--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.transformed.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.transformed.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -45,20 +45,20 @@  ctx.stroke(); ctx.restore(); ctx.fillRect(65, 15, 20, 20);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 14,25, 0,255,0,255, "14,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 15,25, 0,255,0,255, "15,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 16,25, 0,255,0,255, "16,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 34,25, 0,255,0,255, "34,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 36,25, 0,255,0,255, "36,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 64,25, 0,255,0,255, "64,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 66,25, 0,255,0,255, "66,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 84,25, 0,255,0,255, "84,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 85,25, 0,255,0,255, "85,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 86,25, 0,255,0,255, "86,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 14,25, 0,255,0,255, "14,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 15,25, 0,255,0,255, "15,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 16,25, 0,255,0,255, "16,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 34,25, 0,255,0,255, "34,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 35,25, 0,255,0,255, "35,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 36,25, 0,255,0,255, "36,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 64,25, 0,255,0,255, "64,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 65,25, 0,255,0,255, "65,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 66,25, 0,255,0,255, "66,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 84,25, 0,255,0,255, "84,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 85,25, 0,255,0,255, "85,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 86,25, 0,255,0,255, "86,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and all subsequent references were updated accordingly. There are no changes to the actual functionality or security-related aspects of the code.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.transformed.html] [Lines 17-86]
[Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); and all references to offscreenCanvas]
[Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); and all references changed to canvas]

The changes are purely variable renaming with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-7b.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-7b.xml@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->   <link rel="match" href="reference/this-line-lime-background.xht"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body>   <p title="hello world">This line should have a green background.</p>

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-7b.xml [Lines] 13
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
   Fixed Code: [line removed]

Additional details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to have any security implications
- This seems to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change
- The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality

The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test metadata rather than addressing any security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.basic.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.paint.norepeat.basic.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@         var pattern = ctx.createPattern(bitmap, 'no-repeat');         ctx.fillStyle = pattern;         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-        _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+        _assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 32-35]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The modifications are cosmetic/consistency changes rather than security fixes. No known vulnerabilities are being addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ g.addColorStop(1, '#f00'); ctx.fillStyle = g; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

I've analyzed the provided code diff and here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
The changes in this diff are purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and do not appear to address any security vulnerability. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed.

Additional Details:
- The changes affect the entire file (testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.touch2.worker.js)
- Old code used `offscreenCanvas` variable name
- Fixed code uses `canvas` variable name
- All assertions and canvas operations remain identical in functionality
- No security-related changes were made

This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.composite.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.composite.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.shadowBlur = 1; ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-10, -10, 120, 70);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2); t.done(); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [No Vulnerability Found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.composite.2.html] [Lines 17-27]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No security vulnerabilities are addressed or introduced by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.createRadialGradient(Infinity, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1); }); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.createRadialGradient(-Infinity, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming without any security implications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.gradient.radial.nonfinite.worker.js] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` while maintaining identical functionality. There are no security-related fixes in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/proc-macro2/src/wrapper.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/proc-macro2/src/wrapper.rs@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ } impl TokenStream {-    pub fn new() -> TokenStream {+    pub fn new() -> Self {         if inside_proc_macro() {             TokenStream::Compiler(DeferredTokenStream::new(proc_macro::TokenStream::new()))         } else {@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ } impl Span {-    pub fn call_site() -> Span {+    pub fn call_site() -> Self {         if inside_proc_macro() {             Span::Compiler(proc_macro::Span::call_site())         } else {@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@     }     #[cfg(not(no_hygiene))]-    pub fn mixed_site() -> Span {+    pub fn mixed_site() -> Self {         if inside_proc_macro() {             Span::Compiler(proc_macro::Span::mixed_site())         } else {@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@     }     #[cfg(super_unstable)]-    pub fn def_site() -> Span {+    pub fn def_site() -> Self {         if inside_proc_macro() {             Span::Compiler(proc_macro::Span::def_site())         } else {@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ } impl Group {-    pub fn new(delimiter: Delimiter, stream: TokenStream) -> Group {+    pub fn new(delimiter: Delimiter, stream: TokenStream) -> Self {         match stream {             TokenStream::Compiler(tts) => {                 let delimiter = match delimiter {@@ -685,14 +685,14 @@ } impl Ident {-    pub fn new(string: &str, span: Span) -> Ident {+    pub fn new(string: &str, span: Span) -> Self {         match span {             Span::Compiler(s) => Ident::Compiler(proc_macro::Ident::new(string, s)),             Span::Fallback(s) => Ident::Fallback(fallback::Ident::new(string, s)),         }     }-    pub fn new_raw(string: &str, span: Span) -> Ident {+    pub fn new_raw(string: &str, span: Span) -> Self {         match span {             Span::Compiler(s) => {                 let p: proc_macro::TokenStream = string.parse().unwrap();@@ -804,6 +804,14 @@ } impl Literal {+    pub unsafe fn from_str_unchecked(repr: &str) -> Self {+        if inside_proc_macro() {+            Literal::Compiler(compiler_literal_from_str(repr).expect("invalid literal"))+        } else {+            Literal::Fallback(fallback::Literal::from_str_unchecked(repr))+        }+    }+     suffixed_numbers! {         u8_suffixed => u8,         u16_suffixed => u16,@@ -921,25 +929,7 @@     fn from_str(repr: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {         if inside_proc_macro() {-            #[cfg(not(no_literal_from_str))]-            {-                proc_macro::Literal::from_str(repr)-                    .map(Literal::Compiler)-                    .map_err(LexError::Compiler)-            }-            #[cfg(no_literal_from_str)]-            {-                let tokens = proc_macro_parse(repr)?;-                let mut iter = tokens.into_iter();-                if let (Some(proc_macro::TokenTree::Literal(literal)), None) =-                    (iter.next(), iter.next())-                {-                    if literal.to_string().len() == repr.len() {-                        return Ok(Literal::Compiler(literal));-                    }-                }-                Err(LexError::call_site())-            }+            compiler_literal_from_str(repr).map(Literal::Compiler)         } else {             let literal = fallback::Literal::from_str(repr)?;             Ok(Literal::Fallback(literal))@@ -947,6 +937,24 @@     } }+fn compiler_literal_from_str(repr: &str) -> Result<proc_macro::Literal, LexError> {+    #[cfg(not(no_literal_from_str))]+    {+        proc_macro::Literal::from_str(repr).map_err(LexError::Compiler)+    }+    #[cfg(no_literal_from_str)]+    {+        let tokens = proc_macro_parse(repr)?;+        let mut iter = tokens.into_iter();+        if let (Some(proc_macro::TokenTree::Literal(literal)), None) = (iter.next(), iter.next()) {+            if literal.to_string().len() == repr.len() {+                return Ok(literal);+            }+        }+        Err(LexError::call_site())+    }+}+ impl Display for Literal {     fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {         match self {

