--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/locales/filter.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/locales/filter.py@@ -74,15 +74,4 @@                 return "ignore"         return "error"-    # we're in mod == "mobile"-    if path == "chrome/region.properties":-        # only region.properties exceptions remain-        if (-            re.match(r"browser\.contentHandlers\.types\.[0-5]", entity)-            or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.schemes\.", entity)-            or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.defaultHandlersVersion", entity)-            or re.match(r"browser\.suggestedsites\.", entity)-        ):-            return "ignore"-     return "error"

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Overly Permissive Filtering] [mobile/android/locales/filter.py] [Lines 74-83]
[Old Code]
    # we're in mod == "mobile"
    if path == "chrome/region.properties":
        # only region.properties exceptions remain
        if (
            re.match(r"browser\.contentHandlers\.types\.[0-5]", entity)
            or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.schemes\.", entity)
            or re.match(r"gecko\.handlerService\.defaultHandlersVersion", entity)
            or re.match(r"browser\.suggestedsites\.", entity)
        ):
            return "ignore"

[Fixed Code]
    return "error"

Additional Details:
The diff shows removal of a filtering exception for chrome/region.properties. While not clearly a security vulnerability, this change tightens the filtering rules by removing special cases that could have potentially allowed certain configurations to bypass validation. The removed patterns appeared to be related to content handlers and suggested sites, which could have security implications if improperly filtered. However, without more context about how these patterns were used, I can't definitively say this was a security vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/aspect-ratio-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/aspect-ratio-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link name="author" title="Xin Liu" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="4.6. aspect-ratio" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#aspect-ratio"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'aspect-ratio' property with prefix 'min' set '59/79' means that the minimum of ratio is '59/79', only and only if the value of the 'width' to the value of the 'height' is greater than value of 'min-aspect-ratio', the style sheet will be applied. The test runner will run this test in a 800/600 viewport (https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/pull/12695).">

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/aspect-ratio-001.html [Lines] 5  
[Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">`  
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
2. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - this is likely just test cleanup
3. The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality
4. The rest of the changes are comments/assertions about test behavior

No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are present in this change. The modification appears to be routine test maintenance rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/mozapps/handling/content/permissionDialog.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/mozapps/handling/content/permissionDialog.js@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@    * If the triggering principal is null this method always returns false.    */   triggeringPrincipalIsTop() {+    if (!this._principal) {+      return false;+    }+     let topContentPrincipal = this._browsingContext?.top.embedderElement       ?.contentPrincipal;     if (!topContentPrincipal) {@@ -87,8 +91,9 @@     }     // We only show the website address if the request didn't come from the top-    // level frame.-    if (this._principal?.exposablePrePath && !this.triggeringPrincipalIsTop()) {+    // level frame. If we can't get a host to display, fall back to the copy+    // without host.+    if (!this.triggeringPrincipalIsTop() && this.displayPrePath) {       if (this._preferredHandlerName) {         return "permission-dialog-description-host-app";       }@@ -116,6 +121,26 @@       return "permission-dialog-remember-file";     }     return "permission-dialog-remember";+  },++  /**+   * Computes the prePath to show in the prompt. It's the prePath of the site+   * that wants to navigate to the external protocol.+   * @returns {string|null} - prePath to show, or null if we can't derive an+   * exposable prePath from the triggering principal.+   */+  get displayPrePath() {+    if (!this._principal) {+      return null;+    }++    // NullPrincipals don't expose a meaningful prePath. Instead use the+    // precursorPrincipal, which the NullPrincipal was derived from.+    if (this._principal.isNullPrincipal) {+      return this._principal.precursorPrincipal?.exposablePrePath;+    }++    return this._principal?.exposablePrePath;   },   async initL10n() {@@ -138,7 +163,7 @@     document.l10n.pauseObserving();     let pendingElements = [description];-    let host = this._principal?.exposablePrePath;+    let host = this.displayPrePath;     let scheme = this._handlerInfo.type;     document.l10n.setAttributes(description, this.l10nDescriptionId, {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I've identified the following security-related changes:

1. First vulnerability fix:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Null Principal Handling Vulnerability [toolkit/mozapps/handling/content/permissionDialog.js] [Lines 66-69]
    [Old Code]
    triggeringPrincipalIsTop() {
      let topContentPrincipal = this._browsingContext?.top.embedderElement
        ?.contentPrincipal;
    [Fixed Code]
    triggeringPrincipalIsTop() {
      if (!this._principal) {
        return false;
      }

      let topContentPrincipal = this._browsingContext?.top.embedderElement
        ?.contentPrincipal;

