--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-026.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-026.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The change appears to be purely cosmetic/visual, modifying the border style from dashed to solid salmon color. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-026.html] [Lines 23]
    [Old Code] border: 2px dashed;
    [Fixed Code] border: 2px solid salmon;

Additional notes:
1. The change is purely stylistic (border appearance)
2. No security implications were found in this modification
3. The file appears to be a test case (reftest) for CSS grid fragmentation behavior
4. No input validation, sanitization, or security-sensitive operations were modified

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/bindings/private/Quantity.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/bindings/private/Quantity.cpp@@ -19,10 +19,14 @@ void QuantityMetric::Set(int64_t aValue) const {   auto scalarId = ScalarIdForMetric(mId);-  if (scalarId) {-    Telemetry::ScalarSet(scalarId.extract(), static_cast<uint32_t>(aValue));+  if (scalarId && aValue >= 0) {+    uint32_t theValue = static_cast<uint32_t>(aValue);+    if (aValue > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) {+      theValue = std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max();+    }+    Telemetry::ScalarSet(scalarId.extract(), theValue);   }-  fog_quantity_set(mId, int(aValue));+  fog_quantity_set(mId, aValue); } Result<Maybe<int64_t>, nsCString> QuantityMetric::TestGetValue(

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Integer Overflow Vulnerability [Quantity.cpp] [Lines 19-27]
[Old Code]
void QuantityMetric::Set(int64_t aValue) const {
  auto scalarId = ScalarIdForMetric(mId);
  if (scalarId) {
    Telemetry::ScalarSet(scalarId.extract(), static_cast<uint32_t>(aValue));
  }
  fog_quantity_set(mId, int(aValue));
}
[Fixed Code]
void QuantityMetric::Set(int64_t aValue) const {
  auto scalarId = ScalarIdForMetric(mId);
  if (scalarId && aValue >= 0) {
    uint32_t theValue = static_cast<uint32_t>(aValue);
    if (aValue > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) {
      theValue = std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max();
    }
    Telemetry::ScalarSet(scalarId.extract(), theValue);
  }
  fog_quantity_set(mId, aValue);
}

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Potential Integer Truncation Vulnerability [Quantity.cpp] [Lines 19-27]
[Old Code]
  fog_quantity_set(mId, int(aValue));
[Fixed Code]
  fog_quantity_set(mId, aValue);

The changes address two main issues:
1. Added bounds checking for the 64-bit to 32-bit conversion (preventing integer overflow)
2. Removed the potentially dangerous narrowing conversion from int64_t to int
3. Added a check for negative values (aValue >= 0)
4. Properly handles values that exceed uint32_t limits by capping them at max value

The old code could have led to undefined behavior or incorrect values when:
- Large 64-bit values were converted to 32-bit
- Negative values were passed
- Values exceeded the range of int when converted

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50)@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 104-105]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    _assertPixel(canvas, 90,45, 0,255,0,255, "90,45", "0,255,0,255");

This appears to be a simple refactoring change with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.valid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.valid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.lineCap = 'butt' _assertSame(ctx.lineCap, 'butt', "ctx.lineCap", "'butt'");

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.cap.valid.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This change appears to be purely a variable name refactoring from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
- No security vulnerability is being addressed here
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name is changed
- No security-related APIs or patterns are modified in this diff
- The change is likely for consistency with other test files or improved readability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/same-site-cookies.https.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/service-workers/service-worker/same-site-cookies.https.html@@ -22,9 +22,12 @@   return target_url; }+const scopepath = '/cookies/resources/postToParent.py?with-sw';+ async function unregister_service_worker(origin, nested_origins=[]) {   let target_url = origin +-      '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/same-site-cookies-unregister.html';+      '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/unregister-rewrite-worker.html' ++      '?scopepath=' + encodeURIComponent(scopepath);   target_url = make_nested_url(nested_origins, target_url);   const w = window.open(target_url);   try {@@ -36,7 +39,8 @@ async function register_service_worker(origin, nested_origins=[]) {   let target_url = origin +-      '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/same-site-cookies-register.html';+      '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/register-rewrite-worker.html' ++      '?scopepath=' + encodeURIComponent(scopepath);   target_url = make_nested_url(nested_origins, target_url);   const w = window.open(target_url);   try {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be modifying the service worker registration/unregistration URLs and adding a scopepath parameter, which seems more like a functional change than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 22-39]
[Old Code]
let target_url = origin +
    '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/same-site-cookies-unregister.html';
...
let target_url = origin +
    '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/same-site-cookies-register.html';
[Fixed Code]
let target_url = origin +
    '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/unregister-rewrite-worker.html' +
    '?scopepath=' + encodeURIComponent(scopepath);
...
let target_url = origin +
    '/service-workers/service-worker/resources/register-rewrite-worker.html' +
    '?scopepath=' + encodeURIComponent(scopepath);

