Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/extensions/webcompat/injections/js/bug1605611-maps.google.com-directions-time.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/extensions/webcompat/injections/js/bug1605611-maps.google.com-directions-time.js@@ -5,22 +5,15 @@ /** * Bug 1605611 - Cannot change Departure/arrival dates in Google Maps on Android *- * This patch does the following:- * 1. Re-enable the disabled "Leave now" button.- * 2. Fix the precision of datetime-local inputs (to minutes).- * 3. Fixup side effect from enabling the date picker UI via- * injections/css/bug1605611-maps.google.com-directions-time.css+ * This patch re-enables the disabled "Leave now" button. *- * See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1605611#c0 for details.+ * See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1605611 for details. */-// Step 1. document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", () => { // In case the element appeared before the MutationObserver was activated.- for (const elem of document.querySelectorAll(- ".ml-directions-time[disabled]"- )) {- elem.disabled = false;+ for (const elem of document.querySelectorAll(".ml-icon-access-time")) {+ elem.parentNode.disabled = false; } // Start watching for the insertion of the "Leave now" button. const moOptions = {@@ -31,11 +24,12 @@ const mo = new MutationObserver(function(records) { let restore = false; for (const { target } of records) {- if (target.classList.contains("ml-directions-time")) {+ if (target.querySelector(".ml-icon-access-time")) { if (!restore) { restore = true; mo.disconnect(); }+ target.disabled = false; } }@@ -45,38 +39,3 @@ }); mo.observe(document.body, moOptions); });--// Step 2.-const originalValueAsNumberGetter = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(- HTMLInputElement.prototype.wrappedJSObject,- "valueAsNumber"-).get;-Object.defineProperty(- HTMLInputElement.prototype.wrappedJSObject,- "valueAsNumber",- {- configurable: true,- enumerable: true,- get: originalValueAsNumberGetter,- set: exportFunction(function(v) {- if (this.type === "datetime-local" && v) {- const d = new Date(v);- d.setSeconds(0);- d.setMilliseconds(0);- v = d.getTime();- }- this.valueAsNumber = v;- }, window),- }-);--// Step 3.-// injections/css/bug1605611-maps.google.com-directions-time.css fixes the bug,-// but a side effect of allowing the user to click on the datetime-local input-// is that the keyboard appears when the native date picker is closed.-// Fix this by unfocusing the datetime-local input upon focus.-document.addEventListener("focusin", ({ target }) => {- if (target.id === "ml-route-options-time-selector-time-input") {- target.blur();- }-});
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential DOM XSS or Injection] [browser/extensions/webcompat/injections/js/bug1605611-maps.google.com-directions-time.js] [Lines 5-39] [Old Code: Complex mutation observer and DOM manipulation] [Fixed Code: Simplified DOM manipulation focusing only on enabling elements] 2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Prototype Pollution] [browser/extensions/webcompat/injections/js/bug1605611-maps.google.com-directions-time.js] [Lines 45-60] [Old Code: Modifying HTMLInputElement.prototype.wrappedJSObject] [Fixed Code: Removed prototype modification entirely] 3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Event Listener Security Issue] [browser/extensions/webcompat/injections/js/bug1605611-maps.google.com-directions-time.js] [Lines 62-66] [Old Code: Adding focusin listener with blur action] [Fixed Code: Removed event listener entirely] Note: The diff shows significant simplification of the code, removing several potentially risky operations: 1. The prototype modification of HTMLInputElement could have been risky if not properly secured 2. The complex DOM manipulation was simplified to focus only on the essential functionality 3. The event listener that forcibly blurred elements was removed While these changes appear to be security-positive by reducing attack surface, I can't definitively say these were security fixes without more context about the original vulnerabilities they might have been addressing. The changes seem more like code simplification and focus on the core fix rather than explicit security patches.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.curve.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.curve.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(50, 25); ctx.bezierCurveTo(50, 25, 50, 25, 50, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.curve.html [Lines 17-18, 34]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/xpconnect/src/Sandbox.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/xpconnect/src/Sandbox.cpp@@ -55,16 +55,21 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/Fetch.h" #include "mozilla/dom/FileBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/HeadersBinding.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/IOUtilsBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/InspectorUtilsBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/MessageChannelBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/MessagePortBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/NodeBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/NodeFilterBinding.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/PathUtilsBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/PerformanceBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/PromiseBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/PromiseDebuggingBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/RangeBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/RequestBinding.h"+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+# include "mozilla/dom/ReadableStreamBinding.h"+#endif #include "mozilla/dom/ResponseBinding.h" #ifdef MOZ_WEBRTC # include "mozilla/dom/RTCIdentityProviderRegistrar.h"@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/FileReaderBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h" #include "mozilla/dom/SelectionBinding.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/StorageManager.h" #include "mozilla/dom/TextDecoderBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/TextEncoderBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/UnionConversions.h"@@ -357,6 +363,17 @@ dom::Request_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx) && dom::Response_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx) && dom::Headers_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx);+}++static bool SandboxCreateStorage(JSContext* cx, JS::HandleObject obj) {+ MOZ_ASSERT(JS_IsGlobalObject(obj));++ nsIGlobalObject* native = xpc::NativeGlobal(obj);+ MOZ_ASSERT(native);++ dom::StorageManager* storageManager = new dom::StorageManager(native);+ JS::RootedObject wrapped(cx, storageManager->WrapObject(cx, nullptr));+ return JS_DefineProperty(cx, obj, "storage", wrapped, JSPROP_ENUMERATE); } static bool SandboxStructuredClone(JSContext* cx, unsigned argc, Value* vp) {@@ -917,6 +934,8 @@ FormData = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "Headers")) { Headers = true;+ } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "IOUtils")) {+ IOUtils = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "InspectorUtils")) { InspectorUtils = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "MessageChannel")) {@@ -925,6 +944,8 @@ Node = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "NodeFilter")) { NodeFilter = true;+ } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "PathUtils")) {+ PathUtils = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "Performance")) { Performance = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "PromiseDebugging")) {@@ -949,6 +970,10 @@ Window = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "XMLSerializer")) { XMLSerializer = true;+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "ReadableStream")) {+ ReadableStream = true;+#endif } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "atob")) { atob = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "btoa")) {@@ -959,6 +984,8 @@ crypto = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "fetch")) { fetch = true;+ } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "storage")) {+ storage = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "structuredClone")) { structuredClone = true; } else if (JS_LinearStringEqualsLiteral(nameStr, "indexedDB")) {@@ -1045,6 +1072,10 @@ return false; }+ if (IOUtils && !dom::IOUtils_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx)) {+ return false;+ }+ if (InspectorUtils && !dom::InspectorUtils_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx)) return false;@@ -1061,6 +1092,10 @@ return false; }+ if (PathUtils && !dom::PathUtils_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx)) {+ return false;+ }+ if (Performance && !dom::Performance_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx)) { return false; }@@ -1101,6 +1136,11 @@ if (XMLSerializer && !dom::XMLSerializer_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx)) return false;+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+ if (ReadableStream && !dom::ReadableStream_Binding::GetConstructorObject(cx))+ return false;+#endif+ if (atob && !JS_DefineFunction(cx, obj, "atob", Atob, 1, 0)) return false; if (btoa && !JS_DefineFunction(cx, obj, "btoa", Btoa, 1, 0)) return false;@@ -1114,6 +1154,10 @@ } if (fetch && !SandboxCreateFetch(cx, obj)) {+ return false;+ }++ if (storage && !SandboxCreateStorage(cx, obj)) { return false; }
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes. The changes appear to be primarily adding new functionality rather than fixing security vulnerabilities, but I'll analyze each change:
1. First change - New includes and bindings:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - File: js/xpconnect/src/Sandbox.cpp
[Old Code]
(No previous includes for IOUtilsBinding, PathUtilsBinding, ReadableStreamBinding, StorageManager)
[Fixed Code]
Added includes for these new bindings
2. Second change - StorageManager addition:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Privilege Escalation - File: js/xpconnect/src/Sandbox.cpp [Lines 363-373]
[Old Code]
(No storage functionality)
[Fixed Code]
Added SandboxCreateStorage function which creates a new StorageManager instance
3. Third change - New binding checks:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - File: js/xpconnect/src/Sandbox.cpp
[Old Code]
(No checks for IOUtils, PathUtils, ReadableStream, storage)
[Fixed Code]
Added checks and initialization for these new bindings
The changes appear to be adding new functionality rather than fixing existing vulnerabilities. The most notable addition is the StorageManager functionality, which could potentially introduce new security considerations (like ensuring proper sandboxing of storage access), but there's no clear evidence this is fixing an existing vulnerability rather than adding new features.
No clear security vulnerabilities are being fixed in this diff - it's primarily feature additions. The StorageManager addition could have security implications, but without more context about how it's used, I can't identify a specific vulnerability being addressed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/profiler/tests/browser/browser_test_profile_single_frame_page_info.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/profiler/tests/browser/browser_test_profile_single_frame_page_info.js@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ // Requesting the complete log to be able to debug Bug 1586105. SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog(); Assert.ok(!Services.profiler.IsActive());- info("Clear the previous pages just in case we still some open tabs.");+ info("Clear the previous pages just in case we still have some open tabs."); await Services.profiler.ClearAllPages(); info(@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ Assert.equal(typeof page.innerWindowID, "number"); // Top level document will have no embedder. Assert.equal(page.embedderInnerWindowID, 0);+ Assert.equal(typeof page.isPrivateBrowsing, "boolean");+ Assert.equal(page.isPrivateBrowsing, false); pageFound = true; break; }@@ -67,3 +69,87 @@ Assert.equal(pageFound, true); }); });++add_task(async function test_profile_private_browsing() {+ // Requesting the complete log to be able to debug Bug 1586105.+ SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();+ Assert.ok(!Services.profiler.IsActive());+ info("Clear the previous pages just in case we still have some open tabs.");+ await Services.profiler.ClearAllPages();++ info(+ "Start the profiler to test the page information with single frame page."+ );+ startProfiler();++ info("Open a private window with single_frame.html in it.");+ const win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow({+ fission: false,+ private: true,+ });++ try {+ const url = BASE_URL_HTTPS + "single_frame.html";+ const contentBrowser = win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser;+ BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(contentBrowser, url);+ await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(contentBrowser, false, url);++ const contentPid = await SpecialPowers.spawn(contentBrowser, [], () => {+ return Services.appinfo.processID;+ });++ // Getting the active Browser ID to assert the page info tabID later.+ const activeTabID = contentBrowser.browsingContext.browserId;++ info("Capture the profile data.");+ const profile = await Services.profiler.getProfileDataAsync();+ Services.profiler.StopProfiler();++ let pageFound = false;+ // We need to find the correct content process for that tab.+ let contentProcess = profile.processes.find(+ p => p.threads[0].pid == contentPid+ );++ if (!contentProcess) {+ throw new Error(+ `Could not find the content process with given pid: ${contentPid}`+ );+ }++ // This information is available with fission only.+ Assert.equal(+ contentProcess.threads[0].isPrivateBrowsing,+ undefined,+ "The content process has no private browsing flag."+ );++ Assert.equal(+ contentProcess.threads[0].userContextId,+ undefined,+ "The content process has no information about the container used for this process."+ );++ info(+ "Check if the captured page is the one with correct values we created."+ );++ for (const page of contentProcess.pages) {+ if (page.url == url) {+ Assert.equal(page.url, url);+ Assert.equal(typeof page.tabID, "number");+ Assert.equal(page.tabID, activeTabID);+ Assert.equal(typeof page.innerWindowID, "number");+ // Top level document will have no embedder.+ Assert.equal(page.embedderInnerWindowID, 0);+ Assert.equal(typeof page.isPrivateBrowsing, "boolean");+ Assert.equal(page.isPrivateBrowsing, true);+ pageFound = true;+ break;+ }+ }+ Assert.equal(pageFound, true);+ } finally {+ await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win);+ }+});
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Typo Fix [File] tools/profiler/tests/browser/browser_test_profile_single_frame_page_info.js [Lines 13]
Old Code: `info("Clear the previous pages just in case we still some open tabs.");`
Fixed Code: `info("Clear the previous pages just in case we still have some open tabs.");`
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Private Browsing Information Leak [File] tools/profiler/tests/browser/browser_test_profile_single_frame_page_info.js [Lines 60, 144]
Old Code: No check for private browsing status
Fixed Code: Added assertions for private browsing status (`Assert.equal(typeof page.isPrivateBrowsing, "boolean"); Assert.equal(page.isPrivateBrowsing, false);` and similar for true case)
3. Vulnerability Existed: no
New Test Case Addition [File] tools/profiler/tests/browser/browser_test_profile_single_frame_page_info.js [Lines 69-154]
Old Code: No test case for private browsing
Fixed Code: Added comprehensive test case for private browsing scenario
The main security-related change appears to be the addition of private browsing status tracking in the profiler data. While this isn't fixing an existing vulnerability per se, it's adding important privacy-related functionality to ensure private browsing status is properly tracked and reported in profiles. The change helps maintain privacy guarantees by explicitly tracking and verifying private browsing state.
