Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/compatibility/components/UnsupportedBrowserList.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/compatibility/components/UnsupportedBrowserList.js@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ ); const Types = require("devtools/client/inspector/compatibility/types");+const FluentReact = require("devtools/client/shared/vendor/fluent-react");+const Localized = createFactory(FluentReact.Localized); class UnsupportedBrowserList extends PureComponent { static get propTypes() {@@ -27,35 +29,31 @@ render() { const { browsers } = this.props;- // Aggregate the browser version and the aliase by the browser id.- // Convert from- // [{id, name, status, version}, ...]- // to- // {- // id: {- // name,- // versions: [{alias <- status, version}, ...],- // },- // ...- // }- const browsersMap = browsers.reduce(- (map, { id, name, status: alias, version }) => {- if (!map.has(id)) {- map.set(id, { name, versions: [] });- }- map.get(id).versions.push({ alias, version });+ const unsupportedBrowserItems = {};+ const browsersList = [];- return map;+ for (const { id, name, version, status } of browsers) {+ // Only display one icon per browser+ if (!unsupportedBrowserItems[id]) {+ unsupportedBrowserItems[id] = UnsupportedBrowserItem({+ key: id,+ id,+ name,+ });+ }+ browsersList.push(`${name} ${version}${status ? ` (${status})` : ""}`);+ }+ return Localized(+ {+ id: "compatibility-issue-browsers-list",+ $browsers: browsersList.join("\n"),+ attrs: { title: true }, },- new Map()- );-- return dom.ul(- {- className: "compatibility-unsupported-browser-list",- },- [...browsersMap.entries()].map(([id, { name, versions }]) =>- UnsupportedBrowserItem({ key: id, id, name, versions })+ dom.ul(+ {+ className: "compatibility-unsupported-browser-list",+ },+ Object.values(unsupportedBrowserItems) ) ); }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential XSS Vulnerability] [devtools/client/inspector/compatibility/components/UnsupportedBrowserList.js] [Lines 16-58] [Old Code: Manual string concatenation for browser list] [Fixed Code: Uses FluentReact.Localized for string localization] 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Information Disclosure] [devtools/client/inspector/compatibility/components/UnsupportedBrowserList.js] [Lines 27-58] [Old Code: Stored browser data in a Map structure] [Fixed Code: Uses localized strings and simplified data structure] Note: While the changes don't clearly indicate specific security vulnerabilities, they introduce localization handling which could help prevent XSS if the strings were previously vulnerable to injection. The change in data structure handling might also impact how information is displayed, potentially reducing information disclosure risks. However, without more context about the data sources and how they're used, these are speculative assessments.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/streamconv/converters/nsIndexedToHTML.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/streamconv/converters/nsIndexedToHTML.cpp@@ -617,23 +617,21 @@ return mParser->OnDataAvailable(aRequest, aInput, aOffset, aCount); }-static nsresult FormatTime(const mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style& aStyle,- const PRTime aPrTime, nsAString& aStringOut) {- mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag styleBag;- styleBag.date = Some(aStyle);-+static nsresult FormatTime(+ const mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag& aStyleBag,+ const PRTime aPrTime, nsAString& aStringOut) { // FormatPRExplodedTime will use GMT based formatted string (e.g. GMT+1) // instead of local time zone name (e.g. CEST). // To avoid this case when ResistFingerprinting is disabled, use // |FormatPRTime| to show exact time zone name. if (!nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting()) {- return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(styleBag, aPrTime,+ return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(aStyleBag, aPrTime, aStringOut); } PRExplodedTime prExplodedTime; PR_ExplodeTime(aPrTime, PR_GMTParameters, &prExplodedTime);- return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(styleBag, &prExplodedTime,+ return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(aStyleBag, &prExplodedTime, aStringOut); }@@ -782,11 +780,17 @@ pushBuffer.AppendLiteral(" sortable-data=\""); pushBuffer.AppendInt(static_cast<int64_t>(t)); pushBuffer.AppendLiteral("\">");+ // Add date string nsAutoString formatted;- FormatTime(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Short, t, formatted);+ mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag dateBag;+ dateBag.date = Some(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Short);+ FormatTime(dateBag, t, formatted); AppendNonAsciiToNCR(formatted, pushBuffer); pushBuffer.AppendLiteral("</td>\n <td>");- FormatTime(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Long, t, formatted);+ // Add time string+ mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag timeBag;+ timeBag.time = Some(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Long);+ FormatTime(timeBag, t, formatted); // use NCR to show date in any doc charset AppendNonAsciiToNCR(formatted, pushBuffer); }
I'll analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities following the specified format.
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [netwerk/streamconv/converters/nsIndexedToHTML.cpp] [Lines 617-636]
[Old Code]
static nsresult FormatTime(const mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style& aStyle,
const PRTime aPrTime, nsAString& aStringOut) {
mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag styleBag;
styleBag.date = Some(aStyle);
if (!nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting()) {
return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(styleBag, aPrTime,
aStringOut);
}
PRExplodedTime prExplodedTime;
PR_ExplodeTime(aPrTime, PR_GMTParameters, &prExplodedTime);
return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(styleBag, &prExplodedTime,
aStringOut);
}
[Fixed Code]
static nsresult FormatTime(
const mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag& aStyleBag,
const PRTime aPrTime, nsAString& aStringOut) {
if (!nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting()) {
return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(aStyleBag, aPrTime,
aStringOut);
}
PRExplodedTime prExplodedTime;
PR_ExplodeTime(aPrTime, PR_GMTParameters, &prExplodedTime);
return mozilla::intl::AppDateTimeFormat::Format(aStyleBag, &prExplodedTime,
aStringOut);
}
Additional Details:
The change modifies how time formatting is handled, particularly around fingerprinting resistance. While not clearly a security vulnerability, the change could be related to preventing information leaks through time formatting (potentially reducing fingerprinting surface).
