--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/swift.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/swift.py@@ -134,6 +134,33 @@         return var+class BuildInfo:+    def __init__(self, build_date):+        self.build_date = build_date+++def generate_build_date(date: Optional[str]) -> str:+    """+    Generate the build timestamp.+    """++    ts = util.build_date(date)++    data = [+        ("year", ts.year),+        ("month", ts.month),+        ("day", ts.day),+        ("hour", ts.hour),+        ("minute", ts.minute),+        ("second", ts.second),+    ]++    # The internal DatetimeMetricType API can take a `DateComponents` object,+    # which lets us easily specify the timezone.+    components = ", ".join([f"{name}: {val}" for (name, val) in data])+    return f'DateComponents(calendar: Calendar.current, timeZone: TimeZone(abbreviation: "UTC"), {components})'  # noqa++ class Category:     """     Data struct holding information about a metric to be used in the template.@@ -157,6 +184,14 @@         - namespace: The namespace to generate metrics in         - glean_namespace: The namespace to import Glean from         - allow_reserved: When True, this is a Glean-internal build+        - with_buildinfo: If "true" the `GleanBuildInfo` is generated.+          Otherwise generation of that file is skipped.+          Defaults to "true".+        - build_date: If set to `0` a static unix epoch time will be used.+                      If set to a ISO8601 datetime string (e.g. `2022-01-03T17:30:00`)+                      it will use that date.+                      Other values will throw an error.+                      If not set it will use the current date & time.     """     if options is None:         options = {}@@ -174,6 +209,12 @@     namespace = options.get("namespace", "GleanMetrics")     glean_namespace = options.get("glean_namespace", "Glean")+    with_buildinfo = options.get("with_buildinfo", "true").lower() == "true"+    build_date = options.get("build_date", None)+    build_info = None+    if with_buildinfo:+        build_date = generate_build_date(build_date)+        build_info = BuildInfo(build_date=build_date)     filename = "Metrics.swift"     filepath = output_dir / filename@@ -199,6 +240,7 @@                 namespace=namespace,                 glean_namespace=glean_namespace,                 allow_reserved=options.get("allow_reserved", False),+                build_info=build_info,             )         )         # Jinja2 squashes the final newline, so we explicitly add it

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Exposure] [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/swift.py] [Lines 134-157]
   [Old Code] - No build date handling
   [Fixed Code] - Added build date handling with timezone specification in UTC

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Timezone Manipulation] [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/swift.py] [Lines 134-157]
   [Old Code] - No explicit timezone handling
   [Fixed Code] - Added explicit UTC timezone specification in generate_build_date()

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Date Injection] [third_party/python/glean_parser/glean_parser/swift.py] [Lines 184-209]
   [Old Code] - No build date validation
   [Fixed Code] - Added build_date parameter with validation requirements (0 or ISO8601 format)

