--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/parser/stencil-scope.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit-test/tests/parser/stencil-scope.js@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ const optionsLazy = {     fileName: "compileToStencil-DATA.js",     lineNumber: 1,+};++const optionsLazyCache = {+  fileName: "compileToStencil-DATA.js",+  lineNumber: 1,+  fillRuntimeCache: true, }; let result = 0;@@ -26,6 +32,17 @@     const stencil = compileAndDelazifyAllToStencil(script_str, optionsLazy);     result = evalStencil(stencil, optionsLazy);     assertEq(result, 1);+}++function testMainThreadCacheAll(script_str) {+  if (isLcovEnabled()) {+    // Code-coverage implies forceFullParse = true, and as such it cannot be+    // used while testing to incrementally delazify.+    return;+  }+  const stencil = compileAndDelazifyAllToStencil(script_str, optionsLazyCache);+  result = evalStencil(stencil, optionsLazy);+  assertEq(result, 1); } function testOffThread(script_str) {@@ -89,6 +106,7 @@     // console.log(s, ":", code);     testMainThread(code);     testMainThreadDelazifyAll(code);+    testMainThreadCacheAll(code);     if (helperThreadCount() > 0) {         testOffThread(code);     }

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new functionality (caching support) rather than fixing security issues.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [js/src/jit-test/tests/parser/stencil-scope.js] [Lines 7-12, 26-37, 89-106]
[Old Code]
(No previous caching functionality)
[Fixed Code]
Added caching functionality with new optionsLazyCache constant and testMainThreadCacheAll function

The changes primarily:
1. Add a new optionsLazyCache configuration
2. Add a new test function testMainThreadCacheAll
3. Call the new test function from the main test loop

These appear to be feature additions rather than security fixes. The changes relate to JavaScript engine testing infrastructure and don't show any signs of patching security vulnerabilities.

If I had to speculate about potential security implications, the caching functionality could theoretically introduce issues if not properly implemented, but there's no evidence of this being a security fix in the diff provided.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.space.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.space.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@     ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.fillText('E  EE', -100, 37.5);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.space.html [Lines 17-30]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, and there are no security-related patterns being modified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.scale2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.scale2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ ctx.strokeStyle = '#f00'; ctx.stroke(); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes are variable renaming only.

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only variable name changes from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- All assertions remain identical in functionality, just using the new variable name
- No security-sensitive operations were modified
- The changes appear to be code style/consistency improvements rather than security fixes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.dompointinit.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.dompointinit.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,28 +23,28 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,1, 0,255,0,255, "41,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,10, 255,0,0,255, "1,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,21, 0,255,0,255, "1,21", "0,255,0,255"); // top-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,48, 0,255,0,255, "58,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,39, 255,0,0,255, "98,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,28, 0,255,0,255, "98,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,48, 255,0,0,255, "79,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,48, 0,255,0,255, "58,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,39, 255,0,0,255, "98,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,28, 0,255,0,255, "98,28", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.dompointinit.worker.js] [Lines 13-48]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
[...]
_assertPixel(canvas, 20,1, 255,0,0,255, "20,1", "255,0,0,255");

The changes are purely variable renaming with no impact on security functionality. The test logic remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.negative.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-rectangles-to-the-canvas/2d.strokeRect.negative.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ ctx.strokeRect(88, 12, -26, 1); ctx.strokeRect(12, 38, 26, -1); ctx.strokeRect(88, 38, -26, -1);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 13-14, 24-27]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255");

