Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/speculation-rules/prerender/local-storage.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/speculation-rules/prerender/local-storage.html@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ <meta name="timeout" content="long"> <script src="/resources/testharness.js"></script> <script src="/resources/testharnessreport.js"></script>+<script src="/common/utils.js"></script> <script src="resources/utils.js"></script> <body> <script>@@ -10,25 +11,21 @@ setup(() => assertSpeculationRulesIsSupported()); promise_test(async t => {- const bc = new BroadcastChannel('prerender-channel');-- const gotMessage = new Promise(resolve => {- bc.addEventListener('message', e => {- resolve(e.data);- }, {once:true});- });-- const initialValue = "initial_set";- window.localStorage.setItem('initial', initialValue);+ const uid1 = token();+ const uid2 = token();+ window.localStorage.setItem('initial', uid1);+ const {exec} = await create_prerendered_page(t);+ const result = await exec(uid2 => {+ window.localStorage.setItem('prerender', uid2);+ return window.localStorage.getItem('initial');+ }, [uid2]) // Start prerendering a page that attempts to access localStorage API.- startPrerendering(`resources/local-storage-access.html`);- const result = await gotMessage; assert_equals(- result, initialValue,+ result, uid1, 'prerendering page should be able to read from local storage'); assert_equals(- window.localStorage.getItem('prerender'), 'prerender_set',+ window.localStorage.getItem('prerender'), uid2, 'prerendering page should be able to write to local storage'); }, 'prerendering page should be able to access local storage');
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leakage] [testing/web-platform/tests/speculation-rules/prerender/local-storage.html] [Lines 10-25]
[Old Code]
```javascript
const bc = new BroadcastChannel('prerender-channel');
const gotMessage = new Promise(resolve => {
bc.addEventListener('message', e => {
resolve(e.data);
}, {once:true});
});
const initialValue = "initial_set";
window.localStorage.setItem('initial', initialValue);
startPrerendering(`resources/local-storage-access.html`);
const result = await gotMessage;
```
[Fixed Code]
```javascript
const uid1 = token();
const uid2 = token();
window.localStorage.setItem('initial', uid1);
const {exec} = await create_prerendered_page(t);
const result = await exec(uid2 => {
window.localStorage.setItem('prerender', uid2);
return window.localStorage.getItem('initial');
}, [uid2])
```
Additional Details:
- The change replaces hardcoded values with dynamically generated tokens (`uid1`, `uid2`) which is generally more secure, but it's unclear if the previous version had an actual vulnerability
- The removal of `BroadcastChannel` communication might suggest a potential information leakage risk was addressed, but this is speculative
- The test appears to be verifying localStorage access during prerendering rather than fixing a production vulnerability
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/CacheIRWriter.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/CacheIRWriter.h@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "mozilla/Assertions.h" #include "mozilla/Attributes.h"+#include "mozilla/Casting.h" #include "mozilla/Maybe.h" #include <stddef.h>@@ -230,6 +231,10 @@ void writeRawInt64Field(uint64_t val) { addStubField(val, StubField::Type::RawInt64); }+ void writeDoubleField(double d) {+ uint64_t bits = mozilla::BitwiseCast<uint64_t>(d);+ addStubField(bits, StubField::Type::Double);+ } void writeAllocSiteField(gc::AllocSite* ptr) { addStubField(uintptr_t(ptr), StubField::Type::AllocSite); }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Type Confusion/Precision Loss Vulnerability] [js/src/jit/CacheIRWriter.h] [Lines 230-233]
[Old Code]
```cpp
void writeRawInt64Field(uint64_t val) {
addStubField(val, StubField::Type::RawInt64);
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
void writeDoubleField(double d) {
uint64_t bits = mozilla::BitwiseCast<uint64_t>(d);
addStubField(bits, StubField::Type::Double);
}
```
Additional Details: The addition of `writeDoubleField` with proper bitwise casting suggests there might have been potential issues with how double values were being handled before. The use of `mozilla::BitwiseCast` ensures proper type conversion between double and uint64_t representations, which could prevent type confusion or precision loss issues. However, without seeing the previous implementation (if any existed), we can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just adding new functionality safely.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Missing Header Inclusion] [js/src/jit/CacheIRWriter.h] [Lines 9-10]
[Old Code]
```cpp
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Attributes.h"
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Attributes.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
```