The changes:
1. Added a constant scopepath definition
2. Changed the registration/unregistration endpoints
3. Added URL encoding for the scopepath parameter (good practice but not fixing a vulnerability)
4. The encoding prevents potential injection but there's no evidence this was exploitable before

The modifications appear to be test infrastructure changes rather than security fixes. The use of encodeURIComponent() is a security best practice but doesn't indicate a fixed vulnerability in this context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/parser/htmlparser/nsParser.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/parser/htmlparser/nsParser.h@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@    * @param    * @return    */-  nsresult WillBuildModel(nsString& aFilename);+  nsresult WillBuildModel();   /**    *

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak or Unused Parameter Vulnerability] [parser/htmlparser/nsParser.h] [Lines 314]
[Old Code] nsresult WillBuildModel(nsString& aFilename);
[Fixed Code] nsresult WillBuildModel();

Additional Details:
1. The change removes a filename parameter that was passed by reference but not used in the function (based on the context shown)
2. While this could potentially relate to information exposure if the filename was being improperly handled, we can't confirm this from the limited diff
3. The change might simply be cleaning up unused parameters rather than fixing a security vulnerability
4. Without seeing the function implementation or more context, we can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability

Note: This could potentially relate to CWE-116 (Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output) if the filename was being used unsafely, but that's speculative based on the limited information.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpfe/appshell/AppWindow.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpfe/appshell/AppWindow.cpp@@ -3057,11 +3057,13 @@   L10nReadyPromiseHandler(Document* aDoc, nsIWidget* aParentWindow)       : mDocument(aDoc), mWindow(aParentWindow) {}-  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     LoadNativeMenus(mDocument, mWindow);   }-  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {+  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {     // Again, this shouldn't happen, but fallback to loading the menus as is.     NS_WARNING(         "L10nReadyPromiseHandler rejected - loading fallback native "

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Error Handling Improvement [File] [Lines 3057-3066]
[Old Code]
  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
    LoadNativeMenus(mDocument, mWindow);
  }

  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override {
    // Again, this shouldn't happen, but fallback to loading the menus as is.
    NS_WARNING(
        "L10nReadyPromiseHandler rejected - loading fallback native "

[Fixed Code]
  void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {
    LoadNativeMenus(mDocument, mWindow);
  }

  void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
                        ErrorResult& aRv) override {
    // Again, this shouldn't happen, but fallback to loading the menus as is.
    NS_WARNING(
        "L10nReadyPromiseHandler rejected - loading fallback native "

Notes:
1. The change adds ErrorResult parameters to both callback methods, which suggests better error handling was implemented.
2. While this improves error handling, I cannot determine if this was fixing a specific security vulnerability or just improving code robustness.
3. The warning message suggests this was handling an edge case, but there's no clear evidence of a security vulnerability being fixed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_signed_apps.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_signed_apps.js@@ -139,7 +139,12 @@ } function tampered_app_path(test_name) {-  return FileUtils.getFile("TmpD", ["test_signed_app-" + test_name + ".zip"]);+  return new FileUtils.File(+    PathUtils.join(+      Services.dirsvc.get("TmpD", Ci.nsIFile).path,+      `test_signed_app-${test_name}.zip`+    )+  ); } var hashTestcases = [

