--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.html@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);+var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height); var ctx2 = offscreenCanvas2.getContext('2d'); var promise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {     var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);         ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'lighter';         ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,128,255, "50,25", "191,255,128,255", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,128,255, "50,25", "191,255,128,255", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be variable renaming and consistency improvements rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.html] [Lines 17-39]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.html] [Lines 17-39]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(offscreenCanvas.width, offscreenCanvas.height);
[Fixed Code]
var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(canvas.width, canvas.height);

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.canvas.lighter.html] [Lines 17-39]
[Old Code]
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,128,255, "50,25", "191,255,128,255", 5);
[Fixed Code]
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,128,255, "50,25", "191,255,128,255", 5);

The changes are purely variable name changes (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains the same, just with more consistent variable naming.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgb-5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgb-5.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0, 0, 0 /)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and test case maintenance. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-rgb-5.html
Lines: 17-25
Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No security-related changes were made to the test logic or color parsing functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/features/extended_connect/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/features/extended_connect/mod.rs@@ -6,28 +6,45 @@ #![allow(clippy::module_name_repetitions)]-pub mod session;-pub mod webtransport;+pub mod webtransport_session;+pub mod webtransport_streams; use crate::client_events::Http3ClientEvents; use crate::features::NegotiationState; use crate::settings::{HSettingType, HSettings};-use crate::{Http3StreamInfo, Http3StreamType};+use crate::{CloseType, Http3StreamInfo, Http3StreamType}; use neqo_transport::{AppError, StreamId};-pub use session::ExtendedConnectSession;-use std::cell::RefCell;-use std::collections::BTreeSet;-use std::collections::HashMap; use std::fmt::Debug;-use std::rc::Rc;+pub use webtransport_session::WebTransportSession;++#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]+pub enum SessionCloseReason {+    Error(AppError),+    Status(u16),+    Clean { error: u32, message: String },+}++impl From<CloseType> for SessionCloseReason {+    fn from(close_type: CloseType) -> SessionCloseReason {+        match close_type {+            CloseType::ResetApp(e) | CloseType::ResetRemote(e) | CloseType::LocalError(e) => {+                SessionCloseReason::Error(e)+            }+            CloseType::Done => SessionCloseReason::Clean {+                error: 0,+                message: "".to_string(),+            },+        }+    }+} pub trait ExtendedConnectEvents: Debug {-    fn session_start(&self, connect_type: ExtendedConnectType, stream_id: StreamId);+    fn session_start(&self, connect_type: ExtendedConnectType, stream_id: StreamId, status: u16);     fn session_end(         &self,         connect_type: ExtendedConnectType,         stream_id: StreamId,-        error: Option<AppError>,+        reason: SessionCloseReason,     );     fn extended_connect_new_stream(&self, stream_info: Http3StreamInfo); }@@ -66,9 +83,7 @@ #[derive(Debug)] pub struct ExtendedConnectFeature {-    connect_type: ExtendedConnectType,     feature_negotiation: NegotiationState,-    sessions: HashMap<StreamId, Rc<RefCell<ExtendedConnectSession>>>, } impl ExtendedConnectFeature {@@ -76,28 +91,11 @@     pub fn new(connect_type: ExtendedConnectType, enable: bool) -> Self {         Self {             feature_negotiation: NegotiationState::new(enable, HSettingType::from(connect_type)),-            connect_type,-            sessions: HashMap::new(),         }     }     pub fn set_listener(&mut self, new_listener: Http3ClientEvents) {         self.feature_negotiation.set_listener(new_listener);-    }--    pub fn insert(&mut self, stream_id: StreamId, session: Rc<RefCell<ExtendedConnectSession>>) {-        self.sessions.insert(stream_id, session);-    }--    pub fn get_session(-        &mut self,-        stream_id: StreamId,-    ) -> Option<Rc<RefCell<ExtendedConnectSession>>> {-        if !matches!(self.feature_negotiation, NegotiationState::Negotiated) {-            return None;-        }--        self.sessions.get_mut(&stream_id).cloned()     }     pub fn handle_settings(&mut self, settings: &HSettings) {@@ -108,13 +106,4 @@     pub fn enabled(&self) -> bool {         self.feature_negotiation.enabled()     }--    pub fn remove(-        &mut self,-        stream_id: StreamId,-    ) -> Option<(BTreeSet<StreamId>, BTreeSet<StreamId>)> {-        self.sessions-            .remove(&stream_id)-            .and_then(|ec| ec.borrow_mut().take_sub_streams())-    } }

Analyzing the provided code diff, I can identify the following security-related changes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Session Management Improvement] [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/features/extended_connect/mod.rs] [Lines 6-106]
[Old Code]
pub mod session;
pub mod webtransport;
...
pub struct ExtendedConnectFeature {
    connect_type: ExtendedConnectType,
    feature_negotiation: NegotiationState,
    sessions: HashMap<StreamId, Rc<RefCell<ExtendedConnectSession>>>,
}
...
pub fn remove(
    &mut self,
    stream_id: StreamId,
) -> Option<(BTreeSet<StreamId>, BTreeSet<StreamId>)> {
    self.sessions
        .remove(&stream_id)
        .and_then(|ec| ec.borrow_mut().take_sub_streams())
}
[Fixed Code]
pub mod webtransport_session;
pub mod webtransport_streams;
...
pub struct ExtendedConnectFeature {
    feature_negotiation: NegotiationState,
}
...
(remove function and session management code removed)

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Improved Error Handling] [third_party/rust/neqo-http3/src/features/extended_connect/mod.rs] [Lines 6-45]
[Old Code]
fn session_end(
    &self,
    connect_type: ExtendedConnectType,
    stream_id: StreamId,
    error: Option<AppError>,
);
[Fixed Code]
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
pub enum SessionCloseReason {
    Error(AppError),
    Status(u16),
    Clean { error: u32, message: String },
}
...
fn session_end(
    &self,
    connect_type: ExtendedConnectType,
    stream_id: StreamId,
    reason: SessionCloseReason,
);

The changes appear to:
1. Remove direct session management from the ExtendedConnectFeature struct, potentially improving security by reducing attack surface
2. Introduce more detailed error handling through SessionCloseReason enum, which could help with better security logging and error reporting

While these changes seem security-related, I cannot definitively say they fix specific known vulnerabilities without more context about the threat model or previous issues. The modifications appear to be architectural improvements that could enhance security posture.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-008.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-008.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's my assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-008.html] [Lines 23]
[Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
[Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;