    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 25,12, 0,255,0,255, "25,12", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(canvas, 75,12, 0,255,0,255, "75,12", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(canvas, 25,37, 0,255,0,255, "25,37", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(canvas, 75,37, 0,255,0,255, "75,37", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp@@ -1546,16 +1546,6 @@       break;   }-  uint32_t defaultCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds =-      60 * 60 * 28;  // 28 hours in seconds-  uint64_t maxCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds = 60 * 60 * 24 * 365;-  uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds =-      Preferences::GetUint("security.pki.crlite_ct_merge_delay_seconds",-                           defaultCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds);-  if (crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds > maxCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds) {-    crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds = maxCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds;-  }-   CertVerifier::OcspDownloadConfig odc;   CertVerifier::OcspStrictConfig osc;   uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays;@@ -1568,7 +1558,7 @@   mDefaultCertVerifier = new SharedCertVerifier(       odc, osc, softTimeout, hardTimeout, certShortLifetimeInDays, sha1Mode,       PublicSSLState()->NameMatchingMode(), netscapeStepUpPolicy, ctMode,-      crliteMode, crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds, mEnterpriseCerts);+      crliteMode, mEnterpriseCerts); } void nsNSSComponent::UpdateCertVerifierWithEnterpriseRoots() {@@ -1587,8 +1577,7 @@       oldCertVerifier->mCertShortLifetimeInDays, oldCertVerifier->mSHA1Mode,       oldCertVerifier->mNameMatchingMode,       oldCertVerifier->mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, oldCertVerifier->mCTMode,-      oldCertVerifier->mCRLiteMode, oldCertVerifier->mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds,-      mEnterpriseCerts);+      oldCertVerifier->mCRLiteMode, mEnterpriseCerts); } // Enable the TLS versions given in the prefs, defaulting to TLS 1.0 (min) and@@ -1699,7 +1688,7 @@     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;   }   nsAutoString u16ProfilePath;-  rv = profileFileWin->GetCanonicalPath(u16ProfilePath);+  rv = profileFileWin->GetPath(u16ProfilePath);   CopyUTF16toUTF8(u16ProfilePath, aProfilePath); #else   rv = profileFile->GetNativePath(aProfilePath);@@ -2400,9 +2389,7 @@                    "security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.soft") ||                prefName.EqualsLiteral(                    "security.OCSP.timeoutMilliseconds.hard") ||-               prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.crlite_mode") ||-               prefName.EqualsLiteral(-                   "security.pki.crlite_ct_merge_delay_seconds")) {+               prefName.EqualsLiteral("security.pki.crlite_mode")) {       MutexAutoLock lock(mMutex);       setValidationOptions(false, lock); #ifdef DEBUG@@ -2518,12 +2505,9 @@   *result = false; #ifdef DEBUG-  RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nsc = nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert);-  if (!nsc) {-    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;-  }+  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> x509Cert(new nsNSSCertificate(cert));   nsAutoString certHash;-  nsresult rv = nsc->GetSha256Fingerprint(certHash);+  nsresult rv = x509Cert->GetSha256Fingerprint(certHash);   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {     return rv;   }

Analyzing the provided code diff, I've identified several changes that may relate to security fixes. Here's the analysis following the required format:

1. First potential vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [CRLite CT Merge Delay Removal] [security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp] [Lines 1546-1568]
    [Old Code]
    uint32_t defaultCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds =
        60 * 60 * 28;  // 28 hours in seconds
    uint64_t maxCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds = 60 * 60 * 24 * 365;
    uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds =
        Preferences::GetUint("security.pki.crlite_ct_merge_delay_seconds",
                           defaultCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds);
    if (crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds > maxCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds) {
      crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds = maxCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds;
    }
    [Fixed Code]
    (removed entirely)

2. Second potential vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Canonical Path to Simple Path Change] [security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp] [Lines 1699]
    [Old Code]
    rv = profileFileWin->GetCanonicalPath(u16ProfilePath);
    [Fixed Code]
    rv = profileFileWin->GetPath(u16ProfilePath);

3. Third potential vulnerability:
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Certificate Fingerprint Handling Change] [security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp] [Lines 2518-2525]
    [Old Code]
    RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nsc = nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert);
    if (!nsc) {
      return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
    }
    nsAutoString certHash;
    nsresult rv = nsc->GetSha256Fingerprint(certHash);
    [Fixed Code]
    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> x509Cert(new nsNSSCertificate(cert));
    nsAutoString certHash;
    nsresult rv = x509Cert->GetSha256Fingerprint(certHash);

Note: While these changes appear to be security-related, I cannot definitively determine if they were fixing actual vulnerabilities or just improving code quality/functionality. The removal of the CRLite CT merge delay parameter might suggest a security policy change, but without additional context, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability. Similarly, the path handling change and certificate fingerprint handling modification might be security improvements, but I can't confirm specific vulnerabilities being addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures/tests/stream_futures_unordered.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures/tests/stream_futures_unordered.rs@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@     let mut tasks = FuturesUnordered::from_iter(vec![F::default(); 33]);     assert!(tasks.poll_next_unpin(cx).is_pending());-    assert_eq!(33, tasks.iter().filter(|f| f.polled).count());+    assert_eq!(32, tasks.iter().filter(|f| f.polled).count());     let mut tasks = FuturesUnordered::<F>::new();     assert_eq!(Poll::Ready(None), tasks.poll_next_unpin(cx));

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Test Case Correction] [third_party/rust/futures/tests/stream_futures_unordered.rs] [Lines 340-342]
[Old Code]
    assert_eq!(33, tasks.iter().filter(|f| f.polled).count());
[Fixed Code]
    assert_eq!(32, tasks.iter().filter(|f| f.polled).count());

