--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/source-test/node.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/source-test/node.yml@@ -32,6 +32,37 @@     when:         files-changed:             - "browser/components/newtab/**"++newtab-unit-tests-ccov:+    description: newtab unit tests code coverage+    platform: linux1804-64/opt+    treeherder:+        symbol: node(newtab-ccov)+        kind: test+        tier: 1+    worker-type: t-linux-xlarge-source+    worker:+        docker-image: {in-tree: "ubuntu1804-test"}+        max-run-time: 1800+        artifacts:+            - name: public/code-coverage-grcov.zip+              path: /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/components/newtab/logs/coverage/code-coverage-grcov.zip+              type: file+    require-build:+        by-project:+            try:+                linux1804-64/opt: build-linux64/opt+            default:+                linux1804-64/opt: build-linux64-shippable/opt+    run:+        using: run-task+        cache-dotcache: true+        cwd: '{checkout}'+        command: >+            cd /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/browser/components/newtab &&+            npm install &&+            node bin/try-runner.js+    run-on-projects: ["mozilla-central"] debugger-tests:     description: devtools debugger unit tests and flow type checks

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in the diff. The changes appear to add a new test configuration (newtab-unit-tests-ccov) for code coverage without modifying existing security-sensitive code.

The diff shows:
- Addition of a new test job configuration 'newtab-unit-tests-ccov'
- Configuration includes test setup, artifacts, and execution commands
- No security-related changes or fixes are evident
- No vulnerable patterns or security issues are being addressed in this change

The changes are purely additive for test coverage purposes and don't modify any existing security-sensitive functionality. No CVEs or known vulnerability patterns are present in the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/command.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/command.rs@@ -386,54 +386,72 @@             self.state.has_pass_label = true;         }-        // set the framebuffer-        self.cmd_buffer.commands.push(C::ResetFramebuffer);-        for (i, cat) in desc.color_attachments.iter().enumerate() {-            let attachment = glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i as u32;-            self.cmd_buffer.commands.push(C::BindAttachment {-                attachment,-                view: cat.target.view.clone(),-            });-            if let Some(ref rat) = cat.resolve_target {-                self.state-                    .resolve_attachments-                    .push((attachment, rat.view.clone()));-            }-            if !cat.ops.contains(crate::AttachmentOps::STORE) {-                self.state.invalidate_attachments.push(attachment);-            }-        }-        if let Some(ref dsat) = desc.depth_stencil_attachment {-            let aspects = dsat.target.view.aspects;-            let attachment = match aspects {-                crate::FormatAspects::DEPTH => glow::DEPTH_ATTACHMENT,-                crate::FormatAspects::STENCIL => glow::STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,-                _ => glow::DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,-            };-            self.cmd_buffer.commands.push(C::BindAttachment {-                attachment,-                view: dsat.target.view.clone(),-            });-            if aspects.contains(crate::FormatAspects::DEPTH)-                && !dsat.depth_ops.contains(crate::AttachmentOps::STORE)-            {-                self.state-                    .invalidate_attachments-                    .push(glow::DEPTH_ATTACHMENT);-            }-            if aspects.contains(crate::FormatAspects::STENCIL)-                && !dsat.stencil_ops.contains(crate::AttachmentOps::STORE)-            {-                self.state-                    .invalidate_attachments-                    .push(glow::STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);-            }-        }--        // set the draw buffers and states-        self.cmd_buffer-            .commands-            .push(C::SetDrawColorBuffers(desc.color_attachments.len() as u8));+        match desc+            .color_attachments+            .first()+            .map(|at| &at.target.view.inner)+        {+            // default framebuffer (provided externally)+            Some(&super::TextureInner::DefaultRenderbuffer) => {+                self.cmd_buffer+                    .commands+                    .push(C::ResetFramebuffer { is_default: true });+            }+            _ => {+                // set the framebuffer+                self.cmd_buffer+                    .commands+                    .push(C::ResetFramebuffer { is_default: false });++                for (i, cat) in desc.color_attachments.iter().enumerate() {+                    let attachment = glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i as u32;+                    self.cmd_buffer.commands.push(C::BindAttachment {+                        attachment,+                        view: cat.target.view.clone(),+                    });+                    if let Some(ref rat) = cat.resolve_target {+                        self.state+                            .resolve_attachments+                            .push((attachment, rat.view.clone()));+                    }+                    if !cat.ops.contains(crate::AttachmentOps::STORE) {+                        self.state.invalidate_attachments.push(attachment);+                    }+                }+                if let Some(ref dsat) = desc.depth_stencil_attachment {+                    let aspects = dsat.target.view.aspects;+                    let attachment = match aspects {+                        crate::FormatAspects::DEPTH => glow::DEPTH_ATTACHMENT,+                        crate::FormatAspects::STENCIL => glow::STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,+                        _ => glow::DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,+                    };+                    self.cmd_buffer.commands.push(C::BindAttachment {+                        attachment,+                        view: dsat.target.view.clone(),+                    });+                    if aspects.contains(crate::FormatAspects::DEPTH)+                        && !dsat.depth_ops.contains(crate::AttachmentOps::STORE)+                    {+                        self.state+                            .invalidate_attachments+                            .push(glow::DEPTH_ATTACHMENT);+                    }+                    if aspects.contains(crate::FormatAspects::STENCIL)+                        && !dsat.stencil_ops.contains(crate::AttachmentOps::STORE)+                    {+                        self.state+                            .invalidate_attachments+                            .push(glow::STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);+                    }+                }++                // set the draw buffers and states+                self.cmd_buffer+                    .commands+                    .push(C::SetDrawColorBuffers(desc.color_attachments.len() as u8));+            }+        }+         let rect = crate::Rect {             x: 0,             y: 0,

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Improper Framebuffer Handling] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/command.rs] [Lines 386-440]
[Old Code]
```rust
// set the framebuffer
self.cmd_buffer.commands.push(C::ResetFramebuffer);
for (i, cat) in desc.color_attachments.iter().enumerate() {
    // ... rest of the code
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
match desc
    .color_attachments
    .first()
    .map(|at| &at.target.view.inner)
{
    Some(&super::TextureInner::DefaultRenderbuffer) => {
        self.cmd_buffer
            .commands
            .push(C::ResetFramebuffer { is_default: true });
    }
    _ => {
        self.cmd_buffer
            .commands
            .push(C::ResetFramebuffer { is_default: false });
        // ... rest of the code
    }
}
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak Through Framebuffer] [third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/command.rs] [Lines 386-440]
[Old Code]
```rust
// No explicit handling of default vs custom framebuffers
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
// Added explicit handling of default framebuffer case
Some(&super::TextureInner::DefaultRenderbuffer) => {
    self.cmd_buffer
        .commands
        .push(C::ResetFramebuffer { is_default: true });
}
```

The main changes appear to be:
1. Adding explicit differentiation between default and custom framebuffers
2. More careful handling of framebuffer reset operations

While I can't identify a specific named vulnerability, the changes suggest there might have been potential security issues around:
- Improper framebuffer handling that could lead to rendering artifacts or information leaks
- Possible confusion between default and custom framebuffers that could affect security boundaries

The changes make the framebuffer handling more explicit and careful, which generally improves security, but without more context I can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities that were fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-003.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Jieqiong Cui" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="11. The 'perspective-origin' Property" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-2/#propdef-perspective-origin"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'perspective-origin' property set 'bottom' computes to 100% for the vertical position."> <style>   div {

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/perspective-origin-003.html] [Lines 5]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag for "flags", which appears to be test-related metadata rather than security-related
- No actual security vulnerabilities are apparent in this change
- The modification seems to be a cleanup of test file metadata rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/linux/arch/generic/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/linux/arch/generic/mod.rs@@ -135,3 +135,6 @@ pub const BOTHER: ::speed_t = 0o010000; pub const IBSHIFT: ::tcflag_t = 16;++pub const BLKSSZGET: ::c_int = 0x1268;+pub const BLKPBSZGET: ::c_int = 0x127B;

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/linux/arch/generic/mod.rs] [Lines 135-138]
[Old Code]
pub const BOTHER: ::speed_t = 0o010000;
pub const IBSHIFT: ::tcflag_t = 16;

[Fixed Code]
pub const BOTHER: ::speed_t = 0o010000;
pub const IBSHIFT: ::tcflag_t = 16;

pub const BLKSSZGET: ::c_int = 0x1268;
pub const BLKPBSZGET: ::c_int = 0x127B;

Additional Details:
The diff shows the addition of two new constants (BLKSSZGET and BLKPBSZGET) related to block device operations. This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix. The constants are standard Linux ioctl commands for getting sector size and physical block size. No security vulnerability is being addressed here - it's simply expanding the API surface to include these constants.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/reentrant-strategy.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/reentrant-strategy.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js 'use strict';

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Removal of jsshell Environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/reentrant-strategy.any.js] [Lines 1]
[Old Code] // META: global=window,worker,jsshell
[Fixed Code] // META: global=window,worker

Additional Details:
The change removes 'jsshell' from the list of global environments where this test should run. This could be related to security if:
1. The jsshell environment had specific vulnerabilities that needed to be isolated
2. The test wasn't properly secured for jsshell environment
3. There were concerns about test behavior in jsshell

However, without more context about why this change was made, I can't definitively say this was a security fix. It could also be a test scope refinement or maintenance change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-atop.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-atop.html@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-atop';         ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and reference updates without any security implications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.source-atop.html] [17-39]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);

The changes are:
1. Renaming `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating references to use the new variable name
3. No security-related changes were made

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/ipc/other/RemoteAccessible.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/ipc/other/RemoteAccessible.cpp@@ -200,13 +200,18 @@   aText = std::move(text); }-void RemoteAccessible::GetTextAfterOffset(int32_t aOffset,-                                          AccessibleTextBoundary aBoundaryType,-                                          nsString& aText,-                                          int32_t* aStartOffset,-                                          int32_t* aEndOffset) {-  Unused << mDoc->SendGetTextAfterOffset(mID, aOffset, aBoundaryType, &aText,+void RemoteAccessible::TextAfterOffset(int32_t aOffset,+                                       AccessibleTextBoundary aBoundaryType,+                                       int32_t* aStartOffset,+                                       int32_t* aEndOffset, nsAString& aText) {+  if (StaticPrefs::accessibility_cache_enabled_AtStartup()) {+    return RemoteAccessibleBase<RemoteAccessible>::TextAfterOffset(+        aOffset, aBoundaryType, aStartOffset, aEndOffset, aText);+  }+  nsString text;+  Unused << mDoc->SendGetTextAfterOffset(mID, aOffset, aBoundaryType, &text,                                          aStartOffset, aEndOffset);+  aText = std::move(text); } void RemoteAccessible::TextAtOffset(int32_t aOffset,@@ -223,13 +228,18 @@   aText = std::move(text); }-void RemoteAccessible::GetTextBeforeOffset(int32_t aOffset,-                                           AccessibleTextBoundary aBoundaryType,-                                           nsString& aText,-                                           int32_t* aStartOffset,-                                           int32_t* aEndOffset) {-  Unused << mDoc->SendGetTextBeforeOffset(mID, aOffset, aBoundaryType, &aText,+void RemoteAccessible::TextBeforeOffset(int32_t aOffset,+                                        AccessibleTextBoundary aBoundaryType,+                                        int32_t* aStartOffset,+                                        int32_t* aEndOffset, nsAString& aText) {+  if (StaticPrefs::accessibility_cache_enabled_AtStartup()) {+    return RemoteAccessibleBase<RemoteAccessible>::TextBeforeOffset(+        aOffset, aBoundaryType, aStartOffset, aEndOffset, aText);+  }+  nsString text;+  Unused << mDoc->SendGetTextBeforeOffset(mID, aOffset, aBoundaryType, &text,                                           aStartOffset, aEndOffset);+  aText = std::move(text); } char16_t RemoteAccessible::CharAt(int32_t aOffset) {@@ -260,16 +270,18 @@   return attrs.forget(); }-nsIntRect RemoteAccessible::TextBounds(int32_t aStartOffset, int32_t aEndOffset,-                                       uint32_t aCoordType) {-  nsIntRect rect;+LayoutDeviceIntRect RemoteAccessible::TextBounds(int32_t aStartOffset,+                                                 int32_t aEndOffset,+                                                 uint32_t aCoordType) {+  LayoutDeviceIntRect rect;   Unused << mDoc->SendTextBounds(mID, aStartOffset, aEndOffset, aCoordType,                                  &rect);   return rect; }-nsIntRect RemoteAccessible::CharBounds(int32_t aOffset, uint32_t aCoordType) {-  nsIntRect rect;+LayoutDeviceIntRect RemoteAccessible::CharBounds(int32_t aOffset,+                                                 uint32_t aCoordType) {+  LayoutDeviceIntRect rect;   Unused << mDoc->SendCharBounds(mID, aOffset, aCoordType, &rect);   return rect; }@@ -365,14 +377,14 @@   return valid; }-nsIntPoint RemoteAccessible::ImagePosition(uint32_t aCoordType) {-  nsIntPoint retVal;+LayoutDeviceIntPoint RemoteAccessible::ImagePosition(uint32_t aCoordType) {+  LayoutDeviceIntPoint retVal;   Unused << mDoc->SendImagePosition(mID, aCoordType, &retVal);   return retVal; }-nsIntSize RemoteAccessible::ImageSize() {-  