Additional Details:
The change appears to be purely cosmetic/visual, modifying the border style from dashed to solid and changing the color to salmon. This is a styling change in a test file and doesn't appear to have any security implications. The modification is in a CSS property within an HTML test file, which doesn't affect security aspects like input validation, data handling, or system access.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/browser_markup_view-source.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/browser_markup_view-source.js@@ -3,9 +3,22 @@ "use strict";+/* import-globals-from ../../../debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js */+Services.scriptloader.loadSubScript(+  "chrome://mochitests/content/browser/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js",+  this+);++/* import-globals-from ../../../debugger/test/mochitest/helpers/context.js */+Services.scriptloader.loadSubScript(+  "chrome://mochitests/content/browser/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers/context.js",+  this+);+ const DOCUMENT_SRC = ` <body>-<button id="foo">Button</button>+<button id="btn-eval">Eval</button>+<button id="btn-dom0" onclick="console.info('bloup')">DOM0</button> <script> var script = \`   function foo() {@@ -14,7 +27,7 @@ \`; eval(script);-var button = document.getElementById("foo");+var button = document.getElementById("btn-eval"); button.addEventListener("click", foo, false); </script> </body>`;@@ -22,36 +35,94 @@ const TEST_URI = "data:text/html;charset=utf-8," + DOCUMENT_SRC; add_task(async function() {-  // Test that event handler links go to the right debugger source when it-  // came from an eval().-  const { inspector, tab, toolbox } = await openInspectorForURL(TEST_URI);+  const { inspector, toolbox } = await openInspectorForURL(TEST_URI);-  const nodeFront = await getNodeFront("#foo", inspector);+  info(+    "Test that event handler links go to the right debugger source when it came from an eval()"+  );+  const evaledSource = await clickOnJumpToDebuggerIconForNode(+    inspector,+    toolbox,+    "#btn-eval"+  );+  is(evaledSource.url, null, "no expected url for eval source");++  info("Add a breakpoint in opened source");+  const debuggerContext = createDebuggerContext(toolbox);+  await addBreakpoint(+    debuggerContext,+    debuggerContext.selectors.getSelectedSource(),+    1+  );+  await safeSynthesizeMouseEventAtCenterInContentPage("#btn-eval");++  await waitForPaused(debuggerContext);+  ok(true, "The debugger paused on the evaled source breakpoint");+  await resume(debuggerContext);++  info(+    "Test that event handler links go to the right debugger source when it's a dom0 event listener."+  );+  await toolbox.selectTool("inspector");+  const dom0Source = await clickOnJumpToDebuggerIconForNode(+    inspector,+    toolbox,+    "#btn-dom0"+  );+  is(dom0Source.url, null, "no expected url for dom0 event listener source");+  await addBreakpoint(+    debuggerContext,+    debuggerContext.selectors.getSelectedSource(),+    1+  );+  await safeSynthesizeMouseEventAtCenterInContentPage("#btn-dom0");+  await waitForPaused(debuggerContext);+  ok(true, "The debugger paused on the dom0 source breakpoint");+  await resume(debuggerContext);+});++async function clickOnJumpToDebuggerIconForNode(+  inspector,+  toolbox,+  nodeSelector+) {+  const nodeFront = await getNodeFront(nodeSelector, inspector);   const container = getContainerForNodeFront(nodeFront, inspector);   const evHolder = container.elt.querySelector(     ".inspector-badge.interactive[data-event]"   );-   evHolder.scrollIntoView();+  info(`Display event tooltip for node "${nodeSelector}"`);   EventUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(     evHolder,     {},     inspector.markup.doc.defaultView   );-   const tooltip = inspector.markup.eventDetailsTooltip;   await tooltip.once("shown");+  info(`Tooltip displayed, click on the "jump to debugger" icon`);   const debuggerIcon = tooltip.panel.querySelector(     ".event-tooltip-debugger-icon"   );++  if (!debuggerIcon) {+    ok(+      false,+      `There is no jump to debugger icon in event tooltip for node "${nodeSelector}"`+    );+    return null;+  }++  const onDebuggerSelected = toolbox.once(`jsdebugger-selected`);   EventUtils.synthesizeMouse(debuggerIcon, 2, 2, {}, debuggerIcon.ownerGlobal);-  await gDevTools.showToolboxForTab(tab, { toolId: "jsdebugger" });-  const dbg = toolbox.getPanel("jsdebugger");+  const dbg = await onDebuggerSelected;+  ok(true, "The debugger was opened");   let source;+  info("Wait for source to be opened");   await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(     () => {       source = dbg._selectors.getSelectedSource(dbg._getState());@@ -61,6 +132,5 @@     100,     20   );--  is(source.url, null, "expected no url for eval source");-});+  return source;+}

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)] [devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/browser_markup_view-source.js] [Lines 7-14]
   [Old Code]
   `<button id="foo">Button</button>`
   [Fixed Code]
   `<button id="btn-eval">Eval</button>
   <button id="btn-dom0" onclick="console.info('bloup')">DOM0</button>`

   Additional Details: The change adds DOM0 event handlers which could potentially be a security concern if user input isn't properly sanitized, though in this test case it's using hardcoded values.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Insecure Script Loading] [devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/browser_markup_view-source.js] [Lines 3-12]
   [Old Code]
   (No script loading code present)
   [Fixed Code]
   `Services.scriptloader.loadSubScript(
   "chrome://mochitests/content/browser/devtools/client/debugger/test/mochitest/helpers.js",
   this
   );`

   Additional Details: The change adds script loading which could potentially be a security concern if the loaded scripts aren't properly vetted, though these appear to be test helper scripts.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Eval Injection] [devtools/client/inspector/markup/test/browser_markup_view-source.js] [Lines 16-18]
   [Old Code]
   `eval(script);`
   [Fixed Code]
   `eval(script);` (unchanged but now used in more complex test scenario)

   Additional Details: The test continues using eval() which is generally considered dangerous, though in this case it appears to be part of controlled test code.

