--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/release.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/release.md@@ -37,21 +37,21 @@ You can use either desktop or mobile versions of Firefox as the server. Mobile is preferable as some codepaths are specific to Firefox mobile, but if you don't have access to an Android device, using a Desktop server is a decent alternative.-Instructions to setup remote debugging for Firefox mobile: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Tools/about:debugging#connecting_to_a_remote_device.-Instructions to setup remote debugging for Firefox desktop: https://gist.github.com/juliandescottes/b0d3d83154d9ea8a84db5d32aa35d2c1.+- [Instructions](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/devtools-user/about_colon_debugging/index.html#connecting-to-a-remote-device) to setup remote debugging for Firefox mobile.+- [Instructions](https://gist.github.com/juliandescottes/b0d3d83154d9ea8a84db5d32aa35d2c1) to setup remote debugging for Firefox desktop. #### Backward compatibility test - Start the current Nightly (release XX) as Client - Prepare Firefox (release XX -1) as the Server. Either-  https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.mozilla.firefox_beta (mobile beta) or+  [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.mozilla.firefox_beta](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.mozilla.firefox_beta) (mobile beta) or   Desktop Beta or DevEdition #### Same version test - Start the current Nightly (release XX) as Client - Prepare Firefox (also for release XX) as the Server. Either-  https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.mozilla.fenix (mobile nightly)+  [https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.mozilla.fenix](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.mozilla.fenix) (mobile nightly)   or Desktop Nightly ### Tests@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ #### Debug targets:-- On the Server Firefox, open a tab to https://serviceworke.rs/strategy-network-or-cache_demo.html+- On the Server Firefox, open a tab to [https://mdn.github.io/sw-test/](https://mdn.github.io/sw-test/) - On the Client Firefox, check in the Runtime Page for the Server Firefox that you can see the new tab as well as the corresponding service worker - On the Client Firefox, open the Profiler by clicking the Profile Performance button and record a short profile by clicking the Start, then the Stop button. Verify that the profiler opens a new tab with the recording. - On the Server Firefox, close the tab you just opened@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ #### Inspect a remote target:-- On the Server Firefox, open a tab to https://juliandescottes.github.io/webcomponents-playground/debugger-example/+- On the Server Firefox, open a tab to [https://juliandescottes.github.io/webcomponents-playground/debugger-example/](https://juliandescottes.github.io/webcomponents-playground/debugger-example/) - On the Client Firefox, click on Inspect for this tab. Check that toolbox opens. Now we will verify that the toolbox is working. - Open Inspector, check that no panel is blank. Check that selecting another element in the markup-view updates the computed view. - Open Console, check that you see the "script loaded" message. Type "1+1" in the console, check you get "2".@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ #### Inspect a remote extension:-- On the Server Firefox, install any extension (for instance https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/devtools-highlighter/ )+- On the Server Firefox, install any extension (for instance [https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/devtools-highlighter/](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/devtools-highlighter/)) - On the Client Firefox, check the extension is displayed in the Extensions category - Click on Inspect, check the toolbox opens. - Check the Inspector, Console, Debugger and Netmonitor UIs for empty panels.

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily documentation updates, including:

1. Formatting changes (adding markdown link syntax)
2. URL updates (changing from serviceworke.rs to mdn.github.io)
3. General documentation improvements

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found - documentation updates only [File] [Lines]
    [Old Code]
    Various documentation lines with plain URLs
    [Fixed Code]
    Same documentation with markdown-formatted links

The changes are all related to documentation formatting and URL updates, with no apparent security implications. The URLs being modified or formatted were all legitimate Mozilla or GitHub resources to begin with, and the changes don't introduce any new security concerns.

No actual code changes were made that would affect security - this appears to be purely a documentation formatting improvement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp@@ -679,6 +679,10 @@   if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {     MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,             ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));+  }+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,+            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));   }   if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE) {     MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[HTTPS Only Mode Logging Missing] [dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp] [Lines 679+]
[Old Code]
  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {
    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));
  }
[Fixed Code]
  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {
    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));
  }
  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {
    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));
  }

Additional Details:
1. The diff adds logging for HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS status flag
2. This appears to be improving debug logging capabilities rather than fixing a security vulnerability
3. Without more context about the HTTPS Only mode implementation, it's unclear if the missing logging could have security implications
4. The change might be related to better monitoring of secure download states

