Analysis Report

Shared security patch analysis results

AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat
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6017 filtered / 6017 total files
testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-animations/KeyframeEffect-getKeyframes.tentative.html AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-animations/KeyframeEffect-getKeyframes.tentative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-animations/KeyframeEffect-getKeyframes.tentative.html@@ -37,12 +37,24 @@ @keyframes anim-simple-timing {   from { color: rgb(0, 0, 0); animation-timing-function: linear; }-  50%  { color: rgb(0, 0, 255);  animation-timing-function: ease-in-out; }+  50%  { color: rgb(0, 0, 255); animation-timing-function: ease-in-out; }   to   { color: rgb(255, 255, 255); animation-timing-function: step-end; } } @keyframes anim-simple-timing-some {   from { color: rgb(0, 0, 0); animation-timing-function: linear; }+  50%  { color: rgb(0, 0, 255); }+  to   { color: rgb(255, 255, 255); }+}++@keyframes anim-simple-composite {+  from { color: rgb(0, 0, 0); animation-composition: replace; }+  50%  { color: rgb(0, 0, 255); animation-composition: add; }+  to   { color: rgb(255, 255, 255); animation-composition: accumulate; }+}++@keyframes anim-simple-composite-some {+  from { color: rgb(0, 0, 0); animation-composition: add; }   50%  { color: rgb(0, 0, 255); }   to   { color: rgb(255, 255, 255); } }@@ -111,6 +123,28 @@   50%  { margin-right: 10px; animation-timing-function: step-end; }   50%  { margin-bottom: 10px; animation-timing-function: step-end; }   to   { margin-top: 20px; margin-right: 20px; margin-bottom: 20px; }+}++@keyframes anim-merge-offset-and-composite {+  from { color: rgb(0, 0, 0); animation-composition: add; }+  to   { color: rgb(255, 255, 255); }+  from { margin-top: 8px; animation-composition: accumulate; }+  to   { margin-top: 16px; }+  from { font-size: 16px; animation-composition: add; }+  to   { font-size: 32px; }+  from { padding-left: 2px; animation-composition: accumulate; }+  to   { padding-left: 4px; }+}++@keyframes anim-merge-offset-easing-and-composite {+  from { color: rgb(0, 0, 0); animation-composition: add; }+  to   { color: rgb(255, 255, 255); }+  from { margin-top: 8px; animation-composition: accumulate; }+  to   { margin-top: 16px; }+  from { font-size: 16px; animation-composition: add; animation-timing-function: linear; }+  to   { font-size: 32px; }+  from { padding-left: 2px; animation-composition: accumulate; }+  to   { padding-left: 4px; } } @keyframes anim-overriding {@@ -182,6 +216,12 @@   "cubic-bezier(0, 0.25, 0.75, 1)" ];+const kCompositeValues = [+  "replace",+  "add",+  "accumulate"+];+ test(t => {   const div = addDiv(t);@@ -272,6 +312,58 @@    + ' values, when the easing is specified on some keyframes'); test(t => {+  for (const composite of kCompositeValues) {+    const div = addDiv(t);++    div.style.animation = 'anim-simple-three 100s';+    div.style.animationComposition = composite;+    const frames = getKeyframes(div);++    assert_equals(frames.length, 3, "number of frames");++    for (let i = 0; i < frames.length; i++) {+      assert_equals(frames[i].composite, "auto",+                    "value for 'composite' on ComputedKeyframe #" + i);+    }+  }+}, 'KeyframeEffect.getKeyframes() returns frames with expected composite'+   + ' values, when the composite is set on the effect using animation-composition on the'+   + ' element');++test(t => {+  const div = addDiv(t);++  div.style.animation = 'anim-simple-composite 100s';+  const frames = getKeyframes(div);++  assert_equals(frames.length, 3, "number of frames");+  assert_equals(frames[0].composite, "replace",+                "value of 'composite' on ComputedKeyframe #0");+  assert_equals(frames[1].composite, "add",+                "value of 'composite' on ComputedKeyframe #1");+  assert_equals(frames[2].composite, "accumulate",+                "value of 'composite' on ComputedKeyframe #2");+}, 'KeyframeEffect.getKeyframes() returns frames with expected composite'+   + ' values, when the composite is specified on each keyframe');++test(t => {+  const div = addDiv(t);++  div.style.animation = 'anim-simple-composite-some 100s';+  div.style.animationComposition = 'accumulate';+  const frames = getKeyframes(div);++  assert_equals(frames.length, 3, "number of frames");+  assert_equals(frames[0].composite, "add",+                "value of 'composite' on ComputedKeyframe #0");+  assert_equals(frames[1].composite, "auto",+                "value of 'composite' on ComputedKeyframe #1");+  assert_equals(frames[2].composite, "auto",+                "value of 'composite' on ComputedKeyframe #2");+}, 'KeyframeEffect.getKeyframes() returns frames with expected composite'+   + ' values, when the composite is specified on some keyframes');++test(t => {   const div = addDiv(t);   div.style.animation = 'anim-simple-shorthand 100s';@@ -457,6 +549,48 @@ }, 'KeyframeEffect.getKeyframes() returns expected frames for an ' +    'animation with multiple keyframes for the same time and with ' +    'different but equivalent easing functions');++test(t => {+  const div = addDiv(t);+  div.style.animation = 'anim-merge-offset-and-composite 100s';++  const frames = getKeyframes(div);++  const expected = [+    { offset: 0, computedOffset: 0, easing: "ease", composite: "add",+      color: "rgb(0, 0, 0)", fontSize: "16px" },+    { offset: 0, computedOffset: 0, easing: "ease", composite: "accumulate",+      marginTop: "8px", paddingLeft: "2px" },+    { offset: 1, computedOffset: 1, easing: "ease", composite: "auto",+      color: "rgb(255, 255, 255)", fontSize: "32px", marginTop: "16px",+      paddingLeft: "4px" },+  ];+  assert_frame_lists_equal(frames, expected);+}, 'KeyframeEffect.getKeyframes() returns expected frames for an ' ++   'animation with multiple keyframes for the same time and with ' ++   'different composite operations');++test(t => {+  const div = addDiv(t);+  div.style.animation = 'anim-merge-offset-easing-and-composite 100s';++  const frames = getKeyframes(div);++  const expected = [+    { offset: 0, computedOffset: 0, easing: "ease", composite: "add",+      color: "rgb(0, 0, 0)" },+    { offset: 0, computedOffset: 0, easing: "ease", composite: "accumulate",+      marginTop: "8px", paddingLeft: "2px" },+    { offset: 0, computedOffset: 0, easing: "linear", composite: "add",+      fontSize: "16px" },+    { offset: 1, computedOffset: 1, easing: "ease", composite: "auto",+      color: "rgb(255, 255, 255)", fontSize: "32px", marginTop: "16px",+      paddingLeft: "4px" },+  ];+  assert_frame_lists_equal(frames, expected);+}, 'KeyframeEffect.getKeyframes() returns expected frames for an ' ++   'animation with multiple keyframes for the same time and with ' ++   'different easing functions and composite operations'); test(t => {   const div = addDiv(t);
AI Analysis
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test case additions and minor formatting adjustments for CSS animation functionality. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerabilities found in the diff. The changes are primarily:
1. Added new test cases for animation-composition property
2. Fixed whitespace in an existing animation definition
3. Added new keyframe animations for testing composite operations
4. Added new test functions to verify composite operation behavior

The diff shows functional test improvements rather than security fixes. The changes are focused on expanding test coverage for CSS animation features, particularly around the animation-composition property.

Old Code (whitespace example):
  50%  { color: rgb(0, 0, 255);  animation-timing-function: ease-in-out; }

Fixed Code:
  50%  { color: rgb(0, 0, 255); animation-timing-function: ease-in-out; }

This is purely a formatting change with no security implications. The rest of the changes are additive, introducing new test cases without modifying existing security-sensitive code paths.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.sourcepos.html AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.sourcepos.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.sourcepos.html@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 140, 20, 100, 50, 0, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
AI Analysis
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable references in the assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.sourcepos.html
   Lines: 18-19, 35-38
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.sourcepos.html
   Lines: 35-38
   Old Code:
   ```
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security vulnerabilities. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
taskcluster/ci/test/awsy.yml AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/ci/test/awsy.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/ci/test/awsy.yml@@ -21,14 +21,7 @@                     - awsy/macosx_config.py                 default:                     - awsy/linux_config.py-    tier:-        by-variant:-            fission:-                by-test-platform:-                    linux1804-64(?!-shippable).*: 3-                    windows10-64-2004(-qr)?/opt: 3-                    default: 2-            default: default+    tier: default     test-manifest-loader: null  # don't load tests in the taskgraph@@ -40,6 +33,7 @@ awsy-tp6:     description: Are we slim yet - tp6 pageset     variants: [fission]+    run-without-variant: false     treeherder-symbol: SY(sy-tp6)     run-on-projects:         by-test-platform:@@ -62,6 +56,7 @@ awsy-base:     description: Are we slim yet - about:blank base case     variants: [fission]+    run-without-variant: false     treeherder-symbol: SY(ab)     run-on-projects:         by-test-platform:
AI Analysis
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potentially Inconsistent Tier Settings] [taskcluster/ci/test/awsy.yml] [Lines 21-29]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```yaml
   tier:
       by-variant:
           fission:
               by-test-platform:
                   linux1804-64(?!-shippable).*: 3
                   windows10-64-2004(-qr)?/opt: 3
                   default: 2
           default: default
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```yaml
   tier: default
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change simplifies tier configuration by removing platform-specific settings. While not clearly a security fix, inconsistent tier settings could potentially lead to unintended privilege escalations in task scheduling.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Missing Variant Enforcement] [taskcluster/ci/test/awsy.yml] [Lines 33,56]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```yaml
   variants: [fission]
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```yaml
   variants: [fission]
   run-without-variant: false
   ```  
   Additional Details: The addition of `run-without-variant: false` explicitly prevents the tests from running without the specified variant. While not a direct security vulnerability, this could prevent unintended test executions that might bypass security-related variant configurations.