Note: While no clear security vulnerabilities are identified, the changes introduce better handling of time-sensitive data by:
1. Explicitly setting UTC timezone
2. Validating date input formats
3. Making build info generation configurable
These changes could potentially mitigate issues related to timezone confusion or invalid date handling, but don't clearly fix any specific known vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/inspector/rules/models/rule.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/inspector/rules/models/rule.js@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@     this.inherited = options.inherited || null;     this.keyframes = options.keyframes || null;-    this.mediaText =-      this.domRule && this.domRule.mediaText ? this.domRule.mediaText : "";     this.cssProperties = this.elementStyle.ruleView.cssProperties;     this.inspector = this.elementStyle.ruleView.inspector;     this.store = this.elementStyle.ruleView.store;@@ -115,32 +113,8 @@     };   }-  get sourceLink() {-    return {-      label: this._getSourceText(true),-      title: this._getSourceText(),-    };-  }-   get sourceMapURLService() {     return this.inspector.toolbox.sourceMapURLService;-  }--  /**-   * Returns the original source location which includes the original URL, line and-   * column numbers.-   */-  get generatedLocation() {-    if (!this._generatedLocation) {-      this._generatedLocation = {-        sheet: this.sheet,-        url: this.sheet ? this.sheet.href || this.sheet.nodeHref : null,-        line: this.ruleLine,-        column: this.ruleColumn,-      };-    }--    return this._generatedLocation;   }   get title() {@@ -149,7 +123,7 @@       title += ":" + this.ruleLine;     }-    return title + (this.mediaText ? " @media " + this.mediaText : "");+    return title;   }   get inheritedSource() {@@ -263,37 +237,6 @@    */   getDeclaration(id) {     return id ? this.textProps.find(textProp => textProp.id === id) : undefined;-  }--  /**-   * Returns a formatted source text of the stylesheet URL with its source line-   * and @media text.-   *-   * @param  {boolean} shortenURL True to get a shorter version of the URL.-   */-  _getSourceText(shortenURL) {-    if (this.isSystem) {-      return `${STYLE_INSPECTOR_L10N.getStr("rule.userAgentStyles")} ${-        this.title-      }`;-    }--    const currentLocation = this.generatedLocation;--    let sourceText = currentLocation.url;-    if (shortenURL) {-      sourceText = CssLogic.shortSource({ href: sourceText });-    }--    if (currentLocation.line > 0) {-      sourceText += ":" + currentLocation.line;-    }--    if (this.mediaText) {-      sourceText += " @media " + this.mediaText;-    }--    return sourceText;   }   /**

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [devtools/client/inspector/rules/models/rule.js] [Lines 65-66, 115-118, 149]
   [Old Code]
   this.mediaText = this.domRule && this.domRule.mediaText ? this.domRule.mediaText : "";
   get sourceLink() {
     return {
       label: this._getSourceText(true),
       title: this._getSourceText(),
     };
   }
   return title + (this.mediaText ? " @media " + this.mediaText : "");
   [Fixed Code]
   [Removed all mediaText and sourceLink related code]

   Additional Details: The removal of mediaText handling and sourceLink functionality might indicate a potential information leak was being addressed, but without more context about how these values were used, it's not certain.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Exposure] [devtools/client/inspector/rules/models/rule.js] [Lines 115-127]
   [Old Code]
   get generatedLocation() {
     if (!this._generatedLocation) {
       this._generatedLocation = {
         sheet: this.sheet,
         url: this.sheet ? this.sheet.href || this.sheet.nodeHref : null,
         line: this.ruleLine,
         column: this.ruleColumn,
       };
     }
     return this._generatedLocation;
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   [Entire generatedLocation getter removed]

   Additional Details: The removal of the generatedLocation property might indicate it was exposing sensitive information, but this is uncertain without more context about its usage.

Note: The diff shows significant removal of functionality related to source text generation and media text handling, which could potentially be related to security hardening, but without more specific context about the threat model or vulnerability reports, we can't definitively identify specific vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be simplifying the code and potentially removing features that might expose sensitive information.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-155b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-155b.xml@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>  <p class="two words">This line should have a green background.</p>

Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-155b.xml [Lines] 14
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code] (removed line)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose.
2. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here - this appears to be a minor cleanup of test markup.
3. The "flags" meta tag was commonly used in test files but wasn't actually being utilized in this case.
4. No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are involved in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.parse.system.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.parse.system.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.font = 'message-box'; _assertDifferent(ctx.font, 'message-box', "ctx.font", "'message-box'");

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. This doesn't appear to be related to any security vulnerability but rather a code style or consistency improvement. There are no security-related patterns or known vulnerabilities being addressed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/canvas/test/webgl-conf/mochi-single.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/canvas/test/webgl-conf/mochi-single.html@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ } SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [+  ['dom.workers.requestAnimationFrame', true],+  ['gfx.offscreencanvas.enabled', true],   ['webgl.force-enabled', true],   ['webgl.enable-draft-extensions', true], ]}, runTest);

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential WebGL/OffscreenCanvas Security Configuration] [dom/canvas/test/webgl-conf/mochi-single.html] [Lines 68-71]
[Old Code]
SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [
  ['webgl.force-enabled', true],
  ['webgl.enable-draft-extensions', true],
]}, runTest);
[Fixed Code]
SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [
  ['dom.workers.requestAnimationFrame', true],
  ['gfx.offscreencanvas.enabled', true],
  ['webgl.force-enabled', true],
  ['webgl.enable-draft-extensions', true],
]}, runTest);