Additional Details: The addition of `mozilla/Casting.h` header might indicate that some unsafe casting operations were being performed before, which could lead to vulnerabilities. However, this could also just be preparatory work for the new `writeDoubleField` functionality. Without more context, we can't be certain if this was fixing an actual vulnerability.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/version_check/src/channel.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/version_check/src/channel.rs@@ -54,11 +54,12 @@ /// assert!(stable.is_stable()); /// ``` pub fn parse(version: &str) -> Option<Channel> {- if version.contains("-dev") {+ let version = version.trim();+ if version.contains("-dev") || version == "dev" { Some(Channel(Kind::Dev))- } else if version.contains("-nightly") {+ } else if version.contains("-nightly") || version == "nightly" { Some(Channel(Kind::Nightly))- } else if version.contains("-beta") {+ } else if version.contains("-beta") || version == "beta" { Some(Channel(Kind::Beta)) } else if !version.contains("-") { Some(Channel(Kind::Stable))
Here's the analysis following the specified format:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Incomplete Version Channel Detection] [third_party/rust/version_check/src/channel.rs] [Lines 54-62]
[Old Code]
if version.contains("-dev") {
Some(Channel(Kind::Dev))
} else if version.contains("-nightly") {
Some(Channel(Kind::Nightly))
} else if version.contains("-beta") {
Some(Channel(Kind::Beta))
} else if !version.contains("-") {
Some(Channel(Kind::Stable))
[Fixed Code]
let version = version.trim();
if version.contains("-dev") || version == "dev" {
Some(Channel(Kind::Dev))
} else if version.contains("-nightly") || version == "nightly" {
Some(Channel(Kind::Nightly))
} else if version.contains("-beta") || version == "beta" {
Some(Channel(Kind::Beta))
} else if !version.contains("-") {
Some(Channel(Kind::Stable))
Additional Details:
The changes improve version string parsing by:
1. Adding trim() to handle whitespace
2. Adding direct string matches ("dev", "nightly", "beta") in addition to substring checks
While this doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability, it could potentially prevent incorrect version classification that might lead to security issues if the version check is used for security-sensitive decisions. The original code might misclassify version strings that don't contain the expected prefixes but represent the same channel.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/floating-point-total-queue-size.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/floating-point-total-queue-size.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker 'use strict'; // Due to the limitations of floating-point precision, the calculation of desiredSize sometimes gives different answers
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment: Vulnerability Existed: no [Removed jsshell environment from test configuration] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/floating-point-total-queue-size.any.js] [Lines 1] [Old Code] // META: global=window,worker,jsshell [Fixed Code] // META: global=window,worker Additional Details: The change simply removes the 'jsshell' environment from the test configuration. This appears to be a test scope adjustment rather than a security fix. The modification limits where the test runs but doesn't address any specific vulnerability. The comment suggests the change relates to floating-point precision calculations in stream size determinations, but this seems to be a test refinement rather than a security issue.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/test_utils.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/jxl/test_utils.h@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include "lib/jxl/common.h" // JPEGXL_ENABLE_TRANSCODE_JPEG #include "lib/jxl/dec_file.h" #include "lib/jxl/dec_params.h"+#include "lib/jxl/enc_color_management.h" #include "lib/jxl/enc_external_image.h" #include "lib/jxl/enc_file.h" #include "lib/jxl/enc_params.h"@@ -90,8 +91,10 @@ basic_info->alpha_exponent_bits = 0; if (basic_info->bits_per_sample == 32) { basic_info->alpha_bits = 16;+ basic_info->num_extra_channels = 1; } else { basic_info->alpha_bits = basic_info->bits_per_sample;+ basic_info->num_extra_channels = 1; } } else { basic_info->alpha_exponent_bits = 0;@@ -127,8 +130,8 @@ std::unique_ptr<PassesEncoderState> enc_state = jxl::make_unique<PassesEncoderState>();- EXPECT_TRUE(- EncodeFile(cparams, io, enc_state.get(), &compressed, aux_out, pool));+ EXPECT_TRUE(EncodeFile(cparams, io, enc_state.get(), &compressed, GetJxlCms(),+ aux_out, pool)); std::vector<ColorEncoding> metadata_encodings_1; for (const ImageBundle& ib1 : io->frames) {@@ -375,6 +378,312 @@ return io; }+bool Near(double expected, double value, double max_dist) {+ double dist = expected > value ? expected - value : value - expected;+ return dist <= max_dist;+}++// Loads a Big-Endian float+float LoadBEFloat(const uint8_t* p) {+ uint32_t u = LoadBE32(p);+ float result;+ memcpy(&result, &u, 4);+ return result;+}++// Loads a Little-Endian float+float LoadLEFloat(const uint8_t* p) {+ uint32_t u = LoadLE32(p);+ float result;+ memcpy(&result, &u, 4);+ return result;+}++// Based on highway scalar implementation, for testing+float LoadFloat16(uint16_t bits16) {+ const uint32_t sign = bits16 >> 15;+ const uint32_t biased_exp = (bits16 >> 10) & 0x1F;+ const uint32_t mantissa = bits16 & 0x3FF;++ // Subnormal or zero+ if (biased_exp == 0) {+ const float subnormal = (1.0f / 16384) * (mantissa * (1.0f / 1024));+ return sign ? -subnormal : subnormal;+ }++ // Normalized: convert the representation directly (faster than ldexp/tables).