Note: Neither change appears to address a clearly identified security vulnerability, but both could be considered as hardening measures that might have security implications in the broader context of the CI/CD pipeline.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-over.html AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-over.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-over.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-over'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5); t.done(); });
AI Analysis
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming with no security implications. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-over.html] [Lines 17-26]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't affect security. The functionality remains identical.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetY.worker.js AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetY.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetY.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.shadowOffsetY;
AI Analysis
Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable naming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security implications are visible in this change
- This seems to be a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability is being addressed here

No other changes were detected in the provided diff that would indicate security fixes. The entire change consists of just this variable renaming.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-size-003.html AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-size-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-size-003.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@         <title>CSS Test: Value of 'auto' is used for y dimension in 'background-size'</title>         <link rel="author" title="Microsoft" href="http://www.microsoft.com/" />         <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-background/#the-background-size" />-        <meta name="flags" content="" />         <meta name="assert" content="An 'auto' value for y dimension in 'background-size' is resolved by using the image's intrinsic ratio and the size provided for the x dimension." />         <style type="text/css">             .test
AI Analysis
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-size-003.html] [Lines 4]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: [removed]]

This change appears to be a cleanup of test metadata rather than a security fix. The empty flags meta tag wasn't serving any purpose and was likely removed for code hygiene. No actual security vulnerability was addressed in this change.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
netwerk/dns/HTTPSSVC.cpp AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/dns/HTTPSSVC.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/dns/HTTPSSVC.cpp@@ -200,18 +200,33 @@   } }-nsTArray<nsCString> SVCB::GetAllAlpn() const {-  nsTArray<nsCString> alpnList;+class AlpnComparator {+ public:+  bool Equals(const Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>& aA,+              const Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>& aB) const {+    return Get<1>(aA) == Get<1>(aB);+  }+  bool LessThan(const Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>& aA,+                const Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>& aB) const {+    return Get<1>(aA) > Get<1>(aB);+  }+};++nsTArray<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>> SVCB::GetAllAlpn() const {+  nsTArray<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>> alpnList;   for (const auto& value : mSvcFieldValue) {     if (value.mValue.is<SvcParamAlpn>()) {-      alpnList.AppendElements(value.mValue.as<SvcParamAlpn>().mValue);-    }-  }+      for (const auto& alpn : value.mValue.as<SvcParamAlpn>().mValue) {+        alpnList.AppendElement(MakeTuple(alpn, IsAlpnSupported(alpn)));+      }+    }+  }+  alpnList.Sort(AlpnComparator());   return alpnList; } SVCBRecord::SVCBRecord(const SVCB& data,-                       Maybe<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnType>> aAlpn)+                       Maybe<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>> aAlpn)     : mData(data), mAlpn(aAlpn) {   mPort = mData.GetPort(); }@@ -228,7 +243,7 @@ Maybe<uint16_t> SVCBRecord::GetPort() { return mPort; }-Maybe<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnType>> SVCBRecord::GetAlpn() {+Maybe<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>> SVCBRecord::GetAlpn() {   return mAlpn; }@@ -287,21 +302,21 @@   return true; }-static bool CheckAlpnIsUsable(SupportedAlpnType aAlpnType, bool aNoHttp2,+static bool CheckAlpnIsUsable(SupportedAlpnRank aAlpnType, bool aNoHttp2,                               bool aNoHttp3, bool aCheckHttp3ExcludedList,                               const nsACString& aTargetName,                               uint32_t& aExcludedCount) {   // Skip if this alpn is not supported.-  if (aAlpnType == SupportedAlpnType::NOT_SUPPORTED) {+  if (aAlpnType == SupportedAlpnRank::NOT_SUPPORTED) {     return false;   }   // Skip if we don't want to use http2.-  if (aNoHttp2 && aAlpnType == SupportedAlpnType::HTTP_2) {+  if (aNoHttp2 && aAlpnType == SupportedAlpnRank::HTTP_2) {     return false;   }-  if (aAlpnType == SupportedAlpnType::HTTP_3) {+  if (IsHttp3(aAlpnType)) {     if (aCheckHttp3ExcludedList && gHttpHandler->IsHttp3Excluded(aTargetName)) {       aExcludedCount++;       return false;@@ -318,13 +333,14 @@ static nsTArray<SVCBWrapper> FlattenRecords(const nsTArray<SVCB>& aRecords) {   nsTArray<SVCBWrapper> result;   for (const auto& record : aRecords) {-    nsTArray<nsCString> alpnList = record.GetAllAlpn();+    nsTArray<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>> alpnList =+        record.GetAllAlpn();     if (alpnList.IsEmpty()) {       result.AppendElement(SVCBWrapper(record));     } else {       for (const auto& alpn : alpnList) {         SVCBWrapper wrapper(record);-        wrapper.mAlpn.emplace(MakeTuple(alpn, IsAlpnSupported(alpn)));+        wrapper.mAlpn = Some(alpn);         result.AppendElement(wrapper);       }     }@@ -367,7 +383,7 @@         continue;       }-      if (Get<1>(*(record.mAlpn)) == SupportedAlpnType::HTTP_3) {+      if (IsHttp3(Get<1>(*(record.mAlpn)))) {         // If the selected alpn is h3 and ech for h3 is disabled, we want         // to find out if there is another non-h3 record that has         // echConfig. If yes, we'll use the non-h3 record with echConfig
AI Analysis
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential ALPN Sorting Vulnerability] [netwerk/dns/HTTPSSVC.cpp] [Lines 200-233]
[Old Code]
nsTArray<nsCString> SVCB::GetAllAlpn() const {
  nsTArray<nsCString> alpnList;
  for (const auto& value : mSvcFieldValue) {
    if (value.mValue.is<SvcParamAlpn>()) {
      alpnList.AppendElements(value.mValue.as<SvcParamAlpn>().mValue);
    }
  }
  return alpnList;
}
[Fixed Code]
nsTArray<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>> SVCB::GetAllAlpn() const {
  nsTArray<Tuple<nsCString, SupportedAlpnRank>> alpnList;
  for (const auto& value : mSvcFieldValue) {
    if (value.mValue.is<SvcParamAlpn>()) {
      for (const auto& alpn : value.mValue.as<SvcParamAlpn>().mValue) {
        alpnList.AppendElement(MakeTuple(alpn, IsAlpnSupported(alpn)));
      }
    }
  }
  alpnList.Sort(AlpnComparator());
  return alpnList;
}

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential HTTP/3 Exclusion Vulnerability] [netwerk/dns/HTTPSSVC.cpp] [Lines 287-302]
[Old Code]
if (aAlpnType == SupportedAlpnType::HTTP_3) {
[Fixed Code]
if (IsHttp3(aAlpnType)) {

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential ALPN Selection Vulnerability] [netwerk/dns/HTTPSSVC.cpp] [Lines 333-343]
[Old Code]
wrapper.mAlpn.emplace(MakeTuple(alpn, IsAlpnSupported(alpn)));
[Fixed Code]
wrapper.mAlpn = Some(alpn);

The changes appear to be related to:
1. Adding sorting of ALPN values based on their support ranking
2. Changing how HTTP/3 support is checked (from direct enum comparison to a function call)
3. Modifying how ALPN values are stored and selected

While these changes improve the code's robustness and potentially security (by properly sorting and selecting supported protocols), I can't identify any specific CVE or well-known vulnerability being fixed. The changes seem more like protocol handling improvements than direct security fixes.

The most significant change is the addition of ALPN sorting which could prevent potential protocol downgrade attacks by ensuring more secure/supported protocols are preferred, but this is speculative.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.basic.worker.js AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.basic.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.basic.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertDifferent(ctx.createImageData(ctx.createImageData(1, 1)), null, "ctx.createImageData(ctx.createImageData(1, 1))", "null"); t.done();
AI Analysis
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.basic.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, simply renaming a variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. There are no security-related changes in this diff, no changes to functionality, and no vulnerabilities being addressed. The modification doesn't affect any security controls or introduce/remove any security-sensitive operations.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
browser/components/downloads/content/allDownloadsView.js AI: 2 vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/downloads/content/allDownloadsView.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/downloads/content/allDownloadsView.js@@ -208,7 +208,11 @@  * as they exist they "collapses" their history "counterpart" (So we don't show two  * items for every download).  */-function DownloadsPlacesView(aRichListBox, aActive = true) {+function DownloadsPlacesView(+  aRichListBox,+  aActive = true,+  aSuppressionFlag = DownloadsCommon.SUPPRESS_ALL_DOWNLOADS_OPEN+) {   this._richlistbox = aRichListBox;   this._richlistbox._placesView = this;   window.controllers.insertControllerAt(0, this);@@ -227,16 +231,23 @@   this._waitingForInitialData = true;   this._downloadsData.addView(this);-  // Get the Download button out of the attention state since we're about to-  // view all downloads.-  DownloadsCommon.getIndicatorData(window).attention =-    DownloadsCommon.ATTENTION_NONE;+  // Pause the download indicator as user is interacting with downloads. This is+  // skipped on about:downloads because it handles this by itself.+  if (aSuppressionFlag === DownloadsCommon.SUPPRESS_ALL_DOWNLOADS_OPEN) {+    DownloadsCommon.getIndicatorData(+      window+    ).attentionSuppressed |= aSuppressionFlag;+  }   // Make sure to unregister the view if the window is closed.   window.addEventListener(     "unload",     () => {       window.controllers.removeController(this);+      // Unpause the main window's download indicator.+      DownloadsCommon.getIndicatorData(+        window+      ).attentionSuppressed &= ~aSuppressionFlag;       this._downloadsData.removeView(this);       this.result = null;     },@@ -583,6 +594,10 @@   isCommandEnabled(aCommand) {     switch (aCommand) {       case "cmd_copy":+        return Array.prototype.some.call(+          this._richlistbox.selectedItems,+          element => !!element._shell.download.source?.url+        );       case "downloadsCmd_openReferrer":       case "downloadShowMenuItem":         return this._richlistbox.selectedItems.length == 1;@@ -603,8 +618,8 @@   _copySelectedDownloadsToClipboard() {     let urls = Array.from(       this._richlistbox.selectedItems,-      element => element._shell.download.source.url-    );+      element => element._shell.download.source?.url+    ).filter(Boolean);     Cc["@mozilla.org/widget/clipboardhelper;1"]       .getService(Ci.nsIClipboardHelper)@@ -723,10 +738,19 @@       return false;     }-    DownloadsViewUI.updateContextMenuForElement(-      document.getElementById("downloadsContextMenu"),-      element+    let contextMenu = document.getElementById("downloadsContextMenu");+    DownloadsViewUI.updateContextMenuForElement(contextMenu, element);+    // Hide the copy location item if there is somehow no URL. We have to do+    // this here instead of in DownloadsViewUI because DownloadsView doesn't+    // allow selecting multiple downloads, so in that view the menuitem will be+    // shown according to whether just the selected item has a source URL.+    contextMenu.querySelector(+      ".downloadCopyLocationMenuItem"+    ).hidden = !Array.prototype.some.call(+      this._richlistbox.selectedItems,+      el => !!el._shell.download.source?.url     );+     let download = element._shell.download;     if (!download.stopped) {       // The hasPartialData property of a download may change at any time after@@ -880,7 +904,7 @@ } document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {-  let richListBox = document.getElementById("downloadsRichListBox");+  let richListBox = document.getElementById("downloadsListBox");   richListBox.addEventListener("scroll", function(event) {     return this._placesView.onScroll();   });
AI Analysis
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [browser/components/downloads/content/allDownloadsView.js] [Lines 583-595]
   [Old Code]
   case "cmd_copy":
   case "downloadsCmd_openReferrer":
   case "downloadShowMenuItem":
     return this._richlistbox.selectedItems.length == 1;
   [Fixed Code]
   case "cmd_copy":
     return Array.prototype.some.call(
       this._richlistbox.selectedItems,
       element => !!element._shell.download.source?.url
     );
   case "downloadsCmd_openReferrer":
   case "downloadShowMenuItem":
     return this._richlistbox.selectedItems.length == 1;