2. Second vulnerability fix:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Principal Exposure Vulnerability [toolkit/mozapps/handling/content/permissionDialog.js] [Lines 87-89]
    [Old Code]
    if (this._principal?.exposablePrePath && !this.triggeringPrincipalIsTop()) {
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!this.triggeringPrincipalIsTop() && this.displayPrePath) {

3. Third vulnerability fix:
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Null Principal Information Leak [toolkit/mozapps/handling/content/permissionDialog.js] [Lines 116-126]
    [Old Code]
    (No equivalent code existed before)
    [Fixed Code]
    get displayPrePath() {
      if (!this._principal) {
        return null;
      }

      if (this._principal.isNullPrincipal) {
        return this._principal.precursorPrincipal?.exposablePrePath;
      }

      return this._principal?.exposablePrePath;
    },

The changes appear to address several security issues related to principal handling:
1. Added null checks for principal objects to prevent potential null reference exceptions
2. Improved security by properly handling NullPrincipals and their precursor principals
3. Added a new method to safely handle and expose principal information while preventing information leaks from NullPrincipals
4. Changed the logic order to check triggeringPrincipalIsTop() before exposing path information

These changes help prevent potential security issues where sensitive information might be leaked or where null references could cause unexpected behavior.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeat.outside.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeat.outside.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@         ctx.fillStyle = pattern;         ctx.translate(50, 25);         ctx.fillRect(-50, -25, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring (renaming `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the assertions. There are no security-related changes in the diff.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The changes are purely variable renaming and reference updates.

The diff shows:
1. Variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Corresponding updates to assertion calls to use the new variable name
3. No changes to security-sensitive operations or patterns
4. No introduction or removal of security controls

This appears to be a code maintenance change rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/CommonSocketControl.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/CommonSocketControl.cpp@@ -153,17 +153,15 @@   // Ensure that the server certificate covers the hostname that would   // like to join this connection-  UniqueCERTCertificate nssCert;-   nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert;   if (NS_FAILED(GetServerCert(getter_AddRefs(cert)))) {     return NS_OK;   }-  if (cert) {-    nssCert.reset(cert->GetCert());-  }--  if (!nssCert) {+  if (!cert) {+    return NS_OK;+  }+  nsTArray<uint8_t> certDER;+  if (NS_FAILED(cert->GetRawDER(certDER))) {     return NS_OK;   }@@ -181,7 +179,7 @@   // CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert we need to add them here too.   Input serverCertInput;   mozilla::pkix::Result rv =-      serverCertInput.Init(nssCert->derCert.data, nssCert->derCert.len);+      serverCertInput.Init(certDER.Elements(), certDER.Length());   if (rv != Success) {     return NS_OK;   }@@ -242,17 +240,9 @@     return;   }-  RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nssc = nsNSSCertificate::ConstructFromDER(-      BitwiseCast<char*, uint8_t*>(info.mServerCertBytes.Elements()),-      info.mServerCertBytes.Length());-  if (!nssc) {-    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,-            ("RebuildCertificateInfoFromSSLTokenCache failed to construct "-             "server cert"));-    return;-  }--  SetServerCert(nssc, info.mEVStatus);+  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(+      new nsNSSCertificate(std::move(info.mServerCertBytes)));+  SetServerCert(cert, info.mEVStatus);   SetCertificateTransparencyStatus(info.mCertificateTransparencyStatus);   if (info.mSucceededCertChainBytes) {     SetSucceededCertChain(std::move(*info.mSucceededCertChainBytes));

Here's the security analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Leak Vulnerability [security/manager/ssl/CommonSocketControl.cpp] [Lines 153-181]
[Old Code]
UniqueCERTCertificate nssCert;
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert;
if (NS_FAILED(GetServerCert(getter_AddRefs(cert)))) {
  return NS_OK;
}
if (cert) {
  nssCert.reset(cert->GetCert());
}
if (!nssCert) {
  return NS_OK;
}
[Fixed Code]
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert;
if (NS_FAILED(GetServerCert(getter_AddRefs(cert)))) {
  return NS_OK;
}
if (!cert) {
  return NS_OK;
}
nsTArray<uint8_t> certDER;
if (NS_FAILED(cert->GetRawDER(certDER))) {
  return NS_OK;
}

Details: The old code used a manual memory management approach with UniqueCERTCertificate which could potentially lead to memory leaks if not handled properly. The new code uses safer RAII patterns with nsTArray and nsCOMPtr.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Potential Null Pointer Dereference [security/manager/ssl/CommonSocketControl.cpp] [Lines 242-254]
[Old Code]
RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nssc = nsNSSCertificate::ConstructFromDER(
    BitwiseCast<char*, uint8_t*>(info.mServerCertBytes.Elements()),
    info.mServerCertBytes.Length());
if (!nssc) {
  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
          ("RebuildCertificateInfoFromSSLTokenCache failed to construct "
           "server cert"));
  return;
}
[Fixed Code]
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(
    new nsNSSCertificate(std::move(info.mServerCertBytes)));