Additional Details:
This appears to be a test case correction rather than a security fix. The change adjusts the expected count of polled futures from 33 to 32, likely reflecting a more accurate expectation of how many futures should be polled in this scenario. There's no indication of a security vulnerability being addressed here - it seems to be a behavioral correction in the test case.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docshell/test/navigation/test_blockBFCache.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docshell/test/navigation/test_blockBFCache.html@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@         el.src = URL.createObjectURL(ms);         el.preload = "auto";       }).then(el => {-        el.src = ""; +        el.src = "";         return el;       });     },@@ -157,112 +157,133 @@ */ ];-let bc = new BroadcastChannel("bfcache_blocking");--function promiseMessage(type) {-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {-    bc.addEventListener("message", (e) => {-      if (e.data.type == type) {-        resolve(e.data);-      }-    }, { once: true });+++function executeTest() {++  let bc = new BroadcastChannel("bfcache_blocking");++  function promiseMessage(type) {+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {+      bc.addEventListener("message", (e) => {+        if (e.data.type == type) {+          resolve(e.data);+        }+      }, { once: true });+    });+  }++  function promisePageShow(shouldBePersisted) {+    return promiseMessage("pageshow").then(data => data.persisted == shouldBePersisted);+  }++  function promisePageShowFromBFCache(e) {+    return promisePageShow(true);+  }++  function promisePageShowNotFromBFCache(e) {+    return promisePageShow(false);+  }++  function runTests(testArray, shouldBlockBFCache) {+    for (const { name, prefs = {}, test, waitForDone } of testArray) {+      add_task(async function() {+        await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(prefs, async function() {+          // Load a mostly blank page that we can communicate with over+          // BroadcastChannel (though it will close the BroadcastChannel after+          // receiving the next "load" message, to avoid blocking BFCache).+          let loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();+          window.open("file_blockBFCache.html", "", "noopener");+          await loaded;++          // Load the same page with a different URL.+          loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();+          bc.postMessage({ message: "load", url: `file_blockBFCache.html?${name}_${shouldBlockBFCache}` });+          await loaded;++          // Run test script in the second page.+          bc.postMessage({ message: "runScript", fun: test.toString() });+          await promiseMessage("runScriptDone");++          // Go back to the first page (this should just come from the BFCache).+          let goneBack = promisePageShowFromBFCache();+          bc.postMessage({ message: "back" });+          await goneBack;++          // Go forward again to the second page and check that it does/doesn't come+          // from the BFCache.+          let goneForward = promisePageShow(!shouldBlockBFCache);+          bc.postMessage({ message: "forward" });+          let result = await goneForward;+          ok(result, `Page ${shouldBlockBFCache ? "should" : "should not"} have been blocked from going into the BFCache (${name})`);++          // If the test will keep running after navigation, then we need to make+          // sure it's completely done before moving to the next test, to avoid+          // interfering with any following tests. If waitForDone is defined then+          // it'll return a Promise that we can use to wait for the end of the+          // test.+          if (waitForDone) {+            await waitForDone();+          }++          // Do a similar test, but replace the bfcache test page with a new page,+          // not a page coming from the session history.++          // Load the same page with a different URL.+          loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();+          bc.postMessage({ message: "load", url: `file_blockBFCache.html?p2_${name}_${shouldBlockBFCache}` });+          await loaded;++          // Run the test script.+          bc.postMessage({ message: "runScript", fun: test.toString() });+          await promiseMessage("runScriptDone");++          // Load a new page.+          loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();+          bc.postMessage({ message: "load", url: "file_blockBFCache.html" });+          await loaded;++          // Go back to the previous page and check that it does/doesn't come+          // from the BFCache.+          goneBack = promisePageShow(!shouldBlockBFCache);+          bc.postMessage({ message: "back" });+          result = await goneBack;+          ok(result, `Page ${shouldBlockBFCache ? "should" : "should not"} have been blocked from going into the BFCache (${name})`);++          if (waitForDone) {+            await waitForDone();+          }++          bc.postMessage({ message: "close" });++          SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();+        });+      });+    }+  }++  // If Fission is disabled, the pref is no-op.+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]]}, () => {+    runTests(blockBFCacheTests, true);+    runTests(dontBlockBFCacheTests, false);   }); }-function promisePageShow(shouldBePersisted) {-  return promiseMessage("pageshow").then(data => data.persisted == shouldBePersisted);+if (isXOrigin) {+  // Bug 1746646: Make mochitests work with TCP enabled (cookieBehavior = 5)+  // Acquire storage access permission here so that the BroadcastChannel used to+  // communicate with the opened windows works in xorigin tests. Otherwise,+  // the iframe containing this page is isolated from first-party storage access,+  // which isolates BroadcastChannel communication.+  SpecialPowers.wrap(document).notifyUserGestureActivation();+  SpecialPowers.addPermission("storageAccessAPI", true, window.location.href).then(() => {+    SpecialPowers.wrap(document).requestStorageAccess().then(() => {+      executeTest();+    });+  });+} else {+  executeTest(); }--function promisePageShowFromBFCache(e) {-  return promisePageShow(true);-}--function promisePageShowNotFromBFCache(e) {-  return promisePageShow(false);-}--function runTests(testArray, shouldBlockBFCache) {-  for (const { name, prefs = {}, test, waitForDone } of testArray) {-    add_task(async function() {-      await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(prefs, async function() {-        // Load a mostly blank page that we can communicate with over-        // BroadcastChannel (though it will close the BroadcastChannel after-        // receiving the next "load" message, to avoid blocking BFCache).-        let loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();-        window.open("file_blockBFCache.html", "", "noopener");-        await loaded;--        // Load the same page with a different URL.-        loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();-        bc.postMessage({ message: "load", url: `file_blockBFCache.html?${name}_${shouldBlockBFCache}` });-        await loaded;--        // Run test script in the second page.-        bc.postMessage({ message: "runScript", fun: test.toString() });-        await promiseMessage("runScriptDone");--        // Go back to the first page (this should just come from the BFCache).-        let goneBack = promisePageShowFromBFCache();-        bc.postMessage({ message: "back" });-        await goneBack;--        // Go forward again to the second page and check that it does/doesn't come-        // from the BFCache.-        let goneForward = promisePageShow(!shouldBlockBFCache);-        bc.postMessage({ message: "forward" });-        let result = await goneForward;-        ok(result, `Page ${shouldBlockBFCache ? "should" : "should not"} have been blocked from going into the BFCache (${name})`);--        // If the test will keep running after navigation, then we need to make-        // sure it's completely done before moving to the next test, to avoid-        // interfering with any following tests. If waitForDone is defined then-        // it'll return a Promise that we can use to wait for the end of the-        // test.-        if (waitForDone) {-          await waitForDone();-        }--        // Do a similar test, but replace the bfcache test page with a new page,-        // not a page coming from the session history.--        // Load the same page with a different URL.-        loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();-        bc.postMessage({ message: "load", url: `file_blockBFCache.html?p2_${name}_${shouldBlockBFCache}` });-        await loaded;--        // Run the test script.-        bc.postMessage({ message: "runScript", fun: test.toString() });-        await promiseMessage("runScriptDone");--        // Load a new page.-        loaded = promisePageShowNotFromBFCache();-        bc.postMessage({ message: "load", url: "file_blockBFCache.html" });-        await loaded;--        // Go back to the previous page and check that it does/doesn't come-        // from the BFCache.-        goneBack = promisePageShow(!shouldBlockBFCache);-        bc.postMessage({ message: "back" });-        result = await goneBack;-        ok(result, `Page ${shouldBlockBFCache ? "should" : "should not"} have been blocked from going into the BFCache (${name})`);--        if (waitForDone) {-          await waitForDone();-        }--        bc.postMessage({ message: "close" });--        SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();-      });-    });-  }-}--// If Fission is disabled, the pref is no-op.-SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]]}, () => {-  runTests(blockBFCacheTests, true);-  runTests(dontBlockBFCacheTests, false);-}); </script> </body>