The typo fix is purely cosmetic and doesn't relate to security. The new test case is a functional addition rather than a security fix. The private browsing status checks could be considered a security enhancement as they help ensure proper privacy controls are in place.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser/head.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser/head.js@@ -66,6 +66,25 @@ return `<iframe src="${encodeURI(uri)}"></iframe>`; }+/**+ * Create a XUL browser element in the provided XUL tab, with the provided type.+ *+ * @param {xul:tab} tab+ * The XUL tab in which the browser element should be inserted.+ * @param {String} type+ * The type attribute of the browser element, "chrome" or "content".+ * @return {xul:browser}+ * The created browser element.+ */+function createParentBrowserElement(tab, type) {+ const parentBrowser = gBrowser.ownerDocument.createXULElement("browser");+ parentBrowser.setAttribute("type", type);+ const container = gBrowser.getBrowserContainer(tab.linkedBrowser);+ container.appendChild(parentBrowser);++ return parentBrowser;+}+ // Create a test page with 2 iframes: // - one with a different eTLD+1 (example.com) // - one with a nested iframe on a different eTLD+1 (example.net)
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [remote/shared/messagehandler/test/browser/head.js] [Lines 66-83]
[Old Code]
(No previous code existed in this location)
[Fixed Code]
/**
* Create a XUL browser element in the provided XUL tab, with the provided type.
*
* @param {xul:tab} tab
* The XUL tab in which the browser element should be inserted.
* @param {String} type
* The type attribute of the browser element, "chrome" or "content".
* @return {xul:browser}
* The created browser element.
*/
function createParentBrowserElement(tab, type) {
const parentBrowser = gBrowser.ownerDocument.createXULElement("browser");
parentBrowser.setAttribute("type", type);
const container = gBrowser.getBrowserContainer(tab.linkedBrowser);
container.appendChild(parentBrowser);
return parentBrowser;
}
Analysis:
1. This is a new function addition rather than a security fix
2. The function appears to be a test helper for creating browser elements
3. No obvious security vulnerabilities are present in the added code
4. The function properly uses createXULElement and sets attributes before appending
5. The type parameter is properly documented as accepting only "chrome" or "content" values
No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be adding test infrastructure functionality rather than fixing security issues.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/test/test_mozconfig.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozboot/mozboot/test/test_mozconfig.py@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ import os import unittest-+import sys+import pytest++from pathlib import Path from shutil import rmtree from tempfile import (@@ -37,14 +40,14 @@ os.environ.clear() os.environ.update(self._old_env)- for d in self._temp_dirs:- rmtree(d)+ for temp_dir in self._temp_dirs:+ rmtree(str(temp_dir)) def get_temp_dir(self):- d = mkdtemp()- self._temp_dirs.add(d)-- return d+ new_temp_dir = Path(mkdtemp())+ self._temp_dirs.add(new_temp_dir)++ return new_temp_dir def test_find_legacy_env(self): """Ensure legacy mozconfig path definitions result in error."""@@ -61,47 +64,45 @@ relative_mozconfig = ".mconfig" os.environ["MOZCONFIG"] = relative_mozconfig- srcdir = self.get_temp_dir()- curdir = self.get_temp_dir()- dirs = [srcdir, curdir]- for d in dirs:- path = os.path.join(d, relative_mozconfig)- with open(path, "w") as f:- f.write(path)-- orig_dir = os.getcwd()- try:- os.chdir(curdir)- with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:- find_mozconfig(srcdir)+ src_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ cur_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ dirs = [src_dir, cur_dir]+ for iter_dir in dirs:+ path = iter_dir / relative_mozconfig+ with open(path, "w") as file:+ file.write(str(path))++ orig_dir = Path.cwd()+ try:+ os.chdir(cur_dir)+ with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:+ find_mozconfig(src_dir) finally: os.chdir(orig_dir) self.assertIn("exists in more than one of", str(e.exception))- for d in dirs:- self.assertIn(d, str(e.exception))+ for iter_dir in dirs:+ self.assertIn(str(iter_dir.resolve()), str(e.exception)) def test_find_multiple_but_identical_configs(self): """Ensure multiple relative-path MOZCONFIGs pointing at the same file are OK.""" relative_mozconfig = "../src/.mconfig" os.environ["MOZCONFIG"] = relative_mozconfig- topdir = self.get_temp_dir()- srcdir = os.path.join(topdir, "src")- os.mkdir(srcdir)- curdir = os.path.join(topdir, "obj")- os.mkdir(curdir)-- path = os.path.join(srcdir, relative_mozconfig)+ top_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ src_dir = top_dir / "src"+ src_dir.mkdir()+ cur_dir = top_dir / "obj"+ cur_dir.mkdir()++ path = src_dir / relative_mozconfig with open(path, "w"): pass- orig_dir = os.getcwd()- try:- os.chdir(curdir)- self.assertEqual(- os.path.realpath(find_mozconfig(srcdir)), os.path.realpath(path)- )+ orig_dir = Path.cwd()+ try:+ os.chdir(cur_dir)+ self.assertEqual(Path(find_mozconfig(src_dir)).resolve(), path.resolve()) finally: os.chdir(orig_dir)@@ -110,43 +111,49 @@ relative_mozconfig = ".mconfig" os.environ["MOZCONFIG"] = relative_mozconfig- srcdir = self.get_temp_dir()- curdir = self.get_temp_dir()- dirs = [srcdir, curdir]-- orig_dir = os.getcwd()- try:- os.chdir(curdir)- with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:- find_mozconfig(srcdir)+ src_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ cur_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ dirs = [src_dir, cur_dir]++ orig_dir = Path.cwd()+ try:+ os.chdir(cur_dir)+ with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:+ find_mozconfig(src_dir) finally: os.chdir(orig_dir) self.assertIn("does not exist in any of", str(e.exception))- for d in dirs:- self.assertIn(d, str(e.exception))+ for iter_dir in dirs:+ self.assertIn(str(iter_dir.resolve()), str(e.exception)) def test_find_relative_mozconfig(self): """Ensure a relative MOZCONFIG can be found in the srcdir.""" relative_mozconfig = ".mconfig" os.environ["MOZCONFIG"] = relative_mozconfig- srcdir = self.get_temp_dir()- curdir = self.get_temp_dir()-- path = os.path.join(srcdir, relative_mozconfig)+ src_dir = Path(self.get_temp_dir())+ cur_dir = Path(self.get_temp_dir())++ path = src_dir / relative_mozconfig with open(path, "w"): pass- orig_dir = os.getcwd()- try:- os.chdir(curdir)+ orig_dir = Path.cwd()+ try:+ os.chdir(cur_dir) self.assertEqual(- os.path.normpath(find_mozconfig(srcdir)), os.path.normpath(path)+ str(Path(find_mozconfig(src_dir)).resolve()), str(path.resolve()) ) finally: os.chdir(orig_dir)+ @pytest.mark.skipif(+ sys.platform.startswith("win"),+ reason="This test uses unix-style absolute paths, since we now use Pathlib, and "+ "`is_absolute()` always returns `False` on Windows if there isn't a drive"+ " letter, this test is invalid for Windows.",+ ) def test_find_abs_path_not_exist(self): """Ensure a missing absolute path is detected.""" os.environ["MOZCONFIG"] = "/foo/bar/does/not/exist"@@ -155,7 +162,7 @@ find_mozconfig(self.get_temp_dir()) self.assertIn("path that does not exist", str(e.exception))- self.assertTrue(str(e.exception).endswith("/foo/bar/does/not/exist"))+ self.assertIn("/foo/bar/does/not/exist", str(e.exception)) def test_find_path_not_file(self): """Ensure non-file paths are detected."""@@ -170,49 +177,49 @@ def test_find_default_files(self): """Ensure default paths are used when present."""- for p in DEFAULT_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS:- d = self.get_temp_dir()- path = os.path.join(d, p)+ for default_dir in DEFAULT_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS:+ temp_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ path = temp_dir / default_dir with open(path, "w"): pass- self.assertEqual(find_mozconfig(d), path)+ self.assertEqual(Path(find_mozconfig(temp_dir)), path) def test_find_multiple_defaults(self): """Ensure we error when multiple default files are present.""" self.assertGreater(len(DEFAULT_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS), 1)- d = self.get_temp_dir()- for p in DEFAULT_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS:- with open(os.path.join(d, p), "w"):- pass-- with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:- find_mozconfig(d)+ temp_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ for default_dir in DEFAULT_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS:+ with open(temp_dir / default_dir, "w"):+ pass++ with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:+ find_mozconfig(temp_dir) self.assertIn("Multiple default mozconfig files present", str(e.exception)) def test_find_deprecated_path_srcdir(self): """Ensure we error when deprecated path locations are present."""- for p in DEPRECATED_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS:- d = self.get_temp_dir()- with open(os.path.join(d, p), "w"):- pass-- with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:- find_mozconfig(d)+ for deprecated_dir in DEPRECATED_TOPSRCDIR_PATHS:+ temp_dir = self.get_temp_dir()+ with open(temp_dir / deprecated_dir, "w"):+ pass++ with self.assertRaises(MozconfigFindException) as e:+ find_mozconfig(temp_dir) self.assertIn("This implicit location is no longer", str(e.exception))- self.assertIn(d, str(e.exception))+ self.assertIn(str(temp_dir), str(e.exception)) def test_find_deprecated_home_paths(self): """Ensure we error when deprecated home directory paths are present."""- for p in DEPRECATED_HOME_PATHS:+ for deprecated_path in DEPRECATED_HOME_PATHS: home = self.get_temp_dir()- os.environ["HOME"] = home- path = os.path.join(home, p)+ os.environ["HOME"] = str(home)+ path = home / deprecated_path with open(path, "w"): pass@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ find_mozconfig(self.get_temp_dir()) self.assertIn("This implicit location is no longer", str(e.exception))- self.assertIn(path, str(e.exception))+ self.assertIn(str(path), str(e.exception)) if __name__ == "__main__":
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Path Traversal Vulnerability [python/mozboot/mozboot/test/test_mozconfig.py] [Lines 40-42]
[Old Code]
for d in self._temp_dirs:
rmtree(d)
[Fixed Code]
for temp_dir in self._temp_dirs:
rmtree(str(temp_dir))
The change ensures proper path handling by converting Path objects to strings before deletion, preventing potential path traversal issues.
2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Temporary File Handling [python/mozboot/mozboot/test/test_mozconfig.py] [Lines 45-48]
[Old Code]
d = mkdtemp()
self._temp_dirs.add(d)
return d
[Fixed Code]
new_temp_dir = Path(mkdtemp())
self._temp_dirs.add(new_temp_dir)
return new_temp_dir
The change improves security by using Path objects for temporary directory handling, which provides better path manipulation safety.
3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Race Condition [python/mozboot/mozboot/test/test_mozconfig.py] [Lines 69-71]
[Old Code]
path = os.path.join(d, relative_mozconfig)
with open(path, "w") as f:
f.write(path)
[Fixed Code]
path = iter_dir / relative_mozconfig
with open(path, "w") as file:
file.write(str(path))
The change to Path objects might help prevent race conditions in file operations, though it's not explicitly a security fix.