Note: There appears to be a typo in the diff ("HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS" vs "HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS" in the log message) which might be worth checking in the actual source code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/CanvasCaptureMediaStream.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/CanvasCaptureMediaStream.cpp@@ -28,9 +28,6 @@       mPrincipalHandle(aPrincipalHandle) {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());   MOZ_ASSERT(mSourceStream);--  // All CanvasCaptureMediaStreams shall at least get one frame.-  mFrameCaptureRequested = true; } OutputStreamDriver::~OutputStreamDriver() {@@ -48,9 +45,6 @@ void OutputStreamDriver::SetImage(RefPtr<layers::Image>&& aImage,                                   const TimeStamp& aTime) {   MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());--  TRACE_COMMENT("OutputStreamDriverSetImage", "SourceMediaTrack %p",-                mSourceStream.get());   VideoSegment segment;   const auto size = aImage->GetSize();@@ -65,49 +59,61 @@   explicit TimerDriver(SourceMediaTrack* aSourceStream, const double& aFPS,                        const PrincipalHandle& aPrincipalHandle)       : OutputStreamDriver(aSourceStream, aPrincipalHandle),-        mFPS(aFPS),-        mTimer(nullptr) {-    if (mFPS == 0.0) {-      return;-    }--    NS_NewTimerWithFuncCallback(-        getter_AddRefs(mTimer), &TimerTick, this, int(1000 / mFPS),-        nsITimer::TYPE_REPEATING_SLACK, "dom::TimerDriver::TimerDriver");-  }--  static void TimerTick(nsITimer* aTimer, void* aClosure) {-    MOZ_ASSERT(aClosure);-    TimerDriver* driver = static_cast<TimerDriver*>(aClosure);--    driver->RequestFrameCapture();+        mFrameInterval(aFPS == 0.0 ? TimeDuration::Forever()+                                   : TimeDuration::FromSeconds(1.0 / aFPS)) {}++  void RequestFrameCapture() override { mExplicitCaptureRequested = true; }++  bool FrameCaptureRequested(const TimeStamp& aTime) const override {+    if (mLastFrameTime.IsNull()) {+      // All CanvasCaptureMediaStreams shall at least get one frame.+      return true;+    }++    if (mExplicitCaptureRequested) {+      return true;+    }++    if ((aTime - mLastFrameTime) >= mFrameInterval) {+      return true;+    }++    return false;   }   void NewFrame(already_AddRefed<Image> aImage,                 const TimeStamp& aTime) override {+    nsCString str;+    if (profiler_thread_is_being_profiled_for_markers()) {+      TimeDuration sinceLast =+          aTime - (mLastFrameTime.IsNull() ? aTime : mLastFrameTime);+      str.AppendPrintf(+          "TimerDriver %staking frame (%sexplicitly requested; after %.2fms; "+          "interval cap %.2fms)",+          sinceLast >= mFrameInterval ? "" : "NOT ",+          mExplicitCaptureRequested ? "" : "NOT ", sinceLast.ToMilliseconds(),+          mFrameInterval.ToMilliseconds());+    }+    AUTO_PROFILER_MARKER_TEXT("Canvas CaptureStream", MEDIA_RT, {}, str);+     RefPtr<Image> image = aImage;-    if (!mFrameCaptureRequested) {+    if (!FrameCaptureRequested(aTime)) {       return;     }-    mFrameCaptureRequested = false;+    mLastFrameTime = aTime;+    mExplicitCaptureRequested = false;     SetImage(std::move(image), aTime);-  }--  void Forget() override {-    if (mTimer) {-      mTimer->Cancel();-      mTimer = nullptr;-    }   }  protected:   virtual ~TimerDriver() = default;  private:-  const double mFPS;-  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimer;+  const TimeDuration mFrameInterval;+  bool mExplicitCaptureRequested = false;+  TimeStamp mLastFrameTime; }; // ----------------------------------------------------------------------@@ -118,12 +124,16 @@                       const PrincipalHandle& aPrincipalHandle)       : OutputStreamDriver(aSourceStream, aPrincipalHandle) {}+  void RequestFrameCapture() override {}++  bool FrameCaptureRequested(const TimeStamp& aTime) const override {+    return true;+  }+   void NewFrame(already_AddRefed<Image> aImage,                 const TimeStamp& aTime) override {-    // Don't reset `mFrameCaptureRequested` since AutoDriver shall always have-    // `mFrameCaptureRequested` set to true.-    // This also means we should accept every frame as NewFrame is called only-    // after something changed.+    AUTO_PROFILER_MARKER_TEXT("Canvas CaptureStream", MEDIA_RT, {},+                              "AutoDriver taking frame"_ns);     RefPtr<Image> image = aImage;     SetImage(std::move(image), aTime);@@ -148,11 +158,7 @@                                                    HTMLCanvasElement* aCanvas)     : DOMMediaStream(aWindow), mCanvas(aCanvas) {}-CanvasCaptureMediaStream::~CanvasCaptureMediaStream() {-  if (mOutputStreamDriver) {-    mOutputStreamDriver->Forget();-  }-}+CanvasCaptureMediaStream::~CanvasCaptureMediaStream() = default; JSObject* CanvasCaptureMediaStream::WrapObject(     JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) {@@ -195,7 +201,6 @@   }   mOutputStreamDriver->EndTrack();-  mOutputStreamDriver->Forget();   mOutputStreamDriver = nullptr; }

Here's the security analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Timer Resource Leak [File] dom/media/CanvasCaptureMediaStream.cpp [Lines 48-61]
   [Old Code]
   void Forget() override {
     if (mTimer) {
       mTimer->Cancel();
       mTimer = nullptr;
     }
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   (Removed in new version)

   Additional Details: The removal of the timer cleanup code could potentially lead to resource leaks if timers aren't properly canceled, but the new implementation appears to have moved to a different timing mechanism.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Potential Race Condition in Frame Capture [File] dom/media/CanvasCaptureMediaStream.cpp [Lines 48-61]
   [Old Code]
   static void TimerTick(nsITimer* aTimer, void* aClosure) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(aClosure);
     TimerDriver* driver = static_cast<TimerDriver*>(aClosure);
     driver->RequestFrameCapture();
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   bool FrameCaptureRequested(const TimeStamp& aTime) const override {
     if (mLastFrameTime.IsNull()) {
       return true;
     }
     if (mExplicitCaptureRequested) {
       return true;
     }
     if ((aTime - mLastFrameTime) >= mFrameInterval) {
       return true;
     }
     return false;
   }

   Additional Details: The old code used a timer callback that could potentially race with other operations. The new implementation uses a more deterministic approach based on time intervals and explicit requests.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Memory Leak [File] dom/media/CanvasCaptureMediaStream.cpp [Lines 148-152]
   [Old Code]
   CanvasCaptureMediaStream::~CanvasCaptureMediaStream() {
     if (mOutputStreamDriver) {
       mOutputStreamDriver->Forget();
     }
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   CanvasCaptureMediaStream::~CanvasCaptureMediaStream() = default;

   Additional Details: The removal of the destructor implementation might be safe if the driver cleanup is handled elsewhere, but without seeing the full context, it's unclear if this could lead to memory leaks.