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Potential Null Pointer Dereference] [browser/components/downloads/content/allDownloadsView.js] [Lines 603-608]
   [Old Code]
   let urls = Array.from(
     this._richlistbox.selectedItems,
     element => element._shell.download.source.url
   );
   [Fixed Code]
   let urls = Array.from(
     this._richlistbox.selectedItems,
     element => element._shell.download.source?.url
   ).filter(Boolean);

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential UI State Inconsistency] [browser/components/downloads/content/allDownloadsView.js] [Lines 208-231]
   [Old Code]
   function DownloadsPlacesView(aRichListBox, aActive = true) {
   ...
     DownloadsCommon.getIndicatorData(window).attention =
       DownloadsCommon.ATTENTION_NONE;
   [Fixed Code]
   function DownloadsPlacesView(
     aRichListBox,
     aActive = true,
     aSuppressionFlag = DownloadsCommon.SUPPRESS_ALL_DOWNLOADS_OPEN
   ) {
   ...
     if (aSuppressionFlag === DownloadsCommon.SUPPRESS_ALL_DOWNLOADS_OPEN) {
       DownloadsCommon.getIndicatorData(
         window
       ).attentionSuppressed |= aSuppressionFlag;
     }

The first two vulnerabilities address potential null pointer dereferences by adding null checks for download source URLs. The third change appears to be more about UI state management, but could potentially relate to security if inconsistent UI states could lead to user confusion or unintended actions. However, this is less clear.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/permissions-policy/reporting/payment-report-only.https.html AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/permissions-policy/reporting/payment-report-only.https.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/permissions-policy/reporting/payment-report-only.https.html@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@   <head>     <script src='/resources/testharness.js'></script>     <script src='/resources/testharnessreport.js'></script>+    <script src='/resources/testdriver.js'></script>+    <script src='/resources/testdriver-vendor.js'></script>   </head>   <body>     <script>@@ -19,6 +21,7 @@                           {types: ['permissions-policy-violation']}).observe();   });   try {+    await test_driver.bless();     const request = new PaymentRequest(       [{ supportedMethods: 'basic-card' }],       { total: { label: 'Total', amount: { currency: 'USD', value: 0 }}},
AI Analysis
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Test Environment Setup Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/permissions-policy/reporting/payment-report-only.https.html] [Lines 3-6]
    [Old Code]
    <script src='/resources/testharness.js'></script>
    <script src='/resources/testharnessreport.js'></script>
    
    [Fixed Code]
    <script src='/resources/testharness.js'></script>
    <script src='/resources/testharnessreport.js'></script>
    <script src='/resources/testdriver.js'></script>
    <script src='/resources/testdriver-vendor.js'></script>

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Test Isolation Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/permissions-policy/reporting/payment-report-only.https.html] [Lines 19-20]
    [Old Code]
    try {
    
    [Fixed Code]
    try {
    await test_driver.bless();

The changes appear to be related to test infrastructure rather than security fixes. The additions include:
1. Test driver scripts for better test control
2. A call to test_driver.bless() which typically ensures proper test isolation

However, without more context about the test environment and purpose, I can't definitively say these changes address specific vulnerabilities. They seem more related to improving test reliability and isolation.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/profiles/common/user.js AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/profiles/common/user.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/profiles/common/user.js@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ // Tell the search service we are running in the US.  This also has the desired // side-effect of preventing our geoip lookup. user_pref("browser.search.region", "US");+// disable infobar for tests+user_pref("browser.search.removeEngineInfobar.enabled", false); // Disable webapp updates.  Yes, it is supposed to be an integer. user_pref("browser.webapps.checkForUpdates", 0); // We do not wish to display datareporting policy notifications as it might
AI Analysis
Here's my analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability was fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be test configuration updates rather than security fixes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak Prevention [File] testing/profiles/common/user.js [Lines] 28-30
[Old Code]
// Tell the search service we are running in the US.  This also has the desired
// side-effect of preventing our geoip lookup.
user_pref("browser.search.region", "US");
[Fixed Code]
// Tell the search service we are running in the US.  This also has the desired
// side-effect of preventing our geoip lookup.
user_pref("browser.search.region", "US");
// disable infobar for tests
user_pref("browser.search.removeEngineInfobar.enabled", false);

Note: While no direct vulnerability is visible, the comment suggests the original code may have been preventing geoip lookups which could relate to privacy/information disclosure. The new change adds a test configuration setting but doesn't modify the security-related behavior.

The diff primarily shows the addition of a test configuration preference (`browser.search.removeEngineInfobar.enabled`) rather than any clear security fixes. No specific vulnerabilities were addressed in this change.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
third_party/rust/darling/tests/from_generics.rs AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/from_generics.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/from_generics.rs@@ -2,18 +2,15 @@ //! These tests assume `FromTypeParam` is working and only look at whether the wrappers for magic //! fields are working as expected.-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-extern crate syn;--use darling::ast::{self, GenericParamExt};-use darling::util::{Ignored, WithOriginal};-use darling::{FromDeriveInput, Result};+use darling::{+    ast::{self, GenericParamExt},+    util::{Ignored, WithOriginal},+    FromDeriveInput, FromTypeParam, Result,+}; #[derive(FromDeriveInput)] #[darling(attributes(lorem))] struct MyReceiver {-    pub ident: syn::Ident,     pub generics: ast::Generics<ast::GenericParam<MyTypeParam>>, }@@ -40,6 +37,7 @@ } #[test]+#[allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)] fn expand_some() {     let rec: MyReceiver = fdi(r#"         struct Baz<@@ -48,7 +46,7 @@             #[lorem(bar = "x")] U: Eq + ?Sized         >(&'a T, U);     "#)-        .expect("Input is well-formed");+    .expect("Input is well-formed");     assert!(rec.generics.where_clause.is_none());     // Make sure we've preserved the lifetime def, though we don't do anything with it.@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@             #[lorem(bar = "x")] U: Eq + ?Sized         >(&'a T, U);     "#)-        .expect("Input is well-formed");+    .expect("Input is well-formed");     let mut type_param_iter = rec.generics.type_params();     assert!(type_param_iter.next().is_some());@@ -110,7 +108,7 @@             #[lorem(bar = "x")] U: Eq + ?Sized         >(&'a T, U) where T: Into<String>;     "#)-        .expect("Input is well-formed");+    .expect("Input is well-formed");     assert!(rec.generics.where_clause.is_some()); }@@ -130,19 +128,11 @@             #[lorem(bar = "x")] U: Eq + ?Sized         >(&'a T, U) where T: Into<String>;     "#)-        .expect("Input is well-formed");+    .expect("Input is well-formed");     // Make sure we haven't lost anything in the conversion     assert_eq!(rec.generics.parsed.params.len(), 3);-    assert_eq!(-        rec.generics-            .original-            .params-            .iter()-            .collect::<Vec<_>>()-            .len(),-        3-    );+    assert_eq!(rec.generics.original.params.len(), 3);     let parsed_t: &MyTypeParam = rec.generics.parsed.params[1]         .as_type_param()@@ -180,7 +170,7 @@             #[lorem(bar = "x")] U: Eq + ?Sized         >(&'a T, U) where T: Into<String>;     "#)-        .expect("Input is well-formed");+    .expect("Input is well-formed");     assert_eq!(Ignored, rec.generics); }
AI Analysis
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be primarily code quality improvements, dependency updates, and test enhancements. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Entire file]
The changes are primarily code improvements and test enhancements

The main changes include:
1. Updated import statements to use nested imports
2. Removed unused `syn::Ident` field from `MyReceiver` struct
3. Added `#[allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]` for test
4. Simplified assertion logic by directly comparing vector lengths
5. Improved code formatting and alignment

None of these changes appear to address security vulnerabilities, but rather improve code quality and maintainability. The test file focuses on generic type parameter handling functionality, which doesn't involve security-sensitive operations.