Details: The old code had potential null pointer issues if ConstructFromDER failed. The new code uses direct construction with move semantics which is safer and more efficient.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Certificate Handling Improvement [security/manager/ssl/CommonSocketControl.cpp] [Lines 153-181]
[Old Code]
Used nssCert->derCert.data directly
[Fixed Code]
Uses certDER.Elements() after proper DER extraction

Details: The change in certificate handling from direct NSS cert access to using proper DER extraction might address potential certificate parsing vulnerabilities, though the exact vulnerability being fixed isn't clear from the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/signing.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/signing.py@@ -94,6 +94,23 @@ @transforms.add+def add_requirements_link(config, jobs):+    for job in jobs:+        requirements_path = evaluate_keyed_by(+            config.graph_config["mac-notarization"]["mac-requirements"],+            "mac requirements",+            {+                "platform": job["primary-dependency"].attributes.get("build_platform"),+            },+        )+        if requirements_path:+            job["requirements-plist-url"] = config.params.file_url(+                requirements_path,+            )+        yield job++[email protected] def make_task_description(config, jobs):     for job in jobs:         dep_job = job["primary-dependency"]@@ -222,8 +239,9 @@                 " ({} not found in mapping)".format(worker_type_alias)             )             worker_type_alias = worker_type_alias_map[worker_type_alias]-            if job.get("entitlements-url"):-                task["worker"]["entitlements-url"] = job["entitlements-url"]+            for attr in ("entitlements-url", "requirements-plist-url"):+                if job.get(attr):+                    task["worker"][attr] = job[attr]         task["worker-type"] = worker_type_alias         if treeherder:

Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the security-related findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Exposure] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/signing.py] [Lines 94-107]
   [Old Code] (Not present in old version)
   [Fixed Code] 
   ```python
   @transforms.add
   def add_requirements_link(config, jobs):
       for job in jobs:
           requirements_path = evaluate_keyed_by(
               config.graph_config["mac-notarization"]["mac-requirements"],
               "mac requirements",
               {
                   "platform": job["primary-dependency"].attributes.get("build_platform"),
               },
           )
           if requirements_path:
               job["requirements-plist-url"] = config.params.file_url(
                   requirements_path,
               )
           yield job
   ```

   Additional Details: The new code adds functionality to handle requirements plist URLs. While not clearly a vulnerability, there's potential for information exposure if these URLs aren't properly secured or validated.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Insecure Direct Object Reference] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/signing.py] [Lines 222-239]
   [Old Code]
   ```python
   if job.get("entitlements-url"):
       task["worker"]["entitlements-url"] = job["entitlements-url"]
   ```
   [Fixed Code]
   ```python
   for attr in ("entitlements-url", "requirements-plist-url"):
       if job.get(attr):
           task["worker"][attr] = job[attr]
   ```

   Additional Details: The fix expands the worker attributes being copied to include "requirements-plist-url" alongside "entitlements-url". While this isn't a classic vulnerability, it represents a security improvement by ensuring both security-relevant URLs are handled consistently. The original code might have led to incomplete security configurations if only one URL type was processed.

