--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_defaults_handlerService.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_defaults_handlerService.js@@ -9,31 +9,15 @@   "@mozilla.org/uriloader/external-protocol-service;1",   "nsIExternalProtocolService" );--const kDefaultHandlerList = Services.prefs-  .getChildList("gecko.handlerService.schemes")-  .filter(p => {-    try {-      let val = Services.prefs.getComplexValue(p, Ci.nsIPrefLocalizedString)-        .data;-      return !!val;-    } catch (ex) {-      return false;-    }-  });+XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetters(this, {+  kHandlerList: "resource://gre/modules/handlers/HandlerList.jsm",+}); add_task(async function test_check_defaults_get_added() {-  let protocols = new Set(-    kDefaultHandlerList.map(p => p.match(/schemes\.(\w+)/)[1])-  );+  let protocols = Object.keys(kHandlerList.default.schemes);   for (let protocol of protocols) {-    const kPrefStr = `schemes.${protocol}.`;-    let matchingPrefs = kDefaultHandlerList.filter(p => p.includes(kPrefStr));-    let protocolHandlerCount = matchingPrefs.length / 2;-    Assert.ok(-      protocolHandlerCount,-      `Prefs for ${protocol} have at least 1 protocol handler`-    );+    let protocolHandlerCount =+      kHandlerList.default.schemes[protocol].handlers.length;     Assert.ok(       gHandlerService.wrappedJSObject._store.data.schemes[protocol].stubEntry,       `Expect stub for ${protocol}`@@ -80,9 +64,6 @@ }); add_task(async function test_check_default_modification() {-  let mailtoHandlerCount =-    kDefaultHandlerList.filter(p => p.includes("mailto")).length / 2;-  Assert.ok(mailtoHandlerCount, "Prefs have at least 1 mailto handler");   Assert.ok(     true,     JSON.stringify(gHandlerService.wrappedJSObject._store.data.schemes.mailto)@@ -102,64 +83,6 @@   let newMail = gExternalProtocolService.getProtocolHandlerInfo("mailto", {});   Assert.equal(newMail.preferredAction, Ci.nsIHandlerInfo.useSystemDefault);   Assert.equal(newMail.alwaysAskBeforeHandling, false);-  await deleteHandlerStore();-});--/**- * Check that we don't add bogus handlers.- */-add_task(async function test_check_restrictions() {-  const kTestData = {-    testdeleteme: [-      ["Delete me", ""],-      ["Delete me insecure", "http://example.com/%s"],-      ["Delete me no substitution", "https://example.com/"],-      ["Keep me", "https://example.com/%s"],-    ],-    testreallydeleteme: [-      // used to check we remove the entire entry.-      ["Delete me", "http://example.com/%s"],-    ],-  };-  for (let [scheme, handlers] of Object.entries(kTestData)) {-    let count = 1;-    for (let [name, uriTemplate] of handlers) {-      let pref = `gecko.handlerService.schemes.${scheme}.${count}.`;-      let obj = Cc["@mozilla.org/pref-localizedstring;1"].createInstance(-        Ci.nsIPrefLocalizedString-      );-      obj.data = name;-      Services.prefs.setComplexValue(-        pref + "name",-        Ci.nsIPrefLocalizedString,-        obj-      );-      obj.data = uriTemplate;-      Services.prefs.setComplexValue(-        pref + "uriTemplate",-        Ci.nsIPrefLocalizedString,-        obj-      );-      count++;-    }-  }--  gHandlerService.wrappedJSObject._injectDefaultProtocolHandlers();-  let schemeData = gHandlerService.wrappedJSObject._store.data.schemes;--  Assert.ok(schemeData.testdeleteme, "Expect an entry for testdeleteme");-  Assert.ok(-    schemeData.testdeleteme.stubEntry,-    "Expect a stub entry for testdeleteme"-  );--  Assert.deepEqual(-    schemeData.testdeleteme.handlers,-    [null, { name: "Keep me", uriTemplate: "https://example.com/%s" }],-    "Expect only one handler is kept."-  );--  Assert.ok(!schemeData.testreallydeleteme, "No entry for reallydeleteme");   await deleteHandlerStore(); });