4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Windows Path Handling Issue [python/mozboot/mozboot/test/test_mozconfig.py] [Lines 151-155]
[Old Code]
[No equivalent code]
[Fixed Code]
@pytest.mark.skipif(
sys.platform.startswith("win"),
reason="This test uses unix-style absolute paths..."
)
The addition shows awareness of Windows path handling differences, though it's more of a compatibility fix than a security one.
The main security improvements appear to be:
1. Better path handling using Path objects
2. More secure temporary file operations
3. Proper string conversion for path operations
The changes don't indicate any critical vulnerabilities but rather general improvements to make the code more robust and secure in its file handling operations.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/ipc/BrowserChild.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/ipc/BrowserChild.cpp@@ -312,7 +312,6 @@ mMaxTouchPoints(0), mLayersId{0}, mEffectsInfo{EffectsInfo::FullyHidden()},- mOrientation(hal::eScreenOrientation_PortraitPrimary), mDynamicToolbarMaxHeight(0), mUniqueId(aTabId), mDidFakeShow(false),@@ -1273,7 +1272,6 @@ mChromeOffset = aDimensionInfo.chromeOffset(); MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!IsTopLevel(), mChromeOffset == LayoutDeviceIntPoint());- mOrientation = aDimensionInfo.orientation(); SetUnscaledInnerSize(aDimensionInfo.size()); if (!mHasValidInnerSize && aDimensionInfo.size().width != 0 && aDimensionInfo.size().height != 0) {
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. First Change:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [dom/ipc/BrowserChild.cpp] [Lines 312-320]
[Old Code]
mEffectsInfo{EffectsInfo::FullyHidden()},
mOrientation(hal::eScreenOrientation_PortraitPrimary),
mDynamicToolbarMaxHeight(0),
[Fixed Code]
mEffectsInfo{EffectsInfo::FullyHidden()},
mDynamicToolbarMaxHeight(0),
2. Second Change:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [dom/ipc/BrowserChild.cpp] [Lines 1272-1273]
[Old Code]
MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!IsTopLevel(), mChromeOffset == LayoutDeviceIntPoint());
mOrientation = aDimensionInfo.orientation();
[Fixed Code]
MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!IsTopLevel(), mChromeOffset == LayoutDeviceIntPoint());
Additional Details:
- The changes involve removing references to `mOrientation` in both the initialization and update code.
- While this could potentially be related to security (such as preventing information leaks about device orientation), there isn't enough context to confirm this is a security fix rather than just a refactoring.
- Without more information about why these changes were made, we can't definitively say they address a specific vulnerability.
- The changes might be related to privacy concerns (preventing potential fingerprinting via screen orientation), but this is speculative.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/lint/perfdocs/verifier.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/lint/perfdocs/verifier.py@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ "properties": {"test_name": {"type": "string"}}, }, "description": {"type": "string"},+ "owner": {"type": "string"}, }, "required": ["description"], }
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [tools/lint/perfdocs/verifier.py] [Lines around 50]
[Old Code]
"properties": {"test_name": {"type": "string"}},
},
"description": {"type": "string"},
[Fixed Code]
"properties": {"test_name": {"type": "string"}},
},
"description": {"type": "string"},
"owner": {"type": "string"},
Analysis:
1. The change simply adds a new optional field "owner" to a JSON schema validation structure.
2. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here - this is just a schema enhancement.
3. No security-related patterns (like input validation, sanitization, or authentication) are being modified.
4. The change appears to be purely additive functionality rather than a security fix.
The modification is adding metadata (owner information) to performance test documentation schema, which doesn't relate to any known security vulnerability patterns.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-021.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-021.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="match" href="reference/active-selection-021-ref.html"> <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css" />- <meta content="" name="flags"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="support/highlights.css"> <style>
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-pseudo/active-selection-021.html [Lines] 9 Old Code: <meta content="" name="flags"> Fixed Code: (line removed) Additional Details: - The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute - This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix - No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change - The change is likely related to test configuration rather than security
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 0); ctx.arc(100, 0, 150, Math.PI/2, -Math.PI, true); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security vulnerabilities. Here's the analysis following your format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 23]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.ensuresubpath.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.ensuresubpath.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(0, 25); ctx.lineTo(100, 25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and consistency improvements. Here's the analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming Consistency Fix [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.lineTo.ensuresubpath.2.html] [Lines 17-28]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency, without any security implications. No actual functionality or security-related behavior was modified.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/pytestrunner/runner.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/pytestrunner/runner.py@@ -44,14 +44,14 @@ old_environ = os.environ.copy() try: with TemporaryDirectory() as cache:- os.environ["WD_HOST"] = session_config["host"]- os.environ["WD_PORT"] = str(session_config["port"])- os.environ["WD_CAPABILITIES"] = json.dumps(session_config["capabilities"])+ config_path = os.path.join(cache, "wd_config.json")+ os.environ["WDSPEC_CONFIG_FILE"] = config_path- config_path = os.path.join(cache, "wd_server_config.json")- os.environ["WD_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE"] = config_path+ config = session_config.copy()+ config["wptserve"] = server_config.as_dict()+ with open(config_path, "w") as f:- json.dump(server_config.as_dict(), f)+ json.dump(config, f) if environ: os.environ.update(environ)
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Environment Variable Injection] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/pytestrunner/runner.py] [Lines 44-54]
[Old Code]
os.environ["WD_HOST"] = session_config["host"]
os.environ["WD_PORT"] = str(session_config["port"])
os.environ["WD_CAPABILITIES"] = json.dumps(session_config["capabilities"])
config_path = os.path.join(cache, "wd_server_config.json")
os.environ["WD_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE"] = config_path
with open(config_path, "w") as f:
json.dump(server_config.as_dict(), f)
[Fixed Code]
config_path = os.path.join(cache, "wd_config.json")
os.environ["WDSPEC_CONFIG_FILE"] = config_path
config = session_config.copy()
config["wptserve"] = server_config.as_dict()
with open(config_path, "w") as f:
json.dump(config, f)
Additional Details: The fix changes from storing sensitive configuration data in environment variables (which could be accessed by child processes) to storing it in a temporary file. This reduces the risk of sensitive data exposure through environment variables.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Disclosure] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/executors/pytestrunner/runner.py] [Lines 44-54]
[Old Code]
(same as above)
[Fixed Code]
(same as above)
Additional Details: While the change improves security by moving sensitive data from environment variables to a file, it's unclear if proper file permissions are set on the temporary file to prevent unauthorized access. The TemporaryDirectory() might provide sufficient security, but this isn't verifiable from the diff alone.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/caption-writing-mode-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/caption-writing-mode-001.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <script src='/resources/testharnessreport.js'></script> <link rel="author" title="David Grogan" href="[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-writing-modes-3/#orthogonal-flows">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="caption margins are resolved against table's height when table has vertical flow" /> <style> x-table {
Analysis of the code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/caption-writing-mode-001.html] [Lines 3-6] Old Code: ```html <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-writing-modes-3/#orthogonal-flows"> <meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="caption margins are resolved against table's height when table has vertical flow" /> ``` Fixed Code: ```html <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-writing-modes-3/#orthogonal-flows"> <meta name="assert" content="caption margins are resolved against table's height when table has vertical flow" /> ``` Additional Details: The change simply removes an empty meta "flags" tag, which doesn't appear to be security-related. The typo in "writing-modes" was already present in both versions (note the "odes" vs "odes" in the URL).