The changes appear to focus on improving the frame capture mechanism's reliability and removing potentially problematic timer-based code. The new implementation uses a more robust time-based approach for frame capture decisions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/public/SliceBudget.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/public/SliceBudget.h@@ -19,12 +19,14 @@ namespace js { struct JS_PUBLIC_API TimeBudget {-  const int64_t budget;+  const mozilla::TimeDuration budget;   mozilla::TimeStamp deadline;  // Calculated when SliceBudget is constructed.-  explicit TimeBudget(int64_t milliseconds) : budget(milliseconds) {}-  explicit TimeBudget(mozilla::TimeDuration duration)-      : TimeBudget(duration.ToMilliseconds()) {}+  explicit TimeBudget(mozilla::TimeDuration duration) : budget(duration) {}+  explicit TimeBudget(int64_t milliseconds)+      : budget(mozilla::TimeDuration::FromMilliseconds(milliseconds)) {}++  void setDeadlineFromNow(); }; struct JS_PUBLIC_API WorkBudget {@@ -69,8 +71,7 @@   int64_t counter = StepsPerExpensiveCheck;   // This SliceBudget is considered interrupted from the time isOverBudget()-  // finds the interrupt flag set, to the next time resetOverBudget() (or-  // checkAndResetOverBudget()) is called.+  // finds the interrupt flag set.   bool interrupted = false;   explicit SliceBudget(InterruptRequestFlag* irqPtr)@@ -113,25 +114,13 @@   bool isOverBudget() { return counter <= 0 && checkOverBudget(); }-  // Normally not used. Reset the SliceBudget to its initial state.-  // Note that resetting the interrupt request flag could race with-  // anything that is setting it, causing the interrupt to be missed.-  void reset() {-    if (isTimeBudget()) {-      counter = timeBudget();-    } else if (isWorkBudget()) {-      counter = workBudget();-    }-    if (interruptRequested) {-      *interruptRequested = false;-    }-  }-   bool isWorkBudget() const { return budget.is<WorkBudget>(); }   bool isTimeBudget() const { return budget.is<TimeBudget>(); }   bool isUnlimited() const { return budget.is<UnlimitedBudget>(); }-  int64_t timeBudget() const { return budget.as<TimeBudget>().budget; }+  int64_t timeBudget() const {+    return budget.as<TimeBudget>().budget.ToMilliseconds();+  }   int64_t workBudget() const { return budget.as<WorkBudget>().budget; }   mozilla::TimeStamp deadline() const {

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition in Interrupt Flag Handling [js/public/SliceBudget.h] [Lines 69-71, 113-125]
Old Code:
  bool interrupted = false;
  ...
  void reset() {
    if (isTimeBudget()) {
      counter = timeBudget();
    } else if (isWorkBudget()) {
      counter = workBudget();
    }
    if (interruptRequested) {
      *interruptRequested = false;
    }
  }
Fixed Code:
  bool interrupted = false;
  [reset() function completely removed]

Additional Details:
The removed reset() function could cause race conditions when resetting the interrupt flag, potentially causing interrupts to be missed. The comment explicitly mentions this race condition risk.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Integer Overflow/Precision Loss [js/public/SliceBudget.h] [Lines 19-26]
Old Code:
  explicit TimeBudget(int64_t milliseconds) : budget(milliseconds) {}
  explicit TimeBudget(mozilla::TimeDuration duration)
      : TimeBudget(duration.ToMilliseconds()) {}
Fixed Code:
  explicit TimeBudget(mozilla::TimeDuration duration) : budget(duration) {}
  explicit TimeBudget(int64_t milliseconds)
      : budget(mozilla::TimeDuration::FromMilliseconds(milliseconds)) {}

Additional Details:
The change in time representation from raw milliseconds to TimeDuration might address potential precision loss or overflow issues, but without more context about the TimeDuration implementation, this is uncertain.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Deadline Handling Improvement [js/public/SliceBudget.h] [Lines 19-26]
Old Code:
  const int64_t budget;
  mozilla::TimeStamp deadline;
  ...
  [No setDeadlineFromNow() method]
Fixed Code:
  const mozilla::TimeDuration budget;
  mozilla::TimeStamp deadline;
  ...
  void setDeadlineFromNow();

Additional Details:
The addition of setDeadlineFromNow() method and change to TimeDuration might improve deadline handling security, but the exact vulnerability being fixed isn't clear from the diff alone.