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily stylistic improvements and code organization changes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Style improvements [File] [Lines 69, 408, 417, 426, 575, 685, 804]
   [Old Code: pub fn new() -> TokenStream]
   [Fixed Code: pub fn new() -> Self]

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Code reorganization [File] [Lines 804-947]
   [Old Code: Literal parsing logic embedded in from_str implementation]
   [Fixed Code: Literal parsing logic moved to separate compiler_literal_from_str function]

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   New unsafe method added [File] [Lines 804-808]
   [Old Code: (method didn't exist)]
   [Fixed Code: pub unsafe fn from_str_unchecked(repr: &str) -> Self]

The changes are primarily:
1. Using `Self` return type instead of explicit type names for consistency
2. Reorganizing the literal parsing logic into a separate function
3. Adding a new unsafe method for literal creation

None of these changes appear to address security vulnerabilities, but rather improve code quality and add functionality. The unsafe method is properly marked as unsafe, indicating it's the caller's responsibility to ensure safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/safari.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/safari.py@@ -5,24 +5,21 @@ import psutil-from .base import Browser, ExecutorBrowser, require_arg-from .base import NullBrowser  # noqa: F401+from .base import WebDriverBrowser, require_arg from .base import get_timeout_multiplier   # noqa: F401-from ..webdriver_server import SafariDriverServer from ..executors import executor_kwargs as base_executor_kwargs+from ..executors.base import WdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 from ..executors.executorwebdriver import (WebDriverTestharnessExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                            WebDriverRefTestExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                            WebDriverCrashtestExecutor)  # noqa: F401-from ..executors.executorsafari import SafariDriverWdspecExecutor  # noqa: F401 __wptrunner__ = {"product": "safari",                  "check_args": "check_args",-                 "browser": {None: "SafariBrowser",-                             "wdspec": "NullBrowser"},+                 "browser": "SafariBrowser",                  "executor": {"testharness": "WebDriverTestharnessExecutor",                               "reftest": "WebDriverRefTestExecutor",-                              "wdspec": "SafariDriverWdspecExecutor",+                              "wdspec": "WdspecExecutor",                               "crashtest": "WebDriverCrashtestExecutor"},                  "browser_kwargs": "browser_kwargs",                  "executor_kwargs": "executor_kwargs",@@ -143,20 +140,23 @@     return (None, None)-class SafariBrowser(Browser):+class SafariBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):     """Safari is backed by safaridriver, which is supplied through     ``wptrunner.webdriver.SafariDriverServer``.     """--    def __init__(self, logger, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=None, kill_safari=False, **kwargs):+    def __init__(self, logger, binary, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=None,+                 port=None, env=None, kill_safari=False, **kwargs):         """Creates a new representation of Safari.  The `webdriver_binary`         argument gives the WebDriver binary to use for testing. (The browser         binary location cannot be specified, as Safari and SafariDriver are         coupled.) If `kill_safari` is True, then `Browser.stop` will stop Safari."""-        Browser.__init__(self, logger)-        self.server = SafariDriverServer(self.logger,-                                         binary=webdriver_binary,-                                         args=webdriver_args)+        super().__init__(logger,+                         binary,+                         webdriver_binary,+                         webdriver_args=webdriver_args,+                         port=None,+                         env=env)+         if "/" not in webdriver_binary:             wd_path = find_executable(webdriver_binary)         else:@@ -181,11 +181,11 @@         return exe_path-    def start(self, **kwargs):-        self.server.start(block=False)+    def make_command(self):+        return [self.binary, f"--port={self.port}"] + self.webdriver_args     def stop(self, force=False):-        self.server.stop(force=force)+        super().stop(force)         if self.kill_safari:             self.logger.debug("Going to stop Safari")@@ -200,18 +200,3 @@                             proc.kill()                     except psutil.NoSuchProcess:                         pass--    def pid(self):-        return self.server.pid--    def is_alive(self):-        # TODO(ato): This only indicates the driver is alive,-        # and doesn't say anything about whether a browser session-        # is active.-        return self.server.is_alive()--    def cleanup(self):-        self.stop()--    def executor_browser(self):-        return ExecutorBrowser, {"webdriver_url": self.server.url}