Note: While these changes don't appear to be fixing security vulnerabilities (they seem to be adding test functionality), they do introduce elements that could be security concerns in other contexts. The test appears to be enhancing its coverage of debugging scenarios rather than patching security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/enterprisepolicies/tests/browser/browser_policy_downloads.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/enterprisepolicies/tests/browser/browser_policy_downloads.js@@ -2,12 +2,6 @@  * http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ */ "use strict";--ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(-  this,-  "FileUtils",-  "resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm"-); add_task(async function test_defaultdownload() {   await setupPolicyEngineWithJson({@@ -33,7 +27,7 @@       true,       "saveTo should be disabled."     );-    let home = FileUtils.getFile("Home", []).path;+    let home = Services.dirsvc.get("Home", Ci.nsIFile).path;     is(       Services.prefs.getStringPref("browser.download.dir"),       home + "/Downloads",@@ -85,7 +79,7 @@       true,       "chooseFolder should be disabled."     );-    let home = FileUtils.getFile("Home", []).path;+    let home = Services.dirsvc.get("Home", Ci.nsIFile).path;     is(       Services.prefs.getStringPref("browser.download.dir"),       home + "/Documents",

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Module Import Removal] [browser_policy_downloads.js] [Lines 2-6]
   [Old Code]
   ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(
     this,
     "FileUtils",
     "resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm"
   );
   [Fixed Code]
   (removed entirely)

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [File Path Access Change] [browser_policy_downloads.js] [Lines 27,79]
   [Old Code]
   let home = FileUtils.getFile("Home", []).path;
   [Fixed Code]
   let home = Services.dirsvc.get("Home", Ci.nsIFile).path;

Additional Notes:
- The changes appear to be refactoring rather than direct security fixes
- The removal of FileUtils import and change in home directory access method might be related to:
  * Reducing attack surface by removing unused module
  * Using more secure/recommended API for directory access
- Without more context about why these changes were made, it's difficult to determine if they were specifically security-related

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/custom_bound.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/custom_bound.rs@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-extern crate syn;+#![allow(dead_code)] use std::ops::Add;++use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta}; #[derive(Debug, Clone, FromMeta)] #[darling(bound = "T: FromMeta + Add")]

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 1-8]
    Old Code:
    #[macro_use]
    extern crate darling;
    extern crate syn;
    
    Fixed Code:
    #![allow(dead_code)]
    
    use std::ops::Add;
    
    use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};

Analysis:
- The changes are primarily stylistic/modernization changes in Rust code:
  - Removal of `#[macro_use]` and `extern crate` statements (modern Rust prefers `use` statements)
  - Addition of `#![allow(dead_code)]` lint control
  - More specific imports from the darling crate
- No security-related changes are apparent in this diff
- The changes appear to be part of general code cleanup and modernization rather than security fixes

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are related to code style and organization rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/display.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/display.rs@@ -1,29 +1,23 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk; use crate::RawPtr;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct Display {     handle: vk::Instance,-    display_fn: vk::KhrDisplayFn,+    fp: vk::KhrDisplayFn, } impl Display {-    pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {-        let display_fn = vk::KhrDisplayFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+    pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+        let handle = instance.handle();+        let fp = vk::KhrDisplayFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: instance.handle(),-            display_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::KhrDisplayFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceDisplayPropertiesKHR.html>"]@@ -32,7 +26,7 @@         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,     ) -> VkResult<Vec<vk::DisplayPropertiesKHR>> {         read_into_uninitialized_vector(|count, data| {-            self.display_fn+            self.fp                 .get_physical_device_display_properties_khr(physical_device, count, data)         })     }@@ -43,7 +37,7 @@         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,     ) -> VkResult<Vec<vk::DisplayPlanePropertiesKHR>> {         read_into_uninitialized_vector(|count, data| {-            self.display_fn+            self.fp                 .get_physical_device_display_plane_properties_khr(physical_device, count, data)         })     }@@ -55,7 +49,7 @@         plane_index: u32,     ) -> VkResult<Vec<vk::DisplayKHR>> {         read_into_uninitialized_vector(|count, data| {-            self.display_fn.get_display_plane_supported_displays_khr(+            self.fp.get_display_plane_supported_displays_khr(                 physical_device,                 plane_index,                 count,@@ -71,7 +65,7 @@         display: vk::DisplayKHR,     ) -> VkResult<Vec<vk::DisplayModePropertiesKHR>> {         read_into_uninitialized_vector(|count, data| {-            self.display_fn+            self.fp                 .get_display_mode_properties_khr(physical_device, display, count, data)         })     }@@ -85,7 +79,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::DisplayModeKHR> {         let mut display_mode = mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed();-        self.display_fn+        self.fp             .create_display_mode_khr(                 physical_device,                 display,@@ -104,7 +98,7 @@         plane_index: u32,     ) -> VkResult<vk::DisplayPlaneCapabilitiesKHR> {         let mut display_plane_capabilities = mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed();-        self.display_fn+        self.fp             .get_display_plane_capabilities_khr(                 physical_device,                 mode,@@ -121,7 +115,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::SurfaceKHR> {         let mut surface = mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed();-        self.display_fn+        self.fp             .create_display_plane_surface_khr(                 self.handle,                 create_info,@@ -131,8 +125,12 @@             .result_with_success(surface.assume_init())     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::KhrDisplayFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrDisplayFn {-        &self.display_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential API Usage Change] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/display.rs] [Lines: Changed from EntryCustom to Entry]
   [Old Code]
   use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};
   pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {
   [Fixed Code]
   use crate::{Entry, Instance};
   pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {

   Additional Details: The change from EntryCustom to Entry might indicate a security-related change in how Vulkan entry points are handled, but without more context about why this change was made, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Field Renaming] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/display.rs] [Lines: display_fn renamed to fp]
   [Old Code]
   display_fn: vk::KhrDisplayFn,
   [Fixed Code]
   fp: vk::KhrDisplayFn,

   Additional Details: While this appears to be just a field renaming (from display_fn to fp), such changes can sometimes be related to security fixes if the original name was misleading about the field's purpose or security implications. However, without more context, this is uncertain.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Code Reorganization] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/display.rs] [Lines: name() function moved]
   [Old Code]
   pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {
       vk::KhrDisplayFn::name()
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   (function moved to end of file, same implementation)

   Additional Details: This appears to be purely a code reorganization with no security implications.

The changes appear to be primarily code cleanup and reorganization rather than explicit security fixes. The most significant change is the switch from EntryCustom to Entry, which could potentially have security implications, but without more context about why this change was made, we can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/cache-padded/CHANGELOG.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/cache-padded/CHANGELOG.md@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@+# Version 1.2.0++- Improve implementation of `CachePadded`.+ # Version 1.1.1 - Forbid unsafe code.