Additional Details:
- The changes add two new preferences being set for testing:
  1. 'dom.workers.requestAnimationFrame' enabled
  2. 'gfx.offscreencanvas.enabled' enabled
- These could be related to security hardening by properly enabling/disabling features during testing
- The exact security impact is unclear without more context about why these preferences were added
- It might be related to ensuring proper feature flags are set for security testing of WebGL and OffscreenCanvas features

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nn/vi_surface.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nn/vi_surface.rs@@ -1,29 +1,23 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk; use crate::RawPtr;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct ViSurface {     handle: vk::Instance,-    vi_surface_fn: vk::NnViSurfaceFn,+    fp: vk::NnViSurfaceFn, } impl ViSurface {-    pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {-        let surface_fn = vk::NnViSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {-            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+    pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+        let handle = instance.handle();+        let fp = vk::NnViSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))         });-        Self {-            handle: instance.handle(),-            vi_surface_fn: surface_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::NnViSurfaceFn::name()+        Self { handle, fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCreateViSurfaceNN.html>"]@@ -33,7 +27,7 @@         allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>,     ) -> VkResult<vk::SurfaceKHR> {         let mut surface = mem::zeroed();-        self.vi_surface_fn+        self.fp             .create_vi_surface_nn(                 self.handle,                 create_info,@@ -43,8 +37,12 @@             .result_with_success(surface)     }+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::NnViSurfaceFn::name()+    }+     pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::NnViSurfaceFn {-        &self.vi_surface_fn+        &self.fp     }     pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Type Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nn/vi_surface.rs] [Lines: Changed throughout file]
[Old Code]
Used `EntryCustom<L>` and stored function pointers in `vi_surface_fn`
[Fixed Code]
Changed to use `Entry` and renamed field to `fp`

The change from `EntryCustom<L>` to `Entry` might indicate a security improvement by removing a generic parameter that could potentially be misused, but without more context about the custom entry point functionality, I can't be certain if this was an actual security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/nn/vi_surface.rs] [Lines: Changed throughout file]
[Old Code]
Had separate `name()` function implementation
[Fixed Code]
Moved `name()` function after other methods and simplified the structure

The reorganization of the code doesn't appear to directly address any specific security vulnerability, but the simplification could potentially reduce the attack surface by making the code easier to audit.

Note: The changes appear to be primarily structural/refactoring rather than direct security fixes. The most significant change is the removal of the generic parameter from `EntryCustom<L>` to `Entry`, which might have security implications but isn't clearly a vulnerability fix. The unsafe block remains unchanged in both versions for loading function pointers, which is a necessary unsafe operation in Vulkan bindings.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.invalid.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.invalid.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.lineCap = 'butt' _assertSame(ctx.lineCap, 'butt', "ctx.lineCap", "'butt'");