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Path Traversal or Insecure File Path Construction] [security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_signed_apps.js] [Lines 139-143]
[Old Code]
return FileUtils.getFile("TmpD", ["test_signed_app-" + test_name + ".zip"]);
[Fixed Code]
return new FileUtils.File(
  PathUtils.join(
    Services.dirsvc.get("TmpD", Ci.nsIFile).path,
    `test_signed_app-${test_name}.zip`
  )
);

Additional Details:
1. The change appears to modify how temporary file paths are constructed for test files.
2. The new version uses PathUtils.join() which is generally safer for path construction.
3. It also explicitly gets the temporary directory path rather than relying on FileUtils.getFile().
4. While this looks like a security improvement, I can't be certain if it was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving code robustness.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/head.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/head.js@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@   await unloadHandlerStore();   await OS.File.remove(jsonPath, { ignoreAbsent: true });++  Services.prefs.clearUserPref("gecko.handlerService.defaultHandlersVersion"); }; /**@@ -68,6 +70,8 @@   await unloadHandlerStore();   await OS.File.copy(do_get_file("handlers.json").path, jsonPath);++  Services.prefs.setIntPref("gecko.handlerService.defaultHandlersVersion", 100); }; /**

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Preference Clearing Vulnerability] [uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/head.js] [Lines 59-62]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
  await unloadHandlerStore();

  await OS.File.remove(jsonPath, { ignoreAbsent: true });
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
  await unloadHandlerStore();

  await OS.File.remove(jsonPath, { ignoreAbsent: true });

  Services.prefs.clearUserPref("gecko.handlerService.defaultHandlersVersion");
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Preference Setting Vulnerability] [uriloader/exthandler/tests/unit/head.js] [Lines 68-71]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
  await unloadHandlerStore();

  await OS.File.copy(do_get_file("handlers.json").path, jsonPath);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
  await unloadHandlerStore();

  await OS.File.copy(do_get_file("handlers.json").path, jsonPath);

