--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/saved.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/pocket/content/panels/saved.html@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@         <script src="js/vendor/handlebars.runtime.js"></script>         <script src="js/vendor/jquery.tokeninput.min.js"></script>         <script src="js/tmpl.js"></script>+        <script src="js/vendor.bundle.js"></script>         <script src="js/main.bundle.js"></script>         <script src="js/saved/entry.js"></script>     </body>

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Missing Dependency] [browser/components/pocket/content/panels/saved.html] [Lines 14-17]
   [Old Code]
        <script src="js/vendor/handlebars.runtime.js"></script>
        <script src="js/vendor/jquery.tokeninput.min.js"></script>
        <script src="js/tmpl.js"></script>
        <script src="js/main.bundle.js"></script>
   [Fixed Code]
        <script src="js/vendor/handlebars.runtime.js"></script>
        <script src="js/vendor/jquery.tokeninput.min.js"></script>
        <script src="js/tmpl.js"></script>
        <script src="js/vendor.bundle.js"></script>
        <script src="js/main.bundle.js"></script>

Additional Details:
- The change adds a new script reference to `vendor.bundle.js` before `main.bundle.js`
- This could potentially fix a dependency issue where `main.bundle.js` might have been relying on functionality from `vendor.bundle.js`
- Without seeing the contents of these files, it's unclear if this was fixing a security vulnerability or just a dependency loading order issue
- No specific vulnerability name can be identified from this change alone

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.solid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.solid.worker.js@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var g = ctx.createLinearGradient(0, 0, 100, 0); g.addColorStop(0, '#0f0'); g.addColorStop(1, '#0f0'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.interpolate.solid.worker.js
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update the references to it. There are no security implications in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/tests/ws.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/tests/ws.rs@@ -169,6 +169,30 @@     assert!(client.recv().await.is_err()); }+#[tokio::test]+async fn limit_frame_size() {+    let _ = pretty_env_logger::try_init();++    let echo = warp::ws().map(|ws: warp::ws::Ws| {+        ws.max_frame_size(1024).on_upgrade(|websocket| {+            // Just echo all messages back...+            let (tx, rx) = websocket.split();+            rx.forward(tx).map(|result| {+                assert!(result.is_err());+                assert_eq!(+                    format!("{}", result.unwrap_err()).as_str(),+                    "Space limit exceeded: Message length too big: 1025 > 1024"+                );+            })+        })+    });+    let mut client = warp::test::ws().handshake(echo).await.expect("handshake");++    client.send(warp::ws::Message::binary(vec![0; 1025])).await;+    client.send_text("hello warp").await;+    assert!(client.recv().await.is_err());+}+ fn ws_echo() -> impl Filter<Extract = impl warp::Reply, Error = warp::Rejection> + Copy {     warp::ws().map(|ws: warp::ws::Ws| {         ws.on_upgrade(|websocket| {

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Denial of Service via WebSocket Frame Size Limitation [third_party/rust/warp/tests/ws.rs] [Lines added]
    [Old Code]
    No frame size limitation was present in the old code
    [Fixed Code]
    ws.max_frame_size(1024).on_upgrade(|websocket| {
        // Just echo all messages back...
        let (tx, rx) = websocket.split();
        rx.forward(tx).map(|result| {
            assert!(result.is_err());
            assert_eq!(
                format!("{}", result.unwrap_err()).as_str(),
                "Space limit exceeded: Message length too big: 1025 > 1024"
            );
        })
    })

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability being addressed is a potential Denial of Service (DoS) attack vector where an attacker could send excessively large WebSocket frames, consuming server resources.
- The fix implements a frame size limit (1024 bytes) using `max_frame_size()` to prevent oversized frames from being processed.
- The test case verifies that frames exceeding this limit (1025 bytes) are properly rejected with an appropriate error message.
- This is a security hardening measure rather than fixing an actively exploited vulnerability, but it prevents potential DoS attacks.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/RegExpShared.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/RegExpShared.h@@ -48,11 +48,7 @@ }; inline bool IsNativeRegExpEnabled() {-#ifdef JS_CODEGEN_NONE-  return false;-#else-  return jit::JitOptions.nativeRegExp;-#endif+  return jit::HasJitBackend() && jit::JitOptions.nativeRegExp; } /*