nsIntSize retVal;+LayoutDeviceIntSize RemoteAccessible::ImageSize() {+  LayoutDeviceIntSize retVal;   Unused << mDoc->SendImageSize(mID, &retVal);   return retVal; }@@ -741,25 +753,36 @@   Unused << mDoc->SendSetSelected(mID, aSelect); }-bool RemoteAccessible::DoAction(uint8_t aIndex) {+bool RemoteAccessible::DoAction(uint8_t aIndex) const {+  if (StaticPrefs::accessibility_cache_enabled_AtStartup()) {+    return RemoteAccessibleBase<RemoteAccessible>::DoAction(aIndex);+  }+   bool success = false;   Unused << mDoc->SendDoAction(mID, aIndex, &success);   return success; }-uint8_t RemoteAccessible::ActionCount() {+uint8_t RemoteAccessible::ActionCount() const {+  if (StaticPrefs::accessibility_cache_enabled_AtStartup()) {+    return RemoteAccessibleBase<RemoteAccessible>::ActionCount();+  }+   uint8_t count = 0;   Unused << mDoc->SendActionCount(mID, &count);   return count; }-void RemoteAccessible::ActionDescriptionAt(uint8_t aIndex,-                                           nsString& aDescription) {-  Unused << mDoc->SendActionDescriptionAt(mID, aIndex, &aDescription);-}--void RemoteAccessible::ActionNameAt(uint8_t aIndex, nsString& aName) {-  Unused << mDoc->SendActionNameAt(mID, aIndex, &aName);+void RemoteAccessible::ActionNameAt(uint8_t aIndex, nsAString& aName) {+  if (StaticPrefs::accessibility_cache_enabled_AtStartup()) {+    RemoteAccessibleBase<RemoteAccessible>::ActionNameAt(aIndex, aName);+    return;+  }++  nsAutoString name;+  Unused << mDoc->SendActionNameAt(mID, aIndex, &name);++  aName.Assign(name); } KeyBinding RemoteAccessible::AccessKey() {@@ -872,7 +895,7 @@     if (target->IsOuterDoc()) {       if (target->ChildCount() == 0) {         // Return the OuterDoc if the requested point is within its bounds.-        nsIntRect rect = target->Bounds();+        LayoutDeviceIntRect rect = target->Bounds();         if (rect.Contains(aX, aY)) {           return target;         }@@ -885,7 +908,7 @@         // process, so they stop at OOP iframes.         if (aWhichChild == Accessible::EWhichChildAtPoint::DirectChild) {           // Return the child document if it's within the bounds of the iframe.-          nsIntRect docRect = target->Bounds();+          LayoutDeviceIntRect docRect = target->Bounds();           if (docRect.Contains(aX, aY)) {             return childDoc;           }@@ -908,12 +931,12 @@   return target; }-nsIntRect RemoteAccessible::Bounds() const {+LayoutDeviceIntRect RemoteAccessible::Bounds() const {   if (StaticPrefs::accessibility_cache_enabled_AtStartup()) {     return RemoteAccessibleBase<RemoteAccessible>::Bounds();   }-  nsIntRect rect;+  LayoutDeviceIntRect rect;   Unused << mDoc->SendExtents(mID, false, &(rect.x), &(rect.y), &(rect.width),                               &(rect.height));   return rect;

Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify several changes that appear to be security-related. Here's the analysis following the requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [File] accessible/ipc/other/RemoteAccessible.cpp [Lines 200-203, 223-226, 260-263, 270-273, 365-368, 377-380, 753-756, 895-898, 931-934]
[Old Code]
Various functions using nsIntRect/nsIntPoint/nsIntSize
[Fixed Code]
Changed to use LayoutDeviceIntRect/LayoutDeviceIntPoint/LayoutDeviceIntSize

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Type Confusion [File] accessible/ipc/other/RemoteAccessible.cpp [Lines 200-203, 223-226]
[Old Code]
void GetTextAfterOffset/GetTextBeforeOffset with nsString& parameter
[Fixed Code]
Changed to TextAfterOffset/TextBeforeOffset with nsAString& parameter

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Race Condition [File] accessible/ipc/other/RemoteAccessible.cpp [Lines 753-756, 895-898]
[Old Code]
bool DoAction(uint8_t aIndex)
[Fixed Code]
bool DoAction(uint8_t aIndex) const

The changes appear to be primarily focused on:
1. Type safety improvements (changing from nsInt* to LayoutDeviceInt* types)
2. Interface consistency (changing from GetText* to Text* methods)
3. Adding const correctness
4. Adding caching support through StaticPrefs checks

While these changes improve code quality and could potentially prevent certain types of vulnerabilities, I cannot definitively identify any specific security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be more about code hardening and maintenance rather than fixing known security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.outside1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.outside1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#0f0'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I can't identify any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.outside1.worker.js] [Lines 13-48]
[Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas']
[Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas']

The changes don't affect security in any way - they're simply variable renaming and don't modify any security-related functionality. The test assertions remain the same, just using the new variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.path.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.fillRect.path.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.beginPath(); ctx.rect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 16, 16); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities in the changes. Here's the analysis:

1. For the first diff (webrtc-sdp/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is just a checksum file update showing changes in file hashes and package versions. No actual code changes or security implications.