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Improper Process Termination] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/safari.py] [Lines 181-200]
[Old Code]
    def stop(self, force=False):
        self.server.stop(force=force)

        if self.kill_safari:
            self.logger.debug("Going to stop Safari")
            for proc in psutil.process_iter():
                try:
                    if proc.name() == "Safari":
                        proc.kill()
                except psutil.NoSuchProcess:
                    pass
[Fixed Code]
    def stop(self, force=False):
        super().stop(force)

        if self.kill_safari:
            self.logger.debug("Going to stop Safari")
            for proc in psutil.process_iter():
                try:
                    if proc.name() == "Safari":
                        proc.kill()
                except psutil.NoSuchProcess:
                    pass

The change moves from a custom stop implementation to using the parent class's stop method, but maintains the same process termination behavior. While not clearly a security vulnerability, improper process termination could potentially lead to resource leaks or orphaned processes.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Inheritance Security] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/safari.py] [Lines 143-156]
[Old Code]
class SafariBrowser(Browser):
    def __init__(self, logger, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=None, kill_safari=False, **kwargs):
        Browser.__init__(self, logger)
        self.server = SafariDriverServer(self.logger,
                                         binary=webdriver_binary,
                                         args=webdriver_args)
[Fixed Code]
class SafariBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):
    def __init__(self, logger, binary, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args=None,
                 port=None, env=None, kill_safari=False, **kwargs):
        super().__init__(logger,
                         binary,
                         webdriver_binary,
                         webdriver_args=webdriver_args,
                         port=None,
                         env=env)

The change involves switching the base class from Browser to WebDriverBrowser and properly initializing it. While this appears to be more of a refactoring, changing inheritance hierarchies could potentially affect security if the new parent class has different security properties.

Note: The diff shows significant architectural changes (removing SafariDriverServer, changing inheritance) but no clear security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be more about code organization and using shared WebDriver functionality rather than fixing specific security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-1-ref.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-1-ref.html@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ <head>   <title>CSS Reference: width: calc() and min-width: calc() on blocks</title>   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { width: 500px }

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-1-ref.html [Lines] 3-6  
   [Old Code]  
   ```html
   <meta name="flags" content="">
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```html
   (line removed)
   ```  
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to be security-related. The change seems to be cleanup rather than a security fix.

No other vulnerabilities or security-related changes were identified in this diff. The modification is minor and doesn't appear to address any known security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/AtomicOperations.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/AtomicOperations.h@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <string.h>+#include "jit/AtomicOperationsGenerated.h" #include "vm/SharedMem.h" namespace js {@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@  *  * It's not a requirement that these functions be inlined; performance  * is not a great concern.  On some platforms these functions may call- * out to code that's generated at run time.+ * functions that use inline assembly.  See GenerateAtomicOperations.py.  *  * In principle these functions will not be written in C++, thus  * making races defined behavior if all racy accesses from C++ go via@@ -149,13 +150,6 @@                                          size_t nbytes);  public:-  // On some platforms we generate code for the atomics at run-time; that-  // happens here.-  static bool Initialize();--  // Deallocate the code segment for generated atomics functions.-  static void ShutDown();-   // Test lock-freedom for any int32 value.  This implements the   // Atomics::isLockFree() operation in the ECMAScript Shared Memory and   // Atomics specification, as follows:@@ -347,45 +341,12 @@ // participate in the memory exclusivity monitors implemented by the simulator. // Such a solution is likely to be difficult.-#if defined(JS_SIMULATOR_MIPS32)-#  if defined(__clang__) || defined(__GNUC__)-#    include "jit/mips-shared/AtomicOperations-mips-shared.h"-#  else-#    error "AtomicOperations on MIPS-32 for unknown compiler"-#  endif-#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_X64) || defined(__i386__) || \-    defined(_M_IX86)-#  if defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86) || defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64)-#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-shared-jit.h"-#  else-#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-feeling-lucky.h"-#  endif-#elif defined(__arm__)-#  if defined(JS_CODEGEN_ARM)-#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-shared-jit.h"-#  else-#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-feeling-lucky.h"-#  endif-#elif defined(__aarch64__) || defined(_M_ARM64)-#  if defined(JS_CODEGEN_ARM64)-#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-shared-jit.h"-#  else-#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-feeling-lucky.h"-#  endif-#elif defined(__mips__)-#  if defined(__clang__) || defined(__GNUC__)-#    include "jit/mips-shared/AtomicOperations-mips-shared.h"-#  else-#    error "AtomicOperations on MIPS for an unknown compiler"-#  endif-#elif defined(__ppc__) || defined(__PPC__) || defined(__sparc__) ||     \-    defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__PPC64__) || defined(__ppc64le__) || \-    defined(__PPC64LE__) || defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__) ||  \-    defined(__sh__) || defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) ||       \-    defined(__m68k__) || defined(__riscv) || defined(__wasi__)+#ifdef JS_HAVE_GENERATED_ATOMIC_OPS+#  include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-shared-jit.h"+#elif defined(JS_SIMULATOR_MIPS32) || defined(__mips__)+#  include "jit/mips-shared/AtomicOperations-mips-shared.h"+#else #  include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-feeling-lucky.h"-#else-#  error "No AtomicOperations support provided for this platform" #endif #endif  // jit_AtomicOperations_h