Based on the provided diff content, which only shows a changelog update, I cannot identify any specific security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes mention an implementation improvement and forbidding unsafe code, but without seeing the actual code changes, I can't determine if these were security-related fixes.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability identified] [third_party/rust/cache-padded/CHANGELOG.md] [Lines 1-3]
    [Old Changelog content]
    [New Changelog content with implementation improvement note]

Additional notes:
1. The mention of "Forbid unsafe code" could potentially relate to security (as unsafe code can lead to vulnerabilities), but without seeing the actual code changes, I can't confirm this was a security fix.
2. The "Improve implementation of CachePadded" could potentially address security issues, but again, without code context, this is speculative.
3. The changelog doesn't mention any security-related fixes specifically.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-007.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-007.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ 		<link rel="author" href="http://opera.com" title="Opera Software ASA"> 		<link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-conditional/#at-supports"> 		<link rel="match" href="at-supports-001-ref.html">-		<meta name="flags" content=""> 		<style> 			div { 				background-color:red;

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-007.html [Lines] 6
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup or test configuration change.
3. No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here - it's just removing unnecessary markup from a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/stats.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/stats.js@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@       "ssrc",       "mediaType",       "kind",+      "codecId",       "packetsReceived",       "packetsLost",       "packetsDiscarded",@@ -29,7 +30,6 @@     unimplemented: [       "mediaTrackId",       "transportId",-      "codecId",       "associateStatsId",       "sliCount",       "packetsRepaired",@@ -52,19 +52,14 @@       "ssrc",       "mediaType",       "kind",+      "codecId",       "packetsSent",       "bytesSent",       "remoteId",     ],-    optional: ["nackCount"],-    localVideoOnly: ["framesEncoded", "firCount", "pliCount", "qpSum"],-    unimplemented: [-      "mediaTrackId",-      "transportId",-      "codecId",-      "sliCount",-      "targetBitrate",-    ],+    optional: ["nackCount", "qpSum"],+    localVideoOnly: ["framesEncoded", "firCount", "pliCount"],+    unimplemented: ["mediaTrackId", "transportId", "sliCount", "targetBitrate"],     deprecated: ["isRemote"],   },   "remote-inbound-rtp": {@@ -75,6 +70,7 @@       "ssrc",       "mediaType",       "kind",+      "codecId",       "packetsLost",       "jitter",       "localId",@@ -83,7 +79,6 @@     unimplemented: [       "mediaTrackId",       "transportId",-      "codecId",       "packetsDiscarded",       "associateStatsId",       "sliCount",@@ -105,23 +100,32 @@       "ssrc",       "mediaType",       "kind",+      "codecId",       "packetsSent",       "bytesSent",       "localId",       "remoteTimestamp",     ],     optional: ["nackCount"],-    unimplemented: [-      "mediaTrackId",-      "transportId",-      "codecId",-      "sliCount",-      "targetBitrate",-    ],+    unimplemented: ["mediaTrackId", "transportId", "sliCount", "targetBitrate"],     deprecated: ["isRemote"],   },   csrc: { skip: true },-  codec: { skip: true },+  codec: {+    expected: [+      "timestamp",+      "type",+      "id",+      "payloadType",+      "transportId",+      "mimeType",+      "clockRate",+      "sdpFmtpLine",+    ],+    optional: ["codecType", "channels"],+    unimplemented: [],+    deprecated: [],+  },   "peer-connection": { skip: true },   "data-channel": { skip: true },   track: { skip: true },@@ -349,6 +353,21 @@       ok(stat.kind == stat.mediaType, "kind equals legacy mediaType");+      // codecId+      ok(stat.codecId, `${stat.type}.codecId has a value`);+      ok(report.has(stat.codecId), `codecId ${stat.codecId} exists in report`);+      is(+        report.get(stat.codecId).type,+        "codec",+        `codecId ${stat.codecId} in report is codec type`+      );+      is(+        report.get(stat.codecId).mimeType.slice(0, 5),+        stat.kind,+        `codecId ${stat.codecId} in report is for a mimeType of the same ` ++          `media type as the referencing rtp stream stat`+      );+       if (isRemote) {         // local id         if (stat.localId) {@@ -552,6 +571,22 @@       // Optional fields       //+      // qpSum+      // This is supported for all of our vpx codecs (on the encode side, see+      // bug 1519590)+      if (report.get(stat.codecId).mimeType.includes("VP")) {+        ok(+          stat.qpSum >= 0,+          `${stat.type}.qpSum is a sane number (${stat.kind}) ` ++            `for ${report.get(stat.codecId).mimeType}. value=${stat.qpSum}`+        );+      } else {+        ok(+          !stat.qpSum && !("qpSum" in stat),+          `${stat.type}.qpSum absent for ${report.get(stat.codecId).mimeType}`+        );+      }+       //       // Local video only stats       //@@ -577,15 +612,6 @@           stat.framesEncoded >= 0 && stat.framesEncoded < 100000,           `${stat.type}.framesEncoded is a sane number for a short ` +             `${stat.kind} test. value=${stat.framesEncoded}`-        );--        // qpSum-        // techinically optional but should be supported for all of our-        // codecs (on the encode side, see bug 1519590)-        ok(-          stat.qpSum >= 0,-          `${stat.type} qpSum is a sane number (${stat.kind}). ` +-            `value=${stat.qpSum}`         );       }     } else if (stat.type == "remote-outbound-rtp") {@@ -630,6 +656,184 @@           `${stat.type}.timestamp, and no older than 30 seconds. ` +           `difference=${ageSeconds}s`       );+    } else if (stat.type == "codec") {+      //+      // Required fields+      //++      // mimeType & payloadType+      switch (stat.mimeType) {+        case "audio/opus":+          is(stat.payloadType, 109, "codec.payloadType for opus");+          break;+        case "video/VP8":+          is(stat.payloadType, 120, "codec.payloadType for VP8");+          break;+        case "video/VP9":+          is(stat.payloadType, 121, "codec.payloadType for VP9");+          break;+        case "video/H264":+          ok(+            stat.payloadType == 97 || stat.payloadType == 126,+            `codec.payloadType for H264 was ${stat.payloadType}, exp. 97 or 126`+          );+          break;+        default:+          ok(+            false,+            `Unexpected codec.mimeType ${stat.mimeType} for payloadType ` ++              `${stat.payloadType}`+          );+          break;+      }++      // transportId+      // (no transport stats yet)+      ok(stat.transportId, "codec.transportId is set");++      // clockRate+      if (stat.mimeType.startsWith("audio")) {+        is(stat.clockRate, 48000, "codec.clockRate for audio/opus");+      } else if (stat.mimeType.startsWith("video")) {+        is(stat.clockRate, 90000, "codec.clockRate for video");+      }++      // sdpFmtpLine+      // (not technically mandated by spec, but expected here)+      ok(stat.sdpFmtpLine, "codec.sdpFmtpLine is set");+      const opusParams = [+        "maxplaybackrate",+        "maxaveragebitrate",+        "usedtx",+        "stereo",+        "useinbandfec",+        "cbr",+        "ptime",+        "minptime",+        "maxptime",+      ];+      const vpxParams = ["max-fs", "max-fr"];+      const h264Params = [+        "packetization-mode",+        "level-asymmetry-allowed",+        "profile-level-id",+        "max-fs",+        "max-cpb",+        "max-dpb",+        "max-br",+        "max-mbps",+      ];+      for (const param of stat.sdpFmtpLine.split(";")) {+        const [key, value] = param.split("=");+        if (stat.payloadType == 109) {+          ok(+            opusParams.includes(key),+            `codec.sdpFmtpLine param ${key}=${value} for opus`+          );+        } else if (stat.payloadType == 120 || stat.payloadType == 121) {+          ok(+            vpxParams.includes(key),+            `codec.sdpFmtpLine param ${key}=${value} for VPx`+          );+        } else if (stat.payloadType == 97 || stat.payloadType == 126) {+          ok(+            h264Params.includes(key),+            `codec.sdpFmtpLine param ${key}=${value} for H264`+          );+          if (key == "packetization-mode") {+            if (stat.payloadType == 97) {+              is(value, "0", "codec.sdpFmtpLine: H264 (97) packetization-mode");+            } else if (stat.payloadType == 126) {+              is(+                value,+                "1",+                "codec.sdpFmtpLine: H264 (126) packetization-mode"+              );+            }+          }+          if (key == "profile-level-id") {+            is(value, "42e01f", "codec.sdpFmtpLine: H264 profile-level-id");+          }+        }+      }++      //+      // Optional fields+      //++      // codecType+      ok(+        !Object.keys(stat).includes("codecType") ||+          stat.codecType == "encode" ||+          stat.codecType == "decode",+        "codec.codecType (${codec.codecType}) is an expected value or absent"+      );+      let numRecvStreams = 0;+      let numSendStreams = 0;+      const counts = {+        "inbound-rtp": 0,+        "outbound-rtp": 0,+        "remote-inbound-rtp": 0,+        "remote-outbound-rtp": 0,+      };+      const [kind] = stat.mimeType.split("/");+      report.forEach(other => {+        if (other.type == "inbound-rtp" && other.kind == kind) {+          numRecvStreams += 1;+        } else if (other.type == "outbound-rtp" && other.kind == kind) {+          numSendStreams += 1;+        }+        if (other.codecId == stat.id) {+          counts[other.type] += 1;+        }+      });+      const expectedCounts = {+        encode: {+          "inbound-rtp": 0,+          "outbound-rtp": numSendStreams,+          "remote-inbound-rtp": numSendStreams,+          "remote-outbound-rtp": 0,+        },+        decode: {+          "inbound-rtp": numRecvStreams,+          "outbound-rtp": 0,+          "remote-inbound-rtp": 0,+          "remote-outbound-rtp": numRecvStreams,+        },+        absent: {+          "inbound-rtp": numRecvStreams,+          "outbound-rtp": numSendStreams,+          "remote-inbound-rtp": numSendStreams,+          "remote-outbound-rtp": numRecvStreams,+        },+      };+      // Note that the logic above assumes at most one sender and at most one+      // receiver was used to generate this stats report. If more senders or+      // receivers are present, they'd be referring to not only this codec stat,+      // skewing `numSendStreams` and `numRecvStreams` above.+      // This could be fixed when we support `senderId` and `receiverId` in+      // RTCOutboundRtpStreamStats and RTCInboundRtpStreamStats respectively.+      for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(counts)) {+        is(+          value,+          expectedCounts[stat.codecType || "absent"][key],+          `codec.codecType ${stat.codecType || "absent"} ref from ${key} stat`+        );+      }++      // channels+      if (stat.mimeType.startsWith("audio")) {+        ok(stat.channels, "codec.channels should exist for audio");+        if (stat.channels) {+          if (stat.sdpFmtpLine.includes("stereo=1")) {+            is(stat.channels, 2, "codec.channels for stereo audio");+          } else {+            is(stat.channels, 1, "codec.channels for mono audio");+          }+        }+      } else {+        ok(!stat.channels, "codec.channels should not exist for video");+      }     } else if (stat.type == "candidate-pair") {       info("candidate-pair is: " + JSON.stringify(stat));       //@@ -694,8 +898,8 @@         // bytesSent         ok(-          stat.bytesSent > 5000,-          `${stat.type}.bytesSent is a sane number (>5,000) for a short ` ++          stat.bytesSent > 1000,+          `${stat.type}.bytesSent is a sane number (>1,000) for a short ` +             `${stat.kind} test. value=${stat.bytesSent}`         );@@ -988,7 +1192,7 @@       test.pcRemote._pc.getSenders().map(async s => {         checkSenderStats(           await s.getStats(),-          Math.max(1, s.getParameters()?.encodings?.length ?? 0)+          s.track ? Math.max(1, s.getParameters()?.encodings?.length ?? 0) : 0         );       }),     ]);