+ const uint32_t biased_exp32 = biased_exp + (127 - 15);+ const uint32_t mantissa32 = mantissa << (23 - 10);+ const uint32_t bits32 = (sign << 31) | (biased_exp32 << 23) | mantissa32;++ float result;+ memcpy(&result, &bits32, 4);+ return result;+}++float LoadLEFloat16(const uint8_t* p) {+ uint16_t bits16 = LoadLE16(p);+ return LoadFloat16(bits16);+}++float LoadBEFloat16(const uint8_t* p) {+ uint16_t bits16 = LoadBE16(p);+ return LoadFloat16(bits16);+}++size_t GetPrecision(JxlDataType data_type) {+ switch (data_type) {+ case JXL_TYPE_BOOLEAN:+ return 1;+ case JXL_TYPE_UINT8:+ return 8;+ case JXL_TYPE_UINT16:+ return 16;+ case JXL_TYPE_UINT32:+ return 32;+ case JXL_TYPE_FLOAT:+ // Floating point mantissa precision+ return 24;+ case JXL_TYPE_FLOAT16:+ return 11;+ }+ JXL_ASSERT(false); // unknown type+}++size_t GetDataBits(JxlDataType data_type) {+ switch (data_type) {+ case JXL_TYPE_BOOLEAN:+ return 1;+ case JXL_TYPE_UINT8:+ return 8;+ case JXL_TYPE_UINT16:+ return 16;+ case JXL_TYPE_UINT32:+ return 32;+ case JXL_TYPE_FLOAT:+ return 32;+ case JXL_TYPE_FLOAT16:+ return 16;+ }+ JXL_ASSERT(false); // unknown type+}++// Procedure to convert pixels to double precision, not efficient, but+// well-controlled for testing. It uses double, to be able to represent all+// precisions needed for the maximum data types the API supports: uint32_t+// integers, and, single precision float. The values are in range 0-1 for SDR.+std::vector<double> ConvertToRGBA32(const uint8_t* pixels, size_t xsize,+ size_t ysize,+ const JxlPixelFormat& format) {+ std::vector<double> result(xsize * ysize * 4);+ size_t num_channels = format.num_channels;+ bool gray = num_channels == 1 || num_channels == 2;+ bool alpha = num_channels == 2 || num_channels == 4;++ size_t stride =+ xsize * jxl::DivCeil(GetDataBits(format.data_type) * num_channels,+ jxl::kBitsPerByte);+ if (format.align > 1) stride = jxl::RoundUpTo(stride, format.align);++ if (format.data_type == JXL_TYPE_BOOLEAN) {+ for (size_t y = 0; y < ysize; ++y) {+ jxl::BitReader br(jxl::Span<const uint8_t>(pixels + stride * y, stride));+ for (size_t x = 0; x < xsize; ++x) {+ size_t j = (y * xsize + x) * 4;+ double r = br.ReadBits(1);+ double g = gray ? r : br.ReadBits(1);+ double b = gray ? r : br.ReadBits(1);+ double a = alpha ? br.ReadBits(1) : 1;+ result[j + 0] = r;+ result[j + 1] = g;+ result[j + 2] = b;+ result[j + 3] = a;+ }+ JXL_CHECK(br.Close());+ }+ } else if (format.data_type == JXL_TYPE_UINT8) {+ double mul = 1.0 / 255.0; // Multiplier to bring to 0-1.0 range+ for (size_t y = 0; y < ysize; ++y) {+ for (size_t x = 0; x < xsize; ++x) {+ size_t j = (y * xsize + x) * 4;+ size_t i = y * stride + x * num_channels;+ double r = pixels[i];+ double g = gray ? r : pixels[i + 1];+ double b = gray ? r : pixels[i + 2];+ double a = alpha ? pixels[i + num_channels - 1] : 255;+ result[j + 0] = r * mul;+ result[j + 1] = g * mul;+ result[j + 2] = b * mul;+ result[j + 3] = a * mul;+ }+ }+ } else if (format.data_type == JXL_TYPE_UINT16) {+ double mul = 1.0 / 65535.0; // Multiplier to bring to 0-1.0 range+ for (size_t y = 0; y < ysize; ++y) {+ for (size_t x = 0; x < xsize; ++x) {+ size_t j = (y * xsize + x) * 4;+ size_t i = y * stride + x * num_channels * 2;+ double r, g, b, a;+ if (format.endianness == JXL_BIG_ENDIAN) {+ r = (pixels[i + 0] << 8) + pixels[i + 1];+ g = gray ? r : (pixels[i + 2] << 8) + pixels[i + 3];+ b = gray ? r : (pixels[i + 4] << 8) + pixels[i + 5];+ a = alpha ? (pixels[i + num_channels * 2 - 2] << 8) ++ pixels[i + num_channels * 2 - 1]+ : 65535;+ } else {+ r = (pixels[i + 1] << 8) + pixels[i + 0];+ g = gray ? r : (pixels[i + 3] << 8) + pixels[i + 2];+ b = gray ? r : (pixels[i + 5] << 8) + pixels[i + 4];+ a = alpha ? (pixels[i + num_channels * 2 - 1] << 8) ++ pixels[i + num_channels * 2 - 2]+ : 65535;+ }+ result[j + 0] = r * mul;+ result[j + 1] = g * mul;+ result[j + 2] = b * mul;+ result[j + 3] = a * mul;+ }+ }+ } else if (format.data_type == JXL_TYPE_UINT32) {+ double mul = 1.0 / 4294967295.0; // Multiplier to bring to 0-1.0 range+ for (size_t y = 0; y < ysize; ++y) {+ for (size_t x = 0; x < xsize; ++x) {+ size_t j = (y * xsize + x) * 4;+ size_t i = y * stride + x * num_channels * 4;+ double r, g, b, a;+ if (format.endianness == JXL_BIG_ENDIAN) {+ r = LoadBE32(pixels + i);+ g = gray ? r : LoadBE32(pixels + i + 4);+ b = gray ? r : LoadBE32(pixels + i + 8);+ a = alpha ? LoadBE32(pixels + i + num_channels * 2 - 4) : 4294967295;++ } else {+ r = LoadLE32(pixels + i);+ g = gray ? r : LoadLE32(pixels + i + 4);+ b = gray ? r : LoadLE32(pixels + i + 8);+ a = alpha ? LoadLE32(pixels + i + num_channels * 2 - 4) : 4294967295;+ }+ result[j + 0] = r * mul;+ result[j + 1] = g * mul;+ result[j + 2] = b * mul;+ result[j + 3] = a * mul;+ }+ }+ } else if (format.data_type == JXL_TYPE_FLOAT) {+ for (size_t y = 0; y < ysize; ++y) {+ for (size_t x = 0; x < xsize; ++x) {+ size_t j = (y * xsize + x) * 4;+ size_t i = y * stride + x * num_channels * 4;+ double r, g, b, a;+ if (format.endianness == JXL_BIG_ENDIAN) {+ r = LoadBEFloat(pixels + i);+ g = gray ? r : LoadBEFloat(pixels + i + 4);+ b = gray ? r : LoadBEFloat(pixels + i + 8);+ a = alpha ? LoadBEFloat(pixels + i + num_channels * 4 - 4) : 1.0;+ } else {+ r = LoadLEFloat(pixels + i);+ g = gray ? r : LoadLEFloat(pixels + i + 4);+ b = gray ? r : LoadLEFloat(pixels + i + 8);+ a = alpha ? LoadLEFloat(pixels + i + num_channels * 4 - 4) : 1.0;+ }+ result[j + 0] = r;+ result[j + 1] = g;+ result[j + 2] = b;+ result[j + 3] = a;+ }+ }+ } else if (format.data_type == JXL_TYPE_FLOAT16) {+ for (size_t y = 0; y < ysize; ++y) {+ for (size_t x = 0; x < xsize; ++x) {+ size_t j = (y * xsize + x) * 4;+ size_t i = y * stride + x * num_channels * 2;+ double r, g, b, a;+ if (format.endianness == JXL_BIG_ENDIAN) {+ r = LoadBEFloat16(pixels + i);+ g = gray ? r : LoadBEFloat16(pixels + i + 2);+ b = gray ? r : LoadBEFloat16(pixels + i + 4);+ a = alpha ? LoadBEFloat16(pixels + i + num_channels * 2 - 2) : 1.0;+ } else {+ r = LoadLEFloat16(pixels + i);+ g = gray ? r : LoadLEFloat16(pixels + i + 2);+ b = gray ? r : LoadLEFloat16(pixels + i + 4);+ a = alpha ? LoadLEFloat16(pixels + i + num_channels * 2 - 2) : 1.0;+ }+ result[j + 0] = r;+ result[j + 1] = g;+ result[j + 2] = b;+ result[j + 3] = a;+ }+ }+ } else {+ JXL_ASSERT(false); // Unsupported type+ }+ return result;+}+// Returns amount of pixels which differ between the two pictures. Image b is+// the image after roundtrip after roundtrip, image a before roundtrip. There+// are more strict requirements for the alpha channel and grayscale values of+// the output image.+size_t ComparePixels(const uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b, size_t xsize,+ size_t ysize, const JxlPixelFormat& format_a,+ const JxlPixelFormat& format_b,+ double threshold_multiplier = 1.0) {+ // Convert both images to equal full precision for comparison.+ std::vector<double> a_full = ConvertToRGBA32(a, xsize, ysize, format_a);+ std::vector<double> b_full = ConvertToRGBA32(b, xsize, ysize, format_b);+ bool gray_a = format_a.num_channels < 3;+ bool gray_b = format_b.num_channels < 3;+ bool alpha_a = !(format_a.num_channels & 1);+ bool alpha_b = !(format_b.num_channels & 1);+ size_t bits_a = GetPrecision(format_a.data_type);+ size_t bits_b = GetPrecision(format_b.data_type);+ size_t bits = std::min(bits_a, bits_b);+ // How much distance is allowed in case of pixels with lower bit depths, given+ // that the double precision float images use range 0-1.0.+ // E.g. in case of 1-bit this is 0.5 since 0.499 must map to 0 and 0.501 must+ // map to 1.+ double precision = 0.5 * threshold_multiplier / ((1ull << bits) - 1ull);+ if (format_a.data_type == JXL_TYPE_FLOAT16 ||+ format_b.data_type == JXL_TYPE_FLOAT16) {+ // Lower the precision for float16, because it currently looks like the+ // scalar and wasm implementations of hwy have 1 less bit of precision+ // than the x86 implementations.+ // TODO(lode): Set the required precision back to 11 bits when possible.+ precision = 0.5 * threshold_multiplier / ((1ull << (bits - 1)) - 1ull);+ }+ size_t numdiff = 0;+ for (size_t y = 0; y < ysize; y++) {+ for (size_t x = 0; x < xsize; x++) {+ size_t i = (y * xsize + x) * 4;+ bool ok = true;+ if (gray_a || gray_b) {+ if (!Near(a_full[i + 0], b_full[i + 0], precision)) ok = false;+ // If the input was grayscale and the output not, then the output must+ // have all channels equal.+ if (gray_a && b_full[i + 0] != b_full[i + 1] &&+ b_full[i + 2] != b_full[i + 2]) {+ ok = false;+ }+ } else {+ if (!Near(a_full[i + 0], b_full[i + 0], precision) ||+ !Near(a_full[i + 1], b_full[i + 1], precision) ||+ !Near(a_full[i + 2], b_full[i + 2], precision)) {+ ok = false;+ }+ }+ if (alpha_a && alpha_b) {+ if (!Near(a_full[i + 3], b_full[i + 3], precision)) ok = false;+ } else {+ // If the input had no alpha channel, the output should be opaque+ // after roundtrip.+ if (alpha_b && !Near(1.0, b_full[i + 3], precision)) ok = false;+ }+ if (!ok) numdiff++;+ }+ }+ return numdiff;+} } // namespace test bool operator==(const jxl::PaddedBytes& a, const jxl::PaddedBytes& b) {
Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any obvious security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily feature additions and test utility improvements rather than security fixes. Here's my analysis:
1. First change (header addition):
Vulnerability Existed: no
No vulnerability - this is just adding an include for color management functionality
2. Second change (alpha channel handling):
Vulnerability Existed: no
No vulnerability - this adds consistent handling of num_extra_channels for alpha cases
3. Third change (EncodeFile call):
Vulnerability Existed: no
No vulnerability - this adds color management parameter to EncodeFile call
4. The remaining changes (new utility functions):
Vulnerability Existed: no
No vulnerability - these are all new test utility functions for float handling and pixel comparison
The diff primarily shows:
1. Addition of color management support
2. More complete alpha channel handling
3. New test utilities for floating point operations and image comparison
4. No apparent security fixes or vulnerability patches
None of these changes appear to address any security issues - they're either new features or test infrastructure improvements. The code appears to be properly handling memory and data types throughout.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.maxWidth.negative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.fill.maxWidth.negative.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
Analyzing the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`)
