--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpActivityDistributor.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpActivityDistributor.cpp@@ -38,6 +38,21 @@     Unused << mObservers[i]->ObserveActivity(aHttpChannel, aActivityType,                                              aActivitySubtype, aTimestamp,                                              aExtraSizeData, aExtraStringData);+  }+  return NS_OK;+}++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsHttpActivityDistributor::ObserveConnectionActivity(+    const nsACString& aHost, int32_t aPort, bool aSSL, bool aHasECH,+    bool aIsHttp3, uint32_t aActivityType, uint32_t aActivitySubtype,+    PRTime aTimestamp, const nsACString& aExtraStringData) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(XRE_IsParentProcess() && NS_IsMainThread());++  for (size_t i = 0; i < mObservers.Length(); i++) {+    Unused << mObservers[i]->ObserveConnectionActivity(+        aHost, aPort, aSSL, aHasECH, aIsHttp3, aActivityType, aActivitySubtype,+        aTimestamp, aExtraStringData);   }   return NS_OK; }@@ -105,6 +120,13 @@       Unused << self->ObserveActivity(           nsCOMPtr<nsISupports>(do_QueryObject(channel)), aActivityType,           aActivitySubtype, aTimestamp, aExtraSizeData, extraStringData);+    } else if (args.type() == HttpActivityArgs::THttpConnectionActivity) {+      const HttpConnectionActivity& activity =+          args.get_HttpConnectionActivity();+      Unused << self->ObserveConnectionActivity(+          activity.host(), activity.port(), activity.ssl(), activity.hasECH(),+          activity.isHttp3(), aActivityType, aActivitySubtype, aTimestamp,+          activity.connInfoKey());     }   };@@ -205,6 +227,42 @@ nsHttpActivityDistributor::SetObserveProxyResponse(bool aObserveProxyResponse) {   MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);   mObserveProxyResponse = aObserveProxyResponse;+  if (nsIOService::UseSocketProcess()) {+    auto task = [aObserveProxyResponse]() {+      SocketProcessParent* parent = SocketProcessParent::GetSingleton();+      if (parent && parent->CanSend()) {+        Unused << parent->SendOnHttpActivityDistributorObserveProxyResponse(+            aObserveProxyResponse);+      }+    };+    gIOService->CallOrWaitForSocketProcess(task);+  }+  return NS_OK;+}++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsHttpActivityDistributor::GetObserveConnection(bool* aObserveConnection) {+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aObserveConnection);++  MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);+  *aObserveConnection = mObserveConnection;+  return NS_OK;+}++NS_IMETHODIMP+nsHttpActivityDistributor::SetObserveConnection(bool aObserveConnection) {+  MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);+  mObserveConnection = aObserveConnection;+  if (nsIOService::UseSocketProcess()) {+    auto task = [aObserveConnection]() {+      SocketProcessParent* parent = SocketProcessParent::GetSingleton();+      if (parent && parent->CanSend()) {+        Unused << parent->SendOnHttpActivityDistributorObserveConnection(+            aObserveConnection);+      }+    };+    gIOService->CallOrWaitForSocketProcess(task);+  }   return NS_OK; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Information Leak] [netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpActivityDistributor.cpp] [Lines 38-53]  
   [Old Code] (No previous connection activity observation functionality)  
   [Fixed Code] Added new ObserveConnectionActivity method that handles connection-level activity monitoring  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Missing Access Control] [netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpActivityDistributor.cpp] [Lines 205-229]  
   [Old Code] Only had proxy response observation control  
   [Fixed Code] Added new connection observation control with socket process communication  

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Privilege Escalation] [netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpActivityDistributor.cpp] [Lines 227-242]  
   [Old Code] No connection observation settings  
   [Fixed Code] Added GetObserveConnection/SetObserveConnection methods with proper locking  

Note: While the diff shows significant changes to the activity monitoring system, I cannot definitively identify specific vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to add new functionality for connection-level monitoring rather than fixing existing security issues. The additions include proper locking mechanisms (MutexAutoLock) and process isolation checks (XRE_IsParentProcess), which are security-conscious implementations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.coord1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.repeatx.coord1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -35,12 +35,12 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, -16, 100, 50);         ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 16);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and the corresponding updates to the assertions. This seems like a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerabilities found in the diff. Changes appear to be variable renaming for consistency/readability.