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Platform-Specific Atomic Operations Issue [js/src/jit/AtomicOperations.h] [Lines 347-374]
[Old Code]
#if defined(JS_SIMULATOR_MIPS32)
#  if defined(__clang__) || defined(__GNUC__)
#    include "jit/mips-shared/AtomicOperations-mips-shared.h"
#  else
#    error "AtomicOperations on MIPS-32 for unknown compiler"
#  endif
#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_X64) || defined(__i386__) || \
    defined(_M_IX86)
#  if defined(JS_CODEGEN_X86) || defined(JS_CODEGEN_X64)
#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-shared-jit.h"
#  else
#    include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-feeling-lucky.h"
#  endif
[... many more platform-specific conditions ...]
#else
#  error "No AtomicOperations support provided for this platform"
#endif
[Fixed Code]
#ifdef JS_HAVE_GENERATED_ATOMIC_OPS
#  include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-shared-jit.h"
#elif defined(JS_SIMULATOR_MIPS32) || defined(__mips__)
#  include "jit/mips-shared/AtomicOperations-mips-shared.h"
#else
#  include "jit/shared/AtomicOperations-feeling-lucky.h"
#endif

Additional Details:
- The change simplifies the platform-specific atomic operations handling
- The old code had many platform-specific branches which could lead to inconsistencies
- The new code uses a more unified approach with JS_HAVE_GENERATED_ATOMIC_OPS
- While not clearly a security fix, this could potentially address subtle atomic operation issues across platforms

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Initialization Race Condition [js/src/jit/AtomicOperations.h] [Lines 149-154]
[Old Code]
 public:
  // On some platforms we generate code for the atomics at run-time; that
  // happens here.
  static bool Initialize();

  // Deallocate the code segment for generated atomics functions.
  static void ShutDown();
[Fixed Code]
[Removed these functions]

Additional Details:
- The removal of Initialize() and ShutDown() functions suggests a change in atomic operations initialization
- This could potentially address race conditions during initialization
- The comment about run-time code generation was also updated to mention inline assembly instead
- The change might be related to making atomic operations more reliable during startup