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 @@-{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"14de87abee81a5f7c0b422f34a9185aff27250a293a1f7fb0d8ae4ad38f919a7","TODO":"ac0f1c2ebcca03f5b3c0cc56c5aedbb030a4b511e438bc07a57361c789f91e9f","bindings/bindings.toml":"d136f82a333b0ee1499e7858fdfc3d630f7ff37501a3c51028a4eeb7e2f136b4","bindings/mozpkix.hpp":"77072c8bb0f6eb6bfe8cbadc111dcd92e0c79936d13f2e501aae1e5d289a6675","bindings/nspr_err.h":"2d5205d017b536c2d838bcf9bc4ec79f96dd50e7bb9b73892328781f1ee6629d","bindings/nspr_error.h":"e41c03c77b8c22046f8618832c9569fbcc7b26d8b9bbc35eea7168f35e346889","bindings/nspr_io.h":"085b289849ef0e77f88512a27b4d9bdc28252bd4d39c6a17303204e46ef45f72","bindings/nspr_time.h":"2e637fd338a5cf0fd3fb0070a47f474a34c2a7f4447f31b6875f5a9928d0a261","bindings/nss_ciphers.h":"95ec6344a607558b3c5ba8510f463b6295f3a2fb3f538a01410531045a5f62d1","bindings/nss_init.h":"ef49045063782fb612aff459172cc6a89340f15005808608ade5320ca9974310","bindings/nss_p11.h":"0b81e64fe6db49b2ecff94edd850be111ef99ec11220e88ceb1c67be90143a78","bindings/nss_secerr.h":"713e8368bdae5159af7893cfa517dabfe5103cede051dee9c9557c850a2defc6","bindings/nss_ssl.h":"af222fb957b989e392e762fa2125c82608a0053aff4fb97e556691646c88c335","bindings/nss_sslerr.h":"24b97f092183d8486f774cdaef5030d0249221c78343570d83a4ee5b594210ae","bindings/nss_sslopt.h":"b7807eb7abdad14db6ad7bc51048a46b065a0ea65a4508c95a12ce90e59d1eea","build.rs":"4bc26650fa85150c1a377f030e681576f92005a14f14fd8818e7ceb95c2c2a1a","src/aead.rs":"140f77ffb5016836c970c39c6c3a42db9581a14b797b9cd05386d0dd0831fe63","src/aead_fuzzing.rs":"4e60d5a2ee6dedfd08602fa36318239e731244825df2cb801ca1d88f5f2a41c1","src/agent.rs":"db620f07e2c0f441ce0a30a249a18ab699affb43d8209c63c4f1e5eae9f9f688","src/agentio.rs":"85a1f5295e98fcec0e884fb11e21cbc4c64de0f2ad5b6d78464ed9ac064fb495","src/auth.rs":"e821dac1511691151a6e64b7c7130a07d941dffad4529b2631f20ddd07d3f20c","src/cert.rs":"04d7328ab59a5268f2f48b3f880192bf28d42c09c362ef5906ee66e087c754d1","src/constants.rs":"998e77bee88197a240032c1bfbddcff417a25ba82e576a0d2fe18ee9b63cefc7","src/ech.rs":"1b6ee298855d34310a0d65367b21fdc38678a9c37fc7e1d9579c3c8dfd753377","src/err.rs":"d4dbe63e2faba3a1f08dca015549c32550cb18907592abc3831e05e330f0a93b","src/exp.rs":"61586662407359c1ecb8ed4987bc3c702f26ba2e203a091a51b6d6363cbd510f","src/ext.rs":"361277879194dc32f741b8d1894afe5fd3fcc8eb244f7dd5914eeb959b85717d","src/hkdf.rs":"3ff432cc9d40e1dc56e9f983b54b593647c4063a5ae0f16de0a64d033ac9bd94","src/hp.rs":"46a2023c421d89fda8d09b356b648272857fd20ee5cf5829143ac88402b32e4b","src/lib.rs":"4a4aacab783b2e21d9f2f33891bc75c5a8018894c3cdf828848ccb59bf5b2d41","src/once.rs":"b9850384899a1a016e839743d3489c0d4d916e1973746ef8c89872105d7d9736","src/p11.rs":"ae054861719fdead8227220dd5a28b92882756683a436676470b672ee26b9a4e","src/prio.rs":"4224a65f25d7de9bf7d6cb18b15597a39650b3c4fcf7d184a4e4bd7f65cebccd","src/replay.rs":"c9bc0261fe1ae22e7212774c315a2669784e57762ca975a15250d4a33dbf3ea3","src/result.rs":"cef34dfcb907723e195b56501132e4560e250b327783cb5e41201da5b63e9b5c","src/secrets.rs":"48790a330994d892742048000bd12460b7eee2c3daaa444481b8527406d0a4c7","src/selfencrypt.rs":"4a9af42ccefbc77c65baedf00ef389de4fa7ed855d7ab3b60542b5931050667d","src/ssl.rs":"32e934e6dc5df4e4b4cbe96bae53921cf09a684959cb5ad3469cd65965f3164c","src/time.rs":"ddecb9f6cb6b3367852943d27fc89fd36d3c0ca0c9b5c9797494b74de2d8b5c7","tests/aead.rs":"a0fe826aa3bfcce22dbe1b06b74823cb2334331ffe6ce6152952613e9e1ccae5","tests/agent.rs":"edda258896324f0a950427fd625594bd31d772fe968a29097d6dbd76523c39c4","tests/ext.rs":"eba9f03accdd598e38292ac88263a81b367d60d5a736a43117a3663de105ec48","tests/handshake.rs":"6ea3e5b3bc889d201b55f959b658a848c0ada54c956bda087b2ac8897a24a786","tests/hkdf.rs":"47830c1ea58a02d100522bdde6fabc02bb447ccb85affa0cdc44bc25da1be32a","tests/hp.rs":"92e062538c01fa7a474225714ed238d846ceb8c8feb9d79eb05be6111b00fb1e","tests/init.rs":"fc9e392b1efa0d8efb28952f73ffc05e5348e7b2b69207b60e375c3888a252a2","tests/selfencrypt.rs":"1125c858ec4e0a6994f34d162aa066cb003c61b324f268529ea04bcb641347cb"},"package":null}+{"files":{"Cargo.toml":"561d34c14380159b08a88a2461a31355e63fbf410725dd28a12bbb3769596675","TODO":"ac0f1c2ebcca03f5b3c0cc56c5aedbb030a4b511e438bc07a57361c789f91e9f","bindings/bindings.toml":"d136f82a333b0ee1499e7858fdfc3d630f7ff37501a3c51028a4eeb7e2f136b4","bindings/mozpkix.hpp":"77072c8bb0f6eb6bfe8cbadc111dcd92e0c79936d13f2e501aae1e5d289a6675","bindings/nspr_err.h":"2d5205d017b536c2d838bcf9bc4ec79f96dd50e7bb9b73892328781f1ee6629d","bindings/nspr_error.h":"e41c03c77b8c22046f8618832c9569fbcc7b26d8b9bbc35eea7168f35e346889","bindings/nspr_io.h":"085b289849ef0e77f88512a27b4d9bdc28252bd4d39c6a17303204e46ef45f72","bindings/nspr_time.h":"2e637fd338a5cf0fd3fb0070a47f474a34c2a7f4447f31b6875f5a9928d0a261","bindings/nss_ciphers.h":"95ec6344a607558b3c5ba8510f463b6295f3a2fb3f538a01410531045a5f62d1","bindings/nss_init.h":"ef49045063782fb612aff459172cc6a89340f15005808608ade5320ca9974310","bindings/nss_p11.h":"0b81e64fe6db49b2ecff94edd850be111ef99ec11220e88ceb1c67be90143a78","bindings/nss_secerr.h":"713e8368bda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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionEventListener.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionEventListener.cpp@@ -678,12 +678,12 @@ } void ExtensionListenerCallPromiseResultHandler::ResolvedCallback(- JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+ JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) { WorkerRunCallback(aCx, aValue, PromiseCallbackType::Resolve); } void ExtensionListenerCallPromiseResultHandler::RejectedCallback(- JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) {+ JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue, ErrorResult& aRv) { WorkerRunCallback(aCx, aValue, PromiseCallbackType::Reject); }