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Time Formatting Consistency] [netwerk/streamconv/converters/nsIndexedToHTML.cpp] [Lines 782-794]
[Old Code]
nsAutoString formatted;
FormatTime(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Short, t, formatted);
AppendNonAsciiToNCR(formatted, pushBuffer);
pushBuffer.AppendLiteral("</td>\n <td>");
FormatTime(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Long, t, formatted);
[Fixed Code]
nsAutoString formatted;
mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag dateBag;
dateBag.date = Some(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Short);
FormatTime(dateBag, t, formatted);
AppendNonAsciiToNCR(formatted, pushBuffer);
pushBuffer.AppendLiteral("</td>\n <td>");
mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::StyleBag timeBag;
timeBag.time = Some(mozilla::intl::DateTimeFormat::Style::Long);
FormatTime(timeBag, t, formatted);
Additional Details:
The change separates date and time formatting more explicitly, which might be related to preventing inconsistent formatting that could potentially leak information or cause parsing issues. However, this appears more like a code improvement than a direct security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/requirements_edge.txt+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/requirements_edge.txt@@ -1,2 +1 @@-mozprocess==1.3.0 selenium==3.141.0
Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Dependency Version Update] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/requirements_edge.txt] [Lines 1-2] [Old Code] mozprocess==1.3.0 selenium==3.141.0 [Fixed Code] selenium==3.141.0 Additional Details: - The diff shows removal of the mozprocess dependency while keeping selenium at the same version - Without knowing the specific vulnerabilities in mozprocess 1.3.0, I can't confirm if this was a security fix - The change could be related to removing an unnecessary dependency rather than fixing a security issue - Selenium version remains unchanged, so no security implications there No clear security vulnerability is evident from this change, but it's possible the mozprocess removal was related to security concerns that aren't visible in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/browser-places.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/browser-places.js@@ -2143,6 +2143,21 @@ isStarUpdateNeeded = true; } }++ // Reset the default location if it is equal to the folder+ // being deleted. Just check the preference directly since we+ // do not want to do a asynchronous db lookup.+ PlacesUIUtils.defaultParentGuid.then(parentGuid => {+ if (+ ev.itemType == PlacesUtils.bookmarks.TYPE_FOLDER &&+ ev.guid == parentGuid+ ) {+ Services.prefs.setCharPref(+ "browser.bookmarks.defaultLocation",+ PlacesUtils.bookmarks.toolbarGuid+ );+ }+ }); break; case "bookmark-moved": const hasMovedInOutOtherBookmarks =
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Insecure Default Value Handling] [browser/base/content/browser-places.js] [Lines 2143-2158]
[Old Code]
isStarUpdateNeeded = true;
}
}
break;
case "bookmark-moved":
[Fixed Code]
isStarUpdateNeeded = true;
}
}
// Reset the default location if it is equal to the folder
// being deleted. Just check the preference directly since we
// do not want to do a asynchronous db lookup.
PlacesUIUtils.defaultParentGuid.then(parentGuid => {
if (
ev.itemType == PlacesUtils.bookmarks.TYPE_FOLDER &&
ev.guid == parentGuid
) {
Services.prefs.setCharPref(
"browser.bookmarks.defaultLocation",
PlacesUtils.bookmarks.toolbarGuid
);
}
});
break;
case "bookmark-moved":
Additional Details:
- The fix adds logic to reset the default bookmark location when a folder being deleted was previously set as the default location
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, this could prevent potential issues where bookmarks might be saved to a non-existent location after folder deletion
- The change improves robustness but doesn't appear to address a specific known vulnerability
- The fix ensures proper state management when folders are deleted
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-8.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-8.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(2.0943951024rad, 100.0%, 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsla-8.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call accordingly
No security implications are apparent in these changes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ const { resetSchemaVersion, } = require("devtools/client/debugger/src/utils/prefs");++const { isGeneratedId } = require("devtools/client/shared/source-map/index"); function log(msg, data) { info(`${msg} ${!data ? "" : JSON.stringify(data)}`);@@ -458,6 +460,17 @@ await waitForSelectedSource(dbg, url); }+/**+ * Waits for the debugger to resume+ *+ * @memberof mochitest/waits+ * @param {Objeect} dbg+ * @static+ */+function waitForResumed(dbg) {+ return waitForState(dbg, state => !dbg.selectors.getIsCurrentThreadPaused());+}+ function waitForInlinePreviews(dbg) { return waitForState(dbg, () => dbg.selectors.getSelectedInlinePreviews()); }@@ -757,9 +770,9 @@ async function resume(dbg) { const pauseLine = getVisibleSelectedFrameLine(dbg); info(`Resuming from ${pauseLine}`);- const onResumed = waitForActive(dbg);- await dbg.actions.resume(getThreadContext(dbg));- await onResumed;+ const onResumed = waitForResumed(dbg);+ await dbg.actions.resume();+ return onResumed; } function deleteExpression(dbg, input) {@@ -806,6 +819,26 @@ }); return getSelectedLocation(position, source).column;+}++function isMatchingLocation(location1, location2) {+ return (+ location1?.sourceId == location2?.sourceId &&+ location1?.line == location2?.line &&+ location1?.column == location2?.column+ );+}++function getBreakpointForLocation(dbg, location) {+ if (!location) {+ return undefined;+ }++ const isGeneratedSource = isGeneratedId(location.sourceId);+ return dbg.selectors.getBreakpointsList().find(bp => {+ const loc = isGeneratedSource ? bp.generatedLocation : bp.location;+ return isMatchingLocation(loc, location);+ }); } /**@@ -841,7 +874,7 @@ column = column || getFirstBreakpointColumn(dbg, { line, sourceId: source.id }); const location = { sourceId: source.id, sourceUrl: source.url, line, column };- const bp = dbg.selectors.getBreakpointForLocation(location);+ const bp = getBreakpointForLocation(dbg, location); return dbg.actions.disableBreakpoint(getContext(dbg), bp); }@@ -1005,7 +1038,7 @@ const source = dbg.selectors.getSource(sourceId); column = column || getFirstBreakpointColumn(dbg, { line, sourceId }); const location = { sourceId, sourceUrl: source.url, line, column };- const bp = dbg.selectors.getBreakpointForLocation(location);+ const bp = getBreakpointForLocation(dbg, location); return dbg.actions.removeBreakpoint(getContext(dbg), bp); }@@ -1028,10 +1061,6 @@ pauseOnExceptions, pauseOnCaughtExceptions );-}--function waitForActive(dbg) {- return waitForState(dbg, state => !dbg.selectors.getIsCurrentThreadPaused()); } // Helpers@@ -2161,6 +2190,54 @@ await onBreakpointSet; }+/**+ * Instantiate a HTTP Server that serves files from a given test folder.+ * The test folder should be made of multiple sub folder named: v1, v2, v3,...+ * We will serve the content from one of these sub folder+ * and switch to the next one, each time `httpServer.switchToNextVersion()`+ * is called.+ *+ * @return Object Test server with two functions:+ * - urlFor(path)+ * Returns the absolute url for a given file.+ * - switchToNextVersion() + * Start serving files from the next available sub folder.+ */+function createVersionizedHttpTestServer(testFolderName) {+ const httpServer = createTestHTTPServer();++ let currentVersion = 1;++ httpServer.registerPrefixHandler("/", async (request, response) => {+ response.processAsync();+ response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");+ if (request.path.endsWith(".js")) {+ response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript");+ } else if (request.path.endsWith(".js.map")) {+ response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");+ }+ if (request.path == "/" || request.path == "/index.html") {+ response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html");+ }+ const url = URL_ROOT + `examples/${testFolderName}/v${currentVersion}${request.path}`;+ info("[test-http-server] serving: " + url);+ const content = await fetch(url);+ const text = await content.text();+ response.write(text);+ response.finish();+ });++ return {+ switchToNextVersion() {+ currentVersion++;+ },+ urlFor(path) {+ const port = httpServer.identity.primaryPort;+ return `http://localhost:${port}/${path}`;+ },+ };+}+ // This module is also loaded for Browser Toolbox tests, within the browser toolbox process // which doesn't contain mochitests resource://testing-common URL. // This isn't important to allow rejections in the context of the browser toolbox tests.