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure URI Template Validation [uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_defaults_handlerService.js] [Lines removed from test_check_restrictions task]
[Old Code]
The test included validation for insecure URI templates (http://) and missing %s substitution patterns, with test cases like:
["Delete me insecure", "http://example.com/%s"],
["Delete me no substitution", "https://example.com/"],
[Fixed Code]
The entire test case and validation logic was removed, replaced by using kHandlerList.default.schemes from HandlerList.jsm

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Preference Injection [uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_defaults_handlerService.js] [Lines removed from test_check_restrictions task]
[Old Code]
The test manually created and set preferences using:
Services.prefs.setComplexValue(
  pref + "name",
  Ci.nsIPrefLocalizedString,
  obj
);
[Fixed Code]
This preference manipulation code was completely removed

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Protocol Handler Validation [uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/test_defaults_handlerService.js] [Lines throughout]
[Old Code]
Custom validation logic for protocol handlers was implemented in the test
[Fixed Code]
Replaced with standardized kHandlerList from HandlerList.jsm

The most clear security fix was the removal of insecure URI template validation (first entry). The other changes might represent security improvements by centralizing handler validation, but I'm less certain about those.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/html/nsGenericHTMLElement.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/html/nsGenericHTMLElement.h@@ -169,9 +169,14 @@   }   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT-  void GetInnerText(mozilla::dom::DOMString& aValue,-                    mozilla::ErrorResult& aError);-  void SetInnerText(const nsAString& aValue);+  void GetInnerText(mozilla::dom::DOMString& aValue, ErrorResult& aError);+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT+  void GetOuterText(mozilla::dom::DOMString& aValue, ErrorResult& aError) {+    return GetInnerText(aValue, aError);+  }+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void SetInnerText(const nsAString& aValue);+  MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void SetOuterText(const nsAString& aValue,+                                       ErrorResult& aRv);   void GetInputMode(nsAString& aValue) {     GetEnumAttr(nsGkAtoms::inputmode, nullptr, aValue);

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be functional additions rather than security patches. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] nsGenericHTMLElement.h [Lines] 169-178
   [Old Code]
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT
   void GetInnerText(mozilla::dom::DOMString& aValue,
                   mozilla::ErrorResult& aError);
   void SetInnerText(const nsAString& aValue);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT
   void GetInnerText(mozilla::dom::DOMString& aValue, ErrorResult& aError);
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT
   void GetOuterText(mozilla::dom::DOMString& aValue, ErrorResult& aError) {
     return GetInnerText(aValue, aError);
   }
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void SetInnerText(const nsAString& aValue);
   MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void SetOuterText(const nsAString& aValue,
                                      ErrorResult& aRv);

The changes include:
1. Adding MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT annotation to more methods
2. Adding new GetOuterText and SetOuterText methods
3. Minor syntax changes (removing mozilla:: namespace prefix from ErrorResult)

These appear to be functional enhancements rather than security fixes. No CVE or specific vulnerability is being addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.em.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.em.worker.js@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas.width = '100em'; });+assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { canvas.width = '100em'; }); t.done(); });

Here's my analysis following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/size.attributes.parse.em.worker.js] [Lines 13-17]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { offscreenCanvas.width = '100em'; });
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { canvas.width = '100em'; });

Additional Details:
This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here - it's just a code style/consistency improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. The test still verifies that setting width with 'em' units throws a TypeError as expected.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-hsl-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(120 100.0% 50.0%)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 21]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable name changes (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no functional impact
- No security-related patterns or vulnerable functions were modified
- The changes are likely for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes
- The canvas operations and assertions remain the same in functionality
- No input validation or output encoding changes were made that could affect security

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.valid.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.valid.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.lineCap = 'butt' _assertSame(ctx.lineCap, 'butt', "ctx.lineCap", "'butt'");

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications.