  Services.prefs.setIntPref("gecko.handlerService.defaultHandlersVersion", 100);
```

Note: While these changes involve preference handling which could be security-sensitive, I can't determine if they were fixing actual vulnerabilities or just improving test cleanup/setup. The changes ensure proper cleanup of preferences between tests and proper initialization of test preferences, which is good practice but may not necessarily indicate a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/x86/Trampoline-x86.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/x86/Trampoline-x86.cpp@@ -820,12 +820,7 @@       break;     case Type_Double:-      if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {-        masm.Pop(ReturnDoubleReg);-      } else {-        masm.assumeUnreachable(-            "Unable to pop to float reg, with no FP support.");-      }+      masm.Pop(ReturnDoubleReg);       break;     default:@@ -871,13 +866,8 @@   masm.pop(temp1);   LiveRegisterSet save;-  if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {-    save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),-                             FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask));-  } else {-    save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),-                             FloatRegisterSet());-  }+  save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),+                           FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask));   masm.PushRegsInMask(save);   masm.movl(ImmPtr(cx->runtime()), ecx);

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Removal of Floating Point Support Check] [js/src/jit/x86/Trampoline-x86.cpp] [Lines 820-825, 871-876]
   [Old Code]
   case Type_Double:
     if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {
       masm.Pop(ReturnDoubleReg);
     } else {
       masm.assumeUnreachable(
           "Unable to pop to float reg, with no FP support.");
     }
   [Fixed Code]
   case Type_Double:
     masm.Pop(ReturnDoubleReg);

   [Old Code]
   if (JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint) {
     save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),
                          FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask));
   } else {
     save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),
                          FloatRegisterSet());
   }
   [Fixed Code]
   save.set() = RegisterSet(GeneralRegisterSet(Registers::VolatileMask),
                        FloatRegisterSet(FloatRegisters::VolatileMask));

Additional Details:
The changes remove conditional checks for floating point support, suggesting the codebase now assumes FP support is always available. While this isn't clearly a security fix, it could potentially relate to security if the previous conditional logic could lead to undefined behavior or crashes when FP support was unavailable. However, without more context about the JitOptions.supportsFloatingPoint configuration, I can't definitively determine if this was a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/src/lib.rs@@ -144,8 +144,8 @@ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] fn enable_ssl_trace() {     let opt = ssl::Opt::Locking.as_int();-    let mut _v: ::std::os::raw::c_int = 0;-    secstatus_to_res(unsafe { ssl::SSL_OptionGetDefault(opt, &mut _v) })+    let mut v: ::std::os::raw::c_int = 0;+    secstatus_to_res(unsafe { ssl::SSL_OptionGetDefault(opt, &mut v) })         .expect("SSL_OptionGetDefault failed"); }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Uninitialized Variable Usage] [third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/src/lib.rs] [Lines 144-146]
    [Old Code]
    let mut _v: ::std::os::raw::c_int = 0;
    secstatus_to_res(unsafe { ssl::SSL_OptionGetDefault(opt, &mut _v) })
    
    [Fixed Code]
    let mut v: ::std::os::raw::c_int = 0;
    secstatus_to_res(unsafe { ssl::SSL_OptionGetDefault(opt, &mut v) })

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be primarily a variable naming change from `_v` to `v`
- While the change itself doesn't clearly indicate a security fix, there might be a subtle issue with using underscore-prefixed variables in Rust (which conventionally indicates unused variables)
- The potential vulnerability would be if the underscore prefix was preventing proper initialization or usage of the variable, but this is uncertain
- No specific named vulnerability is clearly associated with this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/newtype.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling/tests/newtype.rs@@ -1,13 +1,7 @@ //! A newtype struct should be able to derive `FromMeta` if its member implements it.-#[macro_use]-extern crate darling;-#[macro_use]-extern crate syn;-#[macro_use]-extern crate quote;--use darling::FromDeriveInput;+use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};+use syn::parse_quote; #[derive(Debug, FromMeta, PartialEq, Eq)] struct Lorem(bool);

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Dependency Cleanup [third_party/rust/darling/tests/newtype.rs] [Lines 1-13]
    Old Code:
    ```rust
    #[macro_use]
    extern crate darling;
    #[macro_use]
    extern crate syn;
    #[macro_use]
    extern crate quote;
    
    use darling::FromDeriveInput;
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```rust
    use darling::{FromDeriveInput, FromMeta};
    use syn::parse_quote;
    ```

This appears to be a code cleanup/refactoring change rather than a security fix. The changes:
1. Remove explicit `extern crate` declarations (which are no longer needed in Rust 2018 edition)
2. Clean up imports by combining them and removing unused macro imports
3. Add `FromMeta` to the imports (which is now used in the test)
4. Add `parse_quote` import from syn

No security vulnerabilities are being fixed here - this is purely a modernization and cleanup of the test file's imports and dependencies. The functionality remains the same, just with more idiomatic Rust 2018 code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/storage/test/browser_storage_cookies_navigation.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/storage/test/browser_storage_cookies_navigation.js@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@     [URL_IFRAME],     async function(url) {       const iframe = content.document.querySelector("iframe");+      const onIframeLoaded = new Promise(loaded =>+        iframe.addEventListener("load", loaded, { once: true })+      );       iframe.src = url;+      await onIframeLoaded;     }   );   info("Waiting for storage tree to update");@@ -125,7 +129,11 @@   info("Navigate backward to test bfcache navigation");   gBrowser.goBack();-  await waitUntil(() => isInTree(doc, ["cookies", "https://example.net"]));+  await waitUntil(+    () =>+      isInTree(doc, ["cookies", "https://example.net"]) &&+      isInTree(doc, ["cookies", "https://example.org"])+  );   ok(     !isInTree(doc, ["cookies", "https://example.com"]),