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/vendor_manifest.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/vendor_manifest.py@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import shutil import logging import tarfile+import tempfile import requests import mozfile@@ -24,10 +25,23 @@ ) DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_FILES = [".git*"]+DEFAULT_KEEP_FILES = ["moz.build", "moz.yaml"]+DEFAULT_INCLUDE_FILES = [] class VendorManifest(MozbuildObject):-    def vendor(self, yaml_file, manifest, revision, check_for_update, add_to_exports):+    def should_perform_step(self, step):+        return step not in self.manifest["vendoring"].get("skip-vendoring-steps", [])++    def vendor(+        self,+        yaml_file,+        manifest,+        revision,+        check_for_update,+        add_to_exports,+        patch_mode,+    ):         self.manifest = manifest         if "vendor-directory" not in self.manifest["vendoring"]:             self.manifest["vendoring"]["vendor-directory"] = os.path.dirname(yaml_file)@@ -65,35 +79,41 @@             print("%s %s" % (ref, timestamp))             return-        def perform_step(step):-            return step not in self.manifest["vendoring"].get(-                "skip-vendoring-steps", []-            )--        if perform_step("fetch"):+        if "patches" in self.manifest["vendoring"]:+            if patch_mode == "only":+                self.import_local_patches(+                    self.manifest["vendoring"]["patches"],+                    self.manifest["vendoring"]["vendor-directory"],+                )+                return+            else:+                self.log(+                    logging.INFO,+                    "vendor",+                    {},+                    "Patches present in manifest please run "+                    "'./mach vendor --patch-mode only' after commits from upstream "+                    "have been vendored.",+                )++        if self.should_perform_step("fetch"):             self.fetch_and_unpack(ref)         else:             self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Skipping fetching upstream source.")-        if perform_step("exclude"):-            self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Removing unnecessary files.")-            self.clean_upstream()-        else:-            self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Skipping removing excluded files.")--        if perform_step("update-moz-yaml"):+        if self.should_perform_step("update-moz-yaml"):             self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Updating moz.yaml.")             self.update_yaml(yaml_file, ref, timestamp)         else:             self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Skipping updating the moz.yaml file.")-        if perform_step("update-actions"):+        if self.should_perform_step("update-actions"):             self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Updating files")             self.update_files(ref, yaml_file)         else:             self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Skipping running the update actions.")-        if perform_step("hg-add"):+        if self.should_perform_step("hg-add"):             self.log(                 logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Registering changes with version control."             )@@ -109,7 +129,7 @@                 "Skipping registering changes with version control.",             )-        if perform_step("update-moz-build"):+        if self.should_perform_step("update-moz-build"):             self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Updating moz.build files")             self.update_moz_build(                 self.manifest["vendoring"]["vendor-directory"],@@ -147,6 +167,27 @@             raise Exception(                 "Unknown source host: " + self.manifest["vendoring"]["source-hosting"]             )++    def convert_patterns_to_paths(self, directory, patterns):+        # glob.iglob uses shell-style wildcards for path name completion.+        # "recursive=True" enables the double asterisk "**" wildcard which matches+        # for nested directories as well as the directory we're searching in.+        paths = []+        for pattern in patterns:+            pattern_full_path = mozpath.join(directory, pattern)+            # If pattern is a directory recursively add contents of directory+            if os.path.isdir(pattern_full_path):+                # Append double asterisk to the end to make glob.iglob recursively match+                # contents of directory+                paths.extend(+                    glob.iglob(mozpath.join(pattern_full_path, "**"), recursive=True)+                )+            # Otherwise pattern is a file or wildcard expression so add it without altering it+            else:+                paths.extend(glob.iglob(pattern_full_path, recursive=True))+        # Remove folder names from list of paths in order to avoid prematurely+        # truncating directories elsewhere+        return [path for path in paths if not os.path.isdir(path)]     def fetch_and_unpack(self, revision):         """Fetch and unpack upstream source"""@@ -158,66 +199,127 @@             "Fetching code archive from {revision_url}",         )-        prefix = self.manifest["origin"]["name"] + "-" + revision         with mozfile.NamedTemporaryFile() as tmptarfile:-            req = requests.get(url, stream=True)-            for data in req.iter_content(4096):-                tmptarfile.write(data)-            tmptarfile.seek(0)--            tar = tarfile.open(tmptarfile.name)--            if any(-                [-                    name-                    for name in tar.getnames()-                    if name.startswith("/") or ".." in name-                ]-            ):-                raise Exception(-                    "Tar archive contains non-local paths," "e.g. '%s'" % bad_paths[0]-                )--            vendor_dir = self.manifest["vendoring"]["vendor-directory"]-            self.log(logging.INFO, "rm_vendor_dir", {}, "rm -rf %s" % vendor_dir)-            mozfile.remove(vendor_dir)--            self.log(-                logging.INFO,-                "vendor",-                {"vendor_dir": vendor_dir},-                "Unpacking upstream files from {vendor_dir}.",-            )-            tar.extractall(vendor_dir)--            has_prefix = all(map(lambda name: name.startswith(prefix), tar.getnames()))-            tar.close()--            # GitLab puts everything properly down a directory; move it up.-            if has_prefix:-                tardir = mozpath.join(vendor_dir, prefix)-                mozfile.copy_contents(tardir, vendor_dir)-                mozfile.remove(tardir)--    def clean_upstream(self):-        """Remove files we don't want to import."""-        to_exclude = []-        vendor_dir = self.manifest["vendoring"]["vendor-directory"]-        for pattern in (-            self.manifest["vendoring"].get("exclude", []) + DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_FILES-        ):-            if "*" in pattern:-                to_exclude.extend(glob.iglob(mozpath.join(vendor_dir, pattern)))-            else:-                to_exclude.append(mozpath.join(vendor_dir, pattern))-        self.log(-            logging.INFO,-            "vendor",-            {"files": to_exclude},-            "Removing: " + str(to_exclude),-        )-        for f in to_exclude:-            mozfile.remove(f)+            with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpextractdir:+                req = requests.get(url, stream=True)+                for data in req.iter_content(4096):+                    tmptarfile.write(data)+                tmptarfile.seek(0)++                tar = tarfile.open(tmptarfile.name)++                for name in tar.getnames():+                    if name.startswith("/") or ".." in name:+                        raise Exception(+                            "Tar archive contains non-local paths, e.g. '%s'" % name+                        )++                vendor_dir = self.manifest["vendoring"]["vendor-directory"]+                if self.should_perform_step("keep"):+                    self.log(+                        logging.INFO,+                        "vendor",+                        {},+                        "Retaining wanted in-tree files.",+                    )+                    to_keep = self.convert_patterns_to_paths(+                        vendor_dir,+                        self.manifest["vendoring"].get("keep", [])+                        + DEFAULT_KEEP_FILES+                        + self.manifest["vendoring"].get("patches", []),+                    )+                else:+                    self.log(+                        logging.INFO,+                        "vendor",+                        {},+                        "Skipping retention of included files.",+                    )+                    to_keep = []++                self.log(+                    logging.INFO,+                    "vendor",+                    {"vendor_dir": vendor_dir},+                    "Cleaning {vendor_dir} to import changes.",+                )+                # We use double asterisk wildcard here to get complete list of recursive contents+                for file in self.convert_patterns_to_paths(vendor_dir, "**"):+                    if file not in to_keep:+                        mozfile.remove(file)++                self.log(+                    logging.INFO,+                    "vendor",+                    {"vendor_dir": vendor_dir},+                    "Unpacking upstream files for {vendor_dir}.",+                )+                tar.extractall(tmpextractdir)++                prefix = self.manifest["origin"]["name"] + "-" + revision+                has_prefix = all(+                    map(lambda name: name.startswith(prefix), tar.getnames())+                )+                tar.close()++                # GitLab puts everything down a directory; move it up.+                if has_prefix:+                    tardir = mozpath.join(tmpextractdir, prefix)+                    mozfile.copy_contents(tardir, tmpextractdir)+                    mozfile.remove(tardir)++                if self.should_perform_step("include"):+                    self.log(+                        logging.INFO,+                        "vendor",+                        {},+                        "Retaining wanted files from upstream changes.",+                    )+                    to_include = self.convert_patterns_to_paths(+                        tmpextractdir,+                        self.manifest["vendoring"].get("include", [])+                        + DEFAULT_INCLUDE_FILES,+                    )+                else:+                    self.log(+                        logging.INFO,+                        "vendor",+                        {},+                        "Skipping retention of included files.",+                    )+                    to_include = []++                if self.should_perform_step("exclude"):+                    self.log(+                        logging.INFO,+                        "vendor",+                        {},+                        "Removing unwanted files from upstream changes.",+                    )+                    to_exclude = self.convert_patterns_to_paths(+                        tmpextractdir,+                        self.manifest["vendoring"].get("exclude", [])+                        + DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_FILES,+                    )+                else:+                    self.log(+                        logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Skipping removing excluded files."+                    )+                    to_exclude = []++                to_exclude = list(set(to_exclude) - set(to_include))++                if to_exclude:+                    self.log(+                        logging.INFO,+                        "vendor",+                        {"files": to_exclude},+                        "Removing: " + str(to_exclude),+                    )+                    for exclusion in to_exclude:+                        mozfile.remove(exclusion)++                mozfile.copy_contents(tmpextractdir, vendor_dir)     def update_yaml(self, yaml_file, revision, timestamp):         with open(yaml_file) as f:@@ -440,3 +542,20 @@             )             # Exit with -1 to distinguish this from the Exception case of exiting with 1             sys.exit(-1)++    def import_local_patches(self, patches, vendor_dir):+        self.log(logging.INFO, "vendor", {}, "Importing local patches.")+        for patch in self.convert_patterns_to_paths(vendor_dir, patches):+            script = [+                "patch",+                "-p1",+                "--directory",+                vendor_dir,+                "--input",+                os.path.abspath(patch),+                "--no-backup-if-mismatch",+            ]+            self.run_process(+                args=script,+                log_name=script,+            )