Answer for Each Vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.valid.html
    [Lines 17-18]
    Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change is simply a variable name refactoring and doesn't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. There are no security-related patterns or fixes in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.lighter.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.lighter.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where the variable name `offscreenCanvas` was renamed to `canvas`. The functionality remains the same.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. This appears to be a simple variable renaming change.

Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
```

Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
```

The changes don't indicate any security fixes, just improved code readability through better variable naming. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either version of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/src/anonymizer.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/webrtc-sdp/src/anonymizer.rs@@ -194,122 +194,5 @@ } #[cfg(test)]-mod tests {-    use super::*;--    #[test]-    fn test_mask_ip() {-        let mut anon = StatefulSdpAnonymizer::default();-        let v4 = [-            Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1),-            Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 1),-            Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1),-        ];-        let v4_masked = [-            Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 1),-            Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 2),-            Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 3),-        ];-        let v6 = [-            Ipv6Addr::from(0),-            Ipv6Addr::from(528_189_235),-            Ipv6Addr::from(1_623_734_988_148_990),-        ];-        let v6_masked = [Ipv6Addr::from(1), Ipv6Addr::from(2), Ipv6Addr::from(3)];-        for _ in 0..2 {-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ip(&IpAddr::V4(v4[0])), v4_masked[0]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ip(&IpAddr::V6(v6[0])), v6_masked[0]);--            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ip(&IpAddr::V4(v4[1])), v4_masked[1]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ip(&IpAddr::V6(v6[1])), v6_masked[1]);--            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ip(&IpAddr::V4(v4[2])), v4_masked[2]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ip(&IpAddr::V6(v6[2])), v6_masked[2]);-        }-    }--    #[test]-    fn test_mask_port() {-        let mut anon = StatefulSdpAnonymizer::default();-        let ports = [0, 125, 12346];-        let masked_ports = [1, 2, 3];-        for _ in 0..2 {-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_port(ports[0]), masked_ports[0]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_port(ports[1]), masked_ports[1]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_port(ports[2]), masked_ports[2]);-        }-    }--    #[test]-    fn test_mask_ice_password() {-        let mut anon = StatefulSdpAnonymizer::default();-        let passwords = ["vasdfioqwenl14082`14", "0", "ncp	HY878hp(poh"];-        let masked_passwords = [-            "ice-password-00000001",-            "ice-password-00000002",-            "ice-password-00000003",-        ];-        for _ in 0..2 {-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ice_password(passwords[0]), masked_passwords[0]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ice_password(passwords[1]), masked_passwords[1]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ice_password(passwords[2]), masked_passwords[2]);-        }-    }--    #[test]-    fn test_mask_ice_user() {-        let mut anon = StatefulSdpAnonymizer::default();-        let users = ["user1", "user2", "8109q2asdf"];-        let masked_users = [-            "ice-user-00000001",-            "ice-user-00000002",-            "ice-user-00000003",-        ];-        for _ in 0..2 {-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ice_user(users[0]), masked_users[0]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ice_user(users[1]), masked_users[1]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_ice_user(users[2]), masked_users[2]);-        }-    }--    #[test]-    fn test_mask_cert_fingerprint() {-        let mut anon = StatefulSdpAnonymizer::default();-        let prints: [Vec<u8>; 3] = [-            vec![-                0x59u8, 0x4A, 0x8B, 0x73, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x53, 0x71, 0x88, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0x58, 0x28,-                0x0C, 0x79, 0x72, 0x31, 0x29, 0x9B, 0x05, 0x37, 0xDD, 0x58, 0x43, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x85,-                0xA2, 0xB3, 0x66, 0x38, 0x7A,-            ],-            vec![-                0x30u8, 0xFF, 0x8E, 0x2B, 0xAC, 0x9D, 0xED, 0x70, 0x18, 0x10, 0x67, 0xC8, 0xAE,-                0x9E, 0x68, 0xF3, 0x86, 0x53, 0x51, 0xB0, 0xAC, 0x31, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0xCF, 0xA4,-                0x2E, 0xD3, 0x6E, 0xB4, 0x28,-            ],-            vec![-                0xDFu8, 0x2E, 0xAC, 0x8A, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0x8E, 0x99, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xE7,-                0xFA, 0xFB, 0x08, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0x54, 0x1D, 0xD7, 0xD4, 0x05, 0x77, 0xA0, 0x72, 0x9B,-                0x14, 0x08, 0x6D, 0x0F, 0x4C,-            ],-        ];--        let masked_prints = [1u64.to_byte_vec(), 2u64.to_byte_vec(), 3u64.to_byte_vec()];-        for _ in 0..2 {-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_cert_finger_print(&prints[0]), masked_prints[0]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_cert_finger_print(&prints[1]), masked_prints[1]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_cert_finger_print(&prints[2]), masked_prints[2]);-        }-    }--    #[test]-    fn test_mask_cname() {-        let mut anon = StatefulSdpAnonymizer::default();-        let cnames = ["mailto:foo@bar", "JohnDoe", "Jane Doe"];-        let masked_cnames = ["cname-00000001", "cname-00000002", "cname-00000003"];-        for _ in 0..2 {-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_cname(cnames[0]), masked_cnames[0]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_cname(cnames[1]), masked_cnames[1]);-            assert_eq!(anon.mask_cname(cnames[2]), masked_cnames[2]);-        }-    }-}+#[path = "./anonymizer_tests.rs"]+mod tests;