Let me analyze the code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential JIT-related Security Check] [js/src/vm/RegExpShared.h] [Lines 48-52]
[Old Code]
#ifdef JS_CODEGEN_NONE
  return false;
#else
  return jit::JitOptions.nativeRegExp;
#endif
[Fixed Code]
return jit::HasJitBackend() && jit::JitOptions.nativeRegExp;

Additional Details:
1. The change adds an explicit check for JIT backend availability (`HasJitBackend()`) before checking the native regexp option
2. This appears to be a defensive programming change to ensure JIT is available before trying to use JIT-related features
3. While not clearly fixing a known vulnerability, it could prevent potential issues when running without a JIT backend
4. The change makes the condition more strict by requiring both JIT backend presence AND the nativeRegExp option to be true

Note: Without more context about the JIT implementation details, I can't definitively say this fixes a security vulnerability, but it appears to be a robustness improvement that could have security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.5.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.5.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.shadowColor = '#00f'; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring (renaming `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications. Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.alpha.5.worker.js] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 127,0,127,255, "50,25", "127,0,127,255", 2);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/extras/codec.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/extras/codec.h@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ #include <string>-#include "lib/extras/color_hints.h"+#include "lib/extras/dec/color_hints.h"+#include "lib/extras/dec/decode.h" #include "lib/jxl/base/compiler_specific.h" #include "lib/jxl/base/data_parallel.h" #include "lib/jxl/base/padded_bytes.h"@@ -25,61 +26,30 @@ namespace jxl {-// Codecs supported by CodecInOut::Encode.-enum class Codec : uint32_t {-  kUnknown,  // for CodecFromExtension-  kPNG,-  kPNM,-  kPGX,-  kJPG,-  kGIF,-  kEXR,-  kPSD-};--static inline constexpr uint64_t EnumBits(Codec /*unused*/) {-  // Return only fully-supported codecs (kGIF is decode-only).-  return MakeBit(Codec::kPNM) | MakeBit(Codec::kPNG)-#if JPEGXL_ENABLE_JPEG-         | MakeBit(Codec::kJPG)-#endif-#if JPEGXL_ENABLE_EXR-         | MakeBit(Codec::kEXR)-#endif-         | MakeBit(Codec::kPSD);-}--// Lower case ASCII including dot, e.g. ".png".-std::string ExtensionFromCodec(Codec codec, bool is_gray,-                               size_t bits_per_sample);--// If and only if extension is ".pfm", *bits_per_sample is updated to 32 so-// that Encode() would encode to PFM instead of PPM.-Codec CodecFromExtension(const std::string& extension,-                         size_t* JXL_RESTRICT bits_per_sample);- // Decodes "bytes" and sets io->metadata.m. // color_space_hint may specify the color space, otherwise, defaults to sRGB.-Status SetFromBytes(const Span<const uint8_t> bytes,-                    const ColorHints& color_hints, CodecInOut* io,-                    ThreadPool* pool, Codec* orig_codec);+Status SetFromBytes(Span<const uint8_t> bytes,+                    const extras::ColorHints& color_hints, CodecInOut* io,+                    ThreadPool* pool = nullptr,+                    extras::Codec* orig_codec = nullptr); // Helper function to use no color_space_hint. JXL_INLINE Status SetFromBytes(const Span<const uint8_t> bytes, CodecInOut* io,                                ThreadPool* pool = nullptr,-                               Codec* orig_codec = nullptr) {-  return SetFromBytes(bytes, ColorHints(), io, pool, orig_codec);+                               extras::Codec* orig_codec = nullptr) {+  return SetFromBytes(bytes, extras::ColorHints(), io, pool, orig_codec); } // Reads from file and calls SetFromBytes.-Status SetFromFile(const std::string& pathname, const ColorHints& color_hints,-                   CodecInOut* io, ThreadPool* pool = nullptr,-                   Codec* orig_codec = nullptr);+Status SetFromFile(const std::string& pathname,+                   const extras::ColorHints& color_hints, CodecInOut* io,+                   ThreadPool* pool = nullptr,+                   extras::Codec* orig_codec = nullptr); // Replaces "bytes" with an encoding of pixels transformed from c_current // color space to c_desired.-Status Encode(const CodecInOut& io, Codec codec, const ColorEncoding& c_desired,-              size_t bits_per_sample, PaddedBytes* bytes,-              ThreadPool* pool = nullptr);+Status Encode(const CodecInOut& io, extras::Codec codec,+              const ColorEncoding& c_desired, size_t bits_per_sample,+              PaddedBytes* bytes, ThreadPool* pool = nullptr); // Deduces codec, calls Encode and writes to file. Status EncodeToFile(const CodecInOut& io, const ColorEncoding& c_desired,