2. For the second diff (2d.fillRect.path.html):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    The changes are purely variable name changes from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` in test code. This is a cosmetic/readability change with no security impact.

Answer Format for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No security vulnerabilities found in either diff]
    [Only checksum updates and variable renaming]

Additional Notes:
- The webrtc-sdp changes show updated checksums and version information, which is normal for dependency updates
- The canvas test changes are purely variable renaming with identical functionality
- No security-related fixes or vulnerabilities are apparent in these diffs

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.scale.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.scale.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -30,15 +30,15 @@ ctx.arcTo(50, 50, 50, 0, 50); ctx.lineTo(-1000, 0); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the `_assertPixel` calls. There are no security-related changes in this diff.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are purely variable renaming and reference updates.

The diff shows:
- Variable renamed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- All subsequent references to `offscreenCanvas` updated to `canvas`
- No changes to the actual canvas operations or security-related functionality

This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_filter.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/tls_filter.h@@ -857,6 +857,17 @@   DataBuffer data_; };+class ServerHelloRandomChanger : public TlsHandshakeFilter {+ public:+  ServerHelloRandomChanger(const std::shared_ptr<TlsAgent>& a)+      : TlsHandshakeFilter(a, {kTlsHandshakeServerHello}) {}++ protected:+  PacketFilter::Action FilterHandshake(const HandshakeHeader& header,+                                       const DataBuffer& input,+                                       DataBuffer* output) override;+};+ }  // namespace nss_test #endif

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
- The diff shows an addition of a new class `ServerHelloRandomChanger` which appears to be a test utility for modifying ServerHello random values in TLS handshakes. This is likely added for testing purposes rather than fixing a security vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
- While the addition itself doesn't appear to fix a vulnerability, the purpose of this class (modifying ServerHello random values) might be related to testing for potential vulnerabilities like:
  * Weak randomness in TLS handshakes
  * Predictable random number generation
  * TLS version downgrade attacks
However, since this is test code and we don't see the actual implementation or any fixes to production code, we can't be certain.

The diff shows test infrastructure being added rather than fixing existing code, so no clear security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this specific change. The new class appears to be for testing TLS protocol behavior rather than fixing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/prompts/content/commonDialog.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/prompts/content/commonDialog.js@@ -12,6 +12,19 @@ const { Services } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm"); var propBag, args, Dialog;++// Inherit color scheme overrides from parent window. This is to inherit the+// color scheme of dark themed PBM windows.+{+  let openerColorSchemeOverride =+    window.opener?.browsingContext?.top.prefersColorSchemeOverride;+  if (+    openerColorSchemeOverride &&+    window.browsingContext == window.browsingContext.top+  ) {+    window.browsingContext.prefersColorSchemeOverride = openerColorSchemeOverride;+  }+} function commonDialogOnLoad() {   propBag = window.arguments[0]

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Information Leakage] [File: toolkit/components/prompts/content/commonDialog.js] [Lines: Added lines 12-19]
    [Old Code: No code present]
    [Fixed Code: Added code to inherit color scheme overrides from parent window]

Additional Details:
- The added code implements a feature to inherit color scheme overrides from the parent window, specifically for dark themed Private Browsing Mode (PBM) windows.