From the provided diff, it appears that the entire test module was removed from the file and replaced with a reference to an external test file (`anonymizer_tests.rs`). This is a code organization change rather than a security fix. 

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code Organization Change [File] [Lines]
   Old Code: Entire test module (194-316)
   Fixed Code: #[path = "./anonymizer_tests.rs"] mod tests;

No actual security vulnerabilities were fixed in this change - it's purely a refactoring to move test code to a separate file. The test cases themselves (which test IP masking, port masking, password masking, etc.) appear to have been preserved, just moved to a different location.

There are no indications of:
- Information exposure vulnerabilities
- Weak anonymization
- Insecure test cases
- Any other security-related issues

The change appears to be solely for maintainability/readability purposes by separating test code from implementation code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/url-classifier/tests/mochitest/test_classifier.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/url-classifier/tests/mochitest/test_classifier.html@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@       let tables = "test-malware-simple,test-unwanted-simple,test-phish-simple,test-block-simple,test-harmful-simple";       let uri = SpecialPowers.Services.io.newURI(test.url);       let prin = SpecialPowers.Services.scriptSecurityManager.createContentPrincipal(uri, {});-      SpecialPowers.doUrlClassify(prin, null, function(errorCode) {+      SpecialPowers.doUrlClassify(prin, function(errorCode) {         is(errorCode, test.result,            `Successful asynchronous classification of ${test.url}`);         SpecialPowers.doUrlClassifyLocal(uri, tables, function(results) {

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: yes
Incorrect Function Call [toolkit/components/url-classifier/tests/mochitest/test_classifier.html] [Lines 94-97]
[Old Code]
SpecialPowers.doUrlClassify(prin, null, function(errorCode) {
[Fixed Code]
SpecialPowers.doUrlClassify(prin, function(errorCode) {

Additional Details:
The vulnerability appears to be related to an incorrect function call where an unnecessary null parameter was being passed to doUrlClassify(). The fixed version removes this null parameter, suggesting the original code might have been causing potential issues with the classification functionality. While this isn't a classic security vulnerability with a CVE name, it could potentially lead to incorrect URL classification behavior if the function wasn't properly handling the null parameter. The fix ensures the function is called with the correct parameters.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/marionette/harness/marionette_harness/tests/harness_unit/test_marionette_harness.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/marionette/harness/marionette_harness/tests/harness_unit/test_marionette_harness.py@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@     failures according to the supplied test parameter     """     if "num_fails_crashed" in request.funcargnames:-        num_fails_crashed = request.getfuncargvalue("num_fails_crashed")+        num_fails_crashed = request.getfixturevalue("num_fails_crashed")     else:         num_fails_crashed = (0, 0)     harness_cls = Mock(spec=MarionetteHarness)@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@     runner.crashed attributes are provided by a test parameter     """     if "num_fails_crashed" in request.funcargnames:-        failures, crashed = request.getfuncargvalue("num_fails_crashed")+        failures, crashed = request.getfixturevalue("num_fails_crashed")     else:         failures = 0         crashed = 0

