.next()) {+    MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(mStringHashToIndexMap.reserve(count));+    auto iter = aOther.mStringHashToIndexMap.iter();+    for (auto&& [unusedIndex, progressLogger] :+         aProgressLogger.CreateLoopSubLoggersFromTo(+             10_pc, 90_pc, count, "Copying unique strings...")) {+      (void)unusedIndex;+      if (iter.done()) {+        break;+      }       mStringHashToIndexMap.putNewInfallible(iter.get().key(),                                              iter.get().value());+      iter.next();     }+    aProgressLogger.SetLocalProgress(90_pc, "Copied unique strings");     mStringTableWriter.CopyAndSplice(         aOther.mStringTableWriter.ChunkedWriteFunc());+    aProgressLogger.SetLocalProgress(100_pc, "Spliced unique strings");   } }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Resource Management Issue [File] mozglue/baseprofiler/core/ProfileJSONWriter.cpp [Lines 13-30]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   UniqueJSONStrings::UniqueJSONStrings(const UniqueJSONStrings& aOther,
                                      JSONWriter::CollectionStyle aStyle) {
     mStringTableWriter.StartBareList(aStyle);
     uint32_t count = aOther.mStringHashToIndexMap.count();
     if (count != 0) {
       MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(mStringHashToIndexMap.reserve(count));
       for (auto iter = aOther.mStringHashToIndexMap.iter(); !iter.done();
            iter.next()) {
         mStringHashToIndexMap.putNewInfallible(iter.get().key(),
                                              iter.get().value());
       }
       mStringTableWriter.CopyAndSplice(
           aOther.mStringTableWriter.ChunkedWriteFunc());
     }
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   UniqueJSONStrings::UniqueJSONStrings(const UniqueJSONStrings& aOther,
                                      ProgressLogger aProgressLogger,
                                      JSONWriter::CollectionStyle aStyle) {
     using namespace mozilla::literals::ProportionValue_literals;  // For `10_pc`.

     mStringTableWriter.StartBareList(aStyle);
     uint32_t count = aOther.mStringHashToIndexMap.count();
     if (count != 0) {
       MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(mStringHashToIndexMap.reserve(count));
       auto iter = aOther.mStringHashToIndexMap.iter();
       for (auto&& [unusedIndex, progressLogger] :
            aProgressLogger.CreateLoopSubLoggersFromTo(
                10_pc, 90_pc, count, "Copying unique strings...")) {
         (void)unusedIndex;
         if (iter.done()) {
           break;
         }
         mStringHashToIndexMap.putNewInfallible(iter.get().key(),
                                              iter.get().value());
         iter.next();
       }
       aProgressLogger.SetLocalProgress(90_pc, "Copied unique strings");
       mStringTableWriter.CopyAndSplice(
           aOther.mStringTableWriter.ChunkedWriteFunc());
       aProgressLogger.SetLocalProgress(100_pc, "Spliced unique strings");
     }
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The changes add progress logging and better iteration control, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability. The change from MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT to MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE might indicate a previous potential crash scenario, but this isn't clearly a security fix.

Note: While the changes improve the code's robustness and add progress tracking, I couldn't identify a clear security vulnerability being fixed. The modifications appear to be more about code quality and functionality improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-168.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-168.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-test-has-passed-desc.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>    <p>This test has <span></span>.</p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Meta Tag Removal [File] [Lines 9]
   [Old Code]
   `<meta name="flags" content="" />`
   [Fixed Code]
   (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't introduce or fix any security-related functionality
- The change is likely related to test suite maintenance or standardization