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, there could be potential information leakage concerns if the color scheme override could be used to infer information about the parent window's state or characteristics.
- The code does include a safety check (window.browsingContext == window.browsingContext.top) to ensure it only operates on top-level browsing contexts.
- Without more context about how this feature could be abused, we can't definitively say this is a security fix, but it's worth noting as a potential security-related change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.inside2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.inside2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#0f0'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions to use the new variable name. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes are purely variable renaming and test assertion updates.

Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
// ... assertions using offscreenCanvas ...
```

Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
// ... assertions using canvas ...
```

This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.closed.unaffected.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.closed.unaffected.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#00f'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,10, 0,255,0,255, "90,10", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 10,40, 0,255,0,255, "10,40", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,10, 0,255,0,255, "90,10", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 10,40, 0,255,0,255, "10,40", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.closed.unaffected.html] [Lines 17-30]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

The changes don't indicate any security fixes - just variable renaming and corresponding reference updates. No security-related patterns or known vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.maxWidth.NaN.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.maxWidth.NaN.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-task/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-task/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"428ebb024635d4816406193a092e288c0fd14c54588bf16f56a286252631b222","LICENSE-APACHE":"275c491d6d1160553c32fd6127061d7f9606c3ea25abfad6ca3f6ed088785427","LICENSE-MIT":"6652c868f35dfe5e8ef636810a4e576b9d663f3a17fb0f5613ad73583e1b88fd","README.md":"8d029604e66d3fc39468bd937859e642c843ad43f8dddfb4f9cbb467a111f9e6","build.rs":"f6e21c09f18cc405bd7048cb7a2958f92d5414b9ca6b301d137e120a84fa020a","no_atomic_cas.rs":"ff8be002b49a5cd9e4ca0db17b1c9e6b98e55f556319eb6b953dd6ff52c397a6","src/arc_wake.rs":"0e3f7d7883b75337b0b92ff55e477f0bf96f6eb08def7d953676a289fd9696ec","src/future_obj.rs":"10dab39a613d938823f09c3ecdbf7e199ac173a775fd8c5db675c7ecb3b429a2","src/lib.rs":"c55281988768d44d3305b2352c7ebb66e6449797239c07b14257a2d8e612e06b","src/noop_waker.rs":"41246601dab77f69bf09257afc3321031a5a31a7eda51787029870eda9922356","src/spawn.rs":"afcf46b98d62e78d2c974f91df32590bd78fe8c79031e4ae7accf9270e1f6224","src/waker.rs":"748d4a045ea9be605a67f3c20607cc3a5ba20036942c0016cc4299df0446507c","src/waker_ref.rs":"8e3ce1aea4f433ce04c2d15eb065d89582527c1a3a15886c445eb3a78f4fd0d6"},"package":"dabf1872aaab32c886832f2276d2f5399887e2bd613698a02359e4ea83f8de12"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"984bf931be396558123b5ebca33f16f0e24468c7b1aea54f7a11271c42f168e0","LICENSE-APACHE":"275c491d6d1160553c32fd6127061d7f9606c3ea25abfad6ca3f6ed088785427","LICENSE-MIT":"6652c868f35dfe5e8ef636810a4e576b9d663f3a17fb0f5613ad73583e1b88fd","README.md":"8d029604e66d3fc39468bd937859e642c843ad43f8dddfb4f9cbb467a111f9e6","build.rs":"f6e21c09f18cc405bd7048cb7a2958f92d5414b9ca6b301d137e120a84fa020a","no_atomic_cas.rs":"ff8be002b49a5cd9e4ca0db17b1c9e6b98e55f556319eb6b953dd6ff52c397a6","src/arc_wake.rs":"0e3f7d7883b75337b0b92ff55e477f0bf96f6eb08def7d953676a289fd9696ec","src/future_obj.rs":"10dab39a613d938823f09c3ecdbf7e199ac173a775fd8c5db675c7ecb3b429a2","src/lib.rs":"c55281988768d44d3305b2352c7ebb66e6449797239c07b14257a2d8e612e06b","src/noop_waker.rs":"41246601dab77f69bf09257afc3321031a5a31a7eda51787029870eda9922356","src/spawn.rs":"afcf46b98d62e78d2c974f91df32590bd78fe8c79031e4ae7accf9270e1f6224","src/waker.rs":"748d4a045ea9be605a67f3c20607cc3a5ba20036942c0016cc4299df0446507c","src/waker_ref.rs":"8e3ce1aea4f433ce04c2d15eb065d89582527c1a3a15886c445eb3a78f4fd0d6"},"package":"6ee7c6485c30167ce4dfb83ac568a849fe53274c831081476ee13e0dce1aad72"}=========testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/constructor.any.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/constructor.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/constructor.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker 'use strict'; const error1 = new Error('error1');

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. For the first file (third_party/rust/futures-task/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability identified] [third_party/rust/futures-task/.cargo-checksum.json] [Entire file]
    [Old checksum values]
    [New checksum values]
    Note: This appears to be a checksum update for package dependencies, but without seeing the actual code changes in the referenced files, we can't determine if there were security fixes.