The diff shows:
1. Variable `offscreenCanvas` renamed to `canvas` in the initialization
2. All subsequent references to `offscreenCanvas` updated to use the new `canvas` variable name
3. No changes to the actual logic or security-relevant parts of the code

Since there are no actual security fixes in this diff, I'm not providing multiple entries. The changes are purely cosmetic/readability improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozlint/mozlint/roller.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozlint/mozlint/roller.py@@ -337,6 +337,14 @@                 print(e.output)         if not (paths or vcs_paths) and (workdir or outgoing):+            if os.environ.get("MOZ_AUTOMATION") and not os.environ.get(+                "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST"+            ):+                raise Exception(+                    "Despite being a CI lint job, no files were linted. Is the task "+                    "missing explicit paths?"+                )+             print("warning: no files linted")             return self.result

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Silent Failure Issue [File] python/mozlint/mozlint/roller.py [Lines 337+]  
[Old Code]  
```python
if not (paths or vcs_paths) and (workdir or outgoing):
    print("warning: no files linted")
    return self.result
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```python
if not (paths or vcs_paths) and (workdir or outgoing):
    if os.environ.get("MOZ_AUTOMATION") and not os.environ.get(
        "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST"
    ):
        raise Exception(
            "Despite being a CI lint job, no files were linted. Is the task "
            "missing explicit paths?"
        )
    print("warning: no files linted")
    return self.result
```

Additional Details:
1. The change adds a check for CI environments (MOZ_AUTOMATION) to fail loudly when no files are linted, rather than silently continuing with just a warning.
2. While not a classic security vulnerability, this could be considered a security-related improvement as silent failures in CI could potentially mask important issues.
3. The fix ensures that automation environments will explicitly fail when expected linting doesn't occur, making the behavior more secure/reliable.
4. The exception is not raised during pytest runs (PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST check), maintaining test flexibility.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/payments/res/containers/address-form.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/payments/res/containers/address-form.js@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */-/* import-globals-from ../../../../../browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/+/* import-globals-from /browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/ import LabelledCheckbox from "../components/labelled-checkbox.js"; import PaymentRequestPage from "../components/payment-request-page.js"; import PaymentStateSubscriberMixin from "../mixins/PaymentStateSubscriberMixin.js";

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Path Traversal or Improper Resource Path] [browser/components/payments/res/containers/address-form.js] [Lines 2]  
[Old Code]  
`/* import-globals-from ../../../../../browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/`  
[Fixed Code]  
`/* import-globals-from /browser/extensions/formautofill/content/autofillEditForms.js*/`  

Additional Details:  
The change involves modifying an import path from a relative path to an absolute path. While this could potentially address path traversal vulnerabilities by making the path resolution more explicit, there isn't enough context to confirm if this was actually fixing a security vulnerability or just a code cleanup. The change could potentially prevent path manipulation attacks if the previous relative path was somehow controllable by an attacker, but this would be speculative without more context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-2.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-2.xml@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <address>This address element should have a green background.</address>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-2.xml [Lines] 6
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata
- This doesn't appear to be a security fix, but rather a cleanup of test code
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/remove any security controls

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/mod.rs@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@-use syn;--use {Error, FromMeta, Result};+use crate::{Error, FromMeta, Result}; mod core; mod forward_attrs;+mod from_attributes; mod from_derive; mod from_field; mod from_meta;@@ -16,6 +15,7 @@ pub use self::core::Core; pub use self::forward_attrs::ForwardAttrs;+pub use self::from_attributes::FromAttributesOptions; pub use self::from_derive::FdiOptions; pub use self::from_field::FromFieldOptions; pub use self::from_meta::FromMetaOptions;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in this diff
   File: third_party/rust/darling_core/src/options/mod.rs
   Changes appear to be code organization and import style improvements rather than security fixes. The main changes are:
   - Changed import style from absolute to relative (using `crate::`)
   - Added new module `from_attributes` and its public export
   - Removed unused `syn` import

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No vulnerability name [File] [Lines]
   The changes don't indicate any security fixes, but rather:
   - Code cleanup (removing unused imports)
   - Adding new functionality (from_attributes module)
   - Updating import paths to use crate-relative style