I'll analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities. Here's the structured analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leakage [File] devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js [Lines 2190-2216]
[Old Code] (none - new function added)
[Fixed Code]
function createVersionizedHttpTestServer(testFolderName) {
const httpServer = createTestHTTPServer();
let currentVersion = 1;
httpServer.registerPrefixHandler("/", async (request, response) => {
// ... handler implementation ...
});
return {
switchToNextVersion() { currentVersion++; },
urlFor(path) { return `http://localhost:${port}/${path}`; }
};
}
Additional Details: The new HTTP server implementation might expose sensitive test files if not properly secured. The handler serves files without any authentication or path validation.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential XSS Vulnerability [File] devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js [Lines 2190-2216]
[Old Code] (none - new function added)
[Fixed Code]
httpServer.registerPrefixHandler("/", async (request, response) => {
// ... sets Content-Type headers ...
const url = URL_ROOT + `examples/${testFolderName}/v${currentVersion}${request.path}`;
const content = await fetch(url);
const text = await content.text();
response.write(text);
}
Additional Details: The handler directly writes fetched content to the response without sanitization, which could potentially lead to XSS if malicious content is served.
3. Vulnerability Existed: no
Breakpoint Handling Improvement [File] devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js [Lines 757-770]
[Old Code]
const onResumed = waitForActive(dbg);
await dbg.actions.resume(getThreadContext(dbg));
await onResumed;
[Fixed Code]
const onResumed = waitForResumed(dbg);
await dbg.actions.resume();
return onResumed;
Additional Details: This appears to be a functional improvement rather than a security fix.
The analysis shows no clear security vulnerabilities in the traditional sense, but there are potential security considerations in the new HTTP server implementation that should be reviewed. The changes appear to be primarily functional improvements and test infrastructure additions rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-out.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-out.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-out'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-out.html [Lines 17-26]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, without affecting any security aspects of the code. The functionality remains exactly the same.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.composite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.composite.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) { createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => { ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);- _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+ _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.
Here's the analysis following your format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.composite.worker.js
Lines: 14-15, 32
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.zero.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.zero.2.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00'; ctx.lineWidth = 250; ctx.lineCap = 'round'; ctx.lineJoin = 'round'; ctx.strokeRect(50, 25, 0, 0);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0"); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0");
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. There are no security-related changes in this diff. The functionality remains the same, and no security vulnerabilities are being addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/private-network-access/resources/preflight.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/private-network-access/resources/preflight.py@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@ # This endpoint responds to both preflight requests and the subsequent requests. #-# Its behavior can be configured with the following search/GET parameters:+# Its behavior can be configured with various search/GET parameters, all of+# which are optional: #-# - preflight-uuid: Optional, must be a valid UUID if set.+# - treat-as-public-once: Must be a valid UUID if set.+# If set, then this endpoint expects to receive a non-preflight request first,+# for which it sets the `Content-Security-Policy: treat-as-public-address`+# response header. This allows testing "DNS rebinding", where a URL first+# resolves to the public IP address space, then a non-public IP address space.+# - preflight-uuid: Must be a valid UUID if set, distinct from the value of the+# `treat-as-public-once` parameter if both are set. # If set, then this endpoint expects to receive a preflight request first-# followed by a regular request, as in the regular CORS protocol.+# followed by a regular request, as in the regular CORS protocol. If the+# `treat-as-public-once` header is also set, it takes precedence: this+# endpoint expects to receive a non-preflight request first, then a preflight+# request, then finally a regular request. # If unset, then this endpoint expects to receive no preflight request, only # a regular (non-OPTIONS) request.-# - preflight-headers: Optional, valid values are:+# - preflight-headers: Valid values are: # - cors: this endpoint responds with valid CORS headers to preflights. These # should be sufficient for non-PNA preflight requests to succeed, but not # for PNA-specific preflight requests.@@ -16,7 +26,7 @@ # requests and PNA-specific preflight requests to succeed. # - unspecified, or any other value: this endpoint responds with no CORS or # PNA headers. Preflight requests should fail.-# - final-headers: Optional, valid values are:+# - final-headers: Valid values are: # - cors: this endpoint responds with valid CORS headers to CORS-enabled # non-preflight requests. These should be sufficient for non-preflighted # CORS-enabled requests to succeed.@@ -24,6 +34,22 @@ # requests. This should fail CORS-enabled requests, but be sufficient for # no-CORS requests. #+# The following parameters only affect non-preflight responses:+#+# - mime-type: If set, the `Content-Type` response header is set to this value.+# - file: Specifies a path (relative to this file's directory) to a file. If+# set, the response body is copied from this file.+# - random-js-prefix: If set to any value, the response body is prefixed with+# a Javascript comment line containing a random value. This is useful in+# service worker tests, since service workers are only updated if the new+# script is not byte-for-byte identical with the old script.+# - body: If set and `file` is not, the response body is set to this value.+#++import os+import random++from wptserve.utils import isomorphic_encode _ACAO = ("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*") _ACAPN = ("Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network", "true")@@ -39,13 +65,28 @@ return []-def _get_uuid(request):+def _get_preflight_uuid(request): return request.GET.get(b"preflight-uuid")+def _should_treat_as_public_once(request):+ uuid = request.GET.get(b"treat-as-public-once")+ if uuid is None:+ # If the search parameter is not given, never treat as public.+ return False++ # If the parameter is given, we treat the request as public only if the UUID+ # has never been seen and stashed.+ result = request.server.stash.take(uuid) is None+ request.server.stash.put(uuid, "")+ return result+ def _handle_preflight_request(request, response):- uuid = _get_uuid(request)+ if _should_treat_as_public_once(request):+ return (400, [], "received preflight for first treat-as-public request")++ uuid = _get_preflight_uuid(request) if uuid is None:- raise Exception("missing `preflight-uuid` param from preflight URL")+ return (400, [], "missing `preflight-uuid` param from preflight URL") request.server.stash.put(uuid, "")@@ -55,15 +96,39 @@ return (headers, "preflight")+def _final_response_body(request):+ file_name = request.GET.get(b"file")+ if file_name is None:+ return request.GET.get(b"body") or "success"++ prefix = b""+ if request.GET.get(b"random-js-prefix"):+ value = random.randint(0, 1000000000)+ prefix = isomorphic_encode("// Random value: {}\n\n".format(value))++ path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(isomorphic_encode(__file__)), file_name)+ with open(path, 'rb') as f:+ contents = f.read()++ return prefix + contents+ def _handle_final_request(request, response):- uuid = _get_uuid(request)- if uuid is not None and request.server.stash.take(uuid) is None:- raise Exception("no matching preflight request for {}".format(uuid))+ if _should_treat_as_public_once(request):+ headers = [("Content-Security-Policy", "treat-as-public-address"),]+ else:+ uuid = _get_preflight_uuid(request)+ if uuid is not None and request.server.stash.take(uuid) is None:+ return (405, [], "no preflight received for {}".format(uuid))- mode = request.GET.get(b"final-headers")- headers = _get_response_headers(request.method, mode)+ mode = request.GET.get(b"final-headers")+ headers = _get_response_headers(request.method, mode)- return (headers, "success")+ mime_type = request.GET.get(b"mime-type")+ if mime_type is not None:+ headers.append(("Content-Type", mime_type),)++ body = _final_response_body(request)+ return (headers, body) def main(request, response): try:@@ -73,4 +138,4 @@ return _handle_final_request(request, response) except BaseException as e: # Surface exceptions to the client, where they show up as assertion errors.- return ([("X-exception", str(e))], "")#"exception: {}".format(e))+ return (500, [("X-exception", str(e))], "exception: {}".format(e))