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a benign removal of an unused or unnecessary meta tag from a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.cross.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.cross.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d');@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50) ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-24]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, without any security implications. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/ipc/glue/WindowsMessageLoop.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/ipc/glue/WindowsMessageLoop.cpp@@ -635,10 +635,8 @@ }  // namespace mozilla // See SpinInternalEventLoop below-MessageChannel::SyncStackFrame::SyncStackFrame(MessageChannel* channel,-                                               bool interrupt)-    : mInterrupt(interrupt),-      mSpinNestedEvents(false),+MessageChannel::SyncStackFrame::SyncStackFrame(MessageChannel* channel)+    : mSpinNestedEvents(false),       mListenerNotified(false),       mChannel(channel),       mPrev(mChannel->mTopFrame),@@ -977,8 +975,7 @@   NS_ASSERTION(       mFlags & REQUIRE_DEFERRED_MESSAGE_PROTECTION,       "Shouldn't be here for channels that don't use message deferral!");-  NS_ASSERTION(mTopFrame && !mTopFrame->mInterrupt,-               "Top frame is not a sync frame!");+  NS_ASSERTION(mTopFrame, "No top frame!");   MonitorAutoUnlock unlock(*mMonitor);@@ -1084,135 +1081,6 @@   return WaitResponse(timedout); }-bool MessageChannel::WaitForInterruptNotify() {-  mMonitor->AssertCurrentThreadOwns();--  // Receiving the interrupt notification may require JS to execute on a-  // worker.-  dom::AutoYieldJSThreadExecution yield;--  if (!gUIThreadId) {-    mozilla::ipc::windows::InitUIThread();-  }--  // Re-use sync notification wait code if this channel does not require-  // Windows message deferral behavior.-  if (!(mFlags & REQUIRE_DEFERRED_MESSAGE_PROTECTION)) {-    return WaitForSyncNotify(true);-  }--  if (!InterruptStackDepth()) {-    // There is currently no way to recover from this condition.-    MOZ_CRASH("StackDepth() is 0 in call to MessageChannel::WaitForNotify!");-  }--  NS_ASSERTION(-      mFlags & REQUIRE_DEFERRED_MESSAGE_PROTECTION,-      "Shouldn't be here for channels that don't use message deferral!");-  NS_ASSERTION(mTopFrame && mTopFrame->mInterrupt,-               "Top frame is not a sync frame!");--  MonitorAutoUnlock unlock(*mMonitor);--  bool timedout = false;--  UINT_PTR timerId = 0;-  TimeoutData timeoutData = {0};--  // gWindowHook is used as a flag variable for the loop below: if it is set-  // and we start to spin a nested event loop, we need to clear the hook and-  // process deferred/pending messages.-  while (1) {-    NS_ASSERTION((!!gWindowHook) == MessageChannel::IsPumpingMessages(),-                 "gWindowHook out of sync with reality");--    if (mTopFrame->mSpinNestedEvents) {-      if (gWindowHook && timerId) {-        KillTimer(nullptr, timerId);-        timerId = 0;-      }-      DeneuteredWindowRegion deneuteredRgn;-      SpinInternalEventLoop();-      BOOL success = ResetEvent(mEvent);-      if (!success) {-        gfxDevCrash(mozilla::gfx::LogReason::MessageChannelInvalidHandle)-            << "WindowsMessageChannel::WaitForInterruptNotify::"-               "SpinNestedEvents failed to reset event. GetLastError: "-            << GetLastError();-      }-      return true;-    }--    if (mTimeoutMs != kNoTimeout && !timerId) {-      InitTimeoutData(&timeoutData, mTimeoutMs);-      timerId = SetTimer(nullptr, 0, mTimeoutMs, nullptr);-      NS_ASSERTION(timerId, "SetTimer failed!");-    }--    NeuteredWindowRegion neuteredRgn(true);--    MSG msg = {0};--    // Don't get wrapped up in here if the child connection dies.-    {-      MonitorAutoLock lock(*mMonitor);-      if (!Connected()) {-        break;-      }-    }--    DWORD result =-        MsgWaitForMultipleObjects(1, &mEvent, FALSE, INFINITE, QS_ALLINPUT);-    if (result == WAIT_OBJECT_0) {-      // Our NotifyWorkerThread event was signaled-      BOOL success = ResetEvent(mEvent);-      if (!success) {-        gfxDevCrash(mozilla::gfx::LogReason::MessageChannelInvalidHandle)-            << "WindowsMessageChannel::WaitForInterruptNotify::"-               "WaitForMultipleObjects failed to reset event. GetLastError: "-            << GetLastError();-      }-      break;-    } else if (result != (WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 1)) {-      NS_ERROR("Wait failed!");-      break;-    }--    if (TimeoutHasExpired(timeoutData)) {-      // A timeout was specified and we've passed it. Break out.-      timedout = true;-      break;-    }--    // See MessageChannel's WaitFor*Notify for details.-    bool haveSentMessagesPending =-        (HIWORD(GetQueueStatus(QS_SENDMESSAGE)) & QS_SENDMESSAGE) != 0;--    // Run all COM messages *after* looking at the queue status.-    if (gCOMWindow) {-      if (PeekMessageW(&msg, gCOMWindow, 0, 0, PM_REMOVE)) {-        TranslateMessage(&msg);-        ::DispatchMessageW(&msg);-      }-    }--    // PeekMessage markes the messages as "old" so that they don't wake up-    // MsgWaitForMultipleObjects every time.-    if (!PeekMessageW(&msg, nullptr, 0, 0, PM_NOREMOVE) &&-        !haveSentMessagesPending) {-      // Message was for child, we should wait a bit.-      SwitchToThread();-    }-  }--  if (timerId) {-    KillTimer(nullptr, timerId);-    timerId = 0;-  }--  return WaitResponse(timedout);-}- void MessageChannel::NotifyWorkerThread() {   mMonitor->AssertCurrentThreadOwns();

Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following security-related changes:

1. First vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Race Condition/Inconsistent State Vulnerability [File] ipc/glue/WindowsMessageLoop.cpp [Lines] 635-643
    [Old Code]
    MessageChannel::SyncStackFrame::SyncStackFrame(MessageChannel* channel,
                                               bool interrupt)
        : mInterrupt(interrupt),
          mSpinNestedEvents(false),
    [Fixed Code]
    MessageChannel::SyncStackFrame::SyncStackFrame(MessageChannel* channel)
        : mSpinNestedEvents(false),

    The removal of the interrupt flag suggests there was potential for race conditions or inconsistent state when handling interrupts. The flag was removed entirely, indicating it might have been causing synchronization issues.

2. Second vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Assertion Vulnerability [File] ipc/glue/WindowsMessageLoop.cpp [Lines] 977-978
    [Old Code]
    NS_ASSERTION(mTopFrame && !mTopFrame->mInterrupt,
               "Top frame is not a sync frame!");
    [Fixed Code]
    NS_ASSERTION(mTopFrame, "No top frame!");

    The simplified assertion suggests the previous version had overly strict checks that could fail incorrectly, potentially leading to crashes or security issues when handling frames.

3. Third vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Dead Code/Unsafe Interrupt Handling [File] ipc/glue/WindowsMessageLoop.cpp [Lines] 1084-1181
    [Old Code]
    Entire WaitForInterruptNotify() function
    [Fixed Code]
    Function completely removed

    The complete removal of the WaitForInterruptNotify() function suggests it contained unsafe interrupt handling code that could lead to security vulnerabilities. The function's complex logic for handling interrupts and messages could have contained race conditions or other timing-related vulnerabilities.

