--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.image.copy.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.image.copy.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 40, 40, 10, 10, 40, 50, 10, 10);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 36-37]
   Old Code:
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 36-37]
   Old Code:
   ```
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` without any security implications. No vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The modifications seem to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.zero.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.zero.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50) ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better clarity/consistency rather than addressing security issues.

Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.dirty.zero.worker.js] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the assertion call
3. No security-related changes were made

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/pending-breakpoints.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/pending-breakpoints.js@@ -70,24 +70,4 @@   return state; }-// Selectors-// TODO: these functions should be moved out of the reducer--export function getPendingBreakpoints(state) {-  return state.pendingBreakpoints;-}--export function getPendingBreakpointList(state) {-  return Object.values(getPendingBreakpoints(state));-}--export function getPendingBreakpointsForSource(state, source) {-  return getPendingBreakpointList(state).filter(pendingBreakpoint => {-    return (-      pendingBreakpoint.location.sourceUrl === source.url ||-      pendingBreakpoint.generatedLocation.sourceUrl == source.url-    );-  });-}- export default update;

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Code Organization Improvement [devtools/client/debugger/src/reducers/pending-breakpoints.js] [Lines 70-88]
    [Old Code]
    // Selectors
    // TODO: these functions should be moved out of the reducer

    export function getPendingBreakpoints(state) {
      return state.pendingBreakpoints;
    }

    export function getPendingBreakpointList(state) {
      return Object.values(getPendingBreakpoints(state));
    }

    export function getPendingBreakpointsForSource(state, source) {
      return getPendingBreakpointList(state).filter(pendingBreakpoint => {
        return (
          pendingBreakpoint.location.sourceUrl === source.url ||
          pendingBreakpoint.generatedLocation.sourceUrl == source.url
        );
      });
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    [Removed entirely]

The changes appear to be purely related to code organization and architecture rather than security fixes. The selector functions were removed (likely moved to a more appropriate location), but there's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed. The modification follows the TODO comment suggesting these functions should be moved out of the reducer. No security-related issues were identified in the removed code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/themes/shared/privatebrowsing/aboutPrivateBrowsing.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/themes/shared/privatebrowsing/aboutPrivateBrowsing.css@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ @import url("chrome://global/skin/in-content/info-pages.css");+@media not (prefers-contrast) { html.private {   --in-content-page-color: white;   --in-content-text-color: white;@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@   --in-content-banner-text-color: #0c0c0d;   --in-content-button-background-hover: rgba(12,12,13,.1);   --in-content-button-background-active: rgba(12,12,13,.15);+} } /**@@ -325,8 +327,28 @@ .promo {   text-align: center;+  align-items: center;+}++.promo-visible {   display: flex;-  align-items: center;+}++.promo-dismiss {+  padding: 10px;+  min-width: 16px;+  min-height: 16px;+  display: inline flow-root;+  background: url("chrome://global/skin/icons/close.svg") center no-repeat;+  cursor: pointer;+  -moz-context-properties: fill;+  fill: currentColor;+}++@media not (prefers-contrast) {+  .promo-dismiss {+    opacity: 0.5;+  } } .promo-content {

Analyzing the provided CSS diff, here are the security-related findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific security vulnerability was fixed in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily stylistic and functional improvements:
- Added media query for contrast preferences
- Improved promo section styling
- Added dismiss button styling

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Disclosure [File] [Lines 4-15]
[Old Code]
html.private {
  --in-content-page-color: white;
  --in-content-text-color: white;
  --in-content-page-background: #2a2a2e;
  --in-content-box-background: #38383d;
  --in-content-box-background-hover: #42414d;
  --in-content-banner-text-color: #0c0c0d;
  --in-content-button-background-hover: rgba(12,12,13,.1);
  --in-content-button-background-active: rgba(12,12,13,.15);
}
[Fixed Code]
@media not (prefers-contrast) {
html.private {
  --in-content-page-color: white;
  --in-content-text-color: white;
  --in-content-page-background: #2a2a2e;
  --in-content-box-background: #38383d;
  --in-content-box-background-hover: #42414d;
  --in-content-banner-text-color: #0c0c0d;
  --in-content-button-background-hover: rgba(12,12,13,.1);
  --in-content-button-background-active: rgba(12,12,13,.15);
}
}
Note: While not a direct security fix, the addition of contrast preference media queries could potentially affect accessibility and visibility of sensitive UI elements.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes to the promo section (lines 325-350) appear to be purely UI/UX improvements with no security implications. The added dismiss button styling and visibility controls don't indicate any security fixes.