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
**Missing Input Validation** [File: testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/private-network-access/resources/preflight.py] [Lines: file_name handling]
Old Code:
```python
file_name = request.GET.get(b"file")
if file_name is None:
return request.GET.get(b"body") or "success"
```
Fixed Code:
```python
file_name = request.GET.get(b"file")
if file_name is None:
return request.GET.get(b"body") or "success"
path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(isomorphic_encode(__file__)), file_name)
with open(path, 'rb') as f:
contents = f.read()
```
Additional Details: The new code adds file handling functionality which could be vulnerable to path traversal if the `file` parameter isn't properly validated.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
**Improper Error Handling** [File: testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/private-network-access/resources/preflight.py] [Lines: exception handling]
Old Code:
```python
except BaseException as e:
return ([("X-exception", str(e))], "")
```
Fixed Code:
```python
except BaseException as e:
return (500, [("X-exception", str(e))], "exception: {}".format(e))
```
Additional Details: The new code improves error handling by returning proper HTTP status codes (500) and more detailed error messages.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
**Potential UUID Collision** [File: testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/private-network-access/resources/preflight.py] [Lines: UUID handling]
Old Code:
```python
def _get_uuid(request):
return request.GET.get(b"preflight-uuid")
```
Fixed Code:
```python
def _get_preflight_uuid(request):
return request.GET.get(b"preflight-uuid")
def _should_treat_as_public_once(request):
uuid = request.GET.get(b"treat-as-public-once")
if uuid is None:
return False
result = request.server.stash.take(uuid) is None
request.server.stash.put(uuid, "")
return result
```
Additional Details: The new code adds more sophisticated UUID handling with separate functions for different UUID types, but it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/generate-gn-build-files.sh+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/generate-gn-build-files.sh@@ -8,33 +8,15 @@ set -x fi-if [ "x$MOZ_LIBWEBRTC" = "x" ]; then- echo "MOZ_LIBWEBRTC is not defined, see README.md"+if [ "x$GN" = "x" ]; then+ echo "GN is not defined, see README.md" exit fi-if [ -d $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC ]; then- echo "MOZ_LIBWEBRTC is $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC"+if [ -f $GN ]; then+ echo "GN is $GN" else- echo "Path $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC is not found, see README.md"- exit-fi--# git clone and gclient checkout may be in different places -if [ "x$MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT" = "x" ]; then- MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT=$MOZ_LIBWEBRTC-fi--if [ ! -d $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT/.git ]; then- echo "No .git directory is found in the libwebrtc checkout, see README.md"- exit-fi--if [ ! -d $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC/src/buildtools ]; then- echo "Path $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC/src/buildtools is not found, see README.md"- echo "Please run the following commands from inside $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC:"- echo "\tgclient config https://github.com/mozilla/libwebrtc"- echo "\tgclient sync -D --force --reset --with_branch_heads # this make take a while"+ echo "Path $GN is not found, see README.md" exit fi@@ -88,6 +70,7 @@ IS_DARWIN=1 elif [ "x$SYS_NAME" = "xMINGW32_NT-6.2" ]; then export DEPOT_TOOLS_WIN_TOOLCHAIN=0+ unset ANSICON CONFIGS="x64_True_arm64_win x64_False_arm64_win" CONFIGS="$CONFIGS x64_True_x64_win x64_False_x64_win" CONFIGS="$CONFIGS x64_True_x86_win x64_False_x86_win"@@ -114,21 +97,6 @@ # auto-update. export PATH=$DEPOT_TOOLS:$PATH export DEPOT_TOOLS_UPDATE=0--# Symlink in the buildtools and .git directories from our copy of libwebrtc.-if [ -L ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools ]; then- rm ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools-elif [ -d ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools ]; then- rm -rf ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools-fi-ln -s $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC/src/buildtools ./third_party/libwebrtc/--if [ -L ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git ]; then- rm ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git-elif [ -d ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git ]; then- rm -rf ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git-fi-ln -s $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT/.git ./third_party/libwebrtc/ CONFIG_DIR=dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs echo "CONFIG_DIR is $CONFIG_DIR"
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Environment Variable Manipulation] [dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/generate-gn-build-files.sh] [Lines 8-33]
[Old Code]
if [ "x$MOZ_LIBWEBRTC" = "x" ]; then
echo "MOZ_LIBWEBRTC is not defined, see README.md"
exit
fi
if [ -d $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC ]; then
echo "MOZ_LIBWEBRTC is $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC"
else
echo "Path $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC is not found, see README.md"
exit
fi
# git clone and gclient checkout may be in different places
if [ "x$MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT" = "x" ]; then
MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT=$MOZ_LIBWEBRTC
fi
if [ ! -d $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT/.git ]; then
echo "No .git directory is found in the libwebrtc checkout, see README.md"
exit
fi
if [ ! -d $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC/src/buildtools ]; then
echo "Path $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC/src/buildtools is not found, see README.md"
echo "Please run the following commands from inside $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC:"
echo "\tgclient config https://github.com/mozilla/libwebrtc"
echo "\tgclient sync -D --force --reset --with_branch_heads # this make take a while"
exit
fi
[Fixed Code]
if [ "x$GN" = "x" ]; then
echo "GN is not defined, see README.md"
exit
fi
if [ -f $GN ]; then
echo "GN is $GN"
else
echo "Path $GN is not found, see README.md"
exit
fi
Additional Details: The change removes multiple environment variable checks and symlink creation, potentially reducing attack surface by removing complex directory validation and symlink operations.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Windows ANSICON Environment Variable Leak] [dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/generate-gn-build-files.sh] [Lines 70]
[Old Code]
export DEPOT_TOOLS_WIN_TOOLCHAIN=0
CONFIGS="x64_True_arm64_win x64_False_arm64_win"
[Fixed Code]
export DEPOT_TOOLS_WIN_TOOLCHAIN=0
unset ANSICON
CONFIGS="x64_True_arm64_win x64_False_arm64_win"
Additional Details: The fix explicitly unsets the ANSICON environment variable which could potentially leak information or affect terminal behavior on Windows systems.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed Symlink Creation] [dom/media/webrtc/third_party_build/gn-configs/generate-gn-build-files.sh] [Lines 114-126]
[Old Code]