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be primarily structural/organizational rather than security-related. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The main changes involve:
   - Moving the BroadcastChannel initialization and test execution logic into an `executeTest()` function
   - Adding cross-origin test support with storage access permissions
   - No security vulnerabilities were fixed in these changes

2. The only code change that could potentially be security-related is the empty string assignment to `el.src`, but this appears to be just whitespace cleanup rather than a security fix:
   Vulnerability Existed: no
   Whitespace cleanup [File] [Lines 149-157]
   Old Code: `el.src = ""; `
   Fixed Code: `el.src = "";`

3. The addition of cross-origin test support with storage access permissions appears to be a test enhancement rather than a security fix:
   Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test enhancement for cross-origin scenarios [File] [Lines added at end]
   This is new code added to handle cross-origin testing scenarios

The changes seem focused on:
1. Better code organization by wrapping test execution in a function
2. Adding support for cross-origin testing scenarios
3. Minor whitespace cleanup
4. No actual security vulnerabilities were identified in the diff

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libwebp/src/utils/quant_levels_dec_utils.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libwebp/src/utils/quant_levels_dec_utils.c@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ #define DFIX 4           // extra precision for ordered dithering #define DSIZE 4          // dithering size (must be a power of two)-// cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered_dithering+// cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered_dithering static const uint8_t kOrderedDither[DSIZE][DSIZE] = {   {  0,  8,  2, 10 },     // coefficients are in DFIX fixed-point precision   { 12,  4, 14,  6 },

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No Vulnerability Found] [media/libwebp/src/utils/quant_levels_dec_utils.c] [Lines 30]
[Old Code: "// cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered_dithering"]
[Fixed Code: "// cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered_dithering"]

Additional Details:
- The change only involves updating a URL comment from HTTP to HTTPS
- This is a security improvement (enforcing encrypted connection when visiting the reference)
- No actual code vulnerability was fixed, just a documentation improvement
- The change helps prevent potential MITM attacks when accessing the reference link, but doesn't affect the program's execution