The diff shows typical maintenance changes rather than security fixes. No vulnerabilities or security-related changes are evident in this modification. The changes are focused on code organization and maintainability improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.basic-manual.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.basic-manual.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#000'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- The change is likely for code consistency or readability purposes rather than security fixes

No known vulnerabilities (XSS, injection, etc.) are addressed by this change. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been updated.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPPlatform.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPPlatform.h@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ #include "gmp-platform.h" #include <functional>++namespace mozilla {+namespace ipc {+class ByteBuf;+}  // namespace ipc+}  // namespace mozilla namespace mozilla { namespace gmp {@@ -22,6 +28,8 @@ GMPErr SetTimerOnMainThread(GMPTask* aTask, int64_t aTimeoutMS);+void SendFOGData(ipc::ByteBuf&& buf);+ }  // namespace gmp }  // namespace mozilla

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Missing Namespace Declaration] [dom/media/gmp/GMPPlatform.h] [Lines 8-14, 28]
    [Old Code: No declaration of mozilla::ipc::ByteBuf namespace]
    [Fixed Code: Added namespace declaration for mozilla::ipc::ByteBuf and used it in SendFOGData function]

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Function Exposure] [dom/media/gmp/GMPPlatform.h] [Line 28]
    [Old Code: No SendFOGData function]
    [Fixed Code: Added SendFOGData function declaration]

Note: While the changes don't show obvious security vulnerabilities, they introduce new functionality (SendFOGData) and namespace declarations which could have security implications depending on their implementation. Without seeing the actual implementation of SendFOGData or the context of how ByteBuf is used, it's difficult to determine if there are actual vulnerabilities being fixed here. The changes appear to be more about adding new functionality rather than fixing existing security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/Testing.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/Testing.md@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ The Remote Protocol has unit- and functional tests located under different folders:-  - Shared Modules: `remote/shared/`-  - CDP: `remote/cdp`.+	- CDP: `remote/cdp`+	- Marionette: `remote/marionette`.+	- Shared Modules: `remote/shared/`   - WebDriver BiDi: `remote/webdriver-bidi` You may want to run all the tests under a particular subfolder locally like this:@@ -23,36 +24,38 @@ The unit tests will appear as part of the `X` (for _xpcshell_) jobs on Treeherder.-[xpcshell]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/QA/Writing_xpcshell-based_unit_tests+[xpcshell]: /testing/xpcshell/index.rst-Browser chrome tests---------------------+Browser Chrome Mochitests+--------------------------We also have a set of functional [browser chrome] tests for CDP located-under _remote/cdp/test/browser_:+We also have a set of functional browser-chrome mochitests located+under several components, ie. _remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser_:-	% ./mach mochitest remote/cdp/test/browser/browser_cdp.js+	% ./mach mochitest remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser/browser_* The functional tests will appear under the `M` (for _mochitest_) category in the `remote` jobs on Treeherder. As the functional tests will sporadically pop up new Firefox-application windows, a helpful tip is to run them in [headless-mode]:+application windows, a helpful tip is to run them in headless+mode:-	% ./mach mochitest --headless remote/cdp/test/browser+	% ./mach mochitest --headless remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser The `--headless` flag is equivalent to setting the `MOZ_HEADLESS` environment variable.  You can additionally use `MOZ_HEADLESS_WIDTH` and `MOZ_HEADLESS_HEIGHT` to control the dimensions of the virtual display.-The `add_task()` function used for writing [asynchronous tests] is+The `add_task()` function used for writing asynchronous tests is replaced to provide some additional test setup and teardown useful for writing tests against the Remote Agent and the targets.-Before the task is run, the `nsIRemoteAgent` listener is started+There are also specific browser-chrome tests for CDP.++Before such a task is run, the `nsIRemoteAgent` listener is started and a [CDP client] is connected.  You will use this CDP client for interacting with the agent just as any other CDP client would.@@ -101,9 +104,6 @@ setup you may instead use `add_plain_task()`, which works exactly like the original `add_task()`.-[browser chrome]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Browser_chrome_tests-[headless mode]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Firefox/Headless_mode-[asynchronous tests]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Browser_chrome_tests#Test_functions [CDP client]: https://github.com/cyrus-and/chrome-remote-interface@@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ 	mach try fuzzy+[Puppeteer support]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=puppeteer+[Mocha]: https://mochajs.org/ [Puppeteer test suite]: https://github.com/puppeteer/puppeteer/blob/master/test/README.md [track progress]: https://puppeteer.github.io/ispuppeteerfirefoxready/-[Puppeteer support]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=puppeteer-[Mocha]: https://mochajs.org/-[try preset]: https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/tools/try/presets.html+[try preset]: /tools/try/presets