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes following the required format:
1. For the cargo-checksum.json changes:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability - File hash updates [third_party/rust/neqo-crypto/.cargo-checksum.json] [Various]
[Old checksums]
[New checksums]
Note: These are just checksum updates for dependency files, which don't indicate security fixes.
2. For the ExtensionEventListener.cpp changes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Promise Handling Vulnerability [toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionEventListener.cpp] [Lines 678-687]
[Old Code without ErrorResult parameter]
[Fixed Code with ErrorResult parameter]
Note: The addition of ErrorResult parameters suggests improved error handling, but without more context it's unclear if this fixes a specific vulnerability.
The most significant change is in the promise handling code where ErrorResult parameters were added to callback functions, which could be related to fixing potential unhandled promise rejection issues, but I can't confirm this was specifically fixing a security vulnerability without more context.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.edge.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.edge.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.rect(0, 0, 20, 20); _assertSame(ctx.isPointInPath(0, 0), true, "ctx.isPointInPath(0, 0)", "true");
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.isPointInPath.edge.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been modified for consistency or clarity.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.coord1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.coord1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ ctx.fillStyle = pattern; ctx.translate(50, 0); ctx.fillRect(-50, 0, 100, 50);- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");- _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+ _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the assertions. There are no security-related changes in this diff. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found in this diff. Changes are limited to variable renaming and do not affect security. The diff shows: - Variable renamed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` - All references to the variable updated accordingly - No changes to security-sensitive operations - No changes to input handling or validation - No changes to data flow or security boundaries This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/build_scripts/mach_commands.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/build_scripts/mach_commands.py@@ -3,6 +3,16 @@ # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. from mach.decorators import Command, CommandArgument++LICENSE_HEADER = """# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.+"""++GENERATED_HEADER = """+### This file was AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED by `./mach update-glean-tags`+### DO NOT edit it by hand.+""" @Command(@@ -28,3 +38,38 @@ return data_review.generate( bug, [Path(command_context.topsrcdir) / x for x in metrics_yamls] )+++@Command(+ "update-glean-tags",+ category="misc",+ description=(+ "Creates a list of valid glean tags based on in-tree bugzilla component definitions"+ ),+)+def update_glean_tags(command_context):+ from pathlib import Path+ import yaml+ from mozbuild.frontend.reader import BuildReader, EmptyConfig++ config = EmptyConfig(str((Path(__file__).parent / "../../../../").resolve()))+ reader = BuildReader(config)+ bug_components = set()+ for p in reader.read_topsrcdir():+ if p.get("BUG_COMPONENT"):+ bug_components.add(p["BUG_COMPONENT"])++ tags_filename = (Path(__file__).parent / "../tags.yaml").resolve()++ tags = {"$schema": "moz://mozilla.org/schemas/glean/tags/1-0-0"}+ for bug_component in bug_components:+ product = bug_component.product.strip()+ component = bug_component.component.strip()+ tags["{} :: {}".format(product, component)] = {+ "description": "The Bugzilla component which applies to this object."+ }++ open(tags_filename, "w").write(+ "{}\n{}\n\n".format(LICENSE_HEADER, GENERATED_HEADER)+ + yaml.dump(tags, width=78, explicit_start=True)+ )
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
File Handle Not Properly Closed [File] toolkit/components/glean/build_scripts/mach_commands.py [Lines] 71-73
Old Code:
open(tags_filename, "w").write(
"{}\n{}\n\n".format(LICENSE_HEADER, GENERATED_HEADER)
+ yaml.dump(tags, width=78, explicit_start=True)
)
Fixed Code: Not shown in diff, but the vulnerability exists in the old code where file handle is not properly closed after writing.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential YAML Injection [File] toolkit/components/glean/build_scripts/mach_commands.py [Lines] 71-73
Old Code:
open(tags_filename, "w").write(
"{}\n{}\n\n".format(LICENSE_HEADER, GENERATED_HEADER)
+ yaml.dump(tags, width=78, explicit_start=True)
)
Fixed Code: Not shown in diff, but there might be potential YAML injection if tags content is not properly sanitized before dumping.