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Deprecated Function Usage [File] [Lines 22,41]
    [Old Code]
    num_fails_crashed = request.getfuncargvalue("num_fails_crashed")
    failures, crashed = request.getfuncargvalue("num_fails_crashed")
    [Fixed Code]
    num_fails_crashed = request.getfixturevalue("num_fails_crashed")
    failures, crashed = request.getfixturevalue("num_fails_crashed")

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be updating from deprecated `getfuncargvalue()` to `getfixturevalue()` method calls.
- This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a maintenance update to use current APIs.
- The deprecated function might have potential issues, but no specific vulnerability is documented for this case.
- The functionality remains the same, just using a newer method name.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be API updates rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/core/platform-win32.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/core/platform-win32.cpp@@ -121,10 +121,30 @@   return (aRawValue * GHZ_PER_MHZ + (GHZ_PER_MHZ / 2u)) / cycleTimeFrequencyMHz; }+static RunningTimes GetProcessRunningTimesDiff(+    PSLockRef aLock, RunningTimes& aPreviousRunningTimesToBeUpdated) {+  AUTO_PROFILER_STATS(GetProcessRunningTimes);++  static const HANDLE processHandle = GetCurrentProcess();++  RunningTimes newRunningTimes;+  {+    AUTO_PROFILER_STATS(GetProcessRunningTimes_QueryProcessCycleTime);+    if (ULONG64 cycles; QueryProcessCycleTime(processHandle, &cycles) != 0) {+      newRunningTimes.SetThreadCPUDelta(cycles);+    }+    newRunningTimes.SetPostMeasurementTimeStamp(TimeStamp::Now());+  };++  const RunningTimes diff = newRunningTimes - aPreviousRunningTimesToBeUpdated;+  aPreviousRunningTimesToBeUpdated = newRunningTimes;+  return diff;+}+ static RunningTimes GetThreadRunningTimesDiff(     PSLockRef aLock,     ThreadRegistration::UnlockedRWForLockedProfiler& aThreadData) {-  AUTO_PROFILER_STATS(GetRunningTimes);+  AUTO_PROFILER_STATS(GetThreadRunningTimes);   const mozilla::profiler::PlatformData& platformData =       aThreadData.PlatformDataCRef();@@ -132,7 +152,7 @@   const RunningTimes newRunningTimes = GetRunningTimesWithTightTimestamp(       [profiledThread](RunningTimes& aRunningTimes) {-        AUTO_PROFILER_STATS(GetRunningTimes_QueryThreadCycleTime);+        AUTO_PROFILER_STATS(GetThreadRunningTimes_QueryThreadCycleTime);         if (ULONG64 cycles;             QueryThreadCycleTime(profiledThread, &cycles) != 0) {           aRunningTimes.ResetThreadCPUDelta(cycles);

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [tools/profiler/core/platform-win32.cpp] [Lines 121-152]
[Old Code]
- Original code had less detailed profiling stats naming and didn't have GetProcessRunningTimesDiff function
[Fixed Code]
- Added GetProcessRunningTimesDiff function with proper cycle time measurement
- Improved profiling stats naming consistency (GetRunningTimes → GetThreadRunningTimes)

Additional observations:
1. The changes appear to be primarily about:
   - Adding new functionality (process running times measurement)
   - Improving code organization and profiling granularity
   - Making profiling statistic names more specific
2. No obvious security vulnerabilities were fixed in this diff
3. The changes involve proper use of Windows API functions (QueryProcessCycleTime, QueryThreadCycleTime)
4. The code maintains proper locking mechanisms (PSLockRef)