After analyzing the provided code diff, I can conclude that this is primarily documentation updates and reorganization rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
This diff shows changes to testing documentation (Testing.md) that include:
- Reorganization of test directory listings
- Updates to test command examples
- Changes to documentation links
- General formatting improvements

The changes don't indicate any security vulnerabilities being fixed, but rather documentation maintenance and updates to reflect current testing practices and file locations.

The modifications include:
1. Reordering of test directory listings
2. Updating paths for browser tests
3. Changing external links to internal documentation
4. Adding new sections and reorganizing content
5. Updating command examples

No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are apparent in this documentation update.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/full_screen_exclusive.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/full_screen_exclusive.rs@@ -7,22 +7,16 @@ #[derive(Clone)] pub struct FullScreenExclusive {     handle: vk::Device,-    full_screen_exclusive_fn: vk::ExtFullScreenExclusiveFn,+    fp: vk::ExtFullScreenExclusiveFn, } impl FullScreenExclusive {     pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {-        let full_screen_exclusive_fn = vk::ExtFullScreenExclusiveFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+        let handle = device.handle();+        let fp = vk::ExtFullScreenExclusiveFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: device.handle(),-            full_screen_exclusive_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::ExtFullScreenExclusiveFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkAcquireFullScreenExclusiveModeEXT.html>"]@@ -30,7 +24,7 @@         &self,         swapchain: vk::SwapchainKHR,     ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.full_screen_exclusive_fn+        self.fp             .acquire_full_screen_exclusive_mode_ext(self.handle, swapchain)             .result()     }@@ -42,13 +36,12 @@         surface_info: &vk::PhysicalDeviceSurfaceInfo2KHR,     ) -> VkResult<Vec<vk::PresentModeKHR>> {         read_into_uninitialized_vector(|count, data| {-            self.full_screen_exclusive_fn-                .get_physical_device_surface_present_modes2_ext(-                    physical_device,-                    surface_info,-                    count,-                    data,-                )+            self.fp.get_physical_device_surface_present_modes2_ext(+                physical_device,+                surface_info,+                count,+                data,+            )         })     }@@ -57,7 +50,7 @@         &self,         swapchain: vk::SwapchainKHR,     ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.full_screen_exclusive_fn+        self.fp             .release_full_screen_exclusive_mode_ext(self.handle, swapchain)             .result()     }@@ -68,7 +61,7 @@         surface_info: &vk::PhysicalDeviceSurfaceInfo2KHR,     ) -> VkResult<vk::DeviceGroupPresentModeFlagsKHR> {         let mut present_modes = mem::zeroed();-        self.full_screen_exclusive_fn+        self.fp             .get_device_group_surface_present_modes2_ext(                 self.handle,                 surface_info,@@ -77,8 +70,12 @@             .result_with_success(present_modes)     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::ExtFullScreenExclusiveFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::ExtFullScreenExclusiveFn {-        &self.full_screen_exclusive_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily code organization and naming convention updates. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/full_screen_exclusive.rs] [7-22]
   Old Code: `full_screen_exclusive_fn` field and more verbose initialization
   Fixed Code: `fp` field and more concise initialization

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/ext/full_screen_exclusive.rs] [30-77]
   Old Code: Method calls using `full_screen_exclusive_fn`
   Fixed Code: Method calls using `fp`

The changes are:
1. Renaming `full_screen_exclusive_fn` to `fp` (likely for consistency/brevity)
2. Moving the `name()` method implementation
3. Minor code formatting changes
4. No changes to the actual security-sensitive operations or memory safety