The changes appear to be part of a larger effort to simplify and secure the message handling code by:
1. Removing interrupt-related code paths that could lead to race conditions
2. Simplifying assertions to avoid false positives
3. Completely removing complex interrupt handling code that was potentially unsafe

These changes likely address potential security issues related to message handling and interrupt processing in the Windows message loop implementation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/src/lib.rs@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #![deny(warnings)] #![allow(non_camel_case_types)] #![allow(clippy::all)]-#![doc(html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/lmdb-rkv-sys/0.11.0")]+#![doc(html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/lmdb-rkv-sys/0.11.2")] extern crate libc;

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Dependency Version Update] [third_party/rust/lmdb-rkv-sys/src/lib.rs] [Lines 1-7]
[Old Code]
#![doc(html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/lmdb-rkv-sys/0.11.0")]
[Fixed Code]
#![doc(html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/lmdb-rkv-sys/0.11.2")]

Additional Details:
- The change shows a version bump from 0.11.0 to 0.11.2 in the documentation URL
- This could indicate a security-related version update, but without seeing the changelog or release notes for these versions, we can't be certain
- Version updates often include security fixes, but they can also include non-security related improvements
- The change doesn't show any direct code modifications that would indicate a specific vulnerability fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/syn/tests/test_precedence.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/syn/tests/test_precedence.rs@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ #![cfg(not(syn_disable_nightly_tests))]+#![cfg(not(miri))] #![recursion_limit = "1024"] #![feature(rustc_private)] #![allow(@@ -134,16 +135,16 @@                 l_failed             );-            passed.fetch_add(l_passed, Ordering::SeqCst);-            let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(l_failed, Ordering::SeqCst);+            passed.fetch_add(l_passed, Ordering::Relaxed);+            let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(l_failed, Ordering::Relaxed);             if prev_failed + l_failed >= abort_after {                 process::exit(1);             }         });-    let passed = passed.load(Ordering::SeqCst);-    let failed = failed.load(Ordering::SeqCst);+    let passed = passed.load(Ordering::Relaxed);+    let failed = failed.load(Ordering::Relaxed);     errorf!("\n===== Precedence Test Results =====\n");     errorf!("{} passed | {} failed\n", passed, failed);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Memory Ordering Change] [third_party/rust/syn/tests/test_precedence.rs] [Lines 134-135, 142-143]  
   [Old Code]  
   `passed.fetch_add(l_passed, Ordering::SeqCst);`  
   `let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(l_failed, Ordering::SeqCst);`  
   `let passed = passed.load(Ordering::SeqCst);`  
   `let failed = failed.load(Ordering::SeqCst);`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `passed.fetch_add(l_passed, Ordering::Relaxed);`  
   `let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(l_failed, Ordering::Relaxed);`  
   `let passed = passed.load(Ordering::Relaxed);`  
   `let failed = failed.load(Ordering::Relaxed);`  

Additional Details:  
The change involves switching from `Ordering::SeqCst` (sequential consistency) to `Ordering::Relaxed` for atomic operations. While this isn't a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially lead to memory ordering issues in concurrent scenarios. However, since this is test code and the exact context isn't fully clear, it's uncertain whether this was an actual security fix or just a performance optimization. Sequential consistency provides the strongest guarantees about memory ordering, while relaxed ordering provides no ordering guarantees.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/test/test_create.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/test/test_create.py@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ import unittest+from taskgraph.config import GraphConfig from unittest import mock from gecko_taskgraph import create-from gecko_taskgraph.config import GraphConfig from gecko_taskgraph.graph import Graph from gecko_taskgraph.taskgraph import TaskGraph from gecko_taskgraph.task import Task

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely related to import organization and module structure. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/test/test_create.py] [Lines 5-10]
[Old Code]
from unittest import mock

from gecko_taskgraph import create
from gecko_taskgraph.config import GraphConfig
[Fixed Code]
import unittest

from taskgraph.config import GraphConfig
from unittest import mock

from gecko_taskgraph import create

The changes consist of:
1. Adding `import unittest` (which was likely implicitly imported before)
2. Moving the GraphConfig import from `gecko_taskgraph.config` to `taskgraph.config`
3. Reorganizing the import order

These changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve code organization and potentially fix import dependencies.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff content, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.2.html] [Lines 17-18, 32-33]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/android/nsWindow.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/android/nsWindow.cpp@@ -894,6 +894,9 @@   GeckoSession::Compositor::WeakRef mCompositor;   Atomic<bool, ReleaseAcquire> mCompositorPaused;   java::sdk::Surface::GlobalRef mSurface;+  // Used to communicate with the gecko compositor from the UI thread.+  // Set in NotifyCompositorCreated and cleared in NotifyCompositorSessionLost.+  RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> mUiCompositorControllerChild;   struct CaptureRequest {     explicit CaptureRequest() : mResult(nullptr) {}@@ -1002,21 +1005,39 @@   bool CompositorPaused() const { return mCompositorPaused; }-  java::sdk::Surface::Param GetSurface() { return mSurface; }-- private:-  already_AddRefed<UiCompositorControllerChild>-  GetUiCompositorControllerChild() {-    RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child;-    if (auto window = mWindow.Access()) {+  /// Called from the main thread whenever the compositor has been+  /// (re)initialized.+  void NotifyCompositorCreated(+      RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> aUiCompositorControllerChild) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread());+    mUiCompositorControllerChild = aUiCompositorControllerChild;++    if (auto window{mWindow.Access()}) {       nsWindow* gkWindow = window->GetNsWindow();       if (gkWindow) {-        child = gkWindow->GetUiCompositorControllerChild();-      }-    }-    return child.forget();-  }-+        mUiCompositorControllerChild->OnCompositorSurfaceChanged(+            gkWindow->mWidgetId, mSurface);+      }+    }++    if (!mCompositorPaused) {+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->Resume();++      if (!mCapturePixelsResults.empty()) {+        mUiCompositorControllerChild->RequestScreenPixels();+      }+    }+  }++  /// Called from the main thread whenever the compositor has been destroyed.+  void NotifyCompositorSessionLost() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread());+    mUiCompositorControllerChild = nullptr;+  }++  java::sdk::Surface::Param GetSurface() { return mSurface; }++ private:   already_AddRefed<DataSourceSurface> FlipScreenPixels(       Shmem& aMem, const ScreenIntSize& aInSize, const ScreenRect& aInRegion,       const IntSize& aOutSize) {@@ -1096,6 +1117,21 @@     gkWindow->Resize(aLeft, aTop, aWidth, aHeight, /* repaint */ false);   }+  void NotifyMemoryPressure() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());+    auto acc = mWindow.Access();+    if (!acc) {+      return;  // Already shut down.+    }++    nsWindow* gkWindow = acc->GetNsWindow();+    if (!gkWindow) {+      return;+    }++    gkWindow->mCompositorBridgeChild->SendNotifyMemoryPressure();+  }+   void SetDynamicToolbarMaxHeight(int32_t aHeight) {     MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());     auto acc = mWindow.Access();@@ -1116,9 +1152,8 @@     mCompositorPaused = true;-    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-            GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {-      child->Pause();+    if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->Pause();     }     if (auto lock{mWindow.Access()}) {@@ -1139,10 +1174,9 @@   void SyncResumeCompositor() {     MOZ_ASSERT(AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread());-    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-            GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {+    if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {       mCompositorPaused = false;-      child->Resume();+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->Resume();     }   }@@ -1153,17 +1187,17 @@     mSurface = java::sdk::Surface::GlobalRef::From(aSurface);-    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-            GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {+    if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {       if (auto window = mWindow.Access()) {         nsWindow* gkWindow = window->GetNsWindow();         if (gkWindow) {           // Send new Surface to GPU process, if one exists.-          child->OnCompositorSurfaceChanged(gkWindow->mWidgetId, mSurface);+          mUiCompositorControllerChild->OnCompositorSurfaceChanged(+              gkWindow->mWidgetId, mSurface);         }       }-      child->ResumeAndResize(aX, aY, aWidth, aHeight);+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->ResumeAndResize(aX, aY, aWidth, aHeight);     }     mCompositorPaused = false;@@ -1219,20 +1253,19 @@   }   void SyncInvalidateAndScheduleComposite() {-    RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-        GetUiCompositorControllerChild();-    if (!child) {+    if (!mUiCompositorControllerChild) {       return;     }     if (AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread()) {-      child->InvalidateAndRender();+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->InvalidateAndRender();       return;     }     if (RefPtr<nsThread> uiThread = GetAndroidUiThread()) {       uiThread->Dispatch(NewRunnableMethod<>(-                             "LayerViewSupport::InvalidateAndRender", child,+                             "LayerViewSupport::InvalidateAndRender",+                             mUiCompositorControllerChild,                              &UiCompositorControllerChild::InvalidateAndRender),                          nsIThread::DISPATCH_NORMAL);     }@@ -1241,9 +1274,8 @@   void SetMaxToolbarHeight(int32_t aHeight) {     MOZ_ASSERT(AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread());-    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-            GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {-      child->SetMaxToolbarHeight(aHeight);+    if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->SetMaxToolbarHeight(aHeight);     }   }@@ -1258,30 +1290,28 @@     if (RefPtr<nsThread> uiThread = GetAndroidUiThread()) {       uiThread->Dispatch(NS_NewRunnableFunction(           "LayerViewSupport::SetFixedBottomOffset", [this, offset = aOffset] {-            if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-                    GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {-              child->SetFixedBottomOffset(offset);+            if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {+              mUiCompositorControllerChild->SetFixedBottomOffset(offset);             }           }));     }   }   void SendToolbarAnimatorMessage(int32_t aMessage) {-    RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-        GetUiCompositorControllerChild();-    if (!child) {+    if (!mUiCompositorControllerChild) {       return;     }     if (AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread()) {-      child->ToolbarAnimatorMessageFromUI(aMessage);+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->ToolbarAnimatorMessageFromUI(aMessage);       return;     }     if (RefPtr<nsThread> uiThread = GetAndroidUiThread()) {       uiThread->Dispatch(           NewRunnableMethod<int32_t>(-              "LayerViewSupport::ToolbarAnimatorMessageFromUI", child,+              "LayerViewSupport::ToolbarAnimatorMessageFromUI",+              mUiCompositorControllerChild,               &UiCompositorControllerChild::ToolbarAnimatorMessageFromUI,               aMessage),           nsIThread::DISPATCH_NORMAL);@@ -1297,9 +1327,8 @@   void SetDefaultClearColor(int32_t aColor) {     MOZ_ASSERT(AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread());-    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-            GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {-      child->SetDefaultClearColor((uint32_t)aColor);+    if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->SetDefaultClearColor((uint32_t)aColor);     }   }@@ -1321,9 +1350,8 @@     }     if (size == 1) {-      if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-              GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {-        child->RequestScreenPixels();+      if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {+        mUiCompositorControllerChild->RequestScreenPixels();       }     }   }@@ -1379,13 +1407,12 @@     }     // Pixels have been copied, so Dealloc Shmem-    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-            GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {-      child->DeallocPixelBuffer(aMem);+    if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->DeallocPixelBuffer(aMem);       if (auto window = mWindow.Access()) {         if (!mCapturePixelsResults.empty()) {-          child->RequestScreenPixels();+          mUiCompositorControllerChild->RequestScreenPixels();         }       }     }@@ -1393,9 +1420,8 @@   void EnableLayerUpdateNotifications(bool aEnable) {     MOZ_ASSERT(AndroidBridge::IsJavaUiThread());-    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> child =-            GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {-      child->EnableLayerUpdateNotifications(aEnable);+    if (mUiCompositorControllerChild) {+      mUiCompositorControllerChild->EnableLayerUpdateNotifications(aEnable);     }   }@@ -1535,6 +1561,17 @@     mWindow->mLayerViewSupport =         jni::NativeWeakPtrHolder<LayerViewSupport>::Attach(             compositor, mWindow->mGeckoViewSupport, compositor);++    if (RefPtr<UiCompositorControllerChild> uiCompositorController =+            mWindow->GetUiCompositorControllerChild()) {+      DispatchToUiThread(+          "LayerViewSupport::NotifyCompositorCreated",+          [lvs = mWindow->mLayerViewSupport, uiCompositorController] {+            if (auto lvsAccess{lvs.Access()}) {+              lvsAccess->NotifyCompositorCreated(uiCompositorController);+            }+          });+    }   }   MOZ_ASSERT(mWindow->mAndroidView);@@ -2144,7 +2181,7 @@   return nsEventStatus_eIgnore; }-nsresult nsWindow::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen, nsIScreen*) {+nsresult nsWindow::MakeFullScreen(bool aFullScreen) {   if (!mAndroidView) {     return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;   }@@ -2192,17 +2229,15 @@     LayoutDeviceIntRect rect = GetBounds();     CreateCompositor(rect.Width(), rect.Height());     if (mWindowRenderer) {-      auto lvs(mLayerViewSupport.Access());-      if (lvs) {-        GetUiCompositorControllerChild()->OnCompositorSurfaceChanged(-            mWidgetId, lvs->GetSurface());--        if (!lvs->CompositorPaused()) {-          CompositorBridgeChild* remoteRenderer = GetRemoteRenderer();-          if (remoteRenderer) {-            remoteRenderer->SendResumeAsync();-          }-        }+      if (mLayerViewSupport.IsAttached()) {+        DispatchToUiThread(+            "LayerViewSupport::NotifyCompositorCreated",+            [lvs = mLayerViewSupport,+             uiCompositorController = GetUiCompositorControllerChild()] {+              if (auto lvsAccess{lvs.Access()}) {+                lvsAccess->NotifyCompositorCreated(uiCompositorController);+              }+            });       }       return;@@ -2221,6 +2256,14 @@ void nsWindow::NotifyCompositorSessionLost(     mozilla::layers::CompositorSession* aSession) {   nsBaseWidget::NotifyCompositorSessionLost(aSession);++  DispatchToUiThread("nsWindow::NotifyCompositorSessionLost",+                     [lvs = mLayerViewSupport] {+                       if (auto lvsAccess{lvs.Access()}) {+                         lvsAccess->NotifyCompositorSessionLost();+                       }+                     });+   RedrawAll(); }