Let me analyze the code diff for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes appear to be primarily organizational/structural changes rather than security fixes. The main changes are:
- Moving color_hints.h to a new location (dec/color_hints.h)
- Adding a new include for decode.h
- Moving the Codec enum and related functions to a different location (likely extras namespace)
- Updating function signatures to use extras::Codec and extras::ColorHints

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes involve:
- Reorganizing header includes
- Namespace adjustments (adding extras:: prefix)
- Default parameter additions (ThreadPool* pool = nullptr)
- No apparent security vulnerabilities being fixed

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
The modifications are largely:
- Code refactoring
- Namespace organization
- No changes to security-critical logic
- No removal of vulnerable code patterns

There are no clear security vulnerabilities being addressed in this diff. The changes appear to be architectural improvements and code organization rather than security fixes. The modifications include proper namespace usage and header reorganization but don't show evidence of patching any specific vulnerabilities.

Note: While I don't see any security vulnerabilities in this diff, it's possible some changes might be related to security fixes that aren't immediately obvious from the code structure changes alone. However, based on the visible changes, no security issues are being addressed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/bitreader/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/bitreader/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"1da2771067c7bb47f182c75624cec456ef99daf6882314633a2a68aefc2616ad","LICENSE-APACHE":"cfc7749b96f63bd31c3c42b5c471bf756814053e847c10f3eb003417bc523d30","LICENSE-MIT":"8583712ee2b062ff3d4d6d3e16f19ff0f92bc3a0a4beeec11a81ef00146fbd4f","README.md":"28986de2e8d457e76ae3303d80094697e6ef4ad8da06a4a3178bb1b52bff63d5","src/lib.rs":"6dcb62a9279ecad8cdcfe37f383282089753e28adc0f2785ca73d50040bc89e7","src/tests.rs":"f67d17aa8faed5e3838322de9b98bb0cdc58d35fe5870e3f5c65ef1ef788966e"},"package":"9178181a7d44239c6c8eaafa8688558a2ab5fa04b8855381f2681e9591fb941b"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"28a1d4b7f04f3989f856789ec569d890a91b9dfdc8775ff8cbd4e0c1b2f8f9f2","LICENSE-APACHE":"cfc7749b96f63bd31c3c42b5c471bf756814053e847c10f3eb003417bc523d30","LICENSE-MIT":"8583712ee2b062ff3d4d6d3e16f19ff0f92bc3a0a4beeec11a81ef00146fbd4f","README.md":"28986de2e8d457e76ae3303d80094697e6ef4ad8da06a4a3178bb1b52bff63d5","src/lib.rs":"250d841ee01b90209c6c4ad304969de145287c6c6588850b95e6f843ec4dd579","src/tests.rs":"5e62c77cfa155fd8affa8ff3c7ea688d80bce6f4956f9956582775ae3adca1a6"},"package":"bd5bf8a17cdc06d475689f9e9226f4b5bf5610e93cf5c3010a518fe6fb0d97f5"}=========js/xpconnect/loader/mozJSSubScriptLoader.cpp========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/xpconnect/loader/mozJSSubScriptLoader.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/xpconnect/loader/mozJSSubScriptLoader.cpp@@ -253,17 +253,6 @@     len = buf.Length();   }-#ifdef DEBUG-  int64_t currentLength = -1;-  // if getting content length succeeded above, it should not fail now-  MOZ_ASSERT(chan->GetContentLength(&currentLength) == NS_OK);-  // if content length was not known when GetContentLength() was called before,-  // 'len' would be set to -1 until NS_ReadInputStreamToString() set its correct-  // value. Every subsequent call to GetContentLength() should return the same-  // length as that value.-  MOZ_ASSERT(currentLength == len);-#endif-   Maybe<JSAutoRealm> ar;   // Note that when using the ScriptPreloader cache with loadSubScript, there