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.invalid.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` without altering any security-relevant functionality. The test's purpose (checking line cap styles) remains unchanged.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/queue.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/queue.rs@@ -46,11 +46,13 @@         gl.draw_buffers(&[glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + draw_buffer]);         gl.draw_arrays(glow::TRIANGLES, 0, 3);-        // Reset the draw buffers to what they were before the clear-        let indices = (0..self.draw_buffer_count as u32)-            .map(|i| glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i)-            .collect::<ArrayVec<_, { crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS }>>();-        gl.draw_buffers(&indices);+        if self.draw_buffer_count != 0 {+            // Reset the draw buffers to what they were before the clear+            let indices = (0..self.draw_buffer_count as u32)+                .map(|i| glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i)+                .collect::<ArrayVec<_, { crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS }>>();+            gl.draw_buffers(&indices);+        }         #[cfg(not(target_arch = "wasm32"))]         for draw_buffer in 0..self.draw_buffer_count as u32 {             gl.disable_draw_buffer(glow::BLEND, draw_buffer);@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@             super::TextureInner::Renderbuffer { raw } => {                 gl.framebuffer_renderbuffer(fbo_target, attachment, glow::RENDERBUFFER, Some(raw));             }+            super::TextureInner::DefaultRenderbuffer => panic!("Unexpected default RBO"),             super::TextureInner::Texture { raw, target } => {                 if is_layered_target(target) {                     gl.framebuffer_texture_layer(@@ -370,7 +373,7 @@                 gl.pixel_store_i32(glow::UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH, row_texels as i32);                 gl.pixel_store_i32(glow::UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT, column_texels as i32);                 let mut unbind_unpack_buffer = false;-                if format_info.block_dimensions == (1, 1) {+                if !format_info.is_compressed() {                     let buffer_data;                     let unpack_data = match src.raw {                         Some(buffer) => {@@ -537,7 +540,7 @@                 ref copy,             } => {                 let format_info = src_format.describe();-                if format_info.block_dimensions != (1, 1) {+                if format_info.is_compressed() {                     log::error!("Not implemented yet: compressed texture copy to buffer");                     return;                 }@@ -636,24 +639,28 @@                     }                 }             }-            C::ResetFramebuffer => {-                gl.bind_framebuffer(glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, Some(self.draw_fbo));-                gl.framebuffer_texture_2d(-                    glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER,-                    glow::DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,-                    glow::TEXTURE_2D,-                    None,-                    0,-                );-                for i in 0..crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS {-                    let target = glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i as u32;+            C::ResetFramebuffer { is_default } => {+                if is_default {+                    gl.bind_framebuffer(glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, None);+                } else {+                    gl.bind_framebuffer(glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, Some(self.draw_fbo));                     gl.framebuffer_texture_2d(                         glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER,-                        target,+                        glow::DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,                         glow::TEXTURE_2D,                         None,                         0,                     );+                    for i in 0..crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS {+                        let target = glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i as u32;+                        gl.framebuffer_texture_2d(+                            glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER,+                            target,+                            glow::TEXTURE_2D,+                            None,+                            0,+                        );+                    }                 }                 gl.color_mask(true, true, true, true);                 gl.depth_mask(true);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Null Pointer Dereference/Invalid State [File] third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/queue.rs [Lines 46-53]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   // Reset the draw buffers to what they were before the clear
   let indices = (0..self.draw_buffer_count as u32)
       .map(|i| glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i)
       .collect::<ArrayVec<_, { crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS }>>();
   gl.draw_buffers(&indices);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   if self.draw_buffer_count != 0 {
       // Reset the draw buffers to what they were before the clear
       let indices = (0..self.draw_buffer_count as u32)
           .map(|i| glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i)
           .collect::<ArrayVec<_, { crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS }>>();
       gl.draw_buffers(&indices);
   }
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Unhandled Error Condition [File] third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/queue.rs [Lines 82-83]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   super::TextureInner::Renderbuffer { raw } => {
       gl.framebuffer_renderbuffer(fbo_target, attachment, glow::RENDERBUFFER, Some(raw));
   }
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   super::TextureInner::Renderbuffer { raw } => {
       gl.framebuffer_renderbuffer(fbo_target, attachment, glow::RENDERBUFFER, Some(raw));
   }
   super::TextureInner::DefaultRenderbuffer => panic!("Unexpected default RBO"),
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Buffer Overflow [File] third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/queue.rs [Lines 370-373]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   if format_info.block_dimensions == (1, 1) {
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   if !format_info.is_compressed() {
   ```

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Buffer Overflow [File] third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/queue.rs [Lines 537-540]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   if format_info.block_dimensions != (1, 1) {
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   if format_info.is_compressed() {
   ```

5. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Improper Framebuffer Reset [File] third_party/rust/wgpu-hal/src/gles/queue.rs [Lines 636-660]
   Old Code:
   ```rust
   C::ResetFramebuffer => {
       gl.bind_framebuffer(glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, Some(self.draw_fbo));
       gl.framebuffer_texture_2d(
           glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER,
           glow::DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
           glow::TEXTURE_2D,
           None,
           0,
       );
       for i in 0..crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS {
           let target = glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i as u32;
           gl.framebuffer_texture_2d(
               glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER,
               target,
               glow::TEXTURE_2D,
               None,
               0,
           );
       }
   }
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```rust
   C::ResetFramebuffer { is_default } => {
       if is_default {
           gl.bind_framebuffer(glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, None);
       } else {
           gl.bind_framebuffer(glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER, Some(self.draw_fbo));
           gl.framebuffer_texture_2d(
               glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER,
               glow::DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
               glow::TEXTURE_2D,
               None,
               0,
           );
           for i in 0..crate::MAX_COLOR_TARGETS {
               let target = glow::COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + i as u32;
               gl.framebuffer_texture_2d(
                   glow::DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER,
                   target,
                   glow::TEXTURE_2D,
                   None,
                   0,
               );
           }
       }
   }
   ```

The most significant security fixes appear to be:
1. Adding a check for draw_buffer_count to prevent potential null pointer dereference
2. Adding explicit handling for DefaultRenderbuffer case to prevent undefined behavior
3. Properly handling framebuffer reset cases (default vs non-default) to prevent state corruption

The changes to compressed format handling might be security-related (preventing buffer overflows), but without more context about the format_info implementation, I can't be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/thebes/gfxTextRun.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/thebes/gfxTextRun.h@@ -225,6 +225,9 @@     // Returns the extra width that will be consumed by a hyphen. This should     // be constant for a given textrun.     virtual gfxFloat GetHyphenWidth() const = 0;++    // Return orientation flags to be used when creating a hyphen textrun.+    virtual mozilla::gfx::ShapedTextFlags GetShapedTextFlags() const = 0;     typedef gfxFont::Spacing Spacing;@@ -989,8 +992,9 @@    * The caller is responsible for deleting the returned text run    * when no longer required.    */-  already_AddRefed<gfxTextRun> MakeHyphenTextRun(DrawTarget* aDrawTarget,-                                                 uint32_t aAppUnitsPerDevUnit);+  already_AddRefed<gfxTextRun> MakeHyphenTextRun(+      DrawTarget* aDrawTarget, mozilla::gfx::ShapedTextFlags aFlags,+      uint32_t aAppUnitsPerDevUnit);   /**    * Check whether a given font (specified by its gfxFontEntry)

Here's my analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Missing Security Flag Propagation] [gfx/thebes/gfxTextRun.h] [Lines 989-992]
[Old Code]
already_AddRefed<gfxTextRun> MakeHyphenTextRun(DrawTarget* aDrawTarget,
                                               uint32_t aAppUnitsPerDevUnit);
[Fixed Code]
already_AddRefed<gfxTextRun> MakeHyphenTextRun(
      DrawTarget* aDrawTarget, mozilla::gfx::ShapedTextFlags aFlags,
      uint32_t aAppUnitsPerDevUnit);

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows the addition of a new virtual method `GetShapedTextFlags()` and modification of `MakeHyphenTextRun` to accept ShapedTextFlags parameter.
2. While not clearly a security vulnerability, this change appears to address potential text shaping/rendering consistency issues by properly propagating text orientation flags.
3. The modification could potentially prevent rendering artifacts or layout issues that might be exploitable in some contexts, though this is speculative.
4. The change improves the API's completeness by ensuring text shaping flags are properly considered for hyphenated text runs.

Note: Without more context about the specific security implications of text shaping flags in Firefox, I can't definitively identify this as a security fix, but it appears to be hardening the text rendering system.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.4.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.4.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ ctx.moveTo(50, 25); ctx.arc(50, 25, 60, (512+1/2)*Math.PI, (1024-1)*Math.PI, false); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here are the findings:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.4.html [Lines] 17-27  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   // ... rest of the code using offscreenCanvas ...
   ```
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   // ... rest of the code using canvas ...
   ```

The changes in this diff appear to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`, which doesn't indicate any security vulnerability fix. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.copy.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.copy.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 36]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 36]
   [Old Code]
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);
   [Fixed Code]
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,191, "50,25", "255,255,0,191", 5);