Note: The diff shows the addition of new functionality (update-glean-tags command) rather than a security fix per se. The vulnerabilities identified are patterns that could be problematic in the new code. The actual fix would involve:
1. Using context managers for file handling (with statement)
2. Validating/sanitizing the tags content before YAML dumping
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/syn/benches/file.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/syn/benches/file.rs@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #![feature(rustc_private, test)] #![recursion_limit = "1024"]+#![allow(clippy::missing_panics_doc, clippy::must_use_candidate)] extern crate test;
Based on the provided diff content, I'll analyze it for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 2-3]
Old Code: `#![feature(rustc_private, test)]\n#![recursion_limit = "1024"]`
Fixed Code: `#![feature(rustc_private, test)]\n#![recursion_limit = "1024"]\n#![allow(clippy::missing_panics_doc, clippy::must_use_candidate)]`
Additional Details:
- The changes are purely related to linting configuration (adding Clippy allow attributes)
- No actual code changes were made that would affect security
- The modifications are about suppressing specific Clippy warnings
- No security-related vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff
The changes appear to be related to code quality/style rather than security fixes. The added attributes simply allow certain Clippy lints to pass without warnings.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.css-color-4-rgba-1.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255.0, 0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 19]
Old Code:
```javascript
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
Fixed Code:
```javascript
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
```
The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, changing the variable name from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed in this change. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/skew-test1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/skew-test1.html@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#svg-transform"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#two-d-transform-functions"> <link rel="match" href="reference/skew-test1-ref.html">- <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=17-97;totalPixels=96-771">+ <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=17-233;totalPixels=96-771"> <meta name="flags" content="svg"> <meta name="assert" content="The lime square in this test has a skew method applied : 30deg on x and 20deg on y. The red polygon should be totally hidden by the lime skewed square. Both start at 0,0"> <style>
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be adjusting test parameters rather than addressing security vulnerabilities. Here's the analysis: Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/skew-test1.html] [Lines 8] [Old Code] <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=17-97;totalPixels=96-771"> [Fixed Code] <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=17-233;totalPixels=96-771"> Additional Details: - The change only modifies the acceptable difference thresholds for a visual test comparison - No security-sensitive code was modified (no DOM manipulation, no input handling, etc.) - The change appears to be adjusting test tolerance values to account for rendering differences
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-11.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-11.xml@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/> <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->- <meta name="flags" content="" /> </head> <body> <p title="foobarufoo">This paragraph should have a green background because
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-11.xml [Lines] 7 [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="" /> [Fixed Code] (removed line) Additional Details: This change simply removes an empty meta tag that was not serving any apparent purpose. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here. The modification appears to be a cleanup of unnecessary markup rather than a security fix. The "flags" meta tag was empty and not being used for any security-relevant functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ ctx.transform(0, 0, 0, 0, Infinity, Infinity); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -10, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be variable renaming and consistency improvements rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 96]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency, but don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-keyboard.tentative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-keyboard.tentative.html@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@ <selectmenu id="selectMenu1"> <option id="selectMenu1-child0">one</option>+ </selectmenu>++ <selectmenu id="selectMenu2" disabled>+ <div id="selectMenu2-button0" slot="button" behavior="button" tabindex="0">button</div>+ <option disabled>one</option>+ <option>two</option>+ <option>three</option>+ </selectmenu>++ <selectmenu id="selectMenu3">+ <div id="selectMenu3-button0" slot="button" behavior="button" tabindex="0">button</div>+ <option>one</option>+ <option disabled>two</option>+ <option>three</option> </selectmenu> <script> // See https://w3c.github.io/webdriver/#keyboard-actions@@ -72,7 +86,7 @@ await test_driver.send_keys(selectMenu, KEY_CODE_MAP.Enter); assert_false(selectMenu.open, "Enter key should close selectmenu");-}, "Validate Enter, Up/Down Arrow, and Space keyboard accessibility support for <selecmenu>");+}, "Validate Enter, Up/Down Arrow, and Space keyboard accessibility support for <selectmenu>"); promise_test(async t => { const selectMenuOption = document.getElementById("selectMenu1-child0");@@ -80,4 +94,30 @@ event.initEvent("keydown"); selectMenuOption.dispatchEvent(event); }, "Firing a synthetic event at a selectmenu's option doesn't crash");++promise_test(async t => {+ const selectMenu2 = document.querySelector("#selectMenu2");+ const selectMenu2Button = document.querySelector("#selectMenu2-button0");+ assert_false(selectMenu2.open, "selectmenu should not be initially open");++ await test_driver.send_keys(selectMenu2Button, KEY_CODE_MAP.Enter);+ assert_false(selectMenu2.open, "Enter key should not open a disabled selectmenu");+ await clickOn(selectMenu2);+ assert_false(selectMenu2.open, "Click should not open a disabled selectmenu");+ assert_equals(selectMenu2.value, "one");++ const selectMenu3 = document.querySelector("#selectMenu3");+ const selectMenu3Button = document.querySelector("#selectMenu3-button0");+ assert_false(selectMenu3.open, "selectmenu should not be initially open");++ await test_driver.send_keys(selectMenu3Button, KEY_CODE_MAP.Enter);+ assert_true(selectMenu3.open, "Enter key should open selectmenu");+ assert_equals(selectMenu3.value, "one");++ await test_driver.send_keys(selectMenu3, KEY_CODE_MAP.ArrowDown);+ assert_equals(selectMenu3.value, "three", "Down arrow should go to next non-disabled option");++ await test_driver.send_keys(selectMenu3, KEY_CODE_MAP.ArrowUp);+ assert_equals(selectMenu3.value, "one", "Up arrow should go to the previous non-disabled option");+}, "Validate Enter, Up/Down Arrow keyboard accessibility support for disabled <selectmenu>"); </script>