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Codec Validation] [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/stats.js] [Lines 13-833]
   [Old Code] - No detailed codec validation
   [Fixed Code] - Added comprehensive validation for codec fields including mimeType, payloadType, transportId, clockRate, and sdpFmtpLine

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [QP Sum Validation] [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/stats.js] [Lines 552-612]
   [Old Code] - qpSum was in localVideoOnly section with basic validation
   [Fixed Code] - Moved qpSum to optional section with VP codec-specific validation

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Bytes Sent Threshold] [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/stats.js] [Lines 898-900]
   [Old Code] - bytesSent threshold was >5000
   [Fixed Code] - bytesSent threshold lowered to >1000

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Sender Track Validation] [dom/media/webrtc/tests/mochitests/stats.js] [Lines 1192]
   [Old Code] - No track existence check before getting encodings length
   [Fixed Code] - Added track existence check before getting encodings length

Note: While these changes appear to be improvements in validation and error handling, I cannot definitively say they fix specific vulnerabilities without more context about the security issues they might address. The changes primarily focus on:
1. Adding more rigorous validation of WebRTC stats
2. Adjusting test thresholds
3. Adding safety checks for track existence
4. Reorganizing and expanding test coverage for codec-related stats

The most significant change is the addition of comprehensive codec validation, which could potentially prevent issues with malformed or unexpected codec parameters.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/x86/BaseAssembler-x86.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/x86/BaseAssembler-x86.h@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@                   dst);   }-  void vhaddpd_rr(XMMRegisterID src, XMMRegisterID dst) {-    twoByteOpSimdFlags("vhaddpd", VEX_PD, OP2_HADDPD, src, dst);+  void vhaddpd_rr(XMMRegisterID src1, XMMRegisterID src0, XMMRegisterID dst) {+    twoByteOpSimd("vhaddpd", VEX_PD, OP2_HADDPD, src1, src0, dst);   }   void vsubpd_rr(XMMRegisterID src1, XMMRegisterID src0, XMMRegisterID dst) {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Register Handling Issue] [js/src/jit/x86/BaseAssembler-x86.h] [Lines 155-156]  
   Old Code:  
   ```cpp
   void vhaddpd_rr(XMMRegisterID src, XMMRegisterID dst) {
       twoByteOpSimdFlags("vhaddpd", VEX_PD, OP2_HADDPD, src, dst);
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```cpp
   void vhaddpd_rr(XMMRegisterID src1, XMMRegisterID src0, XMMRegisterID dst) {
       twoByteOpSimd("vhaddpd", VEX_PD, OP2_HADDPD, src1, src0, dst);
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change modifies the function signature and implementation to handle two source registers instead of one. While this appears to be a correctness fix for register handling in SIMD operations, it's unclear if this was specifically addressing a security vulnerability or just improving implementation accuracy. The change from `twoByteOpSimdFlags` to `twoByteOpSimd` might indicate a more fundamental correction in how the operation is processed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-table-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-table-002.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-paint-047-ref.html">   <meta content="This test checks that paint containment applies to table elements. Therefore the content of the table element (including its caption) should be clipped to the padding edge of its principal box." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div#table

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-table-002.html] [Lines 10]
[Old Code]
  <meta content="This test checks that paint containment applies to table elements. Therefore the content of the table element (including its caption) should be clipped to the padding edge of its principal box." name="assert">
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
  <meta content="This test checks that paint containment applies to table elements. Therefore the content of the table element (including its caption) should be clipped to the padding edge of its principal box." name="assert">

The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related. This seems to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix. No known vulnerabilities are addressed by this modification.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-epoch/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"40b65a13f12e97a24c838fe2254a3563a5fe00922053ef7256ed4752876614fa","Cargo.lock":"35b1db42b892c01e72ff1f99fc7767e5e47208d083203866337f6f2f7d0738eb","Cargo.toml":"eab75399db818408fd4f45a91919b08e050e56547014816683a269270e292055","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"5734ed989dfca1f625b40281ee9f4530f91b2411ec01cb748223e7eb87e201ab","README.md":"f946b25082979595d3851d90c4e76424be921a779e88e982f8455d44d46057ec","benches/defer.rs":"c330b704d96b2ad1aed29f72c37a99da534adef8cb06a3976d5f93bf567abb20","benches/flush.rs":"0389ac6c473632f0e93c962f223404cc360257f6699b4ec90b9b3be16bb6d74f","benches/pin.rs":"80f9e65ba04a2ddec7a330172d0b0fbc698e20c221b3d8cdc70cc42e3b9099d1","build.rs":"c8684300062c73e96eae8877d03e145ee95e0cd99d4d933696caa582c08e2416","examples/sanitize.rs":"a39d1635fa61e643e59192d7a63becc97ff81f03c1f4e03d38cedefb1525026a","no_atomic.rs":"a2621c1b029c614fb0ab8e3f5cda2e839df88d90d26133181c1b901965f7eec4","src/atomic.rs":"631d3062e3c30d8e505fda3a7e2c68a88abf7617881035d6131c39cb8fdddce0","src/collector.rs":"7d636f3f96fafd033298d1c2ab126205438a46deb84895d8e28bea9eef67798a","src/default.rs":"e1449bd6e61d7c19e9cbdf183f81c67c3487775fcc55572947874ca535d3d54f","src/deferred.rs":"1ee67bd3200d3891076aac8cfc9767abdddc194602f2084d11455484096005ea","src/epoch.rs":"d31e66d8fe62299928e25867336d96391b26a4fe890a1cae0885dfcf36d6835b","src/guard.rs":"55c56ca1b2fbc067ae21108f0f7de4be91e5b41df2492055b635ed436782dd52","src/internal.rs":"f3f8131819b2a4ec4d1a6d392c734688324f3ae708bac6745e88f2930657eba1","src/lib.rs":"bcaa7c8dc9f9eb1ef6f56b4c0705db348d00b21325b6c0c1544cd7aec0613dc9","src/sync/list.rs":"10aa4c59845ab9ff1d8bcb6f594b70bbe23c320fa7a2b125fdf85df88b9d61e2","src/sync/mod.rs":"cbc6334460d73761c3dea7f99ed2ccbf267d5da3bc76c812e94f85c9f4565c6a","src/sync/queue.rs":"262e0d8f343e97df9e2a738461e4255e339710e81c479e484f9efe517ae47135","tests/loom.rs":"db772f4478966de6ec98774ca4093171dc942da635822a0d2d3257d31188cb9b"},"package":"4ec02e091aa634e2c3ada4a392989e7c3116673ef0ac5b72232439094d73b7fd"}+{"files":{"CHANGELOG.md":"7f3c7198f2e33ba93bb8270e1c1e8dc6d70c343987acd9d0706e3632cbb9e0ad","Cargo.lock":"10e3899295e7e8ce93d3f0b597efbec844bdda40f78ae717f5995341d41ee937","Cargo.toml":"d7e7ab87ca4a4e8cc4ae9644e1537eedc46473ff5f89399b4733c4bdf59058db","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"5734ed989dfca1f625b40281ee9f4530f91b2411ec01cb748223e7eb87e201ab","README.md":"f946b25082979595d3851d90c4e76424be921a779e88e982f8455d44d46057ec","benches/defer.rs":"c330b704d96b2ad1aed29f72c37a99da534adef8cb06a3976d5f93bf567abb20","benches/flush.rs":"0389ac6c473632f0e93c962f223404cc360257f6699b4ec90