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.wrap.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.wrap.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ // be safe enough on reasonable implementations ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,2, 0,255,0,255, "98,2", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,47, 0,255,0,255, "98,47", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,2, 0,255,0,255, "98,2", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,47, 0,255,0,255, "98,47", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.rotate.wrap.worker.js] [Lines 13-24]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,2, 0,255,0,255, "98,2", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,47, 0,255,0,255, "98,47", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,2, 0,255,0,255, "98,2", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 98,47, 0,255,0,255, "98,47", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or style reasons. There are no security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/glean-ffi/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/glean-ffi/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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74cc09077a6290","src/uuid.rs":"c9ea7225fac53b55a8aeef39cd33470228c0a178185aa74b8fa652657994e404","src/weak.rs":"0199f4ef38d667f0b9f8ef3c5505ff15cd6e911bc83c27e7e9954fdffe1be0bb"},"package":"a33681c61cb007b4d4c19b3cac1a8e74b211f7afe88f179328c04a3bc72ec466"}=========devtools/client/debugger/src/client/firefox/commands.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/client/firefox/commands.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/client/firefox/commands.js@@ -319,15 +319,37 @@ } async function blackBox(sourceActor, shouldBlackBox, ranges) {-  const sourceFront = currentThreadFront().source({ actor: sourceActor.actor });-  // If there are no ranges, the whole source is being blackboxed-  if (!ranges.length) {-    await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox);-    return;-  }-  // Blackbox the specific ranges-  for (const range of ranges) {-    await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox, range);+  // @backward-compat { version 98 } Introduced the Blackboxing actor+  //                  The trait can be removed, but as for other code of this module,+  //                  we still have to support cases where we don't support the Watcher actor at all.+  //                  For example in the regular non-multiprocess browser toolbox.+  //                  There, we still have to communicate with each individual source front.+  //  Once we drop 97 support, we can do:+  //  const hasWatcherSupport = commands.targetCommand.hasTargetWatcherSupport();+  //  (Like other method of this module)+  const hasWatcherSupport = commands.targetCommand.hasTargetWatcherSupport(+    "blackboxing"+  );+  if (hasWatcherSupport) {+    const blackboxingFront = await commands.targetCommand.watcherFront.getBlackboxingActor();+    if (shouldBlackBox) {+      await blackboxingFront.blackbox(sourceActor.url, ranges);+    } else {+      await blackboxingFront.unblackbox(sourceActor.url, ranges);+    }+  } else {+    const sourceFront = currentThreadFront().source({+      actor: sourceActor.actor,+    });+    // If there are no ranges, the whole source is being blackboxed+    if (!ranges.length) {+      await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox);+      return;+    }+    // Blackbox the specific ranges+    for (const range of ranges) {+      await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox, range);+    }   } }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Backward Compatibility Issue] [devtools/client/debugger/src/client/firefox/commands.js] [Lines 319-337]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   async function blackBox(sourceActor, shouldBlackBox, ranges) {
     const sourceFront = currentThreadFront().source({ actor: sourceActor.actor });
     // If there are no ranges, the whole source is being blackboxed
     if (!ranges.length) {
       await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox);
       return;
     }
     // Blackbox the specific ranges
     for (const range of ranges) {
       await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox, range);
     }
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   async function blackBox(sourceActor, shouldBlackBox, ranges) {
     // @backward-compat { version 98 } Introduced the Blackboxing actor
     const hasWatcherSupport = commands.targetCommand.hasTargetWatcherSupport(
       "blackboxing"
     );
     if (hasWatcherSupport) {
       const blackboxingFront = await commands.targetCommand.watcherFront.getBlackboxingActor();
       if (shouldBlackBox) {
         await blackboxingFront.blackbox(sourceActor.url, ranges);
       } else {
         await blackboxingFront.unblackbox(sourceActor.url, ranges);
       }
     } else {
       const sourceFront = currentThreadFront().source({
         actor: sourceActor.actor,
       });
       // If there are no ranges, the whole source is being blackboxed
       if (!ranges.length) {
         await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox);
         return;
       }
       // Blackbox the specific ranges
       for (const range of ranges) {
         await toggleBlackBoxSourceFront(sourceFront, shouldBlackBox, range);
       }
     }
   }
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Dependency Checksum Update] [third_party/rust/glean-ffi/.cargo-checksum.json] [Lines 1-1]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```json
   {"files":{...},"package":"9e29c3f0b9dbde127254f375499df382d5fa9c3c2b33bfcb393485876fe79fb2"}
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```json
   {"files":{...},"package":"a33681c61cb007b4d4c19b3cac1a8e74b211f7afe88f179328c04a3bc72ec466"}
   ```

Notes:
1. The first change appears to be a backward compatibility improvement rather than a security fix, though it could potentially address some security concerns related to how blackboxing is handled in different contexts.