These appear to be refactoring changes rather than security fixes. The Vulkan API calls remain the same, just accessed through a differently named field.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.crosscanvas.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.crosscanvas.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#0f0'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.object.crosscanvas.html] [Lines 17-28]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/shistory/SessionHistoryEntry.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/shistory/SessionHistoryEntry.cpp@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CSPMessageUtils.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/DocumentBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/DOMTypes.h" #include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h" #include "mozilla/dom/PermissionMessageUtils.h"@@ -1057,6 +1058,10 @@   return SharedInfo()->mDynamicallyCreated; }+void SessionHistoryEntry::SetWireframe(const Maybe<Wireframe>& aWireframe) {+  mWireframe = aWireframe;+}+ void SessionHistoryEntry::SetIsDynamicallyAdded(bool aDynamic) {   MOZ_ASSERT_IF(SharedInfo()->mDynamicallyCreated, aDynamic);   SharedInfo()->mDynamicallyCreated = aDynamic;@@ -1345,6 +1350,16 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP SessionHistoryEntry::GetBfcacheID(uint64_t* aBfcacheID) {   *aBfcacheID = SharedInfo()->mId;+  return NS_OK;+}++NS_IMETHODIMP+SessionHistoryEntry::GetWireframe(JSContext* aCx, JS::MutableHandleValue aOut) {+  if (mWireframe.isNothing()) {+    aOut.set(JS::NullValue());+  } else if (NS_WARN_IF(!mWireframe->ToObjectInternal(aCx, aOut))) {+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;+  }   return NS_OK; }@@ -1673,6 +1688,58 @@   return true; }+void IPDLParamTraits<mozilla::dom::Wireframe>::Write(+    IPC::Message* aMsg, IProtocol* aActor,+    const mozilla::dom::Wireframe& aParam) {+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mCanvasBackground);+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mRects);+}++bool IPDLParamTraits<mozilla::dom::Wireframe>::Read(+    const IPC::Message* aMsg, PickleIterator* aIter, IProtocol* aActor,+    mozilla::dom::Wireframe* aResult) {+  return ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mCanvasBackground) &&+         ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mRects);+}+ }  // namespace ipc- }  // namespace mozilla++namespace IPC {+// Allow sending mozilla::dom::WireframeRectType enums over IPC.+template <>+struct ParamTraits<mozilla::dom::WireframeRectType>+    : public ContiguousEnumSerializer<+          mozilla::dom::WireframeRectType,+          mozilla::dom::WireframeRectType::Image,+          mozilla::dom::WireframeRectType::EndGuard_> {};++template <>+struct ParamTraits<mozilla::dom::WireframeTaggedRect> {+  static void Write(Message* aMsg,+                    const mozilla::dom::WireframeTaggedRect& aParam);+  static bool Read(const Message* aMsg, PickleIterator* aIter,+                   mozilla::dom::WireframeTaggedRect* aResult);+};++void ParamTraits<mozilla::dom::WireframeTaggedRect>::Write(+    Message* aMsg, const mozilla::dom::WireframeTaggedRect& aParam) {+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mColor);+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mType);+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mX);+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mY);+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mWidth);+  WriteParam(aMsg, aParam.mHeight);+}++bool ParamTraits<mozilla::dom::WireframeTaggedRect>::Read(+    const IPC::Message* aMsg, PickleIterator* aIter,+    mozilla::dom::WireframeTaggedRect* aResult) {+  return ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mColor) &&+         ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mType) &&+         ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mX) &&+         ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mY) &&+         ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mWidth) &&+         ReadParam(aMsg, aIter, &aResult->mHeight);+}+}  // namespace IPC

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new functionality related to wireframe handling in the session history entry system. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] docshell/shistory/SessionHistoryEntry.cpp [Lines] Various
   The changes include:
   - Adding a new Wireframe class and related IPC serialization
   - Adding SetWireframe and GetWireframe methods
   - Adding IPC parameter traits for Wireframe-related types

The changes appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes. The new code includes proper error handling (NS_WARN_IF) and follows Mozilla's IPC security patterns for serialization. There are no obvious:
- Memory safety issues
- Input validation problems
- Improper access control
- Information disclosure risks
- Other common vulnerability patterns

The changes are primarily adding new functionality for wireframe representation in session history, with proper IPC serialization support.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.zero.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.zero.1.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.beginPath(); ctx.arc(50, 25, 50, 0, 0, true); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. The functionality remains the same.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.zero.1.html] [17-18,27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,20, 0,255,0,255, "50,20", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are simply variable renaming with no security implications. The test functionality remains identical, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-height-block-1-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-height-block-1-ref.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <head>   <title>CSS Reference: Test for height:calc() or min-height:calc() on blocks</title>   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { margin: 0 } body > div { float: left; width: 1px; background: blue; }

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-height-block-1-ref.html [Lines] 3-6  
   [Old Code]  
   ```html
   <meta name="flags" content="">
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```html
   (line removed)
   ```  
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose. No security implications are evident from this change.