2. For the second file (testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/constructor.any.js):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential test scope reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/constructor.any.js] [Line 1]
    [// META: global=window,worker,jsshell]
    [// META: global=window,worker]
    Note: The removal of 'jsshell' from the test scope might indicate a security-related change in test coverage, but this is speculative without more context. It could simply be a test environment adjustment.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-184a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-184a.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Lachlan Hunt" href="http://lachy.id.au/about/contact"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="css3-modsel-184-ref.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p class="">This text should be green.</p>

Let me analyze the diff according to the provided format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-184a.xml] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple test file modification removing an empty meta tag
- The change doesn't relate to any security vulnerability
- The modification seems to be cleaning up test markup rather than fixing a security issue
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are affected by this change

The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag that was likely unnecessary for the test case. There's no indication this was fixing any security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/spv/image.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/spv/image.rs@@ -606,6 +606,7 @@         let expr = crate::Expression::ImageSample {             image: si_lexp.image,             sampler: si_lexp.sampler,+            gather: None, //TODO             coordinate,             array_index,             offset,

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Missing Parameter Initialization] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/spv/image.rs] [Lines 606-612]
   [Old Code:
        let expr = crate::Expression::ImageSample {
            image: si_lexp.image,
            sampler: si_lexp.sampler,
            coordinate,
            array_index,
            offset,
   ]
   [Fixed Code:
        let expr = crate::Expression::ImageSample {
            image: si_lexp.image,
            sampler: si_lexp.sampler,
            gather: None, //TODO
            coordinate,
            array_index,
            offset,
   ]

Additional details:
- The change adds a new field `gather: None` to the `ImageSample` expression initialization
- While this might not represent a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially prevent undefined behavior by explicitly initializing all struct fields
- The "TODO" comment suggests this might be a temporary fix that needs further attention
- Without more context about how this struct is used, it's hard to determine if this could have led to security issues

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingParent.h@@ -28,8 +28,7 @@   void ActorDestroy(ActorDestroyReason aWhy) override;   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvReportTestResults(const nsCString& testName,-                                                bool shouldSucceed,-                                                bool didSucceed,+                                                bool passed,                                                 const nsCString& resultMessage);   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvTestCompleted();

Let me analyze the code diff according to the provided format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak or Inconsistent State] [security/sandbox/common/test/SandboxTestingParent.h] [Lines 28-31]
[Old Code]
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvReportTestResults(const nsCString& testName,
                                            bool shouldSucceed,
                                            bool didSucceed,
                                            const nsCString& resultMessage);
[Fixed Code]
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvReportTestResults(const nsCString& testName,
                                            bool passed,
                                            const nsCString& resultMessage);

Additional Details:
1. The change simplifies the boolean parameters from two (shouldSucceed, didSucceed) to one (passed), which could indicate:
   - Previous potential for inconsistent state if shouldSucceed and didSucceed were contradictory
   - Possible information leak if both flags were exposing more information than needed
   - Simplification of the interface to reduce potential misuse

2. Without more context about how this function is used, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code quality. The change appears to be more about API simplification than fixing a specific known vulnerability.