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Race Condition / Event Listener Missing [File] devtools/client/storage/test/browser_storage_cookies_navigation.js [Lines] 96-100  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   iframe.src = url;
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   const onIframeLoaded = new Promise(loaded =>
     iframe.addEventListener("load", loaded, { once: true })
   );
   iframe.src = url;
   await onIframeLoaded;
   ```  
   Additional Details: The fix adds proper waiting for iframe load event, which could prevent race conditions in test execution. While this isn't a security vulnerability in production code, it improves test reliability.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Test Coverage Improvement [File] devtools/client/storage/test/browser_storage_cookies_navigation.js [Lines] 125-129  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   await waitUntil(() => isInTree(doc, ["cookies", "https://example.net"]));
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   await waitUntil(
     () =>
       isInTree(doc, ["cookies", "https://example.net"]) &&
       isInTree(doc, ["cookies", "https://example.org"])
   );
   ```  
   Additional Details: This change improves test coverage by checking for multiple cookie entries after navigation. It doesn't appear to address a security vulnerability but rather makes the test more thorough.

Note: There's a typo in both versions ("cookies" vs "cookies") which appears to be consistent between old and new code and likely unrelated to security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_local_cert.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_local_cert.js@@ -61,19 +61,19 @@   equal(certB.displayName, gNickname);   // Should be matching instances-  ok(certA.equals(certB));+  ok(areCertsEqual(certA, certB));   // Check an expected attribute   equal(certA.certType, Ci.nsIX509Cert.USER_CERT);   // New nickname should give a different cert   let diffNameCert = await getOrCreateCert("cool-stuff");-  ok(!diffNameCert.equals(certA));+  ok(!areCertsEqual(diffNameCert, certA));   // Remove the cert, and get a new one again   await removeCert(gNickname);   let newCert = await getOrCreateCert(gNickname);-  ok(!newCert.equals(certA));+  ok(!areCertsEqual(newCert, certA));   // Drop all cert references and GC   let serial = newCert.serialNumber;

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Certificate Comparison Vulnerability] [security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_local_cert.js] [Lines 61, 67, 72]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   ok(certA.equals(certB));
   ok(!diffNameCert.equals(certA));
   ok(!newCert.equals(certA));
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   ok(areCertsEqual(certA, certB));
   ok(!areCertsEqual(diffNameCert, certA));
   ok(!areCertsEqual(newCert, certA));
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change replaces direct `.equals()` method calls with a new `areCertsEqual()` function. This could indicate a potential security improvement in certificate comparison logic, but without seeing the implementation of `areCertsEqual()`, we can't be certain if this fixes a specific vulnerability or is just a code quality improvement. The change suggests the original `.equals()` method might not have been performing secure comparisons.

Note: While this appears to be a security-related change, we can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability without more context about the potential issues with the original `.equals()` implementation or seeing the implementation of the new `areCertsEqual()` function.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/nsPrinterCUPS.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/nsPrinterCUPS.cpp@@ -404,13 +404,28 @@       if (MOZ_LIKELY(hostnameBytes)) {         const nsDependentCString hostname{hostnameBytes};-        // Match the condional at+        // Attempt to match the condional at         // https://github.com/apple/cups/blob/c9da6f63b263faef5d50592fe8cf8056e0a58aa2/cups/dest-options.c#L718+        //+        // To find the result of the comparison CUPS performs of+        // `strcmp(http->hostname, cg->server)`, we use httpGetHostname to try+        // to get the value of `http->hostname`, but this isn't quite the same.+        // For local addresses, httpGetHostName will normalize the result to be+        // localhost", rather than the actual value of `http->hostname`.+        //+        // https://github.com/apple/cups/blob/2201569857f225c9874bfae19713ffb2f4bdfdeb/cups/http-addr.c#L794-L818+        //+        // Because of this, if both serverName and hostname equal "localhost",+        // then the actual hostname might be a different local address that CUPS+        // normalized in httpGetHostName, and `http->hostname` won't be equal to+        // `cg->server` in CUPS.+        const bool namesMightNotMatch =+            hostname != serverName || hostname == "localhost";         const bool portsDiffer =             mShim.httpAddrPort(mShim.httpGetAddress(aConnection)) !=             mShim.ippPort();         const bool cupsDestDeviceFlag =-            (hostname != serverName && serverName[0] != '/') || portsDiffer;+            (namesMightNotMatch && serverName[0] != '/') || portsDiffer;         // Match the conditional at         // https://github.com/apple/cups/blob/23c45db76a8520fd6c3b1d9164dbe312f1ab1481/cups/dest.c#L1144

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential Logic Flaw/Incorrect Hostname Comparison] [widget/nsPrinterCUPS.cpp] [Lines 404-418]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
const bool cupsDestDeviceFlag =
    (hostname != serverName && serverName[0] != '/') || portsDiffer;
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
const bool namesMightNotMatch =
    hostname != serverName || hostname == "localhost";
const bool cupsDestDeviceFlag =
    (namesMightNotMatch && serverName[0] != '/') || portsDiffer;
```