The diff shows only one change - the removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability, but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup. The "flags" meta tag was commonly used in test files to specify test requirements or conditions, but its removal here doesn't indicate any security fix.

No known vulnerabilities (XSS, injection, etc.) are addressed by this change, and the modification appears to be purely cosmetic or related to test infrastructure rather than security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/dec/vp8_dec.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/dec/vp8_dec.c@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@   0, 1, 4, 8,  5, 2, 3, 6,  9, 12, 13, 10,  7, 11, 14, 15 };-// See section 13-2: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6386#section-13.2+// See section 13-2: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6386#section-13.2 static int GetLargeValue(VP8BitReader* const br, const uint8_t* const p) {   int v;   if (!VP8GetBit(br, p[3], "coeffs")) {

Analyzing the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   URL Protocol Update [File] [Lines 403-403]
   Old Code: "// See section 13-2: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6386#section-13.2"
   Fixed Code: "// See section 13-2: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6386#section-13.2"

Additional Details:
- This change updates an HTTP URL reference to HTTPS in a code comment. While this improves security by using an encrypted connection when accessing the reference, it doesn't represent a security vulnerability fix in the code itself.
- The change is purely a documentation/comment improvement rather than a security fix.
- No actual code logic or functionality was modified, just a comment line.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/timeline_semaphore.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/timeline_semaphore.rs@@ -1,70 +1,59 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Device, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct TimelineSemaphore {-    handle: vk::Instance,-    timeline_semaphore_fn: vk::KhrTimelineSemaphoreFn,+    handle: vk::Device,+    fp: vk::KhrTimelineSemaphoreFn, } impl TimelineSemaphore {-    pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {-        let timeline_semaphore_fn = vk::KhrTimelineSemaphoreFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+    pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {+        let handle = device.handle();+        let fp = vk::KhrTimelineSemaphoreFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: instance.handle(),-            timeline_semaphore_fn,-        }+        Self { handle, fp }+    }++    #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetSemaphoreCounterValue.html>"]+    pub unsafe fn get_semaphore_counter_value(&self, semaphore: vk::Semaphore) -> VkResult<u64> {+        let mut value = 0;+        self.fp+            .get_semaphore_counter_value_khr(self.handle, semaphore, &mut value)+            .result_with_success(value)+    }++    #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkWaitSemaphores.html>"]+    pub unsafe fn wait_semaphores(+        &self,+        wait_info: &vk::SemaphoreWaitInfo,+        timeout: u64,+    ) -> VkResult<()> {+        self.fp+            .wait_semaphores_khr(self.handle, wait_info, timeout)+            .result()+    }++    #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkSignalSemaphore.html>"]+    pub unsafe fn signal_semaphore(&self, signal_info: &vk::SemaphoreSignalInfo) -> VkResult<()> {+        self.fp+            .signal_semaphore_khr(self.handle, signal_info)+            .result()     }     pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {         vk::KhrTimelineSemaphoreFn::name()     }-    #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetSemaphoreCounterValue.html>"]-    pub unsafe fn get_semaphore_counter_value(-        &self,-        device: vk::Device,-        semaphore: vk::Semaphore,-    ) -> VkResult<u64> {-        let mut value = 0;-        self.timeline_semaphore_fn-            .get_semaphore_counter_value_khr(device, semaphore, &mut value)-            .result_with_success(value)+    pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrTimelineSemaphoreFn {+        &self.fp     }-    #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkWaitSemaphores.html>"]-    pub unsafe fn wait_semaphores(-        &self,-        device: vk::Device,-        wait_info: &vk::SemaphoreWaitInfo,-        timeout: u64,-    ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.timeline_semaphore_fn-            .wait_semaphores_khr(device, wait_info, timeout)-            .into()-    }--    #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkSignalSemaphore.html>"]-    pub unsafe fn signal_semaphore(-        &self,-        device: vk::Device,-        signal_info: &vk::SemaphoreSignalInfo,-    ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.timeline_semaphore_fn-            .signal_semaphore_khr(device, signal_info)-            .into()-    }--    pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrTimelineSemaphoreFn {-        &self.timeline_semaphore_fn-    }--    pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {+    pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device {         self.handle     } }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Incorrect Device/Instance Handling] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/timeline_semaphore.rs] [Lines 5-7, 10-16]
   [Old Code: Used vk::Instance handle and EntryCustom]
   [Fixed Code: Uses vk::Device handle and Device]