Note: The changes appear to be security-related improvements rather than fixes for specific vulnerabilities. The main security aspect is ensuring proper handling of security-related URLs (entitlements and requirements) in the task configuration.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.offset.positiveY.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.offset.positiveY.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 25; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 25);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring without any security implications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found]
[File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.offset.positiveY.html
[Lines] 17-18, 26-27
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,12, 0,255,0,255, "50,12", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,37, 0,255,0,255, "50,37", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' throughout the test file, which doesn't affect security in any way. No security-related patterns or vulnerabilities were modified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.h@@ -180,25 +180,23 @@     SSE4_1 = 6,     SSE4_2 = 7   };+  static const int AVX_PRESENT_BIT = 8;   static SSEVersion GetSSEVersion() {-    if (maxSSEVersion == UnknownSSE) {-      SetSSEVersion();-    }--    MOZ_ASSERT(maxSSEVersion != UnknownSSE);+    MOZ_ASSERT(FlagsHaveBeenComputed());     MOZ_ASSERT_IF(maxEnabledSSEVersion != UnknownSSE,                   maxSSEVersion <= maxEnabledSSEVersion);     return maxSSEVersion;   }   static bool IsAVXPresent() {-    if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(maxSSEVersion == UnknownSSE)) {-      SetSSEVersion();-    }-+    MOZ_ASSERT(FlagsHaveBeenComputed());     MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!avxEnabled, !avxPresent);     return avxPresent;+  }++  static inline uint32_t GetFingerprint() {+    return GetSSEVersion() | (IsAVXPresent() ? AVX_PRESENT_BIT : 0);   }  private:@@ -210,8 +208,7 @@   static bool bmi1Present;   static bool bmi2Present;   static bool lzcntPresent;--  static void SetSSEVersion();+  static bool avx2Present;   static void SetMaxEnabledSSEVersion(SSEVersion v) {     if (maxEnabledSSEVersion == UnknownSSE) {@@ -237,40 +234,39 @@   static bool IsBMI1Present() { return bmi1Present; }   static bool IsBMI2Present() { return bmi2Present; }   static bool IsLZCNTPresent() { return lzcntPresent; }--  // The SSE flags can become set at startup when we JIT non-JS code eagerly;-  // thus we must reset the flags before setting any flags explicitly during-  // testing, so that the flags can be in a consistent state.--  static void ResetSSEFlagsForTesting() {-    maxSSEVersion = UnknownSSE;-    maxEnabledSSEVersion = UnknownSSE;-    avxPresent = false;-    avxEnabled = false;-  }+  static bool IsAVX2Present() { return avx2Present; }   static bool FlagsHaveBeenComputed() { return maxSSEVersion != UnknownSSE; }-  // The following should be called only after calling ResetSSEFlagsForTesting.-  // If several are called, the most restrictive setting is kept.+  static void ComputeFlags();++  // The following should be called only before JS_Init (where the flags are+  // computed). If several are called, the most restrictive setting is kept.   static void SetSSE3Disabled() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(!FlagsHaveBeenComputed());     SetMaxEnabledSSEVersion(SSE2);     avxEnabled = false;   }   static void SetSSSE3Disabled() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(!FlagsHaveBeenComputed());     SetMaxEnabledSSEVersion(SSE3);     avxEnabled = false;   }   static void SetSSE41Disabled() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(!FlagsHaveBeenComputed());     SetMaxEnabledSSEVersion(SSSE3);     avxEnabled = false;   }   static void SetSSE42Disabled() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(!FlagsHaveBeenComputed());     SetMaxEnabledSSEVersion(SSE4_1);     avxEnabled = false;   }-  static void SetAVXEnabled() { avxEnabled = true; }+  static void SetAVXEnabled() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(!FlagsHaveBeenComputed());+    avxEnabled = true;+  } }; class AssemblerX86Shared : public AssemblerShared {@@ -1175,6 +1171,7 @@   static bool SupportsFastUnalignedFPAccesses() { return true; }   static bool SupportsWasmSimd() { return CPUInfo::IsSSE41Present(); }   static bool HasAVX() { return CPUInfo::IsAVXPresent(); }+  static bool HasAVX2() { return CPUInfo::IsAVX2Present(); }   static bool HasRoundInstruction(RoundingMode mode) {     switch (mode) {@@ -2301,10 +2298,8 @@   void vpblendvb(FloatRegister mask, FloatRegister src1, FloatRegister src0,                  FloatRegister dest) {     MOZ_ASSERT(HasSSE41());-    MOZ_ASSERT(mask.encoding() == X86Encoding::xmm0 &&-                   src0.encoding() == dest.encoding(),-               "only legacy encoding is supported");-    masm.pblendvb_rr(src1.encoding(), dest.encoding());+    masm.vpblendvb_rr(mask.encoding(), src1.encoding(), src0.encoding(),+                      dest.encoding());   }   void vpinsrb(unsigned lane, const Operand& src1, FloatRegister src0,@@ -2729,33 +2724,33 @@   void vcmpordps(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister lhs, FloatRegister dest) {     vcmpps(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_ORD, rhs, lhs, dest);   }-  void vcmppd(uint8_t order, Operand rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {+  void vcmppd(uint8_t order, Operand