The changes seem focused on functionality improvements and code clarity rather than security fixes. The Windows API calls are used correctly with proper error handling (checking return values).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/ipc/DocAccessibleParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/ipc/DocAccessibleParent.cpp@@ -189,6 +189,11 @@   // we want to keep the Accessible alive for reuse later.   aAcc->SetParent(nullptr);   mMovingIDs.EnsureRemoved(id);+  if (aAcc->IsOuterDoc()) {+    // Leave child documents alone. They are added and removed differently to+    // normal children.+    return;+  }   // Some children might be removed. Handle children the same way.   for (RemoteAccessible* child : aAcc->mChildren) {     ShutdownOrPrepareForMove(child);@@ -916,10 +921,10 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(rootDocument);   bool isActive = true;-  nsIntRect rect(CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, 0, 0);+  LayoutDeviceIntRect rect(CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, 0, 0);   if (Compatibility::IsDolphin()) {     rect = Bounds();-    nsIntRect rootRect = rootDocument->Bounds();+    LayoutDeviceIntRect rootRect = rootDocument->Bounds();     rect.MoveToX(rootRect.X() - rect.X());     rect.MoveToY(rect.Y() - rootRect.Y());

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Memory Safety Issue] [accessible/ipc/DocAccessibleParent.cpp] [Lines 189-194]
   [Old Code]
   aAcc->SetParent(nullptr);
   mMovingIDs.EnsureRemoved(id);
   // Some children might be removed. Handle children the same way.
   for (RemoteAccessible* child : aAcc->mChildren) {
   [Fixed Code]
   aAcc->SetParent(nullptr);
   mMovingIDs.EnsureRemoved(id);
   if (aAcc->IsOuterDoc()) {
     // Leave child documents alone. They are added and removed differently to
     // normal children.
     return;
   }
   // Some children might be removed. Handle children the same way.
   for (RemoteAccessible* child : aAcc->mChildren) {

   Additional Details: The fix adds a check for outer documents before processing children, which could prevent potential memory safety issues if outer documents were incorrectly processed. However, without more context, we can't be certain this was a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Integer Overflow] [accessible/ipc/DocAccessibleParent.cpp] [Lines 916-921]
   [Old Code]
   bool isActive = true;
   nsIntRect rect(CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, 0, 0);
   if (Compatibility::IsDolphin()) {
     rect = Bounds();
     nsIntRect rootRect = rootDocument->Bounds();
   [Fixed Code]
   bool isActive = true;
   LayoutDeviceIntRect rect(CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, 0, 0);
   if (Compatibility::IsDolphin()) {
     rect = Bounds();
     LayoutDeviceIntRect rootRect = rootDocument->Bounds();

   Additional Details: The change from nsIntRect to LayoutDeviceIntRect might be related to preventing potential integer overflow issues when dealing with screen coordinates, but this is speculative without more context about the specific vulnerabilities being addressed.

Note: Both changes appear to be defensive programming improvements, but without explicit vulnerability reports or more context, we can't definitively say they were security fixes. The changes do appear to make the code more robust, which could prevent potential security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/README.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/README.md@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ # Firefox Developer Tools: Contributor Docs-This is a guide to working on the code for Firefox Developer Tools. If you're looking for help with using the tools, see the [user docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Tools). For other ways to get involved, check out our [community site](https://firefox-dev.tools).+This is a guide to working on the code for Firefox Developer Tools. If you're looking for help with using the tools, see the [user docs](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/devtools-user/). For other ways to get involved, check out our [community site](https://firefox-dev.tools).

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/docs/contributor/README.md [Lines] 1-3
   [Old Code]
   This is a guide to working on the code for Firefox Developer Tools. If you're looking for help with using the tools, see the [user docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Tools). For other ways to get involved, check out our [community site](https://firefox-dev.tools).
   
   [Fixed Code]
   This is a guide to working on the code for Firefox Developer Tools. If you're looking for help with using the tools, see the [user docs](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/devtools-user/). For other ways to get involved, check out our [community site](https://firefox-dev.tools).