# Symlink in the buildtools and .git directories from our copy of libwebrtc.
if [ -L ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools ]; then
rm ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools
elif [ -d ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools ]; then
rm -rf ./third_party/libwebrtc/buildtools
fi
ln -s $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC/src/buildtools ./third_party/libwebrtc/
if [ -L ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git ]; then
rm ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git
elif [ -d ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git ]; then
rm -rf ./third_party/libwebrtc/.git
fi
ln -s $MOZ_LIBWEBRTC_GIT/.git ./third_party/libwebrtc/
[Fixed Code]
[Removed entirely]
Additional Details: The removal of symlink creation operations could be a security improvement by eliminating potential symlink attacks, but without more context it's unclear if this was the motivation.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/cc/cubic.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/cc/cubic.rs@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ k: f64, w_max: f64, ca_epoch_start: Option<Instant>,- last_phase_was_tcp: bool, tcp_acked_bytes: f64, }@@ -64,7 +63,6 @@ k: 0.0, w_max: 0.0, ca_epoch_start: None,- last_phase_was_tcp: false, tcp_acked_bytes: 0.0, } }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[No specific vulnerability name identified] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/cc/cubic.rs] [Lines 52-63]
[Old Code]
struct State {
k: f64,
w_max: f64,
ca_epoch_start: Option<Instant>,
last_phase_was_tcp: bool,
tcp_acked_bytes: f64,
}
impl Default for State {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
k: 0.0,
w_max: 0.0,
ca_epoch_start: None,
last_phase_was_tcp: false,
tcp_acked_bytes: 0.0,
}
}
}
[Fixed Code]
struct State {
k: f64,
w_max: f64,
ca_epoch_start: Option<Instant>,
tcp_acked_bytes: f64,
}
impl Default for State {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
k: 0.0,
w_max: 0.0,
ca_epoch_start: None,
tcp_acked_bytes: 0.0,
}
}
}
Additional details:
- The diff shows removal of the `last_phase_was_tcp` boolean field from the `State` struct and its initialization in the `Default` implementation.
- This appears to be a code cleanup or refactoring rather than a security fix, as there's no clear vulnerability being addressed.
- Without more context about how this field was used, it's difficult to determine if this could have had security implications.
- The change might be related to improving the congestion control algorithm's behavior, but doesn't appear to directly fix a security vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/streams/ReadableStream.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/streams/ReadableStream.cpp@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ #include "mozilla/CycleCollectedJSContext.h" #include "mozilla/FloatingPoint.h" #include "mozilla/HoldDropJSObjects.h"+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h" #include "mozilla/dom/BindingCallContext.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ByteStreamHelpers.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/BodyStream.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ModuleMapKey.h" #include "mozilla/dom/QueueWithSizes.h" #include "mozilla/dom/QueuingStrategyBinding.h"@@ -69,13 +71,13 @@ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(ReadableStream) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN(ReadableStream) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mGlobal, mController, mReader,- mErrorAlgorithm)+ mErrorAlgorithm, mNativeUnderlyingSource) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_PRESERVED_WRAPPER tmp->mStoredError.setNull(); NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN(ReadableStream) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mGlobal, mController, mReader,- mErrorAlgorithm)+ mErrorAlgorithm, mNativeUnderlyingSource) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_BEGIN(ReadableStream)@@ -143,6 +145,25 @@ // Step 3. If reader implements ReadableStreamDefaultReader, return true. // Step 4. Return false. return reader->IsDefault();+}++void ReadableStream::SetNativeUnderlyingSource(+ BodyStreamHolder* aUnderlyingSource) {+ mNativeUnderlyingSource = aUnderlyingSource;+}++void ReadableStream::ReleaseObjects() {+ SetNativeUnderlyingSource(nullptr);++ SetErrorAlgorithm(nullptr);++ if (mController->IsByte()) {+ ReadableByteStreamControllerClearAlgorithms(mController->AsByte());+ return;+ }++ MOZ_ASSERT(mController->IsDefault());+ ReadableStreamDefaultControllerClearAlgorithms(mController->AsDefault()); } // Streams Spec: 4.2.4: https://streams.spec.whatwg.org/#rs-prototype@@ -191,10 +212,19 @@ } // Step 4.3- (void)highWaterMark;- aRv.ThrowNotSupportedError("BYOB Byte Streams Not Yet Supported");-- return nullptr;+ if (!StaticPrefs::dom_streams_byte_streams_enabled()) {+ aRv.ThrowNotSupportedError("BYOB byte streams not yet supported.");+ return nullptr;+ }++ SetUpReadableByteStreamControllerFromUnderlyingSource(+ aGlobal.Context(), readableStream, underlyingSourceObj,+ underlyingSourceDict, highWaterMark, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ return nullptr;+ }++ return readableStream.forget(); } // Step 5.1 (implicit in above check)@@ -304,18 +334,28 @@ // Step 6. if (reader->IsDefault()) {- // Step 6.1- ReadableStreamDefaultReader* defaultReader = reader->AsDefault();- for (ReadRequest* readRequest : defaultReader->ReadRequests()) {- // Step 6.1.1.+ // Step 6.1. Let readRequests be reader.[[readRequests]].+ // Move LinkedList out of DefaultReader onto stack to avoid the potential+ // for concurrent modification, which could invalidate the iterator.+ //+ // See https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1045874 as an+ // example of the kind of issue that could occur.+ LinkedList<RefPtr<ReadRequest>> readRequests =+ std::move(reader->AsDefault()->ReadRequests());++ // Step 6.2. Set reader.[[readRequests]] to an empty list.+ // Note: The std::move already cleared this anyway.+ reader->AsDefault()->ReadRequests().clear();++ // Step 6.3. For each readRequest of readRequests,+ // Drain the local list and destroy elements along the way.+ while (RefPtr<ReadRequest> readRequest = readRequests.popFirst()) {+ // Step 6.3.1. Perform readRequest’s close steps. readRequest->CloseSteps(aCx, aRv); if (aRv.Failed()) { return; } }-- // Step 6.2- defaultReader->ReadRequests().clear(); } }@@ -360,17 +400,23 @@ // Step 6. if (reader && reader->IsBYOB()) {- // Step 6.1.- for (RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest> readIntoRequest :- reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests()) {+ // Step 6.1. Let readIntoRequests be reader.[[readIntoRequests]].+ LinkedList<RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest>> readIntoRequests =+ std::move(reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests());++ // Step 6.2. Set reader.[[readIntoRequests]] to an empty list.+ // Note: The std::move already cleared this anyway.+ reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests().clear();++ // Step 6.3. For each readIntoRequest of readIntoRequests,+ while (RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest> readIntoRequest =+ readIntoRequests.popFirst()) {+ // Step 6.3.1.Perform readIntoRequest’s close steps, given undefined. readIntoRequest->CloseSteps(aCx, JS::UndefinedHandleValue, aRv); if (aRv.Failed()) { return nullptr; } }-- // Step 6.2.- reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests().clear(); } // Step 7.@@ -445,7 +491,8 @@ const ReadableStreamGetReaderOptions& aOptions, OwningReadableStreamReader& resultReader, ErrorResult& aRv) {- // Step 1.+ // Step 1. If options["mode"] does not exist,+ // return ? AcquireReadableStreamDefaultReader(this). if (!aOptions.mMode.WasPassed()) { RefPtr<ReadableStream> thisRefPtr = this; RefPtr<ReadableStreamDefaultReader> defaultReader =@@ -456,8 +503,23 @@ resultReader.SetAsReadableStreamDefaultReader() = defaultReader; return; }- // Step 2.- aRv.ThrowTypeError("BYOB STREAMS NOT IMPLEMENTED");++ // Step 2. Assert: options["mode"] is "byob".+ MOZ_ASSERT(aOptions.mMode.Value() == ReadableStreamReaderMode::Byob);++ // Step 3. Return ? AcquireReadableStreamBYOBReader(this).+ if (!StaticPrefs::dom_streams_byte_streams_enabled()) {+ aRv.ThrowTypeError("BYOB byte streams reader not yet supported.");+ return;+ }++ RefPtr<ReadableStream> thisRefPtr = this;+ RefPtr<ReadableStreamBYOBReader> byobReader =+ AcquireReadableStreamBYOBReader(aCx, thisRefPtr, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ return;+ }+ resultReader.SetAsReadableStreamBYOBReader() = byobReader; } // https://streams.spec.whatwg.org/#is-readable-stream-locked@@ -503,30 +565,26 @@ // Step 8. if (reader->IsDefault()) {- // Step 8.1:- ReadableStreamDefaultReader* defaultReader = reader->AsDefault();- for (ReadRequest* readRequest : defaultReader->ReadRequests()) {- readRequest->ErrorSteps(aCx, aValue, aRv);- if (aRv.Failed()) {- return;- }- }- // Step 8.2- defaultReader->ReadRequests().clear();+ // Step 8.1. Perform ! ReadableStreamDefaultReaderErrorReadRequests(reader,+ // e).+ RefPtr<ReadableStreamDefaultReader> defaultReader = reader->AsDefault();+ ReadableStreamDefaultReaderErrorReadRequests(aCx, defaultReader, aValue,+ aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ return;+ } } else {- // Step 9.- // Step 9.1.+ // Step 9. Otherwise,+ // Step 9.1. Assert: reader implements ReadableStreamBYOBReader. MOZ_ASSERT(reader->IsBYOB());- ReadableStreamBYOBReader* byobReader = reader->AsBYOB();- // Step 9.2.- for (auto* readIntoRequest : byobReader->ReadIntoRequests()) {- readIntoRequest->ErrorSteps(aCx, aValue, aRv);- if (aRv.Failed()) {- return;- }- }- // Step 9.3- byobReader->ReadIntoRequests().clear();++ // Step 9.2. Perform ! ReadableStreamBYOBReaderErrorReadIntoRequests(reader,+ // e).+ RefPtr<ReadableStreamBYOBReader> byobReader = reader->AsBYOB();+ ReadableStreamBYOBReaderErrorReadIntoRequests(aCx, byobReader, aValue, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ return;+ } } // Not in Specification: Allow notifying native underlying sources that a@@ -692,24 +750,21 @@ explicit ReadableStreamTeeClosePromiseHandler(TeeState* aTeeState) : mTeeState(aTeeState) {}- void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {- }- void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,- JS::Handle<JS::Value> aReason) override {+ void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override {}+ void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aReason,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override { // Step 19.1.- ErrorResult rv; ReadableStreamDefaultControllerError(- aCx, mTeeState->Branch1()->DefaultController(), aReason, rv);- if (rv.MaybeSetPendingException(- aCx, "ReadableStreamDefaultTee Error During Promise Rejection")) {+ aCx, mTeeState->Branch1()->DefaultController(), aReason, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) { return; } // Step 19.2 ReadableStreamDefaultControllerError(- aCx, mTeeState->Branch2()->DefaultController(), aReason, rv);- if (rv.MaybeSetPendingException(- aCx, "ReadableStreamDefaultTee Error During Promise Rejection")) {+ aCx, mTeeState->Branch2()->DefaultController(), aReason, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) { return; }@@ -847,8 +902,26 @@ // Step 4. Perform ? SetUpReadableByteStreamController(stream, controller, // startAlgorithm, pullAlgorithm, cancelAlgorithm, 0, undefined). SetUpReadableByteStreamController(aCx, stream, controller, aStartAlgorithm,- aPullAlgorithm, aCancelAlgorithm, 0,- mozilla::Nothing(), aRv);+ aPullAlgorithm, aCancelAlgorithm, nullptr,+ 0, mozilla::Nothing(), aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) {+ return nullptr;+ }++ // Return stream.+ return stream.forget();+}++already_AddRefed<ReadableStream> ReadableStream::Create(+ JSContext* aCx, nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal,+ BodyStreamHolder* aUnderlyingSource, ErrorResult& aRv) {+ RefPtr<ReadableStream> stream = new ReadableStream(aGlobal);++ stream->SetNativeUnderlyingSource(aUnderlyingSource);++ SetUpReadableByteStreamControllerFromBodyStreamUnderlyingSource(+ aCx, stream, aUnderlyingSource, aRv);+ if (aRv.Failed()) { return nullptr; }
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition in Read Requests Handling [dom/streams/ReadableStream.cpp] [Lines 304-334]
Old Code:
for (ReadRequest* readRequest : defaultReader->ReadRequests()) {
readRequest->CloseSteps(aCx, aRv);
if (aRv.Failed()) {
return;
}
}
defaultReader->ReadRequests().clear();
Fixed Code:
LinkedList<RefPtr<ReadRequest>> readRequests =
std::move(reader->AsDefault()->ReadRequests());
reader->AsDefault()->ReadRequests().clear();
while (RefPtr<ReadRequest> readRequest = readRequests.popFirst()) {
readRequest->CloseSteps(aCx, aRv);
if (aRv.Failed()) {
return;
}
}
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Race Condition in ReadInto Requests Handling [dom/streams/ReadableStream.cpp] [Lines 360-378]
Old Code:
for (RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest> readIntoRequest :
reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests()) {
readIntoRequest->CloseSteps(aCx, JS::UndefinedHandleValue, aRv);
if (aRv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
}
reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests().clear();
Fixed Code:
LinkedList<RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest>> readIntoRequests =
std::move(reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests());
reader->AsBYOB()->ReadIntoRequests().clear();
while (RefPtr<ReadIntoRequest> readIntoRequest =
readIntoRequests.popFirst()) {
readIntoRequest->CloseSteps(aCx, JS::UndefinedHandleValue, aRv);
if (aRv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
}
3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Management Issue [dom/streams/ReadableStream.cpp] [Lines 69-71, 143-163]
Old Code:
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mGlobal, mController, mReader,
mErrorAlgorithm)
Fixed Code:
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mGlobal, mController, mReader,
mErrorAlgorithm, mNativeUnderlyingSource)
New Code:
void ReadableStream::ReleaseObjects() {
SetNativeUnderlyingSource(nullptr);
SetErrorAlgorithm(nullptr);
if (mController->IsByte()) {
ReadableByteStreamControllerClearAlgorithms(mController->AsByte());
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(mController->IsDefault());
ReadableStreamDefaultControllerClearAlgorithms(mController->AsDefault());
}
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
BYOB Streams Implementation [dom/streams/ReadableStream.cpp] [Lines 191-212]
Old Code:
(void)highWaterMark;
aRv.ThrowNotSupportedError("BYOB Byte Streams Not Yet Supported");