Additional Details:
1. The change addresses a potential logic flaw in hostname comparison when dealing with CUPS printer connections
2. The fix accounts for cases where CUPS might normalize local addresses to "localhost" while the actual hostname might be different
3. While this improves correctness, it's not clear if this was an exploitable security vulnerability or just a bug fix
4. The comment suggests this is matching behavior from the CUPS source code more accurately

Vulnerability Existed: no  
[No specific vulnerability found] [widget/nsPrinterCUPS.cpp] [Lines 404-418]  
[Old Code]  
[Previous comparison logic]  
[Fixed Code]  
[More robust comparison logic]  

Additional Details:
1. The changes appear to be primarily about improving correctness rather than fixing a security vulnerability
2. The modification makes the hostname comparison logic more accurate when dealing with CUPS' normalization of local addresses
3. No CVE or specific vulnerability is referenced in the changes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.relative_size.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.relative_size.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.font = '1em sans-serif'; _assertSame(ctx.font, '10px sans-serif', "ctx.font", "'10px sans-serif'");

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.font.relative_size.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Analysis:
1. This appears to be a simple variable renaming change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`.
2. There are no security-related changes in this diff - no changes to input handling, no security-sensitive operations, and no changes to how the canvas context is obtained or used.
3. The change is purely cosmetic/readability improvement in the test code.
4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, memory issues, etc.) are present in either version of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/initial.reset.clip.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/initial.reset.clip.worker.js@@ -13,16 +13,16 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');-offscreenCanvas.width = 100;+canvas.width = 100; ctx.rect(0, 0, 1, 1); ctx.clip();-offscreenCanvas.width = 100;+canvas.width = 100; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't relate to any security issues. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/the-offscreen-canvas/initial.reset.clip.worker.js] [Lines 13-23]
[Old Code: using variable name 'offscreenCanvas']
[Fixed Code: using variable name 'canvas']

The changes are:
1. Renaming 'offscreenCanvas' variable to 'canvas'
2. Updating all references to use the new variable name
3. No functional changes to the actual canvas operations or security-related operations

These changes appear to be code style/readability improvements rather than security fixes. The canvas operations and assertions remain the same in functionality.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/SecondaryPanes/Breakpoints/Breakpoint.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/debugger/src/components/SecondaryPanes/Breakpoints/Breakpoint.js@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import { createSelector } from "reselect"; import classnames from "classnames"; import actions from "../../../actions";-import { memoize } from "lodash"; import showContextMenu from "./BreakpointsContextMenu"; import { CloseButton } from "../../shared/Button";@@ -102,14 +101,11 @@     return logValue || condition || getSelectedText(breakpoint, selectedSource);   }-  highlightText = memoize(-    (text = "", editor) => {-      const node = document.createElement("div");-      editor.CodeMirror.runMode(text, "application/javascript", node);-      return { __html: node.innerHTML };-    },-    text => text-  );+  highlightText(text = "", editor) {+    const node = document.createElement("div");+    editor.CodeMirror.runMode(text, "application/javascript", node);+    return { __html: node.innerHTML };+  }   render() {     const { breakpoint, editor } = this.props;

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

1. First file (third_party/rust/clap/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    This appears to be a standard dependency version update with checksum changes. No security vulnerabilities are evident from the diff.

2. Second file (Breakpoint.js):
    Vulnerability Existed: yes
    Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability [Breakpoint.js] [Lines 102-111]
    [Old Code]
    highlightText = memoize(
      (text = "", editor) => {
        const node = document.createElement("div");
        editor.CodeMirror.runMode(text, "application/javascript", node);
        return { __html: node.innerHTML };
      },
      text => text
    );
    [Fixed Code]
    highlightText(text = "", editor) {
      const node = document.createElement("div");
      editor.CodeMirror.runMode(text, "application/javascript", node);
      return { __html: node.innerHTML };
    }

    The vulnerability existed because the memoized version could potentially cache and reuse unsafe HTML content. While the direct XSS risk from CodeMirror.runMode is typically low, removing the memoization eliminates any potential caching of unsafe content. The fix makes the function regenerate the HTML each time, which is safer.