The change only updates a documentation URL from developer.mozilla.org to firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org. This appears to be a documentation improvement rather than a security fix. No vulnerabilities were identified in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/shistory/ChildSHistory.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/shistory/ChildSHistory.cpp@@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ nsID ChildSHistory::AddPendingHistoryChange(int32_t aIndexDelta,                                             int32_t aLengthDelta) {-  nsID changeID = {};-  nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(changeID);+  nsID changeID = nsID::GenerateUUID();   PendingSHistoryChange change = {changeID, aIndexDelta, aLengthDelta};   mPendingSHistoryChanges.AppendElement(change);   return changeID;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential UUID Generation Vulnerability] [docshell/shistory/ChildSHistory.cpp] [Lines 89-90]  
[Old Code]  
```
nsID changeID = {};
nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(changeID);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```
nsID changeID = nsID::GenerateUUID();
```

Additional Details:
1. The change involves how UUIDs are generated for pending history changes.
2. The old code used `nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace()` while the new code uses `nsID::GenerateUUID()`.
3. While this might be a security improvement (using a more secure UUID generation method), I couldn't find specific information about vulnerabilities in the old method.
4. The change could potentially address issues with UUID predictability or randomness, but without more context, I can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessBridgeParent.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessBridgeParent.h@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvTest();   mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvInitBackground(-      Endpoint<PBackgroundParent>&& aEndpoint);+      Endpoint<PBackgroundStarterParent>&& aEndpoint);   void ActorDestroy(ActorDestroyReason aWhy) override;   void DeferredDestroy();

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Type Confusion or Incorrect Endpoint Handling] [netwerk/ipc/SocketProcessBridgeParent.h] [Lines 24-25]
[Old Code]
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvInitBackground(
      Endpoint<PBackgroundParent>&& aEndpoint);
[Fixed Code]
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult RecvInitBackground(
      Endpoint<PBackgroundStarterParent>&& aEndpoint);

Additional Details:
- The change involves modifying the endpoint type from PBackgroundParent to PBackgroundStarterParent
- This could indicate a security fix where the wrong endpoint type was being used previously
- Without more context about the IPC implementation, it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just a refactoring
- The change suggests more careful handling of background process initialization

Note: This appears to be part of Firefox's IPC (Inter-Process Communication) system, where endpoint type safety is crucial for security. The change might be preventing potential type confusion or incorrect privilege assignments in process initialization.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/tokio-timer/src/timer/handle.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/tokio-timer/src/timer/handle.rs@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@     inner: Weak<Inner>, }+/// A guard that resets the current timer to `None` when dropped.+#[derive(Debug)]+pub struct DefaultGuard {+    _p: (),+}+ thread_local! {     /// Tracks the timer for the current execution context.     static CURRENT_TIMER: RefCell<Option<HandlePriv>> = RefCell::new(None)@@ -64,42 +70,32 @@ where     F: FnOnce(&mut Enter) -> R, {-    // Ensure that the timer is removed from the thread-local context-    // when leaving the scope. This handles cases that involve panicking.-    struct Reset;--    impl Drop for Reset {-        fn drop(&mut self) {-            CURRENT_TIMER.with(|current| {-                let mut current = current.borrow_mut();-                *current = None;-            });-        }-    }--    // This ensures the value for the current timer gets reset even if there is-    // a panic.-    let _r = Reset;-+    let _guard = set_default(handle);+    f(enter)+}++/// Sets `handle` as the default timer, returning a guard that unsets it on drop.+///+/// # Panics+///+/// This function panics if there already is a default timer set.+pub fn set_default(handle: &Handle) -> DefaultGuard {     CURRENT_TIMER.with(|current| {-        {-            let mut current = current.borrow_mut();--            assert!(-                current.is_none(),-                "default Tokio timer already set \-                 for execution context"-            );--            let handle = handle-                .as_priv()-                .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("`handle` does not reference a timer"));--            *current = Some(handle.clone());-        }--        f(enter)-    })+        let mut current = current.borrow_mut();++        assert!(+            current.is_none(),+            "default Tokio timer already set \+             for execution context"+        );++        let handle = handle+            .as_priv()+            .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("`handle` does not reference a timer"));++        *current = Some(handle.clone());+    });+    DefaultGuard { _p: () } } impl Handle {@@ -194,3 +190,12 @@         write!(f, "HandlePriv")     } }++impl Drop for DefaultGuard {+    fn drop(&mut self) {+        let _ = CURRENT_TIMER.try_with(|current| {+            let mut current = current.borrow_mut();+            *current = None;+        });+    }+}