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities. Here's my analysis:

1. First potential issue:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Possible Race Condition in Compositor Handling [widget/android/nsWindow.cpp] [894-2144]
    [Old Code]
    (No explicit handling of UiCompositorControllerChild member variable)
    [Fixed Code]
    (Added explicit mUiCompositorControllerChild member with proper initialization and cleanup)

2. Second potential issue:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Possible Memory Leak or Dangling Pointer [widget/android/nsWindow.cpp] [1002-2229]
    [Old Code]
    (Getting UiCompositorControllerChild dynamically through GetUiCompositorControllerChild() each time)
    [Fixed Code]
    (Using stored mUiCompositorControllerChild with proper lifecycle management via NotifyCompositorCreated/NotifyCompositorSessionLost)

3. Third potential issue:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Possible Thread Safety Issues [widget/android/nsWindow.cpp] [1005-1561]
    [Old Code]
    (No explicit thread safety measures for compositor operations)
    [Fixed Code]
    (Added thread assertions and proper dispatch mechanisms for UI thread operations)

The changes appear to be primarily architectural improvements rather than direct security fixes, but they do address several potential issues:
1. Better management of the UiCompositorControllerChild lifecycle
2. More explicit thread safety through assertions and proper dispatching
3. Clearer separation of concerns between UI thread and compositor operations

While these changes improve code robustness, I can't identify any specific, named vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes seem more focused on preventing potential future issues rather than fixing existing vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-size-1-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-size-1-ref.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <head>   <title>CSS Reference: Test for calc() on background-size</title>   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=594934">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> p {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-background-size-1-ref.html [Lines] 3-6
   [Old Code]
   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=594934">
   <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code]
   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=594934">

The change simply removes an empty meta tag with name="flags". This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here.

Note: The diff shows removal of a meta tag that wasn't serving any apparent purpose, which doesn't relate to any known security vulnerability. The change appears to be purely cosmetic/cleanup in nature.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1387503-2.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1387503-2.js@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+// |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream") // Test uncatchable error when a stream's queuing strategy's size() method is called. // Make `debugger;` raise an uncatchable exception.

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Test Coverage Issue] [js/src/jit-test/tests/stream/bug-1387503-2.js] [Lines 1]
    [Old Code: (no conditional test skip)]
    [Fixed Code: // |jit-test| skip-if: !this.hasOwnProperty("ReadableStream")]

Additional Details:
- The change adds a conditional skip for the test if the environment doesn't have ReadableStream
- This appears to be a test robustness improvement rather than a security fix
- No specific vulnerability is being fixed here, but it prevents potential test failures in environments without ReadableStream
- The original bug number (1387503) suggests this was related to stream error handling, but the diff itself doesn't show security fixes

Note: The diff doesn't show any clear security vulnerability fixes. The change is primarily about test reliability by adding a feature check before running the test.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-003.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Shiyou Tan" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="8.2. Overflow Ellipsis: the 'text-overflow' property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-ui/#text-overflow"> <link rel="match" href="reference/text-overflow-001-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test checks that text-overflow inherits the parent' clip value when text-overflow set inherit"> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css" /> <style>

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ui/text-overflow-003.html] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a cleanup or maintenance change rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification doesn't introduce any security concerns nor fix any apparent security issues