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Directory Traversal Vulnerability [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/vendor_manifest.py] [Lines 158-166]
[Old Code]
No specific check for directory traversal in tar file names
[Fixed Code]
Added explicit check for paths starting with "/" or containing ".." in tar.getnames()

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Temporary File Handling [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/vendor_manifest.py] [Lines 191-193]
[Old Code]
Using only NamedTemporaryFile without secure directory for extraction
[Fixed Code]
Added tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() for secure extraction directory

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/vendor_manifest.py] [Lines 199-201]
[Old Code]
No explicit cleanup of temporary files shown in old code
[Fixed Code]
Uses context managers (with statements) for both temporary file and directory

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Insecure File Operations [python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor/vendor_manifest.py] [Lines 243-246]
[Old Code]
Direct file operations without proper path validation
[Fixed Code]
Added convert_patterns_to_paths() helper function with more controlled path handling

The most clear security fixes are:
1. The addition of directory traversal checks in the tar file handling
2. The improved temporary file handling using secure directories

The other changes may have security implications but are less clearly security-focused fixes. The new code generally shows better security practices through:
- More careful path handling
- Better resource cleanup
- More controlled file operations
- Additional validation steps

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/context.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/context.rs@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@     pub fn expr_scalar_components(         &mut self,-        parser: &mut Parser,+        parser: &Parser,         expr: Handle<Expression>,         meta: Span,     ) -> Result<Option<(ScalarKind, crate::Bytes)>> {@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@     pub fn expr_power(         &mut self,-        parser: &mut Parser,+        parser: &Parser,         expr: Handle<Expression>,         meta: Span,     ) -> Result<Option<u32>> {@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@     pub fn implicit_conversion(         &mut self,-        parser: &mut Parser,+        parser: &Parser,         expr: &mut Handle<Expression>,         meta: Span,         kind: ScalarKind,@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@     pub fn binary_implicit_conversion(         &mut self,-        parser: &mut Parser,+        parser: &Parser,         left: &mut Handle<Expression>,         left_meta: Span,         right: &mut Handle<Expression>,@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@     pub fn implicit_splat(         &mut self,-        parser: &mut Parser,+        parser: &Parser,         expr: &mut Handle<Expression>,         meta: Span,         vector_size: Option<VectorSize>,

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Mutability Issue] [third_party/rust/naga/src/front/glsl/context.rs] [Lines 881, 891, 921, 941, 974]
   Old Code: `parser: &mut Parser`
   Fixed Code: `parser: &Parser`

Additional Details:
- The changes involve removing mutability from Parser references in multiple methods
- While this doesn't appear to be fixing a known named vulnerability, it could be addressing potential thread safety or data race issues by reducing unnecessary mutability
- The change suggests the parser state wasn't actually being modified in these methods, so removing mutability prevents accidental modifications
- Without more context about the Parser implementation, I can't be certain if this was fixing a security issue or just improving code safety

This appears to be a defensive programming change rather than fixing a specific known vulnerability, but it does improve the code's safety by restricting mutability where it's not needed.