rhs, FloatRegister lhs,+              FloatRegister dest) {     switch (rhs.kind()) {       case Operand::FPREG:-        masm.vcmppd_rr(order, rhs.fpu(), srcDest.encoding(),-                       srcDest.encoding());+        masm.vcmppd_rr(order, rhs.fpu(), lhs.encoding(), dest.encoding());         break;       default:         MOZ_CRASH("NYI");     }   }-  void vcmpeqpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {-    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_EQ, rhs, srcDest);-  }-  void vcmpltpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {-    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_LT, rhs, srcDest);-  }-  void vcmplepd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {-    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_LE, rhs, srcDest);-  }-  void vcmpneqpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {-    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_NEQ, rhs, srcDest);-  }-  void vcmpordpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {-    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_ORD, rhs, srcDest);-  }-  void vcmpunordpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {-    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_UNORD, rhs, srcDest);+  void vcmpeqpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister lhs, FloatRegister dest) {+    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_EQ, rhs, lhs, dest);+  }+  void vcmpltpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister lhs, FloatRegister dest) {+    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_LT, rhs, lhs, dest);+  }+  void vcmplepd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister lhs, FloatRegister dest) {+    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_LE, rhs, lhs, dest);+  }+  void vcmpneqpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister lhs, FloatRegister dest) {+    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_NEQ, rhs, lhs, dest);+  }+  void vcmpordpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister lhs, FloatRegister dest) {+    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_ORD, rhs, lhs, dest);+  }+  void vcmpunordpd(const Operand& rhs, FloatRegister lhs, FloatRegister dest) {+    vcmppd(X86Encoding::ConditionCmp_UNORD, rhs, lhs, dest);   }   void vrcpps(const Operand& src, FloatRegister dest) {     MOZ_ASSERT(HasSSE2());@@ -4670,6 +4665,92 @@     }   }+  void vbroadcastb(const Operand& src, FloatRegister dest) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(HasAVX2());+    switch (src.kind()) {+      case Operand::FPREG:+        masm.vbroadcastb_rr(src.fpu(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_REG_DISP:+        masm.vbroadcastb_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_SCALE:+        masm.vbroadcastb_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), src.index(), src.scale(),+                            dest.encoding());+        break;+      default:+        MOZ_CRASH("unexpected operand kind");+    }+  }+  void vbroadcastw(const Operand& src, FloatRegister dest) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(HasAVX2());+    switch (src.kind()) {+      case Operand::FPREG:+        masm.vbroadcastw_rr(src.fpu(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_REG_DISP:+        masm.vbroadcastw_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_SCALE:+        masm.vbroadcastw_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), src.index(), src.scale(),+                            dest.encoding());+        break;+      default:+        MOZ_CRASH("unexpected operand kind");+    }+  }+  void vbroadcastd(const Operand& src, FloatRegister dest) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(HasAVX2());+    switch (src.kind()) {+      case Operand::FPREG:+        masm.vbroadcastd_rr(src.fpu(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_REG_DISP:+        masm.vbroadcastd_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_SCALE:+        masm.vbroadcastd_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), src.index(), src.scale(),+                            dest.encoding());+        break;+      default:+        MOZ_CRASH("unexpected operand kind");+    }+  }+  void vbroadcastq(const Operand& src, FloatRegister dest) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(HasAVX2());+    switch (src.kind()) {+      case Operand::FPREG:+        masm.vbroadcastq_rr(src.fpu(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_REG_DISP:+        masm.vbroadcastq_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_SCALE:+        masm.vbroadcastq_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), src.index(), src.scale(),+                            dest.encoding());+        break;+      default:+        MOZ_CRASH("unexpected operand kind");+    }+  }+  void vbroadcastss(const Operand& src, FloatRegister dest) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(HasAVX2());+    switch (src.kind()) {+      case Operand::FPREG:+        masm.vbroadcastss_rr(src.fpu(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_REG_DISP:+        masm.vbroadcastss_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), dest.encoding());+        break;+      case Operand::MEM_SCALE:+        masm.vbroadcastss_mr(src.disp(), src.base(), src.index(), src.scale(),+                             dest.encoding());+        break;+      default:+        MOZ_CRASH("unexpected operand kind");+    }+  }+   void flushBuffer() {}   // Patching.