No clear security vulnerabilities were fixed in this CSS diff. The changes appear to be focused on improving accessibility (contrast preferences) and user interface elements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"06fd4ad0f31c8121174fa62523ebb53360675d00d03fb58433b924edc4de31da","LICENSE":"8ea93490d74a5a1b1af3ff71d786271b3f1e5f0bea79ac16e02ec533cef040d6","src/ast/data.rs":"73a6b7a679011135dfee25af462163b3fe3f3effdf028c440aa6e3e4b5ff079f","src/ast/generics.rs":"3bdfe1abdbee64f5aaa9b189dc5c58e222568f196ed206e9d6d91ea5f29673e7","src/ast/mod.rs":"58a58eeb1db7682e5994732cc8eb04088f6ca662805460ef443cf089e5c24e2c","src/codegen/attr_extractor.rs":"d49605dbea8e95d64a9859a8beef5cf678390ffc5ba76ec77d69913f650ba974","src/codegen/default_expr.rs":"60f23b77ddf80da70ec92fd0d8cb5a97143535df85eafa0e47943ac797ec46d2","src/codegen/error.rs":"1a415136f93adde7458e39cab91413adc9a64243b718c7b74fdeba748959b5af","src/codegen/field.rs":"82104df8f3e733b23764fd6683e60d24ce62912b8b29a22dadbbc55d6a42f158","src/codegen/from_derive_impl.rs":"7cc03ffcc65e8e06dbf9d469502dc4ddd8772a2177dbf6404ad32d306379f777","src/codegen/from_field.rs":"a77abdb024b9a884dcdfda758ab072f26d5fae12eb67a3deb3dc47c6be2f2390","src/codegen/from_meta_impl.rs":"8fc08e65736efaf82b7aa2ce7e20c1a4235a94840353b860d6e782606c92ce18","src/codegen/from_type_param.rs":"c9cdb902d72f2ec047aeaa5217c2cda551d6cfc570f51ae4420907d6b398d9e7","src/codegen/from_variant_impl.rs":"1b44e10d8a0c43b1dcb7d66d1ced74ffab7f7beaa680031c11cfd4ab1abb39bf","src/codegen/mod.rs":"2dc3ee7f18177b2ef9c27c4f0cabc5bbd49f970abdba28a0539d81c70d81b6e2","src/codegen/outer_from_impl.rs":"41f5b6b4fb9185f88eaab3fbeed8b07e5791d04f265ee3c77e874a869fac7e1a","src/codegen/trait_impl.rs":"94c6f8a190ab2957ddae55745184e056ec5e43e9c552f492a3cb2f387dfb4a6a","src/codegen/variant.rs":"69ee861a63e31feb158611e93d0a355fdd94d6c8f3adc6c550864b7f5906d0ba","src/codegen/variant_data.rs":"bf17078e1bfeb35fae88b6ba124d730a27028ab75a422b247bbe09022c5f84d1","src/derive.rs":"89180c13798b61510a6d266781e065114b75ca0be27e172a24656347b9baf1d3","src/error/kind.rs":"877f025ff72839ede46b8c7460331dac32ec56a7539816820179110381f8d0fb","src/error/mod.rs":"a440321a7d7d76ecdbd100a8a4ac94d231fdf4e58a8758d09c115d6d7e297601","src/from_derive_input.rs":"b2a04fefa4e14684061c819387ea0384297c67c7f50d5d0959aa69ab19075e76","src/from_field.rs":"f667924422ab4ab8d8b16ebfd42f61e74864cfaa80e96b49de5d1e1287e3d1d3","src/from_generic_param.rs":"49c5a8335eb0a9010998c5600c95c89440f7febe03265afb625d818dbc883d92","src/from_generics.rs":"7285b0fd213507e87c1da413cd1bc9eeada485d4a8f9d19630848d02a4d41c4a","src/from_meta.rs":"11cd84155ab7ac2f20eb5eb6b297be3606871bf5ee10fa529cbb6e370fe9ab68","src/from_type_param.rs":"9b611f276871002ade78146266fde3b6f9101b360082681a2fa2dafc16431f84","src/from_variant.rs":"70a23b5b4cb93c7e5a498fe9d16420b9b93bd69c1376d7703bc7cefd9417d159","src/lib.rs":"337ce983fd49548c60bc0d8662f6d279daec1964c79b123453340158d55d39ab","src/macros_private.rs":"ef249cd9ca593aac423b4242df1c39c31610438da094c21562d74a7e5823c700","src/macros_public.rs":"3ed7eb99f309d9cd600d3a09ff4dcf5cc5d787fb49e8e5ead6bb00e31e5e6793","src/options/core.rs":"02659124b387437daf3b7d6c841a07478dc39a5a626e8ac4b7703e48c6675f6d","src/options/forward_attrs.rs":"a8bb729d8096dd467f23d55c5b4f09e1b8f329181b7d63c75b10fb51518277fd","src/options/from_derive.rs":"e3e13549d327169a64e831612c370662d09465e11690a3e8a6d029591dba3c8b","src/options/from_field.rs":"67f338df3ffc270b3baf08b35cbe985802a65c1360c4e540cc5b937f6f08f915","src/options/from_meta.rs":"81a2ae765d390f64fbcbb1d30d40e895d77f8cd4f4c5f7167b1eacb48e066195","src/options/from_type_param.rs":"d3c8add6c8f5f7ee3d4a487c53e1f85002a2da43b943c03d4ce856fa6e7c8453","src/options/from_variant.rs":"6b2d0b37c9f66ff59b2ac74c51bc7c968a44c2f4812baf428ed2f6801a474704","src/options/input_field.rs":"6e09c3432c63130a7def5cd1c4ba2d9ae2f692e58f82224e96f1212f09d2adb5","src/options/input_variant.rs":"94050b9185838296b7eb6ffacf41472cbff63461162b0005ca07c9a792c749ac","src/options/mod.rs":"8fe5c94c3999d210cb024c6f6b181da92a0cc1a4a862e5d46ec49904c6692e11","src/options/outer_from.rs":"648e3005f19b38299284df954b371fba9cea2fab39a6cfd6b54b5437b4200599","src/options/shape.rs":"03ca937d0c158e96337731517b8cfbc839f536e691f2f31713222bd228b49e07","src/usage/generics_ext.rs":"340774fe43033680e6b494c76dd4f558ada7ca4f09e91f9e4d076f125a729fc2","src/usage/ident_set.rs":"30edb2f0a599284967e3c6b579da31e5f9b15f3dd67bc9a82d6335eb44133df0","src/usage/lifetimes.rs":"35546bd524c38cbae2366e59ac2d836fe09af8e59aa99c7992d1e4d725364db7","src/usage/mod.rs":"e49adadfa8ffed27299d5bbf3c33e68e2c8c7411f89aef655f77e158be9dd642","src/usage/options.rs":"0491c995aad0d55783b24cce8a4e40f0f4435988c54ce2ded34763ac9b199fcf","src/usage/type_params.rs":"c46323838a5e1e87a1a75878314a8b1217e8d63d27a5067961c3b908842d248b","src/util/ident_string.rs":"2b7fdbe9664c2e306114ffa830fde9710d849a0240029636cbb244457795b13f","src/util/ignored.rs":"7c979fbef880498ff64efda7396e759d80bf77fb1c7df0313bed8e533a16c0e0","src/util/mod.rs":"9d8fef190513b6ab675a6ea3cf7e2841d2204fd38d8d55b10cc915d583491982","src/util/over_ride.rs":"5750d284d46c6a51522e908b642c8f09cd6e48c91fd25077f24ce75989525560","src/util/path_list.rs":"4d14eef07b6e3a3e69a539c49b3f25d477e79bd55594cd7324fda3b86784b0f5","src/util/spanned