   The change switches from using instance-level functions to device-level functions, which might indicate a potential security issue where instance-level access was incorrectly being used for device-level operations. However, without more context about the Vulkan API usage, I can't be certain if this was actually a vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Unsafe Function Pointer Loading] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/timeline_semaphore.rs] [Lines 13-15]
   [Old Code: Used entry.get_instance_proc_addr()]
   [Fixed Code: Uses instance.get_device_proc_addr()]

   The change in how function pointers are loaded might relate to security, as using the wrong level of function pointer loading could lead to incorrect function calls. However, this might just be a correctness fix rather than a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Device Handle Exposure] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/timeline_semaphore.rs] [Lines 50-52]
   [Old Code: pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance]
   [Fixed Code: pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device]

   The change in the exposed handle type might relate to security if instance handles were being incorrectly exposed where device handles were needed, but this might just be an API correction.

Note: The changes appear to be more about correctness in the Vulkan API usage rather than clear security vulnerabilities. The main change is moving from instance-level to device-level operations, which is likely an API usage correction rather than a security fix. Without more context about the specific security implications in the Vulkan API, I can't identify any definite vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/performance-new/components/ProfilerEventHandling.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/performance-new/components/ProfilerEventHandling.js@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ // @ts-check++/**+ * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").PerfFront} PerfFront+ * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").RecordingState} RecordingState+ * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").State} StoreState+ * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").RootTraits} RootTraits+ * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").PanelWindow} PanelWindow+ */ /**  * @template P@@ -26,18 +34,12 @@ /**  * @typedef {Object} OwnProps  * @property {PerfFront} perfFront+ * @property {RootTraits} traits  */ /**  * @typedef {ResolveThunks<ThunkDispatchProps>} DispatchProps  * @typedef {StateProps & DispatchProps & OwnProps} Props- * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").PerfFront} PerfFront- * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").RecordingState} RecordingState- * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").State} StoreState- */--/**- * @typedef {import("../@types/perf").PanelWindow} PanelWindow  */ "use strict";@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@       reportProfilerStopped,       reportPrivateBrowsingStarted,       reportPrivateBrowsingStopped,+      traits: { noDisablingOnPrivateBrowsing },     } = this.props;     if (!isSupportedPlatform) {@@ -73,7 +76,9 @@     // Ask for the initial state of the profiler.     Promise.all([       perfFront.isActive(),-      perfFront.isLockedForPrivateBrowsing(),+      noDisablingOnPrivateBrowsing+        ? false+        : perfFront.isLockedForPrivateBrowsing(),     ]).then(([isActive, isLockedForPrivateBrowsing]) => {       reportProfilerReady(isActive, isLockedForPrivateBrowsing);     });@@ -81,14 +86,20 @@     // Handle when the profiler changes state. It might be us, it might be someone else.     this.props.perfFront.on("profiler-started", reportProfilerStarted);     this.props.perfFront.on("profiler-stopped", reportProfilerStopped);-    this.props.perfFront.on(-      "profile-locked-by-private-browsing",-      reportPrivateBrowsingStarted-    );-    this.props.perfFront.on(-      "profile-unlocked-from-private-browsing",-      reportPrivateBrowsingStopped-    );++    if (!noDisablingOnPrivateBrowsing) {+      // @backward-compat { version 98 }+      // These events are not used anymore in Firefox 98 and above. They can be+      // removed along with the rest of the functionality once 98 hits release.+      this.props.perfFront.on(+        "profile-locked-by-private-browsing",+        reportPrivateBrowsingStarted+      );+      this.props.perfFront.on(+        "profile-unlocked-from-private-browsing",+        reportPrivateBrowsingStopped+      );+    }   }   componentWillUnmount() {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [devtools/client/performance-new/components/ProfilerEventHandling.js] [Lines 66, 73-76, 86-98]
   [Old Code]
   [Fixed Code]
   Additional Details: The changes introduce a new trait `noDisablingOnPrivateBrowsing` that affects how private browsing mode is handled. While this appears to be a feature change rather than a security fix, it could potentially impact privacy/security behavior. The exact security implications are unclear without more context about the private browsing handling.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Code Organization Improvement] [devtools/client/performance-new/components/ProfilerEventHandling.js] [Lines 2-14]
   [Old Code]
   [Fixed Code]
   Additional Details: The changes reorganize type definitions at the top of the file, which improves code organization but doesn't appear to address any security issues.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Backward Compatibility Note] [devtools/client/performance-new/components/ProfilerEventHandling.js] [Lines 88-90]
   [Old Code]
   [Fixed Code]
   Additional Details: The changes add a backward compatibility note about events not being used in Firefox 98+, but this appears to be a maintenance change rather than a security fix.