    Additionally, the removal of the lodash memoize import reduces the attack surface by removing a dependency that could potentially have vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-macro/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-macro/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"91e7006ff019782f4ef67b12106d8680236f8a3a084cc1e6764f149bfa145744","LICENSE-APACHE":"275c491d6d1160553c32fd6127061d7f9606c3ea25abfad6ca3f6ed088785427","LICENSE-MIT":"6652c868f35dfe5e8ef636810a4e576b9d663f3a17fb0f5613ad73583e1b88fd","src/executor.rs":"2a6c40ebf1fb70ac5bd0dfb991c7b945210c731b558b546f2ecb6d7a8976f3f6","src/join.rs":"e0d286558bd944fd02c1bd2501d13e62de2aa65e6bd3a2e0567488ac1a2374ed","src/lib.rs":"8324c4d5cc4e9e377b2f95afde751168d7e94196c1f2cb35802193c900ca0026","src/select.rs":"a7ed344932225fbe1b070d132a937184250c31385ac6764a8a6e6817413c7538","src/stream_select.rs":"5fb84834a40876ab1fd975c3af67594d0c5a4f8d724cb164db9bee71e70d14b1"},"package":"a89f17b21645bc4ed773c69af9c9a0effd4a3f1a3876eadd453469f8854e7fdd"}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"46ecfcda3cd6979538f7543858fcfecb52c319cec94d041ab369139723ffa69d","LICENSE-APACHE":"275c491d6d1160553c32fd6127061d7f9606c3ea25abfad6ca3f6ed088785427","LICENSE-MIT":"6652c868f35dfe5e8ef636810a4e576b9d663f3a17fb0f5613ad73583e1b88fd","src/executor.rs":"2a6c40ebf1fb70ac5bd0dfb991c7b945210c731b558b546f2ecb6d7a8976f3f6","src/join.rs":"e0d286558bd944fd02c1bd2501d13e62de2aa65e6bd3a2e0567488ac1a2374ed","src/lib.rs":"8324c4d5cc4e9e377b2f95afde751168d7e94196c1f2cb35802193c900ca0026","src/select.rs":"a7ed344932225fbe1b070d132a937184250c31385ac6764a8a6e6817413c7538","src/stream_select.rs":"5fb84834a40876ab1fd975c3af67594d0c5a4f8d724cb164db9bee71e70d14b1"},"package":"6dbd947adfffb0efc70599b3ddcf7b5597bb5fa9e245eb99f62b3a5f7bb8bd3c"}=========js/src/jit/ProcessExecutableMemory.cpp========--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/ProcessExecutableMemory.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/ProcessExecutableMemory.cpp@@ -19,10 +19,8 @@ #include "jsmath.h" #include "gc/Memory.h"-#ifdef JS_CODEGEN_ARM64-#  include "jit/arm64/vixl/Cpu-vixl.h"-#endif #include "jit/FlushICache.h"  // js::jit::FlushICache+#include "jit/JitOptions.h" #include "threading/LockGuard.h" #include "threading/Mutex.h" #include "util/Memory.h"@@ -330,6 +328,9 @@   MOZ_CRASH("NYI for WASI.");   return nullptr; }+static void DeallocateProcessExecutableMemory(void* addr, size_t bytes) {+  MOZ_CRASH("NYI for WASI.");+} [[nodiscard]] static bool CommitPages(void* addr, size_t bytes,                                       ProtectionSetting protection) {   MOZ_CRASH("NYI for WASI.");@@ -545,6 +546,7 @@     pages_.init();     MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(!initialized());+    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(HasJitBackend());     MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(gc::SystemPageSize() <= ExecutableCodePageSize);     void* p = ReserveProcessExecutableMemory(MaxCodeBytesPerProcess);@@ -570,9 +572,6 @@   }   void release() {-#if defined(__wasi__)-    MOZ_ASSERT(!initialized());-#else     MOZ_ASSERT(initialized());     MOZ_ASSERT(pages_.empty());     MOZ_ASSERT(pagesAllocated_ == 0);@@ -580,7 +579,6 @@     base_ = nullptr;     rng_.reset();     MOZ_ASSERT(!initialized());-#endif   }   void assertValidAddress(void* p, size_t bytes) const {@@ -603,6 +601,7 @@                                         ProtectionSetting protection,                                         MemCheckKind checkKind) {   MOZ_ASSERT(initialized());+  MOZ_ASSERT(HasJitBackend());   MOZ_ASSERT(bytes > 0);   MOZ_ASSERT((bytes % ExecutableCodePageSize) == 0);@@ -723,15 +722,7 @@   execMemory.deallocate(addr, bytes, /* decommit = */ true); }-bool js::jit::InitProcessExecutableMemory() {-#ifdef JS_CODEGEN_ARM64-  // Initialize instruction cache flushing.-  vixl::CPU::SetUp();-#elif defined(__wasi__)-  return true;-#endif-  return execMemory.init();-}+bool js::jit::InitProcessExecutableMemory() { return execMemory.init(); } void js::jit::ReleaseProcessExecutableMemory() { execMemory.release(); }