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No security vulnerability found in the diff. The changes appear to be functional improvements and test case additions for selectmenu keyboard accessibility. 2. Vulnerability Existed: no [Typo Fix] [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-keyboard.tentative.html] [Lines: ~72] Old Code: "Validate Enter, Up/Down Arrow, and Space keyboard accessibility support for <selecmenu>" Fixed Code: "Validate Enter, Up/Down Arrow, and Space keyboard accessibility support for <selectmenu>" This is just a typo correction in a test description. 3. Vulnerability Existed: no [Test Case Addition] [File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/semantics/forms/the-selectmenu-element/selectmenu-keyboard.tentative.html] [Lines: 14-20, 94-118] The diff adds new test cases for disabled selectmenu elements and their keyboard interaction behavior, but these don't represent security fixes. The changes primarily: 1. Add new selectmenu elements with disabled states for testing 2. Add test cases for keyboard interaction with disabled elements 3. Fix a typo in a test description 4. Add tests for proper keyboard navigation around disabled options None of these changes appear to address security vulnerabilities - they're focused on improving accessibility testing and functionality.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/client-hints/resources/echo-ua-client-hints-received.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/client-hints/resources/echo-ua-client-hints-received.py@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ for header in client_hint_headers: if request_client_hints[header] is not None:- response.headers.set(header + b"-recieved", request_client_hints[header])+ response.headers.set(header + b"-received", request_client_hints[header]) headers = [] content = u""
Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes. Vulnerability Existed: no [Typo Fix] [testing/web-platform/tests/client-hints/resources/echo-ua-client-hints-received.py] [Lines 22] [Old Code] response.headers.set(header + b"-recieved", request_client_hints[header]) [Fixed Code] response.headers.set(header + b"-received", request_client_hints[header]) Additional Details: This appears to be a simple spelling correction from "recieved" to "received" in the header name. While this could potentially cause functional issues if clients were expecting the misspelled version, it doesn't represent a security vulnerability. The change improves code correctness but doesn't address any security weakness.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/build_fat_aar.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/build_fat_aar.py@@ -62,9 +62,13 @@ def _get_aar_location(config, job, platform):- artifacts_locations = get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(- config, job, platform=platform- )+ artifacts_locations = []++ for package in job["attributes"]["maven_packages"]:+ artifacts_locations += get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(+ config, job, package, platform=platform+ )+ aar_locations = [ path for path in artifacts_locations[0]["paths"] if path.endswith(".aar") ]
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure through Artifact Paths] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/build_fat_aar.py] [Lines 62-71]
[Old Code]
artifacts_locations = get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(
config, job, platform=platform
)
[Fixed Code]
artifacts_locations = []
for package in job["attributes"]["maven_packages"]:
artifacts_locations += get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts(
config, job, package, platform=platform
)
The change modifies how artifact locations are gathered, now iterating through maven_packages. While not clearly a security fix, this could potentially address information exposure by being more specific about which packages' artifacts are retrieved, rather than getting all artifacts at once. However, without more context about the get_geckoview_upstream_artifacts function's behavior, I can't be certain if this fixes a specific vulnerability.
Note: The change appears to be more of a functional enhancement than a direct security fix, but it could have security implications depending on the broader context.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/docs/running-tests/chrome.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/docs/running-tests/chrome.md@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ ./wpt run --binary-arg=--enable-blink-features=AsyncClipboard chrome clipboard-apis/ ```-[1]: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/RuntimeEnabledFeatures.md+[1]: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/RuntimeEnabledFeatures.md
Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/docs/running-tests/chrome.md [Lines] 27
[Old Code] [1]: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/RuntimeEnabledFeatures.md
[Fixed Code] [1]: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/third_party/blink/renderer/platform/RuntimeEnabledFeatures.md
Additional Details:
- This change only updates a documentation link from "master" to "main" branch reference in a markdown file.
- The change appears to be part of a broader movement to replace "master" terminology with "main" in version control systems.
- No actual code changes or security-related modifications were made.
- The file being modified is documentation (markdown) rather than executable code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/sphinx.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/sphinx.py@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ from __future__ import absolute_import, print_function import importlib-import os from docutils.parsers.rst import Directive from sphinx.util.docstrings import prepare_docstring@@ -197,8 +196,6 @@ def setup(app):- from mach.site import CommandSiteManager- from mozboot.util import get_state_dir from moztreedocs import manager app.add_directive("mozbuildsymbols", MozbuildSymbols)@@ -211,14 +208,3 @@ # documentation. manager.generate_docs(app) app.srcdir = manager.staging_dir-- # We need to adjust sys.path in order for Python API docs to get generated- # properly. We leverage the in-tree virtualenv for this.- topsrcdir = manager.topsrcdir- site = CommandSiteManager.from_environment(- topsrcdir,- lambda: get_state_dir(specific_to_topsrcdir=True, topsrcdir=topsrcdir),- "common",- os.path.join(app.outdir, "_venv"),- )- site.activate()
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Unnecessary Import Removal] [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/sphinx.py] [Lines 5, 197-198]
[Old Code]
import os
from mach.site import CommandSiteManager
from mozboot.util import get_state_dir
[Fixed Code]
(removed imports)
Note: While removing unused imports isn't directly a security fix, it reduces the attack surface by minimizing the codebase. The removed imports could potentially have been used in unsafe ways if they remained.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Virtual Environment Security Improvement] [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/sphinx.py] [Lines 208-218]
[Old Code]
# We need to adjust sys.path in order for Python API docs to get generated
# properly. We leverage the in-tree virtualenv for this.
topsrcdir = manager.topsrcdir
site = CommandSiteManager.from_environment(
topsrcdir,
lambda: get_state_dir(specific_to_topsrcdir=True, topsrcdir=topsrcdir),
"common",
os.path.join(app.outdir, "_venv"),
)
site.activate()
[Fixed Code]
(entire block removed)
Note: The removal of virtual environment activation code might indicate a security improvement by reducing complexity and potential attack vectors in the documentation generation process, though the exact security implications aren't clear from the diff alone.
The changes appear to be primarily about code simplification and removing unused functionality rather than addressing specific known vulnerabilities. The security impact is therefore unclear without more context about why these changes were made.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.