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

1. For the first file (bitreader/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This is just a checksum update for the Rust package dependencies. No security fixes are evident in this change.

2. For the second file (mozJSSubScriptLoader.cpp):
    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Debug Assertion Removal] [js/xpconnect/loader/mozJSSubScriptLoader.cpp] [Lines 253-263]
    [Old Code]
    #ifdef DEBUG
    int64_t currentLength = -1;
    // if getting content length succeeded above, it should not fail now
    MOZ_ASSERT(chan->GetContentLength(&currentLength) == NS_OK);
    // if content length was not known when GetContentLength() was called before,
    // 'len' would be set to -1 until NS_ReadInputStreamToString() set its correct
    // value. Every subsequent call to GetContentLength() should return the same
    // length as that value.
    MOZ_ASSERT(currentLength == len);
    #endif
    [Fixed Code]
    (removed entirely)

    The removal of debug assertions could potentially be related to security if these assertions were masking or preventing some security checks. However, since these were debug-only checks and the functionality remains unchanged in release builds, it's unclear if this represents an actual security fix.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes, though the removal of debug assertions in the second file warrants some attention as it could potentially affect security-related debugging capabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.parallel.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.parallel.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 25); ctx.lineTo(-100, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references in the assertions. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.parallel.worker.js] [Lines 13-26]
    Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)
    Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mod.rs@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@-#![deny(clippy::use_self)] pub mod experimental; pub mod ext; pub mod khr;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Clippy Lint Removal] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mod.rs] [Line 1]
    [Old Code] #![deny(clippy::use_self)]
    [Fixed Code] (removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of a Clippy lint (`use_self`) denial. While this isn't a direct security vulnerability, lints like these help maintain code quality and prevent potential bugs. The removal might indicate a relaxation of code quality standards, but doesn't represent a clear security vulnerability.
- Without more context about why this was removed, we can't be certain about the security implications. The `use_self` lint helps ensure consistent usage of the `Self` type alias in impl blocks, which is more about code style than security.

Note: No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be related to code style/linting configuration rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-75.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-75.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p class="red">This paragraph should have green background</p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-75.xml] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="" />`
   Fixed Code: (removed)

Additional details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- There's no evidence of any security vulnerability being addressed
- The removed tag didn't contain any sensitive information or pose any security risk