_value.rs":"3938cfc5169237cde1f19d65b653e1da8699663d1abfcf005359d48bbcee7d0b","src/util/with_original.rs":"a545b38ba9d624fdc939eb844f001b7fc4102717b1d3683b4cbd0aae00fa7ef2"},"package":"f0c960ae2da4de88a91b2d920c2a7233b400bc33cb28453a2987822d8392519b"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"fb15187abe21001563f3478a4080c6f0171593f112665001d353d7321c17682c","LICENSE":"8ea93490d74a5a1b1af3ff71d786271b3f1e5f0bea79ac16e02ec533cef040d6","src/ast/data.rs":"a1962a07d216846358a30e2e77abe245e7fee2c383c73d2162ba5f30aa0be590","src/ast/generics.rs":"8e1bd81128116d54fe3c8de1a307cb6c9d1ecafa263fd77897719648e0d4b8af","src/ast/mod.rs":"58a58eeb1db7682e5994732cc8eb04088f6ca662805460ef443cf089e5c24e2c","src/codegen/attr_extractor.rs":"a9d94d4c865e070cc609e35bdc3f4ed4c15002dc19db2c59425caf386c67b335","src/codegen/default_expr.rs":"7b906c51b13e3606b93ce06544189d9db800d7d4d9de8c5423f1fe6cff5de047","src/codegen/error.rs":"08d6e3a4fb3cf2ca596a8348bfc6f8b13ecfde9e669f1dad677299bab8930523","src/codegen/field.rs":"a228d7f35ea4f9852043bcc68d41939f3150a31d07c25892561b407ac16aaea2","src/codegen/from_attributes_impl.rs":"22d76169d01a78f633b24659f7a848a65494116d19eff35fc0b918ac1f40abbc","src/codegen/from_derive_impl.rs":"1e0e88b3b9601beedbe42244f4e775c10104438c4c3f58f8fd5465900b2855d4","src/codegen/from_field.rs":"15440e91553215673966aed8001d0500f09f6a605b5f14f8abc088be6ba6bd97","src/codegen/from_meta_impl.rs":"7f6b818a0cec71b93e73661aa1a561ce54e3e4e4226209e4332c53e2b32fca99","src/codegen/from_type_param.rs":"acae66dee3e102026195fa2ec8022e9f9ee03bdf55ddcc7b6ce3a152ea1703e3","src/codegen/from_variant_impl.rs":"98719b8298e2687b5cfbc0911f6d9deb03da090232e2e15d1b8ca0831a0004bb","src/codegen/mod.rs":"77b194876541e8ced86efebb534fc8a4f70c06d92c8b493aa90ef936bcc14273","src/codegen/outer_from_impl.rs":"9e40b80dbc6c025610e367f7c55adac0f114c4fe4ca82c1a64be3a91861e365e","src/codegen/postfix_transform.rs":"68f9b52cbedb17748ce2ff74e2876b7d7e8b1e348d435537f2d9957abb801efa","src/codegen/trait_impl.rs":"fcef7981d8adae92cba7a56355f3f9749174576745f5ec059bea2223ad1a06c1","src/codegen/variant.rs":"4e446a1dace51ee5ce61d53380b7b64168fbe433071a2408e95c8d5d25377f19","src/codegen/variant_data.rs":"fbd5828a2f0ce3a3d233b64b309105b1d6584b668934ff550e969c21faf3f98d","src/derive.rs":"d35f35233eea28bc66bf6f738358415d650741560ca56f8deaee9465b3e88b2a","src/error/kind.rs":"b58812153536bf90b1d68b3c7a49456093a6c44749a0d3505bd1d861bd219582","src/error/mod.rs":"4c4d6e9a7144be047317dfc3a5cdd2d675dd8677a866983b4eb31967d9fae809","src/from_attributes.rs":"9c98a34eccdb66526711793d6d00bd5216de1d0e9d3755133996242a27efe272","src/from_derive_input.rs":"a60aba72ebd4deddd6bb9919995652f90aafdf88f6109c00c1a1c4459e439049","src/from_field.rs":"1e22b7750843b6a018fe75ae1510fb9252343be99ab02d2093881421e87d867d","src/from_generic_param.rs":"bdabc80f49212501e6e3574c7e6c03b4e453d0fe241ac46d465a5f004381f4c9","src/from_generics.rs":"b0a156179b2d1d88467183649afc97405403b01a7fdae39e4df8392f6b9f500c","src/from_meta.rs":"c60d60c0dea43267e94c26aa6f7c5ee2432469defe5c9343b14a7cd0519b14fa","src/from_type_param.rs":"0c8930a42e1f0720429aa968f97f938e207460232dd2169cbf8efec12e7c6f5a","src/from_variant.rs":"dd27ffef65ceea0e68809afde7df82d3751cdedc248773062637aa8c146da6e7","src/lib.rs":"d10554edafa9995821c54b02be4fde5316753a19cf8ca8d7a4be321172804cf7","src/macros_private.rs":"ef249cd9ca593aac423b4242df1c39c31610438da094c21562d74a7e5823c700","src/macros_public.rs":"7d2ce0c5026227ef7854db11d7a885ad891255438b2e49bbdfda56fa2f92feec","src/options/core.rs":"19c8d32a1cd11ca9c27cea2edb68c51ec03b626ccfa4aa07fd40e84372997e84","src/options/forward_attrs.rs":"c6a960f74957854eabd5a5c87a15dbee897ea9a2f48d0094fbaec110f3a785cf","src/options/from_attributes.rs":"f73c4dc53cced30e60812a4247f3252ea0630618b1d162058cce0bd1666c43c9","src/options/from_derive.rs":"79b765e4d457888b1249a4326a117884c786a5f9fbc5203b17086663cadb04dc","src/options/from_field.rs":"006e127a648d9ad095fa92ffc6f9e106fdc1a784dd82be88dc73ed80198fd429","src/options/from_meta.rs":"1a543110dc4ab2e716a914bafced9e1f4035794613117708fc9f37a1036bcf75","src/options/from_type_param.rs":"c6f907d3bceef3a918822b75e019f520650d66c523acc2ffac37d03016234659","src/options/from_variant.rs":"e6c39d54f7e7d0941a78fc4df73fb46424615f9f7e808c473f99babdcb87c780","src/options/input_field.rs":"fd730ffc4b4f6d5bba09bfdf0b57414d3a592dea052e5e56b1c6299d05651b2e","src/options/input_variant.rs":"34092a35dfb707ad69f35f0aaea637e1db89b943367eb745373bc97d621d496f","src/options/mod.rs":"68f9203376f28080a8cc2318400067f4315d3d92cc755025e8d31a7a5ea2d551","src/options/outer_from.rs":"5ecc9dbdcb8074fecf5a40b3c8022dea94f7efb4512f6758b590233b69bc68fc","src/options/shape.rs":"d0dc08cce70a49f0897d68c69caec19e791586356732d85d00456f9582e6664f","src/usage/generics_ext.rs":"b2d15e2ff75c47f43f3ce305b2108e800dd3d89e3a21fadf82bda455837b8090","src/usage/ident_set.rs":"30edb2f0a599284967e3c6b579da31e5f9b15f3dd67bc9a82d6335eb44133df0","src/usage/lifetimes.rs":"c7b5cd7166f319827521dfb70a6f0339a1d9240b8f8d7dea766250a503a81b44","src/usage/mod.rs":"e49adadfa8ffed27299d5bbf3c33e68e2c8c7411f89aef655f77e158be9dd642","src/usage/options.rs":"0491c995aad0d55783b24cce8a4e40f0f4435988c54ce2ded34763ac9b199fcf","src/usage/type_params.rs":"a61f67e398753397b12f65d50feca11b18b20655ab88548bd404a060