Note: There are no other distinct vulnerabilities apparent in this diff. All changes follow the same pattern of removing unnecessary mutability from Parser references.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/instance.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/instance.rs@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@             mem::transmute(static_fn.get_instance_proc_addr(instance, name.as_ptr()))         };-        Instance {+        Self {             handle: instance,             instance_fn_1_0: vk::InstanceFnV1_0::load(load_fn),@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@         &self.instance_fn_1_1     }+    /// Retrieve the number of elements to pass to [`Self::enumerate_physical_device_groups()`]     pub unsafe fn enumerate_physical_device_groups_len(&self) -> VkResult<usize> {         let mut group_count = 0;         self.instance_fn_1_1@@ -59,16 +60,17 @@     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkEnumeratePhysicalDeviceGroups.html>"]-    pub fn enumerate_physical_device_groups(+    ///+    /// Call [`Self::enumerate_physical_device_groups_len()`] to query the number of elements to pass to `out`.+    /// Be sure to [`Default::default()`]-initialize these elements and optionally set their `p_next` pointer.+    pub unsafe fn enumerate_physical_device_groups(         &self,         out: &mut [vk::PhysicalDeviceGroupProperties],     ) -> VkResult<()> {-        unsafe {-            let mut group_count = out.len() as u32;-            self.instance_fn_1_1-                .enumerate_physical_device_groups(self.handle(), &mut group_count, out.as_mut_ptr())-                .into()-        }+        let mut group_count = out.len() as u32;+        self.instance_fn_1_1+            .enumerate_physical_device_groups(self.handle(), &mut group_count, out.as_mut_ptr())+            .result()     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceFeatures2.html>"]@@ -115,9 +117,10 @@                 format_info,                 image_format_prop,             )-            .into()-    }-+            .result()+    }++    /// Retrieve the number of elements to pass to [`Self::get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2()`]     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_len(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,@@ -133,17 +136,20 @@     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceQueueFamilyProperties2.html>"]+    ///+    /// Call [`Self::get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_len()`] to query the number of elements to pass to `out`.+    /// Be sure to [`Default::default()`]-initialize these elements and optionally set their `p_next` pointer.     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,-        queue_family_props: &mut [vk::QueueFamilyProperties2],-    ) {-        let mut queue_count = queue_family_props.len() as u32;+        out: &mut [vk::QueueFamilyProperties2],+    ) {+        let mut queue_count = out.len() as u32;         self.instance_fn_1_1             .get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2(                 physical_device,                 &mut queue_count,-                queue_family_props.as_mut_ptr(),+                out.as_mut_ptr(),             );     }@@ -157,6 +163,7 @@             .get_physical_device_memory_properties2(physical_device, out);     }+    /// Retrieve the number of elements to pass to [`Self::get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2()`]     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2_len(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,@@ -174,6 +181,9 @@     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceSparseImageFormatProperties2.html>"]+    ///+    /// Call [`Self::get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2_len()`] to query the number of elements to pass to `out`.+    /// Be sure to [`Default::default()`]-initialize these elements and optionally set their `p_next` pointer.     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Unsafe Usage] [third_party/rust/ash/src/instance.rs] [Lines 22]
   [Old Code] Instance {
   [Fixed Code] Self {
   Additional Details: The change from `Instance` to `Self` appears to be a stylistic/consistency improvement rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Missing Safety Documentation] [third_party/rust/ash/src/instance.rs] [Lines 51-71]
   [Old Code] pub fn enumerate_physical_device_groups(...)
   [Fixed Code] pub unsafe fn enumerate_physical_device_groups(...)
   Additional Details: The function was marked as unsafe and proper safety documentation was added, including instructions to call `enumerate_physical_device_groups_len()` first and initialize elements properly.

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   [Unsafe Function Without Documentation] [third_party/rust/rust/ash/src/instance.rs] [Lines 136-151]
   [Old Code] pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2(...)
   [Fixed Code] (same function signature but with added documentation)
   Additional Details: Safety documentation was added, explaining the need to call `get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_len()` first and properly initialize elements.

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Buffer Overflow Risk] [third_party/rust/ash/src/instance.rs] [Various lines]
   [Old Code] Various functions without length-checking documentation
   [Fixed Code] Functions now have documentation about querying length first
   Additional Details: The added documentation about querying lengths before calling functions suggests potential buffer overflow risks that are now being mitigated through proper usage patterns.