b9b3be16bb6d74f","benches/pin.rs":"2f649a5153745c7930efdb32a52f9dc522f7b8cf548a251c5e2c82ee25dc3fff","build.rs":"58a36da8f9ca3a9206d31a0d6e7548f200fe8746ebca5edca48679b0d29a8043","examples/sanitize.rs":"a39d1635fa61e643e59192d7a63becc97ff81f03c1f4e03d38cedefb1525026a","no_atomic.rs":"3529c0833bcd1e09a352d3bd1696d3666850c9b09fe2111bf1a783ec16a5f467","src/atomic.rs":"63843b5ecd51b3fc98336247abe8efa824d826f142e40a761636e530d06f3b41","src/collector.rs":"e2d9780d8707e49360b3c33f2f829f29f70e6929307e65e23449b8ba6def6358","src/default.rs":"e1449bd6e61d7c19e9cbdf183f81c67c3487775fcc55572947874ca535d3d54f","src/deferred.rs":"ea532517c8ca22010ed9a624b059471c8a57b25e7925f6a5dfb391be7646a1fa","src/epoch.rs":"d31e66d8fe62299928e25867336d96391b26a4fe890a1cae0885dfcf36d6835b","src/guard.rs":"55c56ca1b2fbc067ae21108f0f7de4be91e5b41df2492055b635ed436782dd52","src/internal.rs":"67a6811b8c58e1152fd1dc17e389884025a0d99d79ab03dee26efcd0d6896690","src/lib.rs":"bcaa7c8dc9f9eb1ef6f56b4c0705db348d00b21325b6c0c1544cd7aec0613dc9","src/sync/list.rs":"10aa4c59845ab9ff1d8bcb6f594b70bbe23c320fa7a2b125fdf85df88b9d61e2","src/sync/mod.rs":"cbc6334460d73761c3dea7f99ed2ccbf267d5da3bc76c812e94f85c9f4565c6a","src/sync/queue.rs":"06173b2255677d0d39178ceb49876fda2878f491e907c595eb65643dbb43c9ba","tests/loom.rs":"db772f4478966de6ec98774ca4093171dc942da635822a0d2d3257d31188cb9b"},"package":"97242a70df9b89a65d0b6df3c4bf5b9ce03c5b7309019777fbde37e7537f8762"}=========services/sync/modules/constants.js========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/services/sync/modules/constants.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/services/sync/modules/constants.js@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ for (let [key, val] of Object.entries({   // Don't manually modify this line, as it is automatically replaced on merge day   // by the gecko_migration.py script.-  WEAVE_VERSION: "1.99.0",+  WEAVE_VERSION: "1.100.0",   // Sync Server API version that the client supports.   SYNC_API_VERSION: "1.5",

Analyzing the provided code diffs:

1. For the first diff (crossbeam-epoch/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is just a checksum update for various files in the Rust crate. No code changes or security fixes are visible in this diff.

2. For the second diff (services/sync/modules/constants.js):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Version Update] services/sync/modules/constants.js [Lines 7]
    [Old Code] WEAVE_VERSION: "1.99.0",
    [Fixed Code] WEAVE_VERSION: "1.100.0",
    Additional Details: This appears to be a routine version bump. Without more context about what changed between versions, we can't determine if this fixes any security vulnerabilities. The version number suggests it might be a minor update rather than a security patch.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in these diffs. The first is just checksum updates, and the second is a version number increment without any accompanying security-related changes visible in the diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/osx.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/osx.py@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ from __future__ import absolute_import, print_function, unicode_literals-import os import platform import subprocess import sys@@ -15,10 +14,11 @@ except ImportError:     from urllib.request import urlopen-from distutils.version import StrictVersion+from packaging.version import Version from mozboot.base import BaseBootstrapper from mozfile import which+from mach.util import to_optional_path, to_optional_str HOMEBREW_BOOTSTRAP = (     "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install.sh"@@ -38,21 +38,6 @@ """ NO_BREW_INSTALLED = "It seems you don't have Homebrew installed."--BAD_PATH_ORDER = """-Your environment's PATH variable lists a system path directory (%s)-before the path to your package manager's binaries (%s).-This means that the package manager's binaries likely won't be-detected properly.--Modify your shell's configuration (e.g. ~/.profile or-~/.bash_profile) to have %s appear in $PATH before %s. e.g.--    export PATH=%s:$PATH--Once this is done, start a new shell (likely Command+T) and run-this bootstrap again.-""" class OSXAndroidBootstrapper(object):@@ -198,9 +183,9 @@     def __init__(self, version, **kwargs):         BaseBootstrapper.__init__(self, **kwargs)-        self.os_version = StrictVersion(version)--        if self.os_version < StrictVersion("10.6"):+        self.os_version = Version(version)++        if self.os_version < Version("10.6"):             raise Exception("OS X 10.6 or above is required.")         self.minor_version = version.split(".")[1]@@ -228,7 +213,7 @@         pass     def _ensure_homebrew_found(self):-        self.brew = which("brew")+        self.brew = to_optional_path(which("brew"))         return self.brew is not None@@ -237,7 +222,7 @@         self.ensure_homebrew_installed()         def create_homebrew_cmd(*parameters):-            base_cmd = [self.brew]+            base_cmd = [to_optional_str(self.brew)]             base_cmd.extend(parameters)             return base_cmd + [package_type_flag]@@ -265,18 +250,22 @@     def _ensure_homebrew_casks(self, casks):         self._ensure_homebrew_found()-        known_taps = subprocess.check_output([self.brew, "tap"])+        known_taps = subprocess.check_output([to_optional_str(self.brew), "tap"])         # Ensure that we can access old versions of packages.         if b"homebrew/cask-versions" not in known_taps:-            subprocess.check_output([self.brew, "tap", "homebrew/cask-versions"])+            subprocess.check_output(+                [to_optional_str(self.brew), "tap", "homebrew/cask-versions"]+            )         # "caskroom/versions" has been renamed to "homebrew/cask-versions", so         # it is safe to remove the old tap. Removing the old tap is necessary         # to avoid the error "Cask [name of cask] exists in multiple taps".         # See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1544981         if b"caskroom/versions" in known_taps:-            subprocess.check_output([self.brew, "untap", "caskroom/versions"])+            subprocess.check_output(+                [to_optional_str(self.brew), "untap", "caskroom/versions"]+            )         self._ensure_homebrew_packages(casks, is_for_cask=True)@@ -294,17 +283,6 @@         if not homebrew_found:             self.install_homebrew()-        # Check for correct $PATH ordering.-        brew_dir = os.path.dirname(self.brew)-        for path in os.environ["PATH"].split(os.pathsep):-            if path == brew_dir:-                break--            for check in ("/bin", "/usr/bin"):-                if path == check:-                    print(BAD_PATH_ORDER % (check, brew_dir, brew_dir, check, brew_dir))-                    sys.exit(1)-     def ensure_clang_static_analysis_package(self):         from mozboot import static_analysis@@ -351,14 +329,15 @@             sys.exit(1)     def _update_package_manager(self):-        subprocess.check_call([self.brew, "-v", "update"])+        subprocess.check_call([to_optional_str(self.brew), "-v", "update"])     def _upgrade_package(self, package):         self._ensure_homebrew_installed()         try:             subprocess.check_output(-                [self.brew, "-v", "upgrade", package], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT+                [to_optional_str(self.brew), "-v", "upgrade", package],+                stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,             )         except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:             if b"already installed" not in e.output:

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Dependency Confusion Vulnerability [python/mozboot/mozboot/osx.py] [Lines: 15, 38]
Old Code: 
from distutils.version import StrictVersion
if self.os_version < StrictVersion("10.6"):

Fixed Code:
from packaging.version import Version
if self.os_version < Version("10.6"):

Additional Details: The code switched from the deprecated distutils.version.StrictVersion to packaging.version.Version. While not a direct security vulnerability, this change prevents potential future issues as distutils is being phased out.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Command Injection Vulnerability [python/mozboot/mozboot/osx.py] [Multiple lines]
Old Code: Direct use of brew path in subprocess calls
Fixed Code: Using to_optional_str() wrapper for brew path in all subprocess calls

Additional Details: The change adds path sanitization through to_optional_str() for all subprocess calls involving the brew executable, making the code more resistant to command injection attacks.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Path Manipulation Vulnerability [python/mozboot/mozboot/osx.py] [Lines: 198-228]
Old Code: Direct use of os.path and PATH environment variable checks
Fixed Code: Removed PATH ordering checks completely

Additional Details: The removal of manual PATH checking eliminates potential path manipulation vulnerabilities that could occur when processing environment variables directly.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [python/mozboot/mozboot/osx.py] [Lines: 265-275]
Old Code: Direct subprocess output handling
Fixed Code: Still uses subprocess but with more structured output handling

Additional Details: While not clearly a security fix, the changes to subprocess output handling might prevent potential information leaks in error cases, though this is uncertain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/karma.mc.config.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/karma.mc.config.js@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@       outputFile: path.join("logs", "karma-run-results.json"),     },     coverageIstanbulReporter: {-      reports: ["html", "text-summary"],+      reports: ["lcov", "text-summary"], // for some reason "lcov" reallys means "lcov" and "html"       dir: PATHS.coverageReportingPath,       // This will make karma fail if coverage reporting is less than the minimums here       thresholds: !isTDD && {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability [File] browser/components/newtab/karma.mc.config.js [Lines] 58
    Old Code: reports: ["html", "text-summary"]
    Fixed Code: reports: ["lcov", "text-summary"] // for some reason "lcov" reallys means "lcov" and "html"

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a modification in test coverage reporting configuration, switching from "html" to "lcov" format.
- The comment suggests this is more about fixing reporting behavior than addressing a security issue.
- No security vulnerability is evident from this change as it's related to test infrastructure rather than application security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/payments/PaymentRequest.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/payments/PaymentRequest.h@@ -201,8 +201,10 @@   nsresult UpdatePaymentMethod(const nsAString& aMethodName,                                const ChangeDetails& aMethodDetails);-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;   bool InFullyActiveDocument();

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Promise Handling Vulnerability] [dom/payments/PaymentRequest.h] [Lines 201-204]
[Old Code]
  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
[Fixed Code]
  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;
  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override;

Additional Details:
- The change adds ErrorResult parameters to promise callback handlers
- This could potentially fix unhandled error cases in promise resolution/rejection
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving error handling
- The modification follows better practices for error handling in Mozilla's Gecko engine

Note: This appears to be a defensive programming improvement rather than a clear vulnerability fix, but could potentially address cases where errors weren't being properly propagated.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPContentChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/gmp/GMPContentChild.cpp@@ -62,8 +62,7 @@   void* vd = nullptr;   GMPErr err = mGMPChild->GetAPI(GMP_API_VIDEO_DECODER, &vdc->Host(), &vd);   if (err != GMPNoErr || !vd) {-    NS_WARNING("GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct decoder.");-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    return IPC_FAIL(this, "GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct decoder.");   }   vdc->Init(static_cast<GMPVideoDecoder*>(vd));@@ -78,8 +77,7 @@   void* ve = nullptr;   GMPErr err = mGMPChild->GetAPI(GMP_API_VIDEO_ENCODER, &vec->Host(), &ve);   if (err != GMPNoErr || !ve) {-    NS_WARNING("GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct encoder.");-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    return IPC_FAIL(this, "GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct encoder.");   }   vec->Init(static_cast<GMPVideoEncoder*>(ve));@@ -95,8 +93,7 @@   void* cdm = nullptr;   GMPErr err = mGMPChild->GetAPI(CHROMIUM_CDM_API, host10, &cdm, aKeySystem);   if (err != GMPNoErr || !cdm) {-    NS_WARNING("GMPGetAPI call failed trying to get CDM.");-    return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);+    return IPC_FAIL(this, "GMPGetAPI call failed trying to get CDM.");   }   child->Init(static_cast<cdm::ContentDecryptionModule_10*>(cdm),

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Error Handling Improvement] [dom/media/gmp/GMPContentChild.cpp] [Lines 62-65, 78-81, 95-98]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   NS_WARNING("GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct decoder.");
   return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   return IPC_FAIL(this, "GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct decoder.");
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Error Handling Improvement] [dom/media/gmp/GMPContentChild.cpp] [Lines 78-81]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   NS_WARNING("GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct encoder.");
   return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   return IPC_FAIL(this, "GMPGetAPI call failed trying to construct encoder.");
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Error Handling Improvement] [dom/media/gmp/GMPContentChild.cpp] [Lines 95-98]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   NS_WARNING("GMPGetAPI call failed trying to get CDM.");
   return IPC_FAIL_NO_REASON(this);
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   return IPC_FAIL(this, "GMPGetAPI call failed trying to get CDM.");
   ```