bcc8b65d","src/util/ident_string.rs":"7c3e00e0e3ddbb042d9a3c67a39186861a626dba4afc961e4e8f59a698169399","src/util/ignored.rs":"099c015023b9be0870fb1c4c44ad00f87789ea13da25e2ca952132443e497214","src/util/mod.rs":"30db26278d9cd4bec8aaf597c238154188888b67ec96c66f1f824a744e32202a","src/util/over_ride.rs":"5ce783a1fdfa7281038c03294572956f22efb1ae9b0794728db5b6d9fbcead68","src/util/parse_attribute.rs":"17f7f26ca2f459a3651ef24e85808e5318795c0ec4f719cabc98ccad65e3257a","src/util/path_list.rs":"6c20c2dbd67f11d2f86c49f65e702cffa2ad7aa779f064d6da29d84549bd386c","src/util/spanned_value.rs":"9bda584fa88fca803e708e1f041c8cb2449eb812799de4d38b42e98a4759bd4c","src/util/with_original.rs":"56ea20c03d07ebe1a8bc0ed220258f6cee5a3cf7192c0e07601fafda99404062"},"package":"7a340f241d2ceed1deb47ae36c4144b2707ec7dd0b649f894cb39bb595986324"}=========python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_update.py========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_update.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_update.py@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ }-def test_commit(repo):-    vcs = get_repository_object(repo.strpath)+def test_update(repo):+    vcs = get_repository_object(repo.dir)     rev0 = vcs.head_ref-    next(repo.step)+    repo.execute_next_step()     rev1 = vcs.head_ref     assert rev0 != rev1@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@     assert vcs.head_ref == rev1     # Update should fail with dirty working directory.-    next(repo.step)+    repo.execute_next_step()     with pytest.raises(CalledProcessError):         vcs.update(rev0)

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be routine updates and refactoring rather than security patches. Here's my analysis:

1. For the rust/darling_core/.cargo-checksum.json file:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is just a checksum update file showing that various source files were modified, but there's no indication of security fixes in the diff.

2. For the python/mozversioncontrol/test/test_update.py file:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    The changes are test refactoring:
    - Renamed test_commit to test_update
    - Changed repo.strpath to repo.dir
    - Changed next(repo.step) to repo.execute_next_step()
    These appear to be test improvements rather than security fixes.

Additional Notes:
- The cargo checksum file shows many files were updated, but without seeing the actual source changes, we can't determine if any security fixes were included
- The test file changes are purely structural/refactoring with no security implications
- No CVE or vulnerability names are referenced in either diff

If you have access to the actual source file changes (not just the checksum file), there might be security fixes that aren't visible in this diff. However, based on what's shown here, no security vulnerabilities were fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/sanitizeDialog.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/sanitizeDialog.js@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-/* import-globals-from ../../../toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */+/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */ var { Sanitizer } = ChromeUtils.import("resource:///modules/Sanitizer.jsm"); var { Services } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm");

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Path Traversal Vulnerability [browser/base/content/sanitizeDialog.js] [Lines 3]  
[Old Code]  
`/* import-globals-from ../../../toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */`  
[Fixed Code]  
`/* import-globals-from /toolkit/content/preferencesBindings.js */`  

Additional Details:  
The change involves modifying the path reference for an imported file. While this doesn't appear to be fixing a direct security vulnerability, the change from a relative path (`../../../toolkit/content/`) to an absolute path (`/toolkit/content/`) could potentially prevent path traversal issues that might occur if the relative path resolution was somehow manipulated. However, without more context about how this path is used, I can't be certain if this was an actual security fix or just a code cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/ImageContainer.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/ImageContainer.h@@ -661,6 +661,12 @@   }   static Maybe<PlanarYCbCrData> From(const SurfaceDescriptorBuffer&);++  // We would use mPicSize, but that's not hooked up in WR for RawData+  // ExternalImages, so we manually clip sizes later on. We should fix WR,+  // but not in this patch. Do not use unless mPicSize doesn't work for you.+  Maybe<gfx::IntSize> mCroppedYSize;+  Maybe<gfx::IntSize> mCroppedCbCrSize; }; // This type is currently only used for AVIF and therefore makes some@@ -728,6 +734,11 @@   virtual bool AdoptData(const Data& aData);   /**+   * This will create an empty data buffers according to the input data's size.+   */+  virtual bool CreateEmptyBuffer(const Data& aData) { return false; }++  /**    * Ask this Image to not convert YUV to RGB during SetData, and make    * the original data available through GetData. This is optional,    * and not all PlanarYCbCrImages will support it.