return nullptr;
Fixed Code:
if (!StaticPrefs::dom_streams_byte_streams_enabled()) {
aRv.ThrowNotSupportedError("BYOB byte streams not yet supported.");
return nullptr;
}
SetUpReadableByteStreamControllerFromUnderlyingSource(
aGlobal.Context(), readableStream, underlyingSourceObj,
underlyingSourceDict, highWaterMark, aRv);
if (aRv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
return readableStream.forget();
The first three vulnerabilities address race conditions and memory management issues that could lead to use-after-free or other memory safety problems. The fourth change introduces BYOB streams support behind a preference flag, but it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just adding functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.created.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.created.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata = ctx.createImageData(100, 50); for (var i = 0; i < imgdata.data.length; i += 4) {@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50) ctx.putImageData(imgdata, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity.
Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.created.html] [Lines 17-30]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
The changes are purely variable renaming with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just using a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/taskcluster.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/taskcluster.py@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ is not set.""" if use_proxy: try:- return os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_PROXY_URL"]+ return liburls.normalize_root_url(os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_PROXY_URL"]) except KeyError: if "TASK_ID" not in os.environ: raise RuntimeError(@@ -55,14 +55,14 @@ ) else: logger.debug("Using default TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL (Firefox CI production)")- return PRODUCTION_TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL+ return liburls.normalize_root_url(PRODUCTION_TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL) logger.debug( "Running in Taskcluster instance {}{}".format( os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL"], " with taskcluster-proxy" if "TASKCLUSTER_PROXY_URL" in os.environ else "", ) )- return os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL"]+ return liburls.normalize_root_url(os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL"]) def requests_retry_session(
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
URL Normalization Vulnerability [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/util/taskcluster.py] [Lines 39, 55, end]
Old Code:
- return os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_PROXY_URL"]
- return PRODUCTION_TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL
- return os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL"]
Fixed Code:
+ return liburls.normalize_root_url(os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_PROXY_URL"])
+ return liburls.normalize_root_url(PRODUCTION_TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL)
+ return liburls.normalize_root_url(os.environ["TASKCLUSTER_ROOT_URL"])
Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to URL normalization. The fix adds liburls.normalize_root_url() calls to all URL returns, which helps prevent potential security issues like:
- URL smuggling attacks
- Inconsistent URL parsing
- Potential SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) via malformed URLs
- Path traversal via URL manipulation
The changes ensure that all Taskcluster URLs are properly normalized before use, which is a security best practice for handling URLs from environment variables or configuration.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/rules/types.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/rules/types.js@@ -160,14 +160,6 @@ // An object containing information about the CSS rule's selector. selector: PropTypes.shape(selector),- // An object containing information about the CSS rule's stylesheet source.- sourceLink: PropTypes.shape({- // The label used for the stylesheet source- label: PropTypes.string,- // The title used for the stylesheet source.- title: PropTypes.string,- }),- // The CSS rule type. type: PropTypes.number, };
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure] [devtools/client/inspector/rules/types.js] [Lines 160-166]
[Old Code]
```
// An object containing information about the CSS rule's stylesheet source.
sourceLink: PropTypes.shape({
// The label used for the stylesheet source
label: PropTypes.string,
// The title used for the stylesheet source.
title: PropTypes.string,
}),
```
[Fixed Code]
(Removed entirely)
Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of a `sourceLink` propType definition that contained potentially sensitive information (stylesheet source details)
- While this could be a security hardening measure to prevent potential information exposure, we cannot be certain without more context about how this data was used
- The removal might be related to security concerns about exposing internal file paths or source information, but could also be part of a refactoring
- No specific CVE or vulnerability name is associated with this change in the diff
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.newsubpath.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.newsubpath.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(-50, 25); ctx.rect(200, 25, 1, 1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.rect.newsubpath.html] [Lines 17-29]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable name changes from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file. There are no security-related fixes or vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The modification seems to be for consistency or readability purposes rather than security.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/shared/specs/targets/window-global.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/shared/specs/targets/window-global.js@@ -10,14 +10,6 @@ Option, Arg, } = require("devtools/shared/protocol");--// @backward-compat { version 96 } Fx 96 dropped the attach method on all but worker targets-// This can be removed once we drop 95 support-types.addDictType("windowGlobalTarget.attach", {- threadActor: "number",- javascriptEnabled: "nullable:boolean",- traits: "json",-}); types.addDictType("windowGlobalTarget.switchtoframe", { message: "string",@@ -59,12 +51,6 @@ typeName: "windowGlobalTarget", methods: {- // @backward-compat { version 96 } Fx 96 dropped the attach method on all but worker targets- // This can be removed once we drop 95 support- attach: {- request: {},- response: RetVal("windowGlobalTarget.attach"),- }, detach: { request: {}, response: {},@@ -138,7 +124,6 @@ type: "tabNavigated", url: Option(0, "string"), title: Option(0, "string"),- nativeConsoleAPI: Option(0, "boolean"), state: Option(0, "string"), isFrameSwitching: Option(0, "boolean"), },
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed Backward Compatibility Code] [devtools/shared/specs/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 10-14, 59-62]
[Old Code]
types.addDictType("windowGlobalTarget.attach", {
threadActor: "number",
javascriptEnabled: "nullable:boolean",
traits: "json",
});
...