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Timing Side-Channel Vulnerability] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.h] [Lines 2301-2305]
   Old Code:
   void vpblendvb(FloatRegister mask, FloatRegister src1, FloatRegister src0,
                  FloatRegister dest) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(HasSSE41());
     MOZ_ASSERT(mask.encoding() == X86Encoding::xmm0 &&
                   src0.encoding() == dest.encoding(),
               "only legacy encoding is supported");
     masm.pblendvb_rr(src1.encoding(), dest.encoding());
   }

   Fixed Code:
   void vpblendvb(FloatRegister mask, FloatRegister src1, FloatRegister src0,
                  FloatRegister dest) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(HasSSE41());
     masm.vpblendvb_rr(mask.encoding(), src1.encoding(), src0.encoding(),
                      dest.encoding());
   }

   Additional Details: The change removes the restrictive assertion and allows more flexible register usage. While not clearly a security fix, removing hardcoded register dependencies could potentially mitigate some timing side-channel vulnerabilities.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential AVX Instruction Handling Vulnerability] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.h] [Lines 2729-2746]
   Old Code:
   void vcmppd(uint8_t order, Operand rhs, FloatRegister srcDest) {
     switch (rhs.kind()) {
       case Operand::FPREG:
         masm.vcmppd_rr(order, rhs.fpu(), srcDest.encoding(),
                       srcDest.encoding());
         break;
       default:
         MOZ_CRASH("NYI");
     }
   }

   Fixed Code:
   void vcmppd(uint8_t order, Operand rhs, FloatRegister lhs,
              FloatRegister dest) {
     switch (rhs.kind()) {
       case Operand::FPREG:
         masm.vcmppd_rr(order, rhs.fpu(), lhs.encoding(), dest.encoding());
         break;
       default:
         MOZ_CRASH("NYI");
     }
   }

   Additional Details: The change separates source and destination registers in AVX comparison operations. This could potentially prevent some register corruption issues, though it's not clearly a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Flag Initialization Vulnerability] [js/src/jit/x86-shared/Assembler-x86-shared.h] [Lines 180-234]
   Old Code:
   static void ResetSSEFlagsForTesting() {
     maxSSEVersion = UnknownSSE;
     maxEnabledSSEVersion = UnknownSSE;
     avxPresent = false;
     avxEnabled = false;
   }

   Fixed Code:
   (Removed in favor of ComputeFlags() and earlier initialization)

   Additional Details: The removal of ResetSSEFlagsForTesting() and addition of ComputeFlags() with earlier initialization could potentially prevent some race conditions during flag initialization, though it's not clearly a security fix.

Note: While none of these changes are explicitly marked as security fixes, they all involve changes to low-level CPU feature handling and instruction emission which could potentially affect security-sensitive operations. The changes generally appear to improve code robustness and flexibility in handling CPU features.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/NativeLayerWayland.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/NativeLayerWayland.cpp@@ -206,8 +206,6 @@       auto transform2DInversed = transform2D.Inverse();       Rect bufferClip = transform2DInversed.TransformBounds(surfaceRectClipped);-      // avoid floating point issues - we always expect integer values here-      bufferClip.Round();       layer->SetViewportSourceRect(bufferClip);       layer->Commit();@@ -348,14 +346,6 @@     mGdkAfterPaintId =         g_signal_connect_after(frameClock, "after-paint",                                G_CALLBACK(sAfterFrameClockAfterPaint), this);-  }-}--void NativeLayerRootWayland::PauseCompositor() {-  MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);--  for (RefPtr<NativeLayerWayland>& layer : mSublayers) {-    layer->EnsureParentSurface(nullptr);   } }@@ -698,11 +688,14 @@ void NativeLayerWayland::SetViewportSourceRect(const Rect aSourceRect) {   MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);-  if (aSourceRect == mViewportSourceRect) {+  Rect bufferRect = Rect(0, 0, mSize.width, mSize.height);+  Rect sourceRect = aSourceRect.Intersect(bufferRect);++  if (mViewportSourceRect == sourceRect) {     return;   }-  mViewportSourceRect = aSourceRect;+  mViewportSourceRect = sourceRect;   wp_viewport_set_source(mViewport, wl_fixed_from_double(mViewportSourceRect.x),                          wl_fixed_from_double(mViewportSourceRect.y),                          wl_fixed_from_double(mViewportSourceRect.width),

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Integer Overflow/Underflow or Floating Point Precision Issue [gfx/layers/NativeLayerWayland.cpp] [Lines 206-210]
   Old Code:
   ```
   auto transform2DInversed = transform2D.Inverse();
   Rect bufferClip = transform2DInversed.TransformBounds(surfaceRectClipped);
   // avoid floating point issues - we always expect integer values here
   bufferClip.Round();
   layer->SetViewportSourceRect(bufferClip);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   auto transform2DInversed = transform2D.Inverse();
   Rect bufferClip = transform2DInversed.TransformBounds(surfaceRectClipped);
   layer->SetViewportSourceRect(bufferClip);
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Improper Input Validation [gfx/layers/NativeLayerWayland.cpp] [Lines 698-708]
   Old Code:
   ```
   if (aSourceRect == mViewportSourceRect) {
     return;
   }
   mViewportSourceRect = aSourceRect;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   Rect bufferRect = Rect(0, 0, mSize.width, mSize.height);
   Rect sourceRect = aSourceRect.Intersect(bufferRect);
   