2. The second change is simply a package checksum update, which doesn't indicate any specific security vulnerability being fixed, but rather a routine dependency update.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/test/browser/browser_telemetry_video_hardware_decoding_support.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/test/browser/browser_telemetry_video_hardware_decoding_support.js@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@   }); });+const ALL_SCALAR = "media.video_hardware_decoding_support";+const HD_SCALAR = "media.video_hd_hardware_decoding_support";+ add_task(async function testVideoCodecs() {   // There are still other video codecs, but we only care about these popular   // codec types.@@ -24,8 +27,6 @@     { fileName: "av1.mp4", type: "video/av1" },     { fileName: "bunny_hd_5s.mp4", type: "video/avc", hd: true },   ];-  const ALL_SCALAR = "media.video_hardware_decoding_support";-  const HD_SCALAR = "media.video_hd_hardware_decoding_support";   for (const file of testFiles) {     const { fileName, type, hd } = file;@@ -76,7 +77,12 @@     await audio.play();     let snapshot = Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars("main", false)       .parent;-    ok(!snapshot, `Did not record scalar for ${file}`);+    ok(+      !snapshot ||+        (!snapshot.hasOwnProperty(ALL_SCALAR) &&+          !snapshot.hasOwnProperty(HD_SCALAR)),+      `Did not record scalar for ${file}`+    );     audio.src = "";   } });

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [dom/media/test/browser/browser_telemetry_video_hardware_decoding_support.js] [Lines 76-77]
   [Old Code]
   let snapshot = Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars("main", false)
     .parent;
   ok(!snapshot, `Did not record scalar for ${file}`);
   [Fixed Code]
   let snapshot = Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForKeyedScalars("main", false)
     .parent;
   ok(
     !snapshot ||
       (!snapshot.hasOwnProperty(ALL_SCALAR) &&
         !snapshot.hasOwnProperty(HD_SCALAR)),
     `Did not record scalar for ${file}`
   );

   Additional Details: The change makes the telemetry data check more strict by verifying specific properties don't exist rather than just checking for null/undefined. This could potentially prevent information leakage if the telemetry data structure changes, but it's not clearly a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Code Organization Improvement] [dom/media/test/browser/browser_telemetry_video_hardware_decoding_support.js] [Lines 14-24]
   [Old Code]
   (constants defined inside test function)
   [Fixed Code]
   const ALL_SCALAR = "media.video_hardware_decoding_support";
   const HD_SCALAR = "media.video_hd_hardware_decoding_support";
   (constants moved to top of file)

   Additional Details: This appears to be purely a code organization improvement with no security implications.

The changes appear to be primarily about improving code quality and test robustness rather than fixing specific security vulnerabilities. The most significant change is the more thorough telemetry data check, which could have security implications but doesn't clearly correspond to any known vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.underflow.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.underflow.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); for (var i = 0; i < 16; ++i)     ctx.restore();

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Stack Underflow] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.underflow.html] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

for (var i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
    ctx.restore();
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

for (var i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
    ctx.restore();

Additional Details:
1. The main change appears to be a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`, which doesn't seem security-related.
2. The test case still performs multiple `restore()` calls without matching `save()` calls, which could potentially cause a stack underflow vulnerability in some implementations.
3. However, since this is a test file, it might be intentionally testing the browser's handling of such cases rather than fixing a vulnerability.
4. The filename suggests it's testing underflow conditions in canvas state management.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/places/tests/unit/interactions/test_snapshots_basics.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/places/tests/unit/interactions/test_snapshots_basics.js@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ const TEST_URL2 = "https://example.com/12345"; const TEST_URL3 = "https://example.com/14235"; const TEST_URL4 = "https://example.com/15234";+const TEST_URL5 = "https://example.com/54321";+const TEST_URL6 = "https://example.com/51432";+ const VERSION_PREF = "browser.places.snapshots.version"; XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetters(this, {@@ -30,6 +33,8 @@     { url: TEST_URL2, created_at: now - 20000, updated_at: now - 20000 },     { url: TEST_URL3, created_at: now - 10000, updated_at: now - 10000 },     { url: TEST_URL4, created_at: now, updated_at: now },+    { url: TEST_URL5, created_at: now, updated_at: now },+    { url: TEST_URL6, created_at: now, updated_at: now },   ]); });@@ -189,7 +194,7 @@       await IOUtils.exists(pathToKeyframes),       "Sanity check: keyframes.sqlite exists."     );-    await Snapshots.query({ url: TEST_URL1 });+    await Snapshots.query();     Assert.ok(       !(await IOUtils.exists(pathToKeyframes)),       "Keyframes.sqlite was deleted."@@ -204,3 +209,59 @@     "Calling Snapshots.query successfully updated to the most recent schema version."   ); });++add_task(async function test_add_titled_snapshot() {+  let title = "test";+  await Snapshots.add({ url: TEST_URL5, title });+  let snapshot = await Snapshots.get(TEST_URL5);+  Assert.equal(snapshot.title, title, "Title should have been set");++  info("Update the title");+  title = "test-changed";+  await Snapshots.add({ url: TEST_URL5, title });+  snapshot = await Snapshots.get(TEST_URL5);+  Assert.equal(snapshot.title, title, "Title should have been updated");++  info("Also check query");+  let snapshots = (await Snapshots.query()).filter(s => s.url == TEST_URL5);+  Assert.equal(snapshots[0].title, title, "Title should have been updated");+});++add_task(async function test_update_untitled_snapshot() {+  info("Add snapshot to a page having history title");+  const HISTORY_TITLE = "history-title";+  let title = HISTORY_TITLE;+  await PlacesTestUtils.addVisits({ uri: TEST_URL6, title });+  await Snapshots.add({+    url: TEST_URL6,+    userPersisted: Snapshots.USER_PERSISTED.PINNED,+  });+  let snapshot = await Snapshots.get(TEST_URL6);+  Assert.equal(snapshot.title, title, "History title should have been used");++  info("Update the title");+  title = "test-changed";+  await Snapshots.add({ url: TEST_URL6, title });+  snapshot = await Snapshots.get(TEST_URL6);+  Assert.equal(snapshot.title, title, "Title should have been updated");+  Assert.equal(+    snapshot.userPersisted,+    Snapshots.USER_PERSISTED.PINNED,+    "UserPersisted should not have been changed"+  );++  info("Not passing a title should not clear it");+  await Snapshots.add({ url: TEST_URL6 });+  snapshot = await Snapshots.get(TEST_URL6);+  Assert.equal(snapshot.title, title, "Title should not have been updated");++  info("Passing an empty title should clear it");+  title = "";+  await Snapshots.add({ url: TEST_URL6, title });+  snapshot = await Snapshots.get(TEST_URL6);+  Assert.equal(+    snapshot.title,+    HISTORY_TITLE,+    "Title should revert to the history one"+  );+});

After analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following security-related changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
The diff primarily shows test case additions and modifications for snapshot functionality in Firefox's Places component. No security vulnerabilities are being fixed in these changes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
The changes include:
- Adding new test URLs (TEST_URL5, TEST_URL6)
- Adding test cases for titled snapshots (test_add_titled_snapshot)
- Adding test cases for updating untitled snapshots (test_update_untitled_snapshot)
- Modifying an existing test case to use Snapshots.query() without parameters

3. Vulnerability Existed: no  
The changes appear to be feature enhancements and test coverage improvements rather than security fixes. The modifications focus on:
- Testing title persistence in snapshots
- Testing interaction between snapshot titles and history titles
- Verifying behavior when updating titles

The diff shows no evidence of security vulnerabilities being addressed, nor does it introduce any obvious security issues. The changes are focused on expanding test coverage for the snapshots feature.

No specific vulnerability names can be associated with these changes as they don't appear to be security-related fixes. The modifications are primarily concerned with adding new test cases and expanding existing functionality tests.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/CHANGELOG.md@@ -23,12 +23,40 @@    the non-coalesced case.  - decoder API: new function `JxlDecoderGetExtraChannelBlendInfo` to get    the blending information for extra channels in the non-coalesced case.+ - encoder API: added ability to set several encoder options to frames using+   `JxlEncoderFrameSettingsSetOption`+ - encoder API: new functions `JxlEncoderSetFrameHeader` and+   `JxlEncoderSetExtraChannelBlendInfo` to set animation+   and blending parameters of the frame, and `JxlEncoderInitFrameHeader` and+   `JxlEncoderInitBlendInfo` to initialize the structs to set.+ - decoder/encoder API: add two fields to `JXLBasicInfo`: `intrinsic_xsize`+   and `intrinsic_ysize` to signal the intrinsic size.+ - encoder API: ability to encode arbitrary extra channels:+  `JxlEncoderInitExtraChannelInfo`, `JxlEncoderSetExtraChannelInfo`,+  `JxlEncoderSetExtraChannelName` and `JxlEncoderSetExtraChannelBuffer`. ### Changed - decoder API: using `JxlDecoderCloseInput` at the end of all input is required   when using JXL_DEC_BOX, and is now also encouraged in other cases, but not   required in those other cases for backwards compatiblity. - encoder API: `JxlEncoderCloseInput` now closes both frames and boxes input.++### Deprecated+- encoder API: `JxlEncoderOptions`: use `JxlEncoderFrameSettings` instead+- encoder API: `JxlEncoderOptionsCreate`: use `JxlEncoderFrameSettingsCreate`+  instead+- encoder API: `JxlEncoderOptionsSetDistance`: use `JxlEncoderSetFrameDistance`+  instead+- encoder API: `JxlEncoderOptionsSetLossless`: use `JxlEncoderSetFrameLossless`+  instead+- encoder API: `JxlEncoderOptionsSetEffort`: use `JxlEncoderFrameSettingsSetOption(+  frame_settings, JXL_ENC_FRAME_SETTING_EFFORT, effort)` instead.+- encoder API: `JxlEncoderOptionsSetDecodingSpeed`: use+  `JxlEncoderFrameSettingsSetOption(frame_settings,+  JXL_ENC_FRAME_SETTING_DECODING_SPEED, tier)` instead.+- encoder API: deprecated `JXL_ENC_NOT_SUPPORTED`, the encoder returns+  `JXL_ENC_ERROR` instead and there is no need to handle+  `JXL_ENC_NOT_SUPPORTED`. ## [0.6.1] - 2021-10-29 ### Changed

Based on the provided diff content from the CHANGELOG.md file, this appears to be a standard update log showing API changes and additions rather than security fixes. There are no direct code changes shown (only changelog entries), and no specific security vulnerabilities are mentioned or patched.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerabilities identified] [third_party/jpeg-xl/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines 23-40]
[Old changelog entries]
[Updated changelog entries with API changes]

Additional notes:
1. The diff shows API changes, deprecations, and new features rather than security fixes
2. No CVE or vulnerability references are mentioned in the changelog
3. The changes appear to be functional improvements rather than security-related
4. Without seeing actual code changes (only changelog entries), we can't analyze specific vulnerabilities

Since this is just a changelog update without any security-related entries, I cannot identify any specific vulnerabilities that were fixed. The changes appear to be routine API evolution.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/src/agentio.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/src/agentio.rs@@ -29,14 +29,6 @@ /// Convert a pinned, boxed object into a void pointer. pub fn as_c_void<T: Unpin>(pin: &mut Pin<Box<T>>) -> *mut c_void {     (Pin::into_inner(pin.as_mut()) as *mut T).cast()-}--// This holds the length of the slice, not the slice itself.-#[derive(Default, Debug)]-struct RecordLength {-    epoch: Epoch,-    ct: ContentType,-    len: usize, } /// A slice of the output.