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Buffer Size Mismanagement] [gfx/layers/ImageContainer.h] [Lines 661-667]
[Old Code]
(No previous code for these fields)
[Fixed Code]
  // We would use mPicSize, but that's not hooked up in WR for RawData
  // ExternalImages, so we manually clip sizes later on. We should fix WR,
  // but not in this patch. Do not use unless mPicSize doesn't work for you.
  Maybe<gfx::IntSize> mCroppedYSize;
  Maybe<gfx::IntSize> mCroppedCbCrSize;

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Uninitialized Buffer Creation] [gfx/layers/ImageContainer.h] [Lines 728-734]
[Old Code]
(No previous method existed)
[Fixed Code]
  /**
   * This will create an empty data buffers according to the input data's size.
   */
  virtual bool CreateEmptyBuffer(const Data& aData) { return false; }

Notes:
1. The first change introduces new size tracking fields with explicit warnings about their careful usage. While not clearly a security fix, it suggests previous potential issues with image size handling.
2. The second change adds a method for creating empty buffers with proper size initialization, which could prevent buffer overflow issues if previously buffers were created without proper sizing.
3. Neither change explicitly mentions fixing a security vulnerability, but both relate to memory/buffer management which often has security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-047.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-047.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-circle-047-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the basic shape circle(100%) value.">   <style>   .container {

Let me analyze the provided code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-047.html [Lines] 9
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional details:
1. The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta "flags" tag, which doesn't appear to have any security implications.
2. This appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix.
3. No actual code changes were made to the functionality, just metadata cleanup.
4. The change doesn't affect any security-related headers, inputs, or outputs.

No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change. The modification seems to be purely about test file maintenance.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/dsp/enc_neon.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/dsp/enc_neon.c@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ // // ARM NEON version of speed-critical encoding functions. //-// adapted from libvpx (http://www.webmproject.org/code/)+// adapted from libvpx (https://www.webmproject.org/code/) #include "src/dsp/dsp.h"

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
[No security vulnerability found] [media/libwebp/src/dsp/enc_neon.c] [Lines 9]  
[Old Code]  
`// adapted from libvpx (http://www.webmproject.org/code/)`  
[Fixed Code]  
`// adapted from libvpx (https://www.webmproject.org/code/)`  

Additional Details:  
- The change only involves updating a comment to use HTTPS instead of HTTP in a URL reference  
- This is a security improvement (using secure HTTPS protocol) but doesn't fix an actual vulnerability  
- No CVE or specific vulnerability is being addressed here  

Note: While this change improves security by using HTTPS, it doesn't represent a vulnerability fix in the code itself. The modification is in a comment line and doesn't affect the executable code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/Editor/Footer.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/Editor/Footer.js@@ -11,18 +11,11 @@   getPrettySource,   getPaneCollapse,   getContext,-} from "../../selectors";--import {-  isPretty,-  getFilename,-  isOriginal,-  shouldBlackbox,-} from "../../utils/source";-import {   getGeneratedSource,   canPrettyPrintSource,-} from "../../reducers/sources";+} from "../../selectors";++import { isPretty, getFilename, shouldBlackbox } from "../../utils/source"; import { PaneToggleButton } from "../shared/Button"; import AccessibleImage from "../shared/AccessibleImage";@@ -172,7 +165,7 @@       selectedSource,     } = this.props;-    if (!mappedSource || !selectedSource || !isOriginal(selectedSource)) {+    if (!mappedSource || !selectedSource || !selectedSource.isOriginal) {       return null;     }

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Import Optimization] [devtools/client/debugger/src/components/Editor/Footer.js] [Lines 11-18]
    [Old Code]
    import {
      isPretty,
      getFilename,
      isOriginal,
      shouldBlackbox,
    } from "../../utils/source";
    [Fixed Code]
    import { isPretty, getFilename, shouldBlackbox } from "../../utils/source";

    Additional Details: The removal of `isOriginal` from imports might indicate it's no longer needed, but this appears to be more of a code optimization rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Direct Property Access vs Function Call] [devtools/client/debugger/src/components/Editor/Footer.js] [Lines 172]
    [Old Code]
    if (!mappedSource || !selectedSource || !isOriginal(selectedSource)) {
    [Fixed Code]
    if (!mappedSource || !selectedSource || !selectedSource.isOriginal) {

    Additional Details: The change from using an `isOriginal()` function to directly accessing `isOriginal` property might suggest a change in how source validation is performed, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just refactoring.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily code organization and property access modifications rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/canvas/WebGLTypes.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/canvas/WebGLTypes.h@@ -266,9 +266,7 @@   UniqueBuffer() = default;-  ~UniqueBuffer() {-    reset();-  }+  ~UniqueBuffer() { reset(); }   UniqueBuffer(UniqueBuffer&& rhs) { *this = std::move(rhs); }@@ -935,6 +933,7 @@ class Element; class ImageBitmap; class ImageData;+class OffscreenCanvas; }  // namespace dom struct TexImageSource {@@ -946,6 +945,8 @@   const dom::ImageBitmap* mImageBitmap = nullptr;   const dom::ImageData* mImageData = nullptr;++  const dom::OffscreenCanvas* mOffscreenCanvas = nullptr;   const dom::Element* mDomElem = nullptr;   ErrorResult* mOut_error = nullptr;

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. First change (destructor simplification):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] dom/canvas/WebGLTypes.h [Lines] 266-268
    [Old Code]
    ~UniqueBuffer() {
        reset();
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    ~UniqueBuffer() { reset(); }

2. Second change (adding OffscreenCanvas):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential incomplete type handling [File] dom/canvas/WebGLTypes.h [Lines] 933-945
    [Old Code]
    class Element;
    class ImageBitmap;
    class ImageData;
    [Fixed Code]
    class Element;
    class ImageBitmap;
    class ImageData;
    class OffscreenCanvas;
    ...