No other changes were present in the diff that would indicate security fixes. The modification appears to be a minor HTML cleanup rather than addressing any security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/TupleType.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/TupleType.cpp@@ -11,12 +11,15 @@ #include "jsapi.h"+#include "builtin/Array.h"  // IsArray() #include "builtin/TupleObject.h" #include "gc/Allocator.h" #include "gc/AllocKind.h" #include "gc/Nursery.h" #include "gc/Tracer.h"+ #include "js/TypeDecls.h"+#include "js/Value.h" #include "util/StringBuffer.h" #include "vm/EqualityOperations.h" #include "vm/GlobalObject.h"@@ -25,10 +28,207 @@ #include "vm/SelfHosting.h" #include "vm/ToSource.h"+#include "vm/GeckoProfiler-inl.h" #include "vm/JSObject-inl.h" #include "vm/NativeObject-inl.h" using namespace js;++static bool TupleConstructor(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp);++static const JSFunctionSpec tuple_static_methods[] = {+    JS_FN("isTuple", tuple_is_tuple, 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("from", "TupleFrom", 1, 0), JS_FN("of", tuple_of, 0, 0),+    JS_FS_END};++static const JSFunctionSpec tuple_methods[] = {+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("toSorted", "TupleToSorted", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("toSpliced", "TupleToSpliced", 2, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("concat", "TupleConcat", 0, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("includes", "TupleIncludes", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("indexOf", "TupleIndexOf", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("join", "TupleJoin", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("lastIndexOf", "TupleLastIndexOf", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("toLocaleString", "TupleToLocaleString", 2, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("toString", "TupleToString", 0, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("entries", "TupleEntries", 0, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("every", "TupleEvery", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("filter", "TupleFilter", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("find", "TupleFind", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("findIndex", "TupleFindIndex", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("forEach", "TupleForEach", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("keys", "TupleKeys", 0, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("map", "TupleMap", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("reduce", "TupleReduce", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("reduceRight", "TupleReduceRight", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("some", "TupleSome", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("values", "$TupleValues", 0, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_SYM_FN(iterator, "$TupleValues", 0, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("flat", "TupleFlat", 0, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("flatMap", "TupleFlatMap", 1, 0),+    JS_SELF_HOSTED_FN("toReversed", "TupleToReversed", 0, 0),+    JS_FN("with", tuple_with, 2, 0),+    JS_FN("slice", tuple_slice, 2, 0),+    JS_FN("valueOf", tuple_value_of, 0, 0),+    JS_FS_END};++Shape* TupleType::getInitialShape(JSContext* cx) {+  return SharedShape::getInitialShape(cx, &TupleType::class_, cx->realm(),+                                      TaggedProto(nullptr), 0);+  // tuples don't have slots, but only integer-indexed elements.+}++// Prototype methods++// Proposal+// Tuple.prototype.with()+bool js::tuple_with(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {+  AutoGeckoProfilerEntry pseudoFrame(+      cx, "Tuple.prototype.with", JS::ProfilingCategoryPair::JS,+      uint32_t(ProfilingStackFrame::Flags::RELEVANT_FOR_JS));++  CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);++  /* Step 1. */+  RootedValue v(cx, args.thisv());++  mozilla::Maybe<TupleType&> maybeTuple = js::ThisTupleValue(cx, v);+  if (!maybeTuple) {+    return false;+  }++  Rooted<TupleType*> tuple(cx, &(*maybeTuple));++  /* Step 2. */+  HeapSlotArray t = tuple->getDenseElements();++  uint64_t length = tuple->getDenseInitializedLength();+  TupleType* list = TupleType::createUninitialized(cx, length);+  if (!list) {+    return false;+  }++  /* Step 4 */+  uint64_t index;+  if (!ToIndex(cx, args.get(0), JSMSG_BAD_TUPLE_INDEX, &index)) {+    return false;+  }+  /* Step 5 */+  if (index >= length) {+    JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,+                              JSMSG_BAD_TUPLE_INDEX, "Tuple.with");+    return false;+  }+  /* Step 6 */+  RootedValue value(cx, args.get(1));+  if (value.isObject()) {+    JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,+                              JSMSG_RECORD_TUPLE_NO_OBJECT, "Tuple.with");+    return false;+  }+  /* Step 7 */+  uint64_t before = index;+  uint64_t after = length - index - 1;+  list->copyDenseElements(0, t, before);+  list->setDenseInitializedLength(index + 1);+  list->initDenseElement(index, value);+  list->copyDenseElements(index + 1, t + uint32_t(index + 1), after);+  list->setDenseInitializedLength(length);+  list->finishInitialization(cx);+  /* Step 8 */+  args.rval().setExtendedPrimitive(*list);+  return true;+}++// Proposal+// Tuple.prototype.slice()+bool js::tuple_slice(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {+  AutoGeckoProfilerEntry pseudoFrame(+      cx, "Tuple.prototype.slice", JS::ProfilingCategoryPair::JS,+      uint32_t(ProfilingStackFrame::Flags::RELEVANT_FOR_JS));++  CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);+  RootedValue v(cx, args.thisv());++  /* Steps 1-2. */+  mozilla::Maybe<TupleType&> maybeList = js::ThisTupleValue(cx, v);+  if (!maybeList) {+    return false;+  }++  Rooted<TupleType*> list(cx, &(*maybeList));+  /* Step 3. */+  uint32_t len = list->getDenseInitializedLength();++  /* Step 4. */+  double relativeStart;+  if (!ToInteger(cx, args.get(0), &relativeStart)) {+    return false;+  }++  /* Step 5. */+  uint32_t k;+  if (relativeStart < 0.0) {+    k = std::max(len + relativeStart, 0.0);+  } else {+    k = std::min(relativeStart, double(len));+  }++  /* Step 6. */+  double relativeEnd;+  if (argc > 1 && !args.get(1).isUndefined()) {+    if (!ToInteger(cx, args.get(1), &relativeEnd)) {+      return false;+    }+  } else {+    relativeEnd = len;+  }++  /* Step 7. */+  uint32_t finalIndex;+  if (relativeEnd < 0.0) {+    finalIndex = std::max(len + relativeEnd, 0.0);+  } else {+    finalIndex = std::min(relativeEnd, double(len));+  }++  /* Step 8. */++  uint32_t newLen = finalIndex >= k ? finalIndex - k : 0;+  TupleType* newList = TupleType::createUninitialized(cx, newLen);+  if (!newList) {+    return false;+  }++  /* Step 9. */+  HeapSlotArray oldElements = list->getDenseElements();+  newList->copyDenseElements(0, oldElements + k, newLen);+  newList->setDenseInitializedLength(newLen);+  newList->finishInitialization(cx);+  /* Step 10. */+  args.rval().setExtendedPrimitive(*newList);+  return true;+}++// Proposal+// Tuple.prototype.valueOf()+bool js::tuple_value_of(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {+  AutoGeckoProfilerEntry pseudoFrame(+      cx, "Tuple.prototype.valueOf", JS::ProfilingCategoryPair::JS,+      uint32_t(ProfilingStackFrame::Flags::RELEVANT_FOR_JS));++  CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);++  /* Step 1. */+  HandleValue thisv = args.thisv();+  mozilla::Maybe<TupleType&> tuple = js::ThisTupleValue(cx, thisv);+  if (!tuple) {+    return false;+  }++  args.rval().setExtendedPrimitive(*tuple);+  return true;+} TupleType* TupleType::create(JSContext* cx, uint32_t length,                              const Value* elements) {@@ -51,17 +251,11 @@   return tup; }-TupleType* TupleType::createUninitialized(JSContext* cx, uint32_t length) {-  RootedShape shape(-      cx, SharedShape::getInitialShape(-              cx, &TupleType::class_, cx->realm(), TaggedProto(nullptr),-              // tuples don't have slots, but only integer-indexed elements.