If I had to speculate about potential security considerations (though none are evident in the diff):
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential input validation [File] [Test cases]
The code processes arbitrary input strings in test cases, but this is in a test context

However, this is purely speculative and not based on any actual vulnerability being fixed in the diff. The changes appear to be routine maintenance rather than security fixes.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/mod.rs AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/mod.rs@@ -699,7 +699,6 @@         all(target_os = "freebsd", any(freebsd11, freebsd10)),         link_name = "fstat@FBSD_1.0"     )]-    #[cfg_attr(target_os = "dragonfly", allow(deprecated))]     pub fn fstat(fildes: ::c_int, buf: *mut stat) -> ::c_int;     pub fn mkdir(path: *const c_char, mode: mode_t) -> ::c_int;@@ -713,7 +712,6 @@         all(target_os = "freebsd", any(freebsd11, freebsd10)),         link_name = "stat@FBSD_1.0"     )]-    #[cfg_attr(target_os = "dragonfly", allow(deprecated))]     pub fn stat(path: *const c_char, buf: *mut stat) -> ::c_int;     pub fn pclose(stream: *mut ::FILE) -> ::c_int;@@ -798,7 +796,6 @@         all(target_os = "freebsd", any(freebsd11, freebsd10)),         link_name = "fstatat@FBSD_1.1"     )]-    #[cfg_attr(target_os = "dragonfly", allow(deprecated))]     pub fn fstatat(         dirfd: ::c_int,         pathname: *const ::c_char,@@ -990,7 +987,6 @@         all(target_os = "freebsd", any(freebsd11, freebsd10)),         link_name = "lstat@FBSD_1.0"     )]-    #[cfg_attr(target_os = "dragonfly", allow(deprecated))]     pub fn lstat(path: *const c_char, buf: *mut stat) -> ::c_int;     #[cfg_attr(
AI Analysis
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Deprecated Function Usage] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/mod.rs] [Lines 699, 713, 798, 990]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```rust
   #[cfg_attr(target_os = "dragonfly", allow(deprecated))]
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   (Attribute removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of `#[cfg_attr(target_os = "dragonfly", allow(deprecated))]` attributes from several function declarations (fstat, stat, fstatat, lstat)
- While this indicates the functions were previously marked as deprecated on DragonFly BSD, the removal doesn't clearly indicate a security fix
- The change might be related to code cleanup or compatibility updates rather than a direct security vulnerability
- Without more context about why these functions were deprecated or what risks they posed, we can't definitively state this was a security fix

No other obvious security-related changes are visible in this diff. The modifications appear to be attribute removals rather than functional security fixes.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
gfx/webrender_bindings/src/moz2d_renderer.rs AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/src/moz2d_renderer.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/webrender_bindings/src/moz2d_renderer.rs@@ -683,10 +683,10 @@                     *visible_rect,                 ));                 command.visible_rect = *visible_rect;-            }+            },             _ => {                 panic!("missing image key");-            }+            },         }     }@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@                                 },                                 FontTemplate::Native(ref handle) => {                                     process_native_font_handle(instance.font_key, handle);-                                }+                                },                             }                         }                     }
AI Analysis
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily formatting/whitespace changes (adding commas after closing braces in match arms) rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [gfx/webrender_bindings/src/moz2d_renderer.rs] [Lines 683-815]
[Old Code]
            }
            _ => {
                panic!("missing image key");
            }
...
                                }
                            }
[Fixed Code]
            },
            _ => {
                panic!("missing image key");
            },
...
                                },
                            }

The changes consist of:
1. Adding a comma after the closing brace in a match arm
2. Consistent formatting of match arms with trailing commas
3. No functional or security-related changes were made

These appear to be purely stylistic/formatting changes to make the code more consistent with Rust style guidelines, rather than addressing any security issues.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
js/src/jit/JitOptions.h AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/JitOptions.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/JitOptions.h@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #endif   bool checkRangeAnalysis;   bool runExtraChecks;+  bool disableJitBackend;   bool disableAma;   bool disableEaa;   bool disableEdgeCaseAnalysis;@@ -119,7 +120,6 @@   bool spectreValueMasking;   bool spectreJitToCxxCalls;-  bool supportsFloatingPoint;   bool supportsUnalignedAccesses;   DefaultJitOptions();@@ -136,12 +136,16 @@ extern DefaultJitOptions JitOptions;-inline bool IsBaselineInterpreterEnabled() {-#ifdef JS_CODEGEN_NONE+inline bool HasJitBackend() {+#if defined(JS_CODEGEN_NONE)   return false; #else-  return JitOptions.baselineInterpreter && JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint;+  return !JitOptions.disableJitBackend; #endif+}++inline bool IsBaselineInterpreterEnabled() {+  return HasJitBackend() && JitOptions.baselineInterpreter; } }  // namespace jit
AI Analysis
Analyzing the provided code diff, here are the security-related findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential JIT Compiler Security Control] [js/src/jit/JitOptions.h] [Lines 39-40, 119-120, 136-146]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```
   bool runExtraChecks;
   bool disableAma;
   ...
   bool supportsFloatingPoint;
   ...
   inline bool IsBaselineInterpreterEnabled() {
   #ifdef JS_CODEGEN_NONE
     return false;
   #else
     return JitOptions.baselineInterpreter && JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint;
   #endif
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```
   bool runExtraChecks;
   bool disableJitBackend;
   bool disableAma;
   ...
   inline bool HasJitBackend() {
   #if defined(JS_CODEGEN_NONE)
     return false;
   #else
     return !JitOptions.disableJitBackend;
   #endif
   }
   
   inline bool IsBaselineInterpreterEnabled() {
     return HasJitBackend() && JitOptions.baselineInterpreter;
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The changes introduce a more explicit JIT backend control mechanism (`disableJitBackend`) and remove the `supportsFloatingPoint` check. While not directly fixing a known vulnerability, this could be related to JIT security hardening by providing better control over JIT compilation capabilities.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Code Refactoring] [js/src/jit/JitOptions.h] [Lines 119-120]  
   [Old Code]  
   `bool supportsFloatingPoint;`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   [Removed line]  
   Additional Details: The removal of `supportsFloatingPoint` appears to be a code cleanup rather than a security fix, as the functionality is replaced by the more general `disableJitBackend` control.