Note: The changes appear to be part of a larger effort to improve timing and interrupt handling safety in the JavaScript engine, with the most clear vulnerability being the race condition in interrupt flag handling that was fixed by removing the problematic reset() function.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/mathml/nsMathMLTokenFrame.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/mathml/nsMathMLTokenFrame.cpp@@ -129,9 +129,12 @@     availSize.BSize(wm) = NS_UNCONSTRAINEDSIZE;     ReflowInput childReflowInput(aPresContext, aReflowInput, childFrame,                                  availSize);+    nsReflowStatus childStatus;     ReflowChild(childFrame, aPresContext, childDesiredSize, childReflowInput,-                aStatus);-    // NS_ASSERTION(aStatus.IsComplete(), "bad status");+                childStatus);+    NS_ASSERTION(childStatus.IsComplete(),+                 "We gave the child unconstrained available block-size, so its "+                 "status should be complete!");     SaveReflowAndBoundingMetricsFor(childFrame, childDesiredSize,                                     childDesiredSize.mBoundingMetrics);   }

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Assertion Bypass] [layout/mathml/nsMathMLTokenFrame.cpp] [Lines 129-136]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
ReflowChild(childFrame, aPresContext, childDesiredSize, childReflowInput,
            aStatus);
// NS_ASSERTION(aStatus.IsComplete(), "bad status");
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
nsReflowStatus childStatus;
ReflowChild(childFrame, aPresContext, childDesiredSize, childReflowInput,
            childStatus);
NS_ASSERTION(childStatus.IsComplete(),
             "We gave the child unconstrained available block-size, so its "
             "status should be complete!");
```

Observations:
1. The change introduces a dedicated `childStatus` variable rather than reusing the parent's `aStatus`
2. The previously commented assertion is now uncommented and enhanced with explanatory text
3. The assertion checks that the child's reflow status is complete when given unconstrained block-size

While this doesn't directly indicate a security vulnerability, the changes improve code robustness by:
- Better separation of concerns (child vs parent status)
- Adding explicit validation
- Providing clearer failure messages

The original code's commented assertion might have masked potential issues, but without more context about how `aStatus` was being used elsewhere, we can't definitively say this was a security vulnerability. The changes appear to be more about code quality than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/gtk/nsGtkKeyUtils.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/gtk/nsGtkKeyUtils.cpp@@ -965,8 +965,11 @@ /* static */ guint KeymapWrapper::GetCurrentModifierState() {   GdkModifierType modifiers;-  gdk_display_get_pointer(gdk_display_get_default(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,-                          &modifiers);+  GdkDisplay* display = gdk_display_get_default();+  GdkScreen* screen = gdk_display_get_default_screen(display);+  GdkWindow* window = gdk_screen_get_root_window(screen);+  gdk_window_get_device_position(window, GdkGetPointer(), nullptr, nullptr,+                                 &modifiers);   return static_cast<guint>(modifiers); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Race Condition or Deprecated API Usage [File] widget/gtk/nsGtkKeyUtils.cpp [Lines] 965-969  
[Old Code]  
```c++
gdk_display_get_pointer(gdk_display_get_default(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
                        &modifiers);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```c++
GdkDisplay* display = gdk_display_get_default();
GdkScreen* screen = gdk_display_get_default_screen(display);
GdkWindow* window = gdk_screen_get_root_window(screen);
gdk_window_get_device_position(window, GdkGetPointer(), nullptr, nullptr,
                               &modifiers);
```

Additional Details:
1. The change appears to replace deprecated `gdk_display_get_pointer()` with a more modern approach using `gdk_window_get_device_position()`
2. While this is primarily an API modernization, there could be potential security implications:
   - The old API might have race conditions in multi-threaded environments
   - The new version is more precise about which device's position is being queried
3. No specific CVE or vulnerability name is directly associated with this change
4. The change improves robustness but it's unclear if it was fixing a known security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/buf_reader.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/buf_reader.rs@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ use futures_core::future::Future; use futures_core::ready; use futures_core::task::{Context, Poll};-#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]-use futures_io::Initializer; use futures_io::{AsyncBufRead, AsyncRead, AsyncSeek, AsyncWrite, IoSliceMut, SeekFrom}; use pin_project_lite::pin_project; use std::io::{self, Read};@@ -143,12 +141,6 @@         let nread = rem.read_vectored(bufs)?;         self.consume(nread);         Poll::Ready(Ok(nread))-    }--    // we can't skip unconditionally because of the large buffer case in read.-    #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]-    unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {-        self.inner.initializer()     } }

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

1. First vulnerability analysis:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential removal of unsafe initialization feature] [third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/buf_reader.rs] [Lines 2-8, 143-148]
    [Old Code:
    #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
    use futures_io::Initializer;
    ...
    // we can't skip unconditionally because of the large buffer case in read.
    #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
    unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {
        self.inner.initializer()
    }]
    [Fixed Code: (removed these code blocks)]

Additional details:
- The diff shows removal of code related to the "read-initializer" feature
- This appears to be removing an unsafe initialization function that was previously exposed
- Without more context about the "read-initializer" feature and its security implications, I can't be certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability
- The removal of unsafe code could potentially be addressing memory safety concerns, but this is speculative

Note: If this was indeed fixing a vulnerability, it might relate to memory initialization safety issues, but I can't confirm this from the given information. The change appears to be removing potentially unsafe functionality entirely rather than fixing its implementation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/resources/test-expectations.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/resources/test-expectations.js@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@       'prep',       'gasp',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'Menlo-Regular',@@ -40,9 +37,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'Menlo-Bold',@@ -56,9 +50,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   {     postscriptName: 'Menlo-BoldItalic',@@ -72,9 +63,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: true,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   // Indic.   {@@ -89,9 +77,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'GujaratiMT-Bold',@@ -105,9 +90,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   {     postscriptName: 'DevanagariMT',@@ -121,9 +103,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'DevanagariMT-Bold',@@ -137,9 +116,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   // Japanese.   {@@ -152,9 +128,6 @@       'CFF ',       'VORG',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'HiraMinProN-W6',@@ -166,9 +139,6 @@       'CFF ',       'VORG',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   // Korean.   {@@ -182,9 +152,6 @@       'glyf',       'loca',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 300,   },   {     postscriptName: 'AppleMyungjo',@@ -197,9 +164,6 @@       'glyf',       'loca',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   // Chinese.   {@@ -214,9 +178,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'STHeitiTC-Medium',@@ -230,9 +191,6 @@       'loca',       'prep',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   // Bitmap.   {@@ -247,9 +205,6 @@       // Tables related to Bitmap Glyphs.       'sbix',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   }, ];@@ -268,9 +223,6 @@       'prep',       'gasp',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'Verdana-Bold',@@ -286,9 +238,6 @@       'prep',       'gasp',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   {     postscriptName: 'Verdana-Italic',@@ -304,9 +253,6 @@       'prep',       'gasp',     ],-    italic: true,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   // Korean.   {@@ -323,9 +269,6 @@       'prep',       'gasp',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   },   // Chinese.   {@@ -334,9 +277,6 @@     family: 'Microsoft YaHei',     style: 'Regular',     label: TEST_SIZE_CATEGORY.medium,-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   },   {     postscriptName: 'MicrosoftYaHei-Bold',@@ -344,9 +284,6 @@     family: 'Microsoft YaHei',     style: 'Bold',     label: TEST_SIZE_CATEGORY.medium,-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 700,   }, ];@@ -365,9 +302,6 @@       'prep',       'gasp',     ],-    italic: false,-    stretch: 1,-    weight: 400,   }, ];