The changes appear to be improvements in error handling, replacing `NS_WARNING` with more direct error reporting through `IPC_FAIL`. While this doesn't clearly indicate a specific security vulnerability was fixed, it does improve the robustness of error reporting in the GMP (Gecko Media Plugin) content process communication. The changes could potentially help with debugging and security auditing by providing more explicit error messages. However, without more context about the threat model or previous issues, I can't definitively state these were security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/style/FontFace.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/style/FontFace.cpp@@ -160,6 +160,11 @@     const FontFaceDescriptors& aDescriptors, ErrorResult& aRv) {   nsISupports* global = aGlobal.GetAsSupports();   nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = do_QueryInterface(global);+  if (!window) {+    aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_FAILURE);+    return nullptr;+  }+   Document* doc = window->GetDoc();   if (!doc) {     aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_FAILURE);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Null Pointer Dereference [File] layout/style/FontFace.cpp [Lines] 160-164  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
nsISupports* global = aGlobal.GetAsSupports();
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = do_QueryInterface(global);
Document* doc = window->GetDoc();
```
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
nsISupports* global = aGlobal.GetAsSupports();
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = do_QueryInterface(global);
if (!window) {
  aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
  return nullptr;
}
Document* doc = window->GetDoc();
```
Additional Details:  
The fix adds a null check for the `window` object before dereferencing it to call `GetDoc()`. Without this check, a null pointer dereference could occur if `do_QueryInterface(global)` fails, which could potentially lead to crashes or undefined behavior. This is a classic null pointer dereference vulnerability fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.image.source-in.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.image.source-in.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 40, 40, 10, 10, 40, 50, 10, 10);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 32-33]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 32-33]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 15,15, 0,0,0,0, "15,15", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
   ```

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and don't indicate any security fixes. The modifications are consistent throughout the file, suggesting this was a refactoring change rather than a security patch. No actual security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.