-              /* nfixed = */ 0));+static TupleType* allocate(JSContext* cx, gc::AllocKind allocKind) {+  RootedShape shape(cx, TupleType::getInitialShape(cx));   if (!shape) {     return nullptr;   }--  gc::AllocKind allocKind = GuessArrayGCKind(length);   JSObject* obj =       js::AllocateObject(cx, allocKind, 0, gc::DefaultHeap, &TupleType::class_);@@ -70,14 +264,23 @@   }   TupleType* tup = static_cast<TupleType*>(obj);-   tup->initShape(shape);   tup->initEmptyDynamicSlots();+  tup->setFixedElements(0);+  return tup;+}++TupleType* TupleType::createUninitialized(JSContext* cx, uint32_t length) {+  gc::AllocKind allocKind = GuessArrayGCKind(length);++  TupleType* tup = allocate(cx, allocKind);+  if (!tup) {+    return nullptr;+  }   uint32_t capacity =       gc::GetGCKindSlots(allocKind) - ObjectElements::VALUES_PER_HEADER;-  tup->setFixedElements(0);   new (tup->getElementsHeader()) ObjectElements(capacity, length);   if (!tup->ensureElements(cx, length)) {@@ -172,7 +375,6 @@                           bool* equal) {   return sameValueWith<SameValue>(cx, lhs, rhs, equal); }- bool TupleType::sameValueZero(TupleType* lhs, TupleType* rhs) {   MOZ_ASSERT(lhs->isAtomized());   MOZ_ASSERT(rhs->isAtomized());@@ -235,7 +437,7 @@   return true; }-JSString* js::TupleToSource(JSContext* cx, TupleType* tup) {+JSString* js::TupleToSource(JSContext* cx, Handle<TupleType*> tup) {   JSStringBuilder sb(cx);   if (!sb.append("#[")) {@@ -297,30 +499,119 @@                        BEGIN: Tuple.prototype methods \*===========================================================================*/-bool IsTuple(HandleValue v) {+static bool ArrayToTuple(JSContext* cx, const CallArgs& args) {+  RootedArrayObject aObj(cx, &args.rval().toObject().as<ArrayObject>());+  TupleType* tup = TupleType::createUnchecked(cx, aObj);++  if (!tup) {+    return false;+  }++  args.rval().setExtendedPrimitive(*tup);+  return true;+}++// Takes an array as a single argument and returns a tuple of the+// array elements, without copying the array+// Should only be called from self-hosted tuple methods;+// assumes all elements are non-objects and the array is packed+bool js::tuple_construct(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {+  CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);++  MOZ_ASSERT(args[0].toObject().is<ArrayObject>());++  args.rval().set(args[0]);+  return ArrayToTuple(cx, args);+}++bool js::tuple_is_tuple(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {+  CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);+  return IsTupleUnchecked(cx, args);+}++TupleType* TupleType::createUnchecked(JSContext* cx, HandleArrayObject aObj) {+  gc::AllocKind allocKind = GuessArrayGCKind(aObj->getDenseInitializedLength());++  RootedShape shape(cx, TupleType::getInitialShape(cx));+  if (!shape) {+    return nullptr;+  }++  JSObject* obj =+      js::AllocateObject(cx, allocKind, 0, gc::DefaultHeap, &TupleType::class_);++  if (!obj) {+    return nullptr;+  }++  TupleType* tup = static_cast<TupleType*>(obj);+  tup->initShape(shape);+  tup->initEmptyDynamicSlots();+  tup->setFixedElements(0);++  if (!tup) {+    return nullptr;+  }++  tup->elements_ = aObj->getElementsHeader()->elements();++  aObj->shrinkCapacityToInitializedLength(cx);++  tup->finishInitialization(cx);+  return tup;+}++bool js::tuple_of(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {+  /* Step 1 */+  CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);+  size_t len = args.length();+  Value* items = args.array();++  /* Step 2 */+  for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {+    if (items[i].isObject()) {+      JS_ReportErrorNumberASCII(cx, GetErrorMessage, nullptr,+                                JSMSG_RECORD_TUPLE_NO_OBJECT, "Tuple.of");+      return false;+    }+  }+  /* Step 3 */+  ArrayObject* result = js::NewDenseCopiedArray(cx, len, items, GenericObject);+  if (!result) {+    return false;+  }+  args.rval().setObject(*result);+  /* Step 4 */+  return ArrayToTuple(cx, args);+}++bool js::IsTuple(const Value& v) {   if (v.isExtendedPrimitive()) return v.toExtendedPrimitive().is<TupleType>();   if (v.isObject()) return v.toObject().is<TupleObject>();   return false;-};--static MOZ_ALWAYS_INLINE TupleType* ThisTupleValue(HandleValue val) {+}++// Caller is responsible for rooting the result+TupleType& TupleType::thisTupleValue(const Value& val) {   MOZ_ASSERT(IsTuple(val));-  return val.isExtendedPrimitive() ? &val.toExtendedPrimitive().as<TupleType>()-                                   : val.toObject().as<TupleObject>().unbox();-}+  return (val.isExtendedPrimitive() ? val.toExtendedPrimitive().as<TupleType>()+                                    : val.toObject().as<TupleObject>().unbox());+}++bool HandleIsTuple(HandleValue v) { return IsTuple(v.get()); } // 8.2.3.2 get Tuple.prototype.length bool lengthAccessor_impl(JSContext* cx, const CallArgs& args) {   // Step 1.-  TupleType* tuple = ThisTupleValue(args.thisv());+  TupleType& tuple = TupleType::thisTupleValue(args.thisv().get());   // Step 2.-  args.rval().setInt32(tuple->length());+  args.rval().setInt32(tuple.length());   return true; } bool TupleType::lengthAccessor(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {   CallArgs args = CallArgsFromVp(argc, vp);-  return CallNonGenericMethod<IsTuple, lengthAccessor_impl>(cx, args);+  return CallNonGenericMethod<HandleIsTuple, lengthAccessor_impl>(cx, args); } /*===========================================================================*\@@ -334,14 +625,15 @@     "Tuple.prototype", JSCLASS_HAS_CACHED_PROTO(JSProto_Tuple),     JS_NULL_CLASS_OPS, &TupleType::classSpec_};-const JSPropertySpec properties_[] = {+/* static */ const JSPropertySpec properties_[] = {+    JS_STRING_SYM_PS(toStringTag, "Tuple", JSPROP_READONLY),     JS_PSG("length", TupleType::lengthAccessor, 0), JS_PS_END}; const ClassSpec TupleType::classSpec_ = {-    GenericCreateConstructor<TupleConstructor, 1, gc::AllocKind::FUNCTION>,+    GenericCreateConstructor<TupleConstructor, 0, gc::AllocKind::FUNCTION>,     GenericCreatePrototype<TupleType>,+    tuple_static_methods,     nullptr,-    nullptr,-    nullptr,+    tuple_methods,     properties_,     nullptr};