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Resource Leak] [third_party/rust/tokio-timer/src/timer/handle.rs] [Lines 44-194]  
[Old Code]  
The old implementation used a local `Reset` struct to clean up thread-local state, but the cleanup was tied to the scope of the `with_default` function.  
[Fixed Code]  
The new implementation introduces a `DefaultGuard` that ensures cleanup happens when the guard is dropped, making the cleanup more robust and possibly preventing resource leaks in cases where the timer wasn't properly reset.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Panic Handling Improvement] [third_party/rust/tokio-timer/src/timer/handle.rs] [Lines 70-93]  
[Old Code]  
The panic handling was implicit in the `with_default` function's scope.  
[Fixed Code]  
The new implementation separates the default timer setting into `set_default` with explicit panic documentation, making the behavior clearer and potentially more robust.

Note: While these changes appear to improve code robustness and resource management, I can't definitively identify specific security vulnerabilities from this diff alone. The changes seem more focused on improving code structure and reliability rather than fixing known security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.inside2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.inside2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#0f0'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all subsequent references to it. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
No Security Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 17-48]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
// ... subsequent _assertPixel calls using offscreenCanvas
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
// ... subsequent _assertPixel calls using canvas
```

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality, input validation, or data handling. It's simply a variable name change for better readability or consistency. No security implications were introduced or fixed by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-size-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-size-001.html@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-contain-1/#contain-property">   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-paint-size-001-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   table

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-size-001.html [Lines] 8
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata rather than a security concern
- No known vulnerability is associated with this change
- The modification seems to be cleanup of test code rather than a security fix

Note: If this were a security-related meta tag (like CSP or XSS protection), its removal might be significant, but in this case it appears to be test infrastructure metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.3.dompointinit.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.3.dompointinit.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ ctx.fill(); // bottom-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,48, 0,255,0,255, "58,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,39, 255,0,0,255, "98,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,28, 0,255,0,255, "98,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,48, 0,255,0,255, "58,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,39, 255,0,0,255, "98,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,28, 0,255,0,255, "98,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.3.dompointinit.html] [17-18, 27-35]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");
...
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");
...

The changes simply rename the variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' and update all references to it. There are no security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-003.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-003.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Xin Liu" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="4.7. device-aspect-ratio" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#device-aspect-ratio"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'device-aspect-ratio' property with prefix 'min' set '1279/1024' means that the minimum of ratio is '1279/1024', only and only if the device value of 'width' to value of 'height' is greater than value of 'min-device-aspect-ratio', the style sheet will be applied."> <style>   div {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be minor HTML cleanup rather than security-related fixes.

Answer:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change simply removes an empty meta tag for flags.

The diff shows:
1. Removal of an empty `<meta name="flags" content="">` tag
2. No other changes to the file's content or functionality

This appears to be a minor cleanup change rather than a security fix. The file is a test case for CSS media queries and doesn't contain any security-sensitive code in either version.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-039.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-039.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-039-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the basic shape ellipse(closest-side farthest-side at right 40px top 60px) border-box">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
    Fixed Code: (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix.
- No actual security vulnerabilities are apparent in this change. The modification seems to be removing unused or unnecessary test configuration.
- The file is a test case for CSS shape-outside functionality and doesn't contain any security-sensitive code in the shown diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.