   if (mViewportSourceRect == sourceRect) {
     return;
   }
   mViewportSourceRect = sourceRect;
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Resource Management Issue [gfx/layers/NativeLayerWayland.cpp] [Lines 348-352]
   Old Code:
   ```
   void NativeLayerRootWayland::PauseCompositor() {
     MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);
     for (RefPtr<NativeLayerWayland>& layer : mSublayers) {
       layer->EnsureParentSurface(nullptr);
     }
   }
   ```
   Fixed Code: (Removed entirely)
   Note: The removal of this function might be related to resource management or synchronization issues, but without more context, it's hard to determine if this was a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/browser/browser_html_detail_view.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/test/browser/browser_html_detail_view.js@@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ add_task(async function testFullDetails() {   Services.telemetry.clearEvents();   let id = "[email protected]";+  let headingId = "addon1_mochi_test-heading";   let win = await loadInitialView("extension");   let doc = win.document;@@ -484,6 +485,15 @@   // This is now the detail card.   card = getAddonCard(win, id);   ok(card.hasAttribute("expanded"), "The detail card is expanded");++  let cardHeading = card.querySelector("h1");+  is(cardHeading.textContent, "Test add-on 1", "Card heading is set");+  is(cardHeading.id, headingId, "Heading has correct id");+  is(+    card.querySelector(".card").getAttribute("aria-labelledby"),+    headingId,+    "Card is labelled by the heading"+  );   // Make sure the preview is hidden.   preview = card.querySelector(".card-heading-image");

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes appear to be related to accessibility improvements (ARIA attributes) and test verification rather than security fixes. The main changes are:
- Added a headingId variable for consistent ID reference
- Added assertions to verify heading text, ID, and ARIA labeling
- No security-related patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) were modified

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes focus on:
- Adding ARIA accessibility attributes (aria-labelledby)
- Verifying DOM element relationships
- No security-sensitive operations (network, storage, permissions) were modified

The diff primarily improves test coverage and accessibility without addressing any apparent security vulnerabilities. The changes are test-related and don't modify any security-sensitive functionality.

No specific vulnerability names apply as these are test improvements rather than security fixes. The changes ensure proper labeling of UI elements for accessibility purposes but don't mitigate any known security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/stream/stream/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/stream/stream/mod.rs@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ #[allow(unreachable_pub)] // https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/57411 pub use self::concat::Concat;+mod count;+#[allow(unreachable_pub)] // https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/57411+pub use self::count::Count;+ mod cycle; #[allow(unreachable_pub)] // https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/57411 pub use self::cycle::Cycle;@@ -574,6 +578,38 @@         Self::Item: Extend<<<Self as Stream>::Item as IntoIterator>::Item> + IntoIterator + Default,     {         assert_future::<Self::Item, _>(Concat::new(self))+    }++    /// Drives the stream to completion, counting the number of items.+    ///+    /// # Overflow Behavior+    ///+    /// The method does no guarding against overflows, so counting elements of a+    /// stream with more than [`usize::MAX`] elements either produces the wrong+    /// result or panics. If debug assertions are enabled, a panic is guaranteed.+    ///+    /// # Panics+    ///+    /// This function might panic if the iterator has more than [`usize::MAX`]+    /// elements.+    ///+    /// # Examples+    ///+    /// ```+    /// # futures::executor::block_on(async {+    /// use futures::stream::{self, StreamExt};+    ///+    /// let stream = stream::iter(1..=10);+    /// let count = stream.count().await;+    ///+    /// assert_eq!(count, 10);+    /// # });+    /// ```+    fn count(self) -> Count<Self>+    where+        Self: Sized,+    {+        assert_future::<usize, _>(Count::new(self))     }     /// Repeats a stream endlessly.

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Integer Overflow Vulnerability [third_party/rust/futures-util/src/stream/stream/mod.rs] [Lines 578-605]
   [Old Code] (No previous count implementation)
   [Fixed Code] 
   ```
   /// Drives the stream to completion, counting the number of items.
   ///
   /// # Overflow Behavior
   ///
   /// The method does no guarding against overflows, so counting elements of a
   /// stream with more than [`usize::MAX`] elements either produces the wrong
   /// result or panics. If debug assertions are enabled, a panic is guaranteed.
   ///
   /// # Panics
   ///
   /// This function might panic if the iterator has more than [`usize::MAX`]
   /// elements.
   fn count(self) -> Count<Self>
   where
       Self: Sized,
   {
       assert_future::<usize, _>(Count::new(self))
   }
   ```

The diff shows the addition of a new `count()` method for streams. While the documentation clearly warns about potential overflow issues, it's marked as "not sure" because:
1. The documentation explicitly acknowledges the overflow behavior
2. It warns users about the potential panic
3. The behavior is documented rather than fixed
4. This might be an acceptable trade-off for performance in this context