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be primarily feature additions and code refactoring related to Tuple implementation in JavaScript. Here's my analysis:

1. First potential area examined - tuple value validation:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found in the object validation checks in tuple_with() and tuple_slice() methods. Proper checks for tuple indices and object values are present.

2. Memory allocation and initialization:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    The changes to createUninitialized() and new allocate() function show proper memory handling and initialization patterns.

3. Type conversion and validation:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    The ToIndex and ToInteger conversions include proper error checking and bounds validation.

4. Prototype methods:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    The added tuple methods (with, slice, valueOf) all include proper input validation and error handling.

The diff shows significant additions to the Tuple implementation including:
- Added numerous tuple methods (with, slice, valueOf, etc.)
- Added tuple static methods (isTuple, from, of)
- Improved memory allocation patterns
- Added proper type checking and validation
- Added tuple conversion utilities

While there are many changes, they appear to be feature additions and code improvements rather than security fixes. The code maintains proper validation and error checking throughout the new functionality.

If I had to identify the most security-relevant change, it would be the addition of proper object validation in tuple methods, but this appears to be new functionality rather than fixing an existing vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Object validation in tuple methods [File] [Multiple locations]
    [New code properly validates against objects in tuples]
    This is new functionality rather than a fix

The changes appear to be implementing the Tuple proposal (currently stage 2) in JavaScript, adding comprehensive tuple functionality with proper security checks throughout.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.xor.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.xor.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.xor.html [Lines] 17-28
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.xor.html [Lines] 28-29
   [Old Code]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring (renaming 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-018.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-018.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-polygon-018-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the polygon(60px 20px, 100px 60px, 20px 60px, 60px 100px) border-box value under horizontal-tb writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta "flags" tag which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality

The change seems to be purely cosmetic/cleanup related to test metadata rather than addressing any security concerns.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/compare_locales/compare_locales/__init__.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/compare_locales/compare_locales/__init__.py@@ -1 +1 @@-version = "8.1.0"+version = "8.2.1"

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Version Update] [third_party/python/compare_locales/compare_locales/__init__.py] [Line 1]
    [Old Code] version = "8.1.0"
    [Fixed Code] version = "8.2.1"

Additional Details:
- The diff only shows a version number update from 8.1.0 to 8.2.1
- Without seeing the actual changelog or release notes for compare_locales, we can't be certain what security fixes (if any) were included
- Version updates often include security fixes, but they can also include feature additions or bug fixes
- The major version (8) stayed the same while minor and patch versions increased, suggesting possible security fixes or important bug fixes

Note: To provide a more definitive answer, we would need access to:
1. The compare_locales changelog for versions 8.1.0 to 8.2.1
2. The actual code changes between these versions
3. Any security advisories related to this library

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-60.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-60.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/three-paragraph-lime-characters.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <div class="stub">

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 8]
   [Old Code]
   <meta name="flags" content="" />
   [Fixed Code]
   (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification is likely for code hygiene or test suite maintenance purposes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/places/tests/browser/interactions/browser_interactions_typing.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/places/tests/browser/interactions/browser_interactions_typing.js@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@     info("reload");     browser.reload();-    await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);+    await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, TEST_URL);     // First typing should have been recorded     await assertDatabaseValues([@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@     info("reload");     browser.reload();-    await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);+    await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, TEST_URL);     // Second typing should have been recorded     await assertDatabaseValues([@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@       },     ]);   });-});+}).skip(); // Bug 1749328 - intermittent failure: dropping the 2nd interaction after the 2nd reload add_task(async function test_switch_tabs_no_typing() {   await Interactions.reset();

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be test-related modifications. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Test Improvement [browser/components/places/tests/browser/interactions/browser_interactions_typing.js] [Lines 240-273]
    [Old Code]
    await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
    [Fixed Code]
    await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, TEST_URL);

    Old Code:
    });
    Fixed Code:
    }).skip(); // Bug 1749328 - intermittent failure: dropping the 2nd interaction after the 2nd reload

Additional Details:
The changes involve:
1. Adding specific parameters to browserLoaded() calls to make the test more precise
2. Skipping a potentially flaky test with a comment referencing a bug number
These appear to be test reliability improvements rather than security fixes. No vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.