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-204.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-204.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Florian Rivoal" href="https://florian.rivoal.net"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css2/visudet.html#line-height"> <link rel="match" href="reference/line-height-202-ref.html">-<meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="The position of the baseline in an inline-level box whose line-height is normal and the position of the baseline in an inline-level box whose line-height is set to a non normal value resulting in the same height are the same,
Analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/CSS2/visudet/line-height-204.html [Lines] 5 [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="">` [Fixed Code] (Line removed) Additional Details: This appears to be a test file modification where a blank meta "flags" tag was removed. There's no security vulnerability being fixed here, just a cleanup of test metadata. The change doesn't relate to any security functionality or vulnerability patching. The modification is part of routine test maintenance rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.image.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.image.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ ctx.restore(); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 25);- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.orientation.image.html
Changes:
- Renamed variable from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
- Updated assertion calls to use new variable name
The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/expand.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/thiserror-impl/src/expand.rs@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@ use crate::ast::{Enum, Field, Input, Struct};+use crate::attr::Trait;+use crate::generics::InferredBounds; use proc_macro2::TokenStream; use quote::{format_ident, quote, quote_spanned, ToTokens};+use std::collections::BTreeSet as Set; use syn::spanned::Spanned;-use syn::{Data, DeriveInput, Member, PathArguments, Result, Type, Visibility};+use syn::{+ Data, DeriveInput, GenericArgument, Member, PathArguments, Result, Token, Type, Visibility,+}; pub fn derive(node: &DeriveInput) -> Result<TokenStream> { let input = Input::from_syn(node)?;@@ -16,14 +21,23 @@ fn impl_struct(input: Struct) -> TokenStream { let ty = &input.ident; let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = input.generics.split_for_impl();+ let mut error_inferred_bounds = InferredBounds::new(); let source_body = if input.attrs.transparent.is_some() {- let only_field = &input.fields[0].member;- Some(quote! {- std::error::Error::source(self.#only_field.as_dyn_error())+ let only_field = &input.fields[0];+ if only_field.contains_generic {+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(only_field.ty, quote!(std::error::Error));+ }+ let member = &only_field.member;+ Some(quote! {+ std::error::Error::source(self.#member.as_dyn_error()) }) } else if let Some(source_field) = input.source_field() { let source = &source_field.member;+ if source_field.contains_generic {+ let ty = unoptional_type(source_field.ty);+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(ty, quote!(std::error::Error + 'static));+ } let asref = if type_is_option(source_field.ty) { Some(quote_spanned!(source.span()=> .as_ref()?)) } else {@@ -58,7 +72,9 @@ self.#source.as_dyn_error().backtrace() } };- let combinator = if type_is_option(backtrace_field.ty) {+ let combinator = if source == backtrace {+ source_backtrace+ } else if type_is_option(backtrace_field.ty) { quote! { #source_backtrace.or(self.#backtrace.as_ref()) }@@ -87,12 +103,15 @@ } });+ let mut display_implied_bounds = Set::new(); let display_body = if input.attrs.transparent.is_some() { let only_field = &input.fields[0].member;+ display_implied_bounds.insert((0, Trait::Display)); Some(quote! { std::fmt::Display::fmt(&self.#only_field, __formatter) }) } else if let Some(display) = &input.attrs.display {+ display_implied_bounds = display.implied_bounds.clone(); let use_as_display = if display.has_bonus_display { Some(quote! { #[allow(unused_imports)]@@ -112,9 +131,17 @@ None }; let display_impl = display_body.map(|body| {+ let mut display_inferred_bounds = InferredBounds::new();+ for (field, bound) in display_implied_bounds {+ let field = &input.fields[field];+ if field.contains_generic {+ display_inferred_bounds.insert(field.ty, bound);+ }+ }+ let display_where_clause = display_inferred_bounds.augment_where_clause(input.generics); quote! { #[allow(unused_qualifications)]- impl #impl_generics std::fmt::Display for #ty #ty_generics #where_clause {+ impl #impl_generics std::fmt::Display for #ty #ty_generics #display_where_clause { #[allow(clippy::used_underscore_binding)] fn fmt(&self, __formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result { #body@@ -124,8 +151,8 @@ }); let from_impl = input.from_field().map(|from_field| {- let backtrace_field = input.backtrace_field();- let from = from_field.ty;+ let backtrace_field = input.distinct_backtrace_field();+ let from = unoptional_type(from_field.ty); let body = from_initializer(from_field, backtrace_field); quote! { #[allow(unused_qualifications)]@@ -139,10 +166,16 @@ }); let error_trait = spanned_error_trait(input.original);+ if input.generics.type_params().next().is_some() {+ let self_token = <Token![Self]>::default();+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(self_token, Trait::Debug);+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(self_token, Trait::Display);+ }+ let error_where_clause = error_inferred_bounds.augment_where_clause(input.generics); quote! { #[allow(unused_qualifications)]- impl #impl_generics #error_trait for #ty #ty_generics #where_clause {+ impl #impl_generics #error_trait for #ty #ty_generics #error_where_clause { #source_method #backtrace_method }@@ -154,18 +187,27 @@ fn impl_enum(input: Enum) -> TokenStream { let ty = &input.ident; let (impl_generics, ty_generics, where_clause) = input.generics.split_for_impl();+ let mut error_inferred_bounds = InferredBounds::new(); let source_method = if input.has_source() { let arms = input.variants.iter().map(|variant| { let ident = &variant.ident; if variant.attrs.transparent.is_some() {- let only_field = &variant.fields[0].member;+ let only_field = &variant.fields[0];+ if only_field.contains_generic {+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(only_field.ty, quote!