The vulnerability would only be triggered if the stream has more than `usize::MAX` elements, which is an extremely large number (typically 2^32 or 2^64 depending on platform). The documentation properly warns about this behavior, so it might be considered a known limitation rather than a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.canvas.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.canvas.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 25);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the `_assertPixel` calls. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-29]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/Building.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/Building.md@@ -46,6 +46,6 @@ [remote/ in central]: https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/remote-[mozconfig]: ../build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.html-[artifact builds]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Build_Instructions/Artifact_builds-[Marionette]: ../testing/marionette/index.html+[mozconfig]: /build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.rst+[artifact builds]: /contributing/build/artifact_builds.rst+[Marionette]: /testing/marionette/index.rst

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] remote/doc/Building.md [Lines] 46-48
    [Old Code]
    [mozconfig]: ../build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.html
    [artifact builds]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Build_Instructions/Artifact_builds
    [Marionette]: ../testing/marionette/index.html
    [Fixed Code]
    [mozconfig]: /build/buildsystem/mozconfigs.rst
    [artifact builds]: /contributing/build/artifact_builds.rst
    [Marionette]: /testing/marionette/index.rst

The changes appear to be documentation updates, changing URL formats and file extensions (.html to .rst), but don't represent any security fixes. The modifications are related to internal documentation links and don't affect the security posture of the application.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.emptystring.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.emptystring.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas2.getContext(""); });

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.emptystring.html [Lines] 17-18
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/context.emptystring.html [Lines] 20
   Old Code: (none, new test added)
   Fixed Code:
   var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas2.getContext(""); });

The changes appear to be:
1. A variable rename from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency/clarity
2. Addition of a new test case to verify that passing an empty string to getContext() throws a TypeError

Neither change appears to address a security vulnerability, but rather improves code clarity and adds test coverage for edge cases. The test addition helps ensure proper error handling when invalid context types are requested.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-41a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-41a.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ ]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>You should see before this paragraph the words GENERATED CONTENT over green background</p>

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-41a.xml] [Lines 6]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
2. This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
3. No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
4. The meta tag wasn't serving any apparent security-related purpose in the first place.

Note: While this change doesn't represent a security fix, it's good practice to remove unnecessary elements from HTML documents.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/ident_string.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/ident_string.rs@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use quote::ToTokens; use syn::{Ident, Meta};-use {FromMeta, Result};+use crate::{FromMeta, Result}; /// A wrapper for an `Ident` which also keeps the value as a string. ///

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability [File] third_party/rust/darling_core/src/util/ident_string.rs [Lines] 5-7  
   Old Code: `use {FromMeta, Result};`  
   Fixed Code: `use crate::{FromMeta, Result};`  

Additional Details:  
- The change appears to be a simple import path correction/update from relative to absolute path using `crate::`  
- No security vulnerability is evident in this change  
- This is likely a maintenance/refactoring change rather than a security fix  

The diff shows only one change, which doesn't appear to be security-related. The modification updates the import statement to use an explicit crate-relative path, which is a common Rust best practice but not a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.center.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.center.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.textAlign = 'center';     ctx.fillText('DD', 50, 37.5);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,5, 0,255,0,255, "95,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,45, 0,255,0,255, "5,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 95,45, 0,255,0,255, "95,45", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.align.center.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 27-32]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[etc...]

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 5,5, 0,255,0,255, "5,5", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[etc...]

The changes are purely variable renaming with no security implications. All functionality remains identical, just using a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities were addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.transform.4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.transform.4.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.translate(50, 0); ctx.rect(50, 0, 20, 20);

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.transform.4.html [Lines] 17-18  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`, which doesn't indicate any security vulnerability fix.
- This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security-related change.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change in OffscreenCanvas usage.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.trailingjunk.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.trailingjunk.worker.js@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas.width = '100#!?'; });+assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { canvas.width = '100#!?'; }); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.trailingjunk.worker.js] [Lines 13-17]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas.width = '100#!?'; });
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { canvas.width = '100#!?'; });

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- The test functionality remains the same, just with a different variable name
- No security vulnerability is being fixed here - it's likely just a code style/consistency improvement
- The test still checks for proper handling of invalid width values (with trailing junk characters) by expecting a TypeError

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.scaledefault.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.scaledefault.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 0.5); ctx.lineTo(2, 0.5); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,5, 0,255,0,255, "50,5", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,5, 0,255,0,255, "50,5", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,45, 0,255,0,255, "50,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.scaledefault.html] [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.