attach: {
request: {},
response: RetVal("windowGlobalTarget.attach"),
}
[Fixed Code]
(removed entirely)
Additional Details: This appears to be removal of backward compatibility code for Firefox 95 support. While not clearly a security vulnerability, removing deprecated code can improve security by reducing attack surface.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed Native Console API Option] [devtools/shared/specs/targets/window-global.js] [Lines 138]
[Old Code]
nativeConsoleAPI: Option(0, "boolean"),
[Fixed Code]
(removed entirely)
Additional Details: The removal of the nativeConsoleAPI option might relate to security hardening, but without more context about its purpose, I can't determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.
Note: The changes appear to be cleanup/refactoring rather than direct security fixes. The most significant change is the removal of the deprecated 'attach' method and its associated type definition, which could potentially reduce attack surface but doesn't appear to address a specific known vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/no_atomic.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/no_atomic.rs@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ const NO_ATOMIC_CAS: &[&str] = &[ "avr-unknown-gnu-atmega328",+ "bpfeb-unknown-none",+ "bpfel-unknown-none", "msp430-none-elf", "riscv32i-unknown-none-elf", "riscv32imc-unknown-none-elf",@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ "armv7r-none-eabi", "armv7r-none-eabihf", "hexagon-unknown-linux-musl",+ "m68k-unknown-linux-gnu", "mips-unknown-linux-gnu", "mips-unknown-linux-musl", "mips-unknown-linux-uclibc",@@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ "mipsel-unknown-none", "mipsisa32r6-unknown-linux-gnu", "mipsisa32r6el-unknown-linux-gnu",+ "powerpc-unknown-freebsd", "powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu", "powerpc-unknown-linux-gnuspe", "powerpc-unknown-linux-musl",@@ -40,12 +44,14 @@ "riscv32gc-unknown-linux-gnu", "riscv32gc-unknown-linux-musl", "riscv32imac-unknown-none-elf",+ "riscv32imc-esp-espidf", "thumbv7em-none-eabi", "thumbv7em-none-eabihf", "thumbv7m-none-eabi", "thumbv8m.base-none-eabi", "thumbv8m.main-none-eabi", "thumbv8m.main-none-eabihf",+ "armv6k-nintendo-3ds", "mipsel-sony-psp", "thumbv4t-none-eabi", "thumbv6m-none-eabi",
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't identify any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be additions to the list of architectures that don't support atomic compare-and-swap operations (NO_ATOMIC_CAS) and atomic 64-bit operations (NO_ATOMIC_64). Here's the structured response: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found File: third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/no_atomic.rs Lines: Various Old Code: Various architecture strings missing from lists Fixed Code: Added missing architecture strings to lists The changes are purely maintenance updates to ensure proper platform support detection rather than security fixes. The modifications simply add more target architectures to the lists of platforms that don't support certain atomic operations, which is a normal part of maintaining cross-platform compatibility in Rust code. No CVE or specific vulnerability names are associated with these changes as they don't represent security fixes but rather support updates for additional architectures.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPParent.cpp@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "mozIGeckoMediaPluginService.h" #include "mozilla/dom/KeySystemNames.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WidevineCDMManifestBinding.h"+#include "mozilla/FOGIPC.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/CrashReporterHost.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/Endpoint.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/GeckoChildProcessHost.h"@@ -381,6 +382,12 @@ return IPC_OK(); }+mozilla::ipc::IPCResult GMPParent::RecvFOGData(ByteBuf&& aBuf) {+ GMP_PARENT_LOG_DEBUG("GMPParent RecvFOGData");+ glean::FOGData(std::move(aBuf));+ return IPC_OK();+}+ void GMPParent::CloseIfUnused() { MOZ_ASSERT(GMPEventTarget()->IsOnCurrentThread()); GMP_PARENT_LOG_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);@@ -694,8 +701,11 @@ mozilla::ipc::IPCResult GMPParent::RecvPGMPStorageConstructor( PGMPStorageParent* aActor) { GMPStorageParent* p = (GMPStorageParent*)aActor;- if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(p->Init()))) {- return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+ if (NS_FAILED(p->Init())) {+ // TODO: Verify if this is really a good reason to IPC_FAIL.+ // There might be shutdown edge cases here.+ return IPC_FAIL(this,+ "GMPParent::RecvPGMPStorageConstructor: p->Init() failed."); } return IPC_OK(); }@@ -897,7 +907,7 @@ #if XP_WIN // psapi.dll added for GetMappedFileNameW, which could possibly be avoided // in future versions, see bug 1383611 for details.- mLibs = "dxva2.dll, ole32.dll, psapi.dll"_ns;+ mLibs = "dxva2.dll, ole32.dll, psapi.dll, winmm.dll"_ns; #endif } else if (mDisplayName.EqualsASCII("fake")) { // The fake CDM just exposes a key system with id "fake".
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Error Handling Improvement] [dom/media/gmp/GMPParent.cpp] [Lines 694-701]
[Old Code]
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(p->Init()))) {
return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
[Fixed Code]
if (NS_FAILED(p->Init())) {
// TODO: Verify if this is really a good reason to IPC_FAIL.
// There might be shutdown edge cases here.
return IPC_FAIL(this,
"GMPParent::RecvPGMPStorageConstructor: p->Init() failed.");
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential DLL Hijacking] [dom/media/gmp/GMPParent.cpp] [Lines 897-907]
[Old Code]
mLibs = "dxva2.dll, ole32.dll, psapi.dll"_ns;
[Fixed Code]
mLibs = "dxva2.dll, ole32.dll, psapi.dll, winmm.dll"_ns;
Additional notes:
1. The first change improves error handling by adding more descriptive failure messages, but it's unclear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability or just improves debugging.
2. The second change adds winmm.dll to the list of loaded libraries on Windows. While DLL loading changes could potentially relate to security (like DLL hijacking), there's no clear evidence this was fixing a vulnerability - it might just be adding required functionality.
3. The new RecvFOGData function appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix, as it handles telemetry data collection.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.