The main security improvements appear to be:
1. Proper marking of unsafe functions
2. Addition of safety documentation
3. Clear instructions for proper buffer size determination before operations
4. Better guidance on initialization requirements

These changes help prevent potential memory safety issues and buffer overflows by ensuring callers properly query and prepare buffers before Vulkan API calls.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.order.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.order.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.rotate(Math.PI / 2); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, -50, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming for better code clarity. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.order.html] [Lines 17-26]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' throughout the file, which doesn't appear to address any security issues but rather improves code readability. No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-anchor-top-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-round-display/polar-anchor-top-001.html@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ 		<title>CSS Test: Anchor of the element</title> 		<link rel="author" title="Jihye Hong" href="mailto:[email protected]" /> 		<link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/motion-1/#polar-anchor-property">-		<meta name="flags" content=""> 		<meta name="assert" content="Test checks that the representative point of the element specified with 'polar-anchor'."> 		<style type="text/css"> 		    .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The diff shows a minor modification to a CSS test file where a meta tag's content attribute was removed. This appears to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix.

Answer:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this diff. This appears to be a test file cleanup.
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code]
    (line removed)

Additional Notes:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag that was likely used for test configuration flags
- No security implications are apparent in this modification
- The file is a test case for CSS polar-anchor functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/warp/src/filters/path.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/warp/src/filters/path.rs@@ -465,8 +465,8 @@     route         .uri()         .path_and_query()-        .expect("server URIs should always have path_and_query")-        .clone()+        .cloned()+        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathAndQuery::from_static("")) } /// Convenient way to chain multiple path filters together.

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Null Pointer Dereference [third_party/rust/warp/src/filters/path.rs] [Lines 465-468]
[Old Code]
route
    .uri()
    .path_and_query()
    .expect("server URIs should always have path_and_query")
    .clone()
[Fixed Code]
route
    .uri()
    .path_and_query()
    .cloned()
    .unwrap_or_else(|| PathAndQuery::from_static(""))

Additional Details:
- The change replaces an unconditional `expect()` with a more defensive approach using `unwrap_or_else()`
- While not a confirmed vulnerability, the old code could potentially panic if path_and_query() returned None, which might be exploitable in some contexts
- The fix provides a default empty path instead of panicking, making the code more robust
- This appears to be a defensive programming improvement rather than fixing a known vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.1.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.1.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ ctx.moveTo(25, 125); ctx.arc(25, 125, 24, 0, 2*Math.PI, false); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,0, 0,255,0,255, "50,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,25, 0,255,0,255, "0,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,25, 0,255,0,255, "99,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,49, 0,255,0,255, "50,49", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding assertions to use the new variable name. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.1.worker.js
    Lines: 13-34
    Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.scale.1.worker.js
    Lines: 34-43
    Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)
    Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, ...)

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't affect security in any way. The functionality remains identical, just with a renamed variable for better clarity or consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowOffset.invalid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.attributes.shadowOffset.invalid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.shadowOffsetX = 1; ctx.shadowOffsetY = 2;

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be purely a variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes were made in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jsapi-tests/testGCHeapBarriers.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jsapi-tests/testGCHeapBarriers.cpp@@ -500,7 +500,8 @@   JS_SetGCZeal(cx, mode, 0);   JS::PrepareZoneForGC(cx, js::GetContextZone(cx));-  JS::StartIncrementalGC(cx, JS::GCOptions(), JS::GCReason::DEBUG_GC, BudgetMS);+  js::SliceBudget budget{TimeBudget(BudgetMS)};+  JS::StartIncrementalGC(cx, JS::GCOptions(), JS::GCReason::DEBUG_GC, budget);   CHECK(JS::IsIncrementalGCInProgress(cx));   CHECK(f());

Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    Potential Memory Management Issue [js/src/jsapi-tests/testGCHeapBarriers.cpp] [Lines 500-503]
    [Old Code]
    JS::StartIncrementalGC(cx, JS::GCOptions(), JS::GCReason::DEBUG_GC, BudgetMS);
    [Fixed Code]
    js::SliceBudget budget{TimeBudget(BudgetMS)};
    JS::StartIncrementalGC(cx, JS::GCOptions(), JS::GCReason::DEBUG_GC, budget);

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be related to garbage collection (GC) configuration, where the BudgetMS parameter is now properly wrapped in a js::SliceBudget object with TimeBudget.
- While this doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability, improper GC budgeting could potentially lead to memory management issues or performance problems that might be exploited.
- Without more context about the BudgetMS parameter's usage and potential impacts, we can't definitively say this is a security fix, but it's a notable change in memory management behavior.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompointinit.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.dompointinit.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@ ctx.fill(); // top-right corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 79,1, 255,0,0,255, "79,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 58,1, 0,255,0,255, "58,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,10, 255,0,0,255, "98,10", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,21, 0,255,0,255, "98,21", "0,255,0,255"); // bottom-left corner-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 20,48, 255,0,0,255, "20,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 41,48, 0,255,0,255, "41,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,39, 255,0,0,255, "1,39", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,28, 0,255,0,255, "1,28", "0,255,0,255"); // other corners-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. Here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-48]
[Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...)
[Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); _assertPixel(canvas, ...)

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality, input validation, or data handling. It's simply a variable name change throughout the test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.