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating its references. There are no apparent security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff. The modifications don't involve any security-sensitive operations or changes to security-related functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-eof.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-eof.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 1'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive modifications. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 1';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 1';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the corresponding references. There are no security implications to these changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/places/tests/unit/interactions/head_interactions.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/places/tests/unit/interactions/head_interactions.js@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@   PlacesUtils: "resource://gre/modules/PlacesUtils.jsm",   setTimeout: "resource://gre/modules/Timer.jsm",   Services: "resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm",+  SnapshotGroups: "resource:///modules/SnapshotGroups.jsm",   Snapshots: "resource:///modules/Snapshots.jsm",+  SnapshotMonitor: "resource:///modules/SnapshotMonitor.jsm",   SnapshotScorer: "resource:///modules/SnapshotScorer.jsm",   SnapshotSelector: "resource:///modules/SnapshotSelector.jsm",   TestUtils: "resource://testing-common/TestUtils.jsm",@@ -287,6 +289,48 @@ } /**+ * Asserts that the snapshot groups match the expected values.+ *+ * @param {SnapshotGroup} group+ *   The actual snapshot groups.+ * @param {SnapshotGroup} expected+ *   The expected snapshot group.+ */+function assertSnapshotGroup(group, expected) {+  if (expected.title != null) {+    Assert.equal(group.title, expected.title, "Should have the expected title");+  }+  if (expected.builder != null) {+    Assert.equal(+      group.builder,+      expected.builder,+      "Should have the expected builder"+    );+  }+  if (expected.builderMetadata != null) {+    Assert.deepEqual(+      group.builderMetadata,+      expected.builderMetadata,+      "Should have the expected builderMetadata"+    );+  }+  if (expected.snapshotCount != null) {+    Assert.equal(+      group.snapshotCount,+      expected.snapshotCount,+      "Should have the expected snapshotCount"+    );+  }+  if (expected.lastAccessed != null) {+    Assert.equal(+      group.lastAccessed,+      expected.lastAccessed,+      "Should have the expected lastAccessed value"+    );+  }+}++/**  * Queries overlapping snapshots from the database and asserts their expected values.  *  * @param {Snapshot[]} expected

Based on the provided diff content, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding new functionality and test assertions rather than addressing security issues.

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 12-14, 287-289]
[Old Code]
  PlacesUtils: "resource://gre/modules/PlacesUtils.jsm",
  setTimeout: "resource://gre/modules/Timer.jsm",
  Services: "resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm",
  Snapshots: "resource:///modules/Snapshots.jsm",
[Fixed Code]
  PlacesUtils: "resource://gre/modules/PlacesUtils.jsm",
  setTimeout: "resource://gre/modules/Timer.jsm",
  Services: "resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm",
  SnapshotGroups: "resource:///modules/SnapshotGroups.jsm",
  Snapshots: "resource:///modules/Snapshots.jsm",
  SnapshotMonitor: "resource:///modules/SnapshotMonitor.jsm",

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 287-328]
[Old Code]
(No previous function existed)
[Fixed Code]
(New assertSnapshotGroup function added for testing)

The changes consist of:
1. Adding new module imports (SnapshotGroups.jsm and SnapshotMonitor.jsm)
2. Adding a new test utility function (assertSnapshotGroup)

Neither change appears to address any security vulnerabilities - they're simply adding new testing capabilities and dependencies for what appears to be enhanced snapshot functionality in Firefox.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.image.transparent.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.image.transparent.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 50, -50);         ctx.shadowColor = '#f00';         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, -50, -50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.image.transparent.2.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 36-38]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity. There are no security-related changes or vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/image_test_utils.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/image_test_utils.h@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ } // Use for floating-point images with fairly large numbers; tolerates small-// absolute errors and/or small relative errors. Returns max_relative.+// absolute errors and/or small relative errors. template <typename T> void VerifyRelativeError(const Plane<T>& expected, const Plane<T>& actual,                          const double threshold_l1,

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/image_test_utils.h] [Lines 80-83]
[Old Code]
// Use for floating-point images with fairly large numbers; tolerates small
// absolute errors and/or small relative errors. Returns max_relative.
[Fixed Code]
// Use for floating-point images with fairly large numbers; tolerates small
// absolute errors and/or small relative errors.