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. First file analysis (third_party/rust/futures-macro/.cargo-checksum.json):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in checksum file update. This appears to be a routine dependency version update with new package hashes.

2. Second file analysis (js/src/jit/ProcessExecutableMemory.cpp):

    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential ARM64 Instruction Cache Flushing Removal [js/src/jit/ProcessExecutableMemory.cpp] [Lines: ~723-730]
    Old Code:
    ```
    #ifdef JS_CODEGEN_ARM64
      // Initialize instruction cache flushing.
      vixl::CPU::SetUp();
    #elif defined(__wasi__)
      return true;
    #endif
      return execMemory.init();
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```
    bool js::jit::InitProcessExecutableMemory() { return execMemory.init(); }
    ```
    Additional Details: The removal of ARM64-specific cache flushing initialization might impact security on ARM64 platforms, but without more context about the broader changes, this is uncertain.

    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    WASI Memory Management Changes [js/src/jit/ProcessExecutableMemory.cpp] [Lines: ~570-580]
    Old Code:
    ```
    void release() {
    #if defined(__wasi__)
        MOZ_ASSERT(!initialized());
    #else
        MOZ_ASSERT(initialized());
        MOZ_ASSERT(pages_.empty());
        MOZ_ASSERT(pagesAllocated_ == 0);
        DeallocateProcessExecutableMemory(base_, MaxCodeBytesPerProcess);
        base_ = nullptr;
        rng_.reset();
        MOZ_ASSERT(!initialized());
    #endif
    }
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```
    void release() {
        MOZ_ASSERT(initialized());
        MOZ_ASSERT(pages_.empty());
        MOZ_ASSERT(pagesAllocated_ == 0);
        DeallocateProcessExecutableMemory(base_, MaxCodeBytesPerProcess);
        base_ = nullptr;
        rng_.reset();
        MOZ_ASSERT(!initialized());
    }
    ```
    Additional Details: The removal of WASI-specific handling might affect memory management security on WASI platforms, but the impact is unclear without more context.

    Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Added JIT Backend Check [js/src/jit/ProcessExecutableMemory.cpp] [Lines: ~545-547]
    Old Code:
    ```
    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(!initialized());
    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(gc::SystemPageSize() <= ExecutableCodePageSize);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```
    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(!initialized());
    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(HasJitBackend());
    MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(gc::SystemPageSize() <= ExecutableCodePageSize);
    ```
    Additional Details: The addition of JIT backend validation might be a security hardening measure, but the exact vulnerability being addressed isn't clear from the diff alone.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-175b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-175b.xml@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-green-color.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>    <p class="13">This line should be green.</p>

Let me analyze the diff according to the provided format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="" />
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta "flags" tag which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- The removed line didn't contain any sensitive information or security-relevant configuration
- No known vulnerability patterns match this change

The change seems related to test file maintenance rather than addressing any security issue. The removed meta tag was empty and didn't serve any apparent security purpose.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.