The main change introduces a new mechanism to disable the JIT backend entirely, which could be security-related as it provides a more comprehensive way to disable potentially vulnerable JIT functionality. However, without more context about specific vulnerabilities being addressed, we can't definitively say this fixes a known vulnerability.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h@@ -503,19 +503,47 @@                          (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint32 _size), \                          (fd, size))-/* If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extension will be sent in every ClientHello,+/* Client:+ * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extension will be sent in every ClientHello,  * unless a valid and supported ECHConfig is configured to the socket- * (in which case real ECH takes precedence). If |!enabled|, it is not sent.*/+ * (in which case real ECH takes precedence). If |!enabled|, it is not sent.+ *+ * Server:+ * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extensions will be sent in every HelloRetryRequest,+ * provided that the corresponding ClientHello contained an ECH extension. If ECH+ * is enabled, the real ECH HRR extension takes precedence.+ */ #define SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch(fd, enabled)        \     SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch", \                          (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))-/* If |enabled|, a server receiving a Client Hello containing the ech_is_inner- * (and not encrypted_client_hello) extension will respond with the ECH+/* If |enabled|, a server receiving a Client Hello containing an encrypted_client_hello+ * of type inner will respond with the ECH  * acceptance signal. This signals the client to continue with the inner  * transcript rather than outer. */ #define SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch(fd, enabled)        \     SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch", \+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))++/* This allows an extension writer to supply different values for inner and+ * outer ClientHello when using encrypted ClientHello.+ *+ * When enabled, each extension writer can be called more than once for the same+ * message; it must provide the same response when called for the same message+ * type.  When calling the writer to construct the outer ClientHello, the+ * function will be called with ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello as the message+ * type (a value from outside the range of valid TLS handshake messages).+ *+ * When disabled, the extension writer is called once for the outer ClientHello+ * and the value is copied to the inner ClientHello.+ *+ * Enabling this affects all extension writers.  The order in which extension+ * writers are added is also important.  Any extension writer that writes+ * different values for inner and outer ClientHello will prevent later+ * extensions from being compressed.+ */+#define SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(fd, enabled)        \+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner", \                          (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled)) /* Called by the client after an initial ECH connection fails with
AI Analysis
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Enhanced ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) Handling] [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h] [Lines 503-547]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```c
   /* If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extension will be sent in every ClientHello,
    * unless a valid and supported ECHConfig is configured to the socket
    * (in which case real ECH takes precedence). If |!enabled|, it is not sent.*/
   #define SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch(fd, enabled)        \
       SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch", \
                            (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   /* Client:
    * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extension will be sent in every ClientHello,
    * unless a valid and supported ECHConfig is configured to the socket
    * (in which case real ECH takes precedence). If |!enabled|, it is not sent.
    *
    * Server:
    * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extensions will be sent in every HelloRetryRequest,
    * provided that the corresponding ClientHello contained an ECH extension. If ECH
    * is enabled, the real ECH HRR extension takes precedence.
    */
   #define SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch(fd, enabled)        \
       SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch", \
                            (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [ECH Acceptance Signal Clarification] [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h] [Lines 519-527]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```c
   /* If |enabled|, a server receiving a Client Hello containing the ech_is_inner
    * (and not encrypted_client_hello) extension will respond with the ECH
    * acceptance signal. This signals the client to continue with the inner
    * transcript rather than outer. */
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   /* If |enabled|, a server receiving a Client Hello containing an encrypted_client_hello
    * of type inner will respond with the ECH
    * acceptance signal. This signals the client to continue with the inner
    * transcript rather than outer. */
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [New ECH Extension Writer Functionality] [security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h] [Lines 529-547]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No equivalent functionality existed in old code)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```c
   /* This allows an extension writer to supply different values for inner and
    * outer ClientHello when using encrypted ClientHello.
    *
    * When enabled, each extension writer can be called more than once for the same
    * message; it must provide the same response when called for the same message
    * type.  When calling the writer to construct the outer ClientHello, the
    * function will be called with ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello as the message
    * type (a value from outside the range of valid TLS handshake messages).
    *
    * When disabled, the extension writer is called once for the outer ClientHello
    * and the value is copied to the inner ClientHello.
    *
    * Enabling this affects all extension writers.  The order in which extension
    * writers are added is also important.  Any extension writer that writes
    * different values for inner and outer ClientHello will prevent later
    * extensions from being compressed.
    */
   #define SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(fd, enabled)        \
       SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner", \
                            (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
   ```

The changes appear to be enhancements to the ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) functionality, with:
1. Better documentation of GREASE ECH behavior for both client and server
2. More precise specification of when the ECH acceptance signal is sent
3. New functionality for handling extensions differently in inner vs outer ClientHellos

While these appear to be security-related improvements, I cannot determine if they are fixing specific vulnerabilities or just improving the implementation. The changes suggest a more robust ECH implementation, which is important for privacy (hiding SNI information), but I can't identify specific vulnerabilities being fixed.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
third_party/python/attrs/attr/_make.py AI: 2 vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/attrs/attr/_make.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/attrs/attr/_make.py@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ from __future__ import absolute_import, division, print_function import copy-import hashlib import linecache import sys import threading+import uuid import warnings from operator import itemgetter@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ _empty_metadata_singleton = metadata_proxy({})+# Unique object for unequivocal getattr() defaults.+_sentinel = object()+ class _Nothing(object):     """@@ -71,15 +74,16 @@     default=NOTHING,     validator=None,     repr=True,-    cmp=True,+    cmp=None,     hash=None,     init=True,-    convert=None,     metadata=None,     type=None,     converter=None,     factory=None,     kw_only=False,+    eq=None,+    order=None, ):     """     Create a new attribute on a class.@@ -87,30 +91,30 @@     ..  warning::         Does *not* do anything unless the class is also decorated with-        :func:`attr.s`!+        `attr.s`!     :param default: A value that is used if an ``attrs``-generated ``__init__``         is used and no value is passed while instantiating or the attribute is         excluded using ``init=False``.-        If the value is an instance of :class:`Factory`, its callable will be+        If the value is an instance of `Factory`, its callable will be         used to construct a new value (useful for mutable data types like lists         or dicts).         If a default is not set (or set manually to ``attr.NOTHING``), a value-        *must* be supplied when instantiating; otherwise a :exc:`TypeError`+        *must* be supplied when instantiating; otherwise a `TypeError`         will be raised.         The default can also be set using decorator notation as shown below.-    :type default: Any value.+    :type default: Any value     :param callable factory: Syntactic sugar for         ``default=attr.Factory(callable)``.-    :param validator: :func:`callable` that is called by ``attrs``-generated+    :param validator: `callable` that is called by ``attrs``-generated         ``__init__`` methods after the instance has been initialized.  They-        receive the initialized instance, the :class:`Attribute`, and the+        receive the initialized instance, the `Attribute`, and the         passed value.         The return value is *not* inspected so the validator has to throw an@@ -120,18 +124,29 @@         all pass.         Validators can be globally disabled and re-enabled using-        :func:`get_run_validators`.+        `get_run_validators`.         The validator can also be set using decorator notation as shown below.     :type validator: ``callable`` or a ``list`` of ``callable``\\ s.-    :param bool repr: Include this attribute in the generated ``__repr__``-        method.-    :param bool cmp: Include this attribute in the generated comparison methods-        (``__eq__`` et al).+    :param repr: Include this attribute in the generated ``__repr__``+        method. If ``True``, include the attribute; if ``False``, omit it. By+        default, the built-in ``repr()`` function is used. To override how the+        attribute value is formatted, pass a ``callable`` that takes a single+        value and returns a string. Note that the resulting string is used+        as-is, i.e. it will be used directly *instead* of calling ``repr()``+        (the default).+    :type repr: a ``bool`` or a ``callable`` to use a custom function.+    :param bool eq: If ``True`` (default), include this attribute in the+        generated ``__eq__`` and ``__ne__`` methods that check two instances+        for equality.+    :param bool order: If ``True`` (default), include this attributes in the+        generated ``__lt__``, ``__le__``, ``__gt__`` and ``__ge__`` methods.+    :param bool cmp: Setting to ``True`` is equivalent to setting ``eq=True,+        order=True``. Deprecated in favor of *eq* and *order*.     :param hash: Include this attribute in the generated ``__hash__``-        method.  If ``None`` (default), mirror *cmp*'s value.  This is the+        method.  If ``None`` (default), mirror *eq*'s value.  This is the         correct behavior according the Python spec.  Setting this value to         anything else than ``None`` is *discouraged*.     :type hash: ``bool`` or ``None``@@ -139,13 +154,13 @@         method.  It is possible to set this to ``False`` and set a default         value.  In that case this attributed is unconditionally initialized         with the specified default value or factory.-    :param callable converter: :func:`callable` that is called by+    :param callable converter: `callable` that is called by         ``attrs``-generated ``__init__`` methods to converter attribute's value         to the desired format.  It is given the passed-in value, and the         returned value will be used as the new value of the attribute.  The         value is converted before being passed to the validator, if any.     :param metadata: An arbitrary mapping, to be used by third-party-        components.  See :ref:`extending_metadata`.+        components.  See `extending_metadata`.     :param type: The type of the attribute.  In Python 3.6 or greater, the         preferred method to specify the type is using a variable annotation         (see `PEP 526 <https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0526/>`_).@@ -155,7 +170,7 @@         Please note that ``attrs`` doesn't do anything with this metadata by         itself. You can use it as part of your own code or for-        :doc:`static type checking <types>`.+        `static type checking <types>`.     :param kw_only: Make this attribute keyword-only (Python 3+)         in the generated ``__init__`` (if ``init`` is ``False``, this         parameter is ignored).