The modification seems to be part of routine test file maintenance rather than addressing any security concern. The empty meta tag was likely removed because it served no purpose in the test case.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/content/aboutaddons.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/content/aboutaddons.js@@ -1811,12 +1811,6 @@   }   async initialize() {-    let addonTypesObjects = AddonManager.addonTypes;-    let addonTypes = new Set();-    for (let type in addonTypesObjects) {-      addonTypes.add(type);-    }-     let hiddenTypes = new Set([]);     for (let button of this.children) {@@ -1824,7 +1818,7 @@       button.hidden =         !button.isVisible || (defaultHidden && this.shouldHideCategory(name));-      if (defaultHidden && addonTypes.has(name)) {+      if (defaultHidden && AddonManager.hasAddonType(name)) {         hiddenTypes.add(name);       }     }@@ -3458,11 +3452,11 @@       throw new Error("addon-card must be initialized with setAddon()");     }-    let headingId = ExtensionCommon.makeWidgetId(`${addon.name}-heading`);-    this.setAttribute("aria-labelledby", headingId);     this.setAttribute("addon-id", addon.id);     this.card = importTemplate("card").firstElementChild;+    let headingId = ExtensionCommon.makeWidgetId(`${addon.id}-heading`);+    this.card.setAttribute("aria-labelledby", headingId);     // Remove the toggle-disabled button(s) based on type.     if (addon.type != "theme") {@@ -3476,6 +3470,7 @@     let headingLevel = this.expanded ? "h1" : "h3";     let nameHeading = document.createElement(headingLevel);     nameHeading.classList.add("addon-name");+    nameHeading.id = headingId;     if (!this.expanded) {       let name = document.createElement("a");       name.classList.add("addon-name-link");@@ -4636,7 +4631,7 @@ // Define views gViewController.defineView("list", async type => {-  if (!(type in AddonManager.addonTypes)) {+  if (!AddonManager.hasAddonType(type)) {     return null;   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Disclosure] [toolkit/mozapps/extensions/content/aboutaddons.js] [Lines 3458-3476]
   [Old Code]
   let headingId = ExtensionCommon.makeWidgetId(`${addon.name}-heading`);
   this.setAttribute("aria-labelledby", headingId);
   this.setAttribute("addon-id", addon.id);
   [Fixed Code]
   this.setAttribute("addon-id", addon.id);
   this.card = importTemplate("card").firstElementChild;
   let headingId = ExtensionCommon.makeWidgetId(`${addon.id}-heading`);
   this.card.setAttribute("aria-labelledby", headingId);
   Note: The change from using addon.name to addon.id in the heading ID generation might be related to preventing potential information disclosure, though this isn't clearly a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Input Validation Improvement] [toolkit/mozapps/extensions/content/aboutaddons.js] [Lines 1811-1824]
   [Old Code]
   let addonTypesObjects = AddonManager.addonTypes;
   let addonTypes = new Set();
   for (let type in addonTypesObjects) {
     addonTypes.add(type);
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   (Removed and replaced with direct AddonManager.hasAddonType() call)
   Note: The change from manual type checking to using AddonManager.hasAddonType() might improve input validation, but it's not clearly a security fix.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Input Validation Improvement] [toolkit/mozapps/extensions/content/aboutaddons.js] [Lines 4636-4638]
   [Old Code]
   if (!(type in AddonManager.addonTypes)) {
   [Fixed Code]
   if (!AddonManager.hasAddonType(type)) {
   Note: Similar to point 2, this change improves type checking but isn't clearly a security fix.

The changes appear to be more about code quality and proper API usage rather than clear security fixes. The most notable change is the switch from using addon.name to addon.id in the heading ID generation, which could potentially relate to security if the name was being exposed in an unsafe way before.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-80.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-80.xml@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ ]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <div>

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-80.xml] [Lines 8]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(Line removed)

Additional Details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This doesn't appear to be security-related.
2. The modification seems to be cleanup/refactoring rather than a security fix.
3. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change.
4. The meta tag being removed wasn't serving any apparent security purpose in the first place.

Note: While this isn't a security fix, it's good practice to remove unnecessary tags from HTML documents.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.end.4.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.end.4.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ ctx.roundRect(-1, -1, 2000, 2000, [1000, 1000, 1000, 1000]); ctx.lineTo(-150, -150); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the assertions. There are no security-related changes in the logic or functionality.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.end.4.worker.js
    Lines: 13-14, 23-26
    Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)
    Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(canvas, ...)

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The test functionality remains exactly the same, just with a renamed variable.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-004.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-004.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Xin Liu" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" title="4.7. device-aspect-ratio" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-mediaqueries/#device-aspect-ratio"> <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The 'device-aspect-ratio' property with prefix 'min' set '0/0' (which is converted into '1/0') is infinite that means the style sheet specified by 'min-device-aspect-ratio' will not be applied."> <style>   div {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/mediaqueries/device-aspect-ratio-004.html [Lines 5]
[Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code] (line removed)