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed RecordLength struct] [third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/src/agentio.rs] [Lines 32-37]
[Old Code]
// This holds the length of the slice, not the slice itself.
#[derive(Default, Debug)]
struct RecordLength {
    epoch: Epoch,
    ct: ContentType,
    len: usize,
}
[Fixed Code]
[Removed]

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows removal of the `RecordLength` struct, but without more context about how it was used, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix or just code cleanup.
2. The struct appears to have held metadata about cryptographic records (epoch, content type, length), but we can't see if it was involved in any security-sensitive operations.
3. The comment suggests it held length information rather than the actual data, which might reduce potential security impact if removed.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The remaining change is just a comment about output slices which doesn't indicate any security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-005.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-005.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

Based on the provided diff, this appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-005.html] [Lines 23]
[Old Code: border: 2px dashed;]
[Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;]

Additional Details:
- This change is purely cosmetic, modifying the border style from dashed to solid and adding a color (salmon)
- The file appears to be a CSS grid layout test case
- No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are evident in this diff
- The modification is likely for better test visualization rather than addressing any security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/audioipc2-client/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/audioipc2-client/src/lib.rs@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ #[allow(clippy::missing_safety_doc)] #[no_mangle] /// Entry point from C code.-pub unsafe extern "C" fn audioipc_client_init(+pub unsafe extern "C" fn audioipc2_client_init(     c: *mut *mut ffi::cubeb,     context_name: *const c_char,     init_params: *const AudioIpcInitParams,

Let me analyze this code diff for potential security issues.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Function Naming Collision] [third_party/rust/audioipc2-client/src/lib.rs] [Lines 63-66]
[Old Code]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn audioipc_client_init(
[Fixed Code]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn audioipc2_client_init(

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a function name modification from `audioipc_client_init` to `audioipc2_client_init`
- While not a direct security vulnerability, this could potentially prevent naming collisions in the C FFI interface
- The change might be related to maintaining consistency with the crate name (audioipc2)
- Without more context about the broader system, it's hard to determine if this was fixing an actual security issue or just a naming convention update

Note: The diff doesn't show any obvious security vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, memory leaks, or unsafe pointer handling. The change is primarily a naming convention update.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-006.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-006.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Xin Liu" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="4.7. device-aspect-ratio" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#device-aspect-ratio"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'device-aspect-ratio' property set '0/0' is invalid that means the style sheet specified by 'device-aspect-ratio' will not be applied."> <style>   div {

Based on the provided diff content, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. First diff (warp/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name] third_party/rust/warp/.cargo-checksum.json [Entire file]
    [Old checksums and package version]
    [New checksums and package version]
    Note: This appears to be a version update of the warp dependency, but without seeing the actual code changes, we can't determine specific security fixes. The checksum file only shows that files were modified.

2. Second diff (device-aspect-ratio-006.html):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    [No vulnerability] testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-006.html [Line 5]
    [Old code containing meta name="flags" content=""]
    [New code without the flags meta tag]
    Note: This appears to be a test file cleanup removing an unused flags meta tag, not a security fix.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in these diffs. The first change is a dependency update which might include security fixes, but we can't determine that from just the checksum file. The second change is a minor test file modification.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgba-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgba-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 0, 0, 1. 0)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

I'll analyze the provided code diff according to the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgba-2.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 0, 0, 1. 0)'; } catch (e) { }
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';
try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 0, 0, 1. 0)'; } catch (e) { }
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the references accordingly. There doesn't appear to be any security vulnerability being fixed here - it's just a variable naming improvement for consistency or clarity. The functionality remains exactly the same, and the test assertions are unchanged in their purpose.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.