Additional Details:
This appears to be a documentation change only, removing an inaccurate comment about the function returning max_relative. There are no code changes or security implications in this diff. The modification is purely for comment accuracy and doesn't affect the actual functionality or security of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.extraargs.cache.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/2d.getcontext.extraargs.cache.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-_assertDifferent(offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', false, {}, [], 1, "2"), null, "offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', false, {}, [], 1, \"2\")", "null");-_assertDifferent(offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', 123), null, "offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', 123)", "null");-_assertDifferent(offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', "test"), null, "offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', \"test\")", "null");-_assertDifferent(offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', undefined), null, "offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', undefined)", "null");-_assertDifferent(offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', null), null, "offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', null)", "null");-_assertDifferent(offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', Symbol.hasInstance), null, "offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d', Symbol.hasInstance)", "null");+_assertDifferent(canvas.getContext('2d', false, {}, [], 1, "2"), null, "canvas.getContext('2d', false, {}, [], 1, \"2\")", "null");+_assertDifferent(canvas.getContext('2d', 123), null, "canvas.getContext('2d', 123)", "null");+_assertDifferent(canvas.getContext('2d', "test"), null, "canvas.getContext('2d', \"test\")", "null");+_assertDifferent(canvas.getContext('2d', undefined), null, "canvas.getContext('2d', undefined)", "null");+_assertDifferent(canvas.getContext('2d', null), null, "canvas.getContext('2d', null)", "null");+_assertDifferent(canvas.getContext('2d', Symbol.hasInstance), null, "canvas.getContext('2d', Symbol.hasInstance)", "null"); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The changes in the diff appear to be primarily variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating corresponding assertions. There are no security-related changes or fixes evident in this diff.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The diff shows no changes in security-sensitive operations or handling of user input. All assertions remain the same in functionality, just with updated variable names.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The changes don't indicate any fixes for potential security issues like XSS, injection, or improper input validation. The test cases for `getContext` with various parameters remain unchanged in their security implications.

The diff appears to be a simple refactoring/renaming change without any security impact. All test cases maintain the same security posture as before, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/border-spacing-included-in-sizes-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/border-spacing-included-in-sizes-001.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/cssom-view/#dom-htmlelement-offsetheight"> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-tables-3/#bounding-box-assignment"> <link rel="bookmark" href="https://crbug.com/613753" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="border-spacing occurring outside rows and sections is not included in their height and width" /> <style>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/border-spacing-included-in-sizes-001.html [Lines] 6
    [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" />
    [Fixed Code] (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality

The change is purely removing a redundant HTML meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose, particularly since its content was empty. This doesn't relate to any security vulnerability fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/clients/api/Clients.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/clients/api/Clients.cpp@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/Promise.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerDescriptor.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ServiceWorkerManager.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/BackgroundUtils.h" #include "mozilla/SchedulerGroup.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_privacy.h"

Let me analyze the code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Header File Change] [dom/clients/api/Clients.cpp] [Lines 14]
[Old Code]
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
[Fixed Code]
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h"

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a header file change where WorkerPrivate.h was replaced with WorkerScope.h
- Without more context about the implementation changes, it's difficult to determine if this was a security fix
- The change might be related to better encapsulation of worker scope functionality rather than direct security concerns
- No specific vulnerability name can be identified from this change alone

Note: The diff shows only one change, which is a header inclusion modification. There's no clear evidence of a security vulnerability being fixed here, but it could potentially be part of a larger security-related refactoring.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.lineJoin.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-canvas-state/2d.state.saverestore.lineJoin.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Test that restore() undoes any modifications var old = ctx.lineJoin;

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better clarity. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability, without any security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. There are no security-related patterns being modified (no input validation changes, no sensitive data handling, no security-related API changes, etc.).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.name-5.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.name-5.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '"red'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring (variable renaming) and don't involve any security vulnerabilities. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.name-5.html] [17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    [...]
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.