@@ -164,7 +179,7 @@     .. versionadded:: 16.3.0 *metadata*     .. versionchanged:: 17.1.0 *validator* can be a ``list`` now.     .. versionchanged:: 17.1.0-       *hash* is ``None`` and therefore mirrors *cmp* by default.+       *hash* is ``None`` and therefore mirrors *eq* by default.     .. versionadded:: 17.3.0 *type*     .. deprecated:: 17.4.0 *convert*     .. versionadded:: 17.4.0 *converter* as a replacement for the deprecated@@ -172,25 +187,17 @@     .. versionadded:: 18.1.0        ``factory=f`` is syntactic sugar for ``default=attr.Factory(f)``.     .. versionadded:: 18.2.0 *kw_only*-    """+    .. versionchanged:: 19.2.0 *convert* keyword argument removed+    .. versionchanged:: 19.2.0 *repr* also accepts a custom callable.+    .. deprecated:: 19.2.0 *cmp* Removal on or after 2021-06-01.+    .. versionadded:: 19.2.0 *eq* and *order*+    """+    eq, order = _determine_eq_order(cmp, eq, order)+     if hash is not None and hash is not True and hash is not False:         raise TypeError(             "Invalid value for hash.  Must be True, False, or None."         )--    if convert is not None:-        if converter is not None:-            raise RuntimeError(-                "Can't pass both `convert` and `converter`.  "-                "Please use `converter` only."-            )-        warnings.warn(-            "The `convert` argument is deprecated in favor of `converter`.  "-            "It will be removed after 2019/01.",-            DeprecationWarning,-            stacklevel=2,-        )-        converter = convert     if factory is not None:         if default is not NOTHING:@@ -209,13 +216,15 @@         default=default,         validator=validator,         repr=repr,-        cmp=cmp,+        cmp=None,         hash=hash,         init=init,         converter=converter,         metadata=metadata,         type=type,         kw_only=kw_only,+        eq=eq,+        order=order,     )@@ -385,38 +394,20 @@     attrs = AttrsClass(base_attrs + own_attrs)+    # Mandatory vs non-mandatory attr order only matters when they are part of+    # the __init__ signature and when they aren't kw_only (which are moved to+    # the end and can be mandatory or non-mandatory in any order, as they will+    # be specified as keyword args anyway). Check the order of those attrs:     had_default = False-    was_kw_only = False-    for a in attrs:-        if (-            was_kw_only is False-            and had_default is True-            and a.default is NOTHING-            and a.init is True-            and a.kw_only is False-        ):+    for a in (a for a in attrs if a.init is not False and a.kw_only is False):+        if had_default is True and a.default is NOTHING:             raise ValueError(                 "No mandatory attributes allowed after an attribute with a "                 "default value or factory.  Attribute in question: %r" % (a,)             )-        elif (-            had_default is False-            and a.default is not NOTHING-            and a.init is not False-            and-            # Keyword-only attributes without defaults can be specified-            # after keyword-only attributes with defaults.-            a.kw_only is False-        ):++        if had_default is False and a.default is not NOTHING:             had_default = True-        if was_kw_only is True and a.kw_only is False and a.init is True:-            raise ValueError(-                "Non keyword-only attributes are not allowed after a "-                "keyword-only attribute (unless they are init=False).  "-                "Attribute in question: {a!r}".format(a=a)-            )-        if was_kw_only is False and a.init is True and a.kw_only is True:-            was_kw_only = True     return _Attributes((attrs, base_attrs, base_attr_map))@@ -518,7 +509,7 @@             for name in self._attr_names:                 if (                     name not in base_names-                    and getattr(cls, name, None) is not None+                    and getattr(cls, name, _sentinel) != _sentinel                 ):                     try:                         delattr(cls, name)@@ -676,7 +667,10 @@     def add_hash(self):         self._cls_dict["__hash__"] = self._add_method_dunders(             _make_hash(-                self._attrs, frozen=self._frozen, cache_hash=self._cache_hash+                self._cls,+                self._attrs,+                frozen=self._frozen,+                cache_hash=self._cache_hash,             )         )@@ -685,6 +679,7 @@     def add_init(self):         self._cls_dict["__init__"] = self._add_method_dunders(             _make_init(+                self._cls,                 self._attrs,                 self._has_post_init,                 self._frozen,@@ -697,13 +692,22 @@         return self-    def add_cmp(self):+    def add_eq(self):         cd = self._cls_dict-        cd["__eq__"], cd["__ne__"], cd["__lt__"], cd["__le__"], cd[-            "__gt__"-        ], cd["__ge__"] = (-            self._add_method_dunders(meth) for meth in _make_cmp(self._attrs)+        cd["__eq__"], cd["__ne__"] = (+            self._add_method_dunders(meth)+            for meth in _make_eq(self._cls, self._attrs)+        )++        return self++    def add_order(self):+        cd = self._cls_dict++        cd["__lt__"], cd["__le__"], cd["__gt__"], cd["__ge__"] = (+            self._add_method_dunders(meth)+            for meth in _make_order(self._cls, self._attrs)         )         return self@@ -727,12 +731,45 @@         return method+_CMP_DEPRECATION = (+    "The usage of `cmp` is deprecated and will be removed on or after "+    "2021-06-01.  Please use `eq` and `order` instead."+)+++def _determine_eq_order(cmp, eq, order):+    """+    Validate the combination of *cmp*, *eq*, and *order*. Derive the effective+    values of eq and order.+    """+    if cmp is not None and any((eq is not None, order is not None)):+        raise ValueError("Don't mix `cmp` with `eq' and `order`.")++    # cmp takes precedence due to bw-compatibility.+    if cmp is not None:+        warnings.warn(_CMP_DEPRECATION, DeprecationWarning, stacklevel=3)++        return cmp, cmp++    # If left None, equality is on and ordering mirrors equality.+    if eq is None:+        eq = True++    if order is None:+        order = eq++    if eq is False and order is True:+        raise ValueError("`order` can only be True if `eq` is True too.")++    return eq, order++ def attrs(     maybe_cls=None,     these=None,     repr_ns=None,     repr=True,-    cmp=True,+    cmp=None,     hash=None,     init=True,     slots=False,@@ -743,13 +780,15 @@     kw_only=False,     cache_hash=False,     auto_exc=False,+    eq=None,+    order=None, ):     r"""     A class decorator that adds `dunder     <https://wiki.python.org/moin/DunderAlias>`_\ -methods according to the-    specified attributes using :func:`attr.ib` or the *these* argument.--    :param these: A dictionary of name to :func:`attr.ib` mappings.  This is+    specified attributes using `attr.ib` or the *these* argument.++    :param these: A dictionary of name to `attr.ib` mappings.  This is         useful to avoid the definition of your attributes within the class body         because you can't (e.g. if you want to add ``__repr__`` methods to         Django models) or don't want to.@@ -757,12 +796,12 @@         If *these* is not ``None``, ``attrs`` will *not* search the class body         for attributes and will *not* remove any attributes from it.-        If *these* is an ordered dict (:class:`dict` on Python 3.6+,-        :class:`collections.OrderedDict` otherwise), the order is deduced from+        If *these* is an ordered dict (`dict` on Python 3.6+,+        `collections.OrderedDict` otherwise), the order is deduced from         the order of the attributes inside *these*.  Otherwise the order         of the definition of the attributes is used.-    :type these: :class:`dict` of :class:`str` to :func:`attr.ib`+    :type these: `dict` of `str` to `attr.ib`     :param str repr_ns: When using nested classes, there's no way in Python 2         to automatically detect that.  Therefore it's possible to set the@@ -771,18 +810,29 @@         representation of ``attrs`` attributes..     :param bool str: Create a ``__str__`` method that is identical to         ``__repr__``.  This is usually not necessary except for-        :class:`Exception`\ s.-    :param bool cmp: Create ``__eq__``, ``__ne__``, ``__lt__``, ``__le__``,-        ``__gt__``, and ``__ge__`` methods that compare the class as if it were-        a tuple of its ``attrs`` attributes.  But the attributes are *only*-        compared, if the types of both classes are *identical*!+        `Exception`\ s.+    :param bool eq: If ``True`` or ``None`` (default), add ``__eq__`` and+        ``__ne__`` methods that check two instances for equality.++        They compare the instances as if they were tuples of their ``attrs``+        attributes, but only iff the types of both classes are *identical*!+    :type eq: `bool` or `None`+    :param bool order: If ``True``, add ``__lt__``, ``__le__``, ``__gt__``,+        and ``__ge__`` methods that behave like *eq* above and allow instances+        to be ordered. If ``None`` (default) mirror value of *eq*.+    :type order: `bool` or `None`+    :param cmp: Setting to ``True`` is equivalent to setting ``eq=True,+        order=True``. Deprecated in favor of *eq* and *order*, has precedence+        over them for backward-compatibility though. Must not be mixed with+        *eq* or *order*.+    :type cmp: `bool` or `None`     :param hash: If ``None`` (default), the ``__hash__`` method is generated-        according how *cmp* and *frozen* are set.+        according how *eq* and *frozen* are set.         1. If *both* are True, ``attrs`` will generate a ``__hash__`` for you.-        2. If *cmp* is True and *frozen* is False, ``__hash__`` will be set to+        2. If *eq* is True and *frozen* is False, ``__hash__`` will be set to            None, marking it unhashable (which it is).-        3. If *cmp* is False, ``__hash__`` will be left untouched meaning the+        3. If *eq* is False, ``__hash__`` will be left untouched meaning the            ``__hash__`` method of the base class will be used (if base class is            ``object``, this means it will fall back to id-based hashing.).@@ -791,20 +841,20 @@         didn't freeze it programmatically) by passing ``True`` or not.  Both of         these cases are rather special and should be used carefully.-        See the `Python documentation \-        <https://docs.python.org/3/reference/datamodel.html#object.__hash__>`_-        and the `GitHub issue that led to the default behavior \-        <https://github.com/python-attrs/attrs/issues/136>`_ for more details.+        See our documentation on `hashing`, Python's documentation on+        `object.__hash__`, and the `GitHub issue that led to the default \+        behavior <https://github.com/python-attrs/attrs/issues/136>`_ for more+        details.     :type hash: ``bool`` or ``None``     :param bool init: Create a ``__init__`` method that initializes the         ``attrs`` attributes.  Leading underscores are stripped for the         argument name.  If a ``__attrs_post_init__`` method exists on the         class, it will be called after the class is fully initialized.-    :param bool slots: Create a slots_-style class that's more-        memory-efficient.  See :ref:`slots` for further ramifications.+    :param bool slots: Create a `slotted class <slotted classes>` that's more+        memory-efficient.     :param bool frozen: Make instances immutable after initialization.  If         someone attempts to modify a frozen instance,-        :exc:`attr.exceptions.FrozenInstanceError` is raised.+        `attr.exceptions.FrozenInstanceError` is raised.         Please note:@@ -813,7 +863,7 @@             2. True immutability is impossible in Python.-            3. This *does* have a minor a runtime performance :ref:`impact+            3. This *does* have a minor a runtime performance `impact                <how-frozen>` when initializing new instances.  In other words:                ``__init__`` is slightly slower with ``frozen=True``.@@ -822,24 +872,24 @@                circumvent that limitation by using                ``object.__setattr__(self, "attribute_name", value)``.-        ..  _slots: https://docs.python.org/3/reference/datamodel.html#slots     :param bool weakref_slot: Make instances weak-referenceable.  This has no         effect unless ``slots`` is also enabled.     :param bool auto_attribs: If True, collect `PEP 526`_-annotated attributes         (Python 3.6 and later only) from the class body.         In this case, you **must** annotate every field.  If ``attrs``-        encounters a field that is set to an :func:`attr.ib` but lacks a type-        annotation, an :exc:`attr.exceptions.UnannotatedAttributeError` is+        encounters a field that is set to an `attr.ib` but lacks a type+        annotation, an `attr.exceptions.UnannotatedAttributeError` is         raised.  Use ``field_name: typing.Any = attr.ib(...)`` if you don't         want to set a type.         If you assign a value to those attributes (e.g. ``x: int = 42``), that         value becomes the default value like if it were passed using-        ``attr.ib(default=42)``.  Passing an instance of :class:`Factory` also+        ``attr.ib(default=42)``.  Passing an instance of `Factory` also         works as expected.-        Attributes annotated as :data:`typing.ClassVar` are **ignored**.+        Attributes annotated as `typing.ClassVar`, and attributes that are+        neither annotated nor set to an `attr.ib` are **ignored**.         .. _`PEP 526`: https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0526/     :param bool kw_only: Make all attributes keyword-only (Python 3+)@@ -852,15 +902,15 @@         fields involved in hash code computation or mutations of the objects         those fields point to after object creation.  If such changes occur,         the behavior of the object's hash code is undefined.-    :param bool auto_exc: If the class subclasses :class:`BaseException`+    :param bool auto_exc: If the class subclasses `BaseException`         (which implicitly includes any subclass of any exception), the         following happens to behave like a well-behaved Python exceptions         class:-        - the values for *cmp* and *hash* are ignored and the instances compare-          and hash by the instance's ids (N.B. ``attrs`` will *not* remove-          existing implementations of ``__hash__`` or the equality methods. It-          just won't add own ones.),+        - the values for *eq*, *order*, and *hash* are ignored and the+          instances compare and hash by the instance's ids (N.B. ``attrs`` will+          *not* remove existing implementations of ``__hash__`` or the equality+          methods. It just won't add own ones.),         - all attributes that are either passed into ``__init__`` or have a           default value are additionally available as a tuple in the ``args``           attribute,@@ -879,13 +929,19 @@     .. versionadded:: 18.2.0 *weakref_slot*     .. deprecated:: 18.2.0        ``__lt__``, ``__le__``, ``__gt__``, and ``__ge__`` now raise a-       :class:`DeprecationWarning` if the classes compared are subclasses of+       `DeprecationWarning` if the classes compared are subclasses of        each other. ``__eq`` and ``__ne__`` never tried to compared subclasses        to each other.+    .. versionchanged:: 19.2.0+       ``__lt__``, ``__le__``, ``__gt__``, and ``__ge__`` now do not consider+       subclasses comparable anymore.     .. versionadded:: 18.2.0 *kw_only*     .. versionadded:: 18.2.0 *cache_hash*     .. versionadded:: 19.1.0 *auto_exc*-    """+    .. deprecated:: 19.2.0 *cmp* Removal on or after 2021-06-01.+    .. versionadded:: 19.2.0 *eq* and *order*+    """+    eq, order = _determine_eq_order(cmp, eq, order)     def wrap(cls):@@ -910,28 +966,30 @@             builder.add_repr(repr_ns)         if str is True:             builder.add_str()-        if cmp is True and not is_exc:-            builder.add_cmp()+        if eq is True and not is_exc:+            builder.add_eq()+        if order is True and not is_exc:+            builder.add_order()         if hash is not True and hash is not False and hash is not None:             # Can't use `hash in` because 1 == True for example.             raise TypeError(                 "Invalid value for hash.  Must be True, False, or None."             )-        elif hash is False or (hash is None and cmp is False):+        elif hash is False or (hash is None and eq is False) or is_exc:+            # Don't do anything. Should fall back to __object__'s __hash__+            # which is by id.             if cache_hash:                 raise TypeError(                     "Invalid value for cache_hash.  To use hash caching,"                     " hashing must be either explicitly or implicitly "                     "enabled."                 )-        elif (-            hash is True-            or (hash is None and cmp is True and frozen is True)-            and is_exc is False-        ):+        elif hash is True or (hash is None and eq is True and frozen is True):+            # Build a __hash__ if told so, or if it's safe.             builder.add_hash()         else:+            # Raise TypeError on attempts to hash.             if cache_hash:                 raise TypeError(                     "Invalid value for cache_hash.  To use hash caching,"@@ -997,19 +1055,44 @@     return tuple(getattr(obj, a.name) for a in attrs)-def _make_hash(attrs, frozen, cache_hash):+def _generate_unique_filename(cls, func_name):+    """+    Create a "filename" suitable for a function being generated.+    """+    unique_id = uuid.uuid4()+    extra = ""+    count = 1++    while True:+        unique_filename = "<attrs generated {0} {1}.{2}{3}>".format(+            func_name,+            cls.__module__,+            getattr(cls, "__qualname__", cls.__name__),+            extra,+        )+        # To handle concurrency we essentially "reserve" our spot in+        # the linecache with a dummy line.  The caller can then+        # set this value correctly.+        cache_line = (1, None, (str(unique_id),), unique_filename)+        if (+            linecache.cache.setdefault(unique_filename, cache_line)+            == cache_line+        ):+            return unique_filename++        # Looks like this spot is taken. Try again.+        count += 1+        extra = "-{0}".format(count)+++def _make_hash(cls, attrs, frozen, cache_hash):     attrs = tuple(-        a-        for a in attrs-        if a.hash is True or (a.hash is None and a.cmp is True)+        a for a in attrs if a.hash is True or (a.hash is None and a.eq is True)     )     tab = "        "-    # We cache the generated hash methods for the same kinds of attributes.-    sha1 = hashlib.sha1()-    sha1.update(repr(attrs).encode("utf-8"))-    unique_filename = "<attrs generated hash %s>" % (sha1.hexdigest(),)+    unique_filename = _generate_unique_filename(cls, "hash")     type_hash = hash(unique_filename)     method_lines = ["def __hash__(self):"]@@ -1066,7 +1149,7 @@     """     Add a hash method to *cls*.     """-    cls.__hash__ = _make_hash(attrs, frozen=False, cache_hash=False)+    cls.__hash__ = _make_hash(cls, attrs, frozen=False, cache_hash=False)     return cls@@ -1082,19 +1165,10 @@     return not result-WARNING_CMP_ISINSTANCE = (-    "Comparision of subclasses using __%s__ is deprecated and will be removed "-    "in 2019."-)---def _make_cmp(attrs):-    attrs = [a for a in attrs if a.cmp]--    # We cache the generated eq methods for the same kinds of attributes.-    sha1 = hashlib.sha1()-    sha1.update(repr(attrs).encode("utf-8"))-    unique_filename = "<attrs generated eq %s>" % (sha1.hexdigest(),)+def _make_eq(cls, attrs):+    attrs = [a for a in attrs if a.eq]++    unique_filename = _generate_unique_filename(cls, "eq")     lines = [         "def __eq__(self, other):",         "    if other.__class__ is not self.__class__:",@@ -1127,8 +1201,11 @@         script.splitlines(True),         unique_filename,     )-    eq = locs["__eq__"]-    ne = __ne__+    return locs["__eq__"], __ne__+++def _make_order(cls, attrs):+    attrs = [a for a in attrs if a.order]     def attrs_to_tuple(obj):         """@@ -1140,79 +1217,69 @@         """         Automatically created by attrs.         """-        if isinstance(other, self.__class__):-            if other.__class__ is not self.__class__:-                warnings.warn(-                    WARNING_CMP_ISINSTANCE % ("lt",), DeprecationWarning-                )+        if other.__class__ is self.__class__:             return attrs_to_tuple(self) < attrs_to_tuple(other)-        else:-            return NotImplemented++        return NotImplemented     def __le__(self, other):         """         Automatically created by attrs.         """-        if isinstance(other, self.__class__):-            if other.__class__ is not self.__class__:-                warnings.warn(-                    WARNING_CMP_ISINSTANCE % ("le",), DeprecationWarning-                )+        if other.__class__ is self.__class__:             return attrs_to_tuple(self) <= attrs_to_tuple(other)-        else:-            return NotImplemented++        return NotImplemented     def __gt__(self, other):         """         Automatically created by attrs.         """-        if isinstance(other, self.__class__):-            if other.__class__ is not self.__class__:-                warnings.warn(-                    WARNING_CMP_ISINSTANCE % ("gt",), DeprecationWarning-                )+        if other.__class__ is self.__class__:             return attrs_to_tuple(self) > attrs_to_tuple(other)-        else:-            return NotImplemented++        return NotImplemented     def __ge__(self, other):         """         Automatically created by attrs.         """-        if isinstance(other, self.__class__):-            if other.__class__ is not self.__class__:-                warnings.warn(-                    WARNING_CMP_ISINSTANCE % ("ge",), DeprecationWarning-                )+        if other.__class__ is self.__class__:             return attrs_to_tuple(self) >= attrs_to_tuple(other)-        else:-            return NotImplemented--    return eq, ne, __lt__, __le__, __gt__, __ge__---def _add_cmp(cls, attrs=None):-    """-    Add comparison methods to *cls*.++        return NotImplemented++    return __lt__, __le__, __gt__, __ge__+++def _add_eq(cls, attrs=None):+    """+    Add equality methods to *cls* with *attrs*.     """     if attrs is None:         attrs = cls.__attrs_attrs__-    cls.__eq__, cls.__ne__, cls.__lt__, cls.__le__, cls.__gt__, cls.__ge__ = _make_cmp(  # noqa-        attrs+    cls.__eq__, cls.__ne__ = _make_eq(cls, attrs)++    return cls+++_already_repring = threading.local()+++def _make_repr(attrs, ns):+    """+    Make a repr method that includes relevant *attrs*, adding *ns* to the full+    name.+    """++    # Figure out which attributes to include, and which function to use to+    # format them. The a.repr value can be either bool or a custom callable.+    attr_names_with_reprs = tuple(+        (a.name, repr if a.repr is True else a.repr)+        for a in attrs+        if a.repr is not False     )--    return cls---_already_repring = threading.local()---def _make_repr(attrs, ns):-    """-    Make a repr method for *attr_names* adding *ns* to the full name.-    """-    attr_names = tuple(a.name for a in attrs if a.repr)     def __repr__(self):         """@@ -1244,12 +1311,14 @@         try:             result = [class_name, "("]             first = True-            for name in attr_names:+            for name, attr_repr in attr_names_with_reprs:                 if first:                     first = False                 else:                     result.append(", ")-                result.extend((name, "=", repr(getattr(self, name, NOTHING))))+                result.extend(+                    (name, "=", attr_repr(getattr(self, name, NOTHING)))+                )             return "".join(result) + ")"         finally:             working_set.remove(id(self))@@ -1269,14 +1338,11 @@ def _make_init(-    attrs, post_init, frozen, slots, cache_hash, base_attr_map, is_exc+    cls, attrs, post_init, frozen, slots, cache_hash, base_attr_map, is_exc ):     attrs = [a for a in attrs if a.init or a.default is not NOTHING]-    # We cache the generated init methods for the same kinds of attributes.-    sha1 = hashlib.sha1()-    sha1.update(repr(attrs).encode("utf-8"))-    unique_filename = "<attrs generated init {0}>".format(sha1.hexdigest())+    unique_filename = _generate_unique_filename(cls, "init")     script, globs, annotations = _attrs_to_init_script(         attrs, frozen, slots, post_init, cache_hash, base_attr_map, is_exc@@ -1321,7 +1387,7 @@     :raise attr.exceptions.NotAnAttrsClassError: If *cls* is not an ``attrs``         class.-    :rtype: tuple (with name accessors) of :class:`attr.Attribute`+    :rtype: tuple (with name accessors) of `attr.Attribute`     ..  versionchanged:: 16.2.0 Returned tuple allows accessing the fields         by name.@@ -1348,7 +1414,7 @@         class.     :rtype: an ordered dict where keys are attribute names and values are-        :class:`attr.Attribute`\\ s. This will be a :class:`dict` if it's+        `attr.Attribute`\\ s. This will be a `dict` if it's         naturally ordered like on Python 3.6+ or an         :class:`~collections.OrderedDict` otherwise.@@ -1678,9 +1744,10 @@     :attribute name: The name of the attribute.-    Plus *all* arguments of :func:`attr.ib`.--    For the version history of the fields, see :func:`attr.ib`.+    Plus *all* arguments of `attr.ib` (except for ``factory``+    which is only syntactic sugar for ``default=Factory(...)``.++    For the version history of the fields, see `attr.ib`.     """     __slots__ = (@@ -1688,7 +1755,8 @@         "default",         "validator",         "repr",-        "cmp",+        "eq",+        "order",         "hash",         "init",         "metadata",@@ -1703,39 +1771,29 @@         default,         validator,         repr,-        cmp,+        cmp,  # XXX: unused, remove along with other cmp code.         hash,         init,-        convert=None,         metadata=None,         type=None,         converter=None,         kw_only=False,+        eq=None,+        order=None,     ):+        eq, order = _determine_eq_order(cmp, eq, order)+         # Cache this descriptor here to speed things up later.         bound_setattr = _obj_setattr.__get__(self, Attribute)         # Despite the big red warning, people *do* instantiate `Attribute`         # themselves.-        if convert is not None:-            if converter is not None:-                raise RuntimeError(-                    "Can't pass both `convert` and `converter`.  "-                    "Please use `converter` only."-                )-            warnings.warn(-                "The `convert` argument is deprecated in favor of `converter`."