3. The modification is in a test-related file (SandboxTestingParent.h), which typically handles test results reporting rather than core security functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/shared/downloads/downloads.inc.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/shared/downloads/downloads.inc.css@@ -1,15 +1,6 @@ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */--%filter substitution--%define keyfocus #downloadsPanel[keyfocus]-%define notKeyfocus #downloadsPanel:not([keyfocus])-%define item #downloadsListBox > richlistitem-%define itemFinished @item@[state="1"]-%define itemNotFinished @item@:not([state="1"])-%define itemFocused #downloadsListBox:focus > richlistitem[selected] /*** Panel and outer controls ***/@@ -39,7 +30,7 @@   pointer-events: none; }-@item@ {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem {   /* Leave space for the 32x32 icon with 16px vertical padding, and/or    * the text in the item, with the same padding, whichever is bigger: */   height: max(48px, calc(16px + 2em));@@ -54,33 +45,33 @@   border-radius: 4px; }-@itemFinished@[exists].hoveringMainArea:hover,-@item@:is(.openWhenFinished).hoveringMainArea:hover,-@item@[verdict]:hover,-@item@:hover:is(.openWhenFinished),+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[state="1"][exists].hoveringMainArea:hover,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem.openWhenFinished.hoveringMainArea:hover,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict]:hover,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem.openWhenFinished:hover, .downloadsPanelFooterButton:hover,-@keyfocus@ @itemFocused@,+#downloadsPanel[keyfocus] #downloadsListBox:focus > richlistitem[selected], #downloadsHistory:focus {   background-color: var(--panel-item-hover-bgcolor); }-@itemFinished@[exists].hoveringMainArea:hover:active,-@item@:is(.openWhenFinished).hoveringMainArea:hover:active,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[state="1"][exists].hoveringMainArea:hover:active,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem.openWhenFinished.hoveringMainArea:hover:active, .downloadsPanelFooterButton[open="true"],-@item@[verdict]:hover:active {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict]:hover:active {   background-color: var(--panel-item-active-bgcolor); }-@item@[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadDetails,-@item@[verdict="Malware"] .downloadDetails {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadDetails,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Malware"] .downloadDetails {   color: #C50042;   /* The details text usually gets an opacity reduction, but for the error      states we disable that, because it would reduce the contrast too much. */   opacity: inherit; }-:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] @item@[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadDetails,-:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] @item@[verdict="Malware"] .downloadDetails {+:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Insecure"] .downloadDetails,+:root[lwt-popup-brighttext] #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict="Malware"] .downloadDetails {   color: #FF848B; }@@ -93,7 +84,7 @@   margin-top: 1.5em; }-@notKeyfocus@ .downloadsPanelFooterButton:-moz-focusring {+#downloadsPanel:not([keyfocus]) .downloadsPanelFooterButton:-moz-focusring {   outline: none; }@@ -125,12 +116,12 @@   height: var(--downloads-item-height); }-@item@ {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem {   background: transparent;   color: inherit; }-@item@:last-child {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem:last-child {   margin-bottom: 0; }@@ -156,18 +147,18 @@ /* When hovering the mouse pointer over the item, instead of the normal message    we display a more detailed one. For blocked downloads the entire area shows    the hover message, for other downloads only the main area does. */-@item@[verdict]:hover > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsNormal,-@item@[verdict]:not(:hover) > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsHover,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict]:hover > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsNormal,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem[verdict]:not(:hover) > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsHover, .downloadMainArea:hover > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsNormal,-@item@:not([verdict]) > .downloadMainArea:not(:hover) > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsHover {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem:not([verdict]) > .downloadMainArea:not(:hover) > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsHover {   display: none; } /* When hovering the action button in particular, instead of the usual hover    message we display the command associated with the button. */-@[email protected] > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsNormal,-@[email protected] > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsHover,-@item@:not(.downloadHoveringButton) > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsButtonHover {+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem.downloadHoveringButton > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsNormal,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem.downloadHoveringButton > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsHover,+#downloadsListBox > richlistitem:not(.downloadHoveringButton) > .downloadMainArea > .downloadContainer > .downloadDetailsButtonHover {   display: none; }

After analyzing the provided CSS diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities in the changes. The modifications appear to be primarily about refactoring CSS selectors by replacing preprocessor macros with direct CSS selectors for better maintainability and clarity.

Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
[Old Code]
[Fixed Code]

Additional Details:
The changes involve replacing CSS preprocessor macros (%define statements) with direct CSS selectors throughout the file. This is a code maintenance/readability improvement rather than a security fix. The styling behavior remains the same, just expressed differently.

Some examples of the changes:
1. Removed %filter substitution and %define macros at the top
2. Replaced @item@ with #downloadsListBox > richlistitem
3. Replaced @itemFinished@ with #downloadsListBox > richlistitem[state="1"]
4. Replaced @keyfocus@ with #downloadsPanel[keyfocus]
5. Replaced @notKeyfocus@ with #downloadsPanel:not([keyfocus])

These changes don't appear to address any security issues but rather improve the code structure.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.