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be removing redundant or unnecessary font style properties (italic, stretch, weight) from test expectations, which is likely a code cleanup rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found. The changes are removing redundant font style properties from test expectations.
File: testing/web-platform/tests/font-access/resources/test-expectations.js
Lines: Various (removing italic, stretch, weight properties throughout the file)
Old Code: Various instances of properties being removed
Fixed Code: Properties removed

The diff shows consistent removal of three properties (`italic`, `stretch`, and `weight`) from font test expectation objects throughout the file. This appears to be either:
1. A simplification of test data where these properties weren't needed
2. A change in how font properties are being tested
3. A move to derive these properties from other font metadata rather than hardcoding them

There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed in these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/resources/testharness.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/resources/testharness.js@@ -1812,7 +1812,7 @@      *      * @param {number} actual - Test value.      * @param {number} lower - Number that ``actual`` must be greater than or equal to.-     * @param {number} upper - Number that ``actual`` must be less than or eqaul to.+     * @param {number} upper - Number that ``actual`` must be less than or equal to.      * @param {string} [description] - Description of the condition being tested.      */     function assert_between_inclusive(actual, lower, upper, description)@@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@      * "WrongDocumentError") or the name of the corresponding error      * code (e.g. "``HIERARCHY_REQUEST_ERR``", "``WRONG_DOCUMENT_ERR``").      * @param {Function} descriptionOrFunc - The function expected to-     * throw (if the exeception comes from another global), or the+     * throw (if the exception comes from another global), or the      * optional description of the condition being tested (if the      * exception comes from the current global).      * @param {string} [description] - Description of the condition

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Typo Correction [File] [Lines 1812-1817]  
   [Old Code]  
   `@param {number} upper - Number that ``actual`` must be less than or eqaul to.`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `@param {number} upper - Number that ``actual`` must be less than or equal to.`  
   Additional Details: This is a simple typo correction ("eqaul" → "equal") in documentation with no security implications.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Typo Correction [File] [Lines 2072-2077]  
   [Old Code]  
   `throw (if the exeception comes from another global), or the`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `throw (if the exception comes from another global), or the`  
   Additional Details: This is another typo correction ("exeception" → "exception") in documentation with no security implications.

No actual security vulnerabilities were found in this diff. The changes are purely documentation/comment improvements fixing typos.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/GfxInfoBase.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/GfxInfoBase.cpp@@ -240,6 +240,9 @@     case nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_SHADER_CACHE:       name = BLOCKLIST_PREF_BRANCH "webrender.program-binary-disk";       break;+    case nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT:+      name = BLOCKLIST_PREF_BRANCH "webrender.partial-present";+      break;     default:       MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected nsIGfxInfo feature?!");       break;@@ -485,6 +488,9 @@   }   if (aFeature.EqualsLiteral("DMABUF")) {     return nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_DMABUF;+  }+  if (aFeature.EqualsLiteral("WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT")) {+    return nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT;   }   // If we don't recognize the feature, it may be new, and something@@ -1367,6 +1373,7 @@                         nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_ALLOW_WEBGL_OUT_OF_PROCESS,                         nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_X11_EGL,                         nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_DMABUF,+                        nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT,                         0};   // For every feature we know about, we evaluate whether this blocklist has a

Here's the analysis following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Missing Feature Handling] [widget/GfxInfoBase.cpp] [Lines 240-243, 485-488]  
[Old Code]  
(No handling for FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT in switch case)  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
case nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT:
  name = BLOCKLIST_PREF_BRANCH "webrender.partial-present";
  break;
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Missing Feature Enumeration] [widget/GfxInfoBase.cpp] [Lines 485-488]  
[Old Code]  
(No return value mapping for "WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT" string)  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
if (aFeature.EqualsLiteral("WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT")) {
  return nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT;
}
```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Incomplete Blocklist Initialization] [widget/GfxInfoBase.cpp] [Line 1373]  
[Old Code]  
(No FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT in feature list array)  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_DMABUF,
nsIGfxInfo::FEATURE_WEBRENDER_PARTIAL_PRESENT,
0};
```

Note: While these changes appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes, they could potentially relate to security if:
1. The missing feature handling could lead to incorrect blocklist behavior
2. The new feature might need proper security controls
However, without more context about the feature's security implications, we can't definitively classify these as security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-033.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-033.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-033-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the basic shape ellipse(40px 60px at right bottom) value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
   Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification is related to test metadata rather than functional code

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-clip-009.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-clip-009.html@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Gérard Talbot" href="http://www.gtalbot.org/BrowserBugsSection/css21testsuite/">   <link rel="reviewer" title="Gérard Talbot" href="http://www.gtalbot.org/BrowserBugsSection/css21testsuite/" /> <!-- 2013-04-09 -->   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-background/#the-background-clip" title="3.7. Painting Area: the 'background-clip' property">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta content="When 'background-clip' is set to 'border-box', then the background painting area is clipped at the edges of the borders of the element. In this test, the border box is 96px tall and 96px wide and is made from only the borders." name="assert">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ref-filled-black-96px-square.xht">   <style>

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-backgrounds/background-clip-009.html [Lines] 7
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which appears to be test-related metadata
- There's no indication this was related to any security vulnerability
- This appears to be a minor cleanup of test code rather than a security fix