Note: The changes to `.cargo-checksum.json` appear to be routine dependency updates and don't show any clear security fixes. The hashes and package versions were updated, but this is normal maintenance activity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-149b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-149b.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background-offset.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <address></address>

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-149b.xml] [Lines 10]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: (removed)]

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this seems like routine test cleanup.
3. The empty flags attribute wasn't posing any security risk, and its removal doesn't appear to address any security issue.

No other vulnerabilities were found in this diff. The change appears to be purely cosmetic or related to test maintenance rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-043.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-043.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-pseudo-4/#highlight-bounds">   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-nothing-below.xht">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <meta name="assert" content="In this test, a filled red image has a padding belt painted red and a red border. This test checks that the associated overlay for an image must not leak outside the image's border box.">   <!--

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-043.html] [Lines 10]
[Old Code] <meta content="" name="flags">
[Fixed Code] [Line removed]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with name="flags" that wasn't serving any apparent purpose
- This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-relevant functionality

The diff shows no evidence of security vulnerabilities being fixed - it's just removing an unused meta tag from the test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/test/unit/test_https_rr_ech_prefs.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/test/unit/test_https_rr_ech_prefs.js@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@   Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.dns.use_https_rr_as_altsvc");   Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.dns.echconfig.enabled");   Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.dns.http3_echconfig.enabled");-  Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.http.http3.enabled");+  Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.http.http3.enable");   Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.http.spdy.enabled");   if (trrServer) {     await trrServer.stop();@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@   trrServer = null; });-// Test the case that "network.http.http3.enabled" and+// Test the case that "network.http.http3.enable" and // "network.http.spdy.enabled" are true/false. add_task(async function testHttp3AndHttp2Pref() {   dns.clearCache(true);@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@   let trrServer = new TRRServer();   await trrServer.start();-  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enabled", false);+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enable", false);   Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.dns.echconfig.enabled", false);   Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.dns.http3_echconfig.enabled", false);   Services.prefs.setIntPref("network.trr.mode", 3);@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@   Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.spdy.enabled", false);   checkResult(inRecord, false, false);-  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enabled", true);+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enable", true);   checkResult(inRecord, false, false, {     expectedPriority: 1,     expectedName: "test.foo_h3.com",

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Preference Name Change] [netwerk/test/unit/test_https_rr_ech_prefs.js] [Lines 27, 452, 460, 522]
    [Old Code]
    Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.http.http3.enabled");
    Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enabled", false);
    Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enabled", true);
    [Fixed Code]
    Services.prefs.clearUserPref("network.http.http3.enable");
    Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enable", false);
    Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.http.http3.enable", true);

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a preference name change from "network.http.http3.enabled" to "network.http.http3.enable"
- This doesn't appear to be fixing a security vulnerability, but rather correcting a preference name
- The change is consistent across all instances in the file
- No obvious security implications from this change alone

Note: While this doesn't appear to be a security fix, I'm including it for completeness since it's the only change in the diff. The modification seems to be about maintaining consistency in preference naming rather than addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.