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with the "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here - this seems to be a minor cleanup of test code.
3. The removed line didn't contain any sensitive information or potential attack vectors.
4. No known vulnerability names are associated with this type of change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/docs/contributor/contributing/code-reviews-checklist.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/docs/contributor/contributing/code-reviews-checklist.md@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ## Bug status and patch file * Bug status is assigned, and assignee is correctly set.-* Commit title and message follow [the conventions](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mercurial/Using_Mercurial#Commit_Message_Conventions).+* Commit title and message follow [the conventions](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/mobile/android/geckoview/contributor/contributing-to-mc.html). * Commit message says [what is being changed and why](http://mozilla-version-control-tools.readthedocs.org/en/latest/mozreview/commits.html#write-detailed-commit-messages). * Patch applies locally to current sources with no merge required. * Check that every new file introduced by the patch has the proper Mozilla license header: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/MPL/headers/@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@   * A try push has started (or even better, is green already). * User facing changes:   * If any user-facing interfaces are added/modified, double-check the changes with the UX mockups or specs, if available. If there's any confusion, need-info the UX designer.<!--TODO this needs updating with the new process-->-  * If a user facing string has been added, it is localized and follows [the localization guidelines](../files/adding-files.md#localization-l10n).-  * If a user-facing string has changed meaning, [the key has been updated](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Localization/Localization_content_best_practices#Changing_existing_strings).+  * If a user facing string has been added, it is localized and follows [the localization guidelines](../files/adding-files.html#localization-l10n).+  * If a user-facing string has changed meaning, [the key has been updated](https://mozilla-l10n.github.io/documentation/localization/making_string_changes.html).   * If a new image is added, it is a SVG image or there is a reason for not using a SVG.   * If a SVG is added/modified, it follows [the SVG guidelines](../frontend/svgs.md).   * If a documented feature has been modified, the keyword `dev-doc-needed` is present on the bug.

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes are primarily documentation updates involving URL changes and minor formatting adjustments. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation Update [devtools/docs/contributor/contributing/code-reviews-checklist.md] [Lines 7,45-46]
   Old Code:
   * Commit title and message follow [the conventions](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mercurial/Using_Mercurial#Commit_Message_Conventions).
   * If a user facing string has been added, it is localized and follows [the localization guidelines](../files/adding-files.md#localization-l10n).
   * If a user-facing string has changed meaning, [the key has been updated](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Localization/Localization_content_best_practices#Changing_existing_strings).

   Fixed Code:
   * Commit title and message follow [the conventions](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/mobile/android/geckoview/contributor/contributing-to-mc.html).
   * If a user facing string has been added, it is localized and follows [the localization guidelines](../files/adding-files.html#localization-l10n).
   * If a user-facing string has changed meaning, [the key has been updated](https://mozilla-l10n.github.io/documentation/localization/making_string_changes.html).

These changes appear to be:
1. Updating URLs to more current documentation
2. Changing some file extensions from .md to .html
3. Moving from developer.mozilla.org to more specific documentation sites

No security vulnerabilities are being addressed in these documentation updates.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/doc/cdp/Usage.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/doc/cdp/Usage.md@@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ system configuration, but is always guaranteed to be free thus eliminating the risk of binding to a port that is already in use.-[Firefox Nightly]: https://www.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/channel/desktop/#nightly+[Firefox Nightly]: https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/channel/desktop/#nightly

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] remote/doc/cdp/Usage.md [Lines] 59
   [Old Code] [Firefox Nightly]: https://www.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/channel/desktop/#nightly
   [Fixed Code] [Firefox Nightly]: https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/channel/desktop/#nightly