No other changes were present in the diff to analyze. The modification doesn't appear to address any known vulnerability class.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/opera.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/opera.py@@ -1,20 +1,18 @@-from .base import Browser, ExecutorBrowser, require_arg-from .base import NullBrowser  # noqa: F401+from .base import require_arg from .base import get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401-from ..webdriver_server import OperaDriverServer+from .chrome import ChromeBrowser from ..executors import executor_kwargs as base_executor_kwargs+from ..executors.base import WdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 from ..executors.executorselenium import (SeleniumTestharnessExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                           SeleniumRefTestExecutor)  # noqa: F401-from ..executors.executoropera import OperaDriverWdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 __wptrunner__ = {"product": "opera",                  "check_args": "check_args",-                 "browser": {None: "OperaBrowser",-                             "wdspec": "NullBrowser"},+                 "browser": "OperaBrowser",                  "executor": {"testharness": "SeleniumTestharnessExecutor",                               "reftest": "SeleniumRefTestExecutor",-                              "wdspec": "OperaDriverWdspecExecutor"},+                              "wdspec": "WdspecExecutor"},                  "browser_kwargs": "browser_kwargs",                  "executor_kwargs": "executor_kwargs",                  "env_extras": "env_extras",@@ -66,38 +64,5 @@     return {}-class OperaBrowser(Browser):-    """Opera is backed by operadriver, which is supplied through-    ``wptrunner.webdriver.OperaDriverServer``.-    """--    def __init__(self, logger, binary, webdriver_binary="operadriver",-                 webdriver_args=None, **kwargs):-        """Creates a new representation of Opera.  The `binary` argument gives-        the browser binary to use for testing."""-        Browser.__init__(self, logger)-        self.binary = binary-        self.server = OperaDriverServer(self.logger,-                                        binary=webdriver_binary,-                                        args=webdriver_args)--    def start(self, **kwargs):-        self.server.start(block=False)--    def stop(self, force=False):-        self.server.stop(force=force)--    def pid(self):-        return self.server.pid--    def is_alive(self):-        # TODO(ato): This only indicates the driver is alive,-        # and doesn't say anything about whether a browser session-        # is active.-        return self.server.is_alive()--    def cleanup(self):-        self.stop()--    def executor_browser(self):-        return ExecutorBrowser, {"webdriver_url": self.server.url}+class OperaBrowser(ChromeBrowser):+    pass

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Dependency Confusion] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/opera.py] [Lines: Import changes]
   [Old Code]
   from .base import Browser, ExecutorBrowser, require_arg
   from .base import NullBrowser  # noqa: F401
   from .base import get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401
   from ..webdriver_server import OperaDriverServer
   [Fixed Code]
   from .base import require_arg
   from .base import get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401
   from .chrome import ChromeBrowser

   Additional Details: The imports were significantly changed, removing direct dependencies on Browser/ExecutorBrowser classes and OperaDriverServer. While this might not be a direct security vulnerability, it could potentially affect security if the new ChromeBrowser implementation has different security properties.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Inheritance Security Issues] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/opera.py] [Lines: OperaBrowser class change]
   [Old Code]
   class OperaBrowser(Browser):
       # Custom implementation with OperaDriverServer
   [Fixed Code]
   class OperaBrowser(ChromeBrowser):
       pass

   Additional Details: The change from a custom implementation to inheriting from ChromeBrowser might introduce security implications if ChromeBrowser has different security properties than the original Opera-specific implementation. However, without seeing the ChromeBrowser implementation, we can't be certain.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential WebDriver Specification Compliance Issue] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/opera.py] [Lines: __wptrunner__ changes]
   [Old Code]
   "browser": {None: "OperaBrowser",
               "wdspec": "NullBrowser"},
   "executor": {"testharness": "SeleniumTestharnessExecutor",
                "reftest": "SeleniumRefTestExecutor",
                "wdspec": "OperaDriverWdspecExecutor"},
   [Fixed Code]
   "browser": "OperaBrowser",
   "executor": {"testharness": "SeleniumTestharnessExecutor",
                "reftest": "SeleniumRefTestExecutor",
                "wdspec": "WdspecExecutor"},

   Additional Details: The change in WebDriver specification handling (from OperaDriverWdspecExecutor to WdspecExecutor) might have security implications if the implementations differ in security-related behaviors.

Note: While these changes appear to be architectural rather than direct security fixes, they could have security implications depending on the implementations of the new components being used (ChromeBrowser and WdspecExecutor). Without seeing those implementations, we can't be certain about specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/ipc/CanvasManagerChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/ipc/CanvasManagerChild.cpp@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRef.h" #include "mozilla/gfx/2D.h"+#include "mozilla/gfx/Swizzle.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/Endpoint.h" #include "mozilla/layers/CompositorManagerChild.h"+#include "mozilla/webgpu/WebGPUChild.h" using namespace mozilla::dom; using namespace mozilla::layers;@@ -130,6 +132,17 @@   return manager; }+RefPtr<webgpu::WebGPUChild> CanvasManagerChild::GetWebGPUChild() {+  if (!mWebGPUChild) {+    mWebGPUChild = MakeAndAddRef<webgpu::WebGPUChild>();+    if (!SendPWebGPUConstructor(mWebGPUChild)) {+      mWebGPUChild = nullptr;+    }+  }++  return mWebGPUChild;+}+ already_AddRefed<DataSourceSurface> CanvasManagerChild::GetSnapshot(     uint32_t aManagerId, int32_t aProtocolId, bool aHasAlpha) {   if (!CanSend()) {@@ -164,9 +177,10 @@     return nullptr;   }+  SurfaceFormat format =+      aHasAlpha ? SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8 : SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8X8;   RefPtr<DataSourceSurface> surface =-      Factory::CreateDataSourceSurfaceWithStride(size, SurfaceFormat::B8G8R8A8,-                                                 stride.value(),+      Factory::CreateDataSourceSurfaceWithStride(size, format, stride.value(),                                                  /* aZero */ false);   if (!surface) {     return nullptr;@@ -178,7 +192,24 @@     return nullptr;   }-  memcpy(map.GetData(), res.shmem->get<uint8_t>(), res.shmem->Size<uint8_t>());+  // The buffer we read back from WebGL is R8G8B8A8, not premultiplied and has+  // its rows inverted. For the general case, we want surfaces represented as+  // premultiplied B8G8R8A8, with its rows ordered top to bottom. Given this+  // path is used for screenshots/SurfaceFromElement, that's the representation+  // we need.+  if (aHasAlpha) {+    if (!PremultiplyYFlipData(res.shmem->get<uint8_t>(), stride.value(),+                              SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8, map.GetData(),+                              map.GetStride(), format, size)) {+      return nullptr;+    }+  } else {+    if (!SwizzleYFlipData(res.shmem->get<uint8_t>(), stride.value(),+                          SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8X8, map.GetData(),+                          map.GetStride(), format, size)) {+      return nullptr;+    }+  }   return surface.forget(); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Buffer Overflow/Incorrect Memory Handling [File] gfx/ipc/CanvasManagerChild.cpp [Lines] 164-192  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   memcpy(map.GetData(), res.shmem->get<uint8_t>(), res.shmem->Size<uint8_t>());
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   if (aHasAlpha) {
     if (!PremultiplyYFlipData(res.shmem->get<uint8_t>(), stride.value(),
                               SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8A8, map.GetData(),
                               map.GetStride(), format, size)) {
       return nullptr;
     }
   } else {
     if (!SwizzleYFlipData(res.shmem->get<uint8_t>(), stride.value(),
                           SurfaceFormat::R8G8B8X8, map.GetData(),
                           map.GetStride(), format, size)) {
       return nullptr;
     }
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change replaces a direct memcpy with safer pixel format conversion functions that properly handle the data transformation while considering the buffer sizes and formats.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Information Disclosure [File] gfx/ipc/CanvasManagerChild.cpp [Lines] 164-192  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   memcpy(map.GetData(), res.shmem->get<uint8_t>(), res.shmem->Size<uint8_t>());
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   // The new code properly handles alpha channel premultiplication and row ordering
   ```  
   Additional Details: The fix ensures proper handling of alpha channels and pixel ordering, which could potentially prevent information disclosure through uninitialized memory or incorrect pixel data.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential WebGPU Initialization Issue [File] gfx/ipc/CanvasManagerChild.cpp [Lines] 130-142  
   [Old Code]  
   (No WebGPU child management existed)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   RefPtr<webgpu::WebGPUChild> CanvasManagerChild::GetWebGPUChild() {
     if (!mWebGPUChild) {
       mWebGPUChild = MakeAndAddRef<webgpu::WebGPUChild>();
       if (!SendPWebGPUConstructor(mWebGPUChild)) {
         mWebGPUChild = nullptr;
       }
     }
     return mWebGPUChild;
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The addition of proper WebGPU child management could potentially fix security issues related to improper initialization or resource management.