(std::error::Error));+ }+ let member = &only_field.member; let source = quote!(std::error::Error::source(transparent.as_dyn_error())); quote! {- #ty::#ident {#only_field: transparent} => #source,+ #ty::#ident {#member: transparent} => #source, } } else if let Some(source_field) = variant.source_field() { let source = &source_field.member;+ if source_field.contains_generic {+ let ty = unoptional_type(source_field.ty);+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(ty, quote!(std::error::Error + 'static));+ } let asref = if type_is_option(source_field.ty) { Some(quote_spanned!(source.span()=> .as_ref()?)) } else {@@ -234,6 +276,27 @@ } } }+ (Some(backtrace_field), Some(source_field))+ if backtrace_field.member == source_field.member =>+ {+ let backtrace = &backtrace_field.member;+ let varsource = quote!(source);+ let source_backtrace = if type_is_option(source_field.ty) {+ quote_spanned! {backtrace.span()=>+ #varsource.as_ref().and_then(|source| source.as_dyn_error().backtrace())+ }+ } else {+ quote_spanned! {backtrace.span()=>+ #varsource.as_dyn_error().backtrace()+ }+ };+ quote! {+ #ty::#ident {#backtrace: #varsource, ..} => {+ use thiserror::private::AsDynError;+ #source_backtrace+ }+ }+ } (Some(backtrace_field), _) => { let backtrace = &backtrace_field.member; let body = if type_is_option(backtrace_field.ty) {@@ -263,6 +326,7 @@ }; let display_impl = if input.has_display() {+ let mut display_inferred_bounds = InferredBounds::new(); let use_as_display = if input.variants.iter().any(|v| { v.attrs .display@@ -282,25 +346,38 @@ None }; let arms = input.variants.iter().map(|variant| {+ let mut display_implied_bounds = Set::new(); let display = match &variant.attrs.display {- Some(display) => display.to_token_stream(),+ Some(display) => {+ display_implied_bounds = display.implied_bounds.clone();+ display.to_token_stream()+ } None => { let only_field = match &variant.fields[0].member { Member::Named(ident) => ident.clone(), Member::Unnamed(index) => format_ident!("_{}", index), };+ display_implied_bounds.insert((0, Trait::Display)); quote!(std::fmt::Display::fmt(#only_field, __formatter)) } };+ for (field, bound) in display_implied_bounds {+ let field = &variant.fields[field];+ if field.contains_generic {+ display_inferred_bounds.insert(field.ty, bound);+ }+ } let ident = &variant.ident; let pat = fields_pat(&variant.fields); quote! { #ty::#ident #pat => #display } });+ let arms = arms.collect::<Vec<_>>();+ let display_where_clause = display_inferred_bounds.augment_where_clause(input.generics); Some(quote! { #[allow(unused_qualifications)]- impl #impl_generics std::fmt::Display for #ty #ty_generics #where_clause {+ impl #impl_generics std::fmt::Display for #ty #ty_generics #display_where_clause { fn fmt(&self, __formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> std::fmt::Result { #use_as_display #[allow(unused_variables, deprecated, clippy::used_underscore_binding)]@@ -316,9 +393,9 @@ let from_impls = input.variants.iter().filter_map(|variant| { let from_field = variant.from_field()?;- let backtrace_field = variant.backtrace_field();+ let backtrace_field = variant.distinct_backtrace_field(); let variant = &variant.ident;- let from = from_field.ty;+ let from = unoptional_type(from_field.ty); let body = from_initializer(from_field, backtrace_field); Some(quote! { #[allow(unused_qualifications)]@@ -332,10 +409,16 @@ }); let error_trait = spanned_error_trait(input.original);+ if input.generics.type_params().next().is_some() {+ let self_token = <Token![Self]>::default();+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(self_token, Trait::Debug);+ error_inferred_bounds.insert(self_token, Trait::Display);+ }+ let error_where_clause = error_inferred_bounds.augment_where_clause(input.generics); quote! { #[allow(unused_qualifications)]- impl #impl_generics #error_trait for #ty #ty_generics #where_clause {+ impl #impl_generics #error_trait for #ty #ty_generics #error_where_clause { #source_method #backtrace_method }@@ -361,6 +444,11 @@ fn from_initializer(from_field: &Field, backtrace_field: Option<&Field>) -> TokenStream { let from_member = &from_field.member;+ let some_source = if type_is_option(from_field.ty) {+ quote!(std::option::Option::Some(source))+ } else {+ quote!(source)+ }; let backtrace = backtrace_field.map(|backtrace_field| { let backtrace_member = &backtrace_field.member; if type_is_option(backtrace_field.ty) {@@ -374,25 +462,43 @@ } }); quote!({- #from_member: source,+ #from_member: #some_source, #backtrace }) } fn type_is_option(ty: &Type) -> bool {+ type_parameter_of_option(ty).is_some()+}++fn unoptional_type(ty: &Type) -> TokenStream {+ let unoptional = type_parameter_of_option(ty).unwrap_or(ty);+ quote!(#unoptional)+}++fn type_parameter_of_option(ty: &Type) -> Option<&Type> { let path = match ty { Type::Path(ty) => &ty.path,- _ => return false,+ _ => return None, }; let last = path.segments.last().unwrap(); if last.ident != "Option" {- return false;- }-- match &last.arguments {- PathArguments::AngleBracketed(bracketed) => bracketed.args.len() == 1,- _ => false,+ return None;+ }++ let bracketed = match &last.arguments {+ PathArguments::AngleBracketed(bracketed) => bracketed,+ _ => return None,+ };++ if bracketed.args.len() != 1 {+ return None;+ }++ match &bracketed.args[0] {+ GenericArgument::Type(arg) => Some(arg),+ _ => None, } }
After analyzing the code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily focused on improving type safety and adding inferred bounds for generics in the error handling implementation. Here's the analysis:
1. First potential area examined (generic type handling):
Vulnerability Existed: no
This appears to be a refactoring/improvement to handle generic types better in error implementations, not a security fix.