-                "  It will be removed after 2019/01.",-                DeprecationWarning,-                stacklevel=2,-            )-            converter = convert-         bound_setattr("name", name)         bound_setattr("default", default)         bound_setattr("validator", validator)         bound_setattr("repr", repr)-        bound_setattr("cmp", cmp)+        bound_setattr("eq", eq)+        bound_setattr("order", order)         bound_setattr("hash", hash)         bound_setattr("init", init)         bound_setattr("converter", converter)@@ -1752,16 +1810,6 @@     def __setattr__(self, name, value):         raise FrozenInstanceError()--    @property-    def convert(self):-        warnings.warn(-            "The `convert` attribute is deprecated in favor of `converter`.  "-            "It will be removed after 2019/01.",-            DeprecationWarning,-            stacklevel=2,-        )-        return self.converter     @classmethod     def from_counting_attr(cls, name, ca, type=None):@@ -1781,7 +1829,6 @@                 "validator",                 "default",                 "type",-                "convert",             )  # exclude methods and deprecated alias         }         return cls(@@ -1789,8 +1836,18 @@             validator=ca._validator,             default=ca._default,             type=type,+            cmp=None,             **inst_dict         )++    @property+    def cmp(self):+        """+        Simulate the presence of a cmp attribute and warn.+        """+        warnings.warn(_CMP_DEPRECATION, DeprecationWarning, stacklevel=2)++        return self.eq and self.order     # Don't use attr.assoc since fields(Attribute) doesn't work     def _assoc(self, **changes):@@ -1839,16 +1896,17 @@         default=NOTHING,         validator=None,         repr=True,-        cmp=True,+        cmp=None,+        eq=True,+        order=False,         hash=(name != "metadata"),         init=True,     )     for name in Attribute.__slots__-    if name != "convert"  # XXX: remove once `convert` is gone ] Attribute = _add_hash(-    _add_cmp(_add_repr(Attribute, attrs=_a), attrs=_a),+    _add_eq(_add_repr(Attribute, attrs=_a), attrs=_a),     attrs=[a for a in _a if a.hash], )@@ -1866,7 +1924,8 @@         "counter",         "_default",         "repr",-        "cmp",+        "eq",+        "order",         "hash",         "init",         "metadata",@@ -1881,22 +1940,34 @@             default=NOTHING,             validator=None,             repr=True,-            cmp=True,+            cmp=None,             hash=True,             init=True,             kw_only=False,-        )-        for name in ("counter", "_default", "repr", "cmp", "hash", "init")+            eq=True,+            order=False,+        )+        for name in (+            "counter",+            "_default",+            "repr",+            "eq",+            "order",+            "hash",+            "init",+        )     ) + (         Attribute(             name="metadata",             default=None,             validator=None,             repr=True,-            cmp=True,+            cmp=None,             hash=False,             init=True,             kw_only=False,+            eq=True,+            order=False,         ),     )     cls_counter = 0@@ -1906,13 +1977,15 @@         default,         validator,         repr,-        cmp,+        cmp,  # XXX: unused, remove along with cmp         hash,         init,         converter,         metadata,         type,         kw_only,+        eq,+        order,     ):         _CountingAttr.cls_counter += 1         self.counter = _CountingAttr.cls_counter@@ -1923,7 +1996,8 @@         else:             self._validator = validator         self.repr = repr-        self.cmp = cmp+        self.eq = eq+        self.order = order         self.hash = hash         self.init = init         self.converter = converter@@ -1963,7 +2037,7 @@         return meth-_CountingAttr = _add_cmp(_add_repr(_CountingAttr))+_CountingAttr = _add_eq(_add_repr(_CountingAttr)) @attrs(slots=True, init=False, hash=True)@@ -1971,7 +2045,7 @@     """     Stores a factory callable.-    If passed as the default value to :func:`attr.ib`, the factory is used to+    If passed as the default value to `attr.ib`, the factory is used to     generate a new value.     :param callable factory: A callable that takes either none or exactly one@@ -2004,15 +2078,15 @@     :param attrs: A list of names or a dictionary of mappings of names to         attributes.-        If *attrs* is a list or an ordered dict (:class:`dict` on Python 3.6+,-        :class:`collections.OrderedDict` otherwise), the order is deduced from+        If *attrs* is a list or an ordered dict (`dict` on Python 3.6+,+        `collections.OrderedDict` otherwise), the order is deduced from         the order of the names or attributes inside *attrs*.  Otherwise the         order of the definition of the attributes is used.-    :type attrs: :class:`list` or :class:`dict`+    :type attrs: `list` or `dict`     :param tuple bases: Classes that the new class will subclass.-    :param attributes_arguments: Passed unmodified to :func:`attr.s`.+    :param attributes_arguments: Passed unmodified to `attr.s`.     :return: A new class with *attrs*.     :rtype: type@@ -2044,6 +2118,14 @@
AI Analysis
After analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following security-related changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Hash Generation [third_party/python/attrs/attr/_make.py] [Lines related to _make_hash function]
[Old Code]
Used hashlib.sha1() for generating unique filenames for cached methods
[Fixed Code]
Replaced with uuid.uuid4() for generating unique identifiers

The old code used SHA-1 for generating unique filenames which is considered cryptographically broken. The new version uses UUID v4 which provides better randomness and security.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Attribute Access Control [third_party/python/attrs/attr/_make.py] [Lines around 509]
[Old Code]
Used getattr(cls, name, None) is not None for attribute checking
[Fixed Code]
Uses getattr(cls, name, _sentinel) != _sentinel with a unique sentinel object

The old code could potentially lead to incorrect attribute checks if None was a valid attribute value. The new version uses a unique sentinel object for more reliable attribute checking.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Timing Attack [third_party/python/attrs/attr/_make.py] [Lines related to comparison methods]
[Old Code]
Used direct attribute comparisons in generated comparison methods
[Fixed Code]
Still uses direct attribute comparisons but with different implementation

While not explicitly a security fix, the changes to comparison methods might affect timing characteristics. However, without more context about the usage, I can't be certain if this was an intentional security improvement.

The most clear security improvement is the replacement of SHA-1 with UUID for method caching identifiers, which addresses a known cryptographic weakness. The other changes appear to be more about correctness and maintainability than direct security fixes.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
devtools/client/performance-new/popup/panel.jsm.js AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/performance-new/popup/panel.jsm.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/performance-new/popup/panel.jsm.js@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@     window: chromeWindow,     inactive: getElementById("PanelUI-profiler-inactive"),     active: getElementById("PanelUI-profiler-active"),-    locked: getElementById("PanelUI-profiler-locked"),     presetDescription: getElementById("PanelUI-profiler-content-description"),     presetsEditSettings: getElementById(       "PanelUI-profiler-content-edit-settings"@@ -148,45 +147,17 @@     updateProfilerState() {       const { Services } = lazy.Services();-      /**-       * Convert two boolean values into a "profilerState" enum.-       *-       * @type {"active" | "inactive" | "locked"}-       */-      let profilerState = Services.profiler.IsActive() ? "active" : "inactive";-      if (!Services.profiler.CanProfile()) {-        // In private browsing mode, the profiler is locked.-        profilerState = "locked";-      }--      switch (profilerState) {-        case "active":-          elements.inactive.hidden = true;-          elements.active.hidden = false;-          elements.settingsSection.hidden = true;-          elements.contentRecording.hidden = false;-          elements.locked.hidden = true;-          break;-        case "inactive":-          elements.inactive.hidden = false;-          elements.active.hidden = true;-          elements.settingsSection.hidden = false;-          elements.contentRecording.hidden = true;-          elements.locked.hidden = true;-          break;-        case "locked": {-          elements.inactive.hidden = true;-          elements.active.hidden = true;-          elements.settingsSection.hidden = true;-          elements.contentRecording.hidden = true;-          elements.locked.hidden = false;-          // This works around XULElement height issues.-          const { height } = elements.locked.getBoundingClientRect();-          elements.locked.style.height = `${height}px`;-          break;-        }-        default:-          throw new Error("Unhandled profiler state.");++      if (Services.profiler.IsActive()) {+        elements.inactive.hidden = true;+        elements.active.hidden = false;+        elements.settingsSection.hidden = true;+        elements.contentRecording.hidden = false;+      } else {+        elements.inactive.hidden = false;+        elements.active.hidden = true;+        elements.settingsSection.hidden = false;+        elements.contentRecording.hidden = true;       }     },@@ -359,12 +330,7 @@   const { Services } = lazy.Services();   // These are all events that can affect the current state of the profiler.-  const events = [-    "profiler-started",-    "profiler-stopped",-    "chrome-document-global-created", // This is potentially a private browser.-    "last-pb-context-exited",-  ];+  const events = ["profiler-started", "profiler-stopped"];   for (const event of events) {     Services.obs.addObserver(view.updateProfilerState, event);     state.cleanup.push(() => {
AI Analysis
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [devtools/client/performance-new/popup/panel.jsm.js] [Lines 70, 148-179, 330-337]
   [Old Code]
   - Included "locked" state handling for private browsing mode
   - Monitored "chrome-document-global-created" and "last-pb-context-exited" events
   - Had complex state management for profiler states including locked state
   [Fixed Code]
   - Removed "locked" state entirely
   - Simplified to only "active/inactive" states
   - Removed private browsing related event listeners

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential UI State Inconsistency] [devtools/client/performance-new/popup/panel.jsm.js] [Lines 148-179]
   [Old Code]
   Complex switch statement handling three states (active, inactive, locked) with specific UI element visibility controls
   [Fixed Code]
   Simplified to just active/inactive states with direct boolean checks

The changes suggest a simplification of the profiler state management, particularly removing handling of private browsing ("locked") state. While this might not represent a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially affect privacy-related functionality. The removal of private browsing-related event listeners ("chrome-document-global-created" and "last-pb-context-exited") might impact how the profiler responds to private browsing mode changes.

Without more context about the profiler's intended behavior in private browsing mode, it's difficult to determine if this represents a security regression or just a simplification of features. The changes could be interpreted as either:
1. Removing potentially sensitive information about private browsing state from the UI (security improvement), or
2. Removing important privacy protections (security regression)
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-87.xml AI: Not sure
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-87.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-87.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/bq-u-u-u-green.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <blockquote><div>This text should be unstyled.</div></blockquote>
AI Analysis
After analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following potential security-related changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Removal of meta flags] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-87.xml] [Lines 8]  
   [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="" />`  
   [Fixed Code] (removed line)  

Additional details:  
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta flags tag. While this doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability, removing unused or empty metadata tags could be considered a security best practice to reduce potential attack surface.  
- Without more context about what flags might have been used for, it's difficult to determine if this was actually fixing a security issue.  
- The change appears to be more about code cleanup than addressing a specific vulnerability.  

No other security-related changes were detected in this diff. The rest of the modifications appear to be standard test file updates.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetX.html AI: No vulnerabilities
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetX.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetX.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.shadowOffsetX;
AI Analysis
Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.shadowOffsetX.html] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this type of change.
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes.
CVE Analysis Results:
CVE-2022-26384: No
View CVE Description
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
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