Note: While these changes appear to improve security by adding proper data handling and resource management, without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed, we can't definitively state what vulnerabilities existed. The changes do appear to make the code more robust and secure.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/generic/nsTextFrameUtils.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/generic/nsTextFrameUtils.cpp@@ -341,43 +341,49 @@ template bool nsTextFrameUtils::IsSkippableCharacterForTransformText(     char16_t aChar);-uint32_t nsTextFrameUtils::ComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression(-    Text* aText, const nsStyleText* aStyleText) {-  const nsTextFragment* frag = &aText->TextFragment();+template <typename CharT>+static uint32_t DoComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression(+    const CharT* aChars, uint32_t aLength, const nsStyleText* aStyleText) {   // This is an approximation so we don't really need anything   // too fancy here.   uint32_t len;   if (aStyleText->WhiteSpaceIsSignificant()) {-    len = frag->GetLength();-  } else {-    bool is2b = frag->Is2b();-    union {-      const char* s1b;-      const char16_t* s2b;-    } u;-    if (is2b) {-      u.s2b = frag->Get2b();-    } else {-      u.s1b = frag->Get1b();-    }-    bool prevWS = true;  // more important to ignore blocks with-                         // only whitespace than get inline boundaries-                         // exactly right-    len = 0;-    for (uint32_t i = 0, i_end = frag->GetLength(); i < i_end; ++i) {-      char16_t c = is2b ? u.s2b[i] : u.s1b[i];-      if (c == ' ' || c == '\n' || c == '\t' || c == '\r') {-        if (!prevWS) {-          ++len;-        }-        prevWS = true;-      } else {+    return aLength;+  }+  bool prevWS = true;  // more important to ignore blocks with+                       // only whitespace than get inline boundaries+                       // exactly right+  len = 0;+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aLength; ++i) {+    CharT c = aChars[i];+    if (c == ' ' || c == '\n' || c == '\t' || c == '\r') {+      if (!prevWS) {         ++len;-        prevWS = false;-      }+      }+      prevWS = true;+    } else {+      ++len;+      prevWS = false;     }   }   return len;+}++uint32_t nsTextFrameUtils::ComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression(+    Text* aText, const nsStyleText* aStyleText) {+  const nsTextFragment* frag = &aText->TextFragment();+  if (frag->Is2b()) {+    return DoComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression(+        frag->Get2b(), frag->GetLength(), aStyleText);+  }+  return DoComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression(+      frag->Get1b(), frag->GetLength(), aStyleText);+}++uint32_t nsTextFrameUtils::ComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression(+    const nsAString& aString, const nsStyleText* aStyleText) {+  return DoComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression(+      aString.BeginReading(), aString.Length(), aStyleText); } bool nsSkipCharsRunIterator::NextRun() {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily refactoring and code organization improvements rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Refactoring for code organization [File] layout/generic/nsTextFrameUtils.cpp [Lines 341-389]
   [Old Code]
   The original monolithic function implementation
   [Fixed Code]
   Split into a template function and wrapper functions for better code reuse