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be a simple URL update from a country-specific version (en-GB) to a generic Mozilla URL
- No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are evident in this documentation update
- This is likely a localization/normalization change rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.round.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.join.round.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -51,16 +51,16 @@ ctx.moveTo(80, 20); ctx.arc(80, 20, 10+tol, 0, 2*Math.PI, true); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 36,14, 0,255,0,255, "36,14", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 36,13, 0,255,0,255, "36,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 37,13, 0,255,0,255, "37,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 38,13, 0,255,0,255, "38,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 38,12, 0,255,0,255, "38,12", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 86,14, 0,255,0,255, "86,14", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 86,13, 0,255,0,255, "86,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 87,13, 0,255,0,255, "87,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 88,13, 0,255,0,255, "88,13", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 88,12, 0,255,0,255, "88,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 36,14, 0,255,0,255, "36,14", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 36,13, 0,255,0,255, "36,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 37,13, 0,255,0,255, "37,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 38,13, 0,255,0,255, "38,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 38,12, 0,255,0,255, "38,12", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 86,14, 0,255,0,255, "86,14", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 86,13, 0,255,0,255, "86,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 87,13, 0,255,0,255, "87,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 88,13, 0,255,0,255, "88,13", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 88,12, 0,255,0,255, "88,12", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect the security of the code. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18, 51-60]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 36,14, 0,255,0,255, "36,14", "0,255,0,255");
...
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 36,14, 0,255,0,255, "36,14", "0,255,0,255");
...

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. There are no security implications in this change - it's purely a code style/readability improvement. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/DMABUFSurfaceImage.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/DMABUFSurfaceImage.cpp@@ -28,10 +28,14 @@ DMABUFSurfaceImage::DMABUFSurfaceImage(DMABufSurface* aSurface)     : Image(nullptr, ImageFormat::DMABUF), mSurface(aSurface) {-  mSurface->GlobalRefAdd();+  MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(mSurface->IsGlobalRefSet(),+                        "DMABufSurface must be marked as used!"); }-DMABUFSurfaceImage::~DMABUFSurfaceImage() { mSurface->GlobalRefRelease(); }+DMABUFSurfaceImage::~DMABUFSurfaceImage() {+  // Unref as we're done with this surface.+  mSurface->GlobalRefRelease();+} StaticRefPtr<GLContext> sSnapshotContext; static StaticMutex sSnapshotContextMutex;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
   [Potential Use-After-Free Vulnerability] [gfx/layers/DMABUFSurfaceImage.cpp] [Lines 28-32]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   DMABUFSurfaceImage::DMABUFSurfaceImage(DMABufSurface* aSurface)
       : Image(nullptr, ImageFormat::DMABUF), mSurface(aSurface) {
     mSurface->GlobalRefAdd();
   }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   DMABUFSurfaceImage::DMABUFSurfaceImage(DMABufSurface* aSurface)
       : Image(nullptr, ImageFormat::DMABUF), mSurface(aSurface) {
     MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(mSurface->IsGlobalRefSet(),
                         "DMABufSurface must be marked as used!");
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change replaces a direct reference count increment with an assertion check, suggesting the reference counting was being handled incorrectly or at the wrong time, which could lead to use-after-free if the surface was deleted while still referenced.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Resource Leak] [gfx/layers/DMABUFSurfaceImage.cpp] [Lines 34-36]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   DMABUFSurfaceImage::~DMABUFSurfaceImage() { mSurface->GlobalRefRelease(); }
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   DMABUFSurfaceImage::~DMABUFSurfaceImage() {
     // Unref as we're done with this surface.
     mSurface->GlobalRefRelease();
   }
   ```  
   Additional Details: While the change appears to be just adding a comment, it might indicate a fix for a resource leak where the reference count wasn't being properly decremented. However, without more context about the GlobalRefRelease behavior, this is uncertain.

The main security fix appears to be the first one, addressing potential reference counting issues that could lead to use-after-free vulnerabilities. The second change might be related to code clarity or could indicate a fix for a subtle resource management issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-out.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-out.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable references in the assertions.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.destination-out.html] [Lines 17-28]
    [Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)]
    [Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ... _assertPixel(canvas, ...)]

This appears to be a simple code refactoring/cleanup change rather than a security fix. The functionality remains identical, only the variable names have changed. No security-related patterns or vulnerabilities (such as XSS, injection, etc.) are present in either version of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.dompoint.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.dompoint.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,15 +27,15 @@ ctx.fill(); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to this variable accordingly. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.4.radii.4.dompoint.html] [Lines 17-27]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');]

The rest of the changes are simply updates to the variable name in the `_assertPixel` calls, which don't represent any security fixes. This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security patch.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.