2. Second potential area examined (backtrace handling):
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes to backtrace handling appear to be adding more complete implementations rather than fixing security issues.
3. Third potential area examined (display trait implementation):
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes to display trait handling are adding inferred bounds and improving generic support, not fixing vulnerabilities.
4. Fourth potential area examined (from field initialization):
Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes to from_initializer are adding proper handling of Option types, not fixing security issues.
The diff shows significant changes to the code structure and added functionality for:
- Better handling of generic types
- More complete trait bounds inference
- Improved Option type handling
- Additional cases for backtrace/source field combinations
However, none of these changes appear to be addressing security vulnerabilities. They seem to be general improvements to the robustness and completeness of the error handling implementation.
If I had to speculate about potential security implications that might have been addressed indirectly:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
The improved type safety and bounds checking could potentially prevent some edge cases that might lead to unsafe behavior, but there's no clear evidence this was fixing an actual vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/allow_std.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/allow_std.rs@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ use futures_core::task::{Context, Poll};-#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]-use futures_io::Initializer; use futures_io::{AsyncBufRead, AsyncRead, AsyncSeek, AsyncWrite, IoSlice, IoSliceMut, SeekFrom}; use std::pin::Pin; use std::{fmt, io};@@ -121,10 +119,6 @@ fn read_vectored(&mut self, bufs: &mut [IoSliceMut<'_>]) -> io::Result<usize> { self.0.read_vectored(bufs) }- #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]- unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {- self.0.initializer()- } fn read_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> io::Result<usize> { self.0.read_to_end(buf) }@@ -154,11 +148,6 @@ bufs: &mut [IoSliceMut<'_>], ) -> Poll<io::Result<usize>> { Poll::Ready(Ok(try_with_interrupt!(self.0.read_vectored(bufs))))- }-- #[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]- unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {- self.0.initializer() } }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential removal of unsafe initialization feature] [third_party/rust/futures-util/src/io/allow_std.rs] [Lines 1-6, 121-123, 154-157]
[Old Code]
```rust
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
use futures_io::Initializer;
...
#[cfg(feature = "read-initializer")]
unsafe fn initializer(&self) -> Initializer {
self.0.initializer()
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```rust
// Entire unsafe initializer functionality removed
```
Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of code related to the "read-initializer" feature, including unsafe initialization functionality
- While this removes unsafe code, it's unclear if there was an actual vulnerability being fixed or just a feature removal
- The unsafe `initializer()` method could potentially have been a source of memory safety issues if misused, but without more context about the feature's purpose, we can't definitively say if a vulnerability existed
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgba-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.rgba-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(100%, 0, 0, 1)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable renaming change (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications.
- The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
- The context ('2d') and assertion parameters remain unchanged.
- No actual security vulnerability is being fixed here, just code style/readability improvement.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/serde/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/serde/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/serde_yaml/tests/test_serde.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/serde_yaml/tests/test_serde.rs@@ -164,7 +164,6 @@ "}) .unwrap(); assert!(single_float.is_nan());- } #[test]@@ -269,6 +268,18 @@ --- - ~ - ~+ "};+ test_serde(&thing, yaml);+}++#[test]+fn test_unit_struct() {+ #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Debug)]+ struct Foo;+ let thing = Foo;+ let yaml = indoc! {"+ ---+ ~ "}; test_serde(&thing, yaml); }
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze the changes for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. First file (cargo-checksum.json changes):
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - this appears to be routine dependency version updates with hash changes
The changes show updated checksums for various files in the serde crate, which is typical for version updates
2. Second file (test_serde.rs changes):
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - test modifications
The changes include:
- Removal of an empty line in a NaN test case
- Addition of a new test case for unit struct serialization
No security vulnerabilities were identified in these changes. The modifications appear to be:
1. Routine dependency updates with checksum changes
2. Test suite improvements/additions
The changes don't show any:
- Input validation modifications
- Security-related function changes
- Vulnerability fixes
- Potentially dangerous operations being modified
Both sets of changes appear to be benign maintenance updates rather than security fixes.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/vm/JSFunction.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/vm/JSFunction.cpp@@ -193,6 +193,14 @@ return false; }+ // Function.arguments isn't standard (not even Annex B), so it isn't+ // worth the effort to guarantee that we can always recover it from+ // an Ion frame. Always return null for differential fuzzing.+ if (js::SupportDifferentialTesting()) {+ args.rval().setNull();+ return true;+ }+ // Return null if this function wasn't found on the stack. NonBuiltinScriptFrameIter iter(cx); if (!AdvanceToActiveCallLinear(cx, iter, fun)) {
Let me analyze this code diff for security fixes.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [js/src/vm/JSFunction.cpp] [Lines 193-201]
[Old Code]
return false;
}
// Return null if this function wasn't found on the stack.
[Fixed Code]
return false;
}
// Function.arguments isn't standard (not even Annex B), so it isn't
// worth the effort to guarantee that we can always recover it from
// an Ion frame. Always return null for differential fuzzing.
if (js::SupportDifferentialTesting()) {
args.rval().setNull();
return true;
}
// Return null if this function wasn't found on the stack.
Additional Details:
- The change adds a special case for differential fuzzing that always returns null for Function.arguments
- While not explicitly a security fix, this could potentially prevent information leaks during fuzzing by standardizing behavior
- The comment suggests this is more about standardization than security, but consistent behavior during fuzzing could help uncover security issues
- No specific CVE or vulnerability name is mentioned in the diff
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.