The main changes are:
1. Extracting the core logic into a template function `DoComputeApproximateLengthWithWhitespaceCompression`
2. Creating two wrapper functions that handle different input types (Text* and nsAString)
3. The actual whitespace compression logic remains functionally the same

There are no changes to security-related aspects like:
- No buffer size checks were added/removed
- No input validation changes
- No memory safety improvements
- No changes to sensitive operations

The changes appear to be purely for code maintainability and reusability rather than addressing any security vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var gradient = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); gradient.addColorStop(0, 'rgba(0,0,0,0)');@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.fillStyle = gradient; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.gradient.transparent.1.worker.js] [Lines 13-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No changes to the actual security-related functionality or behavior of the code

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/glean/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/glean/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.whitespace.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.whitespace.worker.js@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = '	100';-offscreenCanvas.height = '	100';-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.width, 100, "offscreenCanvas.width", "100");-_assertSame(offscreenCanvas.height, 100, "offscreenCanvas.height", "100");+canvas.width = '	100';+canvas.height = '	100';+_assertSame(canvas.width, 100, "canvas.width", "100");+_assertSame(canvas.height, 100, "canvas.height", "100"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. Here's my analysis:

1. For the first file (cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is just a checksum file update showing different hash values for package contents. No code changes or security fixes are evident.

2. For the second file (size.attributes.parse.whitespace.worker.js):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    The changes are purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding assertion message updates. The functionality remains the same - testing whitespace handling in canvas size attributes. No security implications in this change.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in either diff. The changes appear to be routine updates and test improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-157.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-157.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p class="test">This line should have a green background.</p>

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability identified [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-157.xml [Lines] 9
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="" />`
   Fixed Code: (removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change.
- The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce any security risks.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.2.dompoint.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.2.dompoint.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability purposes. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.2.radii.2.dompoint.html] [Lines 17-48]
[Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas']
[Fixed Code: Changed variable name to 'canvas']

The changes are:
1. Variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` in the initialization
2. Corresponding updates to all references of this variable in the `_assertPixel` calls

No security implications are present in this change as it's purely a variable naming convention update. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.alpha.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.alpha.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.25)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50) ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,64, "50,25", "0,255,0,64", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,64, "50,25", "0,255,0,64", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-sensitive operations or fixes. Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,64, "50,25", "0,255,0,64", 2);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,64, "50,25", "0,255,0,64", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.