    const dom::OffscreenCanvas* mOffscreenCanvas = nullptr;

The first change appears to be purely stylistic/optimization with no security implications. The second change adds support for OffscreenCanvas, which could potentially introduce new attack surfaces, but without seeing the implementation details, I can't be certain if this introduces any vulnerabilities. The change appears to be following the same pattern as other similar types in the file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.6.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.6.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ ctx.moveTo(50, 25); ctx.arc(50, 25, 60, (1024-1)*Math.PI, (512+1/2)*Math.PI, true); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.6.worker.js [Lines] 13-23
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or style reasons. There are no security-related changes in this diff, no changes to the actual functionality, and no security vulnerabilities being fixed. The pixel assertions and canvas operations remain exactly the same, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.outside.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.outside.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 16);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 34-37]
   Old Code: 
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes were identified
- The modification seems to be for consistency or readability purposes only
- All functional aspects of the code remain identical, just with a different variable name

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/cleardata/tests/unit/test_storage_permission.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/cleardata/tests/unit/test_storage_permission.js@@ -364,7 +364,8 @@   await new Promise(resolve => {     return Services.clearData.deleteUserInteractionForClearingHistory(       [principalWithStorage],-      timestamp,+      // ClearDataService takes PRTime (microseconds)+      timestamp * 1000,       resolve     );   });

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Incorrect Time Unit Conversion [File] [Lines 364-368]
[Old Code]
return Services.clearData.deleteUserInteractionForClearingHistory(
      [principalWithStorage],
      timestamp,
      resolve
    );
[Fixed Code]
return Services.clearData.deleteUserInteractionForClearingHistory(
      [principalWithStorage],
      // ClearDataService takes PRTime (microseconds)
      timestamp * 1000,
      resolve
    );

Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to incorrect time unit handling. The old code was passing a timestamp value directly without proper conversion, while the fixed code multiplies by 1000 to convert to microseconds (as indicated by the comment). This could potentially cause incorrect time-based operations in the ClearDataService. While not a classic security vulnerability, incorrect time handling could lead to logical errors in data clearing operations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.y.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.y.html@@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'destination-atop'; ctx.shadowColor = '#0f0'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 0.1; ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable name changes) rather than security fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.enable.y.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the references to this variable in the subsequent code
3. No functional changes to the security properties of the code

No CVE or specific vulnerability is being addressed here, and there's no indication of any security impact from these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-179a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-179a.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ ]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>    <p><br></br>This line should be green.</p>

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-179a.xml] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of test code.
3. No known vulnerability is associated with this change.
4. The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive functionality.

The diff shows no evidence of security vulnerabilities being fixed - it's just removing an unused or unnecessary meta tag from a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/painting/nsDisplayList.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/painting/nsDisplayList.h@@ -1690,6 +1690,38 @@    * (or will have) animated geometry. This can return aFrame.    */   nsIFrame* FindAnimatedGeometryRootFrameFor(nsIFrame* aFrame);++  /**+   * Returns true if this is a retained builder and reuse stacking contexts+   * mode is enabled by pref.+   */+  bool IsReusingStackingContextItems() const {+    return mIsReusingStackingContextItems;+  }++  /**+   * Adds display item |aItem| to the reuseable display items set.+   */+  void AddReusableDisplayItem(nsDisplayItem* aItem);++  /**+   * Removes display item |aItem| from the reuseable display items set.+   * This is needed because display items are sometimes deleted during+   * display list building.+   * Called by |nsDisplayItem::Destroy()| when the item has been reused.+   */+  void RemoveReusedDisplayItem(nsDisplayItem* aItem);++  /**+   * Clears the reuseable display items set.+   */+  void ClearReuseableDisplayItems();++  /**+   * Marks the given display item |aItem| as reused, and updates the necessary+   * display list builder state.+   */+  void ReuseDisplayItem(nsDisplayItem* aItem);  private:   bool MarkOutOfFlowFrameForDisplay(nsIFrame* aDirtyFrame, nsIFrame* aFrame,@@ -1885,6 +1917,10 @@   gfx::CompositorHitTestInfo mCompositorHitTestInfo;   bool mIsForContent;+  bool mIsReusingStackingContextItems;++  // Stores reusable items collected during display list preprocessing.+  nsTHashSet<nsDisplayItem*> mReuseableItems; }; class nsDisplayItem;@@ -2079,6 +2115,11 @@     if (aBuilder->IsForPainting() && aBuilder->IsForContent()) {       DL_LOGV("Destroying display item %p (%s)", this, Name());     }++    if (IsReusedItem()) {+      aBuilder->RemoveReusedDisplayItem(this);+    }+     this->~nsDisplayItem();     aBuilder->Destroy(type, this);   }@@ -2755,6 +2796,44 @@   nsRect GetPaintRect(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder, gfxContext* aCtx);   virtual const HitTestInfo& GetHitTestInfo() { return HitTestInfo::Empty(); }++  enum class ReuseState : uint8_t {+    None,+    // Set during display list building.+    Reusable,+    // Set during display list preprocessing.+    PreProcessed,+    // Set during partial display list build.+    Reused,+  };++  void SetReusable() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(mReuseState == ReuseState::None ||+               mReuseState == ReuseState::Reused);+    mReuseState = ReuseState::Reusable;+  }++  bool IsReusable() const { return mReuseState == ReuseState::Reusable; }++  void SetPreProcessed() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(mReuseState == ReuseState::Reusable);+    mReuseState = ReuseState::PreProcessed;+  }++  bool IsPreProcessed() const {+    return mReuseState == ReuseState::PreProcessed;+  }++  void SetReusedItem() {+    MOZ_ASSERT(mReuseState == ReuseState::PreProcessed);+    mReuseState = ReuseState::Reused;+  }++  bool IsReusedItem() const { return mReuseState == ReuseState::Reused; }++  void ResetReuseState() { mReuseState = ReuseState::None; }++  ReuseState GetReuseState() const { return mReuseState; }   nsIFrame* mFrame;  // 8@@ -2784,7 +2863,7 @@   DisplayItemType mType = DisplayItemType::TYPE_ZERO;  // 1   uint8_t mExtraPageForPageNum = 0;                    // 1   uint16_t mPerFrameIndex = 0;                         // 2-  // 2 free bytes here+  ReuseState mReuseState = ReuseState::None;   OldListIndex mOldListIndex;  // 4   uintptr_t mOldList = 0;      // 8@@ -3484,6 +3563,13 @@     return *this;   }+  RetainedDisplayList& operator=(nsDisplayList&& aOther) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(!Count(), "Can only move into an empty list!");+    MOZ_ASSERT(mOldItems.IsEmpty(), "Can only move into an empty list!");+    AppendToTop(&aOther);+    return *this;+  }+   void DeleteAll(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder) override {     for (OldItemInfo& i : mOldItems) {       if (i.mItem && i.mOwnsItem) {@@ -3682,22 +3768,22 @@   nscolor mColor; };-#  define DO_GLOBAL_REFLOW_COUNT_DSP(_name)                                   \-    PR_BEGIN_MACRO                                                            \-    if (!aBuilder->IsBackgroundOnly() && !aBuilder->IsForEventDelivery() &&   \-        PresShell()->IsPaintingFrameCounts()) {                               \-      aLists.Outlines()->AppendNewToTop<nsDisplayReflowCount>(aBuilder, this, \-                                                              _name);         \-    }                                                                         \+#  define DO_GLOBAL_REFLOW_COUNT_DSP(_name)                                 \+    PR_BEGIN_MACRO                                                          \+    if (!aBuilder->IsBackgroundOnly() && !aBuilder->IsForEventDelivery() && \+        PresShell()->IsPaintingFrameCounts()) {                             \+      aLists.Outlines()->AppendNewToTop<mozilla::nsDisplayReflowCount>(     \+          aBuilder, this, _name);                                           \+    }                                                                       \     PR_END_MACRO-#  define DO_GLOBAL_REFLOW_COUNT_DSP_COLOR(_name, _color)                     \-    PR_BEGIN_MACRO                                                            \-    if (!aBuilder->IsBackgroundOnly() && !aBuilder->IsForEventDelivery() &&   \-        PresShell()->IsPaintingFrameCounts()) {                               \-      aLists.Outlines()->AppendNewToTop<nsDisplayReflowCount>(aBuilder, this, \-                                                              _name, _color); \-    }                                                                         \+#  define DO_GLOBAL_REFLOW_COUNT_DSP_COLOR(_name, _color)                   \+    PR_BEGIN_MACRO                                                          \+    if (!aBuilder->IsBackgroundOnly() && !aBuilder->IsForEventDelivery() && \+        PresShell()->IsPaintingFrameCounts()) {                             \+      aLists.Outlines()->AppendNewToTop<mozilla::nsDisplayReflowCount>(     \+          aBuilder, this, _name, _color);                                   \+    }                                                                       \     PR_END_MACRO /*@@ -4055,9 +4141,7 @@   Maybe<nscolor> IsUniform(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder) const override;   bool CanApplyOpacity(WebRenderLayerManager* aManager,-                       nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder) const override {-    return CanBuildWebRenderDisplayItems(aManager, aBuilder);-  }+                       nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder) const override;   /**    * GetBounds() returns the background painting area.@@ -4099,7 +4183,7 @@   nsIFrame* GetDependentFrame() override { return mDependentFrame; }   void SetDependentFrame(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder, nsIFrame* aFrame) {-    if (!aBuilder->IsRetainingDisplayList()) {+    if (!aBuilder->IsRetainingDisplayList() || mDependentFrame == aFrame) {       return;     }     mDependentFrame = aFrame;@@ -4388,7 +4472,7 @@   nsIFrame* GetDependentFrame() override { return mDependentFrame; }   void SetDependentFrame(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder, nsIFrame* aFrame) {-    if (!aBuilder->IsRetainingDisplayList()) {+    if (!aBuilder->IsRetainingDisplayList() || mDependentFrame == aFrame) {       return;     }     mDependentFrame = aFrame;@@ -6321,6 +6405,12 @@     return mPrerenderDecision == PrerenderDecision::Partial;   }+  /**+   * Mark this item as created together with `nsDisplayPerspective`.+   * \see nsIFrame::BuildDisplayListForStackingContext().+   */+  void MarkWithAssociatedPerspective() { mHasAssociatedPerspective = true; }+   void AddSizeOfExcludingThis(nsWindowSizes&) const override;   bool CreatesStackingContextHelper() override { return true; }@@ -6367,6 +6457,9 @@   bool mIsTransformSeparator : 1;   // True if we have a transform getter.   bool mHasTransformGetter : 1;+  // True if this item is created together with `nsDisplayPerspective`+  // from the same CSS stacking context.+  bool mHasAssociatedPerspective : 1; }; /* A display item that applies a perspective transformation to a single

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Management Issue] [File: layout/painting/nsDisplayList.h] [Lines: 2079-2115]
   [Old Code]
   if (aBuilder->IsForPainting() && aBuilder->IsForContent()) {
     DL_LOGV("Destroying display item %p (%s)", this, Name());
   }
   this->~nsDisplayItem();
   aBuilder->Destroy(type, this);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   if (aBuilder->IsForPainting() && aBuilder->IsForContent()) {
     DL_LOGV("Destroying display item %p (%s)", this, Name());
   }

   if (IsReusedItem()) {
     aBuilder->RemoveReusedDisplayItem(this);
   }

   this->~nsDisplayItem();
   aBuilder->Destroy(type, this);

   Additional Details: The fix adds proper cleanup for reused display items, potentially preventing memory leaks or use-after-free issues.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Race Condition] [File: layout/painting/nsDisplayList.h] [Lines: 4099-4183]
   [Old Code]
   void SetDependentFrame(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder, nsIFrame* aFrame) {
     if (!aBuilder->IsRetainingDisplayList()) {
       return;
     }
     mDependentFrame = aFrame;
   }
   
   [Fixed Code]
   void SetDependentFrame(nsDisplayListBuilder* aBuilder, nsIFrame* aFrame) {
     if (!aBuilder->IsRetainingDisplayList() || mDependentFrame == aFrame) {
       return;
     }
     mDependentFrame = aFrame;
   }

   Additional Details: The fix adds an equality check to prevent unnecessary updates, which could potentially lead to race conditions in multi-threaded scenarios.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Resource Management Issue] [File: layout/painting/nsDisplayList.h] [Lines: 3484-3563]
   [Old Code]
   (No move assignment operator shown in diff)
   
   [Fixed Code]
   RetainedDisplayList& operator=(nsDisplayList&& aOther) {
     MOZ_ASSERT(!Count(), "Can only move into an empty list!");
     MOZ_ASSERT(mOldItems.IsEmpty(), "Can only move into an empty list!");
     AppendToTop(&aOther);
     return *this;
   }

   Additional Details: The addition of proper move semantics could prevent resource leaks during display list operations.

Note: While these changes appear to be primarily about improving memory management and resource handling, I've marked them as "not sure" for security vulnerabilities since they could potentially relate to security-relevant memory safety issues, but the diff doesn't provide enough context to be certain. The changes generally improve robustness in areas that could be security-sensitive.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/RTCStatsReport.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/RTCStatsReport.h@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@   nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> mParent; };+void MergeStats(UniquePtr<dom::RTCStatsCollection> aFromStats,+                dom::RTCStatsCollection* aIntoStats);++void FlattenStats(nsTArray<UniquePtr<dom::RTCStatsCollection>> aFromStats,+                  dom::RTCStatsCollection* aIntoStats);+ }  // namespace dom }  // namespace mozilla

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Memory Management Issue] [dom/media/webrtc/jsapi/RTCStatsReport.h] [Lines 143-149]
    [Old Code]
    (No equivalent functions existed before)
    [Fixed Code]
    void MergeStats(UniquePtr<dom::RTCStatsCollection> aFromStats,
                dom::RTCStatsCollection* aIntoStats);

    void FlattenStats(nsTArray<UniquePtr<dom::RTCStatsCollection>> aFromStats,
                  dom::RTCStatsCollection* aIntoStats);

Additional Details:
- The diff shows two new functions being added to handle RTCStatsCollection objects
- The functions deal with UniquePtr which suggests memory management considerations
- Without seeing the implementation, it's unclear if there was a specific vulnerability being fixed
- The changes could be related to preventing memory leaks or improper data handling in WebRTC statistics reporting
- The use of UniquePtr suggests ownership transfer is being properly managed in the new code

Note: Since we don't have the implementation details or context about why these functions were added, we can't definitively say what vulnerability (if any) was being addressed. The changes appear to be adding safer memory management patterns, but we'd need more information to identify specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.zero.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.zero.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.createImageData(10, 0); }); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.createImageData(0, 10); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create2.zero.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change appears to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. This doesn't represent a security fix but rather a code style or consistency improvement. No security vulnerabilities are addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/web-animations/animation-model/animation-types/property-list.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/web-animations/animation-model/animation-types/property-list.js@@ -1284,13 +1284,13 @@   'text-emphasis-position': {     // http://dev.w3.org/csswg/css-text-decor-3/#propdef-text-emphasis-position     types: [-      { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'over right', 'under left' ] ] }+      { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'over', 'under left' ] ] }     ]   },   'text-emphasis-style': {     // http://dev.w3.org/csswg/css-text-decor-3/#propdef-text-emphasis-style     types: [-      { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'filled circle', 'open dot' ] ] }+      { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'circle', 'open dot' ] ] }     ]   },   'text-indent': {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be updates to test cases for CSS property values rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. 
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Not a security fix [File] testing/web-platform/tests/web-animations/animation-model/animation-types/property-list.js [Lines 1284-1291]
    Old Code: 
    'text-emphasis-position': {
      types: [
        { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'over right', 'under left' ] ] }
      ]
    },
    Fixed Code:
    'text-emphasis-position': {
      types: [
        { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'over', 'under left' ] ] }
      ]
    },

2. 
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Not a security fix [File] testing/web-platform/tests/web-animations/animation-model/animation-types/property-list.js [Lines 1284-1291]
    Old Code:
    'text-emphasis-style': {
      types: [
        { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'filled circle', 'open dot' ] ] }
      ]
    },
    Fixed Code:
    'text-emphasis-style': {
      types: [
        { type: 'discrete', options: [ [ 'circle', 'open dot' ] ] }
      ]
    },

The changes appear to be:
1. Updating the valid options for 'text-emphasis-position' from 'over right' to just 'over'
2. Updating the valid options for 'text-emphasis-style' from 'filled circle